

**Appendix For:  
Stable Views in a Time of Tumult:  
Assessing Trends in American Public  
Opinion, 2007-2020**

December 22, 2021

## Details on Panel

Wave	Start Date	End Date	N
Wave 1	October 2nd, 2007	December 31st, 2007	19,190
Wave 2	January 1st, 2008	March 31st, 2008	17,747
Wave 3	April 2nd, 2008	August 28th, 2008	20,052
Wave 4	August 29th, 2008	November 4th, 2008	19,241
Wave 5	November 5th, 2008	January 20th, 2009	19,234
Wave 6	October 19th, 2012	October 29th, 2012	2,606
Wave 7	November 14th, 2012	January 29th, 2013	2,471
Wave 8	October 17th, 2014	October 31st, 2014	1,693
Wave 9	November 19th, 2014	January 14th, 2015	1,493
Wave 10	January 22nd, 2016	February 8th, 2016	1,562
Wave 11	October 14th, 2016	October 24th, 2016	1,227
Wave 12	November 28th, 2016	December 7th, 2016	1,075
Wave 13*	October 23rd, 2018	November 5th, 2018	1,024
Wave 14**	January 24th, 2020	January 31st, 2020	1,107
Wave 15**	October 7th, 2020	October 22nd, 2020	1,131

Table A1: This table summarizes the panel waves and sample sizes. \*Denotes wave over-sampled low-income respondents to wave 7. \*\*Sample was wave 7 respondents.

## Survey Administration and Response Rates


Table A1 provides the dates, wave numbers, and sample sizes for all waves. Waves 6 and 7 straddled the November 2012 election, with two waves in late 2014 (8-9), three waves in 2016 (10-12; January, October, and November/December 2016), one wave in 2018 (13; October/November 2018), and two waves in 2020 (15; January and October).

For the 2008 NAES, the cumulative response rates for the three 2008 panel waves we draw upon (3, 4, and 5) are 8.6 percent, 8.6 percent, and 8.1 percent. These were computed using the household recruitment rate (21.0 percent, 21.2 percent, and 21.0 percent), the household enrollment rate (55.1 percent, 55.5 percent, and 55.7 percent), and the study completion rate (74.3 percent, 73.1 percent, and 69.1 percent). For the October 2012 wave, whose respondents were sampled from the 2007–2008 respondents, the cooperation rate was 72.0 percent (of whom 95 percent also participated in the post-election wave conducted November 2012–January 2013). The January/February 2016 wave had 1,562 respondents sampled from the 2012 October wave, making the cooperation rate 63 percent. The October 2016 wave had 1,227 respondents, all sampled from the prior wave, making the cooperation rate relative to the 2012 baseline 49.7 percent. The November/December 2016 wave had 1,075 respondents, again sampled from the prior wave, making the cooperation rate relative to the 2012 baseline 43.5 percent. The October/November 2018 wave was sampled from respondents to the 2012 pre-election wave, 1,024 of whom completed the survey, making the cooperation rate relative to the 2012 baseline 41.4 percent. The January 2020 wave sampled from the pre-election


2012 wave and included 1,107 complete interviews (44.9 percent cooperation rate). Similarly, the October 2020 wave included 1,131 respondents sampled from the pre-election 2012 wave, for a 45.8 percent cooperation rate. 1,327 panelists were invited by Ipsos to take the 2020 survey, making the completion rate 85.2 percent.

