Online Appendix for:

**“Does class shape legislators’ approach to inequality and economic policy? A comparative view**.” Published in *Government and Opposition.* By Alexander Hemingway.

Institutional moderators: expanded theoretical explanation and results

This supplementary section provides an expanded discussion of the exploratory analysis of whether the observed differences by class are moderated by features of electoral institutions, which create distinct incentive structures for legislators. (An abridged version of this discussion is found in the main paper, where the relevant references can be found.) A recent study of the link between gender and the representation of women’s issues, which focused on the moderating role of electoral institutions, offers a useful framework for examining institutional moderators of the modelled class effect (Lore, 2016). Lore found that institutional features like open party lists, local nominations, and division of powers systems heighten the differences between men and women in the substantive representation of women’s issues.

According to Lore’s (2016) theory of “incentives for unincorporated representation,” each of these three institutional characteristics increases the incentives for competition between individual legislators within parties. The converse of these features – closed lists, centralized nominations, and the fusion of powers – are expected to dampen individual-level differences. Open party lists and local nomination battles straightforwardly imply greater competition between prospective legislators of the same party. Perhaps less obvious is how division of powers systems, unlike fusion of powers systems, increase intra-party competition between legislators. As Lore (2016) outlines, division of powers systems are characterized by weaker party discipline relative to parliamentary systems with the fusion of powers, which means more opportunities for differentiation between legislators in the same party.

This framework is an elaboration of Carey and Shugart’s (1995) theory of personal versus party votes. Because of increased intra-party competition, there is more opportunity and incentive for legislators to differentiate themselves from their fellow partisans. In Lore’s (2016) framework, this holds particularly for issue dimensions that are not already well-incorporated into inter-party competition.

Class-relevant economic issues, however, are likely to be better incorporated into competition between parties than gender policy issues. Political parties are usually understood to act as key political aggregators of class conflict, and economic issues are constitutive of how we conceptualize left and right-wing political parties. Therefore, we may be less likely to observe a class effect being moderated by institutions than a gender effect.

On the other hand, in an era of frequent agreement on liberal economic policies among parties of both the left and right, economic issues may not be as well incorporated into party competition as they once were. Thus, there is reason to believe that institutional features like open party lists might indeed magnify the effects of legislators’ class on their attitudes and behavior.

One might object that such incentives could condition legislators’ behavior in office, but that they shouldn’t affect their attitudes and preferences. However, part of adapting behavior to a strategic context can include adapting one’s privately-held attitudes. Indeed, the fact that people’s attitudes often follow from their behavior is a robust finding in the psychological literature (Olson & Stone, 2005).

In terms of institutional moderators, three indicator variables in the Comparative MP Survey data set are used in the analyses. The first variable indicates whether a jurisdiction uses an open list voting system.[[1]](#footnote-1) The second indicates whether the party nomination for that MP took place at the local level (as opposed the regional or national level). The third variable indicates whether the jurisdiction is characterized by a division of powers system (presidential or semi-presidential) or a fusion of powers system (parliamentary).

The model specification in this institutional analysis is similar to the baseline models in the main analyses, with the addition of an institutional indicator variable that is interacted with the ten occupation indicator variables, as follows:

*Outcomeij* = *β1-10(Occupationij)* + *β11(Institutionj)* + *β12=21(Occupationij)x(Institutionj)*

+ *β22(Controlsij)* + *γk + ϵij*

where *Institutionj* indicates the presence of one of the institutions (open lists, local nominations or division of powers) in parliament *j* and *Controlsij* represents same the vector of controls as in the models presented in the preceding section.

The results show that the relationship between legislators’ class and their attitudes and behavior does vary with institutional incentives. First, there is a statistically and substantively significant interaction between legislators’ occupation and open list electoral systems in terms of attitudes towards inequality (using a Wald test, p<.01).[[2]](#footnote-2) As shown in the marginal effects (see Figure A2, first panel), under open party lists (compared to closed lists) there tend to be larger differences in inequality attitudes between business sector professionals and other occupational categories, including workers and service-based professionals.[[3]](#footnote-3) In absolute terms, the larger difference between classes under open lists is composed of a combination of a shift to the right by business legislators and a shift to the left by workers and service-based professionals.

Specifically, business sector legislators are more favorable to inequality than legislators from other occupations. The magnitude of these class coefficients under open lists is even larger than those seen in the earlier models without moderators. For example, under open lists, the difference between a business legislator and worker is over 60% the size of the coefficient for being in a left party compared another type of party.

Similarly, the interaction of occupation with the division of powers variable is significant (Wald test, p<.01). The differences between business sector legislators and other occupational categories tends to be larger under the division of powers (presidential or semi-presidential systems) compared to the fusion of powers (parliamentary systems), as shown in the second panel of Figure A2. For example, under the division of powers, business legislators are more favorable to inequality than workers, and the coefficient size is about 60% that of being in a left party.

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*Note:* Lower scores correspond to more economically left-wing attitudes. Dots are marginal effect coefficients and lines are 95% confidence intervals. Business is the omitted reference category for occupation.

In contrast, there is no significant interaction between occupation and the institutional characteristic of having local nominations. Local nominations were also the weakest institutional interaction in Lore’s (2016) analysis of gender representation, suggesting this may be a less potent moderator of intra-party differences in legislators’ attitudes and behavior.[[4]](#footnote-4)

For the behavioral dependent variable (levels of contact with workers’ organizations and trade unions), the pattern of results is similar, but more muted. Again, legislators’ class interacts significantly with open lists and division of powers (Wald tests, p<.05), but not local nomination.[[5]](#footnote-5) Under open lists and the division of powers, business legislators have substantially less contact with workers’ organizations and trade unions than worker legislators (see Figure A3), and in both cases the differences are more than 90% of the coefficient size of being in a left party. In contrast, under closed lists and the fusion of powers, the marginal effects show no significant differences between business sector and legislators from other occupation categories.

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*Note:* Higher coefficient indicates more contact with workers’ groups. Dots are marginal effect coefficients and lines are 95% confidence intervals. Business is the omitted reference category for occupation.

Broadly speaking, these findings suggest that electoral institutions play a role in moderating the theorized effect of class representation. These institutions would appear to magnify individual-level differences between legislators by increasing incentives for intra-party competition.

Additional robustness checks to main paper results

The analyses presented in the main paper were shown to hold up under a variety of specifications, and additional robustness checks are outlined here. One concern we might have is that the results are sensitive to the estimation methods used. To address this possibility, a range of additional alternative specifications for each of the three dependent variables can be considered. The models that follow are modifications of the main specification (including controls) for each dependent variable, unless otherwise indicated. Full regression results described in this section are available upon request (and in certain cases, where specifically indicated, they are already included in tables in this Online Appendix).

When clustering standard errors by country instead of by parliament, the relationship between legislators’ class and their attitudes and behavior remains significant. The observed differences by class also hold when using a multilevel model with legislators nested within parliaments (instead of a regression with standard errors clustered by parliament), as well as nesting legislators within parliamentary party groups rather than parliaments (though in this case significance is lost for the government intervention variable). The results also hold when using ordered logit instead of Ordinary Least Squares regression (which is relevant since strictly speaking the dependent variable scales are ordered rather than continuous).[[6]](#footnote-6)

Another concern we might have is that legislators’ education levels are not included as a control in the main analyses. Education a potentially theoretically important control, given the likely relationship between occupation and education. It was excluded in the main analyses because it is not itself statistically significant, and because including it leads to the loss of nearly 300 cases due to missing data for this variable. When education is included as a control, though, the relationship between legislators’ class and their attitudes and behavior remains substantively similar for all three dependent variables.

One particularly important control variable in my models is the “left party” dummy variable. This variable is constructed from expert assessments of the party families to which each party belongs (e.g., “Liberal”, “Socialist”, “Communist”, among others). As an alternative variable to control for party ideology, we can use a “left party” dummy constructed from a legislator’s self-reported assessment of their party’s ideological location on the left-right spectrum. We can also use the self-reported party ideology control as a *continuous* variable rather than a left dummy. In both cases, the coefficient for legislators’ class remains significant for the attitude and behavior outcome variables.

In addition, the findings also hold up if we drop a set of observations that I flagged as “difficult or ambiguous to code” during the process of categorizing occupation descriptions in the data.

Furthermore, a large subset of the Comparative MP Survey sample are legislators from Switzerland (approximately one quarter of the sample). To address this issue, in the weighted models presented in Tables 2 and 3, observation weights were used to equalize the influence of countries and regional/national parliaments. As a further robustness check on this issue, models were run where the Swiss observations are excluded entirely. The pattern of legislators’ class affecting their attitudes and behavior holds up with observations from Switzerland excluded.

