ONLINE APPENDIX for:  
**“Dissecting electoral support for the far right. A comparison between mature and post-communist European democracies”**,published in *Government and Opposition.*

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***Appendix A: Centre-right parties in Europe***

Table A: Centre-right party political parties of the 16 investigated countries which are considered part of the centre-right party family. The schema corresponds to the categorization by Immerzeel et al. (2015).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Parties** | **Parties (EN)** | **ABB** | **Vote (2014)** | **Vote (2016)** |
| Austria | *Das Neue Österreich  Österreichische Volkspartei*  *Team Frank Stronach* | The new Austria  Austrian People’s Party  Team Frank Stronach | NEOS ÖVP  - | 5.2%  29.0%  N/A | 2.7%  26.5% 1.3% |
| Belgium | *Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams*  *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie*  *Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten*  *Centre Démocrate Humaniste*  *Mouvement Réformateur Lijst Dedecker*  *Parti Populaire* | Christian Democratic and Flemish  New Flemish Alliance  Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats  Humanist Democratic Centre  Reformist Movement  List Dedecker  People’s Party | CD&V  N-VA  Open VLD  CDH  MR  -  PP | 13.5%  20.2%  7.6%  4.8%  10.6%  N/A  1.0% | 13.0% 20.4% 8.3% 3.3% 10.3% 0.2% 0.4% |
| Czech Republic | *Top 09*  *Občanská demokratická strana*  *Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová*  *ANO 2011* | Top 09  Civic Democratic Party  Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party ANO | Top09  ODS  KDU-ČSL  ANO | 10.8%  8.6%  5.7%  26.7% | 12.3% 9.5% 6.7%  27.4% |
| Denmark | *Det Radikale Venstre*  *Det Konservative Folkeparti*  *Danmarks liberale parti*  *Liberal Alliance*  *Kristendemokraterne* | Danish Social Liberal Party  Conservative People's Party  Venstre  Liberal Alliance  Christian democrats | B  C  V  I  K | 11.4%  5.5%  26.4%  4.1%  0.7% | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A |
| Estonia | *Eesti Reformierakond*  *Eesti Keskerakond*  *Erakond Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit*  *Eesti Vabaerakond*  *Erakond Eesti Kristlikud Demokraadid* | Estonian Reform Party  Estonian Centre Party  Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica Free Party  Estonian Christian Democrats | REF  KESK  IRL  V  - | 31.2%  27.6%  15.7%  N/A  0.4% | 30.7%  24.1%  11.5% 7.5% N/A |
| Finland | *Kansallinen Kokoomus*  *Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue*  *Suomen Keskusta*  *Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit* | National Coalition Party  Swedish People's Party of Finland  Centre Party  Christian Democrats of Finland | Kok.  RKP  Kesk.  KD | 24.1%  4.6%  18.0%  3.0% | 21.6% 5.0% 21.7% 3.8% |
| France | *Les Républicains (former UMP)*  *Mouvement démocrate Nouveau Centre**Parti Radical Valoisien Mouvement pour la France* | The Republicans  Democratic Movement  New Centre  The Radical Party  Movement for France | LR (UMP)  MoDem  PR MPF | 28.6%  6.0%  1.2%  0.1%  1.0% | 28.8% 2.6%  1.4% 0.4% 1.9% |
