

Supplementary Materials for “The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal Court and Civil Conflict Termination”

Table A: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
ICC Involvement	.2427536	.4291362	0	1
Disparity in Civilian Deaths (ln)	2.319416	2.472629	0	7.860956
ICC Ratification	.2210145	.4153066	0	1
Number of Dyads (ln)	.7808855	.6592516	0	2.079442
Mixed Regime	.5815217	.4937569	0	1
Population (ln)	17.79932	1.512425	14.93741	20.94812
Balanced Intervention	.2355072	.4247003	0	1
Rebel Territorial Control	.3695652	.4831248	0	1
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	.0525362	.2233081	0	1
Rebel Legal Political Wing	.1467391	.3541666	0	1
Africa	.3496377	.477288	0	1
Duration	10.04348	11.174	1	50
Duration Squared	225.5036	454.4115	1	2500
Duration Cubed	7051.543	19224.25	1	125000
Observations	552			

Table B: Control Variables First Differences

	Model 1	Model 2
ICC Ratification	0.107 [0.030,0.185]	0.100 [0.023,0.177]
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.046 [-0.015,0.107]	0.056 [-0.003,0.114]
Mixed Regime	-0.078 [-0.166,0.011]	-0.071 [-0.159,0.016]
Population (ln)	-0.025 [-0.050,0.001]	-0.028 [-0.054,-0.003]
Balanced Intervention	-0.014 [-0.091,0.064]	-0.011 [-0.090,0.068]
Rebel Territorial Control	0.028 [-0.043,0.100]	0.049 [-0.022,0.120]
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.091 [-0.221,0.038]	-0.078 [-0.210,0.055]
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.082 [0.001,0.162]	0.074 [-0.002,0.150]
Africa	0.090 [0.004,0.177]	0.084 [-0.001,0.170]
Duration	-0.026 [-0.048,-0.004]	-0.021 [-0.043,0.001]
Duration Squared	0.001 [-0.001,0.002]	0.000 [-0.001,0.002]
Duration Cubed	-0.000 [-0.000,0.000]	-0.000 [-0.000,0.000]

Change in predicted probability reported. 95% CIs in brackets.

Table C: Multinomial Logit Results for Civil War Outcome

	Settlement vs. Ongoing	Victory vs. Ongoing	Low Activity vs. Ongoing
ICC Involvement	-1.331** (0.522)	-0.108 (0.825)	-0.819** (0.362)
ICC Ratification	1.087** (0.471)	0.958 (0.867)	0.752* (0.408)
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.601 (0.477)	0.255 (0.539)	0.334 (0.248)
Population (ln)	-0.709** (0.350)	-0.618 (0.453)	0.0344 (0.109)
Balanced Intervention	0.00889 (0.479)	0.209 (0.798)	-0.0713 (0.423)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.598 (0.506)	0.948 (0.704)	-0.133 (0.353)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-1.571 (1.182)	-0.573 (0.864)	-0.587 (0.673)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.0790 (0.725)	1.144* (0.620)	0.757** (0.373)
Africa	0.793 (0.522)	0.304 (0.603)	0.263 (0.370)
Duration	0.0831 (0.116)	-1.367*** (0.449)	-0.318** (0.139)
Duration Squared	-0.00835 (0.00723)	0.0907*** (0.0348)	0.0138 (0.0111)
Duration Cubed	0.000140 (0.000117)	-0.00158** (0.000662)	-0.000228 (0.000201)
Constant	8.565 (5.900)	8.079 (7.632)	-1.868 (1.965)
Observations	552		


Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Mixed Regime control excluded due to empty cells in the victory outcome category.