In interpreting the results for the behavioral dependent variable (contact with workers’ organizations), we should keep in mind that trade union staff are coded in the “workers” occupation category (consistent with the coding practice of Carnes 2013). A total of 191 MPs are coded as workers and 37 of these are classified as such because they’re trade union staff. On the surface, one could argue that of course trade union staff have more contact with trade unions. However, the survey question stipulates that it refers only to the contact that legislators have specifically *in their roles as MPs*. As an additional check, I have separated out the union staff subset of workers in a supplementary set of models. Even removing union staff, the coefficients for worker-legislators show a higher level of contact with workers’ organizations and trade unions than legislators in the business sector (and the differences are statistically significant except in the weighted model).[[7]](#footnote-7)

Tables and Figures

**Table A1: Occupation categories by country**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | AUT | BEL | FRA | GER | HUN | IRE | ISR | ITA | NET | NOR | POL | POR | SPA | SWI | UNK |
| Business | 40 | 19 | 12 | 15 | 23 | 9 | 4 | 19 | 14 | 9 | 2 | 9 | 16 | 141 | 18 |
| Technical professional | 15 | 16 | 14 | 39 | 10 | 9 | 5 | 26 | 2 | 2 | 26 | 20 | 24 | 76 | 11 |
| Farmer | 22 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 31 | 2 |
| Lawyer | 10 | 19 | 7 | 18 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 11 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 21 | 33 | 26 | 10 |
| Other white collar | 3 | 5 | 2 | 60 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 46 | 9 |
| Politics | 31 | 38 | 3 | 21 | 24 | 1 | 1 | 10 | 28 | 1 | 4 | 10 | 2 | 57 | 5 |
| Civil service | 11 | 11 | 13 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 11 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 32 | 2 | 2 |
| Service-based professional | 37 | 40 | 16 | 33 | 25 | 7 | 7 | 24 | 6 | 11 | 10 | 34 | 50 | 121 | 36 |
| Worker | 40 | 13 | 1 | 32 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 1 | 8 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 49 | 10 |
| No info | 2 | 0 | 2 | 27 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 35 | 0 |
| Total | 211 | 162 | 74 | 249 | 98 | 34 | 25 | 121 | 65 | 45 | 55 | 115 | 172 | 584 | 103 |

**Table A2: Occupation categories by party type**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Final Occupation Category** | **Initial Coding Categories** | **Right / Other Party** | **Left Party** | **Total** |
| 1. Business | Businessperson - top managementBusinessperson - middle managementOther business / entrepreneur | 257 | 89 | 346  |
| 2. Technical professional | Technical professional | 177 | 111 | 288  |
| 3. Farmer | Farmer | 62 | 10 | 72  |
| 4. Lawyer | Lawyer | 120 | 57 | 177  |
| 5. Other white collar | Other white collar | 74 | 74 | 148  |
| 6. Politics / law enforcement | Military / law enforcementPolitician | 135 | 97 | 232  |
| 7. Civil service | Civil servant (no other identification) | 40 | 66 | 106  |
| 8. Service-based professional | University-professorSchool teacherOther service-based professional | 174 | 275 | 449  |
| 9. Worker | WorkerEmployee (no other identification) | 74 | 114 | 188  |
| 10. No occupation info | Unemployed StudentRetired (and no previous occupation given)No previous occupationOtherUnknown/blank | 38 | 38 | 76  |

Note: I initially coded the open-end, raw text occupation field in the PARTIREP data set into 21 categories shown in the second column of Table A2, and then combined them into the 10 categories shown in the first column. These 10 categories, as well as how example occupations map onto them, are adapted from the coding scheme outline by Carnes (2013) and Carnes and Lupu (2014).

Table A3, adapted from Carnes and Lupu 2014, provided some guidance in this process. For observations where the open-ended PARTIREP occupation text fields were ambiguous but suggested a certain category, I flagged the observation as “uncertain.” As a robustness check, I ran versions of the main regression models with the uncertain cases dropped, as discussed in the robustness section.

**Table A3: Occupational categories (reproduced and adapted from Carnes and Lupu 2014)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Broad occupational category* | *Narrow occupational category* |
| Businessperson | Associate Director / CEO Business owner / manager Farmer, Farm owner / manager Banker Contractor Salesman Business representative |
| Technical professional [labelled “private-sector professional in Carnes and Lupu (2014)] | Accountant / Economist Actor Advertising Architect / Urban Planner Author Consultant Doctor / Dentist / Vet Engineer Hospital Administrator Journalist / Publisher Medical Office Manager Mortician Pharmacist Professional Athlete Radio and Television Notary Public |
| Military / law enforcement | Military Law Enforcement |
| Lawyer | Lawyer |
| Politician | Political Consultant Political Party Officer Pub Policy Analyst Public Relations / Lobbyist Judge Mayor Government Attorney |
| Service-based professional | NGO / Charity Organizer College Administrator College Professor Education Admin. Guidance Councilor High School Admin. Librarian Minister / Priest Sec. School Teacher Social Worker Other educatorNurse Community organizer |
| Worker | Laborer Service industry worker Union officer, staff member |
| *Other* |

