

A Blessing or a Curse?
State Support for Terrorist Groups
Supplemental Appendix

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Abstract

This appendix provides additional details and results not included in the manuscript. I provide several additional model specifications as robustness checks for the results presented in the manuscript. First, it is shown that the main results are not sensitive to the variables included in the specification. Second, I show the results for the pooled logit model that does not distinguish between failure due to internal dissolution and forceful elimination. Third, it is demonstrated that the results are robust to the inclusion of a control for sponsor “state failure”. Fourth, I recode the internal dissolution category of failure to provide a finer distinction between groups that enter peaceful politics because they fail at the use of violence and those that do so because they achieve improved status as political parties. Fifth, I demonstrate that the treatment of groups that achieved “Victory” has no effect on the results presented in the text. None of the main results are affected by any of these robustness checks or alternative codings of variables. Finally, two examples of the coding technique and a detailed example of the coding of one case, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) are provided.

1 Pooled Duration Model

The model shown in the second column of table 1 pools the groups that fail as a result of internal dissolution and forceful elimination into one category of failure. Accordingly, the results of the pooled model are essentially an average of the results across the two modes of failure. The results of the pooled model are a useful referent but are not really of much interest as the two modes of failure are theoretically distinct.

[Table 1 about here.]

2 Internal Problems in the Sponsor

The competing risks model shown in columns 3 and 4 of table 1 adds a measure of sponsor instability to the model presented in the manuscript. This alternative specification demonstrates that the main results are insensitive to inclusion of a reasonable measure of “state failure” in the sponsor. A potential concern about the results in the main text are that relatively weak or failed states overwhelmingly provide sponsorship with safe haven to groups, which may make target actions within the territory of the sponsor easier and less objectionable internationally. The measure of internal instability is taken from the recent work of Goldstone et al. and indicates whether a sponsor that provided safe haven to a group is experiencing an instance of political instability.¹ Note that the coefficient for this variable has no significant effect on either the probability of internal dissolution or forceful elimination. Furthermore, the result that sponsorship with safe haven increases the risk of failure by forceful elimination is robust to the inclusion of this variable.

¹Goldstone et al. 2010.

3 Alternative Coding of Internal Dissolution

The models in table 2 show results for an alternative coding of internal dissolution. Groups that fail for internal reasons in the data do so either as a result of politicization, i.e., a decision to renounce the use of violence, or they splinter due to internal turmoil and disagreement. The majority of groups that fail as a result of politicization do this due to a lack of success in the use of violence. For example, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Army stopped using violence after relocation to Sudan in the 1980s largely because they were almost defeated militarily. Similarly, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) ceased to use violence as a means of influence after it experienced significant internal infighting and turmoil. The SSNP still operates as a peaceful group although it is fairly irrelevant to politics in Syria. Thus, it is not sensible to code these groups as having achieved “victory” or as having survived as terrorist organizations. Rather, they really did fail as violent groups.

In contrast, some groups in the politicization category renounce violence because they are gain legitimate status and enter normal politics as a real political party. Examples include the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). RENAMO demobilized in 1992 as part of a larger peace agreement and subsequently participated in elections with some success. The GAM group signed a peace accord with the Indonesian government in 2005 that included military demobilization in exchange for some autonomy for Aceh. While the group had long sought complete independence from Indonesia, autonomy was a large enough concession for it to “politicize” and stop utilizing violence. Thus, while these groups may not be coded as having achieved victory because they did not achieve their stated goals, it is very debatable whether they truly “fail” as groups either.

To check whether this variation in how and why groups choose to leave violence affects the results presented in the article, I recode internal dissolution to exclude groups that politicize as a result of success. Out of 115 groups that are coded as failing by Jones and Libicki (2006) due to politicization, I found 27 whose “failure” is debatable. Thus, I treat these 27 groups

in the same way I treat the “victory” groups in the article (i.e., as not failing although they leave the data set after politicization). Table 2 shows the results with this coding for both the pooled logit model and the competing risks model. There are virtually no differences between the results in table 2 and those presented in the article. The only difference is that nationalistic groups are found to be significantly more likely to fail due to internal dissolution at the 10% level here, whereas it was insignificant before recoding. This rather minor change occurs because about 20% of groups recoded as not failing due to politicization are groups with nationalistic orientation that have long survival periods.

[Table 2 about here.]

