Colgan and Weeks 2014

**WEB APPENDIX**

TABLE A-1: Revolutionary governments (and year of political overthrow)

Country	Leader	Year	Personalist	Ambig. Revol.
Afghanistan	Taraki	1978	Yes	No
Afghanistan	B. Rabbani	1992	No	No
Afghanistan	Mullah Omar	1996	No	No
Albania	Berisha	1992	No	No
Algeria	Boumedienne	1965	No	No
Argentina	Peron	1946	Yes	Yes
Bangladesh	Ziaur Rahman	1977	Yes	No
Benin	Kerekou	1972	Yes	No
Bolivia	Paz Estenssoro	1952	No	No
Bolivia	Torres	1970	No	Yes
Brazil	Costa de Silva	1967	No	Yes
Bulgaria	Mladenov (Popov)	1989	No	No
Burkina Faso	Sankara	1983	Yes	No
Burkina Faso	Campaore	1987	Yes	Yes
Burundi	Micombero	1966	No	No
Burundi	Bagaza	1976	No	No
Burundi	Buyoya	1987	No	Yes
Cambodia	Pol Pot	1975	Yes	No
Chile	Pinochet	1973	Yes	Yes
China	Chiang Kai-shek	1946	No	No
China	Mao Tse-Tung	1949	Yes	No
Comoros	Soilih	1975	MV	No
Comoros	Abdallah	1978	MV	Yes
Congo	Ngouabi	1969	No	No
Costa Rica	Leon Herrera	1948	No	No
Costa Rica	Figueres Ferrer	1953	No	Yes
Cuba	Castro	1959	Yes	No
Czechoslovakia	Gottwald	1948	No	Yes
Czechoslovakia	Calfa (Havel)	1989	No	No
DR Congo	Mobutu	1965	Yes	No
Egypt	Naguib (Nasser)	1952	Yes	No
El Salvador	Majano Ramos	1979	No	No
Ethiopia	Banti (Mengistu)	1974	Varied	No
Ethiopia	Meles Zenawi	1991	No	No
Fiji	Rabuka	1987	MV	Yes
Ghana	Rawlings	1981	Yes	Yes
Greece	Papadopoulos	1967	No	Yes
Guatemala	Castillo Armas	1954	Yes	No
Guinea	Conte	1984	Yes	No
Guinea-Bissau	Vieira	1980	Yes	No

Country	Leader	Year	Personalist	Ambig. Rev.
Hungary	Szuros (Antall)	1989	No	No
Iran	Khomeini	1979	Varied	No
Iraq	Karrim Kassem	1958	Yes	No
Iraq	Salem Aref	1963	Yes	No
Iraq	Al-Bakr (Hussein)	1968	Yes	No
Laos	Phomivan	1975	No	No
Liberia	Doe	1980	Yes	Yes
Libya	Qaddafi	1969	Yes	No
Madagascar	Ratsiraka	1975	Yes	No
Madagascar	Zafy	1993	No	Yes
Mali	Traore	1968	Yes	Yes
Mauritania	Ould Haidalla	1980	Yes	No
Myanmar	Ne Win	1962	Yes	No
Myanmar	Saw Maung (Shwe)	1988	No	No
Nicaragua	Daniel Ortega	1979	No	No
Pakistan	Ayub Khan	1958	Yes	No
Pakistan	Zia	1977	Yes	No
Panama	Torrijos Herrera	1968	Yes	Yes
Peru	Velasco Alvarado	1968	No	No
Poland	Walesa	1990	No	No
Romania	Roman (Ion Iliescu)	1989	No	Yes
Russia	Yeltsin	1991	No	No
Somalia	Siad Barre	1969	Yes	No
South Korea	Hee Park	1961	No	Yes
Sudan	Nimeiri	1969	Yes	Yes
Sudan	Al-Bashir	1989	Varied	No
Syria	Al-Hafiz	1963	Yes	Yes
Thailand	Pibulsongkram	1946	Varied	No
Thailand	Sarit	1958	No	Yes
Uganda	Amin	1971	Yes	Yes
Uganda	Museveni	1986	Yes	Yes
Venezuela	Hugo Chavez	1999	Varied	No
Yemen AR	Al-Sallal	1962	No	No
Yemen PR	Ali Rubayyi	1969	No	No
Yugoslavia	Milosevic	1989	Yes	No
Zimbabwe	Mugabe	1980	Yes	Yes