## Additional Question Wordings


- “Please rate [Barack Obama/Mitt Romney/Donald Trump/Hillary Clinton/Joe Biden] on a thermometer that runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable and warm toward him, and rating below 50 means that you feel unfavorable and cool.”
- “Next are some questions about various groups in our society. Below are left-right scales on which you can rate characteristics of people in different groups. For the first item below, the far left side of the scale means that you think most of the people in that group are “hard working.” Placing the slider on the far right side means that you think most of the people in that group are “lazy.” The middle means that you think the people in this group are not particularly towards one end or the other. Where would you rate [whites/blacks] in general on these scales?”
  - Hardworking — Lazy
  - Trustworthy — Untrustworthy
- “Using this scale that ranges from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, where would you place each of these candidates on this scale? Just click the box at the bottom if you don’t know enough about the person to rate him or her.”
  - Joe Biden
  - Donald Trump



(a) Clinton




(b) Romney




(c) Obama

Figure A1: This figures illustrate the distribution of feeling thermometer assessments for Hillary Clinton in 2008 and 2016 (top), Mitt Romney in 2008 and 2012 (middle), and Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 (bottom).



(a) Vote by Partisanship

Figure A2: This figure illustrates the distribution of 2012 and 2020 voting by four-year-lagged political partisanship.



(a) Stability of 2012-2016-2020 Vote Choice

Figure A3: Barplot indicating percentages of 795 respondents whose vote choices fall into various categories based on presidential support measured in October of 2012, 2016, and 2020.

### Vote Preference: 2012-2020

The manuscript focuses on affect toward Donald Trump and other presidential candidates, measured via feeling thermometers. However, a closely related question is about the stability of vote choice. Accordingly, we also analyzed 795 respondents who answered questions about their intended vote choice in the pre-election waves in October of 2012, 2016, and 2020. Our respondents evince a very high degree of stability. 68% provided the same answer in all three surveys—36% consistently backed the Democrat, 29% consistently backed the Republican, and 2% were always undecided. Another 7% were two-time GOP supporters who were once undecided, while the comparable number for Democrats was 8%. In all, a striking 88% of our respondents never crossed party lines in this period, as illustrated in Figure A3.

## Validated Turnout Shifts, 2012-2018

This letter has documented the general stability of several attitudes and preferences in the years preceding the 2020 U.S. presidential election. This, in turn, raises a separate but important question: what explains the shifts in presidential election outcomes over this period? Other research has considered that question in considerable depth (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck, 2019), including the relative roles of turnout and vote-switching in contributing to the outcome (Hill, Hopkins and Huber, 2021). Here, we use validated voter turnout data for our panelists to chart shifts in turnout across elections between 2012 and 2018. We do so in part to determine whether this sample can sustain more fine-grained analyses of the causes of the relatively small shifts in voter behavior that have produced quite different outcomes in recent elections.

Specifically, we merged the respondents with administrative voter history records via the data vendor Catalist, allowing us to identify which of our respondents voted in 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. To be sure, this is a panel survey, and so it is not a random sample of the electorate in a given election. It will not capture respondents who were younger than 18 at its inception, and it is likely to over-represent people who have not moved during this period. As Figure A4 illustrates, validated turnout for Democrats, Republicans, and all respondents in this sample is quite high—the *lowest* observed turnout among these groups is the 60% turnout rate among Democrats in 2014’s midterm elections. Overall, 61.4% of the sample were validated voters in 2014, while for 2016 and 2018 the estimates are 72.5% and 75.6%, respectively. According to the U.S. Elections Project, actual voter turnout in those three elections was 36.7%, 60.1%, and 50.0%, meaning that this sample has both higher turnout overall and less variable turnout than the U.S. electorate as a whole.

Given that both U.S. parties have been highly competitive in recent federal elections (Trende, 2012; Lee, 2016), vote swings of less than 1 percentage point in key states have swung the Electoral College. This panel’s over-representation of consistent voters—as well as its omission of those under 18 in 2008—means that it isn’t well positioned to study the narrow shifts that have tipped recent presidential elections to the Republicans or Democrats. Other empirical strategies are likely necessary in studying the extent to which election-to-election changes were the product of changes in turnout versus persuasion, or to identify which specific sub-groups of voters drove particular changes (see instead Hill, Hopkins and Huber, 2021).




