Online Appendix

Modern Family? The Gendered Effects of Marriage and Childbearing on Voter Turnout

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A Appendix for Online Publication

Figure A1: Evolution of Voter Turnout in Italy and Other Democratic Countries



Notes: This figure shows trends in average voter turnout by decade in national elections in Italy and other continuously democratic countries since World War 2 (using data from Kostelka and Blais (2021)). Other continuously democratic countries include: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.

A.1 Trends in Voter Turnout

Figure A1 show trends in average voter turnout by decade in Italy and other democratic countries since the 1940s. The decline in participation in Italy since the 1970s mirrors trends in other established democracies.

Figure A2 plots average turnout by voter gender in Italy and in Emilia-Romagna in the 1994, 1996, 2001, and 2006 national parliamentary elections and in the 1995, 2000, and 2005 regional elections. The figure is based on data from the *Osservatorio Prospex sull'Astensionismo Elettorale* (the *Prospex data*, henceforth). These are individual-level administrative data on voter turnout collected by the research foundation *Istituto Cattaneo*. The Prospex data are an unbalanced panel of approximately 140,000 Italian voters, followed over regional and national elections held in 1994 through 2006. The sampling procedure underlying the Prospex data ensures that the sample is

Figure A2: Voter Turnout in Italy and in Emilia-Romagna by Voter Gender, 1994–2006



Notes: This figure reports average voter turnout in Italy and in Emilia-Romagna by gender in the 1994, 1996, 2001, and 2006 national parliamentary elections (left panel) and in the 1995, 2000, and 2005 regional elections (right panel). The figure is based on administrative voter turnout data at the individual level (i.e., the Prospex data), covering a representative sample of voters from 100 Italian precincts.

representative of the 1981 national population in terms of regions of residence and city size.[1]

[1]For further details on the Prospex data, see http://www.cattaneo.org/activity/rete-prospex/ (in Italian). Accessed: June 22, 2022.

A.2 Demographic Trends in Marriage and Fertility

Here we describe in greater detail the demographic trends that we briefly discuss in the Background section of the main text. Panel A in Table A1 reports the share of never-married, married, divorced, and widowed voters in each election-year included in our administrative data from Bologna, Italy. Panels B and C show these averages among voters who, in every election-year, had below-median and above-median income, respectively. Table A2 shows the average number number of cohabiting kids, among all voters and in different theoretically-important subsets of the electorate (i.e., never-married parents, born in the North of Italy, born in the South).

Panel A in Table A1 documents the significant decline in marriage rates in Bologna. Whereas 54.6% were married in 2004, this proportion dropped to 50.4% in 2013, a trend that was driven by a large increase in never-married voters (29.6% in 2004, compared to 33.5% in 2013) and to a lesser extent by an increase in divorced voters (3.5% in 2004, compared to 4.5% in 2013). Importantly, Panel B shows that this evolution disproportionately affected low-income voters and accelerated with the beginning of Great Recession in 2008. Whereas 28.5% of voters with below-median income were never-married in 2004, this proportion increased to 32.4% in 2008, and to 39.7% in 2013. By contrast, Panel C shows that the proportion of never-married remained stable among above-median income voters (26.5%) between 2004 and 2009, and then rose slightly (28.3%) in 2013, perhaps partly as a result of the economic crisis.

Table A2 shows that the average number of kids per household increased slightly over the period of study, from 0.260 in 2004 to 0.266 in 2013. Interestingly, this trend was partly driven by increasing fertility among households with never-married voters, where the average number of cohabiting kids increased from 0.07 in 2004 to 0.1 in 2013. Yet, we also find that the average number of kids was significantly higher in more traditional families. Specifically, Table A2 documents that, in each election-year, the average number of kids was about 0.4 if one or both married parents were internal migrants from the South of Italy (column 4). The average number of kids in households where both married parents were born in the North (column 3) increased slightly, from 0.246 in 2004 to 0.263 in 2013.

