

APPENDIX

Compositional Data Analysis

This section provides a brief discussion of the statistical implications of using a proportional outcome measure, which requires compositional data analysis. For any donor-recipient dyad the aid channel share is positive and the sum of the aid channels shares must be one hundred percent. Consider the aid share A , in donor-recipient dyad i for channel j . The compositional nature of the variable is expressed by the constraints that the fraction of the aid share that government-to-government or non-state channels might receive is doubly bounded, falling between 0 and 1,

$$A_{i,j} \in [0, 1] \quad \forall i, j, \quad (1)$$

with $A_{i,j}$ denoting the fraction of the aid in donor-recipient dyad i ($i=1, \dots, N$) for delivery channel j ($j=1, J$). Government-to-government aid and non-state aid in a given donor-recipient dyad sums to unity,

$$\sum_{j=1}^J A_{ij} = 1 \quad \forall i, j, \quad (2)$$

where J is the total number of delivery channels, which equal 2 (government-to-government and non-state aid) in my case.

Following Aitchison (1986), I create a $(J - 1)$ log aid ratio, which compares the non-state aid to government-to-government aid:

$$Y_{i1} = \ln(A_{i1}/A_{i2}) = \ln(A_{i1}/(1 - A_{i1})) \quad (3)$$

The advantage of log transforming proportional outcomes is that the outcome is unconstrained, allowing for a straightforward estimation through OLS. The coefficient of the log-transformed non-state share variable then describes how the log ratio of non-state aid changes with respect to government-to-government aid. After modeling, the estimates are transformed back into their original scale of interest:

$$A_{i1} = (1 + e^{-Y_{i1}})^{-1}. \quad (4)$$

and Y is log-transformed following the steps (1) through (4) above.




Figure 1: *Domestic Government Outsourcing Across Individual Donors.* Expenditures on government outsourcing to non-state actors for goods and services used by the government as percentage of government spending (excluding transfers) across donor countries in 2009. Source: OECD National Accounts Database (2011), and authors' calculation.




Figure 2: *Histogram, Quality of Recipient Governance*

Variable	Observations	Mean	St. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Bypass (log-transf)	8760	.80	7.56	-20.00	18.66
Lagged Bypass (log-transf)	8760	0.50	7.69	-20.00	13.33
Governance	8760	1.92	0.62	.04	3.87
LME	8760	0.41	0.49	0	1
LME*Recipient Governance	8760	0.79	1.02	0	3.87
CME	8760	0.44	0.49	0	1
CME*Recipient Governance	8760	0.84	1.04	0	3.87
Major Power	8760	.27	.44	0	1
Democracy	8760	-4.14	1.66	-7	-1
Log(Disaster Deaths)	8760	2.06	3.38	-2.31	12.34
Civil Conflict	8760	.17	.38	0	1
Log(Distance)	8760	8.30	.58	5.72	9.41
Former Colony	8760	.66	.47	0	1
Log(Trade Intensity)	8760	3.90	3.51	-27.63	13.07
Security Council	8760	.05	.27	0	1
Log(Total Aid)	8760	-15.49	2.75	-26.31	-6.65
Log(Democracy Aid)	8760	-9.46	12.91	-27.63	7.87
Log(Social Sector Aid)	8760	-6.64	11.74	-27.63	7.09

Table 1: *Descriptive Statistic of Estimation Sample; Table 1 Model 4*

	Model 1 Table 1, M4	Model 2 Table 1, M6	Model 3 Table 1, M8
LMEs*Rec Gov	-0.53* (0.25)		
CMEs*Rec Gov	0.30 (0.25)		
Neoliberal*Rec Gov		-0.40 (0.29)	
Scandinavian*Rec Gov		-0.70* (0.32)	
Statist*Rec Gov		0.28 (0.29)	
Neocorporatist*Rec Gov		0.32 (0.28)	
Govt Outsourcing/GDP*Rec Gov			-0.10** 0.03
N	8760	8760	8760

Table 2: *Donor Political Economy and Bypassing Governments in Aid-Receiving Countries, 2005-2011; Three-Way-Fixed Effects (donor, recipient, year)*. $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$. Only interaction coefficients reported. Model 1 adds donor fixed effects to Table 1 Model 4, which estimates results based on binary political economy division. Model 2 adds donor fixed effects to Table 1 Model 6, which estimates results based on four-fold political economy division. Model 3 adds donor fixed effects to Table 1 Model 8, which estimates results based on the domestic outsourcing measure.