Figure A4: This figure illustrates the share of self-identified 2012 Republicans and Democrats in the ISCAP panel who cast a validated vote in the 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 elections.



## Codebook for Open-Ended Responses


- NORESPONSE – 1 if there is no response by this respondent to this item, 0 otherwise.
- POLDISAFFECTION – 1 if the respondent makes any reference to disliking politics or distrusting politicians/parties/candidates generally, 0 otherwise.
- CORRUPTION – 1 if the respondent makes reference to a person being corrupt or likely to engage in corruption/criminal activity, 0 otherwise.
- GENDER – 1 if the respondent makes reference to the person’s gender, being a feminist, gender-related stereotypes, etc., 0 otherwise.
- CHANGE – 1 if the respondent makes reference to needing a change, new direction, etc. 0 otherwise.
- TRAITS – 1 if the respondent makes reference to a candidate’s personality traits or character, 0 otherwise (e.g. “he’s a Christian,” “she’s the right temperament”, “he is a bully”).
- DEMOGRAPHICS – 1 if the respondent makes reference to a candidate’s demographic background (e.g. “it’s time for a woman”), 0 otherwise.
- BACKGROUND – 1 if the respondent references a candidate’s prior experience, 0 otherwise.
- IDEOLOGY – 1 if respondent makes an explicit mention of the party’s ideology (e.g. “conservative,” “liberal”, etc.), 0 otherwise.
- POLICY – 1 if the respondent makes an explicit reference to a specific policy (e.g. “for immigration”) or to issues generally (“we agree on the issues”), 0 otherwise.
- WHICHISSUE – If policy = 1, please write in the issue or issues referenced. Separate multiple issues with a comma.
- SCOTUS, set to 1 if the respondent mentions the Supreme Court and 0 otherwise. Mentions of the Supreme Court also count as POLICY=1.
- OTHERPERSON – 1 if the respondent mentions another person beside the candidate in question, 0 otherwise.
- OTHERPERSONNEG – 1 if the other person is mentioned in a negative light, 0 otherwise.
- OTHERPERSON-WHICH – write in which other person was mentioned (Obama, etc.)
- DISOPPONENT–1 if the response in any states or implies that the voter disliked the person’s opponent more.

- ETHGROUPS – code as 1 if the response makes a mention of an ethnic/racial group (e.g. minorities, Hispanics, Mexicans, Chinese people, etc.), 0 otherwise. Please include any mention of “Americans” in the “ETHGROUPS”.
- WHICHETHGROUP – write in the first ethnic/racial group mentioned (e.g. “Blacks”, “white people”).
- ETHGROUPSNEG – Code as 1 for any mention of an ethnic/racial group which is \*negatively\* associated with the party in question. For example, if someone says a party is “anti-Hispanic”, this would be coded as a 1. 0 otherwise.
- AGEGROUPS – code as 1 if the response makes mention of an age-based group (older people, Millennials, Generation Z, septugenarians, etc.), 0 otherwise.
- WHICHAGEGROUP – write in the first age-based group mentioned if AGEGROUPS=1.
- SOCGROUPS – code as 1 if the response makes mention of a socioeconomic group (e.g. the poor, the wealthy, the middle class), 0 otherwise.
- WHICHSOCGROUP – write in the first socio-economic group mentioned (e.g. “poor”, “middle class”, “educated”).
- SOCGROUPSNEG – Code as 1 for any mention of an ethnic/racial group which is \*negatively\* associated with the party in question. For example, if someone says a party is “anti-poor”, this would be coded as a 1. 0 otherwise.
- GENSEXGROUPS – Code as 1 if there is any mention of a group defined by gender, gender identity, and/or sexual orientation. 0 otherwise.
- WHICHGENSEXGROUP – write in group defined by gender/sexual orientation/gender identity mentioned (e.g. “men”, “transgendered people”).
- GENSEXGROUPSNEG – Code as 1 if there is any mention of a group defined by gender, gender identity, and/or sexual orientation which is negatively associated with the party in question. For example, if someone says the party is “anti-woman,” this would be coded as a 1. 0 otherwise.
- PERFORMANCE—0/1, 1 indicates any reference to the candidate’s or party’s performance or conditions while he/she was in any public office; 0 otherwise.
- CAMPAIGNSLOGAN—1 if the respondent uses what seems like some version of either candidates’ messaging/slogans, 0 otherwise. Before doing this, I’d also like you to please review the core campaign slogans from both sides briefly. If someone has the gist of the slogan, err on the side of coding it as a campaign slogan.
- WHICHSLOGAN—text category, complete if CAMPAIGNSLOGAN=1, briefly summarize which campaign slogan, being succinct and consistent across entries.
- COMMUNISM—1 if the respondent uses any negative references to communism or socialism, 0 otherwise. These also count as IDEOLOGY=1.


