Online Appendix

1 Additional Tables

Table A1: Summary Statistics

	Median	Mean	St. Dev.	St. Dev. w/in Countries	Min.	Max.
Democratization	0	.019	.137	.139	0	1
Authoritarian Breakd.	0	.078	.268	.26	0	1
Democratization after Breakd.	0	.249	.433	.343	0	1
% Dem. neigh. (spatial lag 1)	.167	.218	.257	.189	0	1
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year (spatial lag 1)	0	.004	.076	.076	-1	1
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years (spatial lag 1)	0	.008	.106	.105	-1	1
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years (spatial lag 1)	0	.012	.129	.126	-1	1
% Dem. world	.321	.341	.119	.093	.132	.584
Ch. % dem. world last year	0	.004	.016	.016	-.035	.079
Ch. % dem. world last 2 years	.002	.008	.026	.025	-.057	.101
Ch. % dem. world last 3 years	.005	.011	.035	.037	-.062	.13
% Dem. neigh. (spatial lag 2)	.2	.248	.21	.155	0	1
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year (spatial lag 2)	0	.004	.047	.047	-.455	.667
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years (spatial lag 2)	0	.008	.066	.065	-.5	.667
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years (spatial lag 2)	0	.012	.081	.079	-.5	.667
% Dem. region	.143	.192	.221	.147	0	.9
Ch. % dem. region last year	0	.003	.042	.042	-.333	.5
Ch. % dem. region last 2 years	0	.006	.058	.058	-.5	.5
Ch. % dem. region last 3 years	0	.008	.07	.069	-.5	.5
Ch. # dem. neigh. last year (spatial lag 1)	0	.023	.358	.353	-6	3
Ch. # dem. neigh. last year (spatial lag 2)	0	.081	.772	.762	-13	16
Hegemonic power volatility	.411	.604	.518	.486	.057	3.203
Growth rate	1.025	1.63	5.417	5.161	-33.291	158.606
Growth crisis	0	.331	.471	.393	0	1
Bench. Growth	-.284	-.136	5.304	5.042	-34.306	155.251
Rain dev.	-.08	-.076	1.903	1.833	-12.623	14.508
RR crisis	1	.523	.5	.462	0	1
LV crisis	1	.564	.496	.416	0	1
RR/LV crisis	1	.557	.497	.445	0	1
GDP pc (logged)	7.507	7.609	.788	.407	5.093	10.758
Oil	0	440.786	3132.657	2050.923	0	78588.8
Muslim	1	24.136	37.353	0	0	99.7
Catholic	31	42.55	40.651	0	0	99
Protestant	2	9.42	17.104	0	0	90.6
Ethnic frac.	27	30.875	24.561	0	0	82
Rel. frac.	13	22.849	21.761	0	0	83.5
British Col.	0	.154	.361	0	0	1
# Past Break.	0	.221	.542	.353	0	4
Polarized Order	1	.578	.494	.429	0	1
Democratic Order	0	.192	.394	.367	0	1
Alliance with France	0	.012	.109	.103	0	1
Alliance with Germany	0	.012	.111	.095	0	1
Alliance with Japan	0	.003	.052	.05	0	1
Alliance with Russia/USSR	0	.054	.225	.18	0	1
Alliance with US	0	.134	.341	.274	0	1
Alliance with US (Cold War)	0	.113	.317	.262	0	1
Alliance with UK	0	.019	.135	.128	0	1
Pro-Democratic Hegemonic Shocks	0	.137	.344	.337	0	1

Table A2: Cases of Authoritarian Breakdown — Part I

Ecuador 1875	Iran 1896	Dominican Rep 1914	El Salvador 1931	Paraguay 1948
Uruguay 1875	**Netherlands 1897**	Haiti 1914	Panama 1931	Peru 1948
Bolivia 1876	Spain 1897	Mexico 1914	Peru 1931	Venezuela 1948
Dominican Rep 1876	Uruguay 1897	Peru 1914	Chile 1932	China 1949
Ecuador 1876	El Salvador 1898	Haiti 1915	Ecuador 1932	*Indonesia 1949*
El Salvador 1876	Guatemala 1898	Dominican Rep 1916	*Japan 1932*	Panama 1949
Haiti 1876	Venezuela 1898	*Ethiopia 1916*	*Afghanistan 1933*	Paraguay 1949
Honduras 1876	Bolivia 1899	China 1917	*Cuba 1933*	Syria 1949
Mexico 1876	Dominican Rep 1899	*Costa Rica 1917*	Ecuador 1933	Haiti 1950
Turkey 1876	Venezuela 1899	Greece 1917	Peru 1933	***Pakistan 1950***
Uruguay 1876	Colombia 1900	*Russia 1917*	Austria 1934	**Panama 1950**
Paraguay 1877	**Denmark 1901**	**Germany 1918**	Bolivia 1934	Taiwan 1950
Dominican Rep 1878	*Nepal 1901*	Turkey 1918	**Chile 1934**	Venezuela 1950
Afghanistan 1879	Dominican Rep 1902	*Afghanistan 1919*	*Cuba 1934*	Bolivia 1951
Bolivia 1879	Haiti 1902	*Costa Rica 1919*	Yugoslavia 1934	Iran 1951
Dominican Rep 1879	Paraguay 1902	Honduras 1919	Ecuador 1935	Jordan 1951
Haiti 1879	Dominican Rep 1903	**Italy 1919**	Bolivia 1936	Nepal 1951
Peru 1879	Honduras 1903	*Peru 1919*	Paraguay 1936	Bolivia 1952
Venezuela 1879	Paraguay 1904	Spain 1919	Bolivia 1937	Egypt 1952
Afghanistan 1880	Dominican Rep 1905	**Uruguay 1919**	China 1937	**Japan 1952**
Paraguay 1880	Paraguay 1905	Bolivia 1920	**Colombia 1937**	**Panama 1952**
Peru 1881	***Cuba 1906***	Guatemala 1920	Ecuador 1937	*Afghanistan 1953*
Russia 1881	Ecuador 1906	Mexico 1920	Paraguay 1937	Colombia 1953
Peru 1882	Paraguay 1906	Guatemala 1921	Bolivia 1939	Iran 1953
Uruguay 1882	Honduras 1907	Japan 1921	Spain 1939	Egypt 1954
Ecuador 1883	*Korea 1907*	Paraguay 1921	***Cuba 1940***	Paraguay 1954
Honduras 1883	Haiti 1908	Spain 1921	*Estonia 1940*	Syria 1954
Dominican Rep 1885	Morocco 1908	Greece 1922	*Latvia 1940*	Argentina 1955
El Salvador 1885	Paraguay 1908	***Ireland 1922***	*Lithuania 1940*	**Indonesia 1955**
Guatemala 1885	**Portugal 1908**	Spain 1922	Panama 1941	Haiti 1956
Nepal 1885	Venezuela 1908	China 1923	**Uruguay 1942**	Honduras 1956
Peru 1885	**Chile 1909**	Spain 1923	Argentina 1943	Hungary 1956
United Kingdom 1885	Nicaragua 1909	China 1924	Bolivia 1943	Nicaragua 1956
Uruguay 1886	Turkey 1909	Honduras 1924	**Italy 1943**	**Peru 1956**
Haiti 1888	*Korea 1910*	Ecuador 1925	Ecuador 1944	**Colombia 1957**
Brazil 1889	Nicaragua 1910	Greece 1925	El Salvador 1944	Guatemala 1957
Costa Rica 1889	Dominican Rep 1911	Honduras 1925	**France 1944**	Haiti 1957
Ethiopia 1889	Ecuador 1911	Mongolia 1925	Guatemala 1944	**Honduras 1957**
Haiti 1889	Haiti 1911	China 1926	**Brazil 1945**	Thailand 1957
El Salvador 1890	Honduras 1911	**Greece 1926**	Germany 1945	**Argentina 1958**
Brazil 1891	Mexico 1911	Nicaragua 1926	**Guatemala 1945**	**Guatemala 1958**
Chile 1891	Nicaragua 1911	Chile 1927	Venezuela 1945	*Iraq 1958*
Venezuela 1892	Paraguay 1911	China 1928	Bolivia 1946	Thailand 1958
Honduras 1893	**Sweden 1911**	*Afghanistan 1929*	Haiti 1946	**Venezuela 1958**
Nicaragua 1893	**Argentina 1912**	Bolivia 1930	***Philippines 1946***	*Cuba 1959*
Belgium 1894	Dominican Rep 1912	Brazil 1930	Ecuador 1947	El Salvador 1960
El Salvador 1894	Haiti 1912	Guatemala 1930	Nicaragua 1947	**Korea South 1960**
Honduras 1894	Paraguay 1912	*Japan 1930*	**Costa Rica 1948**	Laos 1960
Paraguay 1894	Spain 1912	Peru 1930	**Ecuador 1948**	***Myanmar 1960***
Peru 1894	El Salvador 1913	Romania 1930	El Salvador 1948	Turkey 1960
Ecuador 1895	Mexico 1913	**Spain 1930**	*Indonesia 1948*	Dominican Rep 1961
Peru 1895	Turkey 1913	Ecuador 1931	Panama 1948	El Salvador 1961

Note: Authoritarian breakdowns resulting in a transition to democracy are shown in **bold**. Authoritarian breakdowns shown in *italic* are omitted from our main regression (Model 1 of Table 5) due to missing data on explanatory variables.

Table A2: Cases of Authoritarian Breakdown — Part II

Syria 1961
Turkey 1961
Dominican Rep 1962
Syria 1962
Yemen North 1962
Argentina 1963
Benin 1963
Dominican Rep 1963
Iraq 1963
Nicaragua 1963
Peru 1963
Syria 1963
Togo 1963
Vietnam South 1963
Benin 1964
Bolivia 1964
Gabon 1964
Laos 1964
Sudan 1964
Vietnam South 1964
Algeria 1965
Benin 1965
Congo Kinshasa 1965
Dominican Rep 1965
Vietnam South 1965
Burkina Faso 1966
Burundi 1966
Central Afr. Rep 1966
Ecuador 1966
Ghana 1966
Guatemala 1966
Indonesia 1966
South Africa 1966
Syria 1966
Benin 1967
Togo 1967
Yemen North 1967
Benin 1968
Congo Brazzaville 1968
Czechoslovakia 1968
Iraq 1968
Mali 1968
Sierra Leone 1968
Benin 1969
Bolivia 1969
Brazil 1969
Libya 1969
Yemen South 1969
Argentina 1970
Bolivia 1970
Ghana 1970

Oman 1970
Poland 1970
Syria 1970
Argentina 1971
Bolivia 1971
Honduras 1971
Lebanon 1971
Sudan 1971
Uganda 1971
Benin 1972
Ecuador 1972
Gambia 1972
Madagascar 1972
Qatar 1972
Afghanistan 1973
Argentina 1973
Greece 1973
Rwanda 1973
Thailand 1973
Burkina Faso 1974
Cyprus 1974
Greece 1974
Niger 1974
Portugal 1974
Yemen North 1974
Bangladesh 1975
Chad 1975
Honduras 1975
Laos 1975
Madagascar 1975
Nigeria 1975
Peru 1975
Saudi Arabia 1975
Thailand 1975
Vietnam South 1975
Burundi 1976
Ecuador 1976
Nigeria 1976
Portugal 1976
Uruguay 1976
Congo Brazzaville 1977
Spain 1977
Thailand 1977
Yemen North 1977
Afghanistan 1978
Bolivia 1978
Comoros 1978
Ghana 1978
Honduras 1978
Mauritania 1978
Yemen North 1978

