Appendix for "Cabinet Formation and Coalition Governance: The Effect of Portfolio Allocation on Coalition Agreements" by Svenja Krauss and Heike Kluever

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Length of coalition agreements	6	3711	571.68	621.87	218
Correspondence	1.88	64.17	8.94	7.72	218
Preference divergence	0	121.87	26.56	21.23	218
Max. possible cabinet duration	284	1821	1283	314	218
Minority cabinet	Yes:	14.68 %	No:	85.32 %	218
Minimal winning coalition	Yes:	57.80 %	No:	42.20%	218
Party size	0	178.89	28.48	37.28	218

Table A.2: Explaining the length of coalition agreements (number of words)

DV: Length of a coalition agreement	Model 2
Explanatory variable	
Correspondence	0.970***
	(0.006)
Control variables	
Preference divergence	0.983**
	(0.007)
Max. poss. cabinet duration	1.001***
	(0.0003)
Minority cabinet	0.922
	(0.371)
Minimal winning coalition	1.007
	(0.355)
Party size	0.998
	(0.002)
Observations	218
Log likelihood	-2213.521

***$p \leq 0.01$;** $p \leq 0.05$; p * ≤ 0.10. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients displayed are incidence rate ratios.

Table A.3: Outlier analysis

DV: Length of a coalition agreement	Model 3
Explanatory variable	
Correspondence	0.960**
	(0.017)
Control variables	
Preference divergence	0.984***
	(0.005)
Max. poss. cabinet duration	1.001***
	(0.0003)
Minority cabinet	0.992
	(0.294)
Minimal winning coalition	0.985
	(0.245)
Party size	0.999
	(0.002)
Observations	214
Log likelihood	-1557.312

***$p \leq 0.01$;** $p \leq 0.05$; p * ≤ 0.10. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients displayed are incidence rate ratios.

Table A.4: Robustness checks: alternative measures (difference)

DV: Length of a coalition agreement	Model 4	Model 5
Explanatory variables		
Correspondence (difference)	0.974***	\
	(0.008)	\
Correspondence (difference × mean)	\	0.999***
	\	(0.0004)
Control variables		
Preference divergence	0.982***	0.983***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Max. poss. cabinet duration	1.001***	1.001***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Minority Cabinet	1.243	1.139
	(0.322)	(0.294)
Minimal Winning Coalition	1.209	1.127
	(0.259)	(0.240)
Party size	0.999	0.999
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Observations	218	218
Log likelihood	-1579.758	-1581.362

***$p \leq 0.01$;** $p \leq 0.05$; p * ≤ 0.10. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients displayed are incidence rate ratios.

Table A.5: Explaining the length of coalition agreements (decade dummies)

DV: Length of a coalition agreement	Model 6
Explanatory variable	
Correspondence	0.981***
	(0.006)
Control variables	
Preference divergence	0.998
	(0.004)
Max. poss. cabinet duration	1.001***
	(0.0002)
Minority Cabinet	0.690
	(0.159)
Minimal winning coalition	0.806
	(0.193)
Party Size	0.999
	(0.003)
Decade dummies	✓
Observations	218
Log likelihood	-1524.863

***$p \leq 0.01$;** $p \leq 0.05$; p * ≤ 0.10. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients displayed are incidence rate ratios.

Table A.6: Explaining the length of coalition agreements (country dummies)

DV: Length of a coalition agreement	Model 7
Explanatory variable	
Correspondence	0.963***
	(0.005)
Control variables	
Preference divergence	0.986***
	(0.003)
Max. poss. cabinet duration	1.001***
	(0.0003)
Minority cabinet	0.510
	(0.210)
Minimal winning coalition	0.476**
	(0.147)
Party size	0.985***
	(0.002)
Country dummies	✓
Observations	218
Log likelihood	-1517.212

***$p \leq 0.01$;** $p \leq 0.05$; p * ≤ 0.10. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients displayed are incidence rate ratios.

Table A.7: Robustness check: Quantitative portfolio allocation

DV: Length of a coalition agreement	Model 8
Explanatory variable	
Correspondence	0.980***
	(0.006)
Control variables	
Deviation quantitative PA	0.928***
	(0.011)
Preference divergence	0.982***
	(0.004)
Max. poss. cabinet duration	1.001***
	(0.0003)
Minority Cabinet	0.937
	(0.278)
Minimal Winning Coalition	0.900
	(0.235)
Party size	0.999
	(0.002)
Observations	218
Log likelihood	-1572.535

***$p \leq 0.01$;** $p \leq 0.05$; p * ≤ 0.10. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients displayed are incidence rate ratios.

Table A.8: Robustness check: Number of cabinet parties

DV: Length of a coalition agreement	Model 9
Explanatory variable	
Correspondence	0. 975***
	(0.008)
Control variables	
Preference divergence	0. 982***
	(0.006)
Max. poss. cabinet duration	1.001***
	(0.0002)
Minority Cabinet	1.212
	(0.364)
Minimal Winning Coalition	1.166
	(0.273)
Party size	0.999
	(0.003)
Number of cab. parties	1.173
	(0.144)
Observations	218
Log likelihood	-1579.763

***$p \leq 0.01$;** $p \leq 0.05$; p *≤ 0.10. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients displayed are incidence rate ratios.

