International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Global Diffusion of National Human Rights Institutions

Dongwook Kim

International Organization 67 (3), Summer 2013, pp. 505-39

Online Appendix

This online Appendix presents robustness checks against omitted variable bias, model dependence, and influential observations that cannot be reported in the *Robustness Checks* section of the article due to the space limit. In essence, the main point of this online Appendix is that the article's main findings about human rights INGOs in Model 1 in Table 2 (that is, NETWORK DENSITY and SHAMING) remain robust statistically and substantively, as seen in Tables A2, A3, and A4 below.

Robustness Checks against Omitted Variable Bias

In Models 1 to 4 in Table A2, I estimate four additional expanded specification models to ensure that the main findings about human rights INGOs are robust against omitted variable bias. First, Model 1 controls for the difference between developed versus developing countries because international donors—developed countries and IOs—may cow developing countries into NHRI adoption by imposing human rights conditionality.[1] While the article's global data set already excludes all developed UN member states (that is, advanced capitalist democracies), there still remain six developing UN member states that are Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries: The Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey. Model 1 examines any remaining difference between these six countries and the other developing countries. OECD MEMBERSHIP equals 1 if a state is an OECD member in a given year, and 0 otherwise.

[1] I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.

Second, Model 2 controls for international coercion as another diffusion mechanism.[2] HUMAN RIGHTS-PROMOTING UNPKO equals 1 if a UN peacekeeping operation with an explicit human rights mandate is present in a state in a given year, and 0 otherwise.[3] FOREIGN AID DEPENDENCE measures official development aid as a percentage of GDP for a state in a given year.[4]

Third, Model 3 controls for Moravcsik's democratic lock-in theory, that is, whether new democratic governments are more likely than their old democratic and nondemocratic counterparts to establish an NHRI to tie their own hands and prevent future human rights violations.[5] I construct three dichotomous variables for old democracy, new democracy, and nondemocracy, using the POLITY IV variable and Arend Lijphart's list of thirty old democracies. The Polity IV Project recommends the Polity score +6 as the cut-point for democracy.[6] Accordingly, NEW DEMOCRACY, the reference category, equals 1 if the POLITY IV value of a state in a given year ranges from +6 to +10 and the state is not included in Lijphart's list of thirty old democracies, and 0 otherwise.[7] OLD DEMOCRACY is coded 1 if a state's POLITY IV value ranges from +6 to +10 and the state is included in the list of old democracies, and 0 otherwise. NONDEMOCRACY equals 1 if a state's POLITY IV value is below +6, and 0 otherwise.

Fourth, Model 4 controls for additional domestic sources of governments' human rights policy preferences. PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM controls for Guillermo O'Donnell's claim that the presidential system tends to lack "horizontal accountability" between the president and other government branches.[8] It equals 1 if a state has a presidential system in a given year, and 0 otherwise.[9] NON-CHRISTIAN POPULATION controls for cultural relativism to see if religious and cultural differences lead the West and the rest to diverge in accepting international human rights

[2] Bush 2011.
[3] I adapt the coding scheme from Bush 2011, 119. I check the mandates and mission summaries of all UN peacekeeping operations at work between 1978 and 2003 for the word "human rights." See the UN's peacekeeping operations and their mandates. Available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml>. Accessed 16 July 2011.
[4] This variable is computed using official development aid and GDP in current US dollars taken from the World Bank Development Indicators data.
[5] Moravcsik 2000. I thank a reviewer for this point.
[6] See Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010. Available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>. Accessed 10 April 2010.
[7] While this article excludes all developed UN member states from the statistical analysis, nine developing UN members in the data set still belong to Lijphart's list of thirty old democracies: Barbados, Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Israel, Jamaica, Malta, and Venezuela. See Landman 2005, 90 for Lijphart's list of old democracies.
[8] O'Donnell 1992.
[9] Data are taken from DPI2006. See Beck et al. 2001.

norms.[10] This variable measures the percentage of the non-Christian religious population in a state in a given year.[11]

Table A1 reports the hypotheses and summary statistics for all additional control variables. Table A2 presents the statistical results of robustness checks against omitted variable bias.

<TABLE A1>

<TABLE A2>

In short, while none of those control variables is statistically significant, the main findings about NETWORK DENSITY and SHAMING remain unchanged in all models in Table A2 with the inclusion of the additional control variables.

