A TWO-STAGE APPROACH TO CIVIL CONFLICT:

CONTESTED INCOMPATIBILITIES AND ARMED VIOLENCE

ONLINE APPENDIX

This online appendix contains:

1. The CONIAS validation procedure (pp. 2–82)

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1. The CONIAS Validation Procedure

Comparing CONIAS to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset

In an initial step, we compared the CONIAS violent categories to armed conflicts coded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset[1] (hereafter UCDP/PRIO). We present the operational definitions employed in the two datasets, discussing their differences and similarities, before turning to a more formal comparison of the two datasets using descriptive and multivariate statistics. CONIAS defines "political conflict" (as the base category) as

> a positional difference, regarding values relevant to a society—the conflict items—between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do so.[2]

While the base definition is rather broad and arguably imprecise from an operational perspective,[3] the elements constituting it are defined more specifically.[4]

- *Conflict Actor:*

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[1] Gleditsch et al. 2002; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016.

[2] Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2014, 8.

[3] Note that the original version of *Conflict Barometer* (where the CONIAS methodology is presented; see Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2014, 8–10) is in German, and the English version quoted here is the project's own direct translation.

[4] The direct quotations below are all from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2014, 8–10.

can be either an individual, a state, an international organization or a non-state actor. Collective actors are distinguished from one another through their internal cohesion and internally shared goals. An actor is regarded as decisive if his existence, actions, and communications considerably alter the practices of at least one other conflict actor pertaining to the conflict item.

- *Conflict Measures:*

actions and communications carried out by a conflict actor in the context of a political conflict. They are constitutive for an identifiable conflict if they lie outside established procedures of conflict regulations and—possibly in conjunction with other conflict measures—if they threaten the international order or a core function of the states.

- *Established Regulatory Procedures:*

those mechanisms of conflict management that are accepted by the conflict actors. Examples may include elections and court proceedings. The use of physical violence, however, is never considered to be an established regulatory procedure.

- *Core State Functions:*

encompass providing security of a population, integrity of a territory and of a specific political, socioeconomic or cultural order.

- *Conflict Items:*

Conflict items are material or immaterial goods pursued by conflict actors via conflict measures… The catalog of conflict items… covers ten different items. System/Ideology is encoded if a conflict actor aspires a change of the ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicial orientation of the political system or changing the regime type itself. National power means the power to govern a state. Whereas Autonomy refers to attaining or extending political self-rule of a population within a state or of a dependent territory without striving for independence, Secession refers to the

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aspired separation of a part of a territory of a state aiming to establish a new state or to merge with another state. Furthermore, Decolonization aims at the independence of a dependent territory. Subnational predominance focuses on the attainment of the de-facto control by a government, a non-state organization or a population over a territory or a population. The item Resources is encoded if the possession of natural resources or raw materials, or the profits gained thereof, is pursued. Territory means a change of the course of an international border, while International Power as an item describes the change aspired in the power constellation in the international system or a regional system therein, especially by changing military capabilities or the political or economic influence of a state.

In addition to the definitions of the elements that constitute the base category of political conflict, CONIAS provides a definition of conflict intensity based on which incompatibilities are coded "violent" and "non-violent:"

> Conflict intensity is an attribute of the sum of conflict measures in a specific political conflict in a geographic area and a given space of time… the HIIK has been using a five-level model… dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war and war. The last three levels constitute the category of violent conflict, in contrast to the non-violent conflicts… Whereas a dispute is a political conflict carried out completely without resorting to violence, in a non-violent crisis one of the actors is threatening with violence.

CONIAS uses five proxies to code the three levels of violence: the use of weapons and personnel (which constitute "conflict means"), the number of casualties, destruction, and refugees/internally displaced persons (which constitute "conflict consequences"). The coding procedure follows these steps:

- *Weapons:*

First, the conflict observer evaluates the type of weapon and the manner in which it was used in a measure. A catalogue of keywords helps to distinguish light from heavy weapons and to evaluate the severity of the weapon's employment.

- *Personnel*:

Second, the observer identifies the conflict measure of an analyzed region-month in which the highest number of personnel was employed. He or she then distinguishes between low, medium, and high numbers of personnel, based on two thresholds: 50 and 400 persons.

- *Casualties:*

Third, the observer evaluates the overall number of casualties in the conflict region-month. The thresholds employed here are 20 and 60 persons killed.

- *Destruction:*

Fourth, the degree of destruction resulting from the conflict during the whole month and within the subnational unit is determined in four dimensions considered essential for civil populations: infrastructure, accommodation, economy and culture.

- *Refugees & IDPs*

Last, the conflict observer evaluates the overall number of cross-border refugees as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a region-month. The thresholds employed here are 1000 and 20000 refugees.

Following these thresholds, every region-month (or country-month)[5] of a conflict is assigned an aggregate value that indicates the violence level (i.e., violent crisis, limited war, and war; see the original source for the details on the actual aggregation procedure). Country-month intensities are then used to generate an aggregate region-year (country-year) score. The country-year level of violence is equal to the maximum country-month intensity in a given country-year. For example, if a country experienced at least one country-month of a highest violence level, war, the country-year is assigned the level of war.

The country-year levels of violence can be adjusted based on the total annual number of casualties or refugees. A violent crisis is upgraded to a limited war if it generates more than 360 casualties or more than 18,000 refugees in a year. A limited war is upgraded to a war if it generates more than 1,080 casualties or more than 360,000 refugees in a year. Conversely, a limited war is downgraded to a violent crisis if it generates fewer than 120 casualties and fewer than 6,000 refugees annually, and a war is downgraded to a limited war if it generates fewer than 360 casualties and 120,000 refugees in a year.