FIGURE A-1: Total conflict initiation as a function of a revolutionary personalist leader's tenure in office

Notes:
1. Unit of analysis is a leader (e.g., Mao counts as one observation).
2. Sample includes only leaders coded as revolutionary personalists. (A graph based on revolutionary non-personalists is very similar. The key point is that total conflict initiation increases as a function of a leader's time in office, not that there is any difference between personalists and non-personalists in this respect.)
3. Figure A-1 shows the relationship between the total number of MIDs initiated by individual revolutionary personalist leaders and the total length of their tenure. (See also Table A-2) We do not claim that the *rate* of conflict initiation increases as a leader's tenure increases, in which case the relationship would look hyperbolic rather than linear. The graph simply shows that when personalist revolutionary leaders survive in office for long periods of time, the result is a greater aggregate number of MIDs in the post-revolutionary period.

TABLE A-2: MIDs initiated by year since a revolution (personalist regimes only)

Years Since Revolution	Avg. MIDs Initiated
0	0.58
1	0.44
2	0.53
3	0.54
4	0.60
5	0.73
6	1.15
7	0.79
8	1.42
9	0.59

Notes:
1. Unit of observation is the state-year.

Additional Robustness Tests
(beyond those reported in Tables 1-4 of paper)

Note: Except where otherwise noted, all models are estimated using a logit model with standard errors clustered by directed-dyad, and include additional control variables: cubic splines to control for temporal interdependence; whether or not the two states are geographically contiguous; the major power status of each state in the dyad; the initiator's share of military capabilities; the two states' similarity of alliance portfolio; and each state's similarity of alliance portfolio with the system leader. All regime predictor variables are lagged by one year. Unit of analysis is the directed dyad-year.

Part 1: Additional Robustness Checks for Table 1

Table A.1.1: Use Only the Weeks (2012) Personalism Data

	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 1.3 All MIDs, Unamb Revs Only	Model 1.4 Fatal MIDs, Unamb Revs Only
Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	1.14***[a]	1.41***[b]	1.17***[c]	1.33***[d]
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Post-Revolution Period, Not Personalist Regime	0.64***[a]	0.84***[b]	0.63***[c]	0.86***[d]
	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.24)
Not Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.68***	0.95***	0.69***	0.98***
	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.32***	6.75**	6.31***	6.63**
	(1.57)	(2.92)	(1.57)	(2.94)
Military Capabilities Side B	4.17***	2.97	4.14***	3.00
	(1.58)	(2.88)	(1.59)	(2.90)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-25.20**	-136.84***	-25.60**	-136.58***
	(12.13)	(41.73)	(12.15)	(41.96)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.24	0.26	0.23	0.28
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.20	0.46**	0.20	0.45**
	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.19)
Distance between capitals	-0.26***	-0.37***	-0.26***	-0.37***
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.12)
Constant	-2.57***	-2.93***	-2.55***	-2.90***
	(0.63)	(1.02)	(0.63)	(1.01)
Observations	668,006	668,006	668,006	668,006

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0056
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.0177
[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0097
[d] Wald test: different at p<0.0765

