

Online Appendix:

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A News Outlet Sample

A.1 Sample

To construct the sample of 145 Egyptian news websites, I relied on *ABYZ Web Links*,¹ a community-based list gathered by the *Citizenlab*,² and outlets collected by the Egyptian NGO *Association of Freedom of Thought and Expression* (AFTE 2021). I did not consider 16 websites that were created after May 2017 since they display missing values in my outcome variable until their establishment and I cannot estimate their pre-May 2017 size as well as identify the exact creation date. I gathered this information by searching for domain information using the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and website availability relying on archive.org, also known as the Waybackmachine. Finally, as mentioned in the main text, I focused on websites that were identified to have a primarily Egyptian audience and scope. Tables A.1 and A.2 show the sample of Egyptian outlets including all collected variables. In Appendix H, I also present the 78 regional and international outlets that were mentioned by the used sources.

A.2 Variables

Apart from the identifying variable **domain name**, the dataset of news outlets includes the following variables that were collected by visiting archived versions of the websites,³ current versions, or relying on secondary sources such as the outlets' social media channels or publicly available information.

Alternative name lists alternative domain names if the original domain name was changed during the period of study.

Stance judges from the website's content, including self-description, and funding structure to ascertain the stance of the outlet towards the Sisi regime. This variable is either

¹<http://www.abyznewslinks.com/>

²<https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists>

³For this task, the research assistant and I relied again on the Waybackmachine.

coded as pro-government (including outlets uncritical of the government), Islamist opposition, independent or the residual categories sports/entertainment or "other sectarian." The research assistant coded an outlet as independent (default category) if it is not clearly related to the Islamist opposition or promoted pro-government messages.

Funding source lists the funding organization if this information was available on the website or otherwise publicly available. The variable is either coded as state-owned/backed, party- or group-run, or private if there was no indication of support through a state or party or group.

Institution of funding contains the organization or country of funding if the funding source is other than private.

HQ location contains the country of the outlet's main editorial board location if revealed on the website or otherwise publicly available (not the location of the outlet's server).

Main audience/scope was judged by analyzing the website's content or relying on information on the main audience in the "about the newspaper" section, if available. Of particular interest was whether the outlet predominantly reports on Egypt-related news to create the main sample. The variable is either coded as Egypt, regional, international, or another Middle Eastern country.

Media type describes the type of website and is coded as digital media, TV/Radio, former periodical newspaper or magazine, periodical newspaper or magazine, or news agency.

Blocked includes information about whether the website was blocked during the period of study. The variable can have the following values: not blocked, blocked, or potentially unblocked. The latter value was chosen if the website was listed in the blocking list by

AFTE but the website could be accessed in Spring 2021 from Egypt.⁴

Status describes the status of the website as checked by the research assistant (from within Egypt) and the researcher (from outside Egypt) by visiting the website in March 2021 and relying on information from AFTE. The variable can have the following values: working, closed.

Date of blocking includes the date of the first blocking as determined by AFTE.

Active social media is coded as "yes" if the website has an active social media account either on Facebook, Twitter, or both, in early November 2021 or "no" if this is not the case. A social media channel is defined as active when the last social media post is not older than two months (i.e., early September 2021).

Average pre-May 2017 traffic is calculated as the average reach per million before the first censorship wave on May 24, 2017, relying on the Alexa traffic data (see Appendix C for details on the traffic data).

A.3 Ethical considerations

Since the checking of the website could be potentially risky for the Egyptian research assistant, we undertook several steps to reduce this risk: First, before the coder checked for the availability and blocking of websites, I went through the list of domain names to check whether websites (if found) contain phishing or malicious content. While some indeed ended up showing "advertisement" content, no malicious or suspicious content was downloaded. Second, the coder should only very briefly stay on the website to check whether it is reachable. The classification of websites was mostly done relying on the Waybackmachine that contains archived versions of websites and ensures encrypted communication.

⁴I double-checked these cases by examining recent measurements by OONI (when available) for the respective website. Websites that became inactive and were on the blocking list are assumed to having been blocked until they ceased activity. Unfortunately, given the sparse censorship data, it was not possible to determine the exact blocking duration.

Overall, and after speaking with the research assistant about potential risks, the coding was deemed relatively safe. Reassuringly, OONI, which also relies on worldwide volunteers to measure internet censorship, is not aware of any incident of a volunteer being prosecuted when using their tool to check whether websites are blocked.

Table A.1: Sample of Egyptian news websites (blocked)

