Supplementary Information Memo for "Who Dislikes Whom? Affective Polarization between Pairs of Parties in Western Democracies"

Section S1. Countries, Elections, and Parties Included in Our Analyses

Table A1 at the end of this memo lists the countries and years of the election surveys included in our analyses of affective polarization between pairs of parties, which include every election survey from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data set which has been released to date, across the 20 western democracies in our study. Table A2 lists all of the parties included in our analyses, and also highlights those parties that were classified as members of the radical right family by the Comparative Manifesto Project. We relied on these classifications in our empirical evaluations of our hypotheses pertaining to radical right exceptionalism.

[TABLES A1-A2 ABOUT HERE]

Section S2. Construction of the Elite Cultural and Economic Party Position Variables

To measure party elite policy distances on the economic and cultural dimensions, i.e., the [*elite economic polarization i, j (t)*] and [*elite cultural polarization i, j (t)*] variables described in the main text of the paper, we followed the coding scheme from the Comparative Manifesto Project website, available at https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/information/documents/visualizations. Full information about the coding schemes and details about each individual component of the measures can be found at www.manifesto-project.wzb.eu.

Each party's position on the economic dimension was constructed from the following formula:

(per 401 + per 402 + per 407 + per 414 + per505) – (per 403 + per404 + per405 + per406 + per 409 + per 412 + per 413 + per 415 + per 416 + per 504)

Where each component has the following substantive interpretation:

Per 401: Free Market Economy
Per 402: Incentives: Positive
Per 403: Market Regulation
Per 404: Economic Planning
Per 405: Corporatism/Mixed Economy
Per 406: Protectionism: Positive
Per 407: Protectionism: Negative
Per 409: Keynesian Demand Management
Per 412: Controlled economy
Per 413: Nationalisation
Per 414: Economic Orthodoxy
Per 415: Marxist Analysis
Per 416: Anti-Growth Economy: Positive
Per 504: Welfare State Expansion

Per 505: Welfare State Limitation

Each party's position on the cultural dimension was constructed from the following formula:

(per 104 + per 109 + per 601 + per 605 + per 608) – (per 105 + per 106 + per 107 + per 501 + per 503 + per602 + per604 + per 607 + per 705)

Where each component has the following substantive interpretation:

Per 104: Military: Positive
Per 105: Military: Negative
Per 106: Peace
Per 107: Internationalism: Positive
Per 109: Internationalism: Negative
Per 501: Environmental Protection
Per 503: Equality: Positive
Per 601: National Way of Life Positive
Per 602: National Way of Life: Negative
Per 603: Traditional Morality: Positive
Per 604: Traditional Morality: Negative
Per 605: Law and Order Positive
Per 607: Multiculturalism: Positive
Per 608: Multiculturalism: Negative
Per 705: Underprivileged Minority Groups

Section S3. Reduced Models

Table A3 reports a set of reduced models which separately examine each predictor of out-party dislike presented in Table 2 in the body of the text.

[TABLE A3 ABOUT HERE]

Section S4. Country and Year Fixed Effects Estimates

The results reported in Table 2 in the paper are for statistical models that include country and year fixed effects. Table A4 at the end of this memo reports these fixed effects estimates, for the Left-Right full model and the economics and politics full models.

[TABLE A4 ABOUT HERE]

Section S5. Robustness Checks

Analyses using experts' placements of party positions

The statistical analyses we report in the paper utilize the Comparative Manifesto Project codings as our measures of party elite distances on ideology and issues. To substantiate our substantive conclusions we re-estimated our ideology and issue-based models using alternative measures of elite polarization based on the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES), in which experts placed European parties on various ideological and policy scales (Bakker et al. 2015).[1] Our measure of experts' perceptions is derived from CHES surveys that were administered in 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014, in which respondents who were considered as experts on the focal country's politics were asked to place each party in the system on an overall Left-Right ideology scale, and also on various issue scales described below. Details of the CHES survey methodology can be found at https://www.chesdata.eu/.

Our measure of experts' perceptions of parties' Left-Right ideological positions was based on their responses to the following survey question:

Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

Our measure of experts' party placements on economic issues was based on their responses to the following survey question:

"Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state. Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology."

0 = extreme left
1
2
3
4
5 = center
6
7
8
9
10 = extreme right

Our measure of each party's economic position was the mean position ascribed to it by the CHES survey respondents, averaged over all experts who provided valid party placements.