| Germany | *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands /* *Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern*  *Freie Demokratische Partei* | Christian Democratic Union of Germany / Christian Social Union in Bavaria  Free Democratic Party | CDU/CSU  FDP | 40.4%  2.4% | 41.1%  2.6% |
| Hungary | *-* | - | - | - | - |
| Lithuania | *Liberalų sąjūdis*  *Tėvynės sąjunga - Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai Lietuvos laisvės sąjunga Partija "Jaunoji Lietuva" Tėvynės sąjunga (formerly part of Homeland Union) Lietuvos centro partija* | Liberal Movement  Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats Lithuanian Freedom Union  Party ‘Young Lithuania’ Nationalist Union Lithuanian Centre Party | LRLS  TS-LKD LLSL JL TS LCP | 5.6%  7.7%  N/A  N/A  N/A  0.1% | 2.6% 11.2% 1.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% |
| Netherlands | *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*  *Christen-Democratisch Appèl*  *Democraten 66*  *ChristenUnie*  *Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij*  *50plus* | People's Party for Freedom and Democracy  Christian Democratic Appeal  Democrats 66  Christian Union  Reformed Political Party  50plus | VVD  CDA  D66  CU  SGP  50+ | 23.8%  12.5%  13.4%  3.7%  2.0%  1.7% | 23.0%  12.5%  13.8% 3.1%  1.9%  1.3% |
| Norway | *Venstre*  *Kristelig Folkeparti*  *Senterpartiet*  *Høyre* | Liberal Party  Christian Democratic Party  Centre Party  Conservative Party | V  KrF  Sp  H | 6.0%  4.8%  5.4%  30.3% | 4.4% 4.9% 5.2% 30.2% |
| Poland | *Kongres Nowej Prawicy*  *Platforma Obywatelska*  *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe Nowoczesna Pyszarda Petru*  *Polska jest Najważniejsza* | Congress of the New Right  Civic Platform  Polish Peasants Party Modern Poland  Poland Comes First | KNP  PO  PSL  M  PJN | 2.2%  49.0%  6.0%  N/A  0.3% | N/A 26.2% 4.2% 5.4%  N/A |
| United Kingdom | *Conservative Party*  *Liberal Democrats*  *Scottish National Party* | Conservative Party  Liberal Democrats  Scottish National Party | CP  LD SNP | 34.8%  15.0%  2.8% | 38.0%  8.7%  3.9% |
| Slovenia | *Demokratična stranka upokojencev Slovenije*  *Nova Slovenija - Krščanski demokrati*  *Slovenska ljudska stranka*  *Stranka modernega centra*  *Zavezništvo Alenke Bratušek*  *Državljanska lista* | Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia  New Slovenia - Christian Democrats  Slovenian People's Party  Modern Centre Party  Alliance of Alenka Bratušek  Civic List | DeSUS  NSi  SLS  SMC ZAAB  DL | 10.1%  5.9%  5.2%  37.9%  3.3%  0.2% | 9.7% 6.6% 3.2% 35.7% 2.0%  N/A |
| Sweden | *Centerpartiet*  *Liberalerna*  *Kristdemokraterna*  *Moderata samlingspartiet* | Centre Party  Liberals  Christian Democrats  Moderate Party | C  L  KD  M | 6.6%  7.8%  4.6%  26.2% | 6.4% 6.3% 3.5% 26.1% |
| Switzerland | *Die Liberalen*  *Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz*  *Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz* | The Liberals  Christian Democratic People's Party Conservative Democratic Party Evangelical’s People Party | FDP CVP BDP  EVP | 18.3%  17.0%  3.6%  1.0% | 18.5% 15.5%  3.3% 1.7% |