	Traits	Experience	Policies	Perform	Opposition	Slogans	Ideology	Disaffection
Trump	0.32	0.11	0.30	0.29	0.12	0.14	0.07	0.06
Biden	0.43	0.04	0.14	0.03	0.35	0.04	0.03	0.06

Table A2: This table reports the fraction of all 2020 open-ended responses coded into each of these categories by candidate supported. N=533.

- SUSPICIOUS – Code as 1 any response which seems to be a bot, troll, or otherwise not in the spirit of forthright and honest answering; 0 otherwise.




(a) Open-Ended Responses: Opposition



(b) Open-Ended Responses: Disaffection

Figure A5: This figure illustrates the distribution of 2020 open-ended responses coded as expressing opposition to the alternative (top) or political disaffection (bottom) by January 2016 political partisanship (n=470). Point size is proportional to the number of respondents per cell.



(a) 2016 Open-ended explanations (n=1,067)

Figure A6: This figure illustrates the distribution of hand-coded responses to a question about why respondents supported Trump vs. Clinton in October 2016. Averaged over two annotators.

## Ideological Extremity


Yet another attitude of interest is perceptions of ideological extremity; perhaps 2020 differed in the perceived ideological extremity of the candidates? We probe this by examining 622 respondents who answered questions about candidates' perceived ideological positions in October 2016 and October 2020.<sup>1</sup>

To provide a baseline, the top panel in Figure A7 illustrates the distribution of 2012 nominees Mitt Romney and Barack Obama relative to the respondents. Given that the scale is a 7-point scale (7 is extremely conservative), relative placements vary from -6 (the respondent is much more conservative) to 6 (the respondent is much more liberal). Even though respondents on average favored Obama over Romney, they nonetheless rated Romney's ideology as closer to their own, with an average distance of 1.38 versus 2.10 to Obama.


In Figure A7's middle panel, we repeat the analysis but with 2016 ideological self-placements and October 2020 candidate placements. Trump is viewed virtually identically to Romney, at 1.42 more conservative on average; Biden is likewise viewed quite similarly to Obama, at 2.10 more liberal. From these metrics alone, there is little to indicate that the Trump-Biden match-up was perceived much differently from the Obama-Romney one. Finally, the bottom panel shows that between 2016 and 2020, Trump came to be viewed as significantly more conservative.

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
<sup>1</sup>The question asked, "Using this scale that ranges from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, where would you place each of these candidates on this scale?" Respondents were separately asked to place themselves on the same scale in multiple waves; here, we use November 2012-January 2013 and January 2016 self-reported ideology.



(a) Romney/Obama 2012



(b) Trump 2020/Biden 2020



(c) Trump 2016/Trump 2020

Figure A7: These figures present perceptions of presidential candidates' ideologies relative to respondents' ideologies for various years/elections.

