

Online Appendix for:
“Transborder Ethnic Kind and Civil War”

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This appendix presents a series of sensitivity tests that scrutinize the main findings of the main article.

We start by assessing the robustness of our main results in different parts of the world. Throughout this analysis, we use Model 5 as our reference. Our preliminary sensitivity analysis features a test of the TEK effect in two important world regions. Although the current paper goes beyond that study by extending the analysis to a truly global sample, it is still of interest to explore how well our results hold up in different world regions. Thus, Models A1 and A2 apply Model 5 to Eurasia (including North Africa) and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively.

Table A1: Testing H5 in different world regions

VARIABLES	Model A1 Eurasia	Model A2 Sub- Saharan Africa	Model A3 Without Russians
Rel. Group Size	0.3864 (0.5628)	1.1118 (0.7513)	1.1618** (0.3662)
Excluded TEK Group	-0.2996 (0.2668)	0.0695 (0.3952)	-0.1914 (0.2226)
Rel. TEK Size (excl.)	7.0477* (2.8390)	2.1210 (2.3681)	3.4338* (1.6848)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (excl.)	-7.1621* (3.3515)	-0.8132 (2.5258)	-2.6973 (1.9798)
Included TEK Group	-0.4091 (0.3580)	-0.3841 (0.6125)	-0.3285 (0.2825)
Rel. TEK Size (incl.)	5.8801** (2.0518)	2.7259 (3.4047)	4.4257** (1.6731)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (incl.)	-6.3038** (2.0679)	-4.0164 (3.4571)	-5.0331** (1.7010)
Junior Status	-0.0503 (0.8030)	1.9284* (0.9228)	0.7675 (0.5301)
Autonomy Status	0.3798 (0.8295)		1.0866 (0.5850)
Powerless Status	0.3059 (0.7929)	2.7507** (0.9994)	1.2969* (0.5420)
Discriminated Status	0.8920 (0.7295)	3.5718** (1.0491)	1.8742** (0.5156)
Separatist Status	2.4410** (0.8481)		3.1942** (0.6604)
Downgraded	1.6907** (0.4102)	1.2157** (0.4265)	1.5526** (0.2898)
Number Previous Conflicts	0.4068** (0.0894)	0.5483** (0.2040)	0.4993** (0.0934)
Ongoing Conflict, lag	0.7785* (0.3435)	-0.5861 (0.5015)	0.4564 (0.2843)
GDP/capita, lag, log	-0.1138 (0.1264)	-0.0993 (0.1461)	-0.1895* (0.0755)
Population, lag, log	0.1868 (0.1362)	0.2577 (0.1511)	0.1420 (0.0959)
Constant	-6.4176** (2.0389)	-9.2781** (2.1367)	-6.2511** (1.1191)
Observations	18007	7379	27983

Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimates for peace-year
correction not shown.

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

In order to interpret the influence of TEK size on conflict probability, we plotted how conflict propensity in these two regions varies with relative TEK size (see Figures A1 and A2). Unsurprisingly, our global findings remain very strong when the analysis is restricted to Eurasia. The plot covering Eurasia reveals a strongly curvilinear dependence on the power balance in the secondary dyad, with some conflict dampening effect for large TEK sizes.




Figure A1. Effect of included and excluded TEK groups on conflict in Eurasia

What is possibly more surprising is that we detect a similar TEK effect for sub-Saharan Africa, albeit with much less precision, most likely because of the smaller number of cases (7,233 group years as opposed 17,7813 in Eurasia). Moreover, Figure A2 suggests that the conflict-dampening effect operates for large TEK groups. Thus, we interpret this as an indication that Sub-Saharan Africa may not be entirely different from the rest of the world in terms of border-transgressing conflict processes involving ethnic kin. More detailed analyses of specific cases would be needed to ascertain if the postulated mechanisms actually do operate in this part of the world. To the extent that this similarity survives such scrutiny, this finding stands in some tension to claims that borders have been more sacrosanct in Africa than elsewhere (e.g., Herbst 2000), at least regarding the link between ethnic kin and civil war.