Table A.1.2: Use Alternative Time Cutoffs for the Post-Revolutionary Period

	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs
	8 Years		12 Years	
Post Revolution Period Personalist Regime	1.26*** [a]	1.48*** [b]	1.01*** [c]	1.27*** [d]
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Post Revolution Period, Not Personalist Regime	0.61*** [a]	0.87*** [b]	0.44*** [c]	0.67*** [d]
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.19)
Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.69***	0.85***	0.49***	0.71***
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.54***	8.23***	6.22***	7.80***
	(1.47)	(2.59)	(1.46)	(2.58)
Military Capabilities Side B	5.76***	4.64*	5.81***	4.68
	(1.53)	(2.82)	(1.55)	(2.85)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-23.24**	-110.62***	-24.99**	-113.61***
	(10.85)	(35.74)	(11.03)	(36.22)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.16	0.20	0.18	0.21
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.37**	0.59***	0.38***	0.59***
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Distance between capitals	-0.33***	-0.43***	-0.33***	-0.42***
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Constant	-2.11***	-2.49**	-2.04***	-2.44**
	(0.73)	(1.17)	(0.72)	(1.15)
Observations	804,434	804,434	804,434	804,434

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0003
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.0117
[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0004
[d] Wald test: different at p<0.0062

Table A.1.3: Drop Trade, Use Alternative Measure of Trade Dependence

	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs
	Drop Trade		Trade Dependence Side A	
Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	1.18***[a]	1.46***[b]	1.15***[c]	1.43***[d]
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Post-Revolution Period, Not Personalist Regime	0.56***[a]	0.79***[b]	0.61***[c]	0.91***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.20)
Not Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.68***	0.86***	0.74***	0.95***
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Military Capabilities Side A	4.49***	6.19***	6.74***	8.59***
	(1.23)	(1.99)	(1.47)	(2.52)
Military Capabilities Side B	4.98***	4.37*	6.04***	5.18*
	(1.36)	(2.31)	(1.55)	(2.72)
Trade Dependence, Side A			0.61	0.26
			(0.46)	(1.87)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.19	0.28*	0.17	0.22
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.41***	0.72***	0.39***	0.66***
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Distance between capitals	-0.30***	-0.36***	-0.32***	-0.40***
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Constant	-2.36***	-2.90***	-2.13***	-2.61**
	(0.68)	(1.01)	(0.71)	(1.10)
Observations	828,163	828,163	804,276	804,276

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

[a] Wald test: different at $p<0.0001$
[b] Wald test: different at $p<0.0023$
[c] Wald test: different at $p<0.0008$
[d] Wald test: different at $p<0.0169$

Table A.1.4: Use Alternative Civil War Threshold, Control for Polity Scores

	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs
	Lower Civil War Threshold		Control for Polity Scores	
Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	1.02***[a]	1.24***[b]	1.08***[c]	1.48***[d]
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Post-Revolution Period, Not Personalist Regime	0.53***[a]	0.77***[b]	0.57***[c]	0.91***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.19)
Not Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.69***	0.86***	0.65***	0.96***
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.55***	7.85***	6.43***	8.40***
	(1.41)	(2.49)	(1.46)	(2.52)
Military Capabilities Side B	6.12***	4.62*	5.63***	4.69*
	(1.48)	(2.77)	(1.52)	(2.75)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-17.95*	-97.22***	-22.45**	-119.01***
	(10.02)	(33.56)	(11.00)	(40.21)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A – Lower Threshold	0.49***	0.55***		
	(0.10)	(0.14)		
Civil War Ongoing, Side B – Lower Threshold	0.53***	0.68***		
	(0.10)	(0.15)		
Civil War Ongoing, Side A			0.19	0.18
			(0.14)	(0.19)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A			0.39***	0.61***
			(0.15)	(0.18)
Polity Score, Side A			-0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Distance between Capitals	-0.33***	-0.43***	-0.34***	-0.44***
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Constant	-2.31***	-2.69**	-2.01***	-2.40**
	(0.73)	(1.20)	(0.73)	(1.21)
Observations	804,434	804,434	771,937	771,937

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0019
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.0306
[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0015
[d] Wald test: different at p<0.0139