Table D: Logit Results using Alternative ICC Involvement Measures

	Dyad- Level ICC	Dyad- Level ICC	ICC Continuous	ICC Continuous	ICC Alt Coding	ICC Alt Coding
ICC Dyad-Level	-1.349*** (0.347)	-1.562*** (0.501)				
ICC Continuous			-0.195** (0.0848)	-0.413*** (0.158)		
ICC Restrictive					-0.872*** (0.311)	-1.375*** (0.473)
Disparity in Civilian Deaths		-0.114* (0.0619)		0.0211 (0.0862)		-0.138** (0.0623)
ICC Dyad-Level X Deaths Disparity		0.0805 (0.135)				
ICC Continuous X Deaths Disparity				0.0774* (0.0418)		
ICC Restrictive X Deaths Disparity						0.196 (0.130)
ICC Ratification	0.889*** (0.315)	0.818*** (0.313)	0.758** (0.316)	0.713** (0.316)	0.879*** (0.328)	0.825** (0.329)
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.381 (0.238)	0.465** (0.235)	0.349 (0.242)	0.436* (0.233)	0.400 (0.246)	0.483** (0.239)
Mixed Regime	-0.556 (0.362)	-0.511 (0.360)	-0.666* (0.358)	-0.607* (0.357)	-0.608* (0.366)	-0.563 (0.366)
Population (ln)	-0.201* (0.104)	-0.222** (0.104)	-0.186* (0.104)	-0.219** (0.105)	-0.200* (0.104)	-0.231** (0.104)
Balanced Intervention	-0.0865 (0.313)	-0.0951 (0.321)	-0.0927 (0.312)	-0.0802 (0.321)	-0.0974 (0.310)	-0.0873 (0.321)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.371 (0.288)	0.531* (0.299)	0.182 (0.286)	0.342 (0.292)	0.238 (0.288)	0.391 (0.293)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.944** (0.470)	-0.988** (0.477)	-0.730 (0.525)	-0.629 (0.541)	-0.709 (0.523)	-0.642 (0.544)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.611* (0.336)	0.596* (0.327)	0.641* (0.331)	0.583* (0.317)	0.654** (0.331)	0.602* (0.318)
Africa	0.628* (0.349)	0.674** (0.343)	0.769** (0.344)	0.720** (0.348)	0.704** (0.342)	0.689** (0.343)
Duration	-0.184* (0.0943)	-0.162* (0.0928)	-0.208** (0.0876)	-0.172** (0.0876)	-0.202** (0.0903)	-0.176* (0.0907)
Duration Squared	0.00474 (0.00699)	0.00321 (0.00689)	0.00631 (0.00640)	0.00389 (0.00646)	0.00593 (0.00665)	0.00421 (0.00677)
Duration Cubed	-0.0000491 (0.000125)	-0.0000252 (0.000123)	-0.0000739 (0.000115)	-0.0000363 (0.000115)	-0.0000676 (0.000119)	-0.0000412 (0.000121)
Constant	2.572 (1.897)	2.980 (1.904)	1.968 (1.911)	2.143 (1.948)	2.578 (1.880)	3.218* (1.889)
Observations	552	552	552	552	552	552

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Figure A: First Differences, Alternative ICC Variables



Note: 95% Confidence Intervals reported.
Baseline: No Active ICC Involvement


Table E: Logit Results using Alternative Domestic Punishment Risk Measures

	Cumulative Disparity	Responsible Leaders	Qualitative Disparity	Deaths Ratio
ICC Involvement	-0.981** (0.461)	-1.889** (0.902)	-1.263*** (0.421)	-1.339*** (0.409)
Cumulative Disparity in Civilian Deaths (ln)	-0.172*** (0.0628)			
ICC Involvement X Cumulative Disparity	0.0841 (0.101)			
Responsible Leaders		-0.0712 (0.347)		
ICC Involvement X Responsible Leaders		1.230 (0.911)		
Civilian Deaths Difference Dummy			-0.467 (0.322)	
ICC Involvement X Deaths Difference Dummy			0.781 (0.616)	
Civilian Deaths Ratio (ln)				-0.112* (0.0642)
ICC Involvement X Civilian Deaths Ratio				0.206 (0.128)
ICC Ratification	0.585 (0.358)	0.884*** (0.334)	0.829*** (0.321)	0.836*** (0.321)
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.498** (0.239)	0.387 (0.262)	0.420* (0.239)	0.414* (0.237)
Mixed Regime	-0.517 (0.354)	-0.771** (0.378)	-0.586 (0.364)	-0.582 (0.363)
Population (ln)	-0.230** (0.103)	-0.213* (0.114)	-0.212** (0.105)	-0.204** (0.103)
Balanced Intervention	-0.157 (0.315)	-0.101 (0.321)	-0.105 (0.315)	-0.110 (0.314)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.413 (0.276)	0.287 (0.298)	0.307 (0.285)	0.347 (0.285)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.760 (0.552)	-0.777 (0.574)	-0.607 (0.542)	-0.636 (0.531)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.597* (0.310)	0.764** (0.339)	0.600* (0.321)	0.595* (0.318)
Africa	0.777** (0.337)	0.648* (0.357)	0.677* (0.345)	0.656* (0.343)
Duration	-0.0883 (0.0976)	-0.216** (0.0993)	-0.180** (0.0891)	-0.185** (0.0896)
Duration Squared	-0.000146 (0.00668)	0.00668 (0.00766)	0.00447 (0.00665)	0.00468 (0.00670)
Duration Cubed	0.0000204 (0.000114)	-0.0000774 (0.000142)	-0.0000450 (0.000119)	-0.0000478 (0.000120)