## White Americans’ Racial Attitudes

In the U.S., anti-democratic efforts have been connected with the preservation of White citizens’ political power and the disenfranchisement of Black citizens and other groups for centuries (Key, 1949; Rana, 2011; Mickey, 2015; Parker and Towler, 2019; Bedolla, 2020; Keele, Cubbison and White, 2021; Miller, 2021; Stewart and Kitchens, 2021). Analyzing a January 2020 YouGov survey, Bartels (2020) finds that among Republicans, an index termed “ethnic antagonism” predicts holding anti-democratic views (see also Mutz, 2018; Thompson, 2021). While there is already extensive research on racial attitudes during the Trump era (Engelhardt et al., 2019; Sides, Tesler and Vavreck, 2019; Grimmer and Marble, 2019; Hopkins and Washington, 2020; Jardina, Kalmoe and Gross, 2021; Enns and Jardina, 2021), the events of 2020—including the spring 2020 killing of George Floyd and the protests and mobilization that followed—make updates critical.

Stereotype-based measures of racial prejudice have been shown to predict behavior (Peyton and Huber, 2018). To generate such measures, we asked White respondents to assess White and Black Americans on two scales, one varying from trustworthy (0) to untrustworthy (100) and the other varying from hard-working (0) to lazy (100). We then subtract assessments of Black Americans from assessments of White Americans to generate anti-Black prejudice measures that vary from -100 to 100. The top panel of Figure A8 presents the over-time trends among panelists’ who identified as White in the October 2012 wave and completed the October 2018 and 2020 waves.<sup>2</sup> As it demonstrates, White Americans’ levels of prejudice declined notably between 2016 and 2018, and were further down in 2020 (though with slightly higher levels in October 2020 than January 2020). Democrats and Republicans have different starting levels, but show no evidence of polarization over this period; the trends are broadly similar for those identifying as Democrats and Republicans in 2012.


In Figure A8’s bottom panel, we instead plot White respondents’ mean responses to a separate question about support for government efforts to help Black Americans on a 1-7 scale where 1 indicates the government should help Blacks while 7 indicates Blacks should help themselves.<sup>3</sup> The results echo those from the anti-Black racial prejudice measure. To different degrees, Democrats and Republicans almost always place themselves on the end of the scale indicating “Blacks should help themselves”; even in 2020, Democrats average 3.88 while Republicans average 5.15. Still, the over-time trend is markedly *downward*, as White respondents’ views on this move toward the center of the scale. The average score was 5.4 in 2012, while by 2020 it was 4.5. At the same time that Trump was defying norms through his use of racist rhetoric (Schaffner, 2020), public opinion was shifting in the opposite direction.

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
<sup>2</sup>The total number of respondents is 537, including 249 Democrats and 281 Republicans.

<sup>3</sup>Here, the question reads: “Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help Blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale?”





(a) Anti-Black prejudice (N=537)



(b) Blacks Should Help Themselves (N=568)

Figure A8: This figure illustrates trends in White respondents' (top) relative adherence to negative stereotypes about Black Americans and (bottom) beliefs about whether Blacks should help themselves rather than receiving government assistance.

## Exploring Sources of Stability

	Oct-Dec '07	Oct '14	Nov '14	Nov/Dec '16	Oct '20
Intercept	1.613*	3.222*	2.606*	2.026*	3.308*
	(0.617)	(0.705)	(0.737)	(0.622)	(0.639)
Age	0.011*	0.003	0.003	0.014*	0.015*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Educ (Yrs)	0.097*	0.052	0.074*	0.045	-0.007
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Income	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.425*	-0.281*	-0.232	-0.240*	-0.254*
	(0.115)	(0.130)	(0.137)	(0.116)	(0.120)
White	0.189	-0.173	-0.489	0.025	-0.278
	(0.255)	(0.292)	(0.306)	(0.257)	(0.264)
Black	-0.382	-0.342	-0.458	-0.095	-0.542
	(0.292)	(0.332)	(0.355)	(0.295)	(0.303)
Hispanic	0.243	-0.255	-0.457	-0.371	-0.299
	(0.298)	(0.344)	(0.365)	(0.301)	(0.309)
Catholic	0.202	0.166	0.244	0.348*	0.274
	(0.153)	(0.177)	(0.186)	(0.154)	(0.159)
Protestant	0.064	-0.207	0.030	0.086	0.124
	(0.131)	(0.146)	(0.154)	(0.132)	(0.136)
Union	-0.034	0.050	0.047	-0.018	0.293
	(0.168)	(0.193)	(0.203)	(0.170)	(0.174)
GOP PID	0.063*	-0.078*	0.002	0.073*	-0.033
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.029)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.120	0.069	0.067	0.083	0.085
Num. obs.	344	317	303	344	344