Table A.1.5: Control for Region, Use Alternative Personalism Threshold

	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs
	Control for Region		Alternate Personalism Threshold[1]	
Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.95***[a]	1.08***[b]	1.10***[c]	1.33***[d]
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Post-Revolution Period, Not Personalist Regime	0.57***[a]	0.87***[b]	0.56***[c]	0.83***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Not Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.63***	0.72***	0.67***	0.79***
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.15***	8.01***	6.51***	8.15***
	(1.60)	(2.76)	(1.45)	(2.54)
Military Capabilities Side B	5.28***	3.29	5.80***	4.73*
	(1.53)	(2.93)	(1.52)	(2.81)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-18.90*	-78.93***	-23.43**	-111.63***
	(10.02)	(29.59)	(10.91)	(36.05)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.01	-0.02	0.16	0.19
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.33**	0.57***	0.37***	0.60***
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Distance between Capitals	-0.33***	-0.45***	-0.33***	-0.42***
	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Europe	-0.11	-0.25		
	(0.17)	(0.27)		
Middle East	0.83***	1.29***		
	(0.16)	(0.24)		
Africa	-0.11	0.36		
	(0.16)	(0.23)		
Asia & Oceania	0.36**	0.79***		
	(0.18)	(0.25)		
Constant	-2.28***	-2.69**	-2.17***	-2.58**
	(0.78)	(1.37)	(0.72)	(1.15)
Observations	804,434	804,434	804,434	804,434

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0142
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.3213
[c] Wald test: different at p< 0.0008
[d] Wald test: different at p< 0.0249

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[1] Uses same measure of personalism as main tests, except includes states as personalist if their personalism score equals .50.

Table A.1.6: Drop USSR, China, & Iran, Exclude Tanker Wars, Analyze Deadly MIDs

	Model 1.1 All MIDs Drop USSR, China, & Iran	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 1.1 All MIDs Exclude Tanker Wars[2]	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs Only MIDs > 25 Deaths
Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.96***[a]	1.39***[b]	1.06***[c]	1.49***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.18)
Post-Revolution Period, Not Personalist Regime	0.55***[a]	0.84***[b]	0.57***[c]	1.00***[d]
	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.22)
Not Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.80***	0.90***	0.70***	0.94***
	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Military Capabilities Side A	7.06***	8.14***	6.37***	7.94***
	(1.39)	(1.82)	(1.47)	(2.64)
Military Capabilities Side B	7.37***	5.65	6.16***	3.84
	(1.81)	(3.57)	(1.54)	(2.83)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-34.81***	-125.14***	-23.41**	-112.13***
	(13.31)	(38.62)	(10.99)	(39.43)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.35***	0.31*	0.18	-0.20
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.22)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.22	0.42**	0.37**	0.70***
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Distance between Capitals	-0.54***	-0.56***	-0.33***	-0.42***
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Constant	-0.66	-1.60	-2.13***	-2.95**
	(1.01)	(1.14)	(0.72)	(1.30)
Observations	787,349	787,349	804,434	804,434

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

[a] Wald test: different at $p<0.0156$
[b] Wald test: different at $p<0.0181$
[c] Wald test: different at $p<0.0019$
[d] Wald test: different at $p<0.0444$

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[2] List of tanker wars compiled by authors. Not relevant for fatal MIDs since almost no tanker MIDs resulted in fatalities.

Table A.1.7: Drop Founding Leaders, Drop First 3 Years After Revolution

	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs
	Drop Founding Leaders		Drop First 3 Years After Revolution	
Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	1.08***[a]	1.40***[b]	1.16***[c]	1.36***[d]
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Post-Revolution Period, Not Personalist Regime	0.53***[a]	0.84***[b]	0.64***[c]	0.95***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Not Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.65***	0.84***	0.71***	0.88***
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.01***	7.74***	6.55***	8.49***
	(1.40)	(2.43)	(1.47)	(2.64)
Military Capabilities Side B	5.47***	3.26	5.73***	5.08*
	(1.61)	(3.25)	(1.55)	(2.95)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-35.64***	-126.89***	-24.23**	-126.12***
	(11.20)	(41.42)	(11.48)	(38.49)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.04	0.10	0.14	0.20
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.19)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.32**	0.52**	0.38***	0.62***
	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Distance between Capitals	-0.32***	-0.51***	-0.34***	-0.45***
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Constant	-2.12***	-1.80	-2.08***	-2.36*
	(0.71)	(1.51)	(0.71)	(1.21)
Observations	702,804	702,804	778,386	778,386