Domain name	Alternative name	Stance	Funding source	Institution of funding	HQ Location	Main audience/scope	Media type	Blocked	Status	Date of blocking	Active social media	Avg. traffic
almesryoon.com	elmesryoon.com	Islamist opposition	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper (formerly)	blocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	146.89
cairoportal.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-05-24	no	26.37
egyptwindow.net		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-05-24	no	7.04
elshaab.org		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Labour Party	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper (formerly)	blocked	closed	2017-05-24	no	41.30
hasamegypt.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Hamas	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-05-24	no	0.10
horriapost.net	horriapost.online	Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	17.18
khnty.net		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Saudi Arabia	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-05-24	yes	76.43
madamasr.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	11.98
masralarabia.com	masralarabia.net	Islamist opposition	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-05-24	no	157.31
rassd.com	rassd.net	Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	62.37
dailynwsegypt.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper (formerly)	potentially unblocked	working	2017-05-26	yes	10.71
alhorsanews.com	alhorsaanews.com	Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	potentially unblocked	working	2017-05-28	yes	34.26
mohacet.com		Pro-government	State-backed	UAE	UAE	Egypt	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-05-28	no	33.38
albedaiiah.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-11	no	14.23
elbadil.com	elbadil.net	Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-11	no	53.94
elsharq.web.tv	elsharqtv.org	Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Turkey	Egypt	TV	potentially unblocked	working	2017-06-12	yes	49.07
yanairgate.net		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-12	no	0.60
soutalomma.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	potentially unblocked	working	2017-06-13	yes	18.95
fj-p.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper (formerly)	blocked	working	2017-06-14	yes	18.38
mekameleen.tv		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Turkey	Egypt	TV	potentially unblocked	working	2017-06-14	yes	6.98
revsco.me		Independent	Party- or group-run	Leftists	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-14	yes	1.56
6april.org		Independent	Party- or group-run	6 April Youth Movement	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-16	yes	0.00
almanassa.com	almanassa.net	Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-16	yes	1.88
ida2at.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-16	yes	15.62
madaad.net		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-16	yes	0.08
noonpost.org	noonpost.com	Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-16	yes	9.65
al-gornal.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-18	yes	2.06
alshessa.com		Independent	Private		USA	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-18	no	1.26
arabyexpressnews.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-18	no	2.83
egy7rep.com		Independent	Private		Unknown	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-18	no	1.54
elbheira.net		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-18	no	0.31
masr11.com	masr11.news	Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-06-18	yes	1.40
masrmix.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-06-18	yes	51.85
motamenservice.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-18	no	5.81
qalyubiagate.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-18	yes	1.14
s4s4s4.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-18	no	0.77
sharkiaonline.com	sharkiaonline.net	Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-18	yes	0.08
wantimes.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-18	yes	7.55
masreat.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-19	no	2.35
ansarportsaed.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-20	no	0.73
ikhwanonline.com	ikhwanonline.info	Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-20	yes	2.44
masralekhbaria.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-20	no	2.00
waraa-elahdath.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-20	no	1.15
amlalomah.net		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-22	no	0.35
ardmasr.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-22	no	0.38
aljisr-news.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	closed	2017-06-23	no	0.28
dakahliaikhwan.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-06-23	no	0.15
egyptdailynews.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-23	no	1.79
marsad-egypt.info		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-23	yes	0.02
marsadpress.net		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-23	no	1.37
alamatonline.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-30	yes	3.76
korabia.com	koorabia.com	Sports/entertainment	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-07-06	yes	109.49
fekrapost.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-07-22	no	1.65
bel-ahmar.net		Independent	Party- or group-run	Leftists	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-07-24	no	0.61
fakartany.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-07-27	no	0.02
manzalawy.net		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-08-30	no	0.59
thawrah2day.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-08-30	no	3.46
tournews.ar.nf		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-08-30	no	0.00
shahednow.com		Sports/entertainment	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-09-13	no	2.14
filifa.com		Sports/entertainment	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2018-03-20	yes	63.02
katib.org	katib.net	Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2018-06-24	no	0.48
cairoscene.com		Sports/entertainment	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	blocked	working	2019-01-01	yes	14.41
eparena.com		Sports/entertainment	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2019-01-12	yes	2.28
tahrirnews.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper (formerly)	blocked	closed	2019-05-15	no	68.41

Table A.2: Sample of Egyptian news websites (not blocked)

Domain name	Alternative name	Stance	Funding source	Institution of funding	HQ Location	Main audience/scope	Media type	Blocked	Status	Date of blocking	Active social media	Avg. traffic
alhdasalyoum.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt		Digital Media	not blocked	closed		yes	0.42
ahram.org.eg		Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	206.82
akhbarak.net		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	246.29
akhbaryoum.com		Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	51.40
al-maqal.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper (formerly)	not blocked	working		yes	1.37
alahalygate.com		Pro-government	Party- or group-run	National Progressive Unionist Party	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	0.66
alaham.org		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		no	0.04
albahabnews.com		Pro-government	State-backed	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	72.13
alghomhuria.net.eg	alghomhuria.gomhuriaonline.com	Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	14.17
alhilalalyoum.com		Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	2.98
almasdar.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	0.51
almasryalyoum.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	258.74
almessa.net.eg		Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	4.60
almogaz.com	elmogaz.com	Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	99.19
alsharqnews.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	2.84
arabnet5.com		Pro-government	State-backed	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	5.41
aswatmasriya.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	closed		no	7.18
cairo-now.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		no	0.75
cairolive.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	closed		no	5.32
cb-e-g.com		Pro-government	State-backed	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	TV	not blocked	working		yes	25.13
christian-dogma.com		Other sectarian	Party- or group-run	Coptic Minority in Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	91.63
copts-united.com		Other sectarian	Party- or group-run	Coptic Minority in Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	5.05
daily.rosalyoussef.com		Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	3.61
dailyegypt.net		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	closed		yes	0.00
dostor.org		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	41.18
dotmsr.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	92.11
e3lam.org	e3lam.com	Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	12.39
egynews.net	maspero.eg	Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	17.18
egyptianstreets.com		Independent	Private		Unknown	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	7.13
egyptindependent.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper (formerly)	not blocked	working		yes	5.72
egyptoil-gas.com		Independent	State-backed	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	1.66
egypttoday.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	1.46
el-yom.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	0.25
elaosba.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		no	0.43
elblad.news		Pro-government	State-backed	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	TV	not blocked	working		yes	89.04
elbashayeronline.com	elbashayer.com	Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	14.97
elfagr.org	elfagr.com	Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		no	94.89
elfariq.com		Sports/entertainment	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	17.87
elghad.com		Pro-government	Party- or group-run	Al-ghad party	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	0.00
elgornal.net		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	7.15
elkalimane.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		no	0.01
elmawke3.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	2.29
elnwatin.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	6.89
elsaba7.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper (formerly)	not blocked	closed		no	2.23
elwatannews.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper (formerly)	not blocked	working		yes	201.82
elzamannews.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	1.34
elchobars.com		Pro-government	State-backed	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		no	0.10
filgoal.com		Sports/entertainment	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	266.01
gomhuriaonline.com		Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	3.29
khbaralyoum.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	closed		no	0.15
khbarmasr.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	1.98
kingfut.com		Sports/entertainment	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	1.70
masrawy.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	251.33
masress.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	34.20
medanelakhtar.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	closed		no	0.46
mena.org.eg		Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	News Agency	not blocked	working		yes	3.27
misr5.com		Sports/entertainment	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	124.97
nkegypt.net		Pro-government	State-owned	Russia	Russia	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	0.49
mobtada.com		Pro-government	State-backed	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	12.67
mogazmasr.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	1.23
news.egypt.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		no	3.55
nileinternational.net		Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	TV	not blocked	working		no	0.57
nilesports.com		Sports/entertainment	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	TV	not blocked	working		yes	1.95
niletc.tv		Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	TV	not blocked	working		yes	2.89
onaeg.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	News Agency	not blocked	closed		yes	7.64
ontveg.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	TV	not blocked	working		no	2.19
openarab.net		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		no	0.32
propaganda-eg.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	0.43
qalibiya.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	0.65
sabharabi.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	1.35
sharkiatoday.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	11.19
shabmisr.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper (formerly)	not blocked	working		no	1.59
shorouknews.com		Independent	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	109.79
sis.gov.eg		Pro-government	State-owned	Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	3.81
soutalmalaen.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	0.44
suez-online.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	0.49
suezbalady.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	0.73
vetogate.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	167.24
washwasha.org		Sports/entertainment	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Digital Media	not blocked	working		yes	3.77
watani.net.com		Other sectarian	Party- or group-run	Coptic Minority in Egypt	Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	4.47
youn7.com		Pro-government	Private		Egypt	Egypt	Periodical Newspaper	not blocked	working		yes	913.55