Table A1: Trends in Marital Status in Bologna, 2004–2013

	Marital Status:				
	Never-Married	Married	Divorced	Widowed	N
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A. All Voters					
Election year:					
2004	.296	.546	.035	.123	304,879
2008	.312	.528	.038	.122	289,857
2009	.315	.524	.040	.121	286,757
2013	.335	.504	.045	.116	281,862
Panel B. Voters with Below-Median Household Income					
Election year:					
2004	.285	.500	.040	.175	119,863
2008	.324	.462	.045	.168	107,617
2009	.338	.452	.046	.164	105,228
2013	.397	.408	.051	.145	106,567
Panel C. Voters with Above-Median Household Income					
Election year:					
2004	.265	.605	.029	.101	113,537
2008	.264	.605	.031	.101	105,506
2009	.265	.602	.032	.101	106,026
2013	.283	.585	.035	.096	106,000

Notes: Each cell reports the share of voters with a given marital status (columns) in a given year (rows). The sample in Panel A includes all eligible voters. The sample in Panel B (resp. Panel C) is restricted to voters whose household income is, in every election, below (resp. above) the election-specific median household income.

Table A2: Fertility Trends in Bologna, 2004–2013

	Counts of Cohabiting Children Aged 0-to-18				
Sample:	All Voters	Never-Married Voters	Ever-Married Couples Both Born North	At Least One Spouse Born South	Ever-Married Couples Both Born South
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Election year:					
2004	.260	.070	.246	.421	.395
2008	.263	.083	.258	.410	.374
2009	.263	.085	.261	.406	.374
2013	.266	.103	.263	.412	.389

Notes: The table reports mean counts of cohabiting kids aged 0-to-18. The sample in column 1 consists of heads of households and spouses or cohabiting partners thereof. In column 2, the sample is further restricted to never-married voters. The sample in column 3 (resp. columns 4 and 5) is restricted to couples of ever-married voters with both spouses born in Northern regions (resp. at least one spouse and both spouses born in Center-South regions).

A.3 Sample Data Rows

Figure A3 shows some sample data rows to better illustrate the structure of the data. For the sake of space, we only report the main variables discussed throughout the paper. Here is a description of the reported variables:

- *ID_hh*: household ID,
- *ID_voter*: time-invariant voter ID,
- *year*: election year,
- *hh_position*: position relative to the head of the household as of Election Day,
- *age*: age in years as of Election Day,
- *female*: voter gender,
- *income*: individual-level income in the year of the election (in 2010 k€),
- *hh_income*: OECD-modified household income in the year of the election (in 2010 k€),
- *maritalstatus*: marital status as of Election Day (i.e., never-married, married, divorced, or widowed),
- *nkids_0to5*: counts of cohabiting kids aged 0 through 5 as of Election Day (can be different from 0 only for heads of household, as well as their spouses or unmarried cohabiting partners),
- *nkids_6to11*: counts of cohabiting kids aged 6 through 11 as of Election Day (can be different from 0 only for heads of household, as well as their spouses or unmarried cohabiting partners),
- *nkids_12to17*: counts of cohabiting kids aged 12 through 17 as of Election Day (can be different from 0 only for heads of household, as well as their spouses or unmarried cohabiting partners),
- *nkids_18more*: counts of cohabiting kids aged 18 or older as of Election Day (can be different from 0 only for heads of household, as well as their spouses or unmarried cohabiting partners).