Constant	3.176*	3.008	2.918	2.794
	(1.865)	(2.109)	(1.907)	(1.878)
Observations	552	529	552	552

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Figure B: First Differences, Alt. Domestic Punishment Risk Measures




Note: 95% Confidence Intervals reported.

Table F: Heckman Selection Models

	Model 1	Model 2
DV=Termination		
ICC Involvement	-0.602 ^{***} (0.204)	-1.046 ^{***} (0.323)
Disparity in Civilian Deaths (ln)		-0.0377 (0.0368)
ICC Involvement X Disparity in Civilian Deaths (ln)		0.135 (0.0950)
ICC Ratification	0.573 ^{**} (0.279)	0.552 [*] (0.289)
Number of Dyads (ln)	1.223 ^{***} (0.236)	1.246 ^{**} (0.239)
Mixed Regime	-0.340 (0.250)	-0.352 (0.253)
Population (ln)	-0.265 (0.162)	-0.271 (0.168)
Balanced Intervention	-0.0506 (0.166)	-0.0483 (0.173)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.0296 (0.196)	0.0234 (0.199)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.0992 (0.231)	0.00305 (0.270)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	-0.00200 (0.295)	-0.00912 (0.302)
Africa	0.215 (0.262)	0.189 (0.266)
Duration	-0.0248 (0.0495)	-0.00864 (0.0516)
Duration Squared	-0.000798 (0.00297)	-0.00161 (0.00316)
Duration Cubed	0.0000202 (0.0000450)	0.0000315 (0.0000482)
Constant	3.955 (3.280)	4.095 (3.391)
DV=Incidence		
GDP Per Capita (ln)	-0.270 ^{***} (0.0914)	-0.270 ^{***} (0.0915)
Population (ln)	0.433 ^{***} (0.0946)	0.433 ^{***} (0.0947)
ICC Ratification	-0.555 ^{***} (0.207)	-0.555 ^{***} (0.207)
Size of Excluded Ethnic Groups	1.132 ^{**} (0.479)	1.132 ^{**} (0.479)
Constant	-5.907 ^{***} (1.624)	-5.907 ^{***} (1.628)
Rho	-0.0885 (0.447)	-0.0851 (0.471)
Observations	1843	1843

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Figure C: Change in Predicted Probability of Termination
Heckman Models




Note: 95% Confidence Intervals reported.

Table G: Impact of ICC by Conflict Start Date

	Model 1
ICC Involvement	-1.660 (1.035)
Conflict Start Pre-ICC	0.491 (0.445)
ICC Involvement X Conflict Start Pre-ICC	0.803 (1.088)
ICC Ratification	0.803** (0.326)
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.390 (0.248)
Mixed Regime	-0.742** (0.377)
Population (ln)	-0.238** (0.107)
Balanced Intervention	-0.0418 (0.312)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.176 (0.291)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.784 (0.524)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.688** (0.328)
Africa	0.781** (0.370)
Duration	-0.136 (0.110)
Duration Squared	0.00355 (0.00755)
Duration Cubed	-0.0000383 (0.000135)
Constant	2.813 (1.878)
Observations	552

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on country. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Figure D: Impact of ICC By Conflict Start Date (Pre/Post ICC)
Baseline: No Active ICC Involvement



Note: 95% Confidence Intervals reported.
Difference in effects for Pre vs. Post-ICC not significant ($b=0.02$, $p=.79$)

Table H: Logit Results for Impact of ICC by Referral Type

	Model 1
ICC Involvement via State Referral	-1.032** (0.424)
ICC Involvement via Article 15 Referral	-1.533*** (0.485)
ICC Involvement via UNSC Referral	-0.239 (0.533)
ICC Ratification	1.078*** (0.353)
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.324 (0.238)
Mixed Regime	-0.511 (0.381)
Population (ln)	-0.184* (0.105)
Balanced Intervention	0.00234 (0.327)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.172 (0.286)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.651 (0.514)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.666** (0.323)
Africa	0.481 (0.389)
Duration	-0.197** (0.0937)
Duration Squared	0.00558 (0.00707)
Duration Cubed	-0.0000610 (0.000128)
Constant	2.358 (1.915)
Observations	552