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[1] Bakker, Ryan, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jon Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. 2015. "Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999-2010". *Party Politics* 21(1): 143-52.

Our measure of the party's <u>cultural position</u> was based on experts' responses to the following survey question:

"*Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. Please tick the box that best describes each party's position.*"

0 = Libertarian/postmaterialist
1
2
3
4
5 = center
6
7
8
9
10 = Traditional/authoritarian

Our measure of each party's <u>cultural position</u> was the mean position ascribed to it by the CHES survey respondents, averaged over all experts who provided valid party placements.[2]

We then re-estimated our Left-Right ideology models and our economics and culture models (both the basic and the full models) using these CHES-based measures of party positions. We note that because the CHES surveys were only administered in countries that belonged to the European Union at the time of the current survey year, we had many fewer cases in these CHES-based analyses (N=1349) than we had in the analyses reported in the main text of the paper (N = 2232). Table A5 at the end of this memo reports these CHES-based analyses, which continue to support all of our substantive conclusions. The CHES also only began in 1999, and only contained 14 countries until 2016, meaning that it is not suitable for comparing the differing impact of variables over time in our dataset.

[TABLE A5 ABOUT HERE]

Analyses of different time periods

In order to evaluate whether the effects of the coalition and radical right variables on out-party dislike were time-dependent, we estimated our full models separately on the cases from two different time periods: 1996-2006 (waves 1-2 of the CSES surveys) and 2007-2017 (waves 3-4, plus the surveys released so far from wave 5). In the main text of the paper, we report results for the economic and cultural dimensions, where the cultural dimension increases in importance over time. In table A6, we report similar analyses but using the left-right super dimension.

[TABLE A6 ABOUT HERE]

Analyses of economic and cultural distance over-time with same country sample

In order to evaluate whether our finding about the growing linkage between cultural distance and affective evaluations reflects changes in country samples between the two time periods, we ran the same analyses only with countries that are included in the two different time periods: 1996-2006 and 2007-2017. This entailed excluding from our sample Austria and Greece from our analyses, since these countries are only included in our sample in the second time period. The results, which we present in Table A7, remain substantively similar.

[TABLE A7 ABOUT HERE]

Analyses of economic and cultural distance over-time with individual-level

We examine whether the growing linkage between cultural distance and affective evaluations appears also at the individual-level. The results, presented in Table A8, remain substantively similar.

[TABLE A8 ABOUT HERE]

Analyses of non-lineal relationships between ideological distance and affective evaluations

We examine whether parties are punished more severely, in terms of their affective evaluations, for more extreme ideological positions. That is, we explore whether the relationship ideological distance and affective evaluations is non-linear. If that were the case, our model specification may fail to capture how extreme ideological distance shapes negative feelings toward the radical right. However, we find no evidence for that with regard to economic and cultural ideological disagreements. When looking at left-right ideological disagreements, we find evidence to the contrary: extreme parties are punished slightly *less* than the linear model would predict. The results are presented in Table A9.

[TABLE A9 ABOUT HERE]

Analyses with standard errors clustered by country

We report the analyses with standard errors clustered at the country level rather than the election level. While the standard errors are slightly wider, the results remain consistent at this level of clustering. The results are presented in Table A10.

[TABLE A10 ABOUT HERE]

Lastly, in Figure A1 we present partial residual plots for each country separately: that is, plots of the raw data for the three continuous variables (elite left-right polarization, elite economic polarization

and elite cultural polarization) and the fitted lines. The patterns are consistent with those presented in Figure 2 in the body of the text.

[Figure A1 ABOUT HERE]

Tables

Table A1: Countries and Elections Included in the Analyses

Country		Elections included
Australia		1996, 2004, 2007, 2013
Austria		2008, 2013, 2017
Canada		1997, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015
Denmark		1998, 2001, 2007
Finland		2003, 2007, 2011
France		2002, 2007, 2012
Germany		1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
Great Britain		1997, 2005, 2015
Greece		2009, 2012, 2015
Iceland		1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013
Ireland		2002, 2007, 2011, 2016
Israel		1996, 2003, 2006, 2013
Netherlands		1998, 2002, 2006, 2010
New Zealand		1996, 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014
Norway		1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013
Portugal		2002, 2005, 2009, 2015
Spain		1996, 2000, 2004, 2008
Sweden		1998, 2002, 2006, 2014
Switzerland		1999, 2003, 2007, 2011
United States		1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016