Figure A3: Sample Data Rows

	ID_hh	ID_voter	year	hh_position	age	female	income	hh_income	maritalstatus	nkids_0to5	nkids_6to11	nkids_12to17	nkids_18more
394607	20246029	20190942	2009	Head of household	66	Male	16.656026	14.798681	Married	0	0	0	0
394608	20246029	20190943	2009	Spouse	62	Female	12.941336	14.798681	Married	0	0	0	0
394609	20246029	20190942	2013	Head of household	70	Male	16.336166	14.514164	Married	0	0	0	0
394610	20246029	20190943	2013	Spouse	65	Female	12.692162	14.514164	Married	0	0	0	0
394611	20246031	20113721	2004	Head of household	34	Female	26.308302	36.07286	Married	1	0	0	0
394612	20246031	20968441	2004	Spouse	33	Male	45.837419	36.07286	Married	1	0	0	0
394614	20246031	20113721	2008	Head of household	38	Female	44.322265	49.79323	Married	2	0	0	0
394615	20246031	20968441	2008	Spouse	36	Male	55.264195	49.79323	Married	2	0	0	0
394618	20246031	20113721	2009	Head of household	39	Female	46.035293	49.634371	Married	2	0	0	0
394619	20246031	20968441	2009	Spouse	38	Male	53.23345	49.634371	Married	2	0	0	0
394622	20246031	20113721	2013	Head of household	43	Female	55.653447	56.147309	Married	0	2	0	0
394623	20246031	20968441	2013	Spouse	41	Male	56.641171	56.147309	Married	0	2	0	0
394626	20246038	20061919	2004	Head of household	39	Female	6.5027302	19.295618	Married	1	1	0	0
394627	20246038	20754672	2004	Spouse	44	Male	32.088506	19.295618	Married	1	1	0	0
394631	20246038	20754672	2008	Spouse	47	Male	29.731675	29.731675	Married	0	1	1	0
394635	20246038	20754672	2009	Spouse	49	Male	30.31223	30.31223	Married	0	1	1	0
394638	20246038	20061919	2013	Head of household	47	Female	8.1916903	18.370161	Married	0	0	2	0
394639	20246038	20754672	2013	Spouse	52	Male	28.548631	18.370161	Married	0	0	2	0
394646	20246041	20061920	2004	Head of household	70	Male	24.231041	15.937967	Married	0	0	0	0
394647	20246041	20061921	2004	Spouse	60	Female	7.6448933	15.937967	Married	0	0	0	0
394648	20246041	20061920	2008	Head of household	74	Male	19.225679	19.225679	Widowed	0	0	0	0
394649	20246043	20064163	2004	Head of household	77	Male	15.351466	12.116622	Married	0	0	0	0
394650	20246043	20064164	2004	Spouse	66	Female	8.8817778	12.116622	Married	0	0	0	0

Notes: This figure reports sample data rows and the key variables used in the analyses.

A.4 Turnout by Income, Gender, and Age

In this appendix, we provide further descriptive evidence of gender heterogeneity in the income-turnout relationship. Specifically, pooling the samples used in Figure 2, Appendix Figure A4 plots the lowess fit of voter turnout on OECD-modified household income by voter gender and age group. The figure shows, separately for women and men, the turnout-income relationship among young voters (i.e., voters aged 18–27 as of the first election a voter appears in the data), voters in prime marriage years (i.e., voters aged 28–47 as of the first election a voter appears in the data), and for older voters (i.e., aged 48 or older).

Figure A4: Turnout by Income, Gender, and Age



Notes: The figure plots the lowess fit of voter turnout on OECD-modified household income, in 2010 k€, by voter gender and by age as of the first election a voter first appears in the data.

A.5 Rescaled Event-Study Impact Estimates

To visualize how *levels* of turnout change following marriage and childbirth, here we rescale event-study impact estimates using gender-specific average turnout in the last election before marriage or before parenthood. That is, Figure A5 plots the same estimates and confidence intervals as Figure 3a, after adding gender-specific mean turnout in the last pre-marriage election. This rescaling reveals that the positive effect of marriage on male turnout (and the statistically null effect on female turnout) entirely erases the pre-marriage gender gap in turnout. Analogously, Figure A6 shows that, before childbirth (i.e., $\tau < 0$), both parents exhibit similar levels of turnout; but, in the first election after childbirth, maternal turnout drops below pre-parenthood levels, while paternal turnout remains substantively unaffected.

Figure A5: Event Study of the Impact of Marriage on Turnout: Rescaling by Gender-Specific Mean Turnout in the Last Election Before Marriage



Notes: This figure reports the same event-study estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals of Figure 3a, after rescaling them by gender-specific average turnout in the last pre-marriage election (i.e., at $\tau = -1$). Orange and blue denote, respectively, female and male voters.

Figure A6: Event Study of the Impact of Parenthood on Turnout: Rescaling by Gender-Specific Mean Turnout in the Last Election Before Childbirth



Notes: This figure reports the same event-study estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals of Figure 5a, after rescaling them by gender-specific average turnout in the last election before parenthood (i.e., at $\tau = -1$). Orange and blue denote, respectively, female and male voters.

A.6 Heterogeneity in the Effects of Marriage

In this appendix section, we investigate the effects of marriage vary between national and European/municipal elections. We explore this heterogeneity in our DD models. Table A3 reports the turnout effects of the transition from never-married to married in different subsamples of our data. Column 1 in A3 is identical to column 3 in Table 2, and all models use the full set of available controls. We find that our results are robust when we look at national elections and same-day European/municipal elections separately. Looking specifically at national political elections, patterns of impact estimates are overall similar to those from the full sample, even if the differential effect of marriage on men's falls short of statistical significance.