**Table A4. Regression models relating legislators’ attitudes (full results including all controls)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Inequality (no controls) | Inequality (controls) | Inequality (weighted) | Govt economic intervention (no controls) | Govt economic intervention (controls) | Govt economic intervention (weighted) |
| Business | 0(.) | 0(.) | 0(.) | 0(.) | 0(.) | 0(.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional | -0.282\*(0.108) | -0.132(0.0900) | -0.0677(0.0807) | -0.321\*\*(0.112) | -0.168(0.105) | -0.104(0.124) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | -0.0860(0.178) | -0.263(0.179) | -0.316(0.203) | -0.191(0.148) | -0.408\*\*(0.149) | -0.456\*(0.197) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | -0.308\*(0.121) | -0.192+(0.107) | -0.191(0.115) | -0.219+(0.123) | -0.0966(0.102) | -0.137(0.122) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | -0.617\*\*(0.125) | -0.384\*\*(0.103) | -0.303\*\*(0.102) | -0.275+(0.161) | -0.0550(0.132) | -0.0303(0.137) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | -0.446\*\*(0.108) | -0.238\*(0.0979) | -0.164(0.106) | -0.419\*\*(0.102) | -0.198\*(0.0844) | -0.247\*(0.108) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | -0.607\*\*(0.132) | -0.217+(0.121) | -0.221+(0.113) | -0.628\*\*(0.0977) | -0.197+(0.106) | -0.170(0.117) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | -0.858\*\*(0.102) | -0.449\*\*(0.0812) | -0.337\*\*(0.0776) | -0.731\*\*(0.113) | -0.271\*\*(0.0835) | -0.237\*(0.101) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Worker | -0.695\*\*(0.110) | -0.305\*\*(0.0886) | -0.241\*\*(0.0876) | -0.675\*\*(0.116) | -0.251\*\*(0.0787) | -0.127(0.0808) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No occupation info | -0.303+(0.172) | -0.0822(0.164) | 0.0739(0.319) | -0.149(0.183) | 0.127(0.174) | 0.331(0.212) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AUT | 0(.) | 0(.) | 0(.) | 0(.) | 0(.) | 0(.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BEL | -0.206+(0.114) | -0.322\*\*(0.111) | -0.417\*\*(0.120) | -0.108(0.127) | -0.242+(0.130) | -0.358\*(0.152) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FRA | -0.403\*(0.186) | -0.378\*(0.155) | -0.492\*\*(0.179) | -0.408\*\*(0.151) | -0.363+(0.206) | -0.471+(0.242) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GER | -0.111(0.159) | 0.0178(0.139) | -0.129(0.147) | 0.0970(0.116) | 0.248+(0.126) | 0.0783(0.156) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HUN | 0.215\*(0.0980) | 0.230\*(0.0983) | 0.116(0.104) | 0.0949(0.0989) | 0.0899(0.115) | -0.0308(0.140) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| IRE | -0.0802(0.0982) | -0.268\*\*(0.0964) | -0.349\*\*(0.101) | -0.362\*\*(0.1000) | -0.652\*\*(0.117) | -0.758\*\*(0.141) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ISR | 0.540\*\*(0.105) | 0.330\*\*(0.107) | 0.225+(0.120) | -0.290\*(0.111) | -0.563\*\*(0.130) | -0.678\*\*(0.164) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ITA | -0.452\*\*(0.122) | -0.488\*\*(0.126) | -0.586\*\*(0.130) | 0.263\*(0.129) | 0.209(0.133) | 0.0645(0.160) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NET | -0.325\*\*(0.103) | -0.328\*\*(0.0996) | -0.422\*\*(0.105) | 0.132(0.103) | 0.151(0.109) | 0.0607(0.131) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NOR | -0.161(0.106) | -0.149(0.107) | -0.279\*(0.123) | -0.291\*\*(0.109) | -0.273\*(0.125) | -0.430\*\*(0.157) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POL | 0.676\*\*(0.109) | 0.344\*\*(0.115) | 0.257\*(0.123) | 0.639\*\*(0.118) | 0.135(0.138) | 0.0358(0.165) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POR | -0.385\*(0.191) | -0.364+(0.195) | -0.400+(0.213) | 0.329\*(0.138) | 0.350\*(0.164) | 0.250(0.193) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.123(0.186) | 0.319(0.230) | 0.162(0.211) | -0.480\*\*(0.126) | -0.234(0.166) | -0.407\*(0.188) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SWI | -0.196+(0.117) | -0.250\*(0.117) | -0.339\*\*(0.102) | 0.151(0.119) | 0.103(0.126) | 0.0307(0.135) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNK | -0.491\*\*(0.106) | -0.569\*\*(0.133) | -0.704\*\*(0.146) | -0.120(0.109) | -0.212(0.144) | -0.357\*(0.174) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other Party |  | 0(.) | 0(.) |  | 0(.) | 0(.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left Party |  | -1.158\*\*(0.127) | -1.068\*\*(0.144) |  | -1.284\*\*(0.136) | -1.169\*\*(0.145) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| male |  | 0(.) | 0(.) |  | 0(.) | 0(.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| female |  | -0.0973(0.0614) | -0.0583(0.0671) |  | -0.171\*\*(0.0598) | -0.151\*\*(0.0522) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| age |  | 0.00663\*\*(0.00229) | 0.00902\*\*(0.00272) |  | 0.00874\*\*(0.00240) | 0.0103\*\*(0.00302) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.088\*\*(0.118) | 3.055\*\*(0.164) | 2.921\*\*(0.173) | 3.026\*\*(0.114) | 2.940\*\*(0.163) | 2.900\*\*(0.215) |
| Observations | 1891 | 1817 | 1817 | 1894 | 1820 | 1820 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A5. Regression models on legislators' contact with workers' organizations (full results)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | No controls | Controls | Controls, weighted |
| Business | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | (.) | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional | 0.127 | 0.0357 | 0.0653 |
|  | (0.0827) | (0.0827) | (0.109) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | -0.0588 | 0.0151 | -0.0272 |
|  | (0.137) | (0.136) | (0.188) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | 0.140 | 0.101 | 0.133 |
|  | (0.0956) | (0.0907) | (0.112) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | 0.267\* | 0.156 | 0.0745 |
|  | (0.130) | (0.128) | (0.155) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | 0.267\* | 0.159 | 0.222+ |
|  | (0.102) | (0.104) | (0.112) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | 0.216+ | 0.0461 | 0.129 |
|  | (0.110) | (0.104) | (0.0945) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | 0.310\*\* | 0.0987 | 0.102 |
|  | (0.0956) | (0.0832) | (0.0933) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Worker | 0.579\*\* | 0.383\*\* | 0.245\* |
|  | (0.121) | (0.111) | (0.121) |
|  |  |  |  |
| No occupation info | 0.224 | 0.0873 | 0.103 |
|  | (0.153) | (0.140) | (0.151) |
|  |  |  |  |
| AUT | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | (.) | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |
| BEL | -0.215 | -0.139 | -0.201+ |
|  | (0.159) | (0.137) | (0.118) |
|  |  |  |  |
| FRA | 0.0452 | 0.0226 | -0.0559 |
|  | (0.121) | (0.110) | (0.0835) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GER | 0.189 | 0.127 | 0.104 |
|  | (0.139) | (0.127) | (0.107) |
|  |  |  |  |
| HUN | -0.161 | -0.154 | -0.224\*\* |
|  | (0.118) | (0.107) | (0.0841) |
|  |  |  |  |
| IRE | 0.0563 | 0.204+ | 0.115 |
|  | (0.114) | (0.109) | (0.0882) |
|  |  |  |  |
| ISR | -0.222+ | -0.0790 | -0.176+ |
|  | (0.123) | (0.114) | (0.0940) |
|  |  |  |  |
| ITA | 0.612\*\* | 0.638\*\* | 0.555\*\* |
|  | (0.119) | (0.115) | (0.0946) |
|  |  |  |  |
| NET | 0.0153 | 0.00522 | -0.0951 |
|  | (0.126) | (0.117) | (0.0946) |
|  |  |  |  |
| NOR | 0.393\*\* | 0.384\*\* | 0.371\*\* |
|  | (0.111) | (0.100) | (0.0817) |
|  |  |  |  |
| POL | 0.0869 | 0.258\* | 0.133 |
|  | (0.122) | (0.119) | (0.106) |
|  |  |  |  |
| POR | 0.319 | 0.285 | 0.133 |
|  | (0.224) | (0.237) | (0.243) |
|  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.210 | 0.190 | 0.0789 |
|  | (0.187) | (0.181) | (0.163) |
|  |  |  |  |
| SWI | -0.864\*\* | -0.832\*\* | -0.730\*\* |
|  | (0.125) | (0.120) | (0.124) |
|  |  |  |  |
| UNK | 0.135 | 0.175 | 0.132 |
|  | (0.117) | (0.118) | (0.0952) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Other Party |  | 0 | 0 |
|  |  | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Left Party |  | 0.610\*\* | 0.502\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0725) | (0.0829) |
|  |  |  |  |
| age |  | -0.00979\*\* | -0.00886\*\* |
|  |  | (0.00238) | (0.00263) |
|  |  |  |  |
| male |  | 0 | 0 |
|  |  | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |
| female |  | -0.0410 | -0.0330 |
|  |  | (0.0577) | (0.0628) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 2.959\*\* | 3.355\*\* | 3.408\*\* |
|  | (0.117) | (0.186) | (0.193) |
| Observations | 1946 | 1874 | 1874 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A6. Regression models on legislators' contact with workers’ organizations (workers as omitted reference category).**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | (1) |
|  | Controls, unweighted |
| Business | -0.383\*\* |
|  | (0.111) |
|  |  |
| Technical professional | -0.347\*\* |
|  | (0.105) |
|  |  |
| Farmer | -0.368\* |
|  | (0.176) |
|  |  |
| Lawyer | -0.282+ |
|  | (0.155) |
|  |  |
| Other white collar | -0.227 |
|  | (0.155) |
|  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | -0.224 |
|  | (0.140) |
|  |  |
| Civil service | -0.337\* |
|  | (0.137) |
|  |  |
| Service-based professional | -0.284\* |
|  | (0.110) |
|  |  |
| Worker | 0 |
|  | (.) |
|  |  |
| No info | -0.296+ |
|  | (0.169) |
|  |  |
| Other Party | 0 |
|  | (.) |
|  |  |
| Left Party | 0.610\*\* |
|  | (0.0725) |
|  |  |
| age | -0.00979\*\* |
|  | (0.00238) |
|  |  |
| male | 0 |
|  | (.) |
|  |  |
| female | -0.0410 |
|  | (0.0577) |
|  |  |
| AUT | 0 |
|  | (.) |
|  |  |
| BEL | -0.139 |
|  | (0.137) |
|  |  |
| FRA | 0.0226 |
|  | (0.110) |
|  |  |
| GER | 0.127 |
|  | (0.127) |
|  |  |
| HUN | -0.154 |
|  | (0.107) |
|  |  |
| IRE | 0.204+ |
|  | (0.109) |
|  |  |
| ISR | -0.0790 |
|  | (0.114) |
|  |  |
| ITA | 0.638\*\* |
|  | (0.115) |
|  |  |
| NET | 0.00522 |
|  | (0.117) |
|  |  |
| NOR | 0.384\*\* |
|  | (0.100) |
|  |  |
| POL | 0.258\* |
|  | (0.119) |
|  |  |
| POR | 0.285 |
|  | (0.237) |
|  |  |
| SPA | 0.190 |