Figure 3: *Plots of Interaction Coefficients of Three-Way Fixed Effects Political Economy Type Models, Appendix Table 2, Models 1 and 2.* Left panel: plot based on Appendix Table 2, Model 1 (binary political economy division); Right panel: plot based on Appendix Table 1, Model 2 (four-fold political economy typology) Sources: OECD CRS Database (2013), and authors' calculation.




Figure 4: *Plots of Interaction Coefficients of Three-Way Fixed Effects Government Outsourcing Model, Appendix Table 2, Model 3. Plot based on Appendix Table 2, Model 3. Sources: OECD CRS Database (2013), and authors' calculation.*

	Model 1	Model 2
Lagged Bypass		0.529** (0.01)
Recipient Governance	0.772 (0.94)	0.005 (0.93)
Govt Outsourcing/Govt Expenditure	0.081** (0.03)	0.041** (0.01)
Govt Outsourcing/Govt Expenditure*Gov	-0.020 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
Democracy	-0.240 (0.29)	-0.193 (0.29)
Natural Disaster Deaths	-0.008 (0.03)	-0.020 (0.03)
Civil Conflict	0.175 (0.29)	-0.062 (0.28)
Distance	-0.879** (0.23)	-0.701** (0.16)
Former Colony	2.789** (0.71)	1.366** (0.68)
Trade Intensity	-0.264** (0.06)	-0.130** (0.04)
Security Council	-0.197 (0.29)	-0.136 (0.21)
Major Power	-2.552** (0.22)	-0.837** (0.17)
Total Aid per capita	-0.098** (0.02)	-0.013 (0.05)
Democracy Aid	0.042** (0.01)	0.006 (0.01)
Social Sector Aid	-0.047** (0.01)	-0.019** (0.01)
R squared	0.189	0.432
N	10605	8760

Table 3: *Donor Government Outsourcing as % of Gov't Spending and Bypassing Governments in Aid-Receiving Countries, 2005-2011.* + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Constant (all columns) not reported; two-way year and recipient country fixed effects (Models 1 and 2); lagged bypass (Model 2).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Lagged Bypass		0.475** (0.02)		0.508** (0.02)
Recipient Governance	1.228 (1.03)	0.125 (1.13)	0.284 (0.91)	-0.203 (0.93)
LMEs*Rec Gov	-0.653 (0.42)	-0.377 (0.35)	-0.641* (0.38)	-0.388 (0.29)
LMEs	6.234** (0.92)	3.852** (0.76)	5.606** (0.84)	3.346** (0.62)
CMEs*Rec Gov	0.457 (0.48)	0.383 (0.37)	0.408 (0.45)	0.243 (0.30)
CMEs	2.206** (0.96)	1.262 (0.76)	1.682* (0.92)	1.023 (0.63)
Democracy	-0.308 (0.29)	-0.392 (0.33)	-0.155 (0.28)	-0.150 (0.28)
Natural Disaster Deaths	0.003 (0.04)	-0.016 (0.04)	-0.001 (0.03)	-0.014 (0.03)
Civil Conflict	0.161 (0.28)	0.023 (0.36)	0.203 (0.28)	-0.038 (0.28)
Distance	-1.398** (0.28)	-1.250** (0.20)	-1.643** (0.25)	-1.185** (0.17)
Former Colony	1.305 (1.47)	0.827 (1.57)	2.236** (0.75)	1.172 (0.72)
Trade Intensity	-0.244** (0.07)	-0.147** (0.05)	-0.283** (0.07)	-0.139** (0.04)
Security Council	-0.304 (0.30)	-0.314 (0.25)	-0.122 (0.30)	-0.134 (0.22)
Number of NGOs	1.776 (5.68)	4.200 (5.46)		
Number of IGOs	-0.586 (1.04)	-0.677 (1.00)		
Number of NGOs and IGOs			3.600** (0.46)	2.310** (0.44)
Major Power	-2.788** (0.22)	-0.794** (0.19)	-2.593** (0.22)	-0.795** (0.16)
Total Aid per capita	-0.140** (0.02)	-0.106** (0.05)	-0.119** (0.02)	-0.085* (0.05)
Democracy Aid	0.022* (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.014 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Social Sector Aid	-0.017 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	-0.026** (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)
R squared	0.223	0.420	0.221	0.441
N	8257	6582	10346	8544