B Online Censorship Measurement

AFTE uses so-called OONI Probes to test for web connectivity. Tests were run from different devices and relying on different internet service providers within Egypt. The probe tries then to detect whether access to the tested website is blocked by means of DNS tampering, TCP/IP blocking or by a transparent HTTP proxy, indicated by a block page. To determine whether users face censorship in Egypt the test result is then compared with tests from a control server. If the results match, then this indicates no clear sign of blocking. If the results differ, the measurement is flagged as an anomaly. AFTE and OONI published a report on their main findings, which can be found at <https://ooni.org/documents/Egypt-Internet-Censorship-AFTE-OONI-2018-07.pdf> (accessed on August 12, 2021). Most blocking is done by resetting connections, presumably relying on Deep Package Inspections (DPI), and not by serving block pages. Censorship measurements still continue, yet appear to be most reliable for the years 2017 and 2018. Moreover, the measurements are particularly precise for the date of the first blocking as data from OONI is overall sparse and measurements are not taken in regular intervals for most websites. While most censorship seems to be permanent, some websites were also blocked temporally or intermittently (see Appendix A).

C Alexa Traffic Data

As explained in the main body of the article, I imputed missing values for the Alexa data in two ways. First, I used linear interpolation if less than seven consequent website/days are missing. When the break is longer, the traffic estimate is considered to be “0” as the website fell out of the top million websites per day and received negligible traffic.

Table C.1 illustrate how often these rules were applied distinguishing between (a) interpolated values and (b) values filled with “0.” Since, as emphasized in the main text, the data may be in particular imprecise for smaller websites, the table further distinguishes between larger and smaller websites using the median of the average daily pre-May 2017 traffic as cut-off point (median traffic = 3.27 reach per million).

Table C.1: Percentages of interpolated traffic estimates (full sample)

All outlets		Above median outlets		Below median outlets	
Interpolated	Filled with “0”	Interpolated	Filled with “0”	Interpolated	Filled with “0”
13%	33%	9%	11%	17%	54%

Finally, Table C.2 provides the same information restricting attention to blocked outlets and the pre- and post-time periods of 30 or 142 days as used in the empirical analysis in section 4.1. As evident from the tables, it is in particular smaller outlets that display more missing values and that—more naturally—fall out of the top million website list and thus display a higher share of imputed “0” values. Since the inclusion of these outlets may bias the later analysis, I left them out in sensitivity tests in Appendix D, which actually increased the magnitude and precision of the main results.

Table C.2: Percentages of interpolated traffic estimates (censored outlets sample)

All blocked outlets		Above median outlets		Below median outlets	
Pre- and post- period: 30 days					
Interpolated	Filled with “0”	Interpolated	Filled with “0”	Interpolated	Filled with “0”
14%	27%	5%	2%	21%	47%
Pre- and post-period: 142 days					
Interpolated	Filled with “0”	Interpolated	Filled with “0”	Interpolated	Filled with “0”
12%	30%	5%	3%	19%	53%

D Additional Analyses: Traffic Analysis

To test the sensitivity and robustness of the traffic analysis, I conducted the following tests.

Placebo tests on non-censored outlets First, I constructed another placebo test to explore whether it is the blocking of websites or some other event happening at the same time that may be responsible for the decrease in traffic. To test for this, I randomly assigned the 64 censorship dates to a random sample of 64 non-censored Egyptian outlets and retrieved the pre- and post-censorship estimate, repeating this procedure 10,000 times. The result depicted in Figure D.1 suggest a null effect, i.e., traffic on non-censored outlets is not affected by the censorship event and the drop in traffic is thus not explainable by other events.




Figure D.1: Placebo tests on non-blocked Egyptian outlets randomly assigning the original block dates to non-blocked websites. *Note:* Based on 10,000 draws. The pre- and post-censorship period is set to 30 days.