|  | (0.181) |
|  |  |
| SWI | -0.832\*\* |
|  | (0.120) |
|  |  |
| UNK | 0.175 |
|  | (0.118) |
|  |  |
| Constant | 3.738\*\* |
|  | (0.187) |
| Observations | 1874 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A7. Regression models on legislators’ attitudes and behavior, with parliamentary political culture controls**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Inequality, avg attitude control | Govt economic intervention, avg attitude control | Contact with trade unions, avg attitude control | Inequality, avg MP ideology control | Govt economic intervention, avg MP ideology control | Contact with trade unions, avg MP ideology control |
| Business | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional | -0.119(0.0892) | -0.158(0.106) | -0.0348(0.0831) | -0.126(0.0898) | -0.166(0.105) | -0.0398(0.0830) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | -0.232(0.177) | -0.384\*(0.147) | -0.0120(0.137) | -0.252(0.178) | -0.403\*\*(0.148) | -0.0260(0.136) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | -0.170(0.105) | -0.0794(0.102) | -0.0999(0.0907) | -0.194+(0.108) | -0.0973(0.103) | -0.0995(0.0901) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | -0.405\*\*(0.0961) | -0.0697(0.133) | -0.157(0.127) | -0.387\*\*(0.100) | -0.0558(0.132) | -0.154(0.130) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | -0.227\*(0.0953) | -0.189\*(0.0846) | -0.158(0.104) | -0.234\*(0.0970) | -0.196\*(0.0845) | -0.162(0.104) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | -0.220+(0.116) | -0.200+(0.108) | -0.0459(0.104) | -0.218+(0.120) | -0.198+(0.106) | -0.0441(0.104) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | -0.434\*\*(0.0793) | -0.260\*\*(0.0828) | -0.0978(0.0830) | -0.439\*\*(0.0805) | -0.268\*\*(0.0841) | -0.104(0.0836) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Worker | -0.269\*\*(0.0890) | -0.223\*\*(0.0775) | -0.381\*\*(0.111) | -0.288\*\*(0.0879) | -0.244\*\*(0.0777) | -0.395\*\*(0.111) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No info | -0.0897(0.164) | 0.122(0.168) | -0.0878(0.140) | -0.0641(0.167) | 0.134(0.174) | -0.100(0.141) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other Party | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left Party | -1.125\*\*(0.127) | -1.260\*\*(0.136) | -0.608\*\*(0.0725) | -1.147\*\*(0.127) | -1.280\*\*(0.137) | -0.618\*\*(0.0722) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| male | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| female | -0.0846(0.0575) | -0.161\*\*(0.0603) | 0.0417(0.0576) | -0.0954(0.0611) | -0.170\*\*(0.0597) | 0.0385(0.0576) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| age | 0.00713\*\*(0.00224) | 0.00912\*\*(0.00238) | 0.00982\*\*(0.00238) | 0.00677\*\*(0.00229) | 0.00879\*\*(0.00240) | 0.00966\*\*(0.00235) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AUT | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BEL | -0.165+(0.0890) | -0.126(0.104) | 0.149(0.134) | -0.293\*\*(0.102) | -0.231+(0.129) | 0.115(0.127) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FRA | -0.0481(0.0898) | -0.119(0.227) | -0.00139(0.113) | -0.375\*\*(0.132) | -0.362+(0.211) | -0.0282(0.104) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GER | 0.0249(0.0833) | 0.253\*(0.103) | -0.126(0.126) | 0.0848(0.129) | 0.272\*(0.118) | -0.182(0.135) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HUN | 0.0757(0.0646) | -0.0247(0.0956) | 0.144(0.118) | 0.195\*(0.0968) | 0.0772(0.118) | 0.182+(0.104) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| IRE | -0.184\*\*(0.0665) | -0.590\*\*(0.0920) | -0.199+(0.106) | -0.238\*\*(0.0898) | -0.641\*\*(0.113) | -0.228\*(0.106) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ISR | 0.273\*\*(0.0706) | -0.606\*\*(0.104) | 0.0754(0.117) | 0.278\*(0.110) | -0.582\*\*(0.135) | 0.120(0.111) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ITA | -0.392\*\*(0.0998) | 0.280\*(0.111) | -0.633\*\*(0.112) | -0.461\*\*(0.132) | 0.219+(0.130) | -0.657\*\*(0.105) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NET | -0.276\*\*(0.0651) | 0.188\*(0.0811) | -0.00217(0.116) | -0.329\*\*(0.0929) | 0.150(0.107) | -0.00442(0.113) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NOR | 0.0380(0.0725) | -0.135(0.0922) | -0.373\*\*(0.0964) | -0.244\*(0.121) | -0.308\*(0.141) | -0.308\*\*(0.105) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POL | -0.175+(0.0988) | -0.250+(0.135) | -0.291+(0.168) | 0.178(0.150) | 0.0742(0.167) | -0.126(0.137) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POR | -0.316\*(0.126) | 0.385\*\*(0.127) | -0.282(0.233) | -0.296(0.200) | 0.374\*(0.159) | -0.340(0.224) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.466\*\*(0.137) | -0.128(0.109) | -0.181(0.182) | 0.433+(0.234) | -0.193(0.161) | -0.282(0.178) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SWI | -0.295\*\*(0.0784) | 0.0687(0.0929) | 0.829\*\*(0.122) | -0.296\*(0.117) | 0.0862(0.130) | 0.869\*\*(0.119) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNK | -0.273\*\*(0.0922) | 0.00628(0.102) | -0.156(0.117) | -0.495\*\*(0.116) | -0.185(0.132) | -0.234+(0.132) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| classAttitude\_parliamentAvg | 0.778\*\*(0.108) | 0.576\*\*(0.0978) | 0.0485(0.136) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| selfLR\_parliamentAvg |  |  |  | 0.113+(0.0642) | 0.0413(0.0505) | -0.0905+(0.0495) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.962\*\*(0.355) | 1.389\*\*(0.309) | 2.514\*\*(0.378) | 2.519\*\*(0.358) | 2.745\*\*(0.263) | 3.074\*\*(0.289) |
| R-squared | 0.299 | 0.324 | 0.247 | 0.282 | 0.314 | 0.248 |
| N | 1817 | 1820 | 1874 | 1817 | 1820 | 1874 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A8. Regression models on legislators’ attitudes, with average electorate attitude controls**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Inequality, electorate control | Govt economic intervention, electorate control | Contact with trade unions, electorate control |
| Business | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional | -0.137(0.0900) | -0.170(0.105) | -0.0358(0.0830) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | -0.275(0.177) | -0.414\*\*(0.147) | -0.0154(0.135) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | -0.193+(0.107) | -0.0970(0.102) | -0.101(0.0907) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | -0.389\*\*(0.103) | -0.0576(0.132) | -0.156(0.128) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | -0.241\*(0.0981) | -0.200\*(0.0842) | -0.159(0.104) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | -0.218+(0.121) | -0.199+(0.105) | -0.0461(0.104) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | -0.452\*\*(0.0816) | -0.273\*\*(0.0841) | -0.0988(0.0833) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Worker | -0.314\*\*(0.0868) | -0.256\*\*(0.0788) | -0.383\*\*(0.111) |
|  |  |  |  |
| No info | -0.0898(0.163) | 0.123(0.173) | -0.0874(0.140) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Other Party | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |
| Left Party | -1.164\*\*(0.127) | -1.287\*\*(0.136) | -0.610\*\*(0.0731) |
|  |  |  |  |
| male | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |
| female | -0.0995(0.0615) | -0.172\*\*(0.0604) | 0.0409(0.0578) |
|  |  |  |  |
| age | 0.00641\*\*(0.00234) | 0.00862\*\*(0.00242) | 0.00978\*\*(0.00236) |
|  |  |  |  |
| AUT | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |
| BEL | -0.335\*\*(0.116) | -0.248+(0.133) | 0.139(0.138) |
|  |  |  |  |
| FRA | -0.421\*(0.160) | -0.385+(0.200) | -0.0236(0.113) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GER | -0.0654(0.145) | 0.204(0.131) | -0.129(0.138) |
|  |  |  |  |
| HUN | 0.223\*(0.0998) | 0.0864(0.118) | 0.154(0.107) |
|  |  |  |  |
| IRE | -0.265\*\*(0.0985) | -0.651\*\*(0.121) | -0.204+(0.108) |
|  |  |  |  |
| ISR | 0.403\*\*(0.130) | -0.525\*\*(0.145) | 0.0807(0.118) |
|  |  |  |  |
| ITA | -0.522\*\*(0.126) | 0.191(0.132) | -0.639\*\*(0.118) |
|  |  |  |  |
| NET | -0.359\*\*(0.100) | 0.135(0.111) | -0.00592(0.119) |
|  |  |  |  |
| NOR | -0.197+(0.108) | -0.298\*(0.126) | -0.385\*\*(0.105) |
|  |  |  |  |
| POL | 0.320\*\*(0.116) | 0.123(0.141) | -0.259\*(0.120) |
|  |  |  |  |
| POR | -0.464\*(0.210) | 0.297+(0.169) | -0.288(0.241) |
|  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.228(0.194) | -0.282+(0.160) | -0.192(0.187) |
|  |  |  |  |
| SWI | -0.239+(0.120) | 0.109(0.130) | 0.832\*\*(0.120) |
|  |  |  |  |
| UNK | -0.598\*\*(0.140) | -0.227(0.147) | -0.175(0.120) |
|  |  |  |  |
| electorateLRParliamentAvg | -0.0830(0.0585) | -0.0435(0.0476) | -0.00188(0.0472) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.545\*\*(0.378) | 3.196\*\*(0.313) | 2.656\*\*(0.324) |
| R-squared | 0.281 | 0.314 | 0.247 |
| N | 1817 | 1820 | 1874 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A9. Regression models on legislators’ attitudes, with low district magnitudes excluded**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Inequality, SMD excluded | Govt economic intervention, SMD excluded | Contact with trade unions, SMD excluded | Inequality, DM > 15 | Govt economic intervention, DM > 15 | Contact with trade unions, DM > 15 |