UCDP/PRIO defines armed conflict as

> A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.[6]

The elements that constitute this base definition are defined as follows.

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[5] Note that HIIK codes sub-national units on a monthly basis, which are then aggregated to produce country-year scores.

[6] The direct quotations here and below are all from Themnér 2016, 1–3.

- *Use of armed force:*

  use of arms, resulting in deaths.

- *Arms:*

  Any material means, e.g., manufactured weapons but also sticks, stones, fire, water, etc.

- *25 deaths:*

  A minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and per dyad in an incompatibility.

- *Party:*

  A government of a state or any opposition organization or alliance of organizations… At least one
  of the primary parties is the government of a state.

- *Government:*

  The party controlling the capital of a state.

- *Opposition organization:*

  Any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed
  force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility… The UCDP only deals with formally
  organized opposition. The focus is on armed conflict involving consciously conducted and
  planned political campaigns rather than spontaneous violence.

- *Dyad:*

  A dyad consists of two conflicting primary parties. At least one of the primary parties must be the
  government of a state… In intrastate and extrasystemic conflicts, the non-governmental primary
  party includes one or more opposition organization(s).

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- *State:*

  A state is an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specific territory or an internationally recognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory.

- *Incompatibility concerning government or territory*:

  The incompatibility, as stated by the parties, must concern government and/or territory… *Incompatibility*: The stated general incompatible positions. *Incompatibility concerning government*: Incompatibility concerning type of political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition. *Incompatibility concerning territory*: Incompatibility concerning the status of a territory, e.g., the change of the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict), secession or autonomy (internal conflict).

As indicated above, the base definitions of conflict/incompatibility in CONIAS and UCDP/PRIO are different, since the former aims to cover both non-violent and violent categories and the latter only violent ones. However, the definitions of the separate elements constituting the two base definitions correspond in many respects. For example, both focus on incompatibilities concerning government or territory. In CONIAS, incompatibilities or "conflict items" are subdivided into particular categories—system/ideology, national power, autonomy, secession, and subnational predominance (other conflict items, decolonization, territory, resources, and international power, concern decolonization or international conflicts, which we exclude from our analysis)—all of which are essentially sub-types of governmental or territorial incompatibilities coded in UCDP/PRIO.

UCDP/PRIO focuses on conflict dyads where at least one party is a state government. CONIAS focuses on all types of dyads, including dyads of non-state actors. However, CONIAS provides dyad names, which allows excluding all dyads that do not involve state conflict (i.e., non-state conflicts).

CONIAS aims to capture non-violent and violent categories; for an event to be included in CONIAS, it must therefore be characterized by actions that "lie outside established procedures of conflict regulations". However, the definition also stipulates that the "use of physical violence… is never considered to be an established regulatory procedure", which, for violent categories, corresponds to the UCDP/PRIO criteria of the use of armed force.

To be included in UCDP/PRIO, an incompatibility has to generate at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year (in addition to fulfilling the above-mentioned qualitative criteria). There is no such threshold for inclusion in the CONIAS violent conflict category: as long as an incompatibility involves the use of physical violence (and satisfies the above-indicated qualitative criteria), it is considered a violent conflict. The CONIAS violent categories thus include a number of smaller-scale armed conflicts that fall outside the UCDP/PRIO definition, such as the conflicts between the government of Bhutan and Assam separatists (onset year: 2003), the government of Chile and Mapuches (onset year: 2008), and the government of Italy and the Red Brigades (onset year: 1978). CONIAS therefore also codes many conflict onsets with an earlier date than UCDP/PRIO.

UCDP/PRIO also requires conflict actors to be formally organized and having announced a name for their group, whereas CONIAS applies the criterion of "internal cohesion and internally shared goals" (which is arguably more ambivalent in an operational sense). CONIAS

therefore includes a number of armed conflicts in which parties have no clear formal organization, such as the Albanian Civil War of 1997 or the 1992 Los Angeles riots.

In sum, the CONIAS definition of violent conflict is considerably more inclusive than that of UCDP/PRIO. CONIAS 3–5 categories (i.e., violent crisis, limited war, and war) contain 2,063 conflict years and 413 conflict onsets for 1946–2008, compared to 1,265 conflict years and 284 onsets for the same period in UCDP/PRIO (note that these numbers are generated using the two-year intermittency rule and when two or more conflicts in a year are coded as one).

The CONIAS 4 and 5 categories (i.e., limited war and war) match the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict to a greater extent. A conflict can qualify for a category of limited war in several ways. For example, it has to either involve the use of heavy weapons AND generate more than 20 deaths in at least one month AND more than 120 in a year; or involve the use of heavy weapons AND generate more than 1,000 refugees/IDPs in at least one month AND 6,000 refugees/IDPs in a year. Alternatively, a conflict can qualify as a limited war if it generates more than 360 deaths OR more than 360,000 refugees/IDPs in a year (irrespective of the weapons employed). See the original source for other combinations qualifying for different CONIAS violence levels. In total, *CONIAS 4–5* contains 1,036 conflict years and 250 conflict onsets, which, compared to *CONIAS 3–5*, better matches the incidence and onset of the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict.

We now turn to a graphic comparison of the incidence time trends of *CONIAS 3–5, CONIAS 4–5*, and the UCDP/PRIO conflict. Figure OA1 indicates that the incidence of *CONIAS 3–5* has been steadily increasing since the end of World War II, but—after a peak in the early 1990s—considerably declined. This pattern is also reflected in UCDP/PRIO. Unlike the

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UCDP/PRIO armed conflicts, however, the CONIAS armed conflicts started again increasing in the late 1990s and reached a second peak in the mid-2000s (declining again thereafter).


