

**Appendix to “The Logic of ‘Offstage’ Signaling:
Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protégé Relations”
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Part 1: Searches for *New York Times* Articles

We searched the Proquest Historical Newspapers *New York Times* Database for articles mentioning each type of signal of support. We used the advanced search function and recorded the number of search results. Because of the different nature of each signal, each one required a slightly different search strategy.

For defense pacts, we identified all US defense pacts and drew a random sample of 250 defense pact-years for searching.

- For NATO, we searched for *North Atlantic Treaty Organization OR NATO*.
- For the Rio Pact, we searched for *Rio Treaty OR Rio Pact OR Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance*.
- For ANZUS, we searched for *ANZUS*.
- For bilateral defense pacts, we searched for *“Country Name” AND (ally OR alliance OR “defense pact” OR “defense commitment”)*.

For military aid, we identified all countries that received a level of aid in the top 10 percent given by the US in a particular year and drew a random sample of 250 military aid-years from this set for searching. For arms sales, we used the same procedure as for military aid.

- For military aid, we searched for *“Country Name” AND “military aid”*.
- For arms sales, we searched for *“Country Name” AND (“arms sales” OR “sell arms” OR “selling arms” OR “sold arms” OR “sells arms” OR “weapons sales” OR “sell weapons” OR “selling weapons” OR “sold weapons” OR “sells weapons”)*.

We searched for defense pacts, military aid, and arms sales by year because while all of these signals are given over prolonged periods of time, they are recorded on a yearly basis in our data sources (Gibler 2009; SIPRI 2014; USAID 2015). Since presidential visits abroad and foreign leader visits to the US are more discreet events, it does not make sense to search for them by year. Instead, we drew random samples of 250 presidential visits and 250 foreign leader visits from the lists provided by the Department of State (2015b; 2015c) and searched for articles mentioning them over a three-month period surrounding each visit.

- For presidential visits, we searched for *“President Name” AND (visit OR travel OR trip) AND “Country Name”*.
- For foreign leader visits, we searched for *“Leader Name” AND “Country Name” AND (visit OR travel OR trip)*.

The table below shows the differences between the means for the number of *NYT* search results in each category.

Table A1: Results from T-Tests for Difference in Means

	Difference	P-Value
Between Defense Pacts and Military Aid	190.144	<0.0001
Between Defense Pacts and Arms Sales	201.204	<0.0001
Between Presidential Visits and Military Aid	25.076	<0.0001
Between Presidential Visits and Arms Sales	36.136	<0.0001
Between Foreign Leader Visits and Military Aid	-6.9	0.0054
Between Foreign Leader and Arms Sales	4.16	0.0119
Between Military Aid and Arms Sales	11.06	<0.0001

Note: The means are per year or per visit.

Part 2: Summary Statistics and Variable Distributions

Table A2: Independent Variable Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Min	Max
Polity	0.282	7.463	-1	-10	10
US Rival MIDs	0.102	0.248	0	0	2.6
US Side MIDs	0.046	0.146	0	0	1.4
Other MIDs	0.326	0.561	0.2	0	11.8
UN Voting Similarity	-0.100	0.409	-0.146	-1	1
Russian Ally	0.075	0.264	0	0	1
Real GDP (trillions of \$)	0.138	0.340	0.026	0.0003	4.088
US Exports (billions of \$)	2.231	10.841	0.117	0	235.479
US Imports (billions of \$)	3.118	15.421	0.106	0	339.712
Distance from US (capital to capital)	55.192	21.753	52.74	4.55	101.71
Year	1982	16.313	1984	1950	2008

Table A3: Summary Statistics for Variables Used to Create Dependent Variable

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Min	Max
Frontstage					
Defense Pact	0.318	0.466	0	0	1
Visit (Presidential or Foreign)	0.259	0.438	0	0	1
Offstage					
Military Aid (in millions of \$)	0.086	0.504	0.0001	0	13.907
Arms Sales (in SIPRI units)	0.078	0.257	0	0	4.490

Here we also show more detailed distributions of the two continuous variables that are used in creating the dependent variable. In our main model, we only count these variables as signals of support if a country received a level of aid or arms that was in the top 10 percent provided by the US for all countries in the world in a particular year. We put the cutoff at 10 percent because this is the approximate point at which the level of these variables increases dramatically,¹ as shown in the graphs below:

Figure A1: Distribution of Military Aid Variable





Figure A2: Distribution of Arms Sales Variable



¹ In robustness checks, we use the top 50 percent and top 5 percent as well.