\* $p < 0.05$

Table A3: OLS models of perceived election fairness. GOP partisanship is measured 1-7 in October 2012.

	Oct '12	Oct '14	Nov '14	Oct '16	Oct '20
Intercept	2.255*	2.725*	1.759*	2.678*	2.339*
	(0.490)	(0.540)	(0.543)	(0.479)	(0.528)
Age	0.020*	0.017*	0.020*	0.017*	0.023*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Educ (Yrs)	0.020	0.025	0.044	0.013	-0.007
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Income	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.063	-0.096	-0.035	0.144	-0.193*
	(0.091)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.089)	(0.098)
White	0.460*	0.160	0.422*	0.212	0.231
	(0.180)	(0.197)	(0.210)	(0.176)	(0.194)
Black	0.423	0.302	0.301	0.278	0.075
	(0.217)	(0.240)	(0.247)	(0.212)	(0.234)
Hispanic	0.346	0.142	0.377	0.354	0.195
	(0.222)	(0.243)	(0.255)	(0.217)	(0.239)
Catholic	0.058	0.046	0.183	-0.060	0.094
	(0.119)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.116)	(0.128)
Protestant	0.185	0.091	0.277*	0.078	0.269*
	(0.104)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.101)	(0.112)
Union	0.225	0.067	0.023	0.157	0.167
	(0.124)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.121)	(0.133)
GOP PID	0.044*	0.009	0.034	0.013	0.120*
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.024)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.131	0.068	0.114	0.088	0.214
Num. obs.	437	407	391	437	437

\* $p < 0.05$

Table A4: OLS models of preferring our system of government. GOP partisanship is measured 1-7 in October 2012.

	Oct '12	Oct '14	Nov '14	Oct '16	Oct '20
Intercept	1.798*	2.485*	2.136*	2.015*	1.386*
	(0.566)	(0.593)	(0.565)	(0.548)	(0.587)
Age	0.001	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Educ (Yrs)	0.012	-0.001	-0.012	0.004	-0.014
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Income	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.268*	0.070	0.028	0.075	-0.060
	(0.105)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.109)
White	0.250	0.138	0.250	0.220	0.225
	(0.211)	(0.220)	(0.222)	(0.204)	(0.219)
Black	0.398	0.064	0.263	0.472	0.287
	(0.254)	(0.268)	(0.262)	(0.245)	(0.263)
Hispanic	0.159	0.006	0.151	0.062	0.201
	(0.259)	(0.270)	(0.269)	(0.250)	(0.268)
Catholic	0.193	0.080	0.081	0.039	0.061
	(0.138)	(0.145)	(0.140)	(0.133)	(0.143)
Protestant	0.012	0.010	0.163	-0.035	0.090
	(0.120)	(0.124)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.124)
Union	0.107	0.049	0.155	0.061	-0.201
	(0.143)	(0.150)	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.148)
GOP PID	-0.019	-0.051	-0.005	-0.055*	0.180*
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.033	0.016	0.021	0.042	0.137
Num. obs.	435	405	389	435	435

\* $p < 0.05$

Table A5: OLS Models of not being critical of our political system. GOP partisanship is measured 1-7 in October 2012.