Figure OA1. *Armed Conflict Incidence, 1946–2008: Comparing UCDP/PRIO and CONIAS*

When we use the stricter *CONIAS 4–5* category, its incidence approximates that of UCDP/PRIO much more closely. However, we find that the correlation between the incidence of *CONIAS 3–5* and the incidence of UCDP/PRIO armed conflict is higher than the correlation between the latter and the incidence of *CONIAS 4–5* ($r = 0.60$ and 0.54, respectively). (Although agreement statistics indicate more similar overlaps: percentage agreement = 86.57% and 89.93%; *Krippendorff's α = .57* and .57, respectively).

We also find that the estimates of a replication of Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014) based on *CONIAS 3–5* rather than *CONIAS 4–5* are more in line with the original estimates based on UCDP/PRIO data (see Table OA1 below). In the analyses reported in the

main text, we therefore use *CONIAS 3–5* as our main outcome variable (in Stage 2) and *CONIAS 4–5* as an alternative in robustness tests.

Table OA1. Replication of Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014): Comparing CONIAS 3–5 and CONIAS 4–5 to the UCDP/PRIO armed conflicts

	(1) Expanded BCG	(2) Expanded BCG CONIAS 3-5	(3) Expanded BCG CONIAS 4-5
ELF	0.838*	0.659*	0.230
	(0.412)	(0.335)	(0.494)
Gini	-0.000	0.007	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.013)
LDG	0.823*	0.818*	0.813
	(0.359)	(0.404)	(0.573)
PHI	-0.101	0.137	-0.068
	(0.139)	(0.091)	(0.156)
NHI	0.333**	0.027	0.036
	(0.121)	(0.071)	(0.107)
Downgrade	0.858***	0.367	0.574*
	(0.250)	(0.285)	(0.267)
Power-sharing	0.005	-0.145	-0.009
	(0.221)	(0.173)	(0.233)
Democracy	0.285	0.079	0.382
	(0.334)	(0.184)	(0.267)
Population	0.231***	0.393***	0.359***
	(0.067)	(0.055)	(0.056)
GDP per capita	-0.467***	-0.211*	-0.511***
	(0.126)	(0.101)	(0.133)
Constant	-6.275***	-7.442***	-7.248***
	(0.810)	(0.745)	(0.975)
N	6111	6058	6058
AIC	1476.008	2209.011	1439.974

Clustered standard errors in parentheses
Variables accounting for time-dependence (i.e., one-year dependent variable lags) not reported
$^+p < 0.10$, $^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

In sum, this comparison indicates considerable overlap between the UCDP/PRIO and CONIAS violent categories—comparable to the overlap between other conflict datasets[7]—and that the estimated effects of some commonly employed variables on the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict are similar to their estimated effects on the CONIAS armed conflict(s). While this does not speak directly to the validity of the CONIAS non-violent

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[7] See Sambanis 2004: 834.

categories, it implies that the CONIAS coding rules produce a list of violent categories corresponding to the list of violent categories of a well-established dataset.

Comparing CONIAS to NAVCO

We now turn to a comparison of CONIAS and NAVCO 2.0 (hereafter NAVCO) datasets.[8] While there are substantial differences, NAVCO is arguably the only extant dataset that codes non-violent incompatibilities comparable to those in CONIAS. As in the comparison above, we start with definitional issues (and then turn to descriptive statistics). NAVCO defines mass campaigns as

> a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political
> objective. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the tactics used are overt and documented. A
> campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off
> events or revolts. Campaigns are also purposive, meaning that they are consciously acting with a
> specific objective in mind, such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a domestic
> regime. Campaigns have discernable leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from
> random riots or spontaneous mass acts.[9]

Furthermore, NAVCO stipulates that campaigns must hold

> "maximalist" goals of overthrowing the existing regime, expelling foreign occupations, or
> achieving self-determination. They are also "mature" campaigns, in the sense that they have at
> least 1,000 observed participants and a coherent organization linking tactics to one another over
> time.

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[8] Chenoweth and Lewis 2013a.

[9] All direct quotations are from Chenoweth and Lewis 2013b.

Most importantly for the comparison with CONIAS, NAVCO distinguishes between non-violent and violent campaigns, or rather "primarily nonviolent" and "primarily violent" campaigns based on the primacy of resistance methods. Nonviolent resistance

> does not directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of the opponent. Sharp (1973) has
> identified nearly 200 nonviolent resistance tactics, such as sit-ins, protests, boycotts, civil
> disobedience, and strikes, among many others. When a campaign relies primarily on nonviolent
> methods such as these as opposed to violent or armed tactics, the campaign can be characterized as
> nonviolent…Campaigns where a significant amount of violence occurred are characterized as
> "violent." Violent resistance involves the use of force to physically harm or threaten to harm the
> opponent. Violent campaign data are primarily derived from Kristian Gleditsch's 2004 updates to
> the Correlates of War database on intra-state wars (COW)… The COW dataset requires 1,000
> battle deaths to have occurred during the course of the conflict.

The base definitions of conflict/mass campaign correspond in some respects. Both CONIAS and NAVCO require that conflicts/mass campaigns are overt and observable, acting towards identifiable objectives. Furthermore, NAVCO focuses on campaigns with "maximalist goals": expelling a foreign occupier, overthrowing the existing regime, or achieving self-determination. The CONIAS conflict items presented above can be seen as sub-categories of these goals.