Figure A2. Effect of included and excluded TEK groups on conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

In order to ensure that our results are not driven primarily by the Russians “near abroad”, we analyze a sample that excludes all Russian groups across all countries (Model A3). The results suggest that this concern is not warranted. Indeed, compared to Model 5 the results are almost identical, suggesting that our results are not simply driven by the influence of one particular group, such as the Russians. Figure A3, which displays the effect of included and excluded TEK groups without the Russian groups, confirms this picture. A direct comparison with the findings based on the full sample (see Figure 3 in the main article) reveals that the size curves hardly shift as a result of the Russian cases being dropped.




Figure A3: Effect of included and excluded TEK groups on conflict without Russians

Our sensitivity analysis continues with a number of additional tests:

Rare events

Since the dependent variable contains relatively few hits compared to the total number of group years, we check whether applying the rare-events analysis correction estimator changes the result (see King and Zeng 2001). However, Model A4 indicates that the differences are minimal compared to conventional logit (see Model 5).

Table A2. Rare events estimation applied to Model 5.

VARIABLES	Model A4 Rare events logit
Rel. Group Size	1.1820** (0.366)
Excluded TEK Group	-0.1857 (0.224)
Rel. TEK Size (excl.)	3.3076* (1.687)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (excl.)	-2.5394 (1.984)
Included TEK Group	-0.3203 (0.285)
Rel. TEK Size (incl.)	4.3677** (1.671)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (incl.)	-4.9707** (1.685)
Junior Status	0.7265 (0.532)
Autonomy Status	1.0526 (0.585)
Powerless Status	1.2373* (0.545)
Discriminated Status	1.8286** (0.517)
Separatist Status	3.1382** (0.665)
Downgraded	1.5658** (0.290)
Number Previous Conflicts	0.5074** (0.093)
Ongoing Conflict, lag	0.7785* (0.3435)
GDP/capita, lag, log	-0.1138 (0.1264)
Population, lag, log	0.1868 (0.1362)
Constant	-6.1226** (1.127)
Observations	28,298

Robust standard errors in parentheses, estimates for peace-year correction not shown.

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Testing the influence of ethnic diversity

We next consider the possibility that ethnic diversity, computed as the ethnic fractionalization score based on EPR-ETH groups, may affect our main results. Here we add a variable that measures fractionalization in the state of the largest included TEK group. We also control for the fractionalization score at the country level. However, both these modifications fail to change the main results. Interestingly, in agreement with the argument that highly diverse states may be self-deterred from intervening, the coefficient of the former variable is negative but insignificant.

Table A3. Model 5 with controls for ethnic fractionalization

VARIABLES	Model A5
Rel. Group Size	1.1652** (0.384)
Excluded TEK Group	-0.1779 (0.228)
Rel. TEK Size (excl.)	3.2795 (1.722)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (excl.)	-2.6334 (2.007)
Included TEK Group	-0.1688 (0.456)
Rel. TEK Size (incl.)	4.1787* (1.951)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (incl.)	-4.8053* (1.944)
Ethnic frac. (state of largest TEK)	-0.2991 (0.400)
Junior Status	0.7061 (0.533)
Autonomy Status	1.0859 (0.578)
Powerless Status	1.2933* (0.538)
Discriminated Status	1.9193** (0.508)
Separatist Status	3.2993** (0.665)
Downgraded	1.5402** (0.277)
Number Previous Conflicts	0.4949** (0.090)
Ongoing Conflict, lag	0.4358 (0.288)
GDP/capita, lag, log	-0.1668 (0.088)
Population, lag, log	0.1272 (0.094)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.6040 (0.588)
Constant	-6.6400** (1.330)
Observations	28,298

Controlling for state power rather than using demographic proxies

Throughout our analysis we have relied on demographic variables for group power. Of course, it could be that this operationalization fails to do justice to the logic of irredentism. It could be that a more direct measure of state power is more pertinent. Focusing on included TEK groups only (since excluded ones have no access to the state's resources), we therefore replace the demographic proxy for the balance in the secondary dyad with a new variable that sums the power of all included TEK groups relying on the Correlates of War CINC scores, which correspond to the standard measure of the national material capabilities that influence state power according to the COW project. We also control for the CINC scores of the host state. Based on this analysis, we conclude that the latter variable has a strongly negative influence on conflict probability, as would be expected (see Table A4 below). The CINC replacement behaves somewhat like its demographic counterpart, although with smaller coefficient and less precise estimates. We conclude that the demographic proxy has a stronger and more clearly defined effect.