| Business | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional | -0.136(0.101) | -0.182(0.110) | -0.00765(0.0945) | -0.208(0.134) | -0.209(0.130) | 0.00514(0.131) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | -0.287(0.185) | -0.466\*\*(0.175) | 0.0666(0.126) | -0.102(0.355) | -0.207(0.229) | 0.376(0.252) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | -0.198+(0.118) | -0.0897(0.101) | -0.0415(0.0896) | -0.273+(0.162) | -0.119(0.129) | 0.0481(0.128) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | -0.348\*\*(0.112) | -0.0580(0.142) | -0.260\*(0.129) | -0.269+(0.149) | -0.0325(0.182) | -0.0978(0.161) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | -0.278\*(0.118) | -0.243\*(0.103) | -0.245\*(0.107) | -0.256\*(0.127) | -0.303\*(0.121) | -0.191(0.133) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | -0.162(0.134) | -0.208+(0.114) | -0.0121(0.117) | -0.124(0.149) | -0.267+(0.146) | -0.0764(0.152) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | -0.453\*\*(0.0871) | -0.249\*\*(0.0933) | -0.0720(0.0987) | -0.409\*\*(0.122) | -0.260\*(0.104) | -0.0102(0.120) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Worker | -0.384\*\*(0.0976) | -0.303\*\*(0.0900) | -0.417\*\*(0.119) | -0.436\*\*(0.137) | -0.505\*\*(0.121) | -0.439\*(0.187) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No info | -0.0854(0.187) | 0.201(0.202) | -0.0525(0.157) | -0.156(0.238) | 0.236(0.221) | -0.0206(0.216) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other Party | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left Party | -1.110\*\*(0.105) | -1.320\*\*(0.116) | -0.613\*\*(0.0892) | -1.160\*\*(0.113) | -1.387\*\*(0.136) | -0.606\*\*(0.124) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| male | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| female | -0.141\*(0.0668) | -0.160\*(0.0651) | 0.0285(0.0629) | -0.139\*(0.0596) | -0.102(0.0754) | 0.0573(0.0897) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| age | 0.00512\*(0.00220) | 0.00720\*\*(0.00263) | 0.00893\*\*(0.00258) | 0.00493+(0.00256) | 0.0102\*\*(0.00282) | 0.00725\*(0.00335) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AUT | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BEL | -0.328\*\*(0.110) | -0.254+(0.130) | 0.144(0.140) | -0.302(0.236) | -0.361(0.246) | 0.104(0.144) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FRA | -0.599+(0.313) | 0.0262(0.393) | 0.0241(0.132) | -0.719\*(0.295) | -0.133(0.389) | -0.283+(0.144) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GER | -0.108(0.128) | 0.198(0.141) | -0.0147(0.149) | -0.108(0.249) | 0.0426(0.248) | -0.218(0.185) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HUN | 0.259\*\*(0.0949) | 0.0758(0.111) | 0.0982(0.108) | 0.289(0.229) | 0.00828(0.227) | -0.140(0.122) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| IRE | -0.269\*\*(0.0957) | -0.655\*\*(0.115) | -0.221+(0.111) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ISR | 0.327\*\*(0.107) | -0.575\*\*(0.129) | 0.0581(0.116) | 0.333(0.239) | -0.749\*\*(0.248) | -0.0508(0.130) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ITA | -0.503\*\*(0.127) | 0.199(0.134) | -0.659\*\*(0.116) | -0.558\*(0.250) | 0.0107(0.241) | -0.755\*\*(0.145) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NET | -0.337\*\*(0.102) | 0.148(0.107) | 0.0201(0.119) | -0.363(0.223) | 0.00349(0.210) | -0.0923(0.122) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NOR | -0.162(0.107) | -0.287\*(0.124) | -0.361\*\*(0.100) | -0.402(0.245) | -0.329(0.245) | -0.459\*\*(0.133) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POL | 0.342\*\*(0.111) | 0.116(0.133) | -0.283\*(0.124) | -0.0761(0.236) | -0.273(0.249) | -0.332\*(0.140) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POR | -0.389+(0.195) | 0.331\*(0.164) | -0.299(0.238) | -0.382(0.282) | 0.137(0.245) | -0.499\*(0.227) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.287(0.232) | -0.249(0.167) | -0.216(0.182) | 0.244(0.347) | -0.384(0.293) | -0.369+(0.185) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SWI | -0.251\*(0.115) | 0.0868(0.124) | 0.823\*\*(0.121) | -0.255(0.252) | -0.0910(0.237) | 0.627\*\*(0.140) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNK | -0.817\*\*(0.111) | -0.442\*\*(0.124) | -0.304\*(0.119) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.156\*\*(0.149) | 3.057\*\*(0.171) | 2.699\*\*(0.199) | 3.195\*\*(0.286) | 3.081\*\*(0.262) | 2.862\*\*(0.259) |
| R-squared | 0.274 | 0.318 | 0.254 | 0.279 | 0.349 | 0.223 |
| N | 1539 | 1542 | 1589 | 869 | 873 | 906 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A10. Regression models on placebo attitude questions and alternative DV: full results**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Stiffer sentences | Immigrants must adapt | Govt should regulate cultural morals | Left-right self-placement |
| Business | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional | -0.150+(0.0804) | -0.0892(0.0891) | 0.117(0.0957) | -0.643\*\*(0.197) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | -0.0949(0.143) | -0.154(0.152) | 0.599\*\*(0.144) | -0.0993(0.363) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | -0.551\*\*(0.0801) | 0.0131(0.0909) | -0.206+(0.109) | -0.484\*(0.192) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | -0.140(0.0878) | -0.0146(0.128) | 0.0888(0.109) | -0.543\*\*(0.182) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | -0.256\*\*(0.0840) | -0.0672(0.0846) | -0.0405(0.0882) | -0.647\*\*(0.203) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | -0.187(0.116) | 0.00631(0.108) | 0.0673(0.137) | -0.495+(0.261) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | -0.316\*\*(0.0714) | -0.180\*(0.0883) | -0.0494(0.0921) | -0.844\*\*(0.179) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Worker | -0.0414(0.0989) | -0.0764(0.0935) | 0.138(0.0895) | -0.763\*\*(0.191) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| No info | -0.0609(0.131) | -0.148(0.153) | 0.0465(0.135) | -0.296(0.344) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Other Party | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Left Party | -0.925\*\*(0.0798) | -0.985\*\*(0.0842) | -0.516\*\*(0.0645) | -3.471\*\*(0.156) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| male | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| female | -0.0897(0.0609) | -0.141\*(0.0570) | 0.208\*\*(0.0593) | -0.252\*\*(0.0945) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| age | 0.00377(0.00252) | 0.00798\*\*(0.00211) | 0.0103\*\*(0.00344) | 0.00520(0.00419) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| AUT | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| BEL | 0.139+(0.0801) | -0.181+(0.103) | -0.489\*\*(0.126) | -0.387(0.243) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| FRA | 0.268\*(0.130) | -0.159(0.162) | 0.0818(0.278) | 0.249(0.231) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GER | -0.296\*(0.127) | -0.618\*\*(0.133) | -0.375\*(0.187) | -0.0584(0.217) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| HUN | 0.972\*\*(0.0767) | 0.260\*\*(0.0860) | 0.533\*\*(0.0978) | 0.375+(0.192) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| IRE | 0.319\*\*(0.0788) | -0.422\*\*(0.0886) | -0.229\*(0.104) | -1.139\*\*(0.193) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ISR | 0.0550(0.0814) | -0.998\*\*(0.0940) | -0.0838(0.102) | 0.0219(0.202) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ITA | 0.345\*(0.150) | -0.324\*(0.141) | -0.341\*(0.141) | -0.0401(0.311) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| NET | -0.00861(0.0771) | -0.0729(0.0889) | -1.078\*\*(0.0952) | -0.0334(0.196) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| NOR | 0.169\*(0.0775) | -0.298\*\*(0.0918) | -0.957\*\*(0.101) | 1.003\*\*(0.208) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| POL | 0.197\*(0.0851) | -0.467\*\*(0.0990) | 0.101(0.101) | 0.804\*\*(0.204) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| POR | 0.249\*(0.102) | -1.130\*\*(0.0904) | -0.942\*\*(0.108) | -0.290(0.234) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.0275(0.162) | -0.398\*(0.186) | -0.486\*\*(0.158) | -0.265(0.244) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| SWI | 0.311\*\*(0.0936) | 0.166(0.108) | -0.145(0.108) | 0.128(0.214) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| UNK | -0.398\*\*(0.106) | -0.489\*\*(0.172) | -0.333\*(0.131) | -0.517(0.413) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.629\*\*(0.168) | 3.790\*\*(0.136) | 2.628\*\*(0.224) | 6.420\*\*(0.277) |
| R-squared | 0.278 | 0.340 | 0.153 | 0.550 |
| N | 1815 | 1819 | 1816 | 1824 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A11. Regression models on legislators’ attitudes and behavior, subsample of influential MPs**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | Inequality, leadership position subsample | Inequality, previously held office subsample | Inequality, bill sponsor subsample | Govt economic intervention, leadership position subsample | Govt economic intervention | Govt economic intervention, bill sponsor subsample | Contact with unions, leadership position subsample | Contact with unions, previously held office subsample | Contact with unions, bill sponsor subsample |
| Business | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional | 0.0242(0.222) | -0.0331(0.130) | -0.229(0.189) | 0.0358(0.163) | -0.0377(0.123) | -0.456\*\*(0.154) | -0.243+(0.139) | -0.160(0.123) | -0.0526(0.208) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | -0.276(0.322) | -0.0743(0.292) | 0.791+(0.393) | -0.418(0.294) | -0.343(0.271) | -0.768+(0.447) | 0.227(0.221) | -0.319(0.216) | -0.0411(0.349) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | -0.476+(0.258) | -0.122(0.185) | -0.336+(0.180) | -0.497\*(0.216) | -0.143(0.172) | -0.459\*(0.185) | -0.115(0.208) | -0.109(0.130) | -0.115(0.121) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | -0.342\*(0.150) | -0.212(0.133) | -0.116(0.233) | -0.128(0.193) | -0.0172(0.145) | -0.173(0.150) | -0.291(0.244) | -0.102(0.147) | 0.178(0.309) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | -0.210(0.170) | -0.186+(0.0972) | -0.364\*\*(0.117) | -0.0753(0.162) | -0.252\*(0.0999) | -0.458\*\*(0.149) | -0.170(0.189) | -0.180(0.119) | -0.352+(0.197) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | -0.843\*\*(0.183) | -0.138(0.164) | -0.477(0.282) | -0.212(0.249) | -0.0964(0.132) | -0.605\*\*(0.144) | -0.128(0.197) | -0.172(0.161) | -0.258(0.180) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | -0.356\*(0.139) | -0.394\*\*(0.118) | -0.424\*\*(0.141) | -0.350\*(0.175) | -0.290\*(0.110) | -0.375\*\*(0.134) | -0.0801(0.184) | -0.229+(0.129) | -0.0772(0.159) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Worker | -0.422\*\*(0.135) | -0.329\*\*(0.123) | -0.558\*\*(0.173) | -0.413\*(0.178) | -0.217\*(0.103) | -0.149(0.170) | -0.404\*(0.197) | -0.282+(0.159) | -0.258(0.243) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No info | 0.263(0.260) | 0.0289(0.208) | 0.621(0.602) | 0.406(0.292) | 0.247(0.251) | 0.622(0.372) | -0.00481(0.215) | 0.0413(0.208) | 0.0574(0.273) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other Party | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left Party | -1.404\*\*(0.142) | -1.226\*\*(0.179) | -0.838\*\*(0.149) | -1.403\*\*(0.128) | -1.391\*\*(0.144) | -0.986\*\*(0.120) | -0.633\*\*(0.0961) | -0.619\*\*(0.0691) | -0.350\*(0.136) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| male | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| female | 0.00389(0.122) | -0.105(0.0786) | -0.0616(0.101) | -0.0310(0.119) | -0.165\*(0.0804) | -0.131+(0.0745) | 0.190(0.130) | 0.0799(0.0704) | -0.0480(0.118) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| age | 0.00701(0.00508) | 0.00711\*(0.00344) | 0.00478(0.00319) | 0.0107(0.00664) | 0.0140\*\*(0.00436) | 0.0153\*\*(0.00418) | 0.00715(0.00478) | 0.0173\*\*(0.00340) | 0.0105+(0.00532) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| AUT | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BEL | -0.438\*\*(0.142) | -0.318\*(0.137) | -0.749\*\*(0.0414) | -0.0636(0.168) | -0.202(0.173) | -0.914\*\*(0.0578) | 0.367+(0.205) | -0.0610(0.144) | 0.294\*\*(0.0930) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FRA | -0.198(0.185) | -0.458\*(0.199) | -0.453\*\*(0.0741) | -0.203(0.235) | -0.361(0.220) | -1.060\*\*(0.0436) | 0.430\*(0.169) | -0.0714(0.165) | 0.0334(0.0575) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GER | 0.202(0.146) | 0.0779(0.152) | -0.667\*\*(0.161) | 0.398\*(0.190) | 0.442\*(0.180) | -0.561\*\*(0.149) | 0.441+(0.231) | -0.151(0.140) | 0.432\*\*(0.131) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HUN | 0.892\*\*(0.124) | 0.196(0.135) | -0.411\*\*(0.0411) | 0.559\*\*(0.157) | 0.252+(0.148) | -0.983\*\*(0.0752) | 1.051\*\*(0.167) | -0.130(0.122) | 0.462\*\*(0.0502) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| IRE | -0.561\*\*(0.116) | -0.177(0.110) |  | -0.733\*\*(0.150) | -0.665\*\*(0.138) |  | 0.423\*(0.169) | -0.210+(0.125) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ISR | 0.311\*(0.128) | 0.263+(0.143) | -0.0815+(0.0426) | -0.0998(0.182) | -0.750\*\*(0.183) | -1.328\*\*(0.0609) | 0.553\*\*(0.190) | -0.483\*\*(0.148) | 0.287\*\*(0.0451) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ITA | -0.426\*(0.176) | -0.512\*\*(0.171) | -0.952\*\*(0.0905) | 0.365\*(0.171) | 0.220(0.175) | -0.454\*\*(0.0826) | -0.147(0.213) | -0.672\*\*(0.124) | -0.508\*\*(0.113) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NET | 0.0351(0.103) | -0.489\*\*(0.135) | -0.813\*\*(0.0449) | 0.407\*\*(0.140) | 0.221(0.152) | -0.568\*\*(0.0595) | 0.676\*\*(0.162) | 0.0422(0.133) | 0.275\*\*(0.0492) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NOR | -0.251\*(0.119) | -0.222(0.143) | -0.214\*(0.0876) | -0.174(0.158) | -0.146(0.169) | -0.388\*\*(0.0840) | -0.228(0.166) | -0.594\*\*(0.115) | -0.100(0.0981) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POL | 0.316\*\*(0.108) | 0.190(0.146) | 0.0301(0.0620) | -0.244(0.158) | 0.146(0.175) | -0.323\*\*(0.0387) | -0.911\*\*(0.169) | -0.493\*\*(0.131) | -0.0838(0.0661) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POR | 0.125(0.167) |  | -0.850\*\*(0.166) | 0.576\*\*(0.165) |  | -0.286\*\*(0.0525) | -0.206(0.301) |  | -0.187(0.202) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.804+(0.448) | 0.370(0.297) |  | -0.205(0.236) | -0.170(0.216) |  | 0.0569(0.204) | -0.247(0.191) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SWI | -0.423+(0.213) | -0.169(0.158) |  | 0.231(0.169) | 0.0927(0.166) |  | 1.158\*\*(0.223) | 0.717\*\*(0.160) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNK | -0.460\*\*(0.138) | -0.429\*(0.177) | -1.223\*\*(0.126) | 0.431(0.346) | -0.135(0.180) | -1.062\*\*(0.0379) | 0.0550(0.271) | -0.167(0.151) | -0.0565(0.101) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.084\*\*(0.313) | 3.042\*\*(0.240) | 3.510\*\*(0.203) | 2.715\*\*(0.424) | 2.623\*\*(0.291) | 3.259\*\*(0.238) | 2.383\*\*(0.342) | 2.342\*\*(0.222) | 2.399\*\*(0.360) |
| R-squared | 0.388 | 0.290 | 0.306 | 0.370 | 0.354 | 0.256 | 0.222 | 0.221 | 0.0957 |
| N | 433 | 907 | 504 | 432 | 911 | 508 | 442 | 935 | 514 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A12. Regression models on candidates’ attitudes (CCS data).**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | Inequality | Intervention in economy | Social Security | Globalization |
| Business sector | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Technical professionals | -0.0695 | -0.0282 | 0.0207 | -0.219\* |
|  | (0.0376) | (0.0319) | (0.0228) | (0.0613) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Agriculture, fisheries | 0.135+ | 0.0283 | 0.0661 | -0.736\*\* |
|  | (0.0576) | (0.0425) | (0.123) | (0.0988) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Lower professionals | -0.262\* | -0.0463 | -0.155 | -0.395\* |
|  | (0.0727) | (0.0590) | (0.0825) | (0.136) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Politics/military | -0.0802 | -0.0761 | -0.0619 | -0.0109 |
|  | (0.115) | (0.0574) | (0.116) | (0.107) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Teachers & university profs | -0.351\* | -0.157+ | -0.136 | -0.331\* |
|  | (0.115) | (0.0701) | (0.0809) | (0.0878) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Clerks, service & sales | -0.162\* | -0.0886\* | -0.160\*\* | -0.455\* |
|  | (0.0463) | (0.0352) | (0.0384) | (0.117) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Trades & skilled manual | -0.379\*\* | -0.184\* | -0.276\* | -0.476\* |
|  | (0.0688) | (0.0728) | (0.0873) | (0.147) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| No info | -0.213\* | -0.0615 | -0.120\* | -0.372\* |
|  | (0.0780) | (0.0438) | (0.0401) | (0.0963) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Left party=0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Left party=1 | -1.343\*\* | -0.837\*\* | -0.573\*\* | -0.107 |
|  | (0.203) | (0.162) | (0.135) | (0.161) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Switzerland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Germany | 0.122\* | 0.0929\*\* | -0.0120 |  |
|  | (0.0413) | (0.0221) | (0.0249) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Greece | -0.460\*\* | -0.279\*\* | -0.850\*\* | -0.244\*\* |
|  | (0.0193) | (0.0268) | (0.00797) | (0.0197) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Portugal | -0.445\*\* | -0.496\*\* | -0.236\*\* | 0.215\*\* |
|  | (0.0159) | (0.0142) | (0.0149) | (0.0325) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Norway | -0.163\* | -0.524\*\* | -0.0680 | 0.619\*\* |
|  | (0.0479) | (0.0215) | (0.0419) | (0.0527) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Italy | -0.743\*\* | -0.409\*\* | -0.578\*\* | -0.172\*\* |
|  | (0.0287) | (0.0255) | (0.00710) | (0.0264) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| UK | -0.122\* | -0.468\*\* | 0.625\*\* | -0.203\*\* |
|  | (0.0340) | (0.0428) | (0.0161) | (0.0175) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| education=1 | -0.284+ | -0.319\* | -0.103 | -0.144 |
|  | (0.145) | (0.0966) | (0.171) | (0.756) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| education=2 | -0.388+ | -0.144 | -0.278\* | -0.232 |
|  | (0.199) | (0.309) | (0.0957) | (0.411) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| education=3 | -0.0964 | 0.292 | -0.278\* | -0.350\*\* |
|  | (0.0958) | (0.273) | (0.0884) | (0.0841) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| education=4 | 0.0369 | 0.169 | -0.154\*\* | -0.336\* |
|  | (0.0751) | (0.106) | (0.0322) | (0.0906) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| education=5 | 0.117 | 0.0770 | -0.0863 | -0.142 |
|  | (0.0725) | (0.0512) | (0.0586) | (0.0945) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| education=6 | -0.143+ | 0.0555 | -0.116\*\* | -0.0544 |
|  | (0.0709) | (0.107) | (0.0305) | (0.164) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| education=7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| education=8 | -0.0797\* | 0.0263 | -0.104\*\* | -0.0881+ |
|  | (0.0299) | (0.0355) | (0.0194) | (0.0427) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| education=9 | 0.0125 | 0.0789\* | 0.0350 | 0.0383 |
|  | (0.0695) | (0.0316) | (0.0352) | (0.124) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| age | -0.00180 | 0.0000119 | -0.00864\*\* | -0.00761+ |
|  | (0.00185) | (0.00154) | (0.00186) | (0.00353) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| female | -0.0881 | -0.0883 | -0.143+ | 0.0183 |
|  | (0.0853) | (0.0561) | (0.0599) | (0.0426) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.720\*\* | 2.969\*\* | 3.156\*\* | 3.697\*\* |
|  | (0.130) | (0.165) | (0.138) | (0.193) |
| Observations | 6570 | 6497 | 6529 | 4720 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A13. Regression models on legislators’ attitudes and behaviour, using ordered logit**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Inequality | Govt economic intervention | Contact with unions |
| main |  |  |  |
| Business | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional | -0.216(0.160) | -0.310+(0.161) | 0.0713(0.157) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | -0.488+(0.257) | -0.672\*\*(0.251) | 0.0519(0.246) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | -0.324+(0.190) | -0.155(0.189) | 0.178(0.185) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | -0.675\*\*(0.202) | -0.113(0.203) | 0.257(0.195) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | -0.438\*(0.170) | -0.386\*(0.170) | 0.319+(0.167) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | -0.391+(0.229) | -0.322(0.226) | 0.0523(0.221) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | -0.796\*\*(0.150) | -0.510\*\*(0.147) | 0.228(0.145) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Worker | -0.496\*\*(0.184) | -0.527\*\*(0.184) | 0.728\*\*(0.182) |