Yemen South 1978
Afghanistan 1979
Bolivia 1979
Brazil 1979
Cambodia 1979
Central Afr. Rep 1979
Chad 1979
Congo Brazzaville 1979
Ecuador 1979
El Salvador 1979
Equatorial Guinea 1979
Ghana 1979
Iran 1979
Korea South 1979
Mauritania 1979
Nicaragua 1979
Nigeria 1979
Uganda 1979
Burkina Faso 1980
El Salvador 1980
Guinea-Bissau 1980
Liberia 1980
Mauritania 1980
Peru 1980
Uganda 1980
Argentina 1981
Bangladesh 1981
Bolivia 1981
Central Afr. Rep 1981
Egypt 1981
Panama 1981
Uruguay 1981
Argentina 1982
Bangladesh 1982
Burkina Faso 1982
Chad 1982
Honduras 1982
Panama 1982
Burkina Faso 1983
Guatemala 1983
Panama 1983
Swaziland 1983
Thailand 1983
Turkey 1983
El Salvador 1984
Guinea 1984
Mauritania 1984
Mongolia 1984
Nicaragua 1984
Nigeria 1985
Sudan 1985

Uruguay 1985
Afghanistan 1986
Bangladesh 1986
Guatemala 1986
Haiti 1986
Lesotho 1986
Philippines 1986
Uganda 1986
Yemen South 1986
Burkina Faso 1987
Burundi 1987
Tunisia 1987
Haiti 1988
Korea South 1988
Myanmar 1988
Pakistan 1988
Comoros 1989
Paraguay 1989
Poland 1989
Romania 1989
Bulgaria 1990
Chad 1990
Chile 1990
Czechoslovakia 1990
Germany East 1990
Haiti 1990
Hungary 1990
Kuwait 1990
Liberia 1990
Mongolia 1990
Panama 1990
Benin 1991
Estonia 1991
Haiti 1991
Lesotho 1991
Mali 1991
Nepal 1991
Somalia 1991
Sri Lanka 1991
Afghanistan 1992
Albania 1992
Algeria 1992
Azerbaijan 1992
Georgia 1992
Guyana 1992
Lithuania 1992
Sierra Leone 1992
Tajikistan 1992
Thailand 1992
Azerbaijan 1993
Burundi 1993

Central Afr. Rep 1993
Latvia 1993
Madagascar 1993
Niger 1993
Nigeria 1993
Burundi 1994
Guinea-Bissau 1994
Haiti 1994
Lesotho 1994
Malawi 1994
Mozambique 1994
Rwanda 1994
South Africa 1994
Comoros 1995
Qatar 1995
Afghanistan 1996
Burundi 1996
Sierra Leone 1996
Taiwan 1996
Albania 1997
Cambodia 1997
Congo Brazzaville 1997
Congo Kinshasa 1997
Ghana 1997
Sierra Leone 1997
Sierra Leone 1998
Comoros 1999
Guinea-Bissau 1999
Indonesia 1999
Ivory Coast 1999
Niger 1999
Croatia 2000
Fiji 2000
Ivory Coast 2000
Mexico 2000
Senegal 2000
Yugoslavia 2000
Afghanistan 2001
Congo Kinshasa 2001
Peru 2001
Kenya 2002
Lesotho 2002
Sierra Leone 2002
Ecuador 2003
Georgia 2003
Guinea-Bissau 2003
Iraq 2003
Paraguay 2003
Haiti 2004

Note: Authoritarian breakdowns resulting in a transition to democracy are shown in **bold**. Authoritarian breakdowns shown in *italic* are omitted from our main regression (Model 1 of Table 5) due to missing data on explanatory variables.

Table A3: Effect of Diffusion on Democratization (Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Dem. neigh.	.532 (.147)***				.702 (.215)***			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		.607 (.338)*				.810 (.579)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years			.359 (.251)				.778 (.456)*	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years				.161 (.220)				.643 (.424)
Hegemonic power volatility	.207 (.077)***	.190 (.078)**	.187 (.079)**	.198 (.079)**	.203 (.075)***	.185 (.077)**	.176 (.079)**	.184 (.079)**
Growth rate	-.028 (.010)***	-.028 (.010)***	-.026 (.010)***	-.029 (.010)***	-.027 (.010)***	-.028 (.010)***	-.026 (.010)***	-.028 (.010)***
GDP pc (logged)	.243 (.071)***	.315 (.067)***	.316 (.067)***	.317 (.067)***	.217 (.081)***	.316 (.067)***	.317 (.067)***	.315 (.067)***
Oil	-.0003 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0003 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*
Muslim	-.0009 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.0009 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.0009 (.002)	-.0009 (.002)
Catholic	-.0004 (.002)	-.0001 (.002)	-.0001 (.002)	-.0001 (.002)	-.0006 (.002)	-.0001 (.002)	-.00005 (.002)	-.00005 (.002)
Protestant	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.004 (.002)*	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.004 (.002)
Ethnic frac.	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*
Religious frac.	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)
Brit. col.	.057 (.130)	.069 (.130)	.073 (.131)	.075 (.130)	.109 (.130)	.071 (.130)	.073 (.131)	.072 (.131)
# Past trans.	.265 (.046)***	.285 (.042)***	.273 (.041)***	.283 (.042)***	.252 (.045)***	.288 (.042)***	.275 (.041)***	.281 (.041)***
N	5621	5587	5526	5459	5621	5587	5526	5459
Pseudolog-lik.	-475.964	-477.259	-474.608	-476.088	-476.164	-477.63	-474.253	-475.321

Note: Redoes Table 4 without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A4: Effect of World Diffusion on Democratization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Dem. world	1.622			
	(.397)***			
Ch. % dem. world last year		2.703		
		(2.551)		
Ch. % dem. world last 2 years			4.111	
			(1.827)**	
Ch. % dem. world last 3 years				1.809
				(1.427)
Hegemonic power volatility	.14	.142	.083	.124
	(.066)**	(.072)**	(.077)	(.08)
Growth rate	-.029	-.033	-.031	-.032
	(.010)***	(.010)***	(.010)***	(.010)***
GDP pc (logged)	.277	.332	.324	.328
	(.070)***	(.067)***	(.067)***	(.068)***
Oil	-.0004	-.0004	-.0004	-.0004
	(.0002)*	(.0002)*	(.0002)*	(.0002)*
Muslim	-.0009	-.0002	-.0003	-.0002
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Catholic	.002	.001	.001	.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Protestant	.003	.002	.002	.002
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Ethnic frac.	.001	.002	.002	.002
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Religion frac.	-.002	-.002	-.002	-.002
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Brit. col.	-.012	.049	.038	.045
	(.141)	(.137)	(.137)	(.137)
# Past trans.	.269	.290	.288	.289
	(.044)***	(.043)***	(.043)***	(.043)***
N	6477	6477	6477	6477
Pseudolog-lik.	-497.993	-505.622	-503.008	-505.099

Note: Redoes Table 4 using world diffusion. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A5: Effect of Regional Diffusion on Democratization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Dem. region	.546			
	(.198)***			
Ch. % dem. region last year		2.015		
		(.686)***		
Ch. % dem. region last 2 years			.888	
			(.621)	
Ch. % dem. region last 3 years				.715
				(.559)
% Dem. world	1.242	1.506	1.532	1.547
	(.413)***	(.392)***	(.390)***	(.398)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.147	.126	.129	.131
	(.066)**	(.067)*	(.066)*	(.067)**
Growth rate	-.030	-.029	-.030	-.030
	(.010)***	(.010)***	(.010)***	(.010)***
GDP pc (logged)	.239	.279	.279	.280
	(.072)***	(.069)***	(.070)***	(.070)***
Oil	-.0004	-.0004	-.0004	-.0004
	(.0002)*	(.0002)*	(.0002)*	(.0002)*
Muslim	-.0006	-.0008	-.0008	-.0007
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Catholic	.0008	.002	.002	.002
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Protestant	.002	.003	.003	.003
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Ethnic frac.	.001	.001	.001	.001
	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Religious frac.	-.001	-.002	-.002	-.002
	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)	(.003)
Brit. col.	-.018	-.005	-.008	-.010
	(.145)	(.142)	(.143)	(.144)
# Past trans.	.229	.270	.270	.267
	(.050)***	(.044)***	(.044)***	(.045)***
N	6470	6429	6381	6313
Pseudolog-lik.	-493.666	-494.317	-495.855	-495.123

Note: Note: Redoes Table 4 using regional diffusion. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A6: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.100	.915			.071	1.222		
	(.105)	(.277)***			(.148)	(.355)***		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.245	1.834			-.246	.152
			(.251)	(.636)***			(.506)	(1.062)
Hegemonic power volatility	.153	.127	.164	.139	.153	.126	.165	.147
	(.048)***	(.121)	(.048)***	(.124)	(.048)***	(.118)	(.048)***	(.121)
Growth rate	-.019	-.035	-.020	-.028	-.019	-.030	-.020	-.031
	(.006)***	(.020)*	(.006)***	(.021)	(.006)***	(.020)	(.006)***	(.021)
GDP pc (logged)	-.079	.603	-.068	.845	-.074	.587	-.068	.834
	(.053)	(.201)***	(.051)	(.215)***	(.057)	(.201)***	(.051)	(.219)***
Oil	-6.88e-06	-.0004	-8.72e-06	-.0005	-8.05e-06	-.0004	-8.66e-06	-.0005
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.0007	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.0006
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)
Catholic	.002	-.004	.003	-.004	.002	-.004	.003	-.004
	(.001)*	(.003)	(.001)*	(.003)	(.001)*	(.003)	(.001)*	(.003)
Protestant	-.0004	.003	-.0009	.006	-.0004	.004	-.0009	.006
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0007	.007	.0007	.007	.0006	.007	.0007	.007
	(.001)	(.003)**	(.001)	(.003)**	(.001)	(.003)**	(.002)	(.003)**
Religious frac.	-.003	.002	-.003	.003	-.003	.002	-.003	.002
	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.084	.321	-.077	.346	-.078	.371	-.078	.331
	(.093)	(.246)	(.093)	(.249)	(.093)	(.257)	(.093)	(.245)
# Past trans.	.157	.197	.165	.175	.158	.165	.164	.180
	(.049)***	(.082)**	(.049)***	(.100)*	(.049)***	(.083)**	(.049)***	(.098)*
N	5488	423	5458	416	5488	423	5458	416
Pseudolog-lik.	-1590.302		-1567.283		-1589.545		-1569.415	

Note: Redoes Table 5 without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A7: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Change in % Democratic Neighbors in the Last 2 and 3 Years)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years	-.103	.337			.112	-.013		
	(.194)	(.501)			(.375)	(.853)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years			.027	-.174			.244	-.301
			(.210)	(.372)			(.342)	(.759)
% Dem. world	.390	3.239	.397	3.304	.374	3.279	.369	3.342
	(.235)*	(.811)***	(.236)*	(.800)***	(.236)	(.819)***	(.235)	(.826)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.154	.043	.153	.050	.151	.048	.149	.055
	(.049)***	(.139)	(.050)***	(.139)	(.050)***	(.138)	(.051)***	(.140)
Growth rate	-.020	-.018	-.019	-.020	-.020	-.019	-.019	-.019
	(.006)***	(.022)	(.006)***	(.023)	(.006)***	(.022)	(.006)***	(.022)
GDP pc (logged)	-.080	.832	-.082	.849	-.080	.831	-.082	.849
	(.052)	(.222)***	(.052)	(.221)***	(.052)	(.223)***	(.052)	(.220)***
Oil	-7.32e-06	-.0006	-5.90e-06	-.0006	-7.26e-06	-.0006	-5.94e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0008	-.0008	-.001	-.0004	-.0008	-.0007	-.001	-.0004
	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.004)
Catholic	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002
	(.001)**	(.004)	(.001)**	(.004)	(.001)**	(.004)	(.001)**	(.004)
Protestant	-.0007	.009	-.0006	.009	-.0008	.009	-.0006	.009
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.007)	(.002)	(.007)	(.002)	(.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0004	.006	.0006	.006	.0005	.006	.0006	.006
	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.004)*
Religious frac.	-.004	.0004	-.004	.0003	-.004	.0003	-.004	.0003
	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)*	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.082	.243	-.069	.235	-.082	.235	-.068	.239
	(.093)	(.288)	(.092)	(.289)	(.093)	(.287)	(.092)	(.288)
# Past trans.	.152	.126	.148	.133	.150	.136	.148	.131
	(.049)***	(.105)	(.049)***	(.109)	(.049)***	(.104)	(.048)***	(.108)
N	5402	415	5339	411	5402	415	5339	411
Pseudolog-lik.	-1550.763		-1534.901		-1550.988		-1534.568	