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table I: Logit Results for Impact of ICC by Target Identity

	Model 1
ICC State-Targeted	-0.204 (0.434)
ICC Rebel-Targeted	-1.299** (0.529)
ICC Both-Targeted	-1.327*** (0.446)
ICC Ratification	0.910*** (0.325)
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.350 (0.235)
Mixed Regime	-0.630* (0.361)
Population (ln)	-0.183* (0.104)
Balanced Intervention	-0.0966 (0.312)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.314 (0.279)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.842* (0.495)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.571* (0.335)
Africa	0.745** (0.355)
Duration	-0.179* (0.0961)
Duration Squared	0.00448 (0.00712)
Duration Cubed	-0.0000444 (0.000128)
Constant	2.269 (1.891)
Observations	552

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table J: Tests of Endogeneity of ICC Involvement

	Test Statistic
Smith-Blundell Test	1.871 [0.171]
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test	1.70 [0.192]

Chi-square statistics reported. P-values in brackets.

Table K: Logit Results, Additional Controls

	Model 1	Model 2
ICC Involvement	-0.941 ^{***} (0.307)	-1.658 ^{***} (0.469)
Disparity in Civilian Deaths (ln)		-0.232 ^{***} (0.0698)
ICC Involvement X Disparity in Civilian Deaths (ln)		0.271 ^{**} (0.123)
Democracy	-0.334 (0.842)	-0.701 (0.805)
Repression	-0.162 (0.111)	-0.257 ^{**} (0.116)
Effective Judiciary	-0.661 (0.950)	-0.257 (0.968)
ICC Ratification	0.974 ^{**} (0.388)	0.937 ^{**} (0.399)
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.436 (0.305)	0.567 [*] (0.320)
Mixed Regime	-1.226 [*] (0.641)	-1.336 ^{**} (0.583)
Population (ln)	-0.275 ^{**} (0.112)	-0.363 ^{***} (0.119)
Balanced Intervention	-0.277 (0.368)	-0.261 (0.390)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.163 (0.326)	0.438 (0.323)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.354 (0.500)	-0.325 (0.530)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.651 [*] (0.345)	0.567 [*] (0.328)
Africa	0.762 ^{**} (0.381)	0.859 ^{**} (0.376)
Duration	-0.224 ^{**} (0.109)	-0.196 [*] (0.109)
Duration Squared	0.00718 (0.00809)	0.00524 (0.00820)
Duration Cubed	-0.0000870 (0.000146)	-0.0000564 (0.000148)
Constant	5.058 ^{**} (2.116)	7.004 ^{***} (2.266)
Observations	477	477

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table L: 2SLS Results (Full Results, see Table 2 Main Text)

	Model 1	Model 2	
Stage 1:	ICC Involvement	ICC Involvement	ICC Involvement X Death Disparity
P5 Affinity	0.346** (0.173)	0.327* (0.179)	
Contiguous Affinity	0.333*** (0.115)	0.314** (0.122)	
Contiguous Ratifiers	0.0583*** (0.0158)	0.0608*** (0.0160)	
ICC-hat X Deaths Disparity			1.222*** (0.0919)
Disparity in Civilian Deaths (ln)		0.0184* (0.00963)	-0.0758** (0.0321)
ICC Ratification	0.378*** (0.0788)	0.383*** (0.0775)	0.102 (0.158)
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.0730 (0.0532)	0.0678 (0.0535)	0.0518 (0.139)
Mixed Regime	0.117 (0.0723)	0.0978 (0.0698)	0.202 (0.165)
Population (ln)	-0.0354 (0.0324)	-0.0362 (0.0338)	-0.0647 (0.0648)
Balanced Intervention	-0.123** (0.0608)	-0.120* (0.0647)	-0.220 (0.165)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.121* (0.0645)	0.104 (0.0690)	-0.214 (0.173)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.0189 (0.0815)	-0.0140 (0.0921)	-0.394 (0.293)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.0450 (0.0617)	0.0479 (0.0611)	0.00177 (0.209)
Africa	-0.0606 (0.0804)	-0.0723 (0.0818)	0.0709 (0.174)
Contiguous Civil Conflicts	0.0412** (0.0195)	0.0400** (0.0199)	0.0632 (0.0500)
Transnational Ethnic Kin	0.0153 (0.0624)	0.00364 (0.0654)	-0.129 (0.161)
State Leader Tenure	0.0145 (0.0252)	0.0152 (0.0251)	-0.0164 (0.0779)
Duration	0.0241 (0.0159)	0.0216 (0.0167)	-0.0397 (0.0472)
Duration Squared	-0.00153 (0.000936)	-0.00139 (0.00101)	0.00240 (0.00278)
Duration Cubed	0.0000234 (0.0000144)	0.0000212 (0.0000156)	-0.0000331 (0.0000420)
Constant	0.00313 (0.509)	0.0271 (0.532)	1.167 (1.032)