***Appendix B: Left-wing party family in Europe***

Table B: left-wing political parties of the 16 investigated countries which are considered part of the centre/left party family. The schema corresponds to the categorization by Immerzeel et al. (2015).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Parties** | **Parties (EN)** | **ABB** | **Vote (2014)** | **Vote (2016)** |
| Austria | *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs KPÖ* | Social Democratic Party of Austria Communist Party of Austria | SPÖ  KPÖ | 32.4%  1.4% | 35.2% 0.4% |
| Belgium | *Socialistische Partij Anders*  *Parti Socialiste*  *Parti du travail de Belgique*  *Partij van de Arbeid* | Socialist Party Different  Socialist Party  Workers' Party Labour Party (Flanders) | SP.A  PS  PTB PVDA+ | 6.9%  14.2%  2.1%  1.5% | 9.0% 13.9% 2.2%  1.4% |
| Czech Republic | *Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy*  *Česká strana sociálně demokratická* | Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia  Czech Social Democratic Party | KSČM ČSSD | 11.1%  30.0% | 10.2% 26.7% |
| Denmark | *Socialdemokraterne*  *Socialistisk Folkeparti* | Social Democrats  Socialist People's Party | A  F | 22.7%  9.2% | N/A  N/A |
| Estonia | *Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond* | Social Democratic Party | SDE | 17.1% | 16.2% |
| Finland | *Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue*  *Vasemmistoliitto*  *Suomen Työväenpuolue*  *Kommunistinen Työväenpuolue – Rauhan ja Sosialismin puolesta* | Social Democratic Party of Finland  Left Alliance Workers’ Party  Communist Workers’ Party | SDP  Vas.  STP  KTP | 17.8%  6.5%  N/A 0.1% | 14.4% 5.3%  0.1%  N/A |
| France | *Front de Gauche*  *Parti Socialiste*  *Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste Lutte Ouvrière Parti Radical de Gauche* | Left Front  Socialist Party New Anticapitalistic Party Workers’ Struggle Radical Left Party | FDG  PS NPA LO PCF | 3.8%  31.6%  0.6%  0.9%  1.5% | 4.0% 33.3%  0.5%1.4%2.1% |
| Germany | *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*  *Die Linke* | Social Democratic Party of Germany  The Left | SPD  LINKE | 31.3%  9.5% | 32.0% 8.7% |
| Hungary | *Magyar Szocialista Párt Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt* | Hungarian Socialist Party Hungarian Communist Party | MSZP  MKP | 26.1%  0.7% | 18.7% 0.6% |
| Lithuania | *Darbo partija*  *Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija* | Labour Party  Social Democratic Party of Lithuania | DP  LSDP | 9.2%  14.4% | 2.9% 11.2% |
| Netherlands | *Partij van de Arbeid*  *Socialistische Partij* | Labour Party  Socialist Party | PvdA  SP | 15.6%  10.9% | 18.6% 8.5% |
| Norway | *Sosialistisk Venstreparti*  *Arbeiderpartiet Rødt* | Socialist Left Party  Labour Party The Red Party | SV  AP R | 4.5%  31.3%  1.0% | 5.3% 34.4% 1.3% |
| Poland | *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej Partia Razem*  *Zjednoczona Lewica*  *Polska Partia Pracy*  *Ruch Palikota* | Democratic Left Alliance  Together Party  United Left  Polish Labour Party  Palikot Movement | SLD  Razem  ZL  PPP  TR | 6.2%  N/A  N/A  0.1%  2.1% | 5.1% 1.1%  5.1%  N/A  N/A |
| United Kingdom | *Labour Party* | Labour Party | LP | 32.9% | 33.8% |
| Slovenia | *Pozitivna Slovenija*  *Socialni demokrati*  *Združena levica* | Positive Slovenia  Social Democrats  United Left | PS  SD  ZL | 2.3%  10.6%  5.7% | 2.2% 12.9% 4.2% |
| Sweden | *Vänsterpartiet*  *Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti* | Left Party  Swedish Social Democratic Party | V  S | 6.1%  29.5% | 6.3% 33.2% |
| Switzerland | *Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz*  *Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz* | Social Democratic Party  Swiss Labour Party | SP  PdA | 17.9% 0.1% | 17.2% 0.4% |

***Appendix C: Variables list, including question wording and answer categories***

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Variables** | Questions | Answers |
| Anti-immigrant attitudes | 1. Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? 2. would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? 3. Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? | 1. Good for the economy (1); Cultural life enriched (2); People mostly look out for themselves (3) 2. – 3. – 4. – 5. – 6. – 7. – 8. – 9. – 10. – 11. Bad for economy (1); Cultural life undermined (2); Worse place to live (3) |
| Authoritarian sentiments | Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer.   1. She/he believes that people should do what they're told. She/he thinks people should follow rules at all times. even when no-one is watching. 2. It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens. 3. It is important to her/him always to behave properly. She/he wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong. 4. Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family. | 1. Not like me at all 2. Not like me 3. A little like me 4. Somewhat like me 5. Like me 6. Very much like me |
| Education | Generated variable: Highest level of education. ES - ISCED | 1. Less than lower secondary 2. Lower secondary 3. Lower tier upper secondary 4. Upper tier upper secondary 5. Advanced vocational –sub degree 6. Lower tertiary education. BA level 7. Higher tertiary education. >= MA level |
| Unemployment | MAIN ACTIVITY | 1. Paid work 2. Education 3. **Unemployed. looking for a job** 4. **Unemployed. not looking for a job** 5. Permanently sick or disabled 6. Retired 7. Community or military service 8. Housework. looking after children. other 9. Other |
| Income redistribution | Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:  The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels | 1. Disagree strongly 2. Disagree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree 5. Agree strongly |
| National political trust  Global political trust | Using this card. please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all. and 10 means you have complete trust;   1. [country]'s parliament? 2. the legal system? 3. the police? 4. politicians? 5. political parties? 6. the European Parliament? 7. the United Nations? | 1. No trust 2. – 3. – 4. – 5. – 6. – 7. – 8. – 9. – 10. – 11. Complete trust |
| External political efficacy | 1. How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does? 2. And how much would you say that the political system in [country] allows people like you to have an influence on politics? | 1. Not at all 2. – 3. – 4. – 5. Completely |
| Age | Age | 18 or higher |
| Female | Gender | 1. Male 2. **Female** |