The main difference between the two datasets is that NAVCO focuses on "mature" campaigns that mobilize at least 1,000 participants, whereas CONIAS has no such requirement. CONIAS therefore contains many more cases than NAVCO (417 vs 251). Furthermore, similar to UCDP/PRIO, NAVCO requires that campaigns are continuous, not "one-off events or revolts", and that they have a discernable leadership and often names, "distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts". As mentioned above, there are no such requirements in

CONIAS, again indicating that CONIAS provides a more inclusive list of incompatibilities, some of which have little formal organization (however, we find a limited number of such cases in CONIAS; see Table OA2 below).

The same is true for violent categories. NAVCO employs the COW definition of armed conflict, which has a high threshold (1,000) of battle-related deaths, whereas *CONIAS 3–5* only requires the use of physical force (and fulfilment of other qualitative criteria presented above). Thus, the incidence and number of onsets of the more inclusive *CONIAS 3–5* (2,063 and 413) is less similar to that of NAVCO (1,119 and 149) than the incidence and number of onsets of the more stricter *CONIAS 4–5* (1,036 conflict years and 250). We now turn to comparing the incidence time trends.

As shown in Figure OA2, the CONIAS conflicts (both violent and non-violent) and NAVCO campaigns (both violent and non-violent) accumulated similarly throughout the Cold War era, peaking in early 1990s. The NAVCO campaigns decreased thereafter, whereas the CONIAS conflicts started increasing again in the late 1990s. Overall, while the total number of incompatibilities in the two datasets is quite different, there is a moderate correlation in their incidence during the period 1946–2006 ($r = 0.42$; percentage agreement = 71.10%; *Krippendorff's α = .29*).

Figure OA2. *Incompatibility Incidence, 1946–2006: Comparing NAVCO and CONIAS*

When it comes to violent categories, there is much more overlap. As indicated above, *CONIAS 3–5* contains more country-years than the NAVCO violent campaigns; as shown in Figure OA3 below, however, the incidence time trends of the two categories follow a very similar pattern until the late 1990s ($r = 0.57$; percentage agreement $= 85.54\%$; *Krippendorff's α =* .52). The overlap between *CONIAS 4–5* and the NAVCO violent campaigns is even higher (Figure OA3) ($r = 0.62$; percentage agreement $= 91.71\%$; *Krippendorff's α =* .62). More importantly, the multivariate analysis reported in the main text (see Table 2) indicates that a two-stage analysis based on NAVCO produces estimates that are rather similar to those produced by an analogous two-stage analysis based on CONIAS.

Figure OA3. *Armed Conflict Incidence, 1946–2006: Comparing NAVCO and CONIAS*

In sum, while the two datasets use different qualitative criteria and apply different quantitative thresholds, the resulting datasets contain considerably overlapping phenomena. The overlap between CONIAS and NAVCO is comparable to those between better-known conflict datasets.[10] While this comparison cannot assess whether differences in the two datasets are due to different definitions or the quality of the CONIAS data, it demonstrates that a substantial part of the CONIAS conflicts matches categories of another well-established dataset.

Table OA2 below provides a full list of conflicts and campaigns coded in the two datasets so that readers could evaluate the mismatches in the coding of the two datasets on a case-by-case basis. Generally, the case-by-case comparison indicates that:

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[10] See Sambanis 2004: 843.

- In most cases, CONIAS codes more conflicts per country than NAVCO. As suggested above, this is partly due to the more inclusive CONIAS definition of "political conflict", which does not require the same level of mobilization. In some cases, these additional conflicts constitute different phases (or dyads) of the same incompatibility coded as one campaign in NAVCO. See, for example, the coding of Karen-related conflicts in Burma. In other cases, however, the reverse is true. For example, CONIAS codes two conflicts in Afghanistan, whereas NAVCO subdivides these two conflicts into four distinct campaigns.

- In most cases, CONIAS has an earlier conflict onset date and a later conflict end date than NAVCO. See, for example, the coding of the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan or the Transnistria conflict in Moldova. This is unsurprising, as NAVCO only codes campaigns when they mobilize at least 1,000 people, whereas CONIAS applies no such thresholds.

- However, when it comes to violent categories—especially large-scale conflicts—the onset and end years significantly overlap. In NAVCO, for example, the above-mentioned Transnistria conflict is coded with 1992 as the onset and end year. While CONIAS codes the Transnistria conflict with a 1989 starting date and a 2008 end date, the violent years are coded 1990–92 (*CONIAS 3–5*) or 1992 (*CONIAS 4–5*).

- CONIAS contains much greater variation in conflict intensity than does NAVCO. Whereas in NAVCO most campaigns for all years are either violent or non-violent, conflicts frequently change from non-violent to violent and vice versa in CONIAS.

- NAVCO codes campaigns with a goal to expel foreign occupations (which, in most cases, are anti-colonial campaigns). The original CONIAS data also codes this category. Following common practice in civil war research, however, we excluded anti-colonial conflicts from our main analysis (and so these cases are not reported in the table below).

- Unlike NAVCO, CONIAS includes terrorist attacks or terrorist attack attempts (as non-violent conflicts). See, for example, the conflict between the Government of Singapore and Jemaah Islamiah, the Islamist terror group. Due to the clandestine nature of terrorist groups, most of these cases do not pass the mobilization threshold required in NAVCO.