Table A2: Countries, Parties, and Elections included in the Study

Britain (1997, 2001, 2005, 2015)	**Ireland (2002, 2007, 2011, 2016)**
LAB Labour Party	SF Sinn Fein
LibDem Liberal Democrats	FG Fine Gael
CON Conservative Party	GP Green Party
PC Plaid Cymru	LP Labour Party
SNP Scottish National Party	FF Fianna Fail

UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party*	
GP Green Party	**Netherlands (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010)**
	CDA Christian Democratic Appeal
Denmark (1998, 2001, 2007)	SGP Political Reformed Party
CD Centre Democrats	D66 Democrats 66
KF Conservatives People's Party	GL Green Left
SD Social Democratic Party	PvdA Labour Party
SF Socialist People's Party	SP Socialist Party
V Liberal Party	VVD People's Party for Freedom & Dem
EL Red-Green Unity List	CU Christian Union
RV Danish People's Party*	LPF List Pim Fortuyn*
KrF Christian People's Party	PVV Party of Freedom*
Finland (2003, 2007, 2011)	**Spain (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008)**
KD Christian Democratic Party	PP People's Party
KESK Centre Party	IU United Left
KOK National Coalition Party	PSOE Socialist Workers' Party
RKP/SFP Swedish People's Party	CiU Convergence and Union
SSDP Social Democratic Party	PNV/EAJ Basque Nationalist Party
VAS Left Alliance	ERC Republican Left of Catalonia
VIHR Green League	EA Basque Solidarity
PS True Finns*	CDS Centre Democrats
	CC Canarian Coalition
Germany (1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017)	
CDU Christian Democrats	**Portugal (2002, 2005, 2009, 2015)**
FDP Free Democratic Party	CDS-PP Dem. & Soc Centre+People's Party
GRUNEN Green Party	PSP Socialist Party
PDS/LINKE Party of Dem Socialism	PSD Social Democratic Party
SPD Social Democratic Party	BE Left Bloc
AfD Alternative for Germany*	
	Sweden (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014)
France (2002, 2007, 2012)	V Left Party
EELV Green Party	SAP Social Democrats
UDF Union for French Democracy	FP People's Party
PS Socialist Party	MP Green Party
FN National Front*	M Moderate Party
RPR Rally for the Republic	SD Sweden Democrats*
MoDem Movement for Democracy	KD Christian Democrats
UMP Union for a Popular Movement	C Centre Party
PG Left Party	
FDP Liberal Democrats	**Norway (1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013)**
GP Green Party	SV Left Socialists
SP Social Democrats	DNA Labour Party
	V Liberal Party
Canada (1997, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015)	KrF Christian People's Party

BQ Bloc Quebecois	H Conservative Party
CP Conservative Party	SP Centre Party
LP Liberal Party	Red Electoral Alliance
PC Progressive Conservatives	FrP Progress Party*
ND New Democratic Party	
GP Green Party	
	New Zealand (1996, 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014)
	ACT New Zealand
Australia (1996, 2004, 2007, 2013)	GP Green Party
ALP Australian Labor Party	LP Labour Party
AG Australian Greens	MP Maori Party
LPA Liberal Party of Australia	NP National Party
NPA National Party of Australia	NP National Party
AD Australian Democrats	NZFP New Zealand First Party
PP Palmer Party	UFNZ United Future New Zealand
United States (1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016)	**Iceland (1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013)**
Democratic Party	VGB Left Green Movement
Republican Party	FF Liberal party
	Sj Independence Party
Austria (2008, 2013, 2017)	F Progressive Party
GA Green Alternative	P Pirate Party
SPO Austrian Social Democratic Party	So United Socialist Party
OVP Austrian People's Party	
KPO Communist Party of Austria	**Israel (1996, 2003, 2006, 2013)**
VdU League of Independents	HaAvoda Labour Party
FPO Austrian Freedom Party*	MERETZ Mapam-Ratz
BZO Alliance for the Future of Austria*	Shinui Change
NEOS New Austria and Liberal Forum	MAFDAL National Religious Party
TS Team Stronach for Austria	SHAS Sephardi Torah Guardians
	Likud Union
Greece (2009, 2012, 2015)	National Union
KKE Communist Party of Greece	The Jewish Home*
SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left	
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement	**Switzerland(1999,2003,2007,2011)**
ND New Democracy	CVP Christian Democrats
ANEL Independent Greeks*	FDP Liberal Democrats
LS-XA Golden Dawn*	GP Green Party
	SP Social Democrats
	SVP Swiss People's Party*
	EVP Evangelical People's Party
	GLP Green Liberal Party
	LT Ticino League