Note: Redoes Table 5 using the change in % democracies in the last 2 and 3 years. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A8: Effect of Regional Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. region	.101	.734						
	(.141)	(.333)**						
Ch. % dem. region last year			.814	2.023				
			(.492)*	(1.473)				
Ch. % dem. region last 2 years					.360	1.214		
					(.494)	(.870)		
Ch. % dem. region last 3 years							.212	1.193
							(.407)	(.954)
% Dem. world	.438	2.470	.471	2.976	.494	2.989	.514	3.004
	(.244)*	(.745)***	(.224)**	(.727)***	(.227)**	(.737)***	(.230)**	(.736)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.094	.086	.089	.059	.093	.053	.097	.051
	(.043)**	(.112)	(.043)**	(.116)	(.044)**	(.119)	(.045)**	(.121)
Growth rate	-.019	-.027	-.019	-.024	-.019	-.025	-.021	-.024
	(.006)***	(.020)	(.006)***	(.020)	(.006)***	(.021)	(.006)***	(.022)
GDP pc (logged)	-.066	.645	-.058	.725	-.062	.749	-.059	.762
	(.051)	(.189)***	(.050)	(.187)***	(.050)	(.190)***	(.051)	(.191)***
Oil	-6.18e-06	-.0005	-7.33e-06	-.0006	-6.01e-06	-.0006	-6.04e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0001	-.0009	-.0002	-.0008	-.0002	-.0004	-.0002	-.0003
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)
Catholic	.004	-.003	.004	-.001	.004	-.001	.004	-.001
	(.001)***	(.003)	(.001)***	(.003)	(.001)***	(.003)	(.001)***	(.003)
Protestant	-.002	.002	-.002	.004	-.001	.005	-.001	.005
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)
Ethnic frac.	-.0003	.004	-.0004	.004	-.0003	.005	-.0003	.005
	(.002)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)
Religious frac.	-.002	.001	-.002	.0003	-.002	.0005	-.002	.001
	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)
Brit. col.	-.131	.175	-.124	.190	-.114	.180	-.108	.171
	(.101)	(.279)	(.101)	(.281)	(.101)	(.287)	(.102)	(.291)
# Past trans.	.139	.148	.145	.175	.145	.175	.144	.170
	(.048)***	(.087)*	(.047)***	(.091)*	(.047)***	(.098)*	(.048)***	(.098)*
N	6200	450	6166	450	6126	447	6064	443
Pseudolog-lik.	-1701.985		-1699.506		-1689.096		-1673.735	

Note: Redoes Table 5 using regional diffusion. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A9: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Change % World Democracies in the Last Year)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.099	.924			.071	1.232		
	(.104)	(.283)***			(.147)	(.365)***		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.303	1.811			-.423	-.091
			(.264)	(.640)***			(.525)	(1.118)
Ch. % dem. world last year	1.220	3.339	1.886	1.785	1.241	3.224	2.027	2.712
	(1.688)	(3.886)	(1.750)	(4.069)	(1.690)	(3.968)	(1.771)	(4.011)
Hegemonic power volatility	.140	.090	.145	.119	.140	.090	.146	.120
	(.053)***	(.132)	(.053)***	(.135)	(.054)***	(.130)	(.053)***	(.132)
Growth rate	-.019	-.034	-.019	-.027	-.019	-.028	-.019	-.029
	(.006)***	(.021)	(.006)***	(.022)	(.006)***	(.021)	(.006)***	(.021)
GDP pc (logged)	-.080	.612	-.070	.851	-.076	.594	-.070	.843
	(.053)	(.202)***	(.051)	(.213)***	(.056)	(.203)***	(.051)	(.218)***
Oil	-7.00e-06	-.0004	-8.92e-06	-.0006	-8.14e-06	-.0004	-8.88e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.0008	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.0006
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)
Catholic	.002	-.004	.003	-.004	.002	-.004	.003	-.004
	(.001)*	(.003)	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)*	(.003)	(.001)**	(.003)
Protestant	-.0005	.003	-.001	.006	-.0004	.004	-.001	.006
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0006	.007	.0006	.007	.0006	.007	.0006	.007
	(.001)	(.003)**	(.002)	(.003)**	(.001)	(.003)**	(.002)	(.003)**
Religious frac.	-.003	.002	-.003	.003	-.003	.002	-.003	.002
	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.086	.324	-.082	.347	-.081	.374	-.083	.331
	(.093)	(.250)	(.093)	(.251)	(.093)	(.260)	(.093)	(.248)
# Past trans.	.156	.193	.163	.173	.157	.162	.162	.177
	(.049)***	(.084)**	(.049)***	(.101)*	(.049)***	(.085)*	(.049)***	(.100)*
N	5488	423	5458	416	5488	423	5458	416
Pseudolog-lik.	-1589.806		-1566.649		-1589.064		-1568.663	

Note: Redoes Table 5 using *Change % World Democracies in the last year* rather than *% World Democracies*. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. $^{***}p < .01$, $^{**}p < .05$ and $^{*}p < .1$.

Table A10: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.054	.950			.064	.879		
	(.114)	(.350)***			(.120)	(.279)***		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			.115	1.880			-.114	1.671
			(.340)	(.690)***			(.242)	(.636)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.264	.515	.265	.491	.161	.123	.175	.133
	(.083)***	(.233)**	(.082)***	(.246)**	(.055)***	(.132)	(.055)***	(.137)
Rain dev.	-.049	-.035	-.051	-.027				
	(.015)***	(.050)	(.016)***	(.047)				
RR/LV crises					.226	.076	.231	.074
					(.056)***	(.160)	(.056)***	(.170)
GDP pc (logged)	-.109	.512	-.117	.664	-.071	.582	-.067	.847
	(.051)**	(.242)**	(.049)**	(.239)***	(.060)	(.193)***	(.056)	(.210)***
Oil	-7.09e-06	-.0004	-6.51e-06	-.0005	-.00002	-.0004	-.00002	-.0005
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)**	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)**	(.00003)	(.0002)**	(.00003)	(.0002)**
Muslim	.0005	-.0004	.0005	-.0002	-.0009	-.002	-.0009	-.001
	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.004)
Catholic	.004	-.0008	.005	.00005	.002	-.005	.002	-.006
	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)*	(.001)	(.003)*
Protestant	-.002	-.003	-.004	-.002	-.001	.001	-.002	.005
	(.003)	(.006)	(.003)	(.008)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)
Ethnic frac.	.00006	.010	.0002	.009	.0009	.007	.001	.008
	(.002)	(.004)**	(.002)	(.004)**	(.002)	(.003)**	(.002)	(.004)**
Religious frac.	-.0001	.004	.0001	.004	-.003	.004	-.003	.005
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)
Brit. col.	-.101	.388	-.087	.364	-.070	.251	-.072	.280
	(.091)	(.296)	(.088)	(.284)	(.100)	(.269)	(.100)	(.270)
# Past trans.	.173	.166	.169	.146	.163	.178	.166	.151
	(.057)***	(.121)	(.058)***	(.124)	(.052)***	(.085)**	(.052)***	(.109)
N	3384	250	3369	246	4685	375	4664	371
Pseudolog-lik.	-973.717		-959.065		-1409.389		-1394.649	

Note: Redoes Table 6 without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Uses spatial lag 1. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A11: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (RR and LV Crises)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	-.087	.458			.022	.750		
	(.150)	(.366)			(.152)	(.433)*		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.279	1.790			-.172	2.807
			(.279)	(.668)***			(.377)	(1.379)**
% Dem. world	.399	2.882	.406	3.254	-.302	3.206	-.335	4.158
	(.364)	(1.162)**	(.381)	(1.187)***	(.507)	(1.311)**	(.493)	(1.311)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.125	-.160	.134	-.177	.233	.699	.252	.617
	(.066)*	(.170)	(.068)*	(.162)	(.115)**	(.313)**	(.116)**	(.316)*
RR crises	.154	.054	.153	.019				
	(.068)**	(.214)	(.069)**	(.211)				
LV crises					.293	-.030	.290	-.052
					(.090)***	(.359)	(.089)***	(.351)
GDP pc (logged)	.041	.787	.025	.931	-.137	.727	-.146	.882
	(.077)	(.219)***	(.075)	(.227)***	(.067)**	(.251)***	(.063)**	(.231)***
Oil	-2.66e-06	-.0003	1.00e-05	-.0004	-.00002	-.0009	-.00002	-.001
	(.0002)	(.0002)*	(.0002)	(.0002)**	(.00003)	(.0005)*	(.00003)	(.0005)*
Muslim	-.003	-.005	-.003	-.005	-.002	-.002	-.002	-.002
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.005)
Catholic	.0003	-.004	.0002	-.005	.003	-.002	.003	-.001
	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)	(.003)	(.005)	(.003)	(.005)
Protestant	-.0006	.016	-.001	.026	-.006	-.012	-.006	-.010
	(.003)	(.008)*	(.003)	(.008)***	(.003)*	(.011)	(.003)**	(.011)
Ethnic frac.	.004	.0007	.004	-.0002	-.002	.013	-.002	.011
	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)**	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)**	(.002)	(.006)**
Religious frac.	-.009	.0002	-.009	-.002	-.0005	-.003	-.0006	-.002
	(.003)***	(.008)	(.003)***	(.009)	(.003)	(.007)	(.003)	(.007)
Brit. col.	-.185	.549	-.181	.509	-.061	.553	-.070	.586
	(.169)	(.453)	(.169)	(.443)	(.105)	(.385)	(.106)	(.417)
# Past trans.	.171	-.012	.172	-.084	.231	.053	.229	.053
	(.056)***	(.155)	(.057)***	(.145)	(.067)***	(.210)	(.068)***	(.204)
N	3241	284	3226	281	2326	166	2320	165
Pseudolog-lik.	-1023.812		-1010.81		-639.966		-633.811	

Note: Redoes Table 6 with *RR crises* and *LV crises* on their own. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Uses spatial lag 1. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A12: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Change % Democracies over 2 and 3 Years)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years	-.012	.660			.056	.229		
	(.281)	(.663)			(.199)	(.521)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years			.100	-.152			.141	-.354
			(.286)	(.522)			(.223)	(.406)
% Dem. world	-.173	4.273	-.141	4.398	.234	3.203	.254	3.281
	(.399)	(.967)***	(.405)	(1.004)***	(.263)	(.866)***	(.266)	(.849)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.276	.309	.294	.278	.169	.049	.173	.050
	(.081)***	(.286)	(.082)***	(.284)	(.055)***	(.151)	(.057)***	(.152)
Rain dev.	-.050	.040	-.055	.052				
	(.015)***	(.055)	(.015)***	(.056)				
RR/LV crises					.220	-.070	.207	-.062
					(.059)***	(.195)	(.059)***	(.191)
GDP pc (logged)	-.117	.836	-.115	.847	-.074	.854	-.075	.877
	(.049)**	(.167)***	(.049)**	(.164)***	(.057)	(.223)***	(.057)	(.219)***
Oil	-6.69e-06	-.0006	-5.82e-06	-.0006	-.00002	-.0006	-.00002	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(.00003)	(.0002)**	(.00003)	(.0002)**
Muslim	.0004	-.0003	.0003	.00005	-.001	-.001	-.001	-.0006
	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)
Catholic	.005	-.002	.005	-.003	.002	-.004	.002	-.004
	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)***	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)
Protestant	-.004	.0001	-.004	.001	-.002	.008	-.002	.008
	(.003)	(.009)	(.003)	(.009)	(.002)	(.007)	(.002)	(.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0005	.008	.0007	.008	.0008	.007	.001	.007
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.004)*	(.002)	(.004)*
Religious	.0002	-.0001	.0003	-.0003	-.003	.003	-.003	.003
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.080	.401	-.064	.369	-.078	.185	-.070	.161
	(.088)	(.338)	(.088)	(.338)	(.099)	(.309)	(.100)	(.312)
# Past trans.	.164	.033	.157	.047	.156	.110	.155	.115
	(.056)***	(.169)	(.056)***	(.167)	(.051)***	(.111)	(.051)***	(.118)
N	3311	244	3251	240	4630	371	4593	368
Pseudolog-lik.	-940.406		-923.869		-1384.936		-1373.239	