Table A3: Heterogeneity in the Turnout Effects of Marriage

	Full Sample		European/ Municipal Elections		National Political Elections	
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Married female	.004		-.008		.011	
	(.005)		(.008)		(.008)	
Married male	.019	**	.017	*	.021	**
	(.004)		(.007)		(.007)	
$\beta^{\text{married female}} - \beta^{\text{married male}}$	-.015	*	-.025	*	-.010	
	(.006)		(.010)		(.010)	
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls	✓		✓		✓	
Voter controls	✓		✓		✓	
Children×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓	
Never-married female $\bar{Y}$	.813		.821		.832	
Never-married male $\bar{Y}$	.787		.797		.807	
N	1,084,202		490,054		473,894	

Notes: The table reports estimates of the β coefficients from equation 1. Column 1 reports the same estimates and standard errors as Table 2, column 3. In columns 2 and 3, the sample is restricted to, respectively, European/municipal and national political elections. Neighborhood controls are precinct-year average age and household income, as well as shares of female and Italian residents, and city neighborhood-by-year FEs. Voter controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, OECD-modified gross household income, as well as own income and taxes paid. Children FEs are four dummies indicating presence of one or more children of the following ages: 0-5, 6-11, 12,-17, 18+. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

A.7 Heterogeneity in the Effects of Child-Rearing

We now explore heterogeneity of child-rearing effects along several margins. Table A4 focuses on voters' marital status and geographic origin. Specifically, column 2 reports estimated children effects on ever-married voters; column 3 reports effects on never-married voters; columns 4 and 5 restrict attention to ever-married voters born in Northern and Center-South regions (as defined by ISTAT), respectively; column 1 reports estimates from the full children sample for comparison.

The negative effect of children 5 or younger on maternal turnout is larger on ever-married voters than on never-married ones and on married parents from Center-South regions than on married parents from Northern regions. Since conservative values–particularly on the role of mothers–are arguably stronger among married individuals and among voters from Center-South regions (Alesina and Ichino, 2009), this pattern of effects corroborates the importance of gendered social norms in explaining our children effects. Comparisons between female- and male-specific impact estimates largely support the same conclusion, as differences between effects on maternal and paternal turnout are typically larger among married voters and voters from the Center-South.

In Table A5, we further examine the effects of parenthood among internal migrants from the Center-South of Italy. Results show that the gender asymmetry is larger when both parents were born in the Center-South of Italy than if only one parent is an internal migrant. Interestingly, we find larger gendered effects when (at least) the father is from the Center-South than when the mother is.

Table A6 explores heterogeneity by voting costs–proxied by distance to the polling place–and in the total number of children a voter had over the sample years. Specifically, column 2 restricts the sample to voters living within 400 meters from their polling place (measured in a straight line), corresponding to approximately the median distance in the sample. Column 3 looks at voters living farther than 400 meters from their polling place. Column 4 restricts the sample to voters who have exactly one kid in at least one election and never have more than one kid. Column 1 reports estimates from the full sample for comparison.

All point estimates are substantively in line with those from the full sample, thus suggesting that gender differences in the cost of reaching one's polling location in presence of children are

not the main drivers of our gender-heterogeneous effects. Yet, these results should be interpreted with caution, as distance to the polling place could correlate with other voter characteristics (e.g., income) that may attenuate the negative effect of children on the gender turnout gap.

Table A7 explores heterogeneity by political context. Column 2 restricts the sample to the two European/municipal elections covered by our data (2004 and 2009), while column 3 looks at the two national political elections (2008 and 2013). Columns 4 (respectively, column 5) focuses on residents of precincts where, in the 2008 national election, the center-left coalition received a vote share higher than (respectively, at or lower) than in the median precinct (57.2%).

There is no obvious pattern of heterogeneity by precinct-level results in the 2008 election. By contrast, effects on the gender turnout gap seem stronger in (slightly) lower-salience European/municipal elections than in national political elections. However, two important caveats are in order here. First, these regressions only use two data points for each voter. Second, the differential timing of the two types of elections could mask other margins of heterogeneity. For example, the 2008 and 2013 national elections span the years of the Great Recession, which could drive the relatively smaller effect of children on the gender turnout gap in several ways (e.g., making the allocation of family chores/parental duties more equal across partners).