Notes. The table lists the countries, parties, and election years that were included in our empirical analyses of partisans' out-party evaluations that we report in the main text of the paper. The parties

marked with an asterisk are those that were classified as members of the radical right party family, according to the Comparative Manifesto Project classification system. In Germany, the CDU and CSU share a platform and are treated as a single party in the Manifesto Project data although the CSU is generally understood to be much further to the right on social issues. Because of this, we excluded the CSU from our analysis, but results are robust to their inclusion.

Table A3: Reduced Models

	Left-Right (1)	Economics & Culture (2)	Power Sharing (3)	Radical Right exception. (4)
[*elite right-left polarization i, j (t)*]	0.59** (0.07)			
[*elite economic polarization i, j (t)*]		0.35** (0.05)		
[*elite cultural polarization i, j (t)*]		0.52** (0.06)		
[*i, j are coalition partners (t)*]			−0.98** (0.21)	
[*i, j are opposition partners (t)*]			−0.16 (0.10)	
[*out-party j is radical right*]				1.80** (0.20)
[*in-party i is radical right*]				0.65** (0.09)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.24	0.28	0.15	0.21

Notes. The dependent variable [*party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j (t)*], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. We reversed the thermometer ratings so that 10 denotes maximum dislike. The dependent variables are defined in the text. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on electionss, with country and year fixed effects which are reported in Section S3 of the online supplementary information memo. Section S1 in this memo lists the countries, elections, and parties in our data set.

Table A4: Estimated Country and Year effects for the Full Models

	Left-Right	Economics and Culture
[*elite right-left polarization i, j (t)*]	0.539** (0.060)	
[*elite economic polarization i, j (t)*]		0.399** (0.052)
[*elite cultural polarization i, j (t)*]		0.371** (0.039)
[*i, j are coalition partners (t)*]	-0.871** (0.156)	-0.781** (0.209)
[*i, j are opposition partners (t)*]	-0.323** (0.091)	-0.314** (0.091)
[*out-party j is radical right*]	1.644** (0.200)	1.472** (0.189)
[*in-party i is radical right*]	0.488** (0.111)	0.326** (0.107)
Austria	0.632 (0.470)	0.612 (0.434)
Canada	0.539 (0.579)	.586 (0.520)
Denmark	-0.367 (0.402)	-0.311 (0.404)
Finland	-0.526 (0.429)	-0.419 (0.412)
France	0.214 (0.198)	0.275 (0.247)
Germany	0.067 (0.419)	0.119 (0.409)
Great Britain	0.334 (0.513)	0.578 (0.454)
Greece	1.139 (0.511)	0.521 (.427)
Iceland	-0.165 (0.437)	-0.124 (0.401)
Ireland	0.086 (0.491)	0.220 (0.437)
Israel	-0.048 (0.524)	-0.057 (0.502)
Netherlands	-0.644 (0.429)	-0.660 (0.493)
New Zealand	-0.222 (0.400)	-0.353 (0.394)
Norway	-0.610 (.441)	-0.511 (.406)
Portugal	0.600 (0.425)	0.652 (0.412)
Spain	1.352*	1.158**

	(490)	(.503)
Sweden	-0.17	-0.292
	(0.424)	(0.417)
Switzerland	-1.269*	-960**
	(0.436)	(0.429)
United States of America	0.632	0.481
	(0.437)	(0.424)
1997	0.399	0.277
	(0.461)	(0.387)
1998	-0.003	0.048
	(0.248)	(0.289)
1999	0.195	0.223
	(0.299)	(0.283)
2000	-0.265	-0.142
	(0.332)	(0.355)
2001	0.183	0.095
	(0.301)	(0.285)
2002	0.194	0.209
	(0.253)	(0.286)
2003	0.290	0.307
	(0.348)	(0.319)
2004	-0.536	-0.542
	(0.639)	(0.656)
2005	0.194	0.052
	(0.324)	(0.317)
2006	-0.045	-0.052
	(0.265)	(0.365)
2007	0.117	0.119
	(0.271)	(0.274)
2008	0.114	0.258
	(0.350)	(0.366)
2009	0.181	0.098
	(0.339)	(0.303)
2010	-0.100	0.103
	(0.268)	(0388)
2011	0.171	0.212
	(0.337)	(0.313)
2012	-0.298	0.305
	(0.377)	(0.316)
2013	0.180	0.167
	(0.362)	(0.334)
2014	0.071	0.046
	(0.234)	(0.262)
2015	-0.072	-0.143
	(0.420)	(0.366)
2016	0.372	0.318
	(0.408)	(0.417)
2017	-0.710	-0.203
	(0.449)	(0.452)
N	2232	2232