Note: Redoes Table 6 with change % democracies over 2 and 3 Years. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Uses spatial lag 1. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A13: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Spatial Lag 2)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.056	.576			.065	.874		
	(.192)	(.542)			(.183)	(.388)**		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			.540	-.835			-.143	-.567
			(.588)	(1.498)			(.506)	(1.105)
% Dem. world	-.201	3.605	-.190	4.438	.173	2.098	.250	3.229
	(.399)	(1.133)***	(.399)	(.964)***	(.273)	(.874)**	(.265)	(.888)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.269	.355	.265	.333	.154	.077	.166	.059
	(.082)***	(.273)	(.080)***	(.287)	(.054)***	(.137)	(.055)***	(.145)
Rain dev.	-.051	.018	-.053	.039				
	(.015)***	(.058)	(.015)***	(.058)				
RR/LV crises					.221	-.007	.222	-.062
					(.057)***	(.169)	(.058)***	(.191)
GDP pc (logged)	-.108	.697	-.118	.839	-.074	.613	-.074	.848
	(.053)**	(.193)***	(.049)**	(.179)***	(.061)	(.208)***	(.057)	(.228)***
Oil	-7.75e-06	-.0005	-6.65e-06	-.0006	-.00002	-.0004	-.00002	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)**	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(.00003)	(.0002)**	(.00003)	(.0002)**
Muslim	.0005	-.0005	.0006	-.0005	-.001	-.001	-.001	-.0009
	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.004)
Catholic	.004	-.001	.005	-.001	.002	-.004	.002	-.003
	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.005)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)
Protestant	-.002	-.004	-.004	.0002	-.001	.003	-.002	.008
	(.003)	(.008)	(.003)	(.009)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.007)
Ethnic frac.	.00009	.009	.0002	.009	.0008	.006	.0009	.007
	(.002)	(.005)*	(.002)	(.005)*	(.002)	(.004)*	(.002)	(.004)*
Religious frac.	-.00006	.001	.0002	.00003	-.003	.003	-.003	.002
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.096	.418	-.085	.394	-.071	.196	-.079	.169
	(.092)	(.346)	(.088)	(.350)	(.101)	(.302)	(.100)	(.306)
# Past trans.	.174	.091	.170	.079	.158	.140	.161	.119
	(.056)***	(.170)	(.056)***	(.178)	(.051)***	(.089)	(.051)***	(.111)
N	3384	250	3369	246	4685	375	4664	371
Pseudolog-lik.	-968.456		-951.31		-1405.013		-1388.311	

Note: Redoes Table 6 with spatial lag 2. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A14: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Regional Diffusion)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. region	.161	.299			.083	.728		
	(.177)	(.512)			(.165)	(.350)**		
Ch. % dem. region last year			.452	2.154			1.093	2.097
			(.647)	(1.772)			(.498)**	(1.537)
% Dem. world	-.291	3.948	-.277	4.083	.172	2.413	.176	2.889
	(.399)	(1.035)***	(.386)	(.984)***	(.274)	(.814)***	(.249)	(.802)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.274	.412	.255	.382	.14	.112	.131	.079
	(.082)***	(.274)	(.082)***	(.269)	(.051)***	(.126)	(.051)***	(.131)
Rain dev.	-.049	.021	-.047	.030				
	(.015)***	(.055)	(.015)***	(.055)				
RR/LV crises					.226	-.054	.227	-.059
					(.055)***	(.171)	(.055)***	(.178)
GDP pc (logged)	-.113	.727	-.114	.745	-.073	.629	-.066	.717
	(.048)**	(.186)***	(.048)**	(.176)***	(.059)	(.186)***	(.056)	(.184)***
Oil	-6.16e-06	-.0006	-6.74e-06	-.0006	-.00002	-.0004	-.00002	-.0005
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(.00003)	(.0002)**	(.00003)	(.0002)**
Muslim	.0004	-.002	.0004	-.002	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.0007
	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)
Catholic	.004	-.002	.004	-.002	.003	-.004	.003	-.003
	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.004)	(.0009)***	(.003)	(.0009)***	(.003)
Protestant	-.003	-.006	-.003	-.006	-.002	.001	-.002	.003
	(.003)	(.008)	(.003)	(.008)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)
Ethnic frac.	-.00004	.008	.00007	.008	.0005	.005	.0004	.005
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)
Religious frac.	.0006	-.0002	.0003	-.002	-.002	.003	-.002	.002
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)
Brit. col.	-.124	.387	-.112	.401	-.078	.123	-.068	.156
	(.089)	(.343)	(.087)	(.333)	(.094)	(.300)	(.092)	(.303)
# Past trans.	.162	.091	.162	.063	.149	.145	.153	.164
	(.056)***	(.167)	(.055)***	(.174)	(.050)***	(.091)	(.049)***	(.094)*
N	3476	255	3428	253	4993	397	4974	396
Pseudolog-lik.	-988.2		-977.878		-1485.904		-1481.834	

Note: Redoes Table 6 with regional diffusion. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A15: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Change % World Democracies in the Last Year)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.055	1.016			.063	.882		
	(.113)	(.356)***			(.119)	(.282)***		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			.086	1.759			-.173	1.676
			(.346)	(.676)***			(.256)	(.646)***
Ch. % dem. world last year	.565	11.439	1.167	8.496	1.484	1.346	1.847	-.732
	(2.310)	(5.869)*	(2.362)	(5.821)	(1.794)	(4.140)	(1.849)	(4.353)
Hegemonic power volatility	.257	.390	.252	.397	.144	.107	.154	.141
	(.089)***	(.263)	(.087)***	(.269)	(.061)**	(.143)	(.061)**	(.145)
Rain dev.	-.048	-.020	-.050	-.015				
	(.015)***	(.054)	(.016)***	(.049)				
RR/LV crises					.225	.073	.230	.076
					(.057)***	(.161)	(.057)***	(.168)
GDP pc (logged)	-.110	.560	-.119	.700	-.072	.586	-.067	.846
	(.051)**	(.221)**	(.049)**	(.225)***	(.059)	(.192)***	(.055)	(.207)***
Oil	-7.09e-06	-.0004	-6.55e-06	-.0005	-.00002	-.0004	-.00002	-.0005
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)**	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)**	(.00003)	(.0002)**	(.00003)	(.0002)**
Muslim	.0005	-.001	.0005	-.0005	-.0009	-.002	-.0009	-.0009
	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.004)
Catholic	.004	-.002	.005	-.0004	.002	-.005	.002	-.006
	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)***	(.005)	(.001)	(.003)*	(.001)	(.003)*
Protestant	-.002	-.004	-.004	-.002	-.001	.001	-.002	.005
	(.003)	(.007)	(.003)	(.008)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)
Ethnic frac.	.00004	.010	.0001	.009	.0008	.007	.0009	.008
	(.002)	(.004)**	(.002)	(.004)**	(.002)	(.003)**	(.002)	(.004)**
Religious frac.	-.0001	.003	.0001	.004	-.003	.004	-.003	.005
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)
Brit. col.	-.101	.416	-.087	.377	-.072	.252	-.074	.279
	(.091)	(.301)	(.088)	(.291)	(.100)	(.270)	(.100)	(.270)
# Past trans.	.172	.136	.168	.127	.161	.176	.165	.151
	(.057)***	(.139)	(.058)***	(.136)	(.052)***	(.086)**	(.052)***	(.107)
N	3384	250	3369	246	4685	375	4664	371
Pseudolog-lik.	-971.819		-957.933		-1409.039		-1394.11	

Note: Redoes Table 5 using *Change % World Democracies in the last year* rather than *% World Democracies*. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Uses spatial lag 1. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A16: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (1900-2004)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.098	.576			.054	.763		
	(.107)	(.288)**			(.168)	(.398)*		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.239	1.731			-.149	-.233
			(.249)	(.632)***			(.497)	(1.021)
% Dem. world	.073	2.427	.141	3.230	.100	2.249	.137	3.234
	(.322)	(.942)***	(.318)	(1.005)***	(.327)	(.976)**	(.320)	(1.000)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.132	.054	.136	.036	.131	.060	.136	.048
	(.048)***	(.129)	(.050)***	(.135)	(.048)***	(.126)	(.050)***	(.131)
Growth rate	-.019	-.022	-.019	-.015	-.019	-.020	-.019	-.018
	(.006)***	(.020)	(.006)***	(.022)	(.006)***	(.020)	(.006)***	(.021)
GDP pc (logged)	-.082	.574	-.079	.764	-.077	.565	-.079	.752
	(.053)	(.214)***	(.053)	(.231)***	(.055)	(.217)***	(.053)	(.237)***
Oil	-7.21e-06	-.0005	-8.39e-06	-.0006	-8.55e-06	-.0005	-8.33e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0009	-.001	-.0009	-.001	-.001	-.001	-.0009	-.0008
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)
Catholic	.002	-.002	.002	-.002	.002	-.002	.002	-.002
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)*	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)*	(.004)
Protestant	.0007	.003	.0002	.007	.0008	.004	2.19e-06	.007
	(.003)	(.006)	(.003)	(.007)	(.003)	(.006)	(.003)	(.007)
Ethnic frac.	-.0002	.005	-.0003	.005	-.0003	.005	-.0003	.005
	(.001)	(.003)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)
Religious frac.	-.004	-.0002	-.004	.0004	-.004	-.0001	-.004	-.0004
	(.002)**	(.005)	(.002)**	(.005)	(.002)**	(.005)	(.002)**	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.107	.237	-.098	.263	-.103	.266	-.099	.242
	(.094)	(.279)	(.095)	(.295)	(.095)	(.286)	(.095)	(.289)
# Past trans.	.148	.188	.152	.154	.149	.171	.152	.162
	(.049)***	(.088)**	(.049)***	(.107)	(.049)***	(.087)**	(.049)***	(.104)
N	4769	378	4744	373	4769	378	4744	373
Pseudolog-lik.	-1419.533		-1397.89		-1419.611		-1399.788	

Note: Redoes Table 5 while restricting the sample between 1900 and 2004 (rather than 1875 and 2004). Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A17: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (1900-2004; Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.105	.806			.071	1.099		
	(.103)	(.271)***			(.158)	(.364)***		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.231	1.728			-.130	.199
			(.247)	(.614)***			(.493)	(.997)
Hegemonic power volatility	.133	.096	.138	.098	.133	.098	.138	.104
	(.049)***	(.118)	(.050)***	(.119)	(.049)***	(.116)	(.050)***	(.116)
Growth rate	-.019	-.032	-.020	-.026	-.019	-.027	-.020	-.028
	(.006)***	(.019)*	(.006)***	(.020)	(.006)***	(.019)	(.006)***	(.020)
GDP pc (logged)	-.081	.512	-.075	.717	-.077	.502	-.075	.704
	(.053)	(.201)**	(.053)	(.215)***	(.055)	(.200)**	(.052)	(.217)***
Oil	-7.28e-06	-.0004	-8.80e-06	-.0005	-8.55e-06	-.0004	-8.72e-06	-.0005
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)**	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)**	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0009	-.001	-.0008	-.0008	-.001	-.001	-.0009	-.0007
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)
Catholic	.002	-.003	.002	-.003	.002	-.003	.002	-.002
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)*	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)*	(.003)
Protestant	.0007	.002	.0001	.005	.0008	.003	-3.51e-06	.005
	(.003)	(.005)	(.003)	(.006)	(.003)	(.005)	(.003)	(.006)
Ethnic frac.	-.0002	.006	-.0003	.006	-.0003	.006	-.0003	.006
	(.001)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.003)*	(.001)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.003)*
Religious frac.	-.004	.002	-.004	.003	-.004	.002	-.004	.002
	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.005)	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.105	.277	-.095	.292	-.100	.323	-.096	.277
	(.095)	(.241)	(.096)	(.242)	(.096)	(.251)	(.096)	(.238)
# Past trans.	.148	.201	.154	.180	.149	.173	.153	.183
	(.049)***	(.076)***	(.049)***	(.090)**	(.049)***	(.076)**	(.049)***	(.089)**
N	4769	378	4744	373	4769	378	4744	373
Pseudolog-lik.	-1423.469		-1404.862		-1422.78		-1407.018	