Table OA2. List of all campaigns/conflicts in NAVCO and CONIAS datasets

Location	NAVCO campaign name	Start	End	Violence years	CONIAS conflict name	Start	End	Violence years 3-5	Violence years 4-5
Afghanistan	Afghans	1978	1978	1978	Afghanistan (civil war)	1964	1996	1973, 1978–96	1978–94
	Afghan Resistance	1979	1988	1979–88	Afghanistan (Taliban)	1994	2008	1994–2008	1994–2008
	Taliban/Anti-Government Forces	1992	1996	1992–96					
	Taliban Resistance	2001	2006	2001–06					
Albania	Albania Anti-Communist	1989	1991		Albania (democratization)	1989	1991	1989	
					Albania (Lottery conflict)	1997	1997	1997	
Algeria	Algerian Revolt/National Liberation Front	1952	1962	1954–62	Algeria (Berber/Kabylia)	1963	2008	1963, 1974, 1976, 1998, 2001, 2008	
	Former Rebel Leaders	1962	1963	1962–63	Algeria (AQIM)	1989	2008	1992–2008	1993–2007
	Islamic Salvation Front	1992	2006	1993–2006					
Angola	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola	1961	1974	1961–74	Angola (Cabinda)	1975	2008	1975–2008	1977–78, 1989, 1994–95, 1997–98, 2002–03
	UNITA	1975	2002	1975–2002	Angola (UNITA)	1975	2008	1975–2006	1975–78, 1982–91, 1993–94, 1998–2002
Argentina	ERP/Monteneros	1973	1977	1973–77	Argentina (Guerilla)	1969	1977	1969–77	1974–76
	Argentina pro-democracy movement	1977	1983		Argentina (democratization)	1982	1983		
	Argentina coup plot	1987	1987		Argentina (Piqueteros)	2001	2008	2001–02	
Armenia					Armenia (opposition)	2008	2008	2008	
Austria					Austria (Islamist terrorists)	2007	2008		
Azerbaijan	Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh	1991	1994	1991–94	Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1988	2008	1988–2008	

Country	Movement								
					Azerbaijan (opposition)	2003	2008	2003–05	
Bahrain					Bahrain (Shia opposition)	1975	2008	1994–97	
Bangladesh	Shanti Bahini	1976	1997	1976–97	Bangladesh (PCJSS, UPDF, Chittagong Hill Tracts)	1971	2008	1975–97, 2005	1975–83, 1985–87
	Bangladesh Anti-Ershad	1987	1990		Bangladesh (JMB)	2005	2008	2005–07	
Belarus	Belarus Anti-Communist	1988	1991		Belarus (opposition)	1997	2008	2006	
	Belarus Regime Opposition	2006	2006						
Belgium					Belgium (Flemish)	2007	2008		
Belize					Belize (opposition)	2005	2008	2005	
Benin	Benin Anti-Communist	1989	1990						
Bhutan					Bhutan (Indian Separatist Rebels)	1992	2004	2003–04	2003–04
Bolivia	Bolivian Leftists	1952	1952	1952	Bolivia (revolution)	1946	1952	1946–52	1946, 1949–52
	Bolivian Anti-Junta	1977	1982		Bolivia (Che Guevara)	1966	1967	1967	1967
					Bolivia (opposition)	1983	2008	1995, 2000, 2002–03, 2005–08	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serb militias	1991	1995	1991–95	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat parties/Herzegovina)	1992	2008	1992–94	1993–94
					Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Serbs/Republic of Srpska)	1995	2008	1995–99, 2006	
Botswana					Botswana (Basarwa)	1997	2008		
Brazil	Diretas ja	1984	1985		Brazil (military regime)	1964	1964	1968	

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Country	Event	Start	End	Range	Event	Start	End	Dates	Dates
					Brazil (military regime)	1968	1984		
					Brazil (democratization)	1979	1985	1980, 1982	
					Brazil (MST)	1995	2008	2004, 2006–07	
Bulgaria	Bulgaria Anti-Communist	1989	1989		Bulgaria (Turkish Minority)	1984	1990	1989	
					Bulgaria (democratization)	1989	1990		
Burma	Karens	1948	2006	1948–2006	Myanmar (Arakan Army, NUFA/Rakhine State)	1948	2008	1948–64, 1972–78, 1988–93, 2004	1972–77, 1988–93
	Kachin rebels	1961	1994	1961–94	Myanmar (CNA, CNF/Chin State)	1948	2008	1964–88, 2001–07	
	Burma pro-democracy movement	1988	1990		Myanmar (CPB)	1948	1988	1948–88	1948–88
					Myanmar (KNPP, KnA, KNLA/Kayah State)	1948	2008	1948–2008	1948–90, 2004–05
					Mynamar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State)	1948	2008	1948–2008	1948–50, 1952, 1960–92, 1995–2003, 2006–07
					Myanmar (MNLA, NMSP, MRA, HRP/Mon State, Karen State)	1948	2008	1948–95, 1997–2007	1948–58, 1984–90, 2001–02
					Myanmar (Rohingyas, ARNO/Rakhine State)	1948	2008	1962, 1978–79, 1991–92, 1994, 1997–98, 2001, 2004	1978–79, 1991–92, 1997–98
					Myanmar (Kuomintang)	1949	1961	1950–61, 1950–61	
					Myanmar (Pao)	1949	1994	1949–94	1949–57, 1970–88
					Myanmar (SSA-S, SSNA, SSA-N/Shan State)	1952	2008	1958–2008	1959-2002
					Myanmar (KIA, KIO/Kachin State)	1961	2008	1961–93, 2001–06	1961–75, 1981–93
					Myanmar (opposition)	1962	2008	1962, 1974–75, 1988–92, 1996–98, 2000–03, 2005, 2007–08	1988, 2007
					Myanmar (Lahu)	1972	1989	1972–85	1972–85
					Myanmar (UWSA, UWSP/Shan State)	1988	2008	1989, 1999–2007	1989
Burundi	First Hutu Rebellion	1972	1973	1972–73	Burundi (Putsch 1961)	1961	1961	1961	