4 Robustness Checks for “Victory” Groups

Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that treating the groups that achieved enough of their political objectives to have been successful as active in the manuscript did not drive any of the results. I chose to treat these groups as active because they did not fail. In table 3, I simply remove the 27 groups that achieved their objective from the analysis. Note that none of the main results reported and discussed above are substantively different here.²

The results in table 4 treat “Victory” as a separate category. Thus, in each year a group is active it has a latent probability of failing due to internal dissolution, target elimination, and also of successfully achieving its objective. First, notice that the results for internal dissolution and target elimination are substantively no different than reported in the manuscript. Also, the results show that sponsorship plays a negligible role in helping groups to achieve victory. In fact, none of the sponsorship variables have significant effects on the probability a group is victorious. This finding further confirms the general conclusion that state sponsorship is not all that helpful to groups. Thus, sponsorship is not strongly related to group survival and has no effect on whether groups are successful or not. In fact, the only

²Furthermore, if I recode the 27 groups that politicize but do not obviously “fail” as achieving their objectives none of the key results are altered.

significant result that involves sponsorship shows that it can hurt a group’s prospects of victory. If a group is sponsored and the target initiates a MID against the sponsor, this has a significant and negative effect on the probability the group achieves its objective.

[Table 3 about here.]

[Table 4 about here.]

In contrast, the goals a group seeks to achieve have a lot of importance to its chances of success. In fact, having any goal except the relatively lofty goals of social revolution (i.e., the excluded category) or empire improve a group’s chances. Additionally, groups with religious motivation are significantly less likely to achieve victory. This result likely reflects the fact that it is religious groups that most commonly have the goal of empire (e.g., al Qaeda). Finally, groups that carry out more attacks are more likely to achieve their objectives. This finding is significant at the 0.10 level and provides some support for the notion that groups that are able to carry out more attacks are more likely to achieve success.³

5 Further Robustness Checks

Table 5 shows the results for model specifications that: do not include the the ideology variables or the group goal variables (i.e., columns 2–3), and exclude the sponsorship dropped variables (i.e., columns 4–5). The main results of the paper are robust to both of these alternative model specifications. Thus, while I think it makes sense to include the variables that indicate whether a group has previously had a sponsor, the main results are not dependent on this choice. Additionally, the demonstration that the results are not dependent on the inclusion of the group ideology and group goal measures is a useful robustness check.

[Table 5 about here.]

³Pape 2003.

6 Example of Case

Table 6 shows the yearly coding decision for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). I use the PKK as an example because it is a prominent case that exhibits a lot of variation in terms of its safe havens and sponsorship patterns. The table shows that the PKK had gained bases in three states, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, by 1987. In 1998, it lost its Syrian base when its leader, Abdullah Ocalan was ejected from Damascus in response to Turkish military pressure. The PKK also enjoyed sponsorship without safe haven from Greece between 1981–1999, as well as sponsorship with safe haven from Syria, Iraq, and Iran for periods throughout the 1980s and 1990s.⁴ By 2000, Iraq remained the group's sole sponsor, a relationship which ended with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. While the group retains military bases in Iraq and to a lesser extent Iran, it no longer receives these with the explicit blessing of either of these two governments.⁵

[Table 6 about here.]

⁴Byman 2005; Marcus 2007.

⁵Marcus 2007.

References

- Byman, Daniel. 2005. *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldstone, Jack A., Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Tedd Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder and Mark Woodward. 2010. “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1):190–208.
- Jones, Seth G. and Martin C. Libicki. 2006. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation.
- Marcus, Eliza. 2007. *Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence*. New York, NY: New York University Press.
- Pape, Robert A. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” *American Political Science Review* 97(3):343–361.

Coding Example — State Sponsorship

- Group Name: Hamas
- Group Number: 50
- Group Start Date: 1987
- Group End Date: ACTIVE

State Sponsorship

- Mention of Sponsorship in START? Yes
 - Mentions Iranian support
- First confirming source: Matthew Levitt. 2006. *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*. New Haven. Yale UP. pp. 172–178.
Second confirming source: Daniel Byman. 2005. *Deadly Connections* Cambridge UP. pp. 27–31, 55–58, 322–323.
 - Iran — Strong evidence of direct Iranian support
 - Sponsorship Start Date: 1988
 - Sponsorship End Date: Ongoing
 - * Safe Haven: No
 - * Financing: Yes
 - * Weapons: Yes
 - * Training: Yes
 - * Intelligence: Not Clear
 - Strong evidence of Syrian support
 - Sponsorship Start Date: 1991
 - Sponsorship End Date: Ongoing

- * Safe Haven: Yes
 - Hamas leadership in Damascus
 - * Financing: No
 - * Weapons: No
 - * Training: No
 - * Intelligence: No
- Note: Byman and Levitt also list Sudan as a supporter. I did not find clear evidence that Sudan directly provided sustained support. However, it is clear that Sudan is a “passive” supporter.