Stage 2: Termination		
ICC Involvement	-1.170*** (0.429)	-2.183** (1.068)
Disparity in Civilian Deaths (ln)		-0.0541 (0.0866)
ICC Involvement X Deaths Disparity		0.0299 (0.195)
ICC Ratification	0.779*** (0.245)	1.427** (0.607)
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.191 (0.132)	0.336 (0.286)
Mixed Regime	-0.229 (0.195)	-0.567 (0.426)
Population (ln)	-0.242*** (0.0738)	-0.426*** (0.161)
Balanced Intervention	-0.0132 (0.178)	-0.0785 (0.395)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.244 (0.174)	0.445 (0.386)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.505* (0.302)	-0.925 (0.661)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.407** (0.188)	0.789** (0.369)
Africa	0.245 (0.201)	0.521 (0.443)
Contiguous Civil Conflicts	0.119** (0.0575)	0.201 (0.125)
Transnational Ethnic Kin	-0.471*** (0.179)	-0.708* (0.377)
State Leader Tenure	0.0384 (0.0831)	0.0851 (0.174)
Duration	-0.0668 (0.0499)	-0.107 (0.142)
Duration Squared	0.000301 (0.00338)	-0.000716 (0.0123)
Duration Cubed	0.00000753 (0.0000558)	0.0000332 (0.000271)
Constant	3.632*** (1.307)	6.527** (2.874)
Observations	552	552

Model 1: IV Probit. Model 2: OLS first stage, logit second stage with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. Based on 100 iterations, seed=2.

Instruments for Active ICC Involvement: P5 Affinity, Contiguous Affinity, and Contiguous Ratifiers.

Instruments for Interaction Term (Model 2): ICC fitted valuesXCivilian Death Disparity.


*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table M: 2SLS Second Stage Results, Robustness Checks

	Model 1 Mediation Added	Model 1 Continuous ICC	Model 2 Continuous ICC
ICC Involvement	-1.558** (0.688)		
ICC Continuous		-0.367*** (0.135)	-0.751** (0.345)
Disparity in Civilian Deaths (ln)			-0.000638 (0.109)
ICC Continuous X Deaths Disparity			0.0248 (0.0536)
ICC Ratification	0.810** (0.353)	0.772*** (0.240)	1.444** (0.607)
Number of Dyads (ln)	0.214 (0.171)	0.201 (0.129)	0.366 (0.288)
Mixed Regime	-0.136 (0.259)	-0.265 (0.193)	-0.638 (0.429)
Population (ln)	-0.318*** (0.102)	-0.252*** (0.0758)	-0.463*** (0.166)
Balanced Intervention	-0.305 (0.246)	-0.0458 (0.186)	-0.147 (0.411)
Rebel Territorial Control	0.422* (0.219)	0.250 (0.175)	0.479 (0.403)
Rebels at Parity or Stronger	-0.315 (0.515)	-0.500 (0.312)	-0.891 (0.648)
Rebel Legal Political Wing	0.661*** (0.215)	0.406** (0.192)	0.781** (0.370)
Africa	0.281 (0.309)	0.357* (0.203)	0.717 (0.472)
Contiguous Civil Conflicts	0.127* (0.0762)	0.148** (0.0599)	0.260* (0.136)
Transnational Ethnic Kin	-0.725*** (0.244)	-0.478*** (0.181)	-0.752** (0.371)
State Leader Tenure	0.0136 (0.129)	0.0628 (0.0873)	0.130 (0.178)
Mediation	-0.207 (0.212)		
Duration	-0.148** (0.0750)	-0.0681 (0.0491)	-0.108 (0.141)
Duration Squared	0.00755 (0.00602)	0.000454 (0.00330)	-0.000540 (0.0122)
Duration Cubed	-0.000163 (0.000128)	0.00000429 (0.0000542)	0.0000288 (0.000268)
Constant	5.341*** (1.843)	2.871** (1.303)	5.241* (2.835)
Observations	369	552	552

Stage 1 results suppressed. Model 1: IV Probit. Model 2: OLS first stage, logit second stage with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, clustered on dyad. Based on 100 iterations, seed=2. Instruments for Active ICC Involvement: P5 Affinity, Contiguous Affinity, and Contiguous Ratifiers. Instruments for Interaction Term (Model 2): ICC fitted valuesXCivilian Death Disparity. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Figure E: First Differences, Continuous ICC
Change in Pr(Termination) moving from ICC Min to Max



Note: 95% Confidence Intervals reported.