Part 3: Multinomial Models

The multinomial logit models in Table 4A replicate the results of the bivariate probit model in the main text. They compare the probability of a frontstage signal and the probability of an offstage signal alone to the probability of receiving no signal of support at all, which is the base category for the models.

Table A4: Multinomial Models

	Multinomial Logit	Multinomial Probit
Predicting Offstage Alone		
Polity	-0.098*** (0.027)	-0.051*** (0.016)
US Rival MIDs	0.776 (0.506)	0.641* (0.344)
US Side MIDs	4.190*** (0.994)	2.913*** (0.654)
Other MIDs	0.120 (0.191)	0.087 (0.145)
UN Voting Similarity	2.742*** (0.586)	1.744*** (0.303)
Russian Ally	-1.615*** (0.493)	-1.037*** (0.277)
Real GDP	1.874 (1.599)	1.347 (0.948)
US Exports	0.395** (0.169)	0.196*** (0.070)
US Imports	-0.062 (0.058)	-0.023 (0.029)
Distance	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.007)
Cold War	0.438	0.240

	(0.457)	(0.271)
Year	0.064 ^{***} (0.024)	0.036 ^{***} (0.012)
<hr/> Predicting Frontstage		
Polity	0.063 ^{***} (0.016)	0.052 ^{***} (0.013)
US Rival MIDs	0.553 (0.427)	0.513 (0.332)
US Side MIDs	3.743 ^{***} (0.944)	2.772 ^{***} (0.668)
Other MIDs	-0.011 (0.148)	-0.007 (0.120)
UN Voting Similarity	1.860 ^{***} (0.279)	1.502 ^{***} (0.218)
Russian Ally	-1.384 ^{***} (0.292)	-1.130 ^{***} (0.219)
Real GDP	2.166 (1.691)	1.722 [*] (1.034)
US Exports	0.416 ^{**} (0.167)	0.219 ^{***} (0.073)
US Imports	-0.082 (0.056)	-0.042 (0.030)
Distance	-0.042 ^{***} (0.006)	-0.034 ^{***} (0.005)
Cold War	0.497 ^{***} (0.175)	0.401 ^{***} (0.130)
Year	0.023 ^{***} (0.007)	0.019 ^{***} (0.005)

Note: The base category is no signal.

The multinomial model in Table 5A is estimated using a different dependent variable with four categories. The “no signal” and “offstage alone” categories are the same as in the previous models, but the “frontstage” category is split up into separate categories of “frontstage alone” and “frontstage and offstage together.” Our theory and hypotheses do not directly address which countries will receive frontstage and offstage signals together versus receiving frontstage signals alone. However, we speculate that the countries which receive both types of signals simultaneously are likely to be those that are most strategically important to the US and/or those that face the greatest threats. For these countries, offstage signals are not substitutes for frontstage ones, but are rather complements intended to enhance the effectiveness of frontstage signals.

The results in Table 5A are largely consistent with this prediction. When using “no signal” as the base category in the first column, we see further confirmation that more democratic countries are more likely than autocracies to receive frontstage signals of support, either with or without offstage signals. However, the recipient’s regime type does not offer much insight into the choice between sending frontstage signals *only* or frontstage *in conjunction with offstage* signals, since greater democracy increases the probability of both signaling choices. When the base category is changed to “frontstage only” in the second column, we are able to directly assess which factors make a country more likely to receive frontstage and offstage signals together rather than frontstage only. The results show that countries which have fought more MIDs with US rivals and countries that are farther away from the US are more likely to receive both types of signals together instead of only frontstage. The US was also more likely to send both types of signals together during the Cold War. Therefore, the evidence indicates that a country’s democracy level is a crucial predictor of whether it receives a frontstage signal of support *at all*, but other strategic international factors help to determine whether the frontstage signal will be accompanied by an offstage signal.