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0005
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.0093
[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0023
[d] Wald test: different at p<0.0824

Table A.1.8: Use Time Polynomials Rather than Cubic Splines to Control for Temporal Dependence

	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 1.1 All MIDs, Unamb Revs Only	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs, Unamb Revs Only
Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	1.16*** [a]	1.40*** [b]	1.17*** [c]	1.33*** [d]
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Post-Revolution Period, Not Personalist Regime	0.58*** [a]	0.84*** [b]	0.59*** [c]	0.90*** [d]
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.22)
Not Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.70***	0.85***	0.71***	0.89***
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.56***	8.04***	6.56***	7.90***
	(1.45)	(2.58)	(1.45)	(2.60)
Military Capabilities Side B	5.84***	4.73*	5.83***	4.81*
	(1.54)	(2.84)	(1.55)	(2.86)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-24.66**	-116.12***	-24.87**	-115.43***
	(11.02)	(37.16)	(11.01)	(37.25)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.16	0.19	0.15	0.20
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.35**	0.56***	0.35**	0.54***
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.19)
Distance between Capitals	-0.33***	-0.43***	-0.33***	-0.43***
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Constant	-2.48***	-2.89**	-2.47***	-2.88**
	(0.73)	(1.16)	(0.73)	(1.16)
Observations	804,434	804,434	804,434	804,434

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0004
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.0124
[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0015
[d] Wald test: different at p<0.0855

Table A.1.9: Control for Previous Experiences with Democracy

	Model 1.1 All MIDs	Model 1.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 1.3 All MIDs	Model 1.4 Fatal MIDs
	Number of Prior Years of Democracy		Number of Prior Democratic Spells	
Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	1.19***[a]	1.50***[b]	1.14***[c]	1.39***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Post-Revolution Period, Not Personalist Regime	0.67***[a]	0.98***[b]	0.63***[c]	0.89***[d]
	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Not Post-Revolution Period, Personalist Regime	0.70***	1.02***	0.65***	0.91***
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Previous Experience with Democracy	0.00**	0.01***	0.01	0.09
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Military Capabilities Side A	5.20***	6.71**	6.49***	10.06***
	(1.59)	(2.66)	(1.56)	(2.72)
Military Capabilities Side B	5.24***	3.42	5.05***	2.82
	(1.68)	(3.07)	(1.70)	(3.08)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-28.89**	-122.58***	-25.05**	-105.62***
	(12.78)	(37.98)	(11.41)	(34.49)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.12
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.37**	0.52***	0.37**	0.52***
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Distance between capitals	-0.38***	-0.41***	-0.37***	-0.39***
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Constant	-1.93**	-2.94**	-1.91**	-2.91**
	(0.86)	(1.15)	(0.87)	(1.17)
Observations	789,376	789,376	789,376	789,376

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

[a] Wald test: different at $p<0.0014$
[b] Wald test: different at $p<0.0220$
[c] Wald test: different at $p<0.0018$
[d] Wald test: different at $p<0.0263$