Note: Redoes Table 5 while restricting the sample between 1900 and 2004 (rather than 1875 and 2004), and without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A18: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (1945-2004)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.077	.507			-.020	.695		
	(.114)	(.350)			(.190)	(.535)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.165	1.952			-.136	-.614
			(.309)	(.710)***			(.517)	(1.438)
% Dem. world	-.077	3.720	-.013	4.263	-.018	3.578	-.013	4.390
	(.399)	(1.010)***	(.396)	(.984)***	(.397)	(1.094)***	(.397)	(.973)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.212	.130	.216	.107	.212	.152	.216	.122
	(.064)***	(.187)	(.065)***	(.191)	(.064)***	(.188)	(.065)***	(.196)
Growth rate	-.016	-.008	-.016	.001	-.016	-.006	-.016	-.004
	(.007)**	(.026)	(.007)**	(.026)	(.007)**	(.026)	(.007)**	(.026)
GDP pc (logged)	-.099	.665	-.102	.782	-.092	.661	-.103	.797
	(.050)**	(.187)***	(.048)**	(.173)***	(.052)*	(.193)***	(.048)**	(.179)***
Oil	-5.19e-06	-.0006	-5.26e-06	-.0007	-6.85e-06	-.0006	-5.19e-06	-.0007
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0001	-.0008	-.0001	-.001	-.0002	-.0007	-.0002	-.0006
	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)
Catholic	.004	-.002	.004	-.002	.004	-.002	.004	-.002
	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.004)
Protestant	-.001	-.004	-.003	-2.87e-06	-.001	-.003	-.003	.0007
	(.003)	(.008)	(.003)	(.009)	(.003)	(.008)	(.003)	(.009)
Ethnic frac.	-.0002	.010	-.0001	.009	-.0003	.010	-.0001	.009
	(.002)	(.005)*	(.002)	(.005)*	(.002)	(.005)*	(.002)	(.005)*
Religious frac.	-.001	-.0006	-.001	-.001	-.002	-.0007	-.001	-.002
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.007)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.007)
Brit. col.	-.103	.393	-.089	.409	-.104	.420	-.090	.385
	(.092)	(.333)	(.090)	(.344)	(.093)	(.346)	(.090)	(.348)
# Past trans.	.153	.101	.153	.074	.156	.091	.152	.080
	(.052)***	(.147)	(.053)***	(.151)	(.051)***	(.147)	(.052)***	(.153)
N	3593	268	3578	264	3593	268	3578	264
Pseudolog-lik.	-1029.872		-1012.155		-1030.045		-1013.52	

Note: Redoes Table 5 while restricting the sample between 1945 and 2004 (rather than 1875 and 2004). Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. $***p < .01$, $**p < .05$ and $*p < .1$.

Table A19: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (1945-2004; Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.070	.896			-.025	1.311		
	(.110)	(.334)***			(.187)	(.494)***		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.164	1.895			-.138	.360
			(.306)	(.754)**			(.511)	(1.296)
Hegemonic power volatility	.210	.237	.215	.237	.211	.267	.215	.241
	(.065)***	(.163)	(.066)***	(.165)	(.065)***	(.162)*	(.065)***	(.166)
Growth rate	-.016	-.031	-.016	-.022	-.016	-.026	-.016	-.026
	(.007)**	(.024)	(.007)**	(.024)	(.007)**	(.025)	(.007)**	(.024)
GDP pc (logged)	-.099	.562	-.102	.671	-.091	.560	-.102	.667
	(.050)**	(.241)**	(.048)**	(.240)***	(.052)*	(.236)**	(.048)**	(.246)***
Oil	-5.26e-06	-.0005	-5.32e-06	-.0006	-6.92e-06	-.0005	-5.25e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0002	-.0006	-.0002	-.0006	-.0002	-.0004	-.0002	-.0003
	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)
Catholic	.004	-.002	.004	-.0006	.004	-.003	.004	-.0001
	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.004)
Protestant	-.001	-.004	-.003	-.002	-.001	-.002	-.003	-.002
	(.003)	(.007)	(.003)	(.008)	(.003)	(.007)	(.003)	(.008)
Ethnic frac.	-.0002	.010	-.0001	.009	-.0003	.010	-.0001	.009
	(.002)	(.004)**	(.002)	(.004)**	(.002)	(.005)**	(.002)	(.004)**
Religious frac.	-.002	.003	-.001	.003	-.002	.003	-.001	.003
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.006)
Brit. col.	-.104	.387	-.090	.366	-.105	.453	-.091	.349
	(.092)	(.285)	(.091)	(.278)	(.094)	(.308)	(.091)	(.278)
# Past trans.	.153	.154	.152	.143	.156	.127	.152	.145
	(.053)***	(.113)	(.053)***	(.113)	(.052)***	(.119)	(.053)***	(.113)
N	3593	268	3578	264	3593	268	3578	264
Pseudolog-lik.	-1035.965		-1020.919		-1035.208		-1022.484	

Note: Redoes Table 5 while restricting the sample between 1945 and 2004 (rather than 1875 and 2004), and without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A20: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratization (Excluding Each Region) — Part I

	EXCLUDED REGION					
	Western Countries		Eastern Europe		Latin America	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.066	.704	.064	.626	-.082	.566
	(.115)	(.332)**	(.112)	(.284)**	(.159)	(.384)
% Dem. world	.255	3.427	.356	1.886	.474	1.839
	(.268)	(.926)***	(.240)	(.797)**	(.313)	(.772)**
Hegemonic power volatility	.132	.105	.142	.068	.196	.160
	(.049)***	(.135)	(.051)***	(.129)	(.060)***	(.157)
Growth rate	-.018	-.020	-.019	-.026	-.020	-.005
	(.006)***	(.025)	(.006)***	(.020)	(.007)***	(.020)
GDP pc (logged)	-.113	.633	-.100	.563	-.060	.315
	(.053)**	(.221)***	(.055)*	(.203)***	(.057)	(.236)
Oil	-3.12e-06	-.0005	-3.89e-06	-.0005	-1.00e-05	-.002
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(.00002)	(.0008)**
Muslim	-.0006	-.0007	.00002	-.002	-.0005	.0002
	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)
Catholic	.003	-.002	.004	-.002	.0002	.0004
	(.001)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)
Protestant	-.001	-.002	-.002	.005	-.0005	.004
	(.003)	(.007)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)
Ethnic frac.	-.0001	.008	-.0004	.006	.0004	.005
	(.002)	(.004)*	(.002)	(.003)**	(.002)	(.004)
Religious frac.	-.003	.002	.0008	-.002	-.002	-.0002
	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.004)
Brit. col.	-.092	.281	-.150	.243	-.079	.180
	(.096)	(.335)	(.088)*	(.263)	(.100)	(.244)
# Past trans.	.169	.221	.153	.213	.156	.205
	(.052)***	(.116)*	(.051)***	(.082)***	(.074)**	(.097)**
N	5030	394	4852	405	3853	210
Pseudolog-lik.	-1456.376		-1484.778		-879.846	

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 5 of the main text while excluding each region in succession. *Western Countries* are defined as Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada as well as countries from Western Europe. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A20: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratization (Excluding Each Region) — Part II

	EXCLUDED REGION					
	Middle East		Sub-Saharan Africa		Asia	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.033	.604	.080	.648	.113	.383
	(.116)	(.260)**	(.125)	(.372)*	(.119)	(.302)
% Dem. world	.509	2.169	.470	2.193	.213	2.786
	(.265)*	(.757)***	(.321)	(1.274)*	(.252)	(.877)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.126	.093	.142	-.122	.127	.040
	(.051)**	(.119)	(.054)***	(.162)	(.049)***	(.140)
Growth rate	-.018	-.024	-.017	-.048	-.017	-.028
	(.006)***	(.020)	(.008)**	(.026)*	(.006)***	(.022)
GDP pc (logged)	-.045	.600	-.058	1.017	-.108	.701
	(.059)	(.182)***	(.075)	(.197)***	(.058)*	(.237)***
Oil	-.0001	-.0002	-1.54e-06	-.0005	-5.02e-06	-.0005
	(.0001)	(.0002)	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0006	.002	-.0008	-.003	-.003	-.002
	(.001)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.006)
Catholic	.003	-.002	.003	-.007	.0007	-.001
	(.001)**	(.003)	(.002)*	(.003)*	(.003)	(.005)
Protestant	-.0006	.003	.004	.008	-.003	.006
	(.002)	(.005)	(.003)*	(.008)	(.003)	(.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0003	.004	.001	.004	.0004	.006
	(.002)	(.003)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.004)
Religious frac.	-.004	-.002	-.006	.005	-.005	.002
	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)***	(.006)	(.002)**	(.006)
Brit. col.	-.068	.309	-.250	.068	-.027	.277
	(.108)	(.267)	(.140)*	(.636)	(.097)	(.296)
# Past trans.	.131	.139	.151	-.071	.151	.157
	(.050)***	(.075)*	(.061)**	(.143)	(.051)***	(.101)
N	4775	396	4121	325	4844	386
Pseudolog-lik.	-1463.717		-1187.116		-1430.465	

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 5 of the main text while excluding each region in succession. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A21: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratization (Excluding Each Region; Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World) — Part I

	EXCLUDED REGION					
	Western Countries		Eastern Europe		Latin America	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.101	1.161	.106	.832	-.034	.731
	(.106)	(.315)***	(.107)	(.264)***	(.155)	(.373)**
Hegemonic power volatility	.141	.194	.157	.125	.207	.207
	(.049)***	(.120)	(.051)***	(.120)	(.061)***	(.150)
Growth rate	-.019	-.040	-.020	-.034	-.021	-.012
	(.006)***	(.024)*	(.006)***	(.019)*	(.007)***	(.019)
GDP pc (logged)	-.107	.586	-.095	.524	-.053	.296
	(.052)**	(.219)***	(.056)*	(.199)***	(.058)	(.216)
Oil	-3.35e-06	-.0004	-3.81e-06	-.0004	-1.00e-05	-.002
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)**	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)**	(.00002)	(.0007)**
Muslim	-.0006	-.001	.00002	-.002	-.0004	.00008
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.003)
Catholic	.003	-.004	.003	-.003	-.00004	-.0005
	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.003)	(.002)	(.003)
Protestant	-.0007	-.0006	-.002	.004	-.0007	.002
	(.003)	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.004)
Ethnic frac.	.00002	.009	-.0002	.007	.0009	.006
	(.001)	(.004)**	(.002)	(.003)**	(.001)	(.003)*
Religious frac.	-.003	.004	.0009	-.001	-.002	.001
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.004)
Brit. col.	-.086	.330	-.136	.300	-.062	.242
	(.096)	(.275)	(.088)	(.240)	(.100)	(.210)
# Past trans.	.173	.242	.160	.239	.164	.230
	(.052)***	(.096)**	(.051)***	(.076)***	(.074)**	(.092)**
N	5030	394	4852	405	3853	210
Pseudolog-lik.	-1463.163		-1488.004		-883.349	

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 5 of the main text while excluding each region in succession, and without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. *Western Countries* are defined as Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada as well as countries from Western Europe. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A21: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratization (Excluding Each Region; Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World) — Part II