Table N: Coding Notes for ICC Involvement

State	Rebels	ICC (cntry level)	ICC (dyad level)	ICC alt coding (cntry level)	Relevant ICC Situation	Sources
Afghanistan	Taliban	1	1	1	Ongoing preliminary examination in Afghanistan focused on the conflict ongoing since 2001. Potential crimes by rebels (Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami), the Afghan government, and other pro-government forces (specifically the US) are under examination according to the Court's 2014 report on preliminary examinations. The examination potentially implicates all actors (both sides) in the Afghan situation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/63682F4E-49C8-445D-8C13-F310A4F3AEC2/284116/OTPreportonPreliminaryExaminations13December2011.pdf - http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Pre-Exam-2014.pdf - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/pe-ongoing/afghanistan/Pages/afghanistan.aspx - http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=164&regionSelect=3-Northern_Americas#
Afghanistan	Hezb-i-Islami	1	1	1	See above	See above
Central African Republic	UFDR	1	0	1	Ongoing investigation in CAR focused on alleged crimes committed during the early 2000s in the conflict that saw the Patasse regime deposed and the Bozize regime come to power. Country-level ICC involvement coded due to the ongoing investigation in the country, but dyad-level involvement not coded because the specific actors in this dyad do not appear to be directly implicated in the investigation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2005/Pages/otp%20prosecutor%20receives%20referral%20concerning%20central%20african%20republic.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2007/Pages/prosecutor%20opens%20investigation%20in%20the%20central%20african%20republic.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200105/Pages/situation%20icc-0105.aspx - http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25683279
Central African Republic	CPJP	1	0	1	See above	See above
Central African	Seleka	1	0	1	See above	See above

Republic						
Colombia	FARC	1	1	1	Ongoing preliminary examination in Colombia deals with war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated during the Colombian civil war. Implicated actors include: FARC, ELN, paramilitary groups, military officials, and politicians with ties to armed groups. Actors on both sides and in all dyads potentially implicated.	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA85-35BCFD2A7922/285102/OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterimReportNovember2012.pdf
Colombia	ELN	1	1	1	See above	See above
Colombia	EPL	1	1	1	See above	See above
Democratic Republic of Congo	CNDP	1	1	1	Ongoing investigation in DRC. Initially, the OTP focused on Ituri region, but the DRC referral in 2004 covered all of DRC, not geographically limited. In practice, it appears the court's investigations have focused on Ituri and Kivu regions. High-ranking member of CNDP (Ntaganda) faced charges.	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/prosecutor%20receives%20referral%20of%20the%20situation%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%20congo.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/Pages/situation%20index.aspx - https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/the-international-criminal-court/icc-investigations/28595.html https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28630.html
Democratic Republic of Congo	BDK	1	0	1	See above. ICC coded at the country level, but not the dyad level because this conflict is over Bas-Congo province in far western part of the country (opposite side as the Ituri and Kivu provinces), and because no leaders on either side of this dyad have been charged.	See above
Democratic Republic of Congo	M23	1	1	1	See above. ICC involvement at dyad and country level. Ntaganda, wanted by the	See above