***Appendix D: Descriptive statistics***Table D:Descriptive statistics ESS data (2014/2016) for mature and post-communist democracies and reporting the N, mean, standard deviation (SD), scale, number of items, and Cronbach’s alpha. The descriptive table only reports the valid cases.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Mature democracies | | | Post-communist democracies | | |
| **Variables (range)** | **N of indicators** | **Mean** | **SD** | **α** | **Mean** | **SD** | **α** |
| Perceived income (1-4) | - | 3.30 | 0.74 | - | 2.82 | 0.77 | - |
| Education (1-7) | - | 4.07 | 1.83 | - | 4.09 | 1.60 | - |
| Unemployment (0-1) | - | 0.04 | 0.20 | - | 0.05 | 0.21 | - |
| Income distribution (1-5) | - | 3.72 | 1.07 | - | 3.94 | 1.03 | - |
| Authoritarian sentiments (1-6) | 4 | 4.17 | 0.90 | .62 | 4.42 | 0.84 | .67 |
| Anti-immigration attitudes (0-10) | 3 | 4.61 | 2.07 | .85 | 5.52 | 2.08 | .85 |
| National political trust (0-10) | 5 | 5.33 | 1.90 | .88 | 4.08 | 2.05 | .89 |
| Supranational political trust (0-10) | 2 | 4.79 | 2.19 | .79 | 4.56 | 2.42 | .89 |
| External political efficacy (1-5) | 2 | 2.54 | .89 | .78 | 2.04 | .86 | .77 |
| Age (18-102/97) | - | 52.14 | 17.46 | .78 | 49.81 | 17.06 | - |
| Female (0-1) | - | 0.50 | 0.50 | - | 0.55 | 0.50 | - |
| Valid N |  | 28,517 |  |  | 14,553 |  |  |

***Appendix E: Correlation matrix***

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Mature democracies** | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | A.S | A.I.A | P.I | Education | Unemployment | I.D | N.P.T | S.P.T | E.P.E | Age | Female |
| Authoritarian sentiments (1-6) | - | 0.18 | -0.03 | -0.15 | -0.04 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.00 | -0.04 | 0.18 | 0.01 |
| Anti-immigration attitudes (0-10) | - | - | -0.20 | -0.33 | 0.03 | 0.01 | -0.43 | -0.40 | -0.36 | 0.06 | 0.02 |
| Perceived income (1-4) | - | - | - | 0.24 | -0.21 | -0.18 | 0.25 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.05 | -0.05 |
| Education (1-7) | - | - | - | - | -0.04 | -0.13 | 0.23 | 0.20 | 0.26 | -0.21 | -0.03 |
| Unemployment (0-1) | - | - | - | - | - | 0.05 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.12 | -0.02 |
| Income distribution (1-5) | - | - | - | - | - | - | -0.12 | -0.07 | -0.13 | 0.08 | 0.08 |
| National political trust (0-10) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.70 | 0.57 | -0.03 | -0.03 |
| Supranational political trust (0-10) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.44 | -0.11 | 0.03 |
| External political efficacy (1-5) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -0.11 | -0.05 |
| Age (18-102/97) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.01 |
| Female (0-1) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
|  | **Post-communist democracies** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Authoritarian sentiments (1-6) | - | 0.06 | -0.01 | -0.06 | -0.05 | 0.12 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.18 | 0.09 |
| Anti-immigration attitudes (0-10) | - | - | -0.17 | -0.18 | 0.01 | 0.06 | -0.19 | -0.25 | -0.22 | 0.11 | -0.01 |
| Perceived income (1-4) | - | - | - | 0.30 | -0.18 | -0.13 | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.17 | -0.17 | -0.07 |
| Education (1-7) | - | - | - | - | -0.08 | -0.14 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.20 | -0.19 | 0.09 |
| Unemployment (0-1) | - | - | - | - | - | 0.03 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.10 | -0.02 |
| Income distribution (1-5) | - | - | - | - | - | - | -0.12 | -0.05 | -0.15 | 0.11 | 0.06 |
| National political trust (0-10) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.63 | 0.41 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Supranational political trust (0-10) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.29 | -0.04 | 0.02 |
| External political efficacy (1-5) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | -0.12 | -0.05 |
| Age (18-102/97) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.06 |
| Female (0-1) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