Coding Example — State Sponsorship

- Group Name: Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
 - Group is also known as al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb
- Group Number: 39
- Group Start Date: 1996
- Group End Date: ACTIVE

State Sponsorship

- Mention of Sponsorship in START? Yes
 - Mentions support from Iran and Sudan
- No confirming evidence found of state support. Some sources note that the only evidence for support is an allegation by the target government (Algeria) for which no corroborating evidence exists.

Andrew Hansen and Lauren Vriens. July 2009. “Backgrounder: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).” *Council on Foreign Relations*.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12717/alqaeda_in_the_islamic_maghreb_aqim.html.

Marret, Jean-Luc. 2008. “Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A Glocal Organization”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. 31(6): 541–552.

Table 1: The Duration of Terror

	Pooled Logit	Measure of Sponsor Failure	
	Group Failure	Internal Dissolution	Forceful Elimination
Constant	-1.05** (0.36)	-1.00** (0.47)	-2.99** (0.53)
Sponsorship – No Safe Haven	-0.40 (0.27)	-0.56 (0.40)	-0.41 (0.47)
Sponsorship – Safe Haven	0.16 (0.20)	-0.29 (0.38)	0.74** (0.38)
Sponsorship ended - Safe Haven	0.99** (0.43)	0.57 (0.86)	1.68** (0.52)
Sponsorship ended - No Safe Haven	0.17 (0.33)	-0.31 (0.72)	0.48 (0.41)
Number of Attacks	-0.05 (0.39)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.56** (0.26)
Number of Safe Havens	-0.17* (0.10)	-0.26 (0.15)	-0.26 (0.17)
Territorial change	-0.69** (0.25)	-0.61* (0.33)	-0.47 (0.45)
Policy change	0.50** (0.21)	0.48* (0.26)	0.05 (0.32)
Status quo	-0.18 (0.34)	-0.22 (0.45)	-0.20 (0.54)
Empire	-0.01 (0.40)	-0.32 (0.60)	0.37 (0.71)
Regime change	0.02 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.27)	0.15 (0.32)
Leftist group	0.04 (0.23)	0.27 (0.30)	0.12 (0.35)
Religious group	-0.80** (0.28)	-0.56 (0.38)	-0.85* (0.48)
Nationalistic group	-0.26 (0.24)	0.32 (0.34)	-0.04 (0.42)
Target civil war	-0.20 (0.14)	0.17 (0.20)	-0.85** (0.28)
Target democracy	-0.13 (0.16)	-0.08 (0.23)	-0.29 (0.29)
Target per capita income	0.32** (0.08)	0.35** (0.12)	0.55** (0.17)
Target Military Action	0.28 (0.42)	-0.18 (0.64)	1.02** (0.50)
Sponsor Internal Instability		0.10 (0.47)	0.11 (0.46)
Cold War	-0.27** (0.12)	-0.38** (0.16)	-0.11 (0.20)
t	-30.82** (4.38)	-57.45** (8.22)	-4.46 (5.76)
t^2	1.22** (0.29)	2.85** (0.68)	-0.06 (0.33)
t^3	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Log-likelihood	-1328.07		-1281.93
N =	6560		5844

Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 2: The Duration of Terror: Recoded Internal Dissolution

	Model 1	Model 2	
	Pooled Logit	Internal Dissolution	Forceful By Elimination
Constant	-1.07** (0.37)	-1.17** (0.50)	-2.75** (0.49)
Sponsorship – No Safe Haven	-0.31 (0.27)	-0.37 (0.37)	-0.53 (0.47)
Sponsorship – Safe Haven	0.17 (0.21)	-0.33 (0.34)	0.79** (0.31)
Sponsorship ended - Safe Haven	0.93** (0.44)	0.51 (0.78)	1.38** (0.52)
Sponsorship ended - No Safe Haven	0.07 (0.33)	-0.40 (0.71)	0.47 (0.40)
Number of Attacks	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.26 (0.16)	-0.58** (0.26)
Number of Safe Havens	-0.19* (0.11)	-0.24 (0.15)	-0.28* (0.16)
Territorial change	-0.74** (0.25)	-0.63* (0.32)	-0.45 (0.43)
Policy change	0.38* (0.21)	0.47* (0.26)	0.07 (0.31)
Status quo	-0.50 (0.37)	-0.34 (0.46)	-0.41 (0.53)
Empire	-0.03 (0.39)	-0.12 (0.50)	0.32 (0.69)
Regime change	-0.06 (0.20)	-0.22 (0.28)	0.15 (0.30)
Leftist group	0.15 (0.23)	0.43 (0.33)	-0.06 (0.32)
Religious group	-0.64** (0.29)	-0.27 (0.39)	-1.02** (0.45)
Nationalistic group	0.48* (0.25)	0.66* (0.36)	-0.21 (0.39)
Target Civil War	-0.24* (0.14)	0.06 (0.19)	-0.74** (0.25)
Target democracy	-0.22 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.21)	-0.36 (0.26)
Target per capita income	0.41** (0.08)	0.38** (0.10)	0.53** (0.14)
Target Military Action	0.41 (0.43)	0.01 (0.61)	1.05** (0.50)
Cold War	-0.20* (0.12)	-0.28* (0.16)	-0.07 (0.19)
t	-36.25** (5.40)	-60.27** (9.55)	-6.71 (5.42)
t^2	1.52** (0.39)	2.54** (0.73)	0.11 (0.31)
t^3	-0.02** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Log-likelihood	-1229.70	-1323.57	
N =	6560	6560	

Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 3: The Duration of Terror: Without “Victory” Groups

	Model 1	Model 2	
	Pooled Logit	Internal Dissolution	Forceful By Elimination
Constant	-1.19** (0.35)	-1.47** (0.43)	-2.77** (0.48)
Sponsorship – No Save Haven	-0.56* (0.29)	-0.61* (0.33)	-0.33 (0.49)
Sponsorship – Safe Haven	0.11 (0.22)	-0.20 (0.31)	0.66** (0.33)
Sponsorship ended - Safe Haven	1.32** (0.47)	0.93 (0.79)	1.62** (0.59)
Sponsorship ended - No Safe Haven	0.54* (0.31)	0.26 (0.50)	0.98** (0.37)
Number of Attacks	-0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.65** (0.28)
Number of Safe Havens	-0.16* (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.26 (0.17)
Territorial change	-0.61** (0.26)	-0.56* (0.31)	-0.46 (0.47)
Policy change	0.53** (0.21)	0.73** (0.26)	0.17 (0.33)
Status quo	-0.19 (0.34)	0.11 (0.41)	-0.50 (0.56)
Empire	0.34 (0.44)	-0.05 (0.50)	1.00 (0.72)
Regime change	0.02 (0.20)	-0.02 (0.26)	0.19 (0.32)
Leftist group	0.03 (0.23)	0.18 (0.29)	-0.16 (0.32)
Religious group	-0.68** (0.28)	-0.44 (0.34)	-1.06** (0.45)
Nationalistic group	0.27 (0.25)	0.46 (0.32)	-0.11 (0.42)
Number target conflicts	-0.12** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.31** (0.14)
Target democracy	-0.08 (0.17)	0.10 (0.21)	-0.42 (0.29)
Target per capita income	0.32** (0.09)	0.19* (0.10)	0.56** (0.15)
Target Military Action	0.28 (0.49)	-0.29 (0.66)	1.00* (0.59)
t	-32.54** (4.20)	-47.59** (6.43)	-7.56 (5.30)
t^2	1.25** (0.27)	1.92** (0.43)	0.12 (0.30)
t^3	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Log-likelihood	-1231.05	-1432.87	
N =	6304	6304	

Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses
 ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 4: The Duration of Terror: With “Victory” Category

	Achieved Objectives	Internal Dissolution	Forceful Elimination
Constant	-20.26** (0.94)	-1.50** (0.44)	-2.81** (0.49)
Sponsorship – No Safe Haven	-0.02 (0.63)	-0.62* (0.33)	-0.38 (0.49)
Sponsorship – Safe Haven	0.21 (0.71)	-0.17 (0.31)	0.68** (0.34)
Sponsorship ended - Safe Haven	0.66 (1.47)	1.01 (0.81)	1.67** (0.60)
Sponsorship ended - No Safe Haven	-0.42 (0.84)	0.26 (0.49)	0.98** (0.36)
Number of Attacks	0.05* (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.63** (0.27)
Number of Safe Havens	0.29 (0.19)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.30 (0.18)
Territorial change	13.42** (0.78)	-0.44 (0.31)	-0.29 (0.46)
Policy change	16.02** (0.74)	0.68** (0.26)	0.15 (0.32)
Status quo	14.44** (1.19)	0.19 (0.40)	-0.40 (0.55)
Empire	2.22* (1.23)	0.04 (0.49)	1.13 (0.73)
Regime change	15.38** (0.66)	-0.04 (0.26)	0.19 (0.32)
Leftist group	-0.49 (1.17)	0.21 (0.28)	-0.13 (0.32)
Religious group	-14.51** (1.16)	-0.40 (0.34)	-1.03** (0.46)
Nationalistic group	1.25 (1.11)	0.33 (0.31)	-0.26 (0.40)
Number target conflicts	-0.08 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.30** (0.18)
Target democracy	-0.00 (0.53)	0.11 (0.21)	-0.37 (0.29)
Target per capita income	0.02 (0.37)	0.21** (0.10)	0.57** (0.15)
Target Military Action	-14.66** (0.66)	-0.24 (0.65)	1.12** (0.58)
t	-21.90 (15.01)	-47.66** (6.39)	-7.68 (5.31)
t^2	1.50 (0.96)	1.93** (0.43)	0.13 (0.30)
t^3	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Log-likelihood	-1598.83		
N =	6591		

Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 5: The Duration of Terror

	No Ideology or Goals		No Sponsorship Dropped	
	Internal Dissolution	Forceful Elimination	Internal Dissolution	Forceful Elimination
Constant	-1.03** (0.27)	-2.96** (0.33)	-1.21** (0.46)	-2.81** (0.49)
Sponsorship – No Save Haven	-0.51 (0.36)	-0.43 (0.47)	-0.54 (0.37)	-0.48 (0.48)
Sponsorship – Safe Haven	-0.44 (0.31)	0.61** (0.31)	-0.32 (0.31)	0.66** (0.31)
Sponsorship ended - Safe Haven	0.38 (0.66)	1.05** (0.54)		
Sponsorship ended - No Safe Haven	0.16 (0.52)	0.56 (0.43)		
Number of Safe Havens	-0.29** (0.12)	-0.34** (0.15)	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.16)
Territorial change			-0.55 (0.31)	-0.39 (0.42)
Policy change			0.64** (0.26)	0.08 (0.31)
Status quo			0.08 (0.40)	-0.37 (0.55)
Empire			-0.08 (0.49)	0.30 (0.67)
Regime change			-0.09 (0.27)	0.15 (0.30)
Leftist group			-0.22 (0.29)	-0.04 (0.32)
Religious group			-0.54 (0.35)	-0.97** (0.44)
Nationalistic group			0.30 (0.32)	-0.22 (0.40)
Target civil war	-0.15 (0.16)	-0.96** (0.24)	0.10 (0.18)	-0.74** (0.24)
Target democracy	-0.00 (0.19)	-0.40 (0.27)	-0.02 (0.21)	-0.36 (0.26)
Target per capita income	0.31** (0.09)	0.54** (0.14)	0.25** (0.09)	0.51** (0.14)
Target Military Action	-0.42 (0.63)	0.87* (0.48)	-0.18 (0.62)	1.12** (0.51)
Cold War	-0.23 (0.15)	0.09 (0.19)	-0.37** (0.15)	-0.08 (0.19)
t	-48.89** (6.54)	-7.15 (5.34)	-47.38** (6.47)	-6.32 (5.39)
t^2	1.99** (0.44)	0.15 (0.31)	1.91** (0.43)	0.14 (0.31)
t^3	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.02** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Log-likelihood	-1479.08		-1453.07	
N =	6560		6560	

Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 6: Example Case: Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)

Group	Year	Sponsorship –		Bases	Sponsors
		No Safe Haven	Safe Haven		
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1974	0	0	Turkey	
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1975	0	0	Turkey	
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1976	0	0	Turkey	
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1977	0	0	Turkey	
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1978	0	0	Turkey	
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1979	0	0	Turkey	
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1980	0	1	Turkey, Syria	Syria
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1981	1	1	Turkey, Syria	Syria, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1982	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq	Syria, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1983	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq	Syria, Iraq, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1984	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq	Syria, Iraq, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1985	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq	Syria, Iraq, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1986	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq	Syria, Iraq, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1987	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1988	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1989	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1990	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1991	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1992	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1993	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1994	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1995	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1996	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1997	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1998	1	1	Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	1999	1	1	Turkey, Iraq, Iran	Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	2000	0	1	Turkey, Iraq, Iran	Iraq
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	2001	0	1	Turkey, Iraq, Iran	Iraq
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	2002	0	1	Turkey, Iraq, Iran	Iraq
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	2003	0	1	Turkey, Iraq, Iran	Iraq
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	2004	0	0	Turkey, Iraq, Iran	
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	2005	0	0	Turkey, Iraq, Iran	
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)	2006	0	0	Turkey, Iraq, Iran	