Adjusted R2	0.33		0.34

** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$: two-tailed tests.

<u>Notes</u>. In these models the dependent variable, [*party i's supporters' evaluations of party j (t)*], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to party *j* in the CSES election survey administered at time *t*, computed over all respondents who supported party *i* and who provided valid thermometer ratings of party *j*. We reversed the thermometer ratings so that 10 denotes maximum dislike. The dependent variables are defined in the text of the paper. The top number in each cell is the standardized coefficient, the number in parentheses below is the standard error. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on countries. The reference category for the country fixed effects is Australia, and the reference category for the year fixed effects is 1996.

Table A5: Estimates Using Experts' Party Placements to Measure Elite Polarization

	Left-Right Models			Economics and Culture Models	
	Basic Model (1)	Full Model (2)		Basic Model (3)	Full Model (4)
[*elite right-left polarization i, j (t)*]	0.691** (0.069)	0.727** (0.063)			
[*elite economic polarization i, j (t)*]				0.722** (0.062)	0.676** (0.066)
[*elite cultural polarization i, j (t)*]				0.412** (0.058)	0.356** (0.055)
[*i, j are coalition partners (t)*]		-0.653** (0.112)			-0.582** (0.147)
[*i, j are opposition partners (t)*]		-0.306** (0.101)			-0.355** (0.094)
[*out-party j is radical right*]		2.087** (0.300)			1.261** (0.273)
[*in-party i is radical right*]		0.122 (0.177)			0.574* (0.090)
Country and year fixed effects	**Yes**	**Yes**		**Yes**	**Yes**
N	1222	1222		1222	1222
Adjusted R2	.360	.505		.500	.563

** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$: two-tailed tests.

Notes. In these models the dependent variable, [*party i's supporters' evaluations of party j* (*t*)], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to party *j* in the CSES election survey administered at time *t*, computed over all respondents who supported party *i* and who provided valid thermometer ratings of party *j*. The measures of party elite distances on ideology and issues were based on experts' party placements from the Chapel Hill Exert Surveys, which were administered in European Union countries. The other independent variables are defined in the main text of the paper. The top number in each cell is the standardized coefficient, the number in parentheses below is the standard error. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on countries. All models include country and year fixed effects.

Table A6: The Predictors of Out-Party Dislike: Earlier and Later Time Periods

Full Left-Right Model

	1996-2006 (1)	2007-2017 (2)
[*elite right-left polarization i, j* (*t*)]	0.668** (0.075)	0.440** (.085)
[*i, j are coalition partners* (*t*)]	-0.913** (0.239)	-0.826** (0.214)
[*i, j are opposition partners* (*t*)]	-0.341** (0.144)	-0.306** (0.115)
[*out-party j is radical right*]	1.562** (0.258)	1.686** (0.265)
[*in-party i is radical right*]	0.390* (0.165)	0.530** (0.138)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES
N	1009	1223
Adjusted R2	0.366	0.321

** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$: two-tailed tests.

Notes. In these models the dependent variable, [*party i's supporters' evaluations of party j* (*t*)], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to party *j* in the CSES election survey administered at time *t*, computed over all respondents who supported party *i* and who provided valid thermometer ratings of party *j*. For these analyses we reversed the thermometer ratings so that 10 denotes maximum dislike. The independent variables are defined in the text. The top number in each cell is the standardized coefficient, the number in parentheses below is the

standard error. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on countries.