	Second Hutu Rebellion	1988	1988	1988	Burundi (Putsch Micombero 1966)	1966	1972	1966, 1972	
	Tutsi supremacists	1991	1992	1991–92	Burundi (Putsch Ndizeye 1966)	1966	1966	1966	
	Third Hutu Rebellion	1993	2002	1993–2002	Burundi (Putsch Bagaza 1976)	1976	1976	1976	
					Burundi (church)	1977	1987		
					Burundi (Putsch Buyoya 1987)	1987	1992	1987, 1992	
					Burundi (FJP 2001)	2001	2001	2001	
					Burundi (Putsch no 2 2001)	2001	2001	2001	
					Burundi (FNL)	2005	2008	2005–08	2008
					Burundi (Opposition)	2006	2008	2006, 2008	
CAR	CAR multiple factions	1995	1997	1995–97	Central African Republic (opposition)	1979	1993	1981–82	
					Central African Republic (Patassé)	1997	2007	1997–2005	2001–03
					Central African Republic (UFDR, APRD)	2005	2008	2005–08	2006–07
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge	1970	1975	1970–75	Cambodia (Khmer Rouge)	1967	2006	1967–98	1970–92
	Anti-Khmer Rouge	1978	1979	1978–79	Cambodia (CFF)	2000	2008		
	Second Khmer Rouge	1979	1997	1979–97					
Cameroon	Cameroon anti-colonialist movement	1955	1960	1955	Cameroon (insurgents/Bakassi)	2006	2008	2007–08	
Canada					Canada (Quebec)	1945	2008	1963–71	
					Canada (AFN)	1995	2008		
Chad	Frolinat	1966	1990	1966–90	Chad (Tombalbaye)	1962	1975	1963–71	1968
	Chad rebels	1994	1998	1994–98	Chad (FROLINAT)	1966	1996	1966–96	1966–83, 1986–87, 1990–94
					Chad (opposition)	1990	2008		
					Chad (CSNPD)	1992	1997	1992–94	1992–94
					Chad (MDJT)	1998	2008	1998–2003, 2005–06	1998–2002
					Chad (ethnic groups)	2003	2008	2003–08	2006–07

					Chad (various rebel groups)	2005	2008	2005–08	2005–08
Chile	Anti-Pinochet Movement	1983	1989	1984	Chile (Allende)	1970	1973	1971–73	1973
	Pinochet-led rebels	1973	1973	1973	Chile (opposition)	2006	2008	2006–07	
					Chile (Mapuche)	2008	2008	2008	
China	Taiwanese Revolt	1947	1947	1947	China (Tibet)	1912	2008	1949–51, 1959–60, 1987–90, 1995–96, 2006–08	1949–51, 1959–60, 1989–90
	Sino-Tibetan war	1950	1951	1950–51	China (KMT)	1927	1949	1927–49	1927, 1934, 1945–49
	Hundred Flowers Movement	1956	1957		China (Taiwanese Uprising)	1946	1947	1947	1947
	Tibetan resistance	1956	1959	1956–59	China (Taiwan)	1949	2008	1949–50, 1954–55, 1958	1954, 1958
	Cultural Revolution Red Guards	1966	1968	1966–68	China (cultural revolution)	1965	1966	1966	1966
	Democracy Movement	1976	1979		China (cultural revolution)	1968	1969	1968–69	
	Tibetan Uprising	1987	1989		China (Student Uprising)	1989	1989	1989–89	1989
	Tiananmen	1989	1989		China (Uighurs/Xinjiang)	1990	2008	1990–98, 2007–08	1990, 1997–98
					China (Falun Gong)	1999	2008	2006–07	
					China (Hong Kong pro-democracy parties)	1999	2008		
					China (Hui)	2004	2008	2004	2004
Colombia	Liberals of 1949	1946	1953	1948–53	Colombia (opposition)	1948	1962	1948–62	1948–60
	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and National Liberation Army	1964	2006	1964–2006	Colombia (Violencia and Independent Republics)	1948	1965	1948–65	1949–58, 1962–65
					Colombia (FARC)	1962	2008	1962–66, 1977–2008	1962–66, 1977–83, 1985–2008
					Colombia (ELN)	1964	2008	1964–2007	1993–97, 2000–04
					Colombia (EPL)	1964	2001	1964–84, 1992	1978–82
					Colombia (M-19)	1970	1990	1970–90	1980–82, 1985
					Colombia (AUC)	1995	2008	1995–2002, 2004–05, 2008	1996, 1999–2000, 2002, 2004

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					Colombia (Cali Cartell)	1995	1997		
					Colombia (Guambianos)	2005	2008	2008	
Comoros					Comoros (regions)	1997	2008	1997, 2007–08	
Congo-Brazzaville (ROC)	Denis Sassou Nguesso	1997	1999	1997–99	Congo-Brazzaville (Ninja militias)	1997	2008	1997–99, 2002–05, 2007	1997–99, 2002
Costa Rica	National Union Party	1948	1948	1948	Costa Rica (opposition)	1947	1949	1947–49	1948
Croatia	Croatian Institutional Reform	1999	2000		Croatia (Croatian Serbs/Krajina, West and East Slavonia)	1991	2008	1992–95	1993–95
					Croatia (East Slavonia)	1991	2001	1991–95	1991–92
Cuba	Cuban Revolution	1956	1959	1956–59	Cuba (revolution)	1953	1959	1953, 1956–59	1956–59
					Cuba (Pig's Bay Invasion)	1961	1962	1961	1961
Cyprus	Ethniki Organosis Kyprios Agoniston	1954	1959	1955–56, 1958	Cyprus (Northern Cyprus)	1963	2008	1963–68, 1974–75, 1996	1964, 1974
Czechoslovakia	Czech Anti-Soviet Occupation	1968	1968		Czechoslovakia (Communist takeover)	1948	1948	1948	
	Velvet Revolution	1989	1990		Czechoslovakia (Prague Spring)	1967	1970	1968	
					Czechoslovakia (democratization)	1988	1990		
Denmark					Denmark (Islamist terrorists)	2005	2008		
Djibouti	Afar insurgency	1991	1994	1991–94	Djibouti (FRUD)	1963	2001	1991–2000	1991–94
Dominican Republic	Dominican leftists	1965	1965	1965	Dominican Republic (riots)	2003	2004	2003–04	
East Germany	East Geman Worker Uprising	1953	1953		GDR (uprising 1953)	1953	1953	1953	
	East German pro-dem movement	1989	1989		GDR (democratization)	1989	1990	1989	