	Jan '16	Oct '16	Oct '18	Jan '20	Oct '20
Intercept	32.274*	14.097	28.280*	30.671*	29.966*
	(10.387)	(10.905)	(11.651)	(10.980)	(10.690)
Age	0.134	0.263*	0.138	0.110	0.144
	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.079)
Educ (Yrs)	-2.361*	-2.149*	-2.621*	-2.962*	-2.839*
	(0.479)	(0.503)	(0.540)	(0.506)	(0.493)
Income	-0.016	-0.018	-0.045*	-0.022	-0.050*
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Female	-4.384*	-0.239	-1.576	-0.433	-0.408
	(1.860)	(1.953)	(2.061)	(1.986)	(1.914)
White	3.862	2.512	6.237	3.212	3.439
	(3.832)	(4.074)	(4.205)	(4.017)	(3.944)
Black	0.256	-2.466	2.540	0.723	-2.707
	(4.513)	(4.777)	(5.037)	(4.757)	(4.645)
Hispanic	-1.760	0.128	5.448	7.664	5.290
	(4.659)	(4.888)	(5.080)	(4.961)	(4.795)
Catholic	4.506	0.477	-1.696	-2.604	-1.946
	(2.471)	(2.613)	(2.750)	(2.633)	(2.543)
Protestant	-0.313	0.430	-0.821	-0.854	-0.571
	(2.165)	(2.266)	(2.399)	(2.312)	(2.228)
Union	5.301	2.745	4.338	7.127*	6.066*
	(2.735)	(2.850)	(2.977)	(2.861)	(2.815)
GOP PID	7.876*	8.781*	10.395*	11.723*	11.535*
	(0.455)	(0.472)	(0.500)	(0.478)	(0.468)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.348	0.410	0.495	0.519	0.500
Num. obs.	910	778	679	781	910

\* $p < 0.05$

Table A6: OLS models of 0-100 ratings for the Trump feeling thermometer. GOP partisanship is measured 1-7 in October 2012.

	Oct '12	Nov '12-Jan '13	Jan '16	Oct '16	Nov-Dec '16	Jan '20	Oct '20
Intercept	-1.373*	-1.354*	-0.702*	-0.585*	-0.734*	-0.786*	-0.731*
	(0.215)	(0.243)	(0.234)	(0.227)	(0.232)	(0.260)	(0.256)
Age	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Educ (Yrs)	-0.011	-0.010	-0.044*	-0.051*	-0.048*	-0.045*	-0.048*
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income	0.332	0.272	-0.144	-0.530	-0.404	-1.145*	-0.660
	(0.420)	(0.462)	(0.457)	(0.443)	(0.448)	(0.526)	(0.500)
Female	0.080*	0.079	0.011	-0.007	0.005	0.042	0.062
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.047)
White	0.081	0.021	0.167	0.186*	0.232*	0.202*	0.176
	(0.083)	(0.095)	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Black	-0.099	-0.134	-0.036	-0.021	0.073	0.068	-0.031
	(0.096)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.117)	(0.114)
Hispanic	0.045	0.012	0.013	0.146	0.194	0.256*	0.216
	(0.100)	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.121)	(0.118)
Catholic	0.043	0.029	-0.027	-0.058	-0.077	-0.044	-0.094
	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.063)
Protestant	0.034	0.057	-0.076	0.013	-0.028	-0.011	-0.077
	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Union	0.050	0.044	0.162*	0.158*	0.165*	0.139*	0.120
	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.069)
GOP PID	0.329*	0.344*	0.269*	0.274*	0.290*	0.296*	0.292*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.627	0.647	0.515	0.544	0.570	0.530	0.507
Num. obs.	879	755	879	879	797	775	879

\* $p < 0.05$

Table A7: OLS models of vote preference 2012-2020. GOP partisanship is measured 1-7 in October 2012. Outcome is -1 for Democratic preference, 0 for undecided/non-voter, 1 for Republican preference.

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