Table A.3.1: Use Only the Weeks (2012) Personalism Data

	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 3.3 All MIDs, Unamb Revs Only	Model 3.4 Fatal MIDs, Unamb Revs Only
Revolutionary Personalist Leader	1.08***[a]	1.34***[b]	1.10***[c]	1.32***[d]
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Revolutionary Non-Personalist Leader	0.78***[a]	0.85***[b]	0.75***[c]	0.90***[d]
	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.25)
Non-Revolutionary Personalist Leader	0.55***	0.75***	0.55***	0.82***
	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.19)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.42***	6.81**	6.37***	6.69**
	(1.59)	(2.98)	(1.59)	(2.99)
Military Capabilities Side B	4.20***	3.05	4.14**	2.95
	(1.61)	(2.91)	(1.62)	(2.94)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-24.26**	-133.16***	-24.95**	-133.90***
	(11.98)	(41.03)	(12.01)	(41.41)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.26*	0.30	0.26*	0.30
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.17	0.41**	0.17	0.42**
	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Distance between capitals	-0.26***	-0.37***	-0.26***	-0.37***
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.12)
Constant	-2.58***	-2.89***	-2.54***	-2.85***
	(0.63)	(1.01)	(0.63)	(1.01)
Observations	668,006	668,006	668,006	668,006

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

[a] Wald test: different at $p<0.0606$
[b] Wald test: different at $p<0.0260$
[c] Wald test: different at $p<0.0539$
[d] Wald test: different at $p<0.1048$

Table A.3.2: Drop Trade and Use Alternative Measure of Trade Dependence

	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs
	Drop Trade		Trade Dependence, Side A	
Revolutionary Personalist Leader	1.13***[a]	1.29***[b]	1.23***[c]	1.40***[d]
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Revolutionary Non-Personalist Leader	0.67***[a]	0.77***[b]	0.77***[c]	0.95***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.20)
Non-Revolutionary Personalist Leader	0.51***	0.76***	0.52***	0.77***
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Military Capabilities Side A	4.42***	5.97***	6.85***	8.52***
	(1.27)	(2.10)	(1.48)	(2.58)
Military Capabilities Side B	4.89***	4.31*	5.95***	5.14*
	(1.38)	(2.33)	(1.58)	(2.74)
Trade Dependence, Side A			0.64	0.30
			(0.47)	(1.77)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.22*	0.36**	0.16	0.25
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.38***	0.68***	0.37***	0.62***
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Distance between capitals	-0.29***	-0.36***	-0.32***	-0.39***
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Constant	-2.38***	-2.91***	-2.14***	-2.57**
	(0.68)	(1.01)	(0.71)	(1.10)
Observations	828,163	828,163	804,276	804,276

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0012
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.0184
[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0011
[d] Wald test: different at p<0.0325

Table A.3.3: Use Alternative Civil War Threshold, Control for Polity Scores

	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs
	Lower Civil War Threshold		Control for Polity Scores	
Revolutionary Personalist Leader	1.11***[a]	1.22***[b]	1.16***[c]	1.46***[d]
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Revolutionary Non-Personalist Leader	0.65*** [a]	0.76***[b]	0.71***[c]	0.96***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Non-Revolutionary Personalist Leader	0.49***	0.71***	0.46***	0.81***
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.63***	7.75***	6.58***	8.38***
	(1.42)	(2.52)	(1.48)	(2.57)
Military Capabilities Side B	6.02***	4.54	5.59***	4.69*
	(1.51)	(2.80)	(1.55)	(2.77)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-17.79*	-95.54***	-22.13**	-116.23***
	(10.00)	(33.01)	(10.95)	(39.35)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A – Lower Threshold	0.45***	0.53***		
	(0.10)	(0.14)		
Civil War Ongoing, Side A – Lower Threshold	0.50***	0.65***		
	(0.10)	(0.15)		
Civil War Ongoing, Side A			0.18	0.20
			(0.14)	(0.19)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B			0.37**	0.58***
			(0.15)	(0.19)
Polity Score, Side A			-0.00	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Distance between capitals	-0.32***	-0.42***	-0.33***	-0.44***
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Constant	-2.31***	-2.66**	-2.02***	-2.37**
	(0.73)	(1.20)	(0.73)	(1.21)
Observations	804,434	804,434	771,937	771,937

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0011
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.0256
[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0013
[d] Wald test: different at p<0.0181