Model A4. Using CINC scores

VARIABLES	Model A6
Rel. Group Size	1.0493** (0.390)
Excluded TEK Group	-0.1769 (0.220)
Rel. TEK Size (excl.)	2.5251 (1.657)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (excl.)	-1.4395 (1.944)
Included TEK Group	-0.0337 (0.386)
CINC (incl.)	1.5785 (1.874)
CINC, sq. (incl.)	-1.9308 (1.677)
Junior Status	0.6646 (0.539)
Autonomy Status	1.2690* (0.603)
Powerless Status	1.1929* (0.544)
Discriminated Status	1.7319** (0.525)
Separatist Status	2.9763** (0.665)
Downgraded	1.6261** (0.286)
Number Previous Conflicts	0.3882** (0.111)
Ongoing Conflict, lag	0.2533 (0.256)
GDP/capita, lag, log	-0.1029 (0.091)
Population, lag, log	0.4245** (0.082)
CINC	-16.4273** (4.271)
Constant	-9.0598** (1.314)
Observations	28,298

Controlling for regime type

It is possible that regime type affects the secondary dyad. It could be that democracies are less inclined to intervene. Therefore, we include a measure of the largest TEK group's regime type together with a country-level control. Based on Vreeland's truncated Polity scale, we define dummies for democratic states that is one if the xpolity score is above 5 (out of max 7). However, adding these variables to Model 5 yields no major changes to the results and the regime type variables perform badly, although there may be a weakly negative effect through the TEK group.

Table A5: Controlling for democracy

VARIABLES	Model A7
Rel. Group Size	1.2119** (0.347)
Excluded TEK Group	-0.1897 (0.213)
Rel. TEK Size (excl.)	3.4870* (1.701)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (excl.)	-2.6963 (2.009)
Included TEK Group	-0.3671 (0.285)
Rel. TEK Size (incl.)	4.6336** (1.681)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (incl.)	-5.2658** (1.662)
Democracy (state of largest TEK)	-0.0616 (0.251)
Junior Status	0.7824 (0.541)
Autonomy Status	1.1950 (0.635)
Powerless Status	1.3814* (0.561)
Discriminated Status	1.9786** (0.535)
Separatist Status	3.3441** (0.640)
Downgraded	1.5419** (0.292)
Number Previous Conflicts	0.5174** (0.093)
Ongoing Conflict, lag	0.4462 (0.265)
GDP/capita, lag, log	-0.2154** (0.077)
Population, lag, log	0.1428 (0.090)
Democracy	0.3200 (0.331)
Constant	-6.2807** (1.077)
Observations	28,298

Controlling for separatist TEK groups

Another possibly confounding effect could stem from the TEK group in question being separatist. To investigate this possibility we add a dummy variable that checks if the TEK group enjoys regional or separatist autonomy. These EPR categories should be the most inclined to advance separatist claims. Again, we conclude that the new variable has not effect and fails to change the results of Model 5.

Table A6: Controlling for separatism

VARIABLES	Model A8
Rel. Group Size	1.1544** (0.370)
Excluded TEK Group	-0.1179 (0.231)
Rel. TEK Size (excl.)	3.3139* (1.691)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (excl.)	-2.5794 (2.014)
Included TEK Group	-0.3923 (0.290)
Rel. TEK Size (incl.)	4.5068** (1.674)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (incl.)	-5.1365** (1.685)
Autonomous TEK	-0.6361 (0.450)
Junior Status	0.7871 (0.535)
Autonomy Status	1.1293 (0.588)
Powerless Status	1.3267* (0.548)
Discriminated Status	1.8904** (0.520)
Separatist Status	3.2668** (0.676)
Downgraded	1.5418** (0.290)
Number Previous Conflicts	0.5033** (0.091)
Ongoing Conflict, lag	0.4578 (0.289)
GDP/capita, lag, log	-0.1969** (0.076)
Population, lag, log	0.1371 (0.098)
Constant	-6.1784** (1.131)
Observations	28,298

Controlling for neighborhood conflict

Finally, we explore the influence of conflict that rages in neighboring countries. The new variable, counts the number of neighboring countries that experience conflict. Again, the modification yields no important changes. Conflict diffusion, measured in this way, appears to be unimportant once we take into account TEK.