***Appendix F: Interaction effect anti-immigration attitudes and country type (hypothesis H1b)***

Hypothesis H1b states that anti-immigration attitudes have a weaker effect in explaining electoral support for far-right parties in post-communist democracies compared to mature democracies. This claim is *ad oculum* clearly supported by our findings. To statistically test this hypothesis, we ran an additional regression model with all countries pooled together in which we included an interaction term, in addition to all independent variables (see Table F). It shows that the effects of anti-immigrant attitudes on far-right voting are indeed significantly stronger in the West than in the East, thus supporting H1b.

Table F:Multilevel multinomial logistic regression: all countries. The interaction effect of anti-immigration attitudes and country type on far-right voting.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Centre right | Left-wing | Non-voters |
|  | Estimate (S.E.) | Estimate (S.E.) | Estimate (S.E.) |
| **Cultural backlash** |  |  |  |
| Anti-immigration attitudes (0-10) | **-.37 (.01)** | **-.51 (.01)** | **-.36 (.01)** |
| Authoritarian sentiments (1-6) | -.02 (.02) | **-.20 (.02)** | **-.20 (.02)** |
| **Economic grievances** |  |  |  |
| Perceived income (1-4) | **.20 (.03)** | -.01 (.03) | **-.16 (.03)** |
| Education (1-7) | **.16 (.01)** | **.09 (.01)** | **-.12 (.01)** |
| Unemployment (0-1) | **-.31 (.10)** | -.02 (.10) | .14 (.09) |
| Income distribution (1-5) | **-.18 (.02)** | .32 (.02) | -.00 (.02) |
| **Protest vote** |  |  |  |
| National political trust (0-10) | -.01 (.01) | **-.07 (.02)** | **-.19 (.01)** |
| Supranational political trust (0-10) | **.12 (.01)** | **.12 (.01)** | **.11 (.01)** |
| External political efficacy (1-5) | **.13 (.03)** | **.10 (.03)** | **-.20 (.03)** |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Age (18-102/97) | **.01 (.00)** | **.02 (.00)** | **-.02 (.00)** |
| Female (0-1) | **.34 (.04)** | **.36 (.04)** | **.36 (.04)** |
| **Interaction** |  |  |  |
| Anti-immigration\*Post-communist democracies | **.23 (.02)** | **.32 (.02)** | **.25 (.02)** |

*Note:* Far-right voters are the reference category. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant (p < .05, two-tailed)

***Appendix G: Robustness checks***

First, we have assessed how the results would differ if we use the standard technique of comparing far-right voters with the rest of the electorate, thus all other people who are entitled to vote in national elections. The results are shown in Table G1. The results show that important nuances we highlighted in our article are obfuscated in a conventional design. For instance, the conventional designs shows that far-right voters have significantly stronger authoritarian sentiments, whereas our analysis reveals that this is actually not true if we compare them with centre right voters. Moreover, Table G1 shows that far-right voters are lower educated than the rest of the electorate, but our analysis has revealed that this is clearly incorrect if we compare far-right voters with non-voters, since we showed that they are even significantly *higher* educated.

**Table G1.**Multilevel binary logistic regressions of far-right voting vs all other eligible citizens for mature democracies and post-communist democracies.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mature  democracies | Post-communist  democracies |
|  | Estimate  S | Estimate S |
| **Cultural backlash** |  |  |
| Anti-immigration attitudes (0-10) | **-.39 (.01)** | **-.21 (.02)** |
| Authoritarian sentiments (1-6) | **-.06 (.03)** | **-.14 (.04)** |
| **Economic grievances** |  |  |
| Perceived income (1-4) | .06 (.04) | **.13 (.05)** |
| Education (1-7) | **.15 (.02)** | **.16 (.02)** |
| Unemployment (0-1) | **-.33 (.12)** | .07 (.17) |
| Income distribution (1-5) | .00 (.02) | -.01 (.04) |
| **Protest vote** |  |  |
| National political trust (0-10) | **.15 (.02)** | **-.24 (.02)** |
| Supranational political trust (0-10) | **.10 (.02)** | **.17 (.02)** |
| External political efficacy (1-5) | **.17 (.04)** | -.03 (.04) |
| **Control variables** |  |  |
| Age (18-102/97) | **.02 (.00)** | .02 (.00) |
| Female (0-1) | **.43 (.05)** | **.25 (.07)** |
| Log Likelihood | -5,980.84 | -3,110.92 |
| N= | 22,629 | 8,869 |