Finally, Figures A7 and A8 explore whether the gendered effects of childbearing are stronger/weaker when voters lose their job or start working part-time after becoming parents. Before discussing the results, three important caveats are in order. First, we do not observe occupational status, but only voter-level income. Thus, we try to identify voters who give up paid work or who start working part-time as individuals who, in the first post-children election, earn less than 70% of their income in the last pre-children election.[2] Second, voter-level income and occupational status are themselves potentially affected by the presence of children (i.e., by the treatment). Thus, heterogeneous

[2]In Italy, the standard level of maternity benefits is 80%. Thus, accounting for salary increases that likely occur between elections (e.g., due to seniority), a 70%-income threshold should neatly separate people on maternity leave (or who maintain their old job) from people who take part-time jobs or give up paid work entirely.

effects by income/occupational status should be interpreted with caution. Third, here we use event-study graphs, as these are the natural instrument of choice to study patterns of effects around the time voters have kids.

With these important caveats in mind, a comparison of Figures A7b and A8b suggests that the gendered effects of children on turnout are more pronounced (i.e., relatively stronger on women) on voters who lose more than 30% of their last pre-children income.

Table A4: Effect of Children on Turnout by Children's Age and Voter's Gender: by Marital Status and Geographic Origin

	Full Sample		Ever-Married Voters		Never-Married Voters		Ever-Married Couples Both Born North		Ever-Married Couples Both Born South	
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
Female w/ children aged 0-5	-.017	**	-.018	**	-.009		-.014	**	-.040	**
	(.003)		(.004)		(.009)		(.004)		(.010)	
Male w/ children aged 0-5	.001		-.001		.021	*	-.007		.008	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.010)		(.004)		(.009)	
Female w/ children aged 6-11	.004		.002		.018		-.001		.010	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.011)		(.004)		(.009)	
Male w/ children aged 6-11	.010	**	.009	**	.015		.005		.030	**
	(.003)		(.003)		(.015)		(.004)		(.009)	
Female w/ children aged 12-17	.006	*	.004		.020		-.001		.015	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.013)		(.003)		(.008)	
Male w/ children aged 12-17	.013	**	.013	**	.015		.010	**	.020	*
	(.003)		(.003)		(.020)		(.003)		(.008)	
Female w/ children aged 18+	.013	**	.012	**	.034	*	.011	**	.023	**
	(.002)		(.002)		(.015)		(.003)		(.007)	
Male w/ children aged 18+	.011	**	.012	**	.022		.007	**	.019	**
	(.002)		(.002)		(.030)		(.003)		(.007)	
$\beta^{0\text{-}5\ female} - \beta^{0\text{-}5\ male}$	-.018	**	-.017	**	-.029	*	-.007		-.048	**
	(.004)		(.004)		(.013)		(.005)		(.011)	
$\beta^{6\text{-}11\ female} - \beta^{6\text{-}11\ male}$	-.006		-.008	*	.004		-.005		-.020	
	(.004)		(.004)		(.019)		(.004)		(.010)	
$\beta^{12\text{-}17\ female} - \beta^{12\text{-}17\ male}$	-.007	*	-.008	*	.005		-.011	**	-.005	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.024)		(.004)		(.010)	
$\beta^{18+\ female} - \beta^{18+\ male}$	.002		.001		.012		.003		.004	
	(.003)		(.003)		(.033)		(.003)		(.008)	
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Voter controls	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Marital status×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Female w/o kids $\bar{Y}$	.809		.813		.797		.821		.750	
Male w/o kids $\bar{Y}$	.833		.863		.762		.881		.777	
N	902,103		735,362		166,737		501,518		99,648	

Notes: The table reports estimates of the β coefficients from equation 2. Column 1 reports the same estimates and standard errors as Table 3, column 3. In column 2, the sample is restricted to voters whose marital status is different from "never-married" in at least one election. Column 3 focuses on voters whose marital status is "never-married" throughout the sample years. The sample in column 4 (resp. column 5) is restricted to ever-married voters born in Northern (resp. Center-South) regions and whose spouses were also born in Northern (resp. Center-South) regions. Neighborhood controls are precinct-year average age and household income, as well as shares of female and Italian residents, and city neighborhood-by-year FEs. Voter controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, OECD-modified gross household income, as well as own income and taxes paid. Marital status FEs are three, mutually exclusive dummies indicating married, divorced, and widowed voters. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A5: Effect of Children on Turnout by Children's Age and Voter's Gender: by Geographic Origin (Continued)