Model A7: Model 5 with controls for conflict diffusion

VARIABLES	Model A9
Rel. Group Size	1.2465** (0.374)
Excluded TEK Group	-0.1921 (0.235)
Rel. TEK Size (excl.)	3.1747 (1.679)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (excl.)	-2.3662 (1.926)
Included TEK Group	-0.3237 (0.285)
Rel. TEK Size (incl.)	4.3213* (1.722)
Rel. TEK Size, sq. (incl.)	-4.9687** (1.729)
Junior Status	0.7524 (0.534)
Autonomy Status	1.1868* (0.584)
Powerless Status	1.3201* (0.548)
Discriminated Status	1.8743** (0.524)
Separatist Status	3.0847** (0.665)
Downgraded	1.5416** (0.286)
Number Previous Conflicts	0.5770** (0.099)
Ongoing Conflict, lag	0.5520 (0.297)
GDP/capita, lag, log	-0.2113** (0.074)
Population, lag, log	0.1239 (0.095)
No. conflicts in neighbor states	-0.0396 (0.103)
Constant	-6.1488** (1.106)
Observations	27,813

References:

Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001. Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data. *Political Analysis* 9 (2):137-163.

Alphabetic listing of TEK groups in the EPR-ETH dataset

Abkhaz, Aboriginal peoples / American Indians, Adivasi/Janajati, Afar, Afrikaners, Afropanamanians / Afro-Costa Ricans, Alawites, Albanians, Armenians, Asians in Africa, Austrians, Aymara, Azande, Azeri, Baloch, Basques, Batéké, Bengali, Berber / Tuareg, Bosniaks/Muslims, Bulgarians, Byelorussians, Chinese, Croats, Dayak, Diola, Druze, Dutch, East Timorese, English speakers / Whites, English Speaking Whites in Southern Africa, Ewe, Finns, French, Fula / Peul, Georgians, Germans , Greeks, Guaraní, Gur, Hani, Haratins (Black Moors), Hausa, Herero / Mbanderu, Hindus, Hmong, Hungarians, Hutu, Indians / Punjabi Sikhs, Indigenous peoples (Brazil / Venezuela), Indigenous peoples (Colombia / Brazil), Indigenous peoples (El Salvador, Honduras), Indigenous peoples (Guyana / Brazil), Indigenous peoples (Guyana / Panama), Indigenous peoples (Venezuela / Colombia), Indigenous peoples / Choco, Indigenous peoples / Maya, Indigenous peoples of the Amazon, Irish / Catholics In Northern Ireland, Italians, Jews, Kachins / Jingpo, Kalanga, Kashmiri Muslims, Kazakhs, Khmer, Kirgiz, Koreans, Kru, Kurds, Lao, Lari / Bakongo, Lezgins, Lunda, Maasai, Macedonians, Madhesi, Malay, Mandingue / Malinke / Luo, Mapuche, Maronite Christians, Mbaka, Mestizo, Miskitos, Mohajirs / Bihari, Moldovans, Mongolians, Montenegrins, Ndebele, Nepalese, Nyanja speakers / Chewa, Ossets, Other indigenous peoples, Other Southern Nations (Ethiopia / Kenya), Ovambo, Palestinians, Pamir Tajiks, Papua, Pashtuns, Poles, Pomaks, Punjabi, Quechua, Roma, Romanians, Russians, Sahrawis, San, Sara, Serbs, Shan, Shi'a Arabs, Shona, Slovenes, Somali, Sotho, South/Central (Fon), Southern Mande / Gio, Southwestern (Adja), Sunni Arabs, Swazi, Swedes, Taiwanese, Tajiks, Tamil, Tatars, Tay, Thai, Tong, Toubou, Tsonga, Tswana, Turkmen, Turks, Tutsi, Ukrainians, Uyghur, Uzbeks, Vietnamese, Wa, White Moors, Wolof, Yao / Lao Sung / Dao, Yao and related groups, Yoruba, Zaghawa, Zhuang / Nung, Zomis (Chins) / Mizo