Table A.3.4: Control for Region, Use Alternate Personalism Threshold

	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs
	Control for Region		Alternate Personalism Threshold[3]	
Revolutionary Personalist Leader	1.03***[a]	1.04***[b]	1.16***[c]	1.27***[d]
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Revolutionary Non-Personalist Leader	0.61*** [a]	0.73***[b]	0.77***[c]	0.95***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Non-Revolutionary Personalist Leader	0.44***	0.59***	0.46***	0.63***
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.30***	7.90***	6.61***	8.11***
	(1.60)	(2.79)	(1.47)	(2.62)
Military Capabilities Side B	5.19***	3.19	5.74***	4.70*
	(1.55)	(2.95)	(1.56)	(2.83)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-19.10*	-78.62***	-22.40**	-107.16***
	(10.03)	(29.33)	(10.73)	(35.09)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.03	0.03	0.15	0.22
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.32**	0.54***	0.35**	0.57***
	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Distance between capitals	-0.32***	-0.45***	-0.32***	-0.42***
	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Europe	-0.09	-0.24		
	(0.17)	(0.27)		
Middle East	0.74***	1.21***		
	(0.16)	(0.24)		
Africa	-0.13	0.33		
	(0.16)	(0.23)		
Asia & Oceania	0.36**	0.77***		
	(0.18)	(0.24)		
Constant	-2.26***	-2.59*	-2.17***	-2.53**
	(0.78)	(1.36)	(0.72)	(1.14)
Observations	804,434	804,434	804,434	804,434

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0021

[b] Wald test: different at p<0.1207

[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0093

[d] Wald test: different at p<0.1439

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[3] Uses same measure of personalism as main tests, except includes states as personalist if their personalism score equals .50.

Table A.3.5: Drop USSR, China, & Iran, Exclude Tanker Wars, Analyze Deadly MIDs

	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs
	Drop USSR, China, & Iran		Exclude Tanker Wars[4]	Only MIDs > 25 Deaths
Revolutionary Personalist Leader	1.26***[a]	1.44***[b]	1.06***[c]	1.47***[d]
	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Revolutionary Non-Personalist Leader	0.71***[a]	0.93***[b]	0.70***[c]	1.00***[d]
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.22)
Non-Revolutionary Personalist Leader	0.55***	0.74***	0.50***	0.66***
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.17)
Military Capabilities Side A	7.05***	8.12***	6.32***	7.83***
	(1.38)	(1.82)	(1.47)	(2.70)
Military Capabilities Side B	7.42***	6.01*	6.28***	3.75
	(1.82)	(3.48)	(1.59)	(2.85)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-34.06**	-119.31***	-23.40**	-107.39***
	(13.23)	(37.11)	(11.21)	(38.14)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.29**	0.28	0.21	-0.17
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.20	0.38**	0.34**	0.67***
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Distance between capitals	-0.53***	-0.56***	-0.33***	-0.41***
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.16)
Constant	-0.69	-1.58	-2.06***	-2.90**
	(1.00)	(1.14)	(0.73)	(1.31)
Observations	787,349	787,349	794,931	804,434

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0002
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.0179
[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0155
[d] Wald test: different at p<0.0406

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[4] List of tanker wars compiled by authors. Not relevant for fatal MIDs since almost no tanker MIDs resulted in fatalities.

Table A.3.6: Drop Founding Leaders, Drop First 3 Years After Revolution

	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs
	Drop Founding Leaders		Drop First 3 Years After Revolution	
Revolutionary Personalist Leader	1.17***[a]	1.36***[b]	1.23***[c]	1.35***[d]
	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Revolutionary Non-Personalist Leader	0.68***[a]	0.87***[b]	0.84***[c]	0.99***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Non-Revolutionary Personalist Leader	0.25**	0.48***	0.47***	0.68***
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.17)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.15***	7.67***	6.67***	8.54***
	(1.40)	(2.46)	(1.48)	(2.69)
Military Capabilities Side B	5.33***	3.08	5.65***	4.99*
	(1.65)	(3.23)	(1.59)	(2.96)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-35.47***	-124.02***	-23.38**	-121.78***
	(11.21)	(40.71)	(11.36)	(37.57)
Civil War Ongoing Side A	0.03	0.14	0.13	0.22
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Civil War Ongoing Side B	0.30*	0.48**	0.36**	0.58***
	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Distance between Capitals	-0.32***	-0.51***	-0.33***	-0.45***
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Constant	-2.12***	-1.73	-2.09***	-2.32*
	(0.71)	(1.51)	(0.71)	(1.21)
Observations	702,804	702,804	778,386	778,386