	Full Sample		Ever-Married Couples Both Born South		At Least One Spouse Born South		At Least Wife Born South		At Least Husband Born South	
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
Female w/ children aged 0-5	-.017	**	-.040	**	-.028	**	-.027	**	-.034	**
	(.003)		(.010)		(.006)		(.007)		(.008)	
Male w/ children aged 0-5	.001		.008		.004		.007		.001	
	(.003)		(.009)		(.006)		(.007)		(.007)	
Female w/ children aged 6-11	.004		.010		-.000		.004		-.001	
	(.003)		(.009)		(.006)		(.007)		(.007)	
Male w/ children aged 6-11	.010	**	.030	**	.014	*	.011		.021	**
	(.003)		(.009)		(.005)		(.007)		(.006)	
Female w/ children aged 12-17	.006	*	.015		.009		.012	*	.007	
	(.003)		(.008)		(.005)		(.006)		(.006)	
Male w/ children aged 12-17	.013	**	.020	*	.014	**	.015	*	.017	**
	(.003)		(.008)		(.005)		(.006)		(.006)	
Female w/ children aged 18+	.013	**	.023	**	.015	**	.017	**	.017	**
	(.002)		(.007)		(.004)		(.005)		(.005)	
Male w/ children aged 18+	.011	**	.019	**	.020	**	.018	**	.021	**
	(.002)		(.007)		(.004)		(.005)		(.005)	
$\beta^{0\text{-}5\ female} - \beta^{0\text{-}5\ male}$	-.018	**	-.048	**	-.032	**	-.034	**	-.035	**
	(.004)		(.011)		(.007)		(.009)		(.008)	
$\beta^{6\text{-}11\ female} - \beta^{6\text{-}11\ male}$	-.006		-.020		-.014	*	-.007		-.022	**
	(.004)		(.010)		(.006)		(.008)		(.008)	
$\beta^{12\text{-}17\ female} - \beta^{12\text{-}17\ male}$	-.007	*	-.005		-.005		-.003		-.010	
	(.003)		(.010)		(.006)		(.007)		(.007)	
$\beta^{18+\ female} - \beta^{18+\ male}$	.002		.004		-.005		-.001		-.005	
	(.003)		(.008)		(.005)		(.006)		(.006)	
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Voter controls	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Marital status×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Female w/o kids $\bar{Y}$	.809		.750		.793		.775		.821	
Male w/o kids $\bar{Y}$	.833		.777		.823		.845		.810	
N	902,103		99,648		206,145		136,336		133,169	

Notes: The table reports estimates of the β coefficients from equation 2. Column 1 reports the same estimates and standard errors as Table 3, column 3. The sample in column 2 is restricted to ever-married voters born in Center-South regions and whose spouses were also born in Center-South regions. The sample for column 3 (resp. columns 4 and 5) is restricted to couples of ever-married voters where at least one voter (resp. the woman and the man) comes from a Center-South region. Neighborhood controls are precinct-year average age and household income, as well as shares of female and Italian residents, and city neighborhood-by-year FEs. Voter controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, OECD-modified gross household income, as well as own income and taxes paid. Marital status FEs are three, mutually exclusive dummies indicating married, divorced, and widowed voters. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A6: Effect of Children on Turnout by Children's Age and Voter's Gender: by Cost of Voting