|  |  |  |  |
| No info | -0.194(0.277) | 0.239(0.280) | 0.177(0.256) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Other Party | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |
| Left Party | -1.984\*\*(0.103) | -2.272\*\*(0.107) | 1.059\*\*(0.0936) |
|  |  |  |  |
| male | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |
| female | -0.215\*(0.101) | -0.325\*\*(0.100) | -0.0611(0.0976) |
|  |  |  |  |
| age | 0.0117\*(0.00454) | 0.0170\*\*(0.00460) | -0.0176\*\*(0.00444) |
|  |  |  |  |
| AUT | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |
| BEL | -0.482\*(0.204) | -0.341+(0.205) | -0.206(0.205) |
|  |  |  |  |
| FRA | -0.801\*\*(0.280) | -0.668\*(0.275) | 0.0126(0.256) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GER | 0.0453(0.189) | 0.555\*\*(0.190) | 0.237(0.184) |
|  |  |  |  |
| HUN | 0.406+(0.240) | 0.350(0.247) | -0.266(0.229) |
|  |  |  |  |
| IRE | -0.599+(0.351) | -1.093\*\*(0.359) | 0.305(0.333) |
|  |  |  |  |
| ISR | 0.454(0.409) | -0.770\*(0.390) | -0.108(0.431) |
|  |  |  |  |
| ITA | -0.686\*\*(0.217) | 0.556\*(0.219) | 1.176\*\*(0.216) |
|  |  |  |  |
| NET | -0.487+(0.260) | 0.377(0.259) | 0.0308(0.269) |
|  |  |  |  |
| NOR | -0.392(0.308) | -0.536+(0.313) | 0.644\*(0.303) |
|  |  |  |  |
| POL | 0.466(0.301) | 0.270(0.302) | 0.440(0.322) |
|  |  |  |  |
| POR | -0.496\*(0.233) | 0.695\*\*(0.235) | 0.537\*(0.236) |
|  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.608\*\*(0.212) | -0.313(0.214) | 0.308(0.211) |
|  |  |  |  |
| SWI | -0.468\*\*(0.164) | 0.217(0.164) | -1.504\*\*(0.164) |
|  |  |  |  |
| UNK | -0.953\*\*(0.245) | -0.233(0.239) | 0.264(0.231) |
| / |  |  |  |
| cut1 | -2.207\*\*(0.307) | -2.120\*\*(0.309) | -2.843\*\*(0.304) |
|  |  |  |  |
| cut2 | -0.609\*(0.302) | -0.135(0.304) | -1.481\*\*(0.297) |
|  |  |  |  |
| cut3 | 0.300(0.301) | 0.670\*(0.304) | 0.0989(0.295) |
|  |  |  |  |
| cut4 | 2.417\*\*(0.313) | 2.747\*\*(0.314) | 2.050\*\*(0.301) |
| Observations | 1817 | 1820 | 1874 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A14.** **Regression models on legislators' contact with workers’ organizations, union staff separated**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | No controls | Controls | Controls, weighted |
| Business | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | (.) | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional | 0.128 | 0.0392 | 0.0664 |
|  | (0.0829) | (0.0830) | (0.109) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | -0.0647 | 0.00918 | -0.0272 |
|  | (0.137) | (0.136) | (0.188) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | 0.143 | 0.104 | 0.135 |
|  | (0.0955) | (0.0908) | (0.112) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | 0.265\* | 0.159 | 0.0730 |
|  | (0.129) | (0.127) | (0.154) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | 0.272\*\* | 0.166 | 0.229\* |
|  | (0.102) | (0.105) | (0.113) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | 0.219+ | 0.0542 | 0.135 |
|  | (0.111) | (0.104) | (0.0954) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | 0.313\*\* | 0.107 | 0.108 |
|  | (0.0961) | (0.0840) | (0.0943) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Worker | 0.397\*\* | 0.251\* | 0.116 |
|  | (0.124) | (0.113) | (0.131) |
|  |  |  |  |
| No info | 0.219 | 0.0860 | 0.0960 |
|  | (0.152) | (0.139) | (0.150) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Union staff | 1.349\*\* | 0.965\*\* | 0.687\*\* |
|  | (0.273) | (0.258) | (0.219) |
|  |  |  |  |
| AUT | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | (.) | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |
| BEL | -0.280+ | -0.190 | -0.232+ |
|  | (0.168) | (0.145) | (0.123) |
|  |  |  |  |
| FRA | 0.0252 | 0.0110 | -0.0586 |
|  | (0.119) | (0.107) | (0.0789) |
|  |  |  |  |
| GER | 0.173 | 0.118 | 0.107 |
|  | (0.134) | (0.123) | (0.101) |
|  |  |  |  |
| HUN | -0.175 | -0.161 | -0.223\*\* |
|  | (0.115) | (0.105) | (0.0783) |
|  |  |  |  |
| IRE | 0.0402 | 0.192+ | 0.112 |
|  | (0.111) | (0.107) | (0.0832) |
|  |  |  |  |
| ISR | -0.245\* | -0.0957 | -0.182\* |
|  | (0.119) | (0.112) | (0.0897) |
|  |  |  |  |
| ITA | 0.580\*\* | 0.616\*\* | 0.547\*\* |
|  | (0.115) | (0.113) | (0.0899) |
|  |  |  |  |
| NET | -0.0210 | -0.0226 | -0.111 |
|  | (0.123) | (0.116) | (0.0909) |
|  |  |  |  |
| NOR | 0.406\*\* | 0.395\*\* | 0.391\*\* |
|  | (0.107) | (0.0972) | (0.0754) |
|  |  |  |  |
| POL | 0.0675 | 0.236\* | 0.122 |
|  | (0.118) | (0.117) | (0.102) |
|  |  |  |  |
| POR | 0.308 | 0.278 | 0.138 |
|  | (0.215) | (0.229) | (0.232) |
|  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.195 | 0.183 | 0.0803 |
|  | (0.188) | (0.181) | (0.162) |
|  |  |  |  |
| SWI | -0.885\*\* | -0.849\*\* | -0.745\*\* |
|  | (0.120) | (0.117) | (0.115) |
|  |  |  |  |
| UNK | 0.0798 | 0.134 | 0.111 |
|  | (0.120) | (0.123) | (0.0985) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Other Party |  | 0 | 0 |
|  |  | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Left Party |  | 0.588\*\* | 0.486\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0716) | (0.0847) |
|  |  |  |  |
| age |  | -0.0101\*\* | -0.00918\*\* |
|  |  | (0.00236) | (0.00263) |
|  |  |  |  |
| male |  | 0 | 0 |
|  |  | (.) | (.) |
|  |  |  |  |
| female |  | -0.0353 | -0.0337 |
|  |  | (0.0563) | (0.0622) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 2.980\*\* | 3.391\*\* | 3.437\*\* |
|  | (0.114) | (0.183) | (0.191) |
| Observations | 1946 | 1874 | 1874 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A15. The relationship between class and inequality attitudes, conditioned by institution**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) |  | (1) |  | (1) |
|  | Open lists |  | Division of powers |  | Local nominations |
| Technical professional | 0.0460 |  | 0.0840 |  | 0.0807 |
|  | (0.126) |  | (0.101) |  | (0.141) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | -0.128 |  | -0.0291 |  | -0.238 |
|  | (0.267) |  | (0.213) |  | (0.223) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | -0.260+ |  | -0.262\* |  | 0.00626 |
|  | (0.140) |  | (0.125) |  | (0.181) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | -0.215 |  | -0.207+ |  | -0.227 |
|  | (0.131) |  | (0.111) |  | (0.190) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | -0.219 |  | -0.125 |  | -0.0431 |
|  | (0.133) |  | (0.106) |  | (0.156) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | -0.0536 |  | -0.0622 |  | 0.0857 |
|  | (0.132) |  | (0.127) |  | (0.160) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | -0.222\* |  | -0.265\*\* |  | -0.220+ |
|  | (0.101) |  | (0.0892) |  | (0.126) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Worker | -0.174 |  | -0.113 |  | -0.0979 |
|  | (0.109) |  | (0.0924) |  | (0.172) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No info | 0.246 |  | 0.156 |  | 0.0391 |
|  | (0.289) |  | (0.218) |  | (0.323) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Open list | 0.237 | Division of powers | 0.00968 | Local nomination | 0.397 |
|  | (0.173) |  | (0.257) |  | (0.303) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional # Open list | -0.378+ | Technical professional # Division of powers | -0.481\*\* | Technical professional # Local nomination | -0.293 |
|  | (0.214) |  | (0.181) |  | (0.202) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Farmer # Open list | -0.346 | Farmer # Division of powers | -0.563 | Farmer # Local nomination | -0.0772 |
|  | (0.392) |  | (0.341) |  | (0.312) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer # Open list | 0.459\* | Lawyer # Division of powers | 0.373+ | Lawyer # Local nomination | -0.244 |
|  | (0.219) |  | (0.193) |  | (0.249) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar # Open list | -0.244 | Other white collar # Division of powers | -0.406+ | Other white collar # Local nomination | -0.247 |
|  | (0.240) |  | (0.218) |  | (0.253) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement # Open list | -0.0955 | Politics / law enforcement # Division of powers | -0.215 | Politics / law enforcement # Local nomination | -0.274 |
|  | (0.244) |  | (0.221) |  | (0.191) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil service # Open list | -0.187 | Civil service # Division of powers | -0.433 | Civil service # Local nomination | -0.507+ |
|  | (0.429) |  | (0.336) |  | (0.257) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional # Open list | -0.555\*\* | Service-based professional # Division of powers | -0.463\*\* | Service-based professional # Local nomination | -0.335+ |
|  | (0.188) |  | (0.173) |  | (0.176) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Worker # Open list | -0.513\* | Worker # Division of powers | -0.581\*\* | Worker # Local nomination | -0.276 |
|  | (0.194) |  | (0.182) |  | (0.213) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No info # Open list | -0.657+ | No info # Division of powers | -0.555+ | No info # Local nomination | -0.303 |
|  | (0.362) |  | (0.311) |  | (0.367) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left Party | -1.097\*\* | Left Party | -1.159\*\* | Left Party | -1.185\*\* |
|  | (0.107) |  | (0.128) |  | (0.119) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| female | -0.150\* | female | -0.0996 | female | -0.0918 |
|  | (0.0680) |  | (0.0613) |  | (0.0654) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| age | 0.00528\* | age | 0.00647\*\* | age | 0.00646\*\* |
|  | (0.00221) |  | (0.00224) |  | (0.00233) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BEL | -0.304\* | BEL | -0.304\* | BEL | -0.322\* |
|  | (0.122) |  | (0.116) |  | (0.122) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FRA | -0.621\* | FRA | -0.186 | FRA | -0.312\* |
|  | (0.305) |  | (0.285) |  | (0.127) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GER | -0.140 | GER | -0.00228 | GER | 0.0894 |