Table 4: *Donor Political Economy and Bypassing Governments in Aid-Receiving Countries, 2005-2011*. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Constant (all columns) not reported; two-way year and recipient fixed effects (Models 1 to 4); lagged bypass variable (Models 2 and 4).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Lagged Bypass			0.506** (0.01)	0.536** (0.01)
Initial Recipient Governance	5.183** (0.67)	-0.049 (0.34)	3.398** (0.63)	-0.182 (0.20)
Recipient Governance	0.337 (0.91)	-1.316** (0.49)	-0.119 (0.94)	-0.661** (0.33)
CMEs*Rec Gov	0.400 (0.44)	0.256 (0.42)	0.263 (0.29)	0.206 (0.27)
CMEs	1.716* (0.89)	1.881** (0.87)	1.004 (0.61)	0.928 (0.56)
LMEs*Rec Gov	-0.751* (0.38)	-0.879** (0.37)	-0.419 (0.28)	-0.406 (0.25)
LMEs	5.884** (0.85)	5.924** (0.83)	3.448** (0.60)	3.114** (0.54)
Democracy	-0.256 (0.29)	-0.157 (0.11)	-0.215 (0.29)	-0.084 (0.06)
Natural Disaster Deaths	-0.009 (0.03)	0.152** (0.04)	-0.023 (0.03)	0.068** (0.02)
Civil Conflict	0.208 (0.27)	0.694** (0.29)	-0.034 (0.28)	0.321* (0.19)
Distance	-1.653** (0.25)	-0.727** (0.22)	-1.206** (0.17)	-0.474** (0.12)
Former Colony	-1.014 (1.15)	0.833** (0.31)	-1.016 (1.08)	0.486** (0.17)
Trade Intensity	-0.289** (0.07)	-0.297** (0.05)	-0.143** (0.04)	-0.134** (0.03)
Security Council	-0.193 (0.29)	0.148 (0.31)	-0.153 (0.21)	0.053 (0.20)
Major Power	-2.573** (0.21)	-3.057** (0.19)	-0.820** (0.16)	-0.991** (0.14)
Total Aid per capita	-0.114** (0.02)	-0.116** (0.02)	-0.076* (0.04)	-0.086** (0.04)
Democracy Aid	0.012 (0.01)	0.025** (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)
Social Sector Aid	-0.029** (0.01)	-0.024** (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.006 (0.01)
R squared	0.221	0.172	0.441	0.425
N	10605	10605	8760	8760

Table 5: *Donor Political Economy and Bypassing Governments in Aid-Receiving Countries, 2005-2011*. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Constant (all columns) not reported; year fixed effects (no recipient fixed effects) in Models 2 and 4; two-way year and recipient fixed effects in Models 1 and 3; lagged bypass variable in Models 3 and 4.




Figure 5: *Marginal Effects of Political Economy Types Across Quality of Recipient Governance, Controlling for Initial Governance Conditions in Recipient Country.* Effects of binary political economy division estimated in Appendix Table A4, Model 3. Stars signal statistical significance at 0.05 level. Sources: OECD CRS Database (2013), and authors' calculation.

Number of Respondents	Agency	Country
4	State Department	United States
4	USAID	United States
2	Millennium Challenge Corporation	United States
1	Treasury	United States
1	Office of Budget and Management	United States
6	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Sweden
7	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	Sweden
5	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	France
4	French Agency for Development	France
3	Ministry of Finance	France
9	Ministry of Development Cooperation	Germany
4	Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW)	Germany
3	Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Japan
2	Japanese International Cooperation Agency	Japan

Table 6: *Survey respondents by agency and country.*