Robustness Checks against Model Dependence

In Models 1 and 2 in Table A3, I check the robustness of the main results for human rights INGOs against model dependence. First, Model 1 reestimates the main Weibull model in the article (that is, Model 1 in Table 2) with the Royston-Parmar flexible parametric model. As explained in the article, the Royston-Parmar model uses natural cubic splines to specify time dependence empirically and reduces to the Weibull model as its special case if splines are not used.[12]

Second, Model 2 reestimates the main model in the article with the Cox semi-parametric model. The Cox model estimates the hazard rate of enacting NHRI founding legislation solely as a function of independent variables without dealing with time dependence in the data.[13] I use the Efron method to handle "ties" (that is, cases where two or more governments established an

[10] Donnelly 2003, 89-123.
[11] This variable is time-invariant. Data are taken from La Porta et al. 1999 and the *CIA Factbook*.
[12] See Royston and Parmar 2002; and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 89-90.
[13] Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 47-48.

NHRI in the same year) because of its superior performance.[14] Table A3 presents the statistical results of robustness checks against model dependence.

<TABLE A3>

In short, the main findings about NETWORK DENSITY and SHAMING remain robust and consistent across the Weibull, the Royston-Parmar, and the Cox models. Furthermore, Model 1 in Table A3 demonstrates the adequacy of the article's choice of the Weibull model over the Royston-Parmar and the Cox models in two ways. First, the fact that time dependence—SPLINE 1 in particular—is statistically significant in the Royston-Parmar model shows that event history models that explicitly account for time dependence, such as the Weibull or the Royston-Parmar model, are superior to the Cox model that makes the strong (and often untenable) assumption of time independence. Even when time dependence may not take statistical significance, it does not mean that time dependence is zero (that is, non-existent). As such, it is preferable to use an event history model that allows for the possibility of time dependence. Second, the Weibull distribution function employed in the article specifies the actual time dependence as accurately as, but more parsimoniously than, splines because the Weibull model in Model 1 in Table 2 in the article has the smaller AIC and hence the better model fit than the best-fit spline model in Model 1 in Table A3 (224.40 versus 224.77).

Robustness Checks against Influential Observations

In Models 1 and 2 in Table A4, I conduct subsample analyses to ensure that influential observations do not drive any significant effects of human rights INGOs. First, Model 1 reestimates the main model in the article by excluding OECD countries from the global data set.[15] Second, Model 2 reestimates the main model by excluding old democracies from the global data set.[16] Tables A4 present the statistical results of robustness checks against influential observations.

[14] Hertz-Piccioto and Rockhill 1997.
[15] As previously explained, the global data set still includes six OECD countries.
[16] As previously explained, the global data set contains nine of Lijphart's thirty old democracies.

<TABLE A4>

In brief, the main findings about human rights INGOs remain consistent across the global, the non-OECD, and the non-old-democracy data sets.

In conclusion, in all models in Tables A2, A3, and A4, the coefficients of NETWORK DENSITY and SHAMING all remain positive and highly statistically significant. Thus, the main results for human rights INGOs are robust against omitted variable bias, model dependence, and influential observations.

Appendix References

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TABLE A1. *Hypotheses and summary statistics*

Variable	*Hypothesis*	*Number*	*Mean*	*Standard Deviation*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
OECD MEMBERSHIP	–	2800	0.03	0.16	0	1
HUMAN RIGHTS-PROMOTING UNPKO	+	2800	0.01	0.10	0	1
FOREIGN AID DEPENDENCE	+	2421	8.32	12.02	0	108.33
OLD DEMOCRACY	–	2762	0.06	0.24	0	1
NEW DEMOCRACY	(reference)	2762	0.20	0.40	0	1
NONDEMOCRACY	–	2762	0.74	0.44	0	1
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM	–	2800	0.81	0.39	0	1
NON-CHRISTIAN POPULATION	+/–	2800	66.41	37.06	0.90	100

TABLE A2. Robustness Checks against Omitted Variable Bias: *Determinants of the enactment of national human rights institution founding legislation*

	Weibull			
	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Human rights international NGOs				
NETWORK DENSITY	0.585**	0.578**	0.623***	0.621***
	(0.248)	(0.273)	(0.241)	(0.242)
SHAMING	0.176***	0.169**	0.178***	0.174***
	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Global norm cascades				
GLOBAL NHRI DENSITY	0.017**	0.013	0.017**	0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)
International organizations				
UN ADVICE	1.365***	1.286***	1.363***	1.342***
	(0.314)	(0.347)	(0.309)	(0.315)
REGIONAL IO SCORE	0.048**	0.039*	0.051**	0.054**
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)
EU PTA	0.164	0.169	0.141	0.155
	(0.244)	(0.259)	(0.242)	(0.244)
Domestic political factors				
POLITY IV	0.005	0.000	(replaced)	0.007
	(0.022)	(0.023)		(0.023)
POLITICAL TERROR	–0.138	–0.118	–0.143	–0.131
	(0.126)	(0.144)	(0.123)	(0.127)
RATIFIED TREATIES	0.161	0.134	0.147	0.152
	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.107)
Economic factors				
GDP PER CAPITA	–0.170	–0.116	–0.157	–0.170
	(0.137)	(0.166)	(0.143)	(0.139)
OECD MEMBERSHIP	0.349			
	(0.531)			
International coercion				
HUMAN RIGHTS-PROMOTING UNPKO		0.315		
		(0.716)		
FOREIGN AID DEPENDENCE		–0.003		
		(0.014)		
Democratic lock-in				
OLD DEMOCRACY			–0.203	
			(0.413)	
NEW DEMOCRACY			(reference)	
NONDEMOCRACY			–0.061	
			(0.298)	
Additional domestic factors				
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM				–0.069
				(0.308)
NON-CHRISTIAN POPULATION				0.002
				(0.003)