Congo					ICC, was leader of M23 after splintering off from CNDP.	
Democratic Republic of Congo	Kata Katanga	1	0	1	See above. ICC coded at country level but not dyad level because this conflict is a separatist conflict over the Katanga region in south western DRC; not directly linked to the dyads/region with ICC involvement.	See above
Democratic Republic of Congo	APCLS	1	1	1	See above. APCLS fought with FDLR, one of the groups with leaders under investigation. Further, they are active in the North Kivu region, one of the areas where ICC investigations have taken place. Therefore both country level and dyad level ICC involvement coded.	See above
Democratic Republic of Congo	Forces of Paul Joseph Mukungubila	1	0	1	See above. ICC coded at country level but not at dyad level. This dyad is unrelated to the conflicts with ICC involvement.	See above
Georgia	Republic of South Ossetia	1	1	1	Ongoing preliminary examination in Georgia deals with alleged crimes committed in the context of the 2008 South Ossetia war (which involved Georgian forces, South Ossetian forces, and Russian forces). The examination appears to be focused on abuses by South Ossetian forces and Georgian forces, as well as potential abuses by Russian servicemen.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/pe-ongoing/georgia/Pages/pr625.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Pre-Exam-2014.pdf - http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C433C462-7C4E-4358-8A72-8D99FD00E8CD/285209/OTP2012ReportonPreliminaryExaminations22Nov2012.pdf
Iraq	Al-Mahdi Army	1	1	1	Preliminary examination in Iraq terminated in 2006. The examination focuses on alleged abuses that occurred since the start of the 2003 Iraq war. There are some jurisdictional issues that limit who the court can actually investigate. Specifically, because Iraq is not a State Party, the court only has jurisdiction over actions of nationals of state parties in Iraqi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/pe-ongoing/iraq/Pages/iraq.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/04D143C8-19FB-466C-AB77-4CDB2FDEBEF7/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf - http://justsecurity.org/10457/backgrounder-preliminary-

					territory. This, therefore, excludes examination of crimes committed by Iraqis or Americans, as neither is a state party. The examination appears, therefore, to focus on actions by the UK, though this is not explicitly stated in ICC documents. Because secondary warring parties with troop involvement are implicated by the examination, I code active ICC involvement for the conflict.	examination-united-kingdom-personnel-iraq/ - https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/the-international-criminal-court/icc-investigations/other-cases.html
Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	1	1	1	See above	See above
Iraq	ISI/Jama'at Al-Tawhid wa Al-Jihad	1	1	1	See above	See above
Iraq	RJF/Al-Jaysh al-Islami fi Iraq	1	1	1	See above	See above
Israel	PIJ	1	1	1	Preliminary examination concluded in 2012. Dealt with crimes allegedly committed in Gaza since 2002. Court ultimately decided it did not have jurisdiction because Palestine is not a state, and could therefore not accept the court's jurisdiction under article 12(3). The examination likely implicated Israel and possibly various Gaza rebel groups.	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf - http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/63682F4E-49C8-445D-8C13-F310A4F3AEC2/284116/OTPreportonPreliminaryExaminations13December2011.pdf
Israel	Hamas	1	1	1	See above	See above
Ivory Coast	FDSI-CI	1	0	1	Investigation ongoing in Ivory Coast. Initial examination of post-election violence from 2010 on, was later expanded to include investigations of possible crimes since 2002. Country-level ICC involvement coded, but not dyad level because the Quattara regime and the FDSI-CI are not clearly implicated in the ICC's	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1240553.pdf - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0211/Pages/situation%20index.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/Gbagbo-and-BleGoudeEng.pdf http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=40

					investigation of post-election violence, which focuses on the previous Gbagbo regime.	&regionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#
Libya	NTC	1	1	1	Ongoing investigation in Libya. Referral and investigation deal with crimes committed during the Libyan civil war in 2011, with warrants issued for members of the Gaddafi regime.	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/081A9013-B03D-4859-9D61-5D0B0F2F5EFA/0/1970Eng.pdf - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0111/Pages/situation%20index.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/GaddafiEng.pdf - https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/the-international-criminal-court/icc-investigations/libya.html
Libya	Forces of Muammar Gaddafi	1	1	1	See above	See above
Mali	Ansar Dine	1	1	1	Ongoing investigation in Mali involves alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali since January 2012. Specifically focused on crimes in the three northern regions of Mali associated with the civil conflict that began in Jan. 2012. On May 30, 2012, Malian cabinet made the public decision to refer crimes committed by “MNLA, AQIM, Ansar Dine, and other armed groups in the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu” to the ICC (paragraph 17, ICC public report on situation in Mali).	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news%20and%20highlights/Pages/pr869.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0112/Documents/SASMaliArticle53_1PublicReportENG16Jan2013.pdf
Mali	MNLA	1	1	1	See above	See above
Mali	MUJAO	1	1	1	See above	See above
Mali	AQIM	1	1	1	See above	See above
Mali	Signed-in-blood-Battalion	1	1	1	See above	See above
Nigeria	Boko Haram	1	1	1	Ongoing preliminary examination in Nigeria, focused on the Boko Haram	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/docs/SAS%20-%20NGA%20-