Table A5: Multinomial Logit Model with an Additional Category

	“No Signal” as Base Category	“Frontstage Only” as Base Category
Predicting No Signal		
Polity		-0.058 ^{***} (0.017)
US Rival MIDs		0.222 (0.483)
US Side MIDs		-3.511 ^{***} (0.927)
Other MIDs		0.128 (0.188)
UN Voting Similarity		-1.690 ^{***} (0.293)
Russian Ally		1.261 ^{***} (0.298)
Real GDP		-1.992 (1.647)
US Exports		-0.400 ^{**} (0.166)
US Imports		0.074 (0.055)
Distance		0.047 ^{***} (0.007)
Cold War		-0.338 [*] (0.186)
Year		-0.019 ^{**} (0.007)
Predicting Offstage Alone		
Polity	-0.096 ^{***} (0.027)	-0.154 ^{***} (0.029)
US Rival MIDs	0.960 [*]	1.183 ^{**}

	(0.514)	(0.519)
US Side MIDs	4.250 ^{***} (0.999)	0.738 (0.661)
Other MIDs	0.133 (0.199)	0.262 (0.212)
UN Voting Similarity	2.830 ^{***} (0.608)	1.140 [*] (0.657)
Russian Ally	-1.608 ^{***} (0.496)	-0.348 (0.530)
Real GDP	1.972 (1.663)	-0.019 (0.575)
US Exports	0.399 ^{**} (0.170)	-0.000 (0.028)
US Imports	-0.064 (0.058)	0.010 (0.023)
Distance	0.004 (0.012)	0.051 ^{***} (0.012)
Cold War	0.469 (0.459)	0.131 (0.457)
Year	0.065 ^{***} (0.024)	0.047 ^{**} (0.024)

Predicting Frontstage Alone

Polity	0.058 ^{***} (0.017)
US Rival MIDs	-0.222 (0.483)
US Side MIDs	3.511 ^{***} (0.927)
Other MIDs	-0.128 (0.188)
UN Voting Similarity	1.690 ^{***} (0.293)

Russian Ally	-1.261 ^{***} (0.298)
Real GDP	1.992 (1.647)
US Exports	0.400 ^{**} (0.166)
US Imports	-0.074 (0.055)
Distance	-0.047 ^{***} (0.007)
Cold War	0.338 [*] (0.186)
Year	0.019 ^{**} (0.007)

Predicting Frontstage and Offstage Together

Polity	0.073 ^{***} (0.023)	0.016 (0.021)
US Rival MIDs	1.539 ^{***} (0.502)	1.761 ^{***} (0.473)
US Side MIDs	4.224 ^{***} (1.051)	0.713 (0.535)
Other MIDs	0.155 (0.159)	0.284 (0.173)
UN Voting Similarity	2.401 ^{***} (0.457)	0.711 (0.441)
Russian Ally	-1.856 ^{***} (0.563)	-0.596 (0.540)
Real GDP	2.512 (1.841)	0.521 (0.417)
US Exports	0.452 ^{***} (0.167)	0.053 ^{***} (0.020)

US Imports	-0.104* (0.058)	-0.029* (0.017)
Distance	-0.025*** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.007)
Cold War	0.947*** (0.281)	0.609** (0.289)
Year	0.037** (0.014)	0.018 (0.015)

Note: Both columns show the results of the same multinomial logit model. It is only the base category that differs.

Part 4: Disaggregated Regressions

In order to account for differences between the different types of frontstage signals (defense pacts and leadership visits) and the different types of offstage signals (military aid and arms sales), we predict the four signals in a more disaggregated way. Table A6 shows the results of a structural equation model that includes four equations with correlated error terms – one predicting the existence of a defense pact, a second predicting whether a visit took place, a third predicting the log of military aid, and a fourth predicting the log of arms sales. The model is estimated using Stata’s gsem command.

Table A6: Structural Equation Model with Four Equations

	Predicting Defense Pact	Predicting Visits	Predicting Military Aid	Predicting Arms Sales
Polity	0.014*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
US Rival MIDs	0.093*** (0.020)	0.079*** (0.023)	0.167*** (0.010)	0.194*** (0.008)
US Side MIDs	0.187*** (0.034)	0.207*** (0.040)	0.121*** (0.017)	0.010 (0.014)
Other MIDs	-0.026*** (0.007)	0.015* (0.009)	0.030*** (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)
UN Voting Similarity	0.204*** (0.015)	0.105*** (0.017)	0.072*** (0.007)	0.085*** (0.006)
Russian Ally	-0.241*** (0.016)	-0.034* (0.018)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.020*** (0.006)
Real GDP	0.275*** (0.018)	0.292*** (0.021)	-0.080*** (0.009)	0.124*** (0.007)
US Exports	0.012*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
US Imports	-0.010***	-0.007***	0.000	-0.002***