*Note:* Far-right voters are the reference category. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant (p < .05, two-tailed)

Second, we conducted a series of robustness checks to assess to what extent the results are influenced by the classification of parties and the inclusion or exclusion of countries and parties. We start with far-right parties: to what extent are the results influenced by the exclusion or inclusion of a few additional parties that could arguably also be classified as far right? As we have explained in the paper, our selection of far-right parties consists of parties that have a strong authoritarian-nativist position (7.5 or higher) *and* deem anti-elitism and/or authoritarian-nativist issues as most important issue, as indicated by the two most important issues mentioned in CHES 2014. Four marginal parties that were not included but nevertheless possess both attributes could arguably have been added. These four parties are: People’s Party (Belgium), Movement for France (France), The Way of Courage (Lithuania) and Congress of the New Right (Poland). In our main analysis, three of these parties are coded as centre-right and one of them is excluded as it is difficult to categorize as either centre-right or left-wing party (The Way of Courage).   
 Our robustness check consisted of four additional analyses in which we included one of the four parties. These findings show that each addition did not affect our findings, which is not surprising given the fact that these four parties are rather small (see Table G2).

**Table G2.** Four marginal parties that could additionally be coded as far-right parties.


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Parties + ABB** | **Vote (ESS 2014)** | **Vote (ESS 2016)** | **Position score**  **(CHES 2014)** | **Main issue**  **(CHES 2014)** | **Second issue**  **(CHES 2014)** |
| Belgium | Parti Populaire (PP) | 1.0% | 0.4% | 8.5 | tie: anti-elite and immigration | ethnic minorities |
| France | Mouvement pour la France (MPF) | 1.0% | 1.9% | 9.1 | nationalism | immigration |
| Lithuania | The Way of Courage (DK) | 1.3% | 0.2% | 7.7 | anti-elite rhetoric | corruption. |
| Poland | Congress of the New Right (KNP) | 2.2% | -- | 8.8 | anti-elite rhetoric | public services vs taxes |

Furthermore, we have checked the opposite possibility, namely the removal of some far-right parties from our analysis. Since they are popular among a large portion of the population, particularly PiS (Poland) and Fidesz (Hungary) are the most important cases to consider. We classified PiS and Fidesz as part of the far-right family. Table G3 shows the results if we classify them as centre-right, instead of far-right parties.  
 Table G3 interestingly shows that trust in national politics has some opposite significant effects when parties PiS (Poland) and Fidesz (Hungary) are coded as centre-right (model 2) rather than far-right party (model 1): the results show that far-right voters in post-communist democracies have *less* trust in national politics when compared to centre-right voters and left-wing voters (in line with H5). They are still more trustful than non-voters. It is important to note that three parties we classified as far right were in power at the time of the surveys, namely PiS in Poland (since 2015), Fidesz in Hungary (since 2014) and Order and Justice in Lithuania (2012–2016). This robustness check thus suggests that the ‘protest voting’ explanation is context-dependent: when far-right parties are in government, their supporters are not politically dissatisfied, or at least not more so than voters of other mainstream parties. To further clarify this dependency, we conducted a country-by-country analysis of the effect of trust in national politics (see Figure G1).

