**Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics**

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Type | Description | Mean (S.D) | [Min-Max] | N |
| Intra-systemic Violence*it* (I) | Binary | Equals 1 if *i* was affected by intra-systemic violence in election *t.* | .033 (.18) | [0-1] | 18982 |
| Intra-systemic Violence*it*(II) | Categorical | Equals 1 if *i* was affected by non-lethal intra-systemic violence in election *t*, and equals 2 if *i* was affected by lethal intra-systemic violence in election *t.* | .037 (.209) | [0-2] | 18982 |
| Anti-systemic Violence*it* (I) | Binary | Equals 1 if *i* was affected by a boycott call of a non-state armed group in election *t*. | .016 (.13) | [0-1] | 18982 |
| Anti-systemic Violence*it*(II) | Categorical | Equals 1 if *i* was affected by a boycott call in election *t,* equals 2 if *i* was affected by a boycott with incidents of non-lethal violence and equals 3 if *i* was affected by boycott with incidents of lethal violence in election *t*. | .019 (.167) | [0-3] | 18982 |
| Non-boycott Violence (I) | Binary | Equals 1 if *i* was affected by violence not related to a boycott call in election *t*. | .037 (.189) | [0-1] | 18982 |
| Non-boycott Violence (II) | Categorical | Equals 1 is *i* was affected by non-lethal violence not related to a boycott call in election *t*, and equals 2 if *i* was affected by lethal violence not related to a boycott call in election *t.* | .043 (.229) | [0-2] | 18982 |
| Alignment*it* | Binary | Equals 1 if incumbent in *i* belongs the same party as the state-ruling party in election *t*. | .19 (.39) | [0-1] | 18982 |
| Turnout*it* | Percentage | Percentage of voters who cast their votes in election *t* in unit *i*. | 62 (13) | [0-98] | 18982 |
| Incumbent Vote Share*it* | Percentage | Percentage of the votes that the incumbent party in *i* received in election *t* in unit *i*. | 33 (18) | [0-99] | 16851 |
| Margin of Victory*it* | Percentage | Difference of percentages between the winner and runner up in election *t* in unit *i*. | 14 (12) | [0-99] | 18982 |
| Literacy*t* | Percentage | Percentage of the population that is literate in the district in year of election *t*. | 48 (15) | [13-86] | 18982 |
| Electrification*t* | Percentage | Percentage of the households in the district in year of election *t* that has access to electricity. | 48 (27) | [3.2-121] | 18982 |
| Urbanization*it* | Percentage | Percentage of the population that lives in urban areas in the district in year of election *t*. | 25 (18) | [2.5-100] | 18982 |
| Ruggedness | Continuous | Standard deviation of altitude within constituency, in meters. | 47 (87) | [0-1075] | 18982 |
| Constituency Type | Categorical | Type of constituency: General, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes. | 1.3 (.6) | [1-3] | 18982 |

Note: *i* unit of analysis = assembly constituency; *t* temporal identifier = election as electoral sequence.

**Appendix B. Alternative Specifications of “Table 2. Results Fixed Effects Analysis, Dependent Variable: Turnout (%)”**

The three columns on the left (Model (1) to (3)) draw on the binary operationalizations of intra-systemic violence and anti-systemic violence. Results are consistent with those in the manuscript. The two columns on the right (Model (4) and (5)) draw on non-boycott violence, an operationalization including all violent events that did not occur in the context of a boycott call. Results are substantively similar to those with intra-systemic violence, though the coefficient for lethal non-boycott violence is now significant.