					conflict, the Niger Delta situation, Central and Northern states' inter-communal violence, and election-related violence.	%20Public%20version%20Article%205%20Report%20-%2005%20August%202013.PDF - http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Pre-Exam-2014.pdf
Russia	Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	1	0	0	Russian forces are potentially implicated in the Georgian examination (see Georgia above). ICC involvement coded at the country level because of coding criterion #2: at least one combatant is implicated in an ongoing examination or investigation. No ICC involvement coded in the alternative, more restrictive coding.	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/off%20ice%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/pe-ongoing/georgia/Pages/pr625.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Pre-Exam-2014.pdf - http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C433C462-7C4E-4358-8A72-8D99FD00E8CD/285209/OTP2012ReportonPreliminaryExaminations22Nov2012.pdf
Rwanda	FDLR	1	1	0	FDLR forces are implicated in the DRC examination because the leader of FDLR, Sylvestre Mudacumura, faces charges for his involvement in the DRC situation. Because the leader of FDLR is under investigation, this dyad is directly implicated in the ICC investigation. Country-level ICC is coded 1 because this meets the second criterion: at least one combatant is implicated in an ongoing examination or investigation. No ICC involvement coded in the alternative, more restrictive coding	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/prosecutor%20receives%20referral%20of%20the%20situation%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%20congo.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/Pages/situation%20index.aspx - https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/the-international-criminal-court/icc-investigations/28595.html https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28630.html
Sudan	SLM/A	1	1	1	Ongoing investigation in Sudan. The UNSC referred the situation in Darfur to the court, so the investigation is focused on crimes in the Darfur region specifically. Both government and rebel actors under investigation. Warrants for leaders of Sudanese government, leaders of Janjaweed militia, and leaders of URF and	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/85FEBD1A-29F8-4EC4-9566-48EDF55CC587/283244/N0529273.pdf - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2005/Pages/the%20prosecutor%20of%20the%20icc%20opens%20investigation%20in%20darfur.aspx - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2005/Pages/the%20prosecutor%20of%20the%20icc%20opens%20investigation%20in%20darfur.aspx

					JEM (rebel groups).	http://www.icc.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/Pages/situation%20icc-0205.aspx - http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article28043 http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=145&regionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#773
Sudan	JEM	1	1	1	See above	See above
Sudan	NRF	1	1	1	See above	See above
Sudan	SLM/A – MM	1	1	1	See above	See above
Sudan	SLM/A-Unity	1	1	1	See above	See above
Sudan	Forces of George Athor	1	0	1	See above. No dyad-level involvement coded because this dyad is not involved in the Darfur conflict	See above
Sudan	SPLM/A-North	1	0	1	See above. No dyad-level involvement coded because this dyad is not involved in the Darfur conflict	See above
Sudan	SSLM/A	1	0	1	See above. No dyad-level involvement coded because this dyad is not involved in the Darfur conflict	See above
Sudan	Republic of South Sudan	1	0	1	See above. No dyad-level involvement coded because this dyad is not involved in the Darfur conflict	See above
Sudan	SRF	1	1	1	See above	See above
Uganda	LRA	1	1	1	Ongoing investigation in Uganda: Museveni referred the situation regarding the LRA to the ICC in 2003. All dyads are coded as experiencing ICC involvement at the country level; at the dyad-level, only the LRA dyad is implicated.	- http://www.icc-int.org/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/president%20of%20uganda%20refers%20situation%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%20resistance%20army%20_lra_%20to%20the%20icc.aspx - http://www.icc-int.org/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/prosecutor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20court%20opens%20an%20investigation%20into%20northern%20uganda.aspx

						- http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/Pages/situation%20index.aspx
Uganda	ADF	1	0	1	See above	See above
USA	al-Qaida [The Base]	1	0	0	US forces are potentially implicated in the ongoing preliminary examination in Afghanistan (see Afghanistan above). Country-level icc involvement is therefore coded by criterion #2: at least one combatant is implicated in an ongoing examination or investigation. No ICC involvement coded in the alternative, more restrictive coding.	- http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/63682F4E-49C8-445D-8C13-F310A4F3AEC2/284116/OTPreportonPreliminaryExaminations13December2011.pdf - http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Pre-Exam-2014.pdf - http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/pe-ongoing/afghanistan/Pages/afghanistan.aspx http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=164&regionSelect=3-Northern_Americas#

