Online Appendix of the article:

**Presidential Instability in Latin America: Why Institutionalized Parties Matter**

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##### Appendix A.1. Latin American failed presidents (1979-2019)

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| **Year** | **Country** | **President** |
| 1985 | Bolivia | Hernán Siles Zuazo |
| 1989 | Argentina | Raúl Alfonsín |
| 1992 | Brazil | Fernando Collor de Mello |
| 1993 | Venezuela | Carlos A. Pérez |
| 1993 | Guatemala | Jorge Serrano |
| 1996 | Dominican Republic | Joaquín Balaguer |
| 1997 | Ecuador | Abdalá Bucaram |
| 1999 | Paraguay | Fernando Cubas |
| 2000 | Ecuador | Jamil Mahuad |
| 2000 | Peru | Alberto Fujimori |
| 2001 | Argentina | Fernando de la Rúa |
| 2003 | Bolivia | Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada |
| 2003 | Argentina | Eduardo Duhalde |
| 2005 | Ecuador | Lucio Gutiérrez |
| 2005 | Bolivia | Carlos Mesa |
| 2009 | Honduras | Manuel Zelaya |
| 2012 | Paraguay | Fernando Lugo |
| 2015 | Guatemala | Otto Pérez Molina |
| 2016 | Brazil | Dilma Rousseff |
| 2018 | Peru | Pedro P. Kuczynski |
| 2019 | Bolivia | Evo Morales (not included in the analysis) |

**Table A.2. Party Institutionalisation, Government Stability and Presidential Crises**

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|  | ***Low PI*** | ***Moderate PI*** | ***High PI*** |
| *Government stability source* | President’s strength vis-à-vis other actors. Parties are too weak or may not even exist. | President’s strength vis-à-vis other actors. Ad-hoc agreements between the chief executive and key politicians. Fragile stability. | Formal and informal long-term institutions built upon a large ‘shadow of the future’. |
| *Is PI a direct source of a presidential crisis?* | No. Direct causes may include deadlocks, economic recessions, presidential scandals, anti-government demonstrations, recalcitrant congressional opposition, presidential attacks on other branches, inter-branch conflicts, among others. | | |
| *How does PI distantly affect the occurrence of a presidential crisis?* | It is expected that (i) parties allow outsiders and political neophytes, who lack negotiation skills and experience, to rise; (ii) unconstrained by either government or opposition parties, presidents are more prone to engage in risky behaviour (e.g., pursue radical, destabilizing goals); (iii) inter and intra-party conflicts may arise more frequently since parties fail to reconcile competing interests/factions. These features make crises more likely. | | Parties are more likely to (i) provide leaders with political experience and negotiation skills, (ii) constrain the president forcing her to accommodate, (iii) reconcile interests of competing factions, and (iv) help legitimise the political system; all of which reduces the occurrence of a crisis. |
| *In the face of a presidential crisis, would parties fuel or deter its occurrence?* | Parties are too weak or may not even exist, thus, either have a limited (if any) role throughout a crisis. | Parties either do nothing or, more likely, seek short-term gains from it. The latter fuels the crisis. | Parties have a long-term view and are more risk averse, thus, would try to prevent or contain a crisis. |
| *When a presidential crisis occurs, with whom the president negotiates her way out of it?* | Parties are too weak or may not even exist, thus, the president is on her own. | Players unable or unwilling to negotiate.  Agreements could be reached but probably fragile and short-lived.  Opposition parties also likely to take advantage of the crisis and are strong enough to destabilise the president. | With congress through parties. Crisis exits likely to be funnelled institutionally. |