	Full Sample		Distance 0-400m		Distance 400m+		Max 1 Kid	
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
Female w/ children aged 0-5	-.017	**	-.015	**	-.017	**	-.019	**
	(.003)		(.005)		(.005)		(.004)	
Male w/ children aged 0-5	.001		-.003		.003		.001	
	(.003)		(.005)		(.005)		(.004)	
Female w/ children aged 6-11	.004		.006		-.0002		.005	
	(.003)		(.004)		(.0043)		(.004)	
Male w/ children aged 6-11	.010	**	.008		.008	*	.012	**
	(.003)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
Female w/ children aged 12-17	.006	*	.006		.004		.007	*
	(.003)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
Male w/ children aged 12-17	.013	**	.010	*	.011	**	.015	**
	(.003)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
Female w/ children aged 18+	.013	**	.009	**	.016	**	.021	**
	(.002)		(.003)		(.003)		(.004)	
Male w/ children aged 18+	.011	**	.005		.015	**	.025	**
	(.002)		(.003)		(.003)		(.004)	
$\beta^{0\text{-}5\ female} - \beta^{0\text{-}5\ male}$	-.018	**	-.013	*	-.019	**	-.020	**
	(.004)		(.006)		(.006)		(.005)	
$\beta^{6\text{-}11\ female} - \beta^{6\text{-}11\ male}$	-.006		-.002		-.009		-.006	
	(.004)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)	
$\beta^{12\text{-}17\ female} - \beta^{12\text{-}17\ male}$	-.007	*	-.003		-.007		-.008	
	(.003)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)	
$\beta^{18+\ female} - \beta^{18+\ male}$	.002		.004		.000		-.005	
	(.003)		(.004)		(.004)		(.005)	
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Voter controls	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Marital status×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Female w/o kids $\bar{Y}$	.809		.813		.807		.855	
Male w/o kids $\bar{Y}$	.833		.840		.831		.844	
N	902,103		455,639		425,283		176,868	

Notes: The table reports estimates of the β coefficients from equation 2. Column 1 reports the same estimates and standard errors as Table 3, column 3. The sample in columns 2 and 3 is restricted to voters living within 400 and more than 400 meters of their polling place, respectively. The sample in column 4 is restricted to voters who have at most 1 cohabiting child. Neighborhood controls are precinct-year average age and household income, as well as shares of female and Italian residents, and city neighborhood-by-year FEs. Voter controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, OECD-modified gross household income, as well as own income and taxes paid. Marital status FEs are three, mutually exclusive dummies indicating married, divorced, and widowed voters. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A7: Effect of Children on Turnout by Children's Age and Voter's Gender: by Political Context

	Full Sample		European/ Municipal Elections		National Political Elections		High Left Vote Share		Low Left Vote Share	
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
Female w/ children aged 0-5	-.017	**	-.020	**	-.005		-.017	**	-.015	**
	(.003)		(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)	
Male w/ children aged 0-5	.001		-.000		.005		-.0005		.004	
	(.003)		(.005)		(.005)		(.0046)		(.004)	
Female w/ children aged 6-11	.004		.008		.003		.015	**	-.006	
	(.003)		(.005)		(.005)		(.004)		(.004)	
Male w/ children aged 6-11	.010	**	.011	*	.009		.012	**	.006	
	(.003)		(.005)		(.005)		(.004)		(.004)	
Female w/ children aged 12-17	.006	*	.019	**	-.003		.011	**	.001	
	(.003)		(.005)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
Male w/ children aged 12-17	.013	**	.015	**	.005		.013	**	.011	**
	(.003)		(.005)		(.004)		(.004)		(.004)	
Female w/ children aged 18+	.013	**	.017	**	.011	**	.008	**	.018	**
	(.002)		(.003)		(.004)		(.003)		(.003)	
Male w/ children aged 18+	.011	**	.012	**	.011	**	.011	**	.011	**
	(.002)		(.004)		(.004)		(.003)		(.003)	
$\beta^{0\text{-}5\ female} - \beta^{0\text{-}5\ male}$	-.018	**	-.020	**	-.010		-.016	**	-.018	**
	(.004)		(.007)		(.007)		(.006)		(.006)	
$\beta^{6\text{-}11\ female} - \beta^{6\text{-}11\ male}$	-.006		-.002		-.006		.003		-.012	*
	(.004)		(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)	
$\beta^{12\text{-}17\ female} - \beta^{12\text{-}17\ male}$	-.007	*	.004		-.009		-.002		-.010	*
	(.003)		(.005)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)	
$\beta^{18+\ female} - \beta^{18+\ male}$	.002		.005		-.000		-.002		.007	
	(.003)		(.004)		(.005)		(.004)		(.004)	
Voter FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Age×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Neighborhood controls	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Voter controls	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Marital status×Gender FEs	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Female w/o kids $\bar{Y}$	.809		.821		.826		.818		.802	
Male w/o kids $\bar{Y}$	.833		.848		.857		.843		.827	
N	902,103		400,576		393,718		444,167		441,978	