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Country	Group/Event				Group				
East Timor	Freitilin	1974	1978	1975–78	East Timor (opposition)	2006	2008	2006–07	
	Timorese resistance	1988	1999	1988	East Timor (veterans)	2006	2008	2006–08	
Ecuador					Ecuador (indigenous population)	1998	2008	1998, 2005–08	
					Ecuador (opposition groups)	1998	2002	1998–2001	
					Ecuador (opposition groups)	2005	2008	2005–07	
Egypt	Kifaya	2000	2005		Egypt (Islamic Groups)	1992	2008	1992–94, 1996–2000, 2004–06	
El Salvador	Salvadoran Civil Conflict	1977	1991	1980–91	El Salvador (Putsch Castilo 1960)	1960	1960		
					El Salvador (Putsch Portillo 1961)	1961	1961	1961	
					El Salvador (civil war)	1977	1992	1977–91	1981–91
Equatorial Guinea					Equatorial Guinea (coup plotter)	2004	2005		
Eritrea	Shifta insurgency	1945	1952	1945–52					
Estonia	Singing Revolution	1987	1991		Estonia (Russian-speaking population)	1991	2008	2007	
Ethiopia	Eritrean-led rebels	1974	1991	1974–91	Ethiopia (Eritrea)	1950	1993	1961–91	1969–70, 1974–91
	Somali rebels (Ogaden)	1976	1983	1976–83	Ethiopia (Oromo)	1974	2003	1974–87, 1989–93, 1998–2003	1989–92, 1998–2001
	Tigrean People's Liberation Front	1978	1991	1978–91	Ethiopia (Tigray)	1974	1991	1974–89	1979–88
					Ethiopia (WSLF)	1974	1988	1974–88	1976–77, 1980–82
					Ethiopia (Afar)	1975	1975	1975	
					Ethiopia (Ogaden)	1984	2008	2006–08	2007
					Ethiopia (EPPF)	1998	2008	2001–08	2006
					Ethiopia (TPDM)	2002	2008	2002–08	
					Ethiopia (opposition)	2005	2008	2005	

					Ethiopia (Oromo-Somali)	2005	2008	2005–06	
Fiji					Fiji (indigenous traditionalist Fijians)	1987	2008		
France	Pro-French Nationalists	1960	1962	1960–62	France (FLNC/Corsica)	1975	2008	1975–99, 2002–08	
					France (Rioters)	2005	2008	2005–08	
Georgia	Gamsakhurdia & Abkhazia	1989	1993	1992–93	Georgia (Abkhazia)	1989	2008	1992–2008	1992-1994, 1998, 2008
	Rose Revolution	2003	2003		Georgia (Ajaria)	1989	2004	2004	
					Georgia (Gamsachurdia)	1991	1998	1991–94	1991–94
					Georgia (South Ossetia)	1992	2008	1992, 2004–08	1992
					Georgia (coup d'état)	2003	2004		
					Georgia (Armenian minority)	2004	2008		
					Georgia (Azeri minority)	2004	2008	2004	
					Georgia (opposition)	2007	2008	2007	
Germany					Germany (RAF-Terrorism)	1968	1998	1972, 1974–75, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1985–87, 1989–91	
					Germany (Islamist terrorists)	2006	2008		
Ghana	Convention People's Party movement	1949	1957		Ghana (Konkomba)	1994	2000	1994–95	1994–95
	Anti-Rawlings	2000	2000		Ghana	2002	2003	2002	
Greece	Anti-Karamanlis	1963	1963		Greece (civil war)	1944	1949	1944–49	1944–49
	Greece Anti-Military	1973	1974		Greece (democratization)	1963	1981	1967, 1973	
					Greece (Leftwing militants)	1973	2008	1973–2008	
					Greece (17 November)	1975	2003	1975–77, 1980, 1983–2000, 2002	

Country	Movement				Event				
Grenada					Grenada (Putsch)	1974	1979	1979	
Guatemala	Conservative movement	1954	1954	1954	Guatemala (civil war)	1954	2008	1960, 1962–67, 1972–80, 1982–93, 1995–97, 2003, 2006-2007	1965–67, 1974–1980, 1982–87, 1989–91, 2003
	Indian resistance	1966	1972	1966–72					
	Marxist rebels (URNG)	1961	1996	1961–62, 1965–95					
Guinea					Guinea (UDFG)	2000	2003	2000–01	2000–01
					Guinea (putsch)	2005	2005	2005	
					Guinea (opposition)	2006	2008	2006–08	
Guinea-Bisau	PAIGC	1963	1974	1963–74					
Guyana	Anti-Burnham/Hoyte	1990	1992	1992					
Haiti	Anti-Duvalier	1985	1985		Haiti (Mulattos)	1956	1960	1956–58	1957–58
					Haiti (opposition)	1986	2008	1986, 1993–2008	1991, 1994, 1999–2005
Honduras					Honduras (Arellano Putsch)	1963	1963	1963	
Hungary	Hungary Anti-Communist	1956	1956		Hungary (Communist takeover)	1946	1949		
	Hungary Anti-Soviet Occupation	1956	1956		Hungary (democratization)	1983	1990		
	Hungary pro-dem movement	1989	1989						
India	Hyderabad activists	1948	1948	1948	India (Sikhs)	1929	2008	1981–92, 1995, 2000	1984–88
	Naga Rebellion	1955	1975	1955–57, 1960–75	India (Telengana 46-51)	1946	1951	1946–50	1947–50
	Mizo Revolt	1966	1986	1966–86	India (Hyderabad)	1947	1948	1948	1948
	Naxalite rebellion	1967	1971	1967–71	India (Junagadh)	1947	1948		