Constant	–6.146***	–6.749***	–6.259***	–6.304***
	(1.446)	(1.855)	(1.586)	(1.478)
SHAPE PARAMETER	1.178	1.311	1.165	1.161
	(0.201)	(0.306)	(0.195)	(0.196)
Number of states	141	127	141	141
Number of NHRI laws	82	70	82	82
Number of observations	2555	2320	2555	2555
Log likelihood	–99.99	–91.26	–100.14	–100.01
Wald χ^2	63.30***	42.61***	61.87***	61.86***
Degrees of freedom	13	14	13	14
Akaike information criterion	225.99	210.52	226.28	228.01

Notes: Coefficients are reported. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on state. All independent variables use a one-year lag. *** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .10$, in two-tailed tests.

TABLE A3. Robustness Checks against Model Dependence: *Determinants of the enactment of national human rights institution founding legislation*

	Royston-Parmar *Model 1*	*Cox* *Model 2*
Human rights international NGOs		
NETWORK DENSITY	0.651***	0.844***
	(0.247)	(0.232)
SHAMING	0.176**	0.170**
	(0.071)	(0.069)
Global norm cascades		
GLOBAL NHRI DENSITY	0.026**	0.056***
	(0.011)	(0.012)
International organizations		
UN ADVICE	1.338***	1.387***
	(0.325)	(0.336)
REGIONAL IO SCORE	0.046**	0.037**
	(0.021)	(0.019)
EU PTA	0.197	0.234
	(0.268)	(0.262)
Domestic political factors		
POLITY IV	0.011	0.006
	(0.023)	(0.022)
POLITICAL TERROR	–0.129	–0.114
	(0.125)	(0.128)
RATIFIED TREATIES	0.130	0.118
	(0.098)	(0.104)
Economic factors		
GDP PER CAPITA	–0.177	–0.179
	(0.144)	(0.145)
Constant	–6.945***	
	(1.618)	
SPLINE 1	1.386***	
	(0.338)	
SPLINE 2	0.117	
	(0.093)	
Number of states	141	141
Number of NHRI laws	82	82
Number of observations	2555	2555
Log likelihood	–99.39	–325.69
Wald χ^2	61.34***	81.34***
Degrees of freedom	13	10
Akaike information criterion	224.77	671.38

Notes: Coefficients are reported. Numbers in parentheses in the Royston-Parmar model are standard errors. Those in the Cox model are robust standard errors clustered on state. All independent variables use a one-year lag. *** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .10$, in two-tailed tests.

TABLE A4. Robustness Checks against Influential Observations: *Determinants of the enactment of national human rights institution founding legislation*

	Weibull	
	Non-OECD Model 1	*Non-old democracy Model 2*
Human rights international NGOs		
NETWORK DENSITY	0.638***	0.531**
	(0.236)	(0.245)
SHAMING	0.191***	0.198***
	(0.060)	(0.061)
Global norm cascades		
GLOBAL NHRI DENSITY	0.019**	0.016*
	(0.008)	(0.008)
International organizations		
UN ADVICE	1.402***	1.369***
	(0.313)	(0.321)
REGIONAL IO SCORE	0.052**	0.065***
	(0.022)	(0.022)
EU PTA	0.109	0.142
	(0.253)	(0.243)
Domestic political factors		
POLITY IV	0.005	0.009
	(0.023)	(0.023)
POLITICAL TERROR	–0.203	–0.111
	(0.141)	(0.131)
RATIFIED TREATIES	0.120	0.057
	(0.103)	(0.109)
Economic factors		
GDP PER CAPITA	–0.168	–0.200
	(0.147)	(0.143)
Constant	–6.078***	–5.926***
	(1.552)	(1.516)
SHAPE PARAMETER	1.158	1.270
	(0.204)	(0.247)
Number of states	132	137
Number of NHRI laws	76	77
Number of observations	2385	2484
Log likelihood	–90.25	–92.81
Wald χ^2	63.18***	55.33***
Degrees of freedom	12	12
Akaike information criterion	204.50	209.63

Notes: Coefficients are reported. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on state. All independent variables use a one-year lag. *** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .10$, in two-tailed tests.