Excluding observations close to the censorship events In a second test, I left out observations that are ± 5 days close to the censorship event. The reasoning behind this is to mitigate concerns about measurement errors (imprecise censorship dates), anticipation effects⁵ (outlets may have been blocked because of extraordinary interest), and to take potential implementation delays into considerations (blocking could have been intensified only after some days). Figure D.2 shows that the results remain fully consistent and become even stronger.

Excluding potentially unblocked websites Third, Figure D.3 illustrates the results when leaving out websites that were found to be potentially unblocked by the research assistant. The results remain consistent and even become stronger when looking at the medium-term consequences.

Relying on a different outcome variable and imputation procedures Fourth, Figure D.4 shows the results when relying on the “page views per million” metric, which is an alternative metric provided by Alexa to measure internet traffic. Table D.1 reports the average changes when handling missing values of the traffic data differently using linear imputation with a maximum gap of 3 or 14 days, or using the smallest value of

⁵While most blocking was sudden and surprising, there is indeed some evidence that some outlets were blocked after they ran specific stories. For instance, on June 11, 2017, the outlet *Al-Badil* was supposedly blocked after publishing an opinion piece titled “Egypt is not for sale: Arhil,” where the term “Arhil” implies a call for El-Sisi to resign (AFTE 2021). Despite this, it is difficult to presume that outlets anticipated being blocked when publishing such or similar stories, i.e., the exact blocking date is hard to predict.




Figure D.2: Traffic on blocked Egyptian outlets, leaving out observations ± 5 days around the censorship event. *Note:* Average daily traffic per million in the month before and after the censorship event (panel a) and five months before and after (panel b) with loess smoothed lines. Generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and actual observed change (dotted line) in month (panel c) and five month period (panel d). Blocking dates (red points) are left out since censorship may have been implemented at any point in time during that day.

“0.04” to replace missing values. The results remain fully consistent.

Table D.1: Sensitivity tests for different imputation procedures.

	Average change (1 month)	p-value	Average change (5 months)	p-value
Linear imputation (3 days)	-10.57	0.02	-9.54	0.01
Linear imputation (14 days)	-10.53	0.02	-9.51	0.01
Replacement of missing values with 0.04	-10.56	0.02	-9.53	0.01

Using a panel interrupted time series (ITS) approach Fifth, I rely on a different estimation strategy and use an interrupted time series approach. In contrast to Pan and Siegel (2020), I set up a panel interrupted time series model that includes random effects (different baselines and slopes) for each website and addresses autocorrelation by modeling a first order autoregressive (AR1) error term for each website (Bernal, Cummins and Gasparrini 2017). The fixed parts of the models include different slopes for the pre- and post-censorship period as well as the main variable of interest *blocked (level change)*. The models are reported in Table D.2 and do not only focus on one (model 1) or five months (model 2) before and after the blocking but also consider the full period from -142 to $+536$ days for which data for all censored outlets are available (model 3). The




Figure D.3: Traffic on blocked Egyptian outlets, leaving out potentially unblocked websites. *Note:* Average daily traffic per million in the month before and after the censorship event (panel a) and five months before and after (panel b) with loess smoothed lines. Generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and actual observed change (dotted line) in month (panel c) and five month period (panel d). Blocking dates (red points) are left out since censorship may have been implemented at any point in time during that day.

estimates for the blocking variable *blocked* (*level change*) remains significantly negatively associated with traffic in all three models.⁶

Table D.2: Panel interrupted time series models.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Baseline	18.87*** (4.64)	16.97*** (3.96)	16.22*** (3.88)
Blocked (level change)	-8.97* (3.62)	-6.55* (2.74)	-7.49* (2.99)
Pre-censorship trend	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Blocked (slope change)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.03* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
AIC	29984.31	132273.82	286469.33
BIC	30040.58	132344.09	286547.45
Log Likelihood	-14983.15	-66127.91	-143225.67
Num. obs.	3840	18176	43456
Num. groups: site	64	64	64
Time period	-30/ + 30 days	-142/ + 142 days	-142/ + 536 days

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

⁶Since the models make assumptions on the parametric form or distribution of the outcome variable, the more robust and conservative non-parametric tests are reported in the main text. In setting up the ITS models, I again left out the blocking dates as it is unclear at what specific time the blocking started.




Figure D.4: Traffic on blocked Egyptian outlets, using page views per million as dependent variable. *Note:* Average daily traffic per million in the month before and after the censorship event (panel a) and five months before and after (panel b) with loess smoothed lines. Generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and actual observed change (dotted line) in month (panel c) and five month period (panel d). Blocking dates (red points) are left out since censorship may have been implemented at any point in time during that day.

Heterogeneity analyses Finally, I conducted two heterogeneity analyses to explore whether all outlets are similarly affected by online filtering. More precisely, I distinguish censored outlets in their stance towards the Egyptian government and their size.

Figures D.5–D.8 display the results for websites when distinguishing Islamist opposition, independent, and pro-government news websites as well as censored entertainment or sports outlets. The results show that in particular independent (Figure D.6) and Islamist opposition (Figure D.5) news outlets lost traffic. In the short-term, outlets lost 79% (independent) or 39% (Islamist opposition) in traffic and, in the long-term, 64% (independent) or 60% (Islamist opposition) as compared to the respective pre-censorship traffic trends. The few blocked pro-government websites (see Figure D.7), in contrast, lost only 27% (short-term) or 24% (long-term) in traffic, suggesting that those have been only temporally banned. Finally, also the consequences for entertainment or sports websites appear to be not as severe. As displayed in Figure D.8, while these websites lost on average 49% of traffic in the short-term, the long-term result in panel b depicts an increase in traffic again. This increase, however, is primarily due to the blocked sports website

korabia.com that changed its domain name (see also Figure G.1). As evident from the drop in traffic again, it is very likely that the new domain was censored shortly afterward as well. The blocked sports/entertainment websites appear thus not to be necessarily more resilient to censorship—likely because users have still viable alternatives.