	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Distance	-0.009*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Cold War	0.086*** (0.015)	0.043** (0.017)	0.006 (0.007)	0.036*** (0.006)
Year	0.001 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Observations	7187			

The estimates of the covariances among the error terms produced by the `gsem` command confirm that the errors are correlated, making this type of model necessary. The biggest shortcoming of the `gsem` command is that it cannot estimate equations that have both limited dependent variables and correlated errors. Therefore, we treat all four dependent variables as continuous for purposes of this estimation. Despite the small amount of bias that likely results from this, we find that the results for predicting defense pacts and visits individually both resemble our original results for predicting frontstage signals as a whole. Polity is a positive and highly significant predictor of both defense pacts and visits, and most control variables have the same signs.

In contrast, the results for predicting military aid and arms sales in the structural equation model above are quite different from the results for predicting offstage signals alone in the bivariate probit model and the multinomial models. In particular, Polity is positive and significant rather than negative and significant. However, this is to be expected because this model does not make any distinction between military aid/arms sales given alone and military aid/arms sales given together with frontstage signals. As explained in our article, this distinction is crucial.

In order to incorporate this distinction into our disaggregated analysis, we drop all country-years with a visit or defense pact from our sample and estimate a new structural equation model consisting of

only two equations with correlated errors – one predicting the log of military aid and the other predicting the log of arms sales. In this case, Table A7 shows that the results more closely replicate our original results, with Polity being shown to be a negative and significant predictor of both military aid and arms sales. This suggests that among countries that do not receive alliances or visits, the more democratic ones are the ones that the US simply does not care about enough to signal support for, whereas the less democratic ones are more likely to be countries that the US does care about but cannot signal support for publicly. Therefore, the less democratic countries are more likely to get military aid and arms sales.

Table A7: Structural Equation Model with Offstage Only Equations

	Predicting Military Aid	Predicting Arms Sales
Polity	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
US Rival MIDs	0.015** (0.007)	0.016** (0.007)
US Side MIDs	0.229*** (0.017)	0.142*** (0.018)
Other MIDs	0.003** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
UN Voting Similarity	0.023*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)
Russian Ally	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.004)
Real GDP	0.047*** (0.012)	0.081*** (0.014)
US Exports	0.001 (0.001)	0.033*** (0.002)

US Imports	-0.003 ^{***} (0.001)	-0.006 ^{***} (0.001)
Distance	0.000 ^{**} (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Cold War	-0.008 ^{**} (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Year	-0.000 ^{***} (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<hr/>		
Observations	3415	
<hr/>		

Note: Observations with defense pacts and leadership visits are dropped.

Part 5: Robustness Check Results

The following pages contain robustness check results tables. In most tables, **we omit the control variable results** in order to be able to view the results on one or two pages. We only include results for *new* control variables of substantive interest in the regression in which they are introduced. As before, all independent variables are lagged one year except those related to distance and time, and standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A8: Alternate Regime Measures

	Polity Dummy	Unified Democracy instead of Polity	Freedom of Expression instead of Polity	Personalist and Non-Personalist instead of Polity	Islamic and Non-Islamic Autocracies instead of Polity
Predicting Frontstage Signals					
Polity Dummy	0.504*** (0.135)				
Unified Democracy Score		0.332*** (0.096)			
Empowerment Rights Index			0.092*** (0.019)		
Non-Personalist Autocracy				-0.566*** (0.152)	
Personalist Autocracy				-0.714*** (0.168)	
Islamic Autocracy					-0.820*** (0.161)
Non-Islamic Autocracy					-0.314** (0.149)

Predicting Offstage Signals Alone					
Polity Dummy	-0.892 ^{***}				
	(0.198)				
Unified Democracy Score		-0.457 ^{***}			
		(0.114)			
Empowerment Rights Index			-0.076 ^{**}		
			(0.030)		
Non-Personalist Autocracy				1.155 ^{***}	
				(0.259)	
Personalist Autocracy				0.869 ^{***}	
				(0.331)	
Islamic Autocracy					1.160 ^{***}
					(0.231)
Non-Islamic Autocracy					0.655 ^{***}
					(0.206)
Observations	7187	7259	3746	6687	7187

Note: The Unified Democracy score does not have missing values for foreign-imposed regime interruptions, so it allows more observations to be included than Polity. The next two measures cover fewer years than Polity.