**Table 1. Left: Binary independent variables; Right: Non-boycott violence as independent variable**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) | Model (5) |
|  | *DV: Turnout (%)* | *DV: Turnout (%)* | *DV: Turnout (%)* | *DV: Turnout (%)* | *DV: Turnout (%)* |
| Intra-systemic Violence (Ref: 0) | -2.490\*\*\*(.622) |  | -2.712\*\*\* (.596) |  |  |
| Anti-systemic Violence (Ref: 0) |  | -19.17\*\*\* (.518) | -19.24\*\*\* (.518) |  |  |
| Non-boycott violence (Ref: 0) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-lethal |  |  |  | -3.368\*\*\* (.769) | -3.208\*\*\* (.765) |
| Lethal |  |  |  | 3.221\* (1.309) | 3.612\*\* (1.349) |
| Anti-systemic violence (Ref: 0) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Boycott call |  |  |  |  | -18.66\*\*\* (4.414) |
| Non-lethal |  |  |  |  | -22.26\*\* (8.490) |
| Lethal |  |  |  |  | -25.39\*\*\* (4.953) |
| Alignment (Ref: No) | 1.314\*\*\* (.179) | 1.146\*\*\* (.171) | 1.136\*\*\* (.171) | 1.320\*\*\* (.347) | 1.150\*\*\* (.313) |
| Margin of Victory | -.0737\*\*\*(.00581) | -.0618\*\*\* (.00558) | -.0615\*\*\*(.00557) | -.0735\*\*\* (.0123) | -.0613\*\*\* (.0105) |
| Literacy | .203\*\*\* (.0141) | .166\*\*\* (.0134) | .165\*\*\* (.0136) | .203\*\*\* (.0599) | .165\*\* (.0532) |
| Electrification | .0395\*\*\* (.00943) | .0567\*\*\* (.00899) | .0576\*\*\* (.00905) | .0402 (.0342) | .0583 (.0313) |
| Urbanization | -.0372 (.0265) | -.0484 (.0254) | -.0496 (.0254) | -.0369 (.0800) | -.0512 (.0742) |
| Turnout (*t—1*) | .0578\*\*\* (.00801) | .0965\*\*\* (.00771) | .0966\*\*\* (.00775) | .0578 (.0383) | .0961\*\* (.0341) |
| Spatial lag ISV | 4.586\*\*\* (.743) |  | 2.323\*\* (.715) |  |  |
| Spatial lag Non-Boycott |  |  |  | 5.367\*\*\* (1.159) | 2.441\* (1.185) |
| Intercept | 48.70\*\*\* (.757) | 47.84\*\*\* (.726) | 47.89\*\*\* (.726) | 48.65\*\*\* (2.356) | 47.90\*\*\* (2.398) |
| Log lik. | -64742.2 | -63945.0 | -63932.0 | -64727.8 | -63904.1 |
| *N* | 18982 | 18982 | 18982 | 18982 | 18982 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001; DV = Dependent variable.

**Appendix C. Alternative Specifications of “Table 3. Results ZIP Regression, Logit Inflation Model.”**

Model (1) and (2) replicate the main results with a fixed-effects / within-unit variation model specification, rather than a zero-inflation poisson regression. The results are consistent with this type of specification: the coefficients are much smaller, and standard errors are larger. Coefficients do not change direction, which confirms the robustness of our main findings.

**Table 1. Fixed effects model**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model (1) | Model (2) |
|  | Fixed effects  *DV: Intra-systemic violence* | Fixed effects  *DV: Anti-systemic violence* |
| Alignment (Ref: No) | -.0105 (.00561) | -.00200 (.00459) |
| Margin of Victory | .000162 (.000181) | .000595\*\*\* (.000172) |
| Literacy | -.00408\*\*\* (.000897) | -.000481 (.000487) |
| Electrification | .00221\*\*\* (.000541) | .000525 (.000310) |
| Urbanization | .000883 (.00126) | -.00148 (.000865) |
| Ruggedness |  |  |
| Constituency (Ref: GEN) |  |  |
| SC | -.00131 (.00294) | -.00335 (.00290) |
| ST | -.0141(.00739) | -.0180 (.0139) |
| Intercept | .104\*\* (.0368) | .0460 (.0245) |
| Zero Inflation |  |  |
| Assembly Constituency |  |  |
| Constant |  |  |
| Log. likelihood | 7788.3 | 1475.4 |
| N zero | <NA> | <NA> |
| *N* | 18962 | 18962 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

Table 2 replicates the results of our second analysis investigating the determinants of different types of violence. In model (1) and (2) we use an alternative specification of intra-systemic violence: in model (1), non-lethal intra-systemic violence takes the value {0} for no violence or lethal violence and {1} for non-lethal violence; in model (2), lethal intra-systemic violence takes the value {0} for no violence or non-lethal violence and {1} for lethal violence. The results are similar to the main ones in direction, but not strength or significance.