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0005
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.0159
[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0067
[d] Wald test: different at p<0.1022

Table A.3.7: Use Time Polynomials Rather than Cubic Splines to Control for Temporal Dependence

	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 3.3 All MIDs, Unamb Revs Only	Model 3.4 Fatal MIDs, Unamb Revs Only
Revolutionary Personalist Leader	1.22***[a]	1.35***[b]	1.24***[c]	1.30***[d]
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Revolutionary Non-Personalist Leader	0.74***[a]	0.87***[b]	0.69***[c]	0.90***[d]
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.23)
Non-Revolutionary Personalist Leader	0.47***	0.66***	0.51***	0.76***
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Military Capabilities Side A	6.63***	7.90***	6.58***	7.98***
	(1.47)	(2.65)	(1.49)	(2.67)
Military Capabilities Side B	5.74***	4.69	5.66***	4.58
	(1.57)	(2.85)	(1.58)	(2.87)
Lower Trade Dependence in Dyad	-23.82**	-112.21***	-22.57**	-106.66***
	(10.90)	(36.31)	(10.69)	(35.32)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.15	0.22	0.14	0.21
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.33**	0.52***	0.34**	0.56***
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Distance between Capitals	-0.32***	-0.42***	-0.32***	-0.42***
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Constant	-2.48***	-2.85**	-2.10***	-2.44**
	(0.73)	(1.16)	(0.72)	(1.16)
Observations	804,434	804,434	804,434	804,434

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[a] Wald test: different at p<0.0007
[b] Wald test: different at p<0.0227
[c] Wald test: different at p<0.0005
[d] Wald test: different at p<0.0900

Table A.3.8: Control for Previous Experiences with Democracy

	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs	Model 3.1 All MIDs	Model 3.2 Fatal MIDs
	Number of Prior Years of Democracy		Number of Prior Democratic Spells	
Revolutionary	1.19***[a]	1.51***[b]	1.13***[c]	1.38***[d]
Personalist Leader	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.17)
Revolutionary	0.84***[a]	1.02***[b]	0.79***[c]	0.92***[d]
Non-Personalist Leader	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Non-Revolutionary	0.59***	0.85***	0.54***	0.74***
Personalist Leader	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.17)
Previous Experience with	0.00**	0.01***	0.01	0.07
Democracy	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Military Capabilities Side A	4.96***	6.48**	6.35***	9.87***
	(1.61)	(2.74)	(1.58)	(2.81)
Military Capabilities Side B	5.26***	3.60	5.05***	2.94
	(1.71)	(3.12)	(1.72)	(3.14)
Lower Trade Dependence in	-28.14	-117.67***	-23.99**	-100.86***
Dyad	(12.69)**	(36.65)	(11.23)	(33.27)
Civil War Ongoing, Side A	0.20	0.17	0.19	0.15
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Civil War Ongoing, Side B	0.34**	0.48**	0.35**	0.49**
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.19)
Distance between capitals	-0.38***	-0.41***	-0.37***	-0.39***
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Constant	-1.94**	-2.92**	-1.92**	-2.87**
	(0.85)	(1.15)	(0.86)	(1.17)
Observations	833,287	833,287	833,287	833,287

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

[a] Wald test: different at $p<0.0154$
[b] Wald test: different at $p<0.0212$
[c] Wald test: different at $p<0.0210$
[d] Wald test: different at $p<0.0311$