**Table G3.**Comparison of two multilevel multinomial logistic regressions of post-communist democracies. In model 2 the parties PiS (Poland) and Fidesz (Hungary) are coded as centre-right instead of far-right parties.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Centre-right** | | **Left-wing** | | **Non-voters** | |
|  | **model 1** | **model 2** | **model 1** | **model 2** | **model 1** | **model 2** |
|  | **Estimate (S.E.)** | **Estimate (S.E.)** | **Estimate (S.E.)** | **Estimate (S.E.)** | **Estimate (S.E.)** | **Estimate (S.E.)** |
| **Cultural backlash** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Anti-immigration attitudes (0-10) | **-.22 (.02)** | **-.17 (.02)** | **-.15 (0.02)** | **-.14 (.02)** | **-.15 (.02)** | **-.13 (.02)** |
| Authoritarian sentiments (1-6) | -.07 (.04) | **.15 (.05)** | **-.19 (0.04)** | -.07 (.05) | **-.28 (.04)** | **-.16 (.05)** |
| **Economic grievances** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Perceived income (1-4) | **.21 (.05)** | **.14 (.06)** | .06 (0.05) | .04 (.06) | **-.09 (.05)** | -.10 (.06) |
| Education (1-7) | **.13 (.02)** | -.02 (.03) | **.10 (0.02)** | .04 (.03) | **-.16 (.02)** | **-.22 (.03)** |
| Unemployment (0-1) | .08 (.16) | -.26 (.18) | .06 (0.18) | -.18 (.21) | .23 (.14) | .00 (.17) |
| Income distribution (1-5) | **-.16 (.03)** | -.06 (.04) | **.10 (0.04)** | **.11 (.05)** | .02 (.03) | .02 (.04) |
| **Protest vote** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| National political trust (0-10) | **-.20 (.02)** | **.16 (.03)** | **-.23 (0.02)** | **.07 (.03)** | **-.35 (.02)** | **-.06 (.03)** |
| Supranational political trust (0-10) | **.10 (.02)** | -.03 (.02) | **.15 (0.02)** | **.05 (.02)** | **.13 (.02)** | .03 (.02) |
| External political efficacy (1-5) | .00 (.04) | **.07 (.05)** | -.01 (0.04) | .02 (.06) | **-.30 (.04)** | **-.26 (.05)** |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age (18-102/97) | **.01 (.00)** | **.02 (.00)** | **.03 (0.00)** | **.03 (.00)** | **-.02 (.00)** | **-.01 (.00)** |
| Female (0-1) | **.25 (.06)** | **.52 (.08)** | **.20 (0.07)** | **.46 (.09)** | **.33 (.06)** | **.60 (.08)** |

*Note:* Far-right voters are the reference category. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant (p < .05, two-tailed)



**Figure G1.** Country-by-country analysis of the effect of trust in national politics. Far-right voters are the reference category.


Furthermore, we have estimated our regression models for different subsets of the sample of countries: we dropped the countries one at a time to assess how sensitive the results are for outlying cases. These results show that our findings are robust to inclusion or exclusion of particular countries.

Third, we assess the effect of the inclusion of different independent variables and thus the three different theories. In order to be able to adequately execute this particular robustness check, we used a series of multilevel logistic regressions. The change of regression method is aimed at enabling the independent specification per model.

To investigate the fit of the model, we made use of Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1974). The reason behind this choice is twofold. First, it controls for the sample size and the number of independent variables per theory. Second, the AIC is appropriate for comparing different hypotheses. This paper investigates multiple hypotheses wherein the question is not: ‘which hypothesis holds the singular truth?’, but rather ‘which hypothesis explains the differences between far-right voters and other groups in a given region most accurately?’ (Chamberlin 1965, as cited in Burnham and Anderson 2004).

Figure G2 presents the results. It shows that, considering the AIC of the models, the model which includes all the hypotheses accounts for the least information loss compared to the models in which the separate hypotheses are tested. This indicates that the three explanatory approaches complement each other, rather than substitute each other.

Furthermore, the results demonstrate that for every comparison between far-right voters and another group, the cultural backlash hypothesis is the best fitting explanatory model, both in mature democracies and post-communist democracies. The only exception occurs when the abstainers are compared to the far-right supporters in CEE *–* in that case, the differences between far right voters and non-voters is best explained through the ‘protest vote’ approach, rather than the cultural backlash explanation.



**Figure G2.** Comparing the model fit of different model specifications based on three explanatory approaches, using multilevel logistic regressions.

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Akaike, H. (1974). A new look at the statistical model identification. *IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control*, *19*(6), 716-723.

Burnham, K. P., & Anderson, D. R. (2004). Multimodel inference: understanding AIC and BIC in model selection. *Sociological Methods & Research*, *33*(2), 261-304.