**Table 2. Results ZIP Regression, Logit Inflation Model: Replications with alternative specifications of the dependent variables.**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) |
|  | *DV: Non-lethal Intra-Systemic Violence[[1]](#footnote-1)* | *DV: Lethal Intra-Systemic Violence[[2]](#footnote-2)* | *DV: Anti-Systemic Violence[[3]](#footnote-3)* | *DV: Non-boycott violence[[4]](#footnote-4)* |
| Alignment (Ref: No) | -.338\*\* (.130) | -.223 (.253) | .388 (.443) | -.337\*\* (.114) |
| Margin of Victory | .00632\* (.00282) | .00992 (.00762) | .0268\*\* (.00876) | .00763\*\* (.00246) |
| Literacy | -.0636\*\*\* (.00652) | -.0217\* (.0104) | -.0322 (.0206) | -.0458\*\*\* (.00535) |
| Electrification | .0401\*\*\* (.00580) | -.0148 (.0124) | .0385\* (.0169) | .0194\*\*\* (.00504) |
| Urbanization | .00551 (.00460) | .0220 (.0115) | -.0262\* (.0132) | .0101\*\* (.00395) |
| Ruggedness | .000333 (.000881) | .00554 (.00301) | .00204 (.00161) | -.000154 (.000572) |
| Constituency (Ref: GEN) |  |  |  |  |
| SC | -.0461 (.105) | -1.031\* (.443) | -.540 (.541) | -.198\* (.0982) |
| ST | -.0530 (.177) | -22.07\*\*\* (.498) | -26.45\*\*\* (.364) | -.233(.163) |
| Intercept | -3.164\*\*\* (.214) | 1.413\*\*\* (.332) | -6.578\*\*\* (.896) | -2.622\*\*\* (.184) |
| Zero Inflation |  |  | .000171 (.000300) |  |
| Assembly Constituency | -.0000825\* (.0000336) | .0000369\* (.0000162) | .000171 (.000300) | -.0000566\* (.0000291) |
| Intercept | -15.74\*\*\* (.376) | 3.989\*\*\* (.260) | -13.93 (16.75) | -16.246\*\*\* (.338) |
| Log. Likelihood | -1768.2 | -537.2 | -175.5 | -2236.318 |
| N zero | 18405 | 18887 | 18928 | 18258 |
| *N* | 18962 | 18962 | 18962 | 18962 |
| State Fixed Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001.

**Appendix D. Alternative Specifications of “Table 4. Fixed Effects Analysis, Dependent Variable: Incumbent Vote Share (%).”**

Model (1) is the replication with the operationalization differentiating between lethal and non-lethal violence; Model (2) adds the interaction term. The results are generally the same, except for the category lethal intra-systemic violence, which has a positive coefficient but with a very large standard error. Models (3) and (4) report results with non-boycott violence rather than intra-systemic violence. Results are very similar to the ones in Table 4 in the main text.