	EXCLUDED REGION					
	Middle East		Sub-Saharan Africa		Asia	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.095 (.111)	.852 (.241)***	.134 (.122)	.856 (.360)**	.143 (.113)	.794 (.289)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.146 (.051)***	.153 (.112)	.163 (.054)***	-.085 (.153)	.135 (.049)***	.118 (.131)
Growth rate	-.020 (.006)***	-.032 (.019)	-.017 (.009)**	-.050 (.028)*	-.017 (.006)***	-.038 (.022)*
GDP pc (logged)	-.041 (.060)	.566 (.177)***	-.037 (.071)	1.010 (.217)***	-.106 (.058)*	.620 (.229)***
Oil	-.00008 (.0001)	-.0001 (.0002)	-2.95e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)**	-4.94e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0004 (.001)	.002 (.003)	-.0009 (.002)	-.003 (.004)	-.003 (.002)	-.003 (.005)
Catholic	.002 (.001)*	-.004 (.003)	.002 (.001)*	-.008 (.003)***	.0004 (.003)	-.004 (.005)
Protestant	-.0007 (.002)	.002 (.005)	.004 (.002)	.005 (.007)	-.003 (.003)	.003 (.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0006 (.002)	.005 (.003)*	.001 (.002)	.004 (.006)	.0005 (.002)	.006 (.003)*
Religious frac.	-.004 (.002)**	-.001 (.004)	-.006 (.002)***	.006 (.006)	-.006 (.002)**	.003 (.006)
Brit. col.	-.047 (.108)	.399 (.235)*	-.235 (.141)*	.253 (.583)	-.019 (.098)	.360 (.256)
# Past trans.	.140 (.050)***	.161 (.069)**	.152 (.060)**	-.088 (.143)	.155 (.051)***	.192 (.091)**
N	4775	396	4121	325	4844	386
Pseudolog-lik.	-1468.73		-1189.564		-1435.894	

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 5 of the main text while excluding each region in succession, and without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A22: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Benchmarked Growth Rates)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.051	.603			-.026	.781		
	(.109)	(.290)**			(.160)	(.393)**		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.254	1.682			-.275	-.302
			(.250)	(.622)***			(.502)	(1.029)
% Dem. world	.327	2.452	.381	3.230	.377	2.293	.383	3.244
	(.242)	(.806)***	(.238)	(.838)***	(.251)	(.841)***	(.240)	(.832)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.147	.071	.155	.051	.146	.075	.157	.064
	(.048)***	(.130)	(.049)***	(.138)	(.048)***	(.127)	(.049)***	(.133)
Bench. Growth rate	-.020	-.022	-.020	-.018	-.020	-.020	-.020	-.021
	(.006)***	(.022)	(.006)***	(.023)	(.006)***	(.022)	(.006)***	(.022)
GDP pc (logged)	-.085	.619	-.083	.824	-.076	.614	-.083	.810
	(.053)	(.203)***	(.052)	(.224)***	(.056)	(.208)***	(.052)	(.227)***
Oil	-6.64e-06	-.0005	-7.10e-06	-.0006	-8.19e-06	-.0005	-7.04e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.001	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.0007
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)
Catholic	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002
	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.004)	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.003)
Protestant	-.0003	.004	-.0008	.009	-.0003	.005	-.0008	.009
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.007)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0003	.005	.0004	.006	.0002	.006	.0004	.006
	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.003)*
Religious frac.	-.003	.0005	-.003	.0009	-.003	.0005	-.003	.0002
	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.098	.221	-.094	.242	-.100	.253	-.095	.219
	(.092)	(.274)	(.093)	(.288)	(.093)	(.282)	(.093)	(.282)
# Past trans.	.150	.172	.154	.134	.153	.154	.153	.142
	(.049)***	(.087)**	(.049)***	(.105)	(.049)***	(.087)*	(.049)***	(.101)
N	5488	423	5458	416	5488	423	5458	416
Pseudolog-lik.	-1584.814		-1557.662		-1584.697		-1559.458	

Note: Redoes Table 5 with growth rates benchmarked against the world growth rate. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A23: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Excluding Outliers)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.059	.626			-.002	.810		
	(.109)	(.295)**			(.160)	(.396)**		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.269	1.701			-.288	-.320
			(.252)	(.625)***			(.506)	(1.041)
% Dem. world	.386	2.463	.443	3.266	.424	2.301	.445	3.289
	(.242)	(.804)***	(.239)*	(.828)***	(.250)*	(.842)***	(.241)*	(.824)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.137	.059	.146	.040	.137	.065	.147	.052
	(.048)***	(.129)	(.049)***	(.136)	(.048)***	(.126)	(.049)***	(.132)
Growth rate	-.018	-.025	-.018	-.017	-.018	-.022	-.018	-.020
	(.007)***	(.021)	(.007)***	(.022)	(.007)***	(.021)	(.007)***	(.021)
Oil	-5.98e-06	-.0005	-6.64e-06	-.0006	-7.29e-06	-.0005	-6.59e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
GDP pc (logged)	-.090	.637	-.086	.836	-.083	.629	-.086	.823
	(.054)*	(.205)***	(.053)*	(.224)***	(.056)	(.210)***	(.052)*	(.228)***
Muslim	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.001	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.0007
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)
Catholic	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002
	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.004)	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.004)
Protestant	-.0001	.004	-.0005	.009	-.00002	.005	-.0005	.009
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0004	.006	.0005	.006	.0004	.006	.0004	.006
	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.003)*
Religious frac.	-.003	.0004	-.004	.0009	-.003	.0005	-.004	.0001
	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.105	.228	-.101	.246	-.106	.260	-.102	.225
	(.091)	(.278)	(.092)	(.292)	(.093)	(.285)	(.092)	(.286)
# Past trans.	.151	.169	.155	.132	.153	.151	.154	.140
	(.050)***	(.089)*	(.050)***	(.107)	(.049)***	(.089)*	(.050)***	(.104)
N	5453	423	5423	416	5453	423	5423	416
Pseudolog-lik.	-1583.243		-1556.217		-1583.202		-1558.044	

Note: Redoes Table 5 without observations with growth rates below -20 percent or above 20 percent. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A24: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Growth Crisis)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.049	.592			-.016	.784		
	(.108)	(.283)**			(.156)	(.392)**		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.260	1.745			-.249	-.217
			(.250)	(.638)***			(.502)	(1.033)
% Dem. world	.248	2.459	.290	3.325	.288	2.307	.292	3.294
	(.264)	(.846)***	(.260)	(.914)***	(.275)	(.879)***	(.262)	(.898)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.151	.066	.160	.039	.151	.070	.161	.055
	(.048)***	(.135)	(.049)***	(.145)	(.048)***	(.132)	(.049)***	(.139)
Growth crisis	.137	.080	.147	-.0005	.138	.059	.147	.039
	(.064)**	(.159)	(.064)**	(.179)	(.064)**	(.160)	(.064)**	(.172)
GDP pc (logged)	-.102	.588	-.100	.792	-.095	.583	-.100	.774
	(.053)*	(.194)***	(.052)*	(.215)***	(.056)*	(.198)***	(.052)*	(.217)***
Oil	-7.85e-06	-.0005	-8.37e-06	-.0006	-9.20e-06	-.0005	-8.31e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0009	-.001	-.0008	-.0009	-.0009	-.001	-.0008	-.0007
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)
Catholic	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002
	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.004)	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.003)
Protestant	-.0005	.004	-.001	.009	-.0005	.005	-.001	.009
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.007)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0004	.006	.0004	.006	.0003	.006	.0004	.006
	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.003)*
Religious frac.	-.004	.0001	-.004	.0007	-.004	.0002	-.004	-.0001
	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.005)	(.002)**	(.004)	(.002)**	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.107	.220	-.103	.249	-.109	.254	-.103	.225
	(.091)	(.276)	(.091)	(.290)	(.092)	(.283)	(.091)	(.283)
# Past trans.	.152	.174	.155	.141	.155	.158	.155	.148
	(.048)***	(.085)**	(.048)***	(.103)	(.048)***	(.085)*	(.048)***	(.099)
N	5488	423	5458	416	5488	423	5458	416
Pseudolog-lik.	-1586.508		-1558.897		-1586.322		-1560.853	

Note: Redoes Table 5 with a dummy variable for growth crises (defined as a growth rate below -2% in the last three years) rather than the continuous growth rate measure. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. $^{***}p < .01$, $^{**}p < .05$ and $^{*}p < .1$.

Table A25: Effect of Diffusion on Democratization (Country Fixed Effects)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Dem. neigh.	.510				1.263			
	(.337)				(.587)**			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		.405				.241		
		(.405)				(.809)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years			.106				.137	
			(.295)				(.691)	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years				-.155				-.114
				(.278)				(.564)
% Dem. world	5.582	5.910	5.868	5.920	5.000	5.921	5.868	5.908
	(1.246)***	(1.161)***	(1.173)***	(1.169)***	(1.341)***	(1.164)***	(1.179)***	(1.176)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.056	.041	.055	.055	.057	.041	.053	.055
	(.123)	(.126)	(.125)	(.125)	(.123)	(.126)	(.128)	(.126)
Growth rate	-.073	-.077	-.078	-.080	-.071	-.077	-.078	-.080
	(.018)***	(.018)***	(.018)***	(.018)***	(.018)***	(.018)***	(.018)***	(.018)***
GDP pc (logged)	1.562	1.604	1.628	1.614	1.544	1.604	1.626	1.614
	(.318)***	(.304)***	(.311)***	(.310)***	(.322)***	(.306)***	(.313)***	(.310)***
Oil	.002	.001	.002	.002	.002	.002	.002	.002
	(.0008)*	(.0008)*	(.0008)**	(.0008)**	(.0008)*	(.0008)*	(.0008)**	(.0008)**
# Past trans.	-.657	-.623	-.629	-.621	-.736	-.619	-.627	-.624
	(.192)***	(.198)***	(.200)***	(.204)***	(.177)***	(.199)***	(.200)***	(.204)***
N	3386	3359	3322	3289	3386	3359	3322	3289
Pseudolog-lik.	-359.033	-357.82	-355.115	-356.475	-356.173	-358.068	-355.13	-356.551

Note: Redoes Table 4 with country fixed effects. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A26: Effect of Alternative Political Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy

	(1)		(2)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	-.014 (.119)	.572 (.304)*	-.122 (.121)	.503 (.316)
% Dem. world	1.212 (.525)**	3.214 (1.245)***	.471 (.258)*	2.168 (.904)**
Hegemonic Power Volatility	.134 (.050)***	.111 (.129)	.125 (.050)**	.072 (.127)
Growth rate	-.016 (.006)**	-.027 (.021)	-.018 (.006)***	-.029 (.021)
GDP pc (logged)	-.081 (.052)	.633 (.209)***	-.105 (.048)**	.578 (.210)***
Oil	-7.53e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-6.26e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0006 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0002 (.001)	-.0008 (.003)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.003 (.003)	.002 (.001)*	-.003 (.003)
Protestant	-.0002 (.002)	.004 (.006)	-.001 (.002)	.003 (.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0004 (.001)	.006 (.004)	.0002 (.001)	.005 (.003)
Religious frac.	-.004 (.002)**	.0002 (.005)	-.003 (.002)	.002 (.004)
Brit. col.	-.127 (.093)	.126 (.323)	-.103 (.093)	.133 (.317)
# Past trans.	.153 (.055)***	.187 (.093)**	.124 (.052)**	.148 (.092)
Polarized Order	-.074 (.124)	-.182 (.258)		
Democratic Order	-.251 (.196)	-.409 (.355)		
Alliance with France			.110 (.403)	5.662 (.886)***
Alliance with Germany			-.538 (.291)*	.889 (.824)
Alliance with Japan			.711 (.278)**	-.241 (.930)
Alliance with Russia/USSR			-.219 (.101)**	-.542 (.654)
Alliance with US			.265 (.253)	.112 (.396)
Alliance with US (Cold War)			.049 (.247)	.246 (.394)
Alliance with UK			-.192 (.261)	-4.500 (.952)***
N	5229	413	5229	413
Pseudolog-lik.	-1541.107		-1529.542	