Figure D.9 and Figure D.10 report the results when distinguishing between websites with above (Figure D.9) and below median pre-May 2017 traffic (Figure D.10). Figure D.9 illustrate very similar results as the main analysis reported in the main body of this study. Looking at the results for smaller outlets in Figure D.10 highlight that users still accessed the website after the block and that traffic decreased gradually thereafter. Also, note that the placebo tests fail to find significant patterns anymore. Whereas this finding could be due to the less precise traffic and censorship date measurements for smaller outlets, other explanations could be (1) that the regular readership of smaller outlets is more dedicated to circumvent the blocking, (2) that the obstruction of smaller outlets attracted other users to visit the previously unknown website to find out why it got censored (cf. Martin 2007), or (3) that smaller outlets were more likely to face limited blocking only.




Figure D.5: Traffic on blocked Islamist opposition Egyptian outlets. *Note:* Average daily traffic per million in the month before and after the censorship event (panel a) and five months before and after (panel b) with loess smoothed lines. Generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and actual observed change (dotted line) in month (panel c) and five month period (panel d). Blocking dates (red points) are left out since censorship may have been implemented at any point in time during that day.




Figure D.6: Traffic on blocked independent Egyptian outlets. *Note:* Average daily traffic per million in the month before and after the censorship event (panel a) and five months before and after (panel b) with loess smoothed lines. Generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and actual observed change (dotted line) in month (panel c) and five month period (panel d). Blocking dates (red points) are left out since censorship may have been implemented at any point in time during that day.




Figure D.7: Traffic on blocked pro-government Egyptian outlets. *Note:* Average daily traffic per million in the month before and after the censorship event (panel a) and five months before and after (panel b) with loess smoothed lines. Generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and actual observed change (dotted line) in month (panel c) and five month period (panel d). Blocking dates (red points) are left out since censorship may have been implemented at any point in time during that day.




Figure D.8: Traffic on blocked sports/entertainment Egyptian outlets. *Note:* Average daily traffic per million in the month before and after the censorship event (panel a) and five months before and after (panel b) with loess smoothed lines. Generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and actual observed change (dotted line) in month (panel c) and five month period (panel d). Blocking dates (red points) are left out since censorship may have been implemented at any point in time during that day.




Figure D.9: Traffic on blocked outlets that have an above median pre-May 2017 traffic statistic. *Note:* Average daily traffic per million in the month before and after the censorship event (panel a) and five months before and after (panel b) with loess smoothed lines. Generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and actual observed change (dotted line) in month (panel c) and five month period (panel d). Blocking dates (red points) are left out since censorship may have been implemented at any point in time during that day.




Figure D.10: Traffic on blocked outlets that have a below median pre-May 2017 traffic statistic. *Note:* Average daily traffic per million in the month before and after the censorship event (panel a) and five months before and after (panel b) with loess smoothed lines. Generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and actual observed change (dotted line) in month (panel c) and five month period (panel d). Blocking dates (red points) are left out since censorship may have been implemented at any point in time during that day.

E Substitution Effects

In this section, I test for potential substitution effects, i.e., whether like-minded news outlet experienced an increase in visitors when websites get blocked. To explore such dynamics, I focused on the first large censoring wave that took place on May 24, 2017 as a most likely case to expect substitution effects. Overall, 21 domestic *and* international outlets, including prominent websites such as *Al Jazerra* were started being blocked that day. Figure E.1 displays the average development of internet traffic on non-censored Egyptian outlets 30 days before and after the censorship event.⁷ To not bias this comparison, I left out all outlets blocked until June 24. Besides, the figure distinguishes between different types of websites to make comparisons easier.




Figure E.1: Development of internet traffic on non-censored Egyptian outlets sorted along their stance towards the Egyptian government 30 days before and after May 24, 2017 (first censoring wave). *Note:* Data is fitted using loess smoothed lines with the censoring date as breaking point. The red dot displays the average reach per million on the blocking day.

The figure shows some interesting patterns. First, we see a small increase in traffic after the mass censoring event on independent and even to a lesser degree on pro-government outlets. One explanation could be that some users indeed switched to other independent (or pro-government websites) to gain information. In fact, some independent and pro-government outlets actually informed about the blocking of some of the censored outlets on May 24, 2017. Another explanation could be that an unrelated event a few

⁷I focus on Egyptian outlets only as it harder to determine for regional and international outlets where traffic came from.

days after the censoring event is responsible for general higher interest in news websites. As evident from the panel that depicts the traffic development on “other sectarian” websites, which exclusively considers pro-Coptic websites in the non-censored Egyptian outlet sample, traffic substantially increased on these sites two days after the first censorship wave. However, this increase in traffic is very unlikely because of the blocking but due to a terrorist attack on Coptic Egyptians that took place on May 26, 2017 (9NEWS 2017).⁸ Interestingly, the figure shows that traffic on sports and entertainment websites also increased around, and especially after, the censorship event. Speaking to the findings of Kern and Hainmueller (2009) on the consumption of West German television in authoritarian East Germany, it could be that Egyptians “escape” to non-political websites in the face of higher levels of online repression.




Figure E.2: Placebo tests for the development of internet traffic on non-censored Egyptian outlets sorted along their stance towards the Egyptian government 30 days before and after May 24, 2017 (first censoring wave). *Note:* The panels show the generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and the actual observed change (dotted line).