|  | (0.134) |  | (0.140) |  | (0.194) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HUN | 0.274\*\* | HUN | 0.242\* | HUN | 0.327\* |
|  | (0.0946) |  | (0.0986) |  | (0.155) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ISR | 0.350\*\* | IRE | -0.265\*\* | IRE | -0.201 |
|  | (0.114) |  | (0.0950) |  | (0.164) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ITA | -0.477\*\* | ISR | 0.372\*\* | ISR | 0.458 |
|  | (0.125) |  | (0.112) |  | (0.287) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NET | -0.282\* | ITA | -0.483\*\* | ITA | -0.370 |
|  | (0.106) |  | (0.130) |  | (0.279) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NOR | -0.183 | NET | -0.294\*\* | NET | -0.198 |
|  | (0.115) |  | (0.0994) |  | (0.275) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POL | 0.333\* | NOR | -0.155 | NOR | -0.167 |
|  | (0.154) |  | (0.112) |  | (0.116) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POR | -0.396\* | POL | 0.624\* | POL | 0.422 |
|  | (0.180) |  | (0.256) |  | (0.282) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.290 | POR | -0.207 | POR | -0.439 |
|  | (0.237) |  | (0.213) |  | (0.266) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SWI | -0.224 | SPA | 0.334 | SPA | 0.420 |
|  | (0.160) |  | (0.231) |  | (0.341) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNK | -0.816\*\* | SWI | 0.0455 | SWI | -0.254+ |
|  | (0.114) |  | (0.249) |  | (0.131) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.016\*\* | UNK | -0.555\*\* | UNK | -0.589\*\* |
|  | (0.146) |  | (0.146) |  | (0.135) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Constant | 2.929\*\* | Constant | 2.772\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.155) |  | (0.355) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1510 | Observations | 1817 | Observations | 1751 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Table A16. The relationship between class and contact with workers’ organizations, conditioned by institution**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) |  | (1) |  | (1) |
|  | Open lists |  | Division of powers |  | Local nominations |
| Technical professional | 0.0176 |  | 0.0226 |  | 0.0631 |
|  | (0.104) |  | (0.0861) |  | (0.149) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Farmer | 0.0532 |  | 0.0660 |  | 0.113 |
|  | (0.185) |  | (0.207) |  | (0.301) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer | 0.0957 |  | 0.0515 |  | -0.0000622 |
|  | (0.109) |  | (0.115) |  | (0.106) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar | 0.00315 |  | -0.177 |  | 0.00655 |
|  | (0.184) |  | (0.146) |  | (0.173) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement | 0.276+ |  | 0.0273 |  | 0.193 |
|  | (0.147) |  | (0.132) |  | (0.150) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil service | -0.00543 |  | -0.0192 |  | -0.0327 |
|  | (0.145) |  | (0.127) |  | (0.144) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional | -0.0411 |  | -0.0386 |  | 0.124 |
|  | (0.153) |  | (0.114) |  | (0.167) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Worker | 0.316+ |  | 0.256+ |  | 0.370+ |
|  | (0.167) |  | (0.135) |  | (0.191) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No info | -0.0342 |  | 0.0258 |  | -0.0239 |
|  | (0.244) |  | (0.188) |  | (0.274) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Open list | -0.0894 | Division of powers | 0.317+ | Local nomination | -0.00279 |
|  | (0.165) |  | (0.172) |  | (0.170) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Technical professional # Open list | -0.0966 | Technical professional # Division of powers | -0.0420 | Technical professional # Local nomination | -0.0413 |
|  | (0.197) |  | (0.180) |  | (0.178) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Farmer # Open list | -0.153 | Farmer # Division of powers | -0.0768 | Farmer # Local nomination | -0.0933 |
|  | (0.247) |  | (0.262) |  | (0.324) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lawyer # Open list | -0.239 | Lawyer # Division of powers | 0.00241 | Lawyer # Local nomination | 0.166 |
|  | (0.203) |  | (0.183) |  | (0.172) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other white collar # Open list | 0.543\* | Other white collar # Division of powers | 0.857\*\* | Other white collar # Local nomination | 0.257 |
|  | (0.239) |  | (0.200) |  | (0.191) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Politics / law enforcement # Open list | -0.107 | Politics / law enforcement # Division of powers | 0.311 | Politics / law enforcement # Local nomination | -0.0729 |
|  | (0.216) |  | (0.205) |  | (0.205) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Civil service # Open list | -0.0255 | Civil service # Division of powers | 0.0215 | Civil service # Local nomination | 0.189 |
|  | (0.337) |  | (0.265) |  | (0.237) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Service-based professional # Open list | 0.255 | Service-based professional # Division of powers | 0.362\* | Service-based professional # Local nomination | -0.0350 |
|  | (0.190) |  | (0.158) |  | (0.216) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Worker # Open list | 0.248 | Worker # Division of powers | 0.392 | Worker # Local nomination | 0.0883 |
|  | (0.253) |  | (0.257) |  | (0.219) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| No info # Open list | 0.144 | No info # Division of powers | 0.117 | No info # Local nomination | 0.176 |
|  | (0.320) |  | (0.269) |  | (0.319) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Left Party | 0.610\*\* | Left Party | 0.615\*\* | Left Party | 0.631\*\* |
|  | (0.0900) |  | (0.0722) |  | (0.0737) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| female | -0.0254 | female | -0.0486 | female | -0.0314 |
|  | (0.0647) |  | (0.0591) |  | (0.0590) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| age | -0.00885\*\* | age | -0.0100\*\* | age | -0.00994\*\* |
|  | (0.00266) |  | (0.00248) |  | (0.00251) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BEL | -0.127 | BEL | -0.116 | BEL | -0.131 |
|  | (0.139) |  | (0.138) |  | (0.144) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FRA | -0.00765 | FRA | -0.274 | FRA | 0.0562 |
|  | (0.128) |  | (0.166) |  | (0.113) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GER | 0.0857 | GER | 0.187 | GER | 0.151 |
|  | (0.140) |  | (0.118) |  | (0.131) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HUN | -0.113 | HUN | -0.156 | HUN | -0.169 |
|  | (0.114) |  | (0.111) |  | (0.111) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ISR | -0.0643 | IRE | 0.171 | IRE | 0.210+ |
|  | (0.123) |  | (0.110) |  | (0.118) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ITA | 0.667\*\* | ISR | -0.0895 | ISR | -0.0500 |
|  | (0.134) |  | (0.119) |  | (0.142) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NET | -0.0481 | ITA | 0.640\*\* | ITA | 0.687\*\* |
|  | (0.127) |  | (0.117) |  | (0.144) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| NOR | 0.441\*\* | NET | 0.0145 | NET | 0.0187 |
|  | (0.103) |  | (0.124) |  | (0.144) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POL | 0.399\* | NOR | 0.450\*\* | NOR | 0.361\*\* |
|  | (0.161) |  | (0.102) |  | (0.107) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| POR | 0.313 | POL | -0.150 | POL | 0.282+ |
|  | (0.230) |  | (0.177) |  | (0.150) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SPA | 0.223 | POR | -0.0388 | POR | 0.543\*\* |
|  | (0.184) |  | (0.161) |  | (0.139) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| SWI | -0.801\*\* | SPA | 0.190 | SPA | 0.218 |
|  | (0.164) |  | (0.182) |  | (0.206) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| UNK | 0.353\*\* | SWI | -1.346\*\* | SWI | -0.833\*\* |
|  | (0.119) |  | (0.185) |  | (0.127) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 3.323\*\* | UNK | 0.203 | UNK | 0.176 |
|  | (0.209) |  | (0.124) |  | (0.129) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Constant | 3.445\*\* | Constant | 3.335\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.185) |  | (0.198) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1560 | Observations | 1874 | Observations | 1808 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01

**Figure A1**

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Each outcome variable in the figure is on a scale from 1-5 as described in the main text.

1. This variable is defined only for the proportional systems in the data set, which makes up the large majority of observations (over 80%). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Full regression results are in Table A15. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Note that I focus here on models with controls, unweighted. Since the purpose of these models is to measure the interactive effect of institutional differences, weighting by jurisdiction would be inappropriate. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For simplicity, I’ve focused here on the inequality attitude dependent variable, for which I observe the strongest coefficient in the main, non-interactive models. When I run these interactive models with the government intervention dependent variable, the results are substantively similar. The interaction effect remains significant for open lists and division of powers (Wald test, p<.05) and is not significant for local nominations. The pattern of the marginal effects is similar but less pronounced. These results are available on request. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Full regression results in Table A16. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Regression results for the logit specification can be found in Table A13. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Results can be found in Table A14. These models also show the coefficients for union staff compared to business legislators are even higher than those for worker-legislators. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)