Notes: The table reports estimates of the β coefficients from equation 2. Column 1 reports the same estimates and standard errors as Table 3, column 3. In columns 2 and 3, the sample is restricted to, respectively, European/municipal and national political elections. Samples in columns 4 and 5 are restricted to precincts where the vote share of the center-left coalition in the 2008 national political election was, respectively, above or below the median precinct. Neighborhood controls are precinct-year average age and household income, as well as shares of female and Italian residents, and city neighborhood-by-year FEs. Voter controls are the share of household members who are Italian citizens, OECD-modified gross household income, as well as own income and taxes paid. Marital status FEs are three, mutually exclusive dummies indicating married, divorced, and widowed voters. Standard errors are two-way clustered by voter and household.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Figure A7: Event Study of the Impact of Parenthood on Turnout – Income Drop

(a) Orange = Mother, Blue = Father



(b) Children-Induced Gender Difference in Voter Turnout



Notes: the figure replicates Figure 5 restricting the sample to voters who, in the first post-children election (i.e., $\tau = 0$), make less than 70% of their income in the last pre-children election (i.e., $\tau = -1$). All estimates are from a unique regression controlling for the same covariates included in Table 3, column 3. The x-axis denotes the election relative to the first election in which a voter is first observed having children. Panel B plots differences between female- and male-specific effects.

Figure A8: Event Study of the Impact of Parenthood on Turnout – No Income Drop

(a) Orange = Mother, Blue = Father



(b) Children-Induced Gender Difference in Voter Turnout



Notes: the figure replicates Figure 5 restricting the sample to voters who, in the first post-children election (i.e., $\tau = 0$), make 70% or more of their income in the last pre-children election (i.e., $\tau = -1$). All estimates are from a unique regression controlling for the same covariates included in Table 3, column 3. The x-axis denotes the election relative to the first election in which a voter is first observed having children. Panel B plots differences between female- and male-specific effects.

A.8 Cohabitation

We now examine the turnout effect of cohabitation using event-study graphs. Because the Bologna administrative data record cohabitation as a type of relationship to the head of the household (and not as a possible category of marital status), identifying couples of cohabiting partners is complicated. For example, the civil register may record cohabiting partners as heads of two separate households. In other cases, the civil register may record roommates who are simply sharing an apartment as "cohabiting" (i.e., assigning them a unique household identifier and making one of them the head of the household). With this important limitation in mind, we define cohabiting couples as consisting of unmarried heads of households cohabiting with an unmarried individual of the opposite gender (where "cohabitation" status is determined from the relationship to the head of the household). The resulting sample consists of approximately 10,000 voters per election.

Figure A9a reports gender-specific estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals from an event-study regression (equation 3). As evidenced by the jump in voter participation occurring at $\tau = 0$, cohabitation increases both men's and women's turnout by about 2 percentage points. We also find suggestive evidence that men's turnout (and not women's) increases even further in the third election following cohabitation, which is consistent with our marriage estimates.

Unsurprisingly, the female-minus-male differences in event-study coefficients (i.e., $\beta_{\tau}^{cohabit,female} - \beta_{\tau}^{cohabit,male}$, plotted in Figure A9b) are centered around 0 and insignificant. Corroborating a causal interpretation of the results, neither figure shows significant pre-trends. Again, caution is needed in interpreting the results, as our definition of cohabiting couples (1) excludes cohabiting couples whose members are assigned different household identifiers and (2) includes cohabiting roommates of different genders sharing identical household identifiers.

Figure A9: Cohabitation Event Study

(a) Orange = Women, Blue = Men



(b) Cohabitation-Induced Gender Difference in Voter Turnout



Notes: Panel A plots event-study estimates of the effect of cohabitation on women's (orange) vs. men's (blue) turnout, along with 95-percent confidence intervals. All estimates are from a unique regression controlling for the same covariates included in Table 2, column 3. The x-axis denotes the election relative to the first election in which a voter's household composition status is cohabiting. Panel B plots differences between female- and male-specific effects.

References

Alesina, Alberto and Andrea Ichino. 2009. *L'Italia fatta in casa*. Mondadori.

Kostelka, Filip and André Blais. 2021. "The Generational and Institutional Sources of the Global Decline in Voter Turnout." *World Politics* .