**Table 1. Left: Intra-Systemic Violence (categorical operationalization); Right: Non-boycott violence.**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) |
|  | *DV: Incumbent Vote (%)* | *DV: Incumbent Vote (%)* | *DV: Incumbent Vote (%)* | *DV: Incumbent Vote (%)* |
| Intra-systemic violence (Ref: 0) |  |  |  |  |
| Non-lethal | -5.976\*\*\* (1.195) | -6.991\*\*\* (1.290) |  |  |
| Lethal | 0.555 (2.881) | 0.668 (2.912) |  |  |
| Alignment (Ref: No) | 11.17\*\*\* (.500) | 10.99\*\*\* (.489) | 11.19\*\*\* (.326) | 11.03\*\*\* (.330) |
| ISV *X* Alignment |  |  |  |  |
| Non-lethal ISV |  | 9.206\*\*\* (2.416) |  |  |
| Lethal ISV |  | -1.070 (9.376) |  |  |
| Non-boycott violence (Ref: 0) |  |  | -5.057\*\*\* (.643) | -5.785\*\*\* (.683) |
| Non-boycott violence *X* Alignment |  |  |  | 6.118\*\* (1.949) |
| Margin of Victory | -.00121 (.0229) | -.00129 (.0229) | -.00145 (.0117) | -.00116 (.0117) |
| Literacy | .165\*\* (.0500) | .162\*\* (.0499) | .170\*\*\* (.0260) | .166\*\*\* (.0260) |
| Electrification | .0251 (.0445) | .0274 (.0444) | .0220 (.0181) | .0241 (.0181) |
| Urbanization | .280\*\* (.0993) | .280\*\* (.0992) | .273\*\*\* (.0550) | .273\*\*\* (.0550) |
| Turnout | .126\*\*\* (.0260) | .127\*\*\* (.0259) | .127\*\*\* (.0157) | .128\*\*\* (.0157) |
| Incumbent vote share *(t—1)* | .167\*\*\* (.0232) | .167\*\*\* (.0232) | .166\*\*\* (.0143) | .166\*\*\* (.0143) |
| Intercept | -1.211 (3.168) | -1.109 (3.174) | -1.114 (1.769) | -1.046 (1.769) |
| ll | -66874.6 | -66864.1 | -66881.2 | -66875.0 |
| *N* | 16851 | 16851 | 16851 | 16851 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; Cluster by district; \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

**Appendix E. Replications with Restricted Sample (missing observation on *Incumbent Vote Share* dropped)**

In the main text of the article, the third analysis (Table 4) has a smaller sample (16851 units vs 18330) due to missing values on the dependent variable *Incumbent Vote Share*. To ensure consistency between our different analyses, we replicate the first and second analysis of the main text (respectively Table 2 and Table 3), excluding the observations that have missing values on Incumbent Vote Share. The results are the same in direction and significance, and vary slightly in strength, which means that the excluded observations are not driving our results in the main text.

**Table 1. Replication Results Fixed Effects Analysis, Dependent Variable: Turnout (%). Restricted sample.**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) |
| Intra-systemic Violence (Ref: 0) |  |  |  |
| Non-lethal | -3.151\*\*\* (.919) |  | -3.339\*\*\* (.908) |
| Lethal | 1.995 (1.265) |  | 1.836 (1.279) |
| Anti-systemic violence (Ref: 0) |  |  |  |
| Boycott call |  | -14.72\*\*\* (4.004) | -14.95\*\*\* (4.081) |
| Non-lethal |  | -21.26\*\* (7.606) | -21.39\*\* (7.586) |
| Lethal |  | -21.45\*\*\* (5.391) | -21.69\*\*\* (5.472) |
| Alignment (Ref: No) | .950\*\* (.363) | .882\*\* (.330) | .862\*\* (.331) |
| Margin of Victory | -.0456\*\*\*(.0120) | -.0370\*\* (.0112) | -.0363\*\* (.0112) |
| Literacy | .170\*\* (.0598) | .143\*\* (.0551) | .138\* (.0556) |
| Electrification | .0640 (.0354) | .0749\*(.0333) | .0783\* (.0334) |
| Urbanization | -.0270 (.101) | -.0478 (.0946) | -.0473 (.0942) |
| Turnout (*t—1*) | .0427 (.0374) | .0724\*(.0348) | .0737\* (.0348) |
| Spatial Lags ISV | 4.064\*\*\* (1.115) |  | 2.219\* (1.086) |
| Intercept | 49.66\*\*\* (2.756) | 49.32\*\*\* (2.781) | 49.35\*\*\* (2.759) |
| Log likelihood | -56777.7 | -5630.1 | -56278.4 |
| *N* | 16851 | 16851 | 16851 |
| n | 3485 | 3485 | 3485 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; Standard error clustered by district; \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