Table A7: economic and cultural distance over-time with same country sample

	1996-2006 (1)	2007-2017 (2)
[*elite economic polarization i, j* (*t*)]	0.463** (0.068)	0.311*** (0.054)
[*elite cultural polarization i, j* (*t*)]	0.363** (0.084)	0.445*** (0.082)
[*i, j are coalition partners* (*t*)]	-0.950** (0.304)	−0.689* (0.334)
[*i, j are opposition partners* (*t*)]	-0.362** (0.153)	−0.293** (0.105)
[*out-party j is radical right*]	1.437** (0.183)	1.786*** (0.317)
[*in-party i is radical right*]	0.269 (0.183)	0.432** (0.161)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES
N	1009	1009
Adjusted R2	0.339	0.343

Notes. In these models the dependent variable, [*party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j* (*t*)], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. We reversed the thermometer ratings so that 10 denotes maximum dislike. The dependent variables are defined in the text. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include country and year fixed effects. We excluded Austria and Greece, so the sample of countries included in both time periods is identical.

Table A8: economic and cultural distance over-time with Individual Level Data

	1996-2006 (1)	2007-2017 (2)
[*elite economic polarization i, j (t)*]	0.470∗∗∗ (0.056)	0.351∗∗∗ (0.069)
[*elite cultural polarization i, j (t)*]	0.347∗∗∗ (0.070)	0.409∗∗∗ (0.087)
[*i, j are coalition partners (t)*]	−1.034∗∗∗ (0.261)	−0.653∗ (0.279)
[*i, j are opposition partners (t)*]	−0.371∗∗∗ (0.105)	−0.437∗∗ (0.112)
[*out-party j is radical right*]	1.255∗∗∗ (0.238)	1.426∗∗∗ (0.249)
Individual Fixed Effects	YES	YES
N	182,508	176,848
Adjusted R2	0.116	0.126

Table A9: Non-linear relationships between elite distance and affective evaluations

	(1)	(2)
[*elite economic polarization i, j (t)*]	0.378∗∗∗ (0.066)	
[*elite economic polarization i, j (t)*] squared	−0.008 (0.024)	
[*elite cultural polarization i, j (t)*]	0.458∗∗∗ (0.061)	
[*elite cultural polarization i, j (t)*] squared	−0.044 (0.023)	
[*elite left-right polarization i, j (t)*]		0.650∗∗∗ (0.062)

[*elite left-right polarization i, j (t)*] squared		−0.097∗∗∗ (0.036)
[*i, j are coalition partners (t)*]	−0.783∗∗∗ (0.223)	−0.843∗∗∗ (0.162)
[*i, j are opposition partners (t)*]	−0.320∗∗∗ (0.091)	−0.309∗∗∗ (0.089)
[*out-party j is radical right*]	1.380∗∗∗ (0.202)	1.629∗∗∗ (0.202)
[*in-party i is radical right*]	0.313∗∗ (0.124)	0.460∗∗ (0.111)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES
N	2,232	2,232
Adjusted R2	0.337	0.329

Notes. In these models the dependent variable, [*party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j (t)*], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. We reversed the thermometer ratings so that 10 denotes maximum dislike. The dependent variables are defined in the text. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on elections. All models include country and year fixed effects.

Table A10: Standard Errors Clustered at Country Level

	Left-Right model (1)	Economics & Culture model (2)
[*elite right-left polarization i, j (t)*]	0.54[**] (0.08)	
[*elite economic polarization i, j (t)*]		0.37[**] (0.04)
[*elite cultural polarization i, j (t)*]		0.40[**] (0.08)
[*i, j are coalition partners (t)*]	-0.87[**] (0.22)	-0.78[**] (0.32)

[*i, j are opposition partners* (*t*)]	-0.32** (0.08)	-0.31** (0.07)
[*out-party j is radical right*]	1.64** (0.23)	1.47** (0.24)
[*in-party i is radical right*]	0.49** (0.13)	0.33* (0.13)
Country and year fixed effects	YES	YES
Adjusted R2	0.34	0.35

** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$: two-tailed tests.

<u>Notes</u>. The dependent variable [*party i's supporters' evaluations of out-party j* (*t*)], is the average thermometer rating on a 0-10 scale that party *i*'s partisans assigned to party *j* in the election survey administered at time *t*. We reversed the thermometer ratings so that 10 denotes maximum dislike. The dependent variables are defined in the text. The OLS regression models were estimated with standard errors clustered on countries, with country and year fixed effects which are reported in Section S3 of the online supplementary information memo. Section S1 in this memo lists the countries, elections, and parties in our data set.

Figure A1: partial residual plots

Notes. Figure A1 presents partial residual plots by country for the three continuous variables in the regression analyses, with fitted lines and 95% confidence intervals.