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 5 with additional measures of political shocks. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an authocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. *Polarized Order* takes the value 1 in 1933-90, and *Democratic Order* takes the value 1 in 1919-32 and 1991-2000. These variables and the variables on alliances are taken from Boix (2011). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A27: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (US Power Volatility)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.026	.663			-.065	.820		
	(.117)	(.318)**			(.169)	(.420)*		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.288	1.790			-.457	-.379
			(.255)	(.608)***			(.517)	(1.087)
% Dem. world	.411	1.796	.435	2.618	.472	1.702	.439	2.670
	(.238)*	(.851)**	(.231)*	(.868)***	(.250)*	(.872)*	(.232)*	(.850)***
US Power Volatility	2.202	3.523	2.394	2.651	2.175	3.448	2.460	2.831
	(.740)***	(2.050)*	(.756)***	(2.108)	(.742)***	(2.026)*	(.749)***	(2.061)
Growth rate	-.016	-.029	-.016	-.020	-.016	-.025	-.017	-.023
	(.006)***	(.022)	(.006)***	(.023)	(.006)***	(.022)	(.006)***	(.022)
GDP pc (logged)	-.082	.668	-.082	.856	-.073	.662	-.081	.849
	(.053)	(.198)***	(.052)	(.209)***	(.054)	(.201)***	(.052)	(.217)***
Oil	-7.12e-06	-.0005	-7.01e-06	-.0006	-8.64e-06	-.0005	-7.01e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0007	-.0009	-.0006	-.0007	-.0006	-.0008	-.0005	-.0005
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)
Catholic	.003	-.003	.003	-.003	.003	-.003	.003	-.003
	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.004)	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.004)
Protestant	-.0004	.005	-.001	.009	-.0004	.005	-.0009	.009
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.007)	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0003	.006	.0004	.006	.0002	.006	.0004	.006
	(.001)	(.003)	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.004)*
Religious frac.	-.004	-.00007	-.004	.0005	-.004	-1.00e-05	-.004	-.0003
	(.002)**	(.005)	(.002)**	(.005)	(.002)**	(.005)	(.002)**	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.129	.135	-.126	.152	-.135	.170	-.127	.133
	(.092)	(.329)	(.093)	(.342)	(.093)	(.338)	(.093)	(.335)
# Past trans.	.150	.188	.153	.147	.155	.169	.152	.153
	(.050)***	(.099)*	(.050)***	(.114)	(.049)***	(.100)*	(.050)***	(.112)
N	5488	423	5458	416	5488	423	5458	416
Pseudolog-lik.	-1547.687		-1521.646		-1547.632		-1523.317	

Note: Redoes Table 5 but measures political shocks with the absolute value of the change in the US share of hegemonic power over the last three years, rather than the average of the absolute value of the change in the share of power of each hegemon over the last three years. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A28: Effect of Diffusion on Democratization (Interaction Between Diffusion and Economic Shocks)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Dem. neigh.	.381 (.152)**				.465 (.229)**			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		.559 (.346)				.667 (.601)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years			.290 (.252)				.402 (.461)	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years				.083 (.220)				.364 (.426)
% Dem. world	1.111 (.422)***	1.422 (.401)***	1.442 (.401)***	1.429 (.406)***	1.061 (.430)**	1.411 (.403)***	1.445 (.399)***	1.404 (.405)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.184 (.076)**	.155 (.078)**	.154 (.079)*	.167 (.079)**	.183 (.075)**	.154 (.077)**	.147 (.079)*	.157 (.079)**
Growth rate	-.034 (.014)**	-.023 (.009)**	-.021 (.009)**	-.023 (.009)**	-.034 (.016)**	-.023 (.009)**	-.025 (.010)***	-.027 (.010)***
% Dem. neigh.*Growth rate	.027 (.027)				.024 (.036)			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year*Growth rate		-.080 (.094)				-.077 (.157)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years*Growth rate			-.049 (.071)				.130 (.099)	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years*Growth rate				-.043 (.060)				.061 (.093)
GDP pc (logged)	.231 (.072)***	.271 (.068)***	.274 (.068)***	.275 (.068)***	.218 (.078)***	.274 (.068)***	.275 (.069)***	.275 (.069)***
Oil	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*
Muslim	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)
Catholic	.0005 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.0004 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Protestant	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)*	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)*
Ethnic frac.	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)
Brit. col.	.015 (.136)	.004 (.138)	.007 (.139)	.009 (.138)	.050 (.137)	.005 (.138)	.002 (.139)	.005 (.139)
# Past trans.	.255 (.046)***	.262 (.045)***	.250 (.044)***	.261 (.044)***	.249 (.045)***	.266 (.044)***	.255 (.043)***	.263 (.044)***
N	5621	5587	5526	5459	5621	5587	5526	5459
Pseudolog-lik.	-472.111	-471.016	-468.238	-469.806	-473.048	-471.586	-467.942	-469.535

Note: Redoes Table 4 with interaction terms between growth and diffusion. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A29: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Interaction Between Diffusion and Economic Shocks)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.0001	.633			-.050	.770		
	(.115)	(.303)**			(.166)	(.398)*		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.228	1.789			-.412	-.310
			(.252)	(.647)***			(.508)	(1.085)
% Dem. world	.303	2.440	.403	3.238	.355	2.257	.414	3.270
	(.239)	(.821)***	(.235)*	(.832)***	(.252)	(.845)***	(.238)*	(.826)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.142	.060	.148	.042	.143	.068	.149	.054
	(.047)***	(.130)	(.049)***	(.136)	(.048)***	(.126)	(.049)***	(.131)
Growth rate	-.034	-.021	-.018	-.018	-.033	-.036	-.019	-.021
	(.008)***	(.033)	(.006)***	(.022)	(.010)***	(.035)	(.006)***	(.021)
% Dem. neigh.*Growth rate	.063	-.008			.051	.045		
	(.025)**	(.076)			(.031)	(.096)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year*Growth rate			-.031	-.077			.095	-.019
			(.081)	(.154)			(.129)	(.334)
GDP pc (logged)	-.087	.634	-.082	.831	-.079	.627	-.081	.822
	(.053)*	(.207)***	(.052)	(.224)***	(.055)	(.208)***	(.052)	(.226)***
Oil	-4.85e-06	-.0005	-7.33e-06	-.0006	-7.16e-06	-.0005	-7.38e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0008	-.001	-.0006	-.001	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.0008
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)
Catholic	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002
	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.004)	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.004)
Protestant	-.0006	.004	-.0008	.009	-.0004	.005	-.0008	.009
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.007)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0003	.006	.0005	.006	.0003	.006	.0005	.006
	(.001)	(.003)*	(.001)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.003)*
Religious frac.	-.003	.0005	-.003	.0008	-.003	.0005	-.003	.00006
	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.096	.246	-.093	.249	-.096	.258	-.095	.229
	(.091)	(.282)	(.093)	(.291)	(.093)	(.287)	(.093)	(.286)
# Past trans.	.156	.171	.156	.134	.155	.152	.156	.141
	(.048)***	(.090)*	(.050)***	(.107)	(.049)***	(.087)*	(.049)***	(.103)
N	5488	423	5458	416	5488	423	5458	416
Pseudolog-lik.	-1581.479		-1558		-1583.617		-1559.65	

Note: Redoes Table 5 with interaction terms between growth and diffusion. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A30: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Change in the Number of Democratic Neighbors)

	Spatial Lag 1 (1)		Spatial Lag 2 (2)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
Ch. # dem. neigh. last year	.054 (.065)	.304 (.095)***	.018 (.029)	-.084 (.080)
% Dem. world	.409 (.241)*	3.091 (.817)***	.408 (.243)*	3.197 (.817)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.153 (.048)***	.064 (.130)	.152 (.048)***	.093 (.127)
Growth rate	-.019 (.006)***	-.023 (.021)	-.019 (.006)***	-.025 (.020)
GDP pc (logged)	-.075 (.050)	.809 (.220)***	-.075 (.050)	.822 (.224)***
Oil	-7.96e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-8.04e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0008 (.001)	-.002 (.004)	-.0008 (.001)	-.002 (.003)
Catholic	.003 (.001)*	-.003 (.003)	.003 (.001)*	-.003 (.003)
Protestant	-.0009 (.002)	.007 (.006)	-.0009 (.002)	.008 (.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0002 (.001)	.005 (.003)	.0002 (.001)	.005 (.003)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)*	-.0002 (.005)	-.003 (.002)*	-.0008 (.005)
Brit. col.	-.103 (.093)	.248 (.285)	-.103 (.093)	.213 (.281)
# Past trans.	.156 (.049)***	.155 (.100)	.157 (.049)***	.158 (.101)
N	5412	5412	5412	5412
Pseudolog-lik.	-1553.449		-1554.508	

Note: Redoes models 2 and 4 of Table 5 with a variable indicating the change over the last year in the number (rather than proportion) of neighbors that are democratic. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A31: Instrumental Variable Estimations of the Effect of Growth on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy

	(1)		(2)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	-.021	.509		
	(.125)	(.389)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.143	1.516
			(.341)	(.862)*
% Dem. world	-2.497	5.980	-2.394	6.265
	(.871)***	(1.986)***	(.882)***	(1.754)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.020	.631	.043	.525
	(.129)	(.289)**	(.129)	(.270)*
Growth Rate	-.413	.449	-.396	.448
	(.129)***	(.401)	(.130)***	(.355)
GDP pc (logged)	.330	.167	.296	.271
	(.155)**	(.594)	(.155)*	(.583)
Oil	1.00e-05	-.0005	.00002	-.0005
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)*	(1.00e-05)	(.0003)**
Muslim	-.004	.004	-.004	.004
	(.002)*	(.006)	(.002)*	(.005)
Catholic	-.0006	.002	-.0002	.001
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.004)
Protestant	-.011	.006	-.012	.011
	(.004)***	(.013)	(.004)***	(.012)
Ethnic frac.	-.008	.017	-.007	.016
	(.003)***	(.007)**	(.003)***	(.006)**
Religious frac.	.002	-.004	.002	-.003
	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.005)
Brit. col.	.086	.248	.091	.223
	(.125)	(.403)	(.123)	(.394)
# Past trans.	.248	-.096	.241	-.125
	(.060)***	(.218)	(.060)***	(.188)
		Growth as Dependent Variable		
Rain dev.		.177		.179
		(.054)***		(.054)***
% Dem. neigh.		-.122		
		(.317)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year				-.488
				(.909)
% Dem. world.		-5.711		-5.742
		(.753)***		(.742)***
GDP pc (logged)		1.080		1.072
		(.110)***		(.108)***
Oil		.00005		.00005
		(.00002)**		(.00002)**
Muslim		-.011		-.011
		(.003)***		(.003)***
Catholic		-.013		-.013
		(.003)***		(.003)***
Protestant		-.021		-.021
		(.006)***		(.006)***
Ethnic frac.		-.018		-.018
		(.003)***		(.003)***
Religious frac.		.003		.003
		(.004)		(.004)
Brit. col.		.536		.541
		(.188)***		(.189)***
# Past trans.		.215		.211
		(.125)*		(.125)*
F-stat. instr.		10.79***		10.97***
N	3244	241	3221	238
Pseudolog-lik.	-797.729	-920.749	-789.776	-910.324

Note: The first stage regressions use rainfall to instrument for growth. The second stage regressions use Heckman probit models. We run a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. We then run a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

2 Interaction Between Economic and Political Shocks

Conditional relationships also warrant consideration, particularly the possibility that economic shocks become more destabilizing when they occur concurrently with political shocks, and vice versa. In Tables A32 and A33 we redo Tables 4 and 5 with an interaction terms between *Growth rate* and *Hegemonic power volatility*. The interaction term is never statistically significant.

However, one must be cautious when interpreting interaction terms in non-linear models (Ai and Norton, 2003). We thus provide marginal effect plots based on model 1 of Table A33 in Figure A1. All variables are kept at their means. The key variable of interest – growth in the two left panels and *Hegemonic power volatility* in the two right panels – is also kept at its mean.[1]

The bottom two panels of Figure A1 suggest that the effect of *Growth rate* and *Hegemonic power volatility* on the choice to democratize after an authoritarian breakdown is never statistically significant, regardless of the value of the conditioning variable. The top two panels, however, do provide some evidence suggesting that the effect of *Growth rate* (*Hegemonic power volatility*) on authoritarian breakdowns is conditional on *Hegemonic power volatility* (*Growth rate*). Specifically, the marginal effect of economic contractions on the probability of autocratic breakdown increases slightly at higher levels of *Hegemonic power volatility*. When there is no secure and dominant world power to bail out client states and preserve order, domestic economic performance matters a little bit more for the survival of autocracies. Similarly, political shocks are more likely to destabilize autocracies that are experiencing economic difficulties.