Of course, given that the data do not tell how visiting patterns of single users changed, the interpretations of the discussed patterns are all suggestive and need further examination. Nevertheless, the permutation tests presented in Figure E.2 provide some level of confidence ($p\text{-value} = 0.07$) that pre- and post-censorship traffic differed for independent (and pro-government) websites, albeit by on average 2 users per million only. As a point of comparison, Figure D.6 shows a reduction of almost 18 users per million after indepen-

⁸Similarly, the outliers for traffic on independent and pro-government websites on June 5, 2017, 12 days after the censorship wave, is likely to be attributed to a significant international political event—the Qatar crisis that started that day (New York Times 2017).

dent outlets get blocked. Potential substitution effects appear to be thus not very strong. Overall this conclusion aligns with other studies from China (Stockmann 2013), which show that most consumers do not actively seek out alternative news sources. Future research could rely on the web browsing data of users to investigate potential substitution effects more precisely (see, for example, Stier et al. 2022), taking into account ethical and privacy related standards that are of particular relevance in authoritarian contexts.

F Additional Material: Stop of Activity Analysis

In this section, Table F.1 reports the results of the stop of activity analysis when the blocking variable is temporally disaggregated. The results illustrate that most coefficients remain positive. Given the small number of blocks for many month-years, half of the coefficients miss statistical significance. In the month with the most blocks (June 2017), no particular political domestic event happened and the estimate is very similar to the one reported in Table 1 in the main text, suggesting that the timing of the blocks did not substantially influenced a stop in activity.

Table F.1: Likelihood for Egyptian news outlets to stop activity (blocking dates disaggregated)

	Model 1
Intercept	0.13 (0.18)
Blocked (August 2017)	0.73** (0.26)
Blocked (January 2019)	0.02 (0.31)
Blocked (July 2017)	0.56** (0.20)
Blocked (June 2017)	0.27* (0.11)
Blocked (June 2018)	0.63 (0.39)
Blocked (March 2018)	0.07 (0.41)
Blocked (May 2017)	0.11 (0.15)
Blocked (May 2019)	0.83* (0.41)
Blocked (September 2018)	-0.04 (0.41)
Pre-May 2017 traffic: below median	0.10 (0.07)
Funding: private	0.14 (0.16)
Funding: state	0.07 (0.19)
Stance: Islamist opposition	0.08 (0.17)
Stance: other sectarian	-0.07 (0.28)
Stance: pro-government	-0.13 (0.10)
Stance: sports/entertainment	-0.34 (0.17)
Type: news agency	0.28 (0.28)
Type: periodical newspaper	-0.18 (0.09)
Type: periodical newspaper (formerly)	-0.10 (0.14)
Type: TV/radio	-0.21 (0.15)
HQ: Outside Egypt	-0.03 (0.14)
R ²	0.39
Adj. R ²	0.28
Num. obs.	145
Num. pos. events	39

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

G Newspaper Evasion Tactics

In this appendix, I explore how news outlets responded to the blocking of their sites. Depending on the censoring mode, one tactic is to switch the domain name to evade censorship. Indeed, 14 of 64 blocked Egyptian outlets changed domain names during the period of study. Figure G.1 displays the development of traffic on these outlets.



Figure G.1: Traffic on censored websites that changed their domain names. Data are fitted using GAM with the censoring date as breaking point. The vertical dashed line displays the blocking date.

The figure displays that in most cases (in particular for larger outlets) traffic remained substantially reduced after the block even when websites changed their domain names. It thus seems that changing the domain name often does not help in evading censorship. Rather, authoritarian regimes respond to such evasion tactics by again blocking the new domain. Supporting this conclusion, the blocked outlet *Mada Masr* describes its attempt to circumvent blocking as a "cat and mouse game" in which the government subsequently censors dedicated proxy websites—another circumvention tactic (Mada Masr 2019). As shown in Figure G.2, this tactic also seems only to partially work.

Another evasion tactic for news websites is to switch to other platforms to distribute




Figure G.2: Traffic on the independent outlet Mada Masr. *Note:* Data is fitted using loess smoothed lines with the censoring date as breaking point. The vertical dashed line displays the blocking date.

news. To explore this tactic, I gathered information on whether blocked Egyptian outlets have active social media pages on Facebook or Twitter in early November 2021. The investigation shows that 47% or 30 out of 64 Egyptian blocked outlets actively use social media accounts to distribute news. The median follower statistic per active social media site for blocked websites is 486,464 (sd = 2,485,310). As a point of comparison, 80% or 65 of 81 uncensored Egyptian outlets have active social media accounts and the median follower statistic per active social media site is 289,766 (sd = 5,258,550).⁹ Since above 46% of Egyptians Internet users are on Facebook and 63% of those were estimated to find and consume news on the platform in 2018 (Dennis et al. 2019), I relied on information from Facebook pages.¹⁰

Finally, I used the Waybackmachine (archive.org) to retrieve the number of followers of the social media pages run by Egyptian outlets in early 2017, before the first censoring wave and when available, and calculated the median growth rate in followers. Unfortunately, the Waybackmachine did not save the social media pages with frequency and

⁹I relied on the median value to down-weight the impact of outliers.

¹⁰Unfortunately, the latter question was not asked in previous waves of the Media Use in the Middle East survey (Dennis et al. 2019).

this information could only be retrieved for 24 of 95 outlets and their Twitter pages.¹¹ The result should thus be treated with caution. While this investigation shows that the median number of followers for channels of blocked websites increased by 49% (sd = 143%) between 2017 and 2021, the median follower count for social media channels by uncensored outlets increased by 165% (sd = 1461%) too, and the overall variance between outlets is very large. The median increase therefore rather reflects the general trend of consumers to more frequently rely on social media to obtain news. Supporting this point, Table G.1 shows the change in followers for Twitter accounts of news outlets closer to their blocking date. The result illustrates that only for the *Mada Masr* outlet the follower count increased by 13,500 within two months around the censorship date. Unfortunately, this analysis includes only three outlets with social media pages that were saved close to the censoring date.