Table A9: Address Alternate Explanations

	Move Visits to Other Category	Control for Internal Instability	Drop Countries with Defense Pacts
Predicting Frontstage Signals			
Polity	0.048*** (0.014)	0.044*** (0.009)	0.024*** (0.006)
Civil War		0.015 (0.162)	
Recent Irregular Power Transition		0.177* (0.105)	
Predicting Offstage Signals Alone			
Polity	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.062*** (0.014)	-0.051*** (0.013)
Civil War		-0.279* (0.167)	
Recent Irregular Power Transition		-0.008 (0.142)	
Observations	7187	7187	4848

Table A10: Inertia Controls and Fixed Effects

	Control for Time since Signal Change	Lagged DVs	Region FEs	President FEs
Predicting Frontstage Signals				
Polity	0.037*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.039*** (0.009)
Predicting Offstage Signals Alone				
Polity	-0.069*** (0.012)	-0.046*** (0.011)	-0.058*** (0.015)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Observations	7187	7187	7187	7187

Table A11: Exploring Causal Mechanisms in More Detail

	Interaction with Post-1975 Dummy	Interaction with Post-1983 Dummy	Interaction with Opposition in Congress	Interaction with Opposition in Congress, Dropping Allies
Predicting Frontstage Signals				
Polity	0.030 ^{***} (0.012)	0.031 ^{***} (0.011)	0.001 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.015)
Post-1975	0.145 [*] (0.080)			
Polity X Post-1975	0.019 [*] (0.010)			
Post-1985		0.157 (0.102)		
Polity X Post-1985		0.020 [*] (0.011)		
% of Opposition Seats in Congress			0.007 ^{***} (0.002)	0.006 ^{**} (0.002)
Polity X % Opp. Seats on Congress			0.001 ^{***} (0.000)	0.001 ^{**} (0.000)
Predicting Offstage Signals Alone				
Polity	-0.053 ^{***} (0.015)	-0.056 ^{***} (0.012)	-0.048 [*] (0.026)	-0.036 (0.031)
Post-1975	0.397 ^{***} (0.142)			
Polity X Post-1975	-0.004 (0.019)			
Post-1985		0.347 ^{**} (0.154)		
Polity X Post-1985		-0.005 (0.013)		

% of Opposition Seats in Congress			-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)
Polity X % Opp. Seats on Congress			-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Observations	7187	7187	7187	4848

Table A12: Tests Mentioned Briefly, Part 1

	Drop Countries with MID against US in Last 5 Years	Lower Threshold for Offstage Signals	Higher Threshold for Offstage Signals	10% Threshold in Terms of Recipient GDP
Predicting Frontstage Signals				
Polity	0.040*** (0.009)	0.040*** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.009)	0.042*** (0.009)
Predicting Offstage Signals Alone				
Polity	-0.064*** (0.014)	-0.028*** (0.008)	-0.079*** (0.021)	-0.043*** (0.010)
Observations	6660	7187	7187	7187

Table A13: Tests Mentioned Briefly, Part 2

	Drop Latin America to Remove Rio Pact	Drop NATO	ATOP Measure	Drop Controls with Missing Values
Predicting Frontstage Signals				
Polity	0.040 ^{***} (0.007)	0.039 ^{***} (0.009)	0.035 ^{***} (0.009)	0.066 ^{***} (0.010)
Predicting Offstage Signals Alone				
Polity	-0.059 ^{***} (0.015)	-0.060 ^{***} (0.014)	-0.056 ^{***} (0.017)	-0.039 ^{***} (0.012)
Observations	5891	6463	6423	7210

Table A14: Tests Mentioned Briefly, Part 3

	Cold War Only	Post-Cold War Only	10-Year Lags	Drop Signals Sent in US Wars
Predicting Frontstage Signals				
Polity	0.032 ^{***} (0.010)	0.074 ^{***} (0.012)	0.033 ^{***} (0.009)	0.042 ^{***} (0.009)
Predicting Offstage Signals Alone				
Polity	-0.072 ^{***} (0.013)	-0.054 ^{***} (0.019)	-0.062 ^{***} (0.014)	-0.062 ^{***} (0.015)
Observations	4594	2593	5767	7176

Note: We only show a 10-year lag here, but shorter lags also produce similar results. In the last column, we drop South Korea during the Korean War, South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, and Afghanistan and Iraq after the US invasions.