**Table 2. Replication Results Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) Regression, Logit Inflation Model. Restricted Sample.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | Intra-systemic violence | Anti-systemic violence |
| Alignment (Ref: No) | -.427\*\*\* (.128) | .387 (.424) |
| Margin of Victory | .00699\* (.00283) | .0311\*\*\* (.00947) |
| Literacy | -.0620\*\*\* (.00600) | -.0337 (.0213) |
| Electrification | .0297\*\*\* (.00586) | .0335(.0183) |
| Urbanization | .0108\* (.00433) | -.0310\* (.0145) |
| Ruggedness | .000722 (.000731) | .00186 (.00174) |
| Constituency (Ref: GEN) |  |  |
| SC | -.150 (.102) | -.474 (.547) |
| ST | -.164 (.170) | -21.851\*\*\* (.382) |
| Intercept | -2.570\*\*\* (.197) | -6.151\*\*\* (.898) |
| Zero Inflation |  |  |
| Assembly Constituency | -.000361\*\*\* (.0000435) | -.0000399 (.00029) |
| Intercept | -14.34\*\*\* (.390) | -11.628\*\*\* (3.118) |
| Log lik. | -1898.4 | -163.6187 |
| N zero | 16222 | 16801 |
| N | 16833 | 16833 |
| State fixed effects | Yes | Yes |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

**Appendix F. Replications with Full Sample (missing observation on *Incumbent Vote Share* set to 0)**

In the main text of the article, the third analysis (Table 4) has a smaller sample (16851 units vs 18330) due to missing values on the dependent variable incumbent vote share. To ensure consistency between our different analyses, we replicate the third analysis investigating the combined impacts of intra-systemic violence and alignment on incumbent vote share with an artificially full sample. For this, we set the missing values on the incumbent vote share variable to 0, so we could include these observations in the analysis. Even with this artificial set up, the results are very similar to the main ones, although smaller in strength (which is consistent with the addition of artificial zeros in the dependent variable). This means that the exclusion or inclusion of these observations do not drive our results in one direction or another.

**Table 1. Replication Results Fixed Effects Analysis, Dependent Variable: Incumbent Vote Share (%). Full Sample.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| Intra-Systemic Violence (Ref: 0) | -3.507\*\* (1.203) | -4.158\*\* (1.313) |
| Alignment (Ref: No) | 13.95\*\*\* (.543) | 13.82\*\*\* (.541) |
| Intra-systemic Violence *X* Alignment |  | 5.868\* (2.713) |
| Margin of Victory | -.0248 (.0222) | -.0248 (.0222) |
| Literacy | .198\*\*\* (.0576) | .196\*\*\* (.0576) |
| Electrification | .0711 (.0470) | .0724 (.0469) |
| Urbanization | .524\*\* (.172) | .523\*\* (.172) |
| Turnout | .216\*\*\* (.0304) | .216\*\*\* (.0304) |
| Incumbent vote share *(t—1)* | .158\*\*\* (.0230) | .158\*\*\* (.0230) |
| Intercept | -20.24\*\*\* (4.503) | -20.20\*\*\* (4.505) |
| Log likelihood | -78302.7 | -78298.9 |
| *N* | 18982 | 18982 |
| n | 3486 | 3486 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; Cluster by district; \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

1. Non-lethal intra-systemic violence = (0) for no violence or lethal violence; (1) for non-lethal violence [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Lethal intra-systemic violence = (0) for no violence or non-lethal violence; (1) for lethal violence [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Anti-systemic violence = (0) for no boycott and boycott call only; (1) for lethal or non-lethal violence related to a boycott call [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Non-boycott violence = (0) for no violence or violence related to a boycott call; (1) violence not related to a boycott call [↑](#footnote-ref-4)