Table G.1: Pre- and post-censorship Twitter followers for three outlets.

Domain name	Censorship date	Pre-censorship followers	Measurement 1	Post-censorship followers	Measurement 2
madamasr.com	2017-05-24	48,500	2017-03-25	62,000	2017-06-23
dailynewsegypt.com	2017-05-26	230,000	2017-05-25	231,000	2017-06-01
alborsanews.com	2017-05-28	39,200	2017-04-22	39,800	2017-07-01

Considering all evidence, the additional analyses suggest that most newspapers were rather unsuccessful or only partly successful in fending off the negative consequences of online censorship. Also, generated advertising revenues are much lower for page visits on the social media channels of the respective outlets as compared to visits to the original website.

H Regional and International Outlets

This final section reports the results of the analyses when focusing on regional and international outlets. While displaying a negative relationship since some of the outlets may have a considerable Egyptian audience, Figure H.3 no longer shows significant patterns. In particular, when looking at the 5 months time window, the placebo tests in panel d suggest that the censoring event had no systematic effect on the sites' traffic statistics,

¹¹The majority of saved Facebook sites were protected by CAPTCHAS.

i.e., traffic appears to decrease over time regardless of the event. Also, Table H.2 reports no significantly higher likelihood for regional or international outlets to cease activity upon blocking. More information on the sample of regional and international outlets can be found in Table H.3.¹²




Figure H.3: Traffic on blocked regional or international outlets. *Note:* Average daily traffic per million in the month before and after the censorship event (panel a) and five months before and after (panel b) with loess smoothed lines. Generated null distribution of hypothetical changes and actual observed change (dotted line) in month (panel c) and five month period (panel d). Blocking dates (red points) are left out since censorship may have been implemented at any point in time during that day.

¹²In the international sample, I left out the UK-based outlet *Al Araby*, which has been subject to blocking since 2015. This restriction was necessary as traffic data from Alexa could be only retrieved from January 2017 onward.

Table H.2: Likelihood for regional and international news outlet to stop activity.

	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	0.03 (0.05)	0.12 (0.22)
Blocked	0.08 (0.06)	0.01 (0.09)
Pre-May 2017 traffic: below median		0.09 (0.09)
Funding: private		-0.13 (0.16)
Funding: state		-0.17 (0.17)
Stance: Islamist opposition		-0.43* (0.19)
Stance: other sectarian		-0.21 (0.19)
Stance: pro-government		-0.16 (0.22)
Stance: sports/entertainment		0.01 (0.33)
Type: news agency		-0.16 (0.35)
Type: TV/radio		0.00 (0.11)
HQ: Germany		-0.01 (0.26)
HQ: Iran		0.24 (0.39)
HQ: Iraq		0.33 (0.39)
HQ: Jordan		-0.07 (0.22)
HQ: Lebanon		-0.01 (0.22)
HQ: Palestine		0.54 (0.28)
HQ: Qatar		0.42 (0.25)
HQ: Russia		0.20 (0.39)
HQ: Saudi Arabia		-0.06 (0.47)
HQ: South Africa		-0.10 (0.33)
HQ: Tunisia		0.29 (0.37)
HQ: Turkey		0.43 (0.23)
HQ: UAE		0.20 (0.27)
HQ: UK		0.02 (0.19)
HQ: Unknown		0.24 (0.19)
HQ: USA		0.18 (0.19)
HQ: Yemen		0.15 (0.27)
R ²	0.02	0.27
Adj. R ²	0.01	-0.13
Num. obs.	78	78
Num. of dissolved websites	6	6