However, the evidence in favor of an interactive effect is weak. In particular, while the effect of economic contractions strengthens as *Hegemonic power volatility* increases, and

[1]We use its mean value for an illustration. The marginal effect of, say, growth may vary at different growth levels in non-linear model interactions.

Table A32: Effect of Diffusion on Democratization (Interaction Between Economic and Political Shocks)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Dem. neigh.	.396 (.152)***				.472 (.228)**			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		.534 (.333)				.593 (.569)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years			.277 (.245)				.509 (.435)	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years				.072 (.212)				.391 (.411)
% Dem. world	1.136 (.418)***	1.424 (.400)***	1.449 (.401)***	1.438 (.404)***	1.083 (.428)**	1.419 (.401)***	1.422 (.396)***	1.393 (.401)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.188 (.077)**	.157 (.078)**	.151 (.080)*	.167 (.079)**	.186 (.076)**	.155 (.078)**	.145 (.079)*	.159 (.079)**
Growth rate	-.019 (.014)	-.024 (.014)*	-.025 (.014)*	-.024 (.014)*	-.019 (.014)	-.023 (.014)*	-.024 (.014)*	-.024 (.014)*
Growth rate*Hegemonic power volatility	-.010 (.016)	-.0009 (.015)	.005 (.014)	-.0008 (.015)	-.009 (.017)	-.001 (.016)	.004 (.015)	-.0008 (.015)
GDP pc (logged)	.226 (.072)***	.273 (.068)***	.275 (.069)***	.276 (.068)***	.218 (.078)***	.274 (.068)***	.276 (.069)***	.276 (.069)***
Oil	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*
Muslim	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)
Catholic	.0006 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.0005 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Protestant	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.005 (.003)*	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)
Ethnic frac.	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)
Brit. col.	.012 (.136)	.002 (.138)	.003 (.139)	.007 (.139)	.049 (.137)	.005 (.137)	.005 (.139)	.007 (.139)
# Past trans.	.252 (.047)***	.264 (.044)***	.253 (.043)***	.263 (.044)***	.246 (.046)***	.266 (.044)***	.255 (.043)***	.262 (.044)***
N	5621	5587	5526	5459	5621	5587	5526	5459
Pseudolog-lik.	-472.325	-471.239	-468.388	-470.003	-473.089	-471.668	-468.338	-469.695

Note: Redoes Table 4 with an interaction term between economic and political shocks. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Table A33: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Interaction Between Economic and Political Shocks)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.059	.632			-.009	.811		
	(.109)	(.298)**			(.160)	(.398)**		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.263	1.706			-.300	-.308
			(.252)	(.620)***			(.506)	(1.023)
% Dem. world	.346	2.451	.405	3.255	.389	2.289	.407	3.276
	(.239)	(.813)***	(.234)*	(.841)***	(.249)	(.848)***	(.236)*	(.837)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.137	.074	.145	.051	.136	.078	.147	.060
	(.049)***	(.129)	(.051)***	(.137)	(.049)***	(.128)	(.051)***	(.133)
Growth rate	-.019	-.019	-.020	-.013	-.019	-.017	-.020	-.017
	(.010)**	(.028)	(.010)**	(.029)	(.010)**	(.028)	(.010)**	(.028)
Growth rate*Hegemonic power volatility	.003	-.011	.003	-.008	.003	-.010	.003	-.006
	(.014)	(.031)	(.014)	(.033)	(.014)	(.032)	(.014)	(.031)
GDP pc (logged)	-.085	.639	-.082	.837	-.078	.631	-.082	.824
	(.053)	(.205)***	(.052)	(.223)***	(.055)	(.209)***	(.052)	(.227)***
Oil	-6.68e-06	-.0005	-7.34e-06	-.0006	-8.12e-06	-.0005	-7.29e-06	-.0006
	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***	(1.00e-05)	(.0002)***
Muslim	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.001	-.0007	-.001	-.0006	-.0008
	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)	(.001)	(.003)	(.001)	(.004)
Catholic	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002	.003	-.002
	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.004)	(.001)**	(.003)	(.001)**	(.004)
Protestant	-.0003	.004	-.0008	.009	-.0003	.005	-.0008	.009
	(.002)	(.006)	(.002)	(.007)	(.002)	(.005)	(.002)	(.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0004	.006	.0005	.006	.0003	.006	.0005	.006
	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.004)	(.002)	(.003)*	(.002)	(.003)*
Religious frac.	-.003	.0004	-.003	.0008	-.003	.0004	-.003	.0001
	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)	(.002)*	(.004)	(.002)*	(.005)
Brit. col.	-.097	.235	-.093	.251	-.099	.267	-.094	.230
	(.092)	(.279)	(.093)	(.293)	(.093)	(.286)	(.093)	(.287)
# Past trans.	.152	.167	.156	.131	.155	.150	.155	.139
	(.049)***	(.090)*	(.049)***	(.108)	(.049)***	(.090)*	(.049)***	(.104)
N	5488	5488	5458	5458	5488	5488	5458	5458
Pseudolog-lik.	-1585.11		-1558.057		-1585.079		-1559.867	

Note: Redoes Table 5 with an interaction term between economic and political shocks. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

Figure A1: Marginal Effects of Growth Rate and Hegemonic Power Volatility



Note: Dashed lines give 95 percent confidence intervals. Based on model 1 of Table A33.

vice versa, the confidence intervals also become much wider and they overlap highly, which suggests that these changes are not statistically significant. In fact, whether *Growth rate* (or *Hegemonic power volatility*) is statistically significant or not does not depend on *Hegemonic power volatility* (*Growth rate*). The effect of economic contractions on authoritarian breakdowns is significant at the five percent level at all values of *Hegemonic power volatility*. Similarly, with the exception of countries experiencing a growth rate above about 18 percent – which represents less than one percent of our sample – the effect of political shocks on authoritarian reversals is always significant at the five percent level.

We conduct two types of tests to show that adding the interaction term between economic and political shocks does not improve over the models presented in Table 4 and 5 of the main text. First, likelihood-ratio tests suggest that adding the interaction term does not improve the fit of the model. The test statistic (which follows a chi-squared distribution) comparing models 1 of Tables 5 and A33 is 0.148.[2]

Second, based on model 1 of Table A33, we calculate the marginal effect of *Growth rate* on authoritarian breakdowns when *Hegemonic power volatility* is set at its mean along with a 95 percent confidence interval. We also calculate the marginal effect of *Growth rate* when *Hegemonic power volatility* is one standard deviation above its mean. Again, we compute a 95 percent confidence interval. We find that the two confidence intervals overlap. In fact, 99 percent of the confidence interval computed when *Hegemonic power volatility* is at its mean is contained within the confidence interval calculated when *Hegemonic power volatility* is one standard deviation above its mean. Similarly, 90.8 percent of the latter confidence interval is contained within the former confidence interval. Therefore, the marginal effect of *Growth rate* on authoritarian breakdowns when *Hegemonic power volatility* is set at its mean is not statistically different than its marginal effect when *Hegemonic power volatility* is one standard deviation above its mean. This suggests that the effect of *Growth rate* is not

[2]To be statistically significant at the five percent level, the test statistic would need to be at least 5.991.

conditional on *Hegemonic power volatility*. This is also easy to see from the top left panel of Figure A1, since the confidence intervals are largely overlapped across different *Hegemonic power volatility* values.

We have conducted the same exercise to test whether the marginal effect of *Hegemonic power volatility* is conditional on *Growth rate*. Again, we find that the marginal effect of *Hegemonic power volatility* on authoritarian breakdowns when *Growth rate* is at its means is not statistically different than its marginal effect when *Growth rate* is one standard deviation above its mean. This time 85.2 percent of the confidence interval calculated when *Growth rate* is at its mean is contained within the confidence interval when *Growth rate* is one standard deviation above its mean. Likewise, 92.5 percent of the latter confidence interval is contained within the former confidence interval.

3 Spatial Probit Model

Some scholars recommend using a spatial econometric model to test diffusion of democratization (e.g., Leeson and Dean 2009). For example, in a spatial autoregressive model (i.e., $Y = \rho WY + X\beta + u$), a weighting matrix W is designed to capture a country's neighbors, and the model tests if a country's decision to democratize is influenced by its neighbors' level of democracy (i.e., if ρ is positive and statistically significant). Since we use a binary dependent variable, we employ a spatial autoregressive probit model to examine diffusion of democratization as a robustness test.[3] That is, we test if ρ is positive and statistically significant in $Y^* = \rho WY^* + X\beta + u$, where Y^* is a latent variable.

We implement this spatial probit model using the gmmprobit command from the McSpatial package in R (McMillen 2013). Since we only include countries that begin the year as autocracies, our estimation captures whether democratization among neighbors within a given year induces democratization at home during that same year. Models of Table 4 in the main text are replicated,[4] and the results are shown in column 1 of Table A34.[5] As clearly demonstrated, the estimated ρ is $-.020$ and is statistically insignificant.[6] Put differently, our spatial probit model suggests that contrary to the prediction of diffusion of democratization, autocracies are not more likely to democratize when their neighbors democratize during the same year. This finding echoes our findings in the main text. Column 2 redoes model 1

[3]For instance, see LeSage and Pace (2009) for a discussion of spatial autoregressive probit models.

[4]Since a spatial model does not need to include an independent variable to measure diffusion, it has less missing observations than the models in Table 4.

[5]When the oil income variable is employed, this spatial probit model fails to converge because this variable is highly skewed. Instead, we use a dichotomous oil variable taken from Przeworski et al. 2000, which is equal to 1 if the average ratio of fuel exports to total exports in 1984-86 was greater than 50 percent, and 0 otherwise.

[6]This variable is labeled $WX\beta$ to denote WY^*.

without the control variable for the proportion of countries in the world that are democratic. Results are unchanged. In addition, the findings of other independent variables in Table A34 are consistent with our earlier results.

Table A34: Spatial Probit Estimation of Effect of Diffusion on Democratization

	(1)	(2)
$WX\beta$	-.020 (.069)	-.035 (.061)
% Dem. world	1.610 (.406)***	
Hegemonic power volatility	.149 (.067)**	.192 (.068)***
Growth rate	-.026 (.011)**	-.031 (.012)***
GDP pc (logged)	.260 (.066)***	.314 (.068)***
Oil	-.954 (.352)***	-.963 (.327)***
Muslim	-.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Catholic	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Protestant	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)
Ethnic frac.	.001 (.002)	.003 (.002)
Religious frac.	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.002)
Brit. col.	.012 (.138)	.089 (.135)
# Past trans.	.262 (.058)***	.286 (.059)***
N	6477	6477

Note: Spatial probit estimation ($Y^* = \rho WY^* + X\beta + u$). Standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. ***$p < .01$, **$p < .05$ and *$p < .1$.

We did not use spatial probit models as our main estimation technique because we believe the effect of diffusion occurs with at least one period lag. Put differently, neighbors' lagged level of democracy is more appropriate for the test of diffusion. Theoretically, it is difficult to justify a concurrent effect because it takes time for a country to observe and learn from its neighbors. Empirically, the yearly data does not offer information on the order of democratization when two or more countries democratize in the same year. Due to this data limitation, it is likely a later democratization is mistakenly assumed to have an effect on an earlier transition. Because of the temporal lags, the TSCS spatial autoregressive probit model can be estimated by a probit model (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley 2006).[7] The

[7]In addition, we assume the error terms are temporally independent in the spatial au-

implication for our test of the diffusion of democratization is that instead of using a spatial autoregressive probit model, one can simply introduce a variable, like ours, to measure diffusion.

toregressive probit model.

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