

# Online Supplementary Materials for “Gatekeeping by Central and Local Party Actors: Theory and Evidence from a Field Study of New Brunswick Nominations, 2017-2018”

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# 1 Interview Methodology

## 1.1 Organizational Ties of Interviewees

Table 1 provides breakdown by current or former party. The lion’s share of participants were from the Liberal and PC parties, but the interviewees covered all the parties. I interviewed a number of individuals more than once, particularly if they were party insiders who knew a great deal about the workings of particular nomination contests. I only count these individuals once in Table 1.

Table 1: Current and Former Organizational Affiliations of Interviewees

<b>Party</b>	<b>Number (Percentage)</b>
Liberal	26 (37%)
PC	23 (32%)
Green	8 (11%)
NDP	3 (4%)
People’s Alliance	1 (1%)
Feminist Organizations	7 (10%)
Others	6 (9%)
Total	70

Note: These affiliations are not mutually exclusive. Some individuals may have changed parties or left partisan politics altogether. As a result, these numbers do not sum to 100 percent.

## 1.2 Organizational Roles of Interviewees

Table 2 provides a breakdown by role within party organizations. Most of the individuals interviewed (56 percent) had either considered running for elected office or were recruited to run for elected office. Since early interviews emphasized the importance of the central party organization, particularly the party leader’s office, the party’s legislative office and party headquarters, the interviews with non-candidate party insiders typically focused on the central party organization. Many of the elected MLAs, of course, are also party insiders involved in recruitment or supporting preferred candidates.

Table 2: Current and Former Organizational Roles of Interviewees

<b>Role</b>	<b>Number (Percentage)</b>
Local party executive	4 (6%)
Party headquarters	11 (16%)
Leader's or legislative office	10 (14%)
Current or former party leaders	7 (10%)
Current of former MLAs	17 (24%)
General election candidates who lost	7 (10%)
Nomination candidates who lost	6 (13%)
Potential candidates who did not run	7 (10%)
Total	70

Note: These roles are not mutually exclusive. As a result, these numbers do not sum to 100 percent.

### **1.3 Demographics of Interviewees**

Thirty-six percent of the participants were women. Seventeen percent were francophone. The over-representation of men and anglophones is in large part a consequence of which individuals occupied positions of power within party organizations.


## **2 Participant-Observation Methodology**

### **2.1 Overview**

I attended every contested nomination across all five parties that had some chance of winning a seat, save for two: Southwest Miramichi-Bay du Vin for the People's Alliance and Albert for the PC Party. The People's Alliance held their convention for Southwest Miramichi-Bay du Vin at the same time as the Fundy-The Isles-Saint John West PC convention. The Albert PC convention conflicted with the Kent North Liberal convention. I have covered these conflicting conventions through interviews. Figures 1 and 2 show maps of the electoral districts in which I attended the nominating convention, separately for each party.


## 2.2 Liberal Nominating Conventions Attended

Figure 1: Map of Liberal Nominating Conventions Attended



### 2.3 Progressive-Conservative Nominating Conventions Attended

Figure 2: Map of Progressive-Conservative Nominating Conventions Attended



### 3 The 2017-2018 New Brunswick Nominations Dataset

In Table 3, I indicate each variable, describe it, and outline which variables come from each source – Elections New Brunswick (ENB) or field observations (FO).

Table 3: Description of Variables, 2017-2018 New Brunswick Nominations Dataset

Variable	Description	Source
Party	The Political Party (1 = Liberal, 2 = PC)	ENB
District Name	A string containing the official name of riding	ENB
District ID	A unique identifier for each riding	ENB
Incumbent	A binary variable indicating whether the party has an incumbent seeking re-election (0 = No Incumbent, 1 = Incumbent)	FO
Competitiveness	A three-category variable indicating the perceived competitiveness of the riding based on conversations with party insiders (1 = Safe, 2 = Competitive, 3 = Hopeless)	FO
Win Margin	The party's margin of victory or loss in the 2014 New Brunswick election	ENB
Disagreement	A binary variable indicating whether central and local party actors had different preferred candidates (0 = Agreement, 1 = Disagreement)	FO
Gatekeeping	A binary variable that indicates whether central party actors engaged in one or more gatekeeping activities (0 = No Observed Gatekeeping Activity, 1 = At Least One Observed Gatekeeping Activity)	FO
Contested	A binary variable indicating whether the nomination was contested (0 = Uncontested, 1 = Contested)	ENB



## 4 Cross-Tabulations for Figures

### 4.1 Cross-Tabulation for Figure 1

Table 4: Internal Disagreement and Contested Nominations for the 2018 New Brunswick Election, by Party and Riding Context

Party	Riding Context	Disagreement ( <i>N</i> )	Contested ( <i>N</i> )	Total
Liberal	Incumbent	5% (1)	0% (0)	20
	Safe	80% (4)	60% (3)	5
	Competitive	17% (2)	27% (3)	11
	Hopeless	8% (1)	0% (0)	13
PC	Incumbent	15% (3)	5% (1)	20
	Safe	0% (0)	0% (0)	0
	Competitive	33% (4)	33% (4)	12
	Hopeless	12% (2)	6% (1)	17

### 4.2 Cross-Tabulation for Figure 2


Table 5: Disagreement Over Preferred Candidates and Contested Nominations for the 2018 New Brunswick Election, by Party

Party	Disagreement	Uncontested	Contested	Total
Liberal	Yes	38% (3)	63% (5)	8
	No	100% (41)	0% (0)	41
PC	Yes	44% (4)	56% (5)	9
	No	98% (39)	2% (1)	40

## 5 Objective vs. Subjective Competitiveness


### 5.1 Comparison of Objective and Subjective Measures of Competitiveness

Figure 3: Objective Measures of Riding Competitiveness in 2018 (2014 Win Margin), by Perceived Competitiveness in 2018 and Party, Non-Incumbent Nomination Races Only




## 5.2 Scatterplot of Disagreement by 2014 Win Margin

Figure 4: Disagreement in Liberal and PC Non-Incumbent Nominations, by 2014 Win Margin



### 5.3 Scatterplot of Contested Nominations by 2014 Win Margin

Figure 5: Contested Nominations in Liberal and PC Non-Incumbent Nominations, by 2014 Win Margin



## 6 Replication Using 2014 Win Margin as a Measure of Competitiveness

### 6.1 Regression Table

Table 6: Logistic Regressions of Contested Nominations using 2014 Win Margin as Measure of Competitiveness, Estimated with Penalized Maximum Likelihood, by Party

Outcome: Contested Nomination	
Incumbent	-2.71 [-5.73, 0.31]
Win Margin	2.17 [-2.17, 6.51]
Observed Disagreement	5.78* [2.29, 9.27]
Observed Anti-Competitive Gatekeeping	-3.85* [-7.53, -0.16]
Constant	-2.23* [-3.57, -0.88]
Observations	98

Note: 95% confidence intervals in brackets. \*  $p < 0.05$ .

## 6.2 Predicted Probabilities from Models Using 2014 Win Margin as a Measure of Competitiveness

Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities of Contested Nominations, by Observed Disagreement and Anti-Competitive Gatekeeping




Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities of Contested Nominations Based on Riding Competitiveness (Win Margin in 2014 Election), Estimated with Penalized Maximum Likelihood