Table H.3: Sample of regional and international news websites

Domain name	Alternative name	Stance	Funding source	Institution of funding	HQ Location	Main audience/scope	Media type	Blocked	Status	Date of blocking	Active social media	Avg. traffic
al-sharq.com		Islamist opposition	State-owned	Qatar	Qatar	Qatar	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	24.85
al-watan.com		Islamist opposition	State-owned	Qatar	Qatar	Qatar	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	13.20
alarab.qa		Islamist opposition	State-owned	Qatar	Qatar	Qatar	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	11.86
aljazeera.net		Islamist opposition	State-owned	Qatar	Qatar	Regional	TV	blocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	483.08
arab21.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	Unknown	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	106.57
huffpostarabi.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	USA	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-05-24	no	254.69
nabdapp.com		Pro-government	State-owned	UAE	UAE	Regional	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	10.28
qtv.qa		Islamist opposition	State-owned	Qatar	Qatar	Qatar	TV	blocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	3.85
raya.com		Islamist opposition	State-owned	Qatar	Qatar	Qatar	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-05-24	yes	20.77
hamas.ps		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Hamass organization	Palestine	Palestine	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-05-24	no	1.63
aljazeera.com		Islamist opposition	State-owned	Qatar	Qatar	Regional	TV	blocked	working	2017-06-10	yes	471.90
ssaspost.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	France	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-10	yes	96.85
turkpress.co		Islamist opposition	State-owned	Qatar	Turkey	Turkey	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-10	yes	26.94
alalam.ir	alalamtv.net	Other sectarian	State-owned	Iran	Iran	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-10	yes	127.69
akhtaralislam.net		Independent	Private	Unknown	Turkey	Turkey	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	closed	2017-06-11	no	1.27
akhtarurkiya.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Turkey	Turkey	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-11	no	0.73
arab-turkey.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-11	yes	3.64
dailyasabah.com		Islamist opposition	State-owned	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-11	yes	27.41
gul-times.com		State-owned	Qatar	Qatar	Qatar	Qatar	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-11	yes	51.48
thepenninsulaqatar.com		Islamist opposition	State-owned	Qatar	Qatar	Qatar	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-11	yes	13.49
turk.life		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-11	no	0.19
hurriyetdailynews.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	Turkey	Turkey	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-16	yes	32.08
arabsoal.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey	Turkey	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-18	no	0.36
ehwada.com		Islamist opposition	Private	Unknown	Iran	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-18	no	6.68
akhtarasabah.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Unknown	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-20	no	2.14
alaraby.tv	alaraby.com	Independent	Private	Unknown	UK	Regional	TV	potentially unblocked	working	2017-06-20	yes	5.31
essada.net		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-06-20	yes	47.85
harmess.com		Islamist opposition	Private	Unknown	Palestine	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-20	no	0.08
alascene.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	Unknown	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	closed	2017-06-20	no	1.70
asararabiya.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood	Unknown	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-30	no	0.29
wataserb.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	USA	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-06-30	yes	34.35
ultrasawt.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	Unknown	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-07-18	yes	8.67
defenceweb.co.za		Independent	Private	Unknown	South Africa	Regional	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-07-27	yes	3.05
ar.qatara.de		Independent	State-owned	Germany	Germany	Regional	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2017-08-18	yes	7.63
shiaweb.org		Other sectarian	Private	Unknown	Unknown	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-08-18	no	4.05
umayyapress.com	umayya.org	Islamist opposition	Private	Unknown	Turkey	Syria	Digital Media	blocked	working	2017-08-21	yes	0.28
al-akhlbar.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	Lebanon	Lebanon	Digital Media	blocked	working	2018-01-20	yes	41.65
thenewkhaliq.org	thenewkhaliq.news	Islamist opposition	State-owned	Qatar	Qatar	Qatar	Digital Media	blocked	working	2018-01-20	yes	4.46
huffingtonpost.com	huffpost.com	Independent	Private	Unknown	USA	International	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2018-03-07	yes	4331.25
almodon.com/portal		Independent	Private	Unknown	Lebanon	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2018-07-17	yes	12.82
onamh.com		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine	Palestine	Palestine	Digital Media	blocked	working	2018-07-17	yes	0.01
raseef22.com	raseef22.net	Independent	Private	Unknown	Lebanon	Regional	Digital Media	blocked	working	2018-09-06	yes	31.48
alhurra.com		Independent	State-owned	USA	USA	Regional	TV	blocked	working	2019-09-22	yes	34.18
arij.net		Independent	Private	Unknown	Jordan	Regional	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2019-09-22	yes	1.74
bbc.com/ar		Independent	State-owned	UK	UK	Regional	TV	potentially unblocked	working	2019-09-22	yes	7612.69
7iber.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	Jordan	Regional	Digital Media	potentially unblocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	2.25
20sep.net		Other sectarian	State-owned	Houthi movement - Yemen	Yemen	Yemen	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	1.04
akhtaralislam.net		Pro-government	State-owned	UAE	UAE	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	36.88
alarab.co.uk		Independent	Private	Unknown	UK	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	17.94
aljaras.com		Sports/entertainment	State-owned	Unknown	Lebanon	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	34.24
almasrah.net		Other sectarian	State-owned	Houthi movement - Yemen	Yemen	Yemen	TV	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	no	7.56
almayaden.net		Other sectarian	Party- or group-run	Lebanon-based Hezbollah	Lebanon	Regional	TV	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	58.90
alquds.co.uk		Independent	Private	Unknown	UK	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	61.85
alsharqtimes.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	Unknown	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	closed	2019-09-26	no	0.66
ansardoll.com		Other sectarian	State-owned	Houthi movement - Yemen	Yemen	Yemen	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	0.71
arab48.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	Unknown	Palestine	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	14.78
arabic.rt.com		Pro-government	State-owned	Russia	Russia	Regional	TV	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	2400.94
arabist.net		Independent	Private	Unknown	Jordan	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	0.54
dw.com/ar		Independent	State-owned	Germany	Germany	Regional	TV	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	748.01
elaph.com		Pro-government	Private	Unknown	UK	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	30.36
enabshahid.net		Islamist opposition	Private	Unknown	Turkey	Syria	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	15.20
etifaq.org		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Syrian Coalition	Qatar	Syria	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	1.59
faithfreedom.org		Independent	Private	Unknown	Unknown	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	no	2.75
france24.com/ar		Independent	State-owned	France	France	Regional	TV	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	289.79
humaaden.com		Pro-government	State-owned	Yemen	Yemen	Yemen	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	0.82
khawariq.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	Jordan	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	28.49
lepetitjournal.com/le-caire		Independent	Private	Unknown	France	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	13.16
moqawama.org		Other sectarian	Party- or group-run	Lebanon-based Hezbollah	Lebanon	Lebanon	Radio	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	23.03
news.akhbarten.com		Sports/entertainment	State-owned	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	no	0.01
orient-news.net		Islamist opposition	Party- or group-run	Syrian Coalition	UAE	Syria	TV	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	33.15
radiosawa.com		Independent	State-owned	USA	USA	Regional	Radio	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	18.52
rasalyoum.com		Independent	Private	Unknown	UK	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	73.10
sadaqapress.net		Other sectarian	State-owned	Houthi movement - Yemen	Yemen	Yemen	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	0.22
ssanews.net		Other sectarian	Party- or group-run	Houthi movement - Yemen	Yemen	Yemen	News Agency	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	3.40
vice.com/ar		Independent	Private	Unknown	USA	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	1957.80
yeenafak.com/ar		Islamist opposition	State-backed	Turkey	Turkey	Regional	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	177.09
zamanahesl.net		Islamist opposition	Private	Unknown	Turkey	Syria	Digital Media	not blocked	working	2019-09-26	yes	12.55

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