Table A.9: Attachment of MP categories to ministerial portfolios

Portfolio	Attached MP categories
Foreign	per101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive per102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative per103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive per106 Peace per107 Internationalism: Positive per108 European Integration: Positive per109 Internationalism: Negative per110 European Integration: Negative
Finance	per402 Incentives per409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive per414 Economic Orthodoxy
Interior	per201 Freedom and Human Rights per202 Democracy per203 Constitutionalism: Positive per204 Constitutionalism: Negative per301 Decentralisation: Positive per302 Centralisation: Positive per303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive per304 Political Corruption: Negative per601 National Way of Life: Positive per602 National Way of Life: Negative per605 Law and Order: Positive per607 Multiculturalism: Positive per608 Multiculturalism: Negative
Defence	per104 Military: Positive per105 Military: Negative
Economy	per401 Free Enterprise: Positive per403 Market Regulation: Positive per404 Economic Planning: Positive per405 Corporatism: Positive per406 Protectionism: Positive per407 Protectionism: Negative per408 Economic Goals per409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive per410 Economic Growth per412 Controlled Economy: Positive per413 Nationalisation: Positive per415 Marxist Analysis: Positive
Justice	per201 Freedom and Human Rights per202 Democracy per203 Constitutionalism: Positive per204 Constitutionalism: Negative per303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive per304 Political Corruption: Negative per605 Law and Order: Positive
Social Affairs	per503 Equality: Positive per504 Welfare State Expansion per505 Welfare State Limitation per603 Traditional Morality: Positive per604 Traditional Morality: Negative per606 Civic Mindedness per705 Minority Groups: Positive per706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive
Labour	per405 Corporatism: Positive per504 Welfare State Expansion per505 Welfare State Limitation per701 Labour Groups: Positive per702 Labour Groups: Negative
Health	per504 Welfare State Expansion per505 Welfare State Limitation
Agriculture	per703 Agriculture and Farmers
Environment	per416 Anti-Growth-Economy: Positive per501 Environmental Protection: Positive
Education	per506 Education Expansion per507 Education Limitation

Table A.10: Information about sequence of coalition negotiations in Germany

Cabinet	Source	Quote	Sequence
Kiesinger	Schwarz (2012, p. 155)	"Darauf will er (Kohl) geantwortet haben: 'Grundbedingung der F.D.P. für Koalitionsverhandlungen ist: Scheel wird Außenminister. Ich an Eurer Stelle würde gerade jetzt die F.D.P. nicht demütigen.'"	offices => policies
Brandt I	Brandt (1990, p. 269f.)	"Inzwischen war Kurt-Georg Kiesinger nervös und aktiv geworden. Noch am späten Abend hatte er seinen Prtotege, Helmut Kohl […] auf den befreundeten Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Geschäftsführer der FDP-Bundestagsfraktion […], angesetzt, um die Freien Demokraten durch extrem großzügige Angebote herüberzuziehen: mehr als eine Handvoll Miniaterien, ein Abkommen [...]" "Die den Liberalen zugedachten Wohltaten im einzelnen: Mende zufolge seien der FDP dieselben Ressorts angeboten worden, die die SPD in der Großen Koalition innehatte, also neun [...]" Union versucht <u>direkt nach der Wahl</u> mit Versprechungen (u.A. Ministerposten) die FDP als Koalitionspartner zu gewinnen.	offices => policies
Brandt II	Brandt (1990, p. 306)	"Ich hatte Walter Scheel <u>vor der Wahl</u> zugesagt, daß die Freien Demokraten künftig auch auf wirtschaftspolitischem Feld vertreten sein sollten; eine Zusage, die nach dem Wahlerfolg um so eher einzulösen sein sollte. "	offices => policies
Schröder I	Urschel (2002, p. 255)	"Noch bevor die Koalitionsverhandlungen offiziell aufgenommen werden, wird in den Parteien und Fraktionen über die anstehenden Personalfragen diskutiert. Fast alle Überlegungen beginnen beim saarländischen Ministerpräsidenten und Parteivorsitzenden Oskar Lafontaine. [...] Lafontaine entscheidet sich schneller, als viele erwartet haben. Er will ins Finanzressort, das gestärkt werden soll durch wichtige Teile des Wirtschaftsministeriums."	offices => policies
Merkel I	Moury (2013, p. 46)	"Rather than following the customary rule of naming the members of the coalition cabinet only at the end of the negotiations, the SPD party leadership unilaterally announced the names of their ministers four days before the start of the negotiations - thus clearly making the point of showing Merkel's lack of control over the appointment of SPD ministers (Fleischer 2010)."	offices => policies
Merkel I	Fleischer (2010, p. 357)	"Instead, all three party chairmen and the previous Chancellor settled the portfolio allocation between the two catch-all parties and agreed that any future portfolio changes should be agreed by all three party chairmen." (E.g. G. Bannas, 'Die Koordinationskanzlerin', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12. Oct. 2005, p.2.	offices => policies

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