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					India (Kashmir)	1947	2008	1947–2008	1947–49, 1963, 1965, 1990–2008
	Sikh insurgency	1984	1994	1984–94					
	Kashmiri Muslim separatists	1988	2006	1988–2006	India (NSCN/Nagaland)	1947	2008	1947, 1954–63, 1967–75, 1993–97, 2004–08	1954–57, 1993–97
					India (Gujarat autonomy)	1958	1960	1958–60	
					India (Mizoram)	1961	1986	1964–70	1966
					India (Hindi language)	1963	1965	1964–65	
					India (Naxalites I)	1967	1969	1967–69	
					India (Telangana)	1970	1973		
					India (Gurkha)	1979	1988	1979–83	1983
					India (ULFA, NDFB/Assam)	1979	2008	1979–83, 1989–2008	1983, 1990–94, 2003
					India (Dimasa/Assam)	1980	2008	2000–08	2003, 2005–06
					India (NLFT/Tripura)	1980	2008	1980–88, 1993–2008	1980–88
					India (Hmar-India)	1986	2008	1991–92, 1999, 2003–08	1991–92, 2003
					India (LTTE)	1987	2008	1987–89, 1991	1987–89
					India (PULF)	1993	2008	1993–2008	
					India (Naxalites II)	1997	2008	1997–2008	2005–08
					India-Manipur	1999	2008	1999–2008	2005
					India (Meghalaya)	2000	2008	2005–08	
					India (Government–Islamists)	2001	2008	2001–03, 2005–08	2008
Indonesia	Indonesian Revolt	1945	1949	1945–49	Indonesia (Darul Islam)	1947	1991	1947–62	1948–62
	Darul Islam	1949	1962	1949–62	Indonesia (Papua)	1949	2008	1962, 1965–90, 1995–2003, 2006–08	
	Moluccans	1950	1950	1950	Indonesia (RMSMoluccas)	1950	2008	1950–67	1950
	Indonesian leftists/Anti-Sukarno	1956	1960	1958	Indonesia (South Moluccas)	1950	1975	1950	1950
	GAM	1976	2005	1976–2005	Indonesia (South Sulawesi)	1950	1965	1950–65	1950–65
	Anti-Suharto	1997	1998		Indonesia (Aceh)	1953	2008	1953–61, 1990–98, 2002–06, 2008	1953–61, 1990–98, 2002–04
					Indonesia (PRRI)	1955	1961	1956–61	1956–58

Country	Group				Conflict				
					Indonesia (communists)	1965	1984	1965–66, 1984	1965–66
					Indonesia (East Timor)	1974	2002	1975–84, 1991–2002	1975–84, 1991–99
					Indonesia (communists)	1988	2001	1994–97, 1999–2001	
					Indonesia (democracy)	1997	2007	1999	
					Indonesia (Moluccans)	1998	2008	1999–2007	1999–2004
					Indonesia (Jeemah Islamiyah)	2002	2008	2002–05	
Iran	Iranian Mujahideen	1981	1982	1981–82	Iran (Azerbaijan)	1945	1949	1945–46	
	Iranian Revolution	1977	1978		Iran (Kurds I)	1945	1947	1946–47	
	KDPI	1979	1996	1979–96	Iran (Islamic revolution)	1963	1979	1963, 1978–79	1978–79
					Iran (People's Mujahideen)	1965	2008	1970–2003	1970–79
					Iran (PJAK/Kurdish areas)	1979	2008	1979–91, 2006–08	1979–84, 2006–08
					Iran (PRMI/Sistan-Balochistan)	1979	2008	1979–2008	
Iraq	Shammar Tribe and pro-Western officers	1959	1959	1959	Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan)	1945	2003	1945–70, 1974–75, 1988–2003	1945–46, 1961–66, 1969–70, 1974–75, 1988, 1991
	Kurdish rebellion	1961	1975	1961–75	Iraq (Mosul Revolt)	1958	1963	1959	1959
	Kurdish Secession against Sadam	1985	1993	1985–93	Iraq (Shia Muslims)	1991	2003	1991–95	1991–95
	Shiite rebellion	1991	1991	1991	Iraq (al-Zarqawi group/AQI)	2003	2008	2004–08	2005–08
	KDP Kurds	1996	1996	1996	Iraq (al-Sadr group)	2004	2008	2004–08	2004, 2006–08
	Iraqi insurgency	2003	2006	2003–06	Iraq (insurgents)	2004	2008	2004–08	2004–08
Israel	Druze resistance	1982	1982		Israel (PNA, al-Fatah, Hamas/Palestine)	1920	2008	1921–22, 1936–49, 1965–2008	1936–39, 1947–48, 1978–82, 1987–89, 1996–2004, 2006–08
					Israel (PFLP)	1968	2008	1968–71, 1976–78, 1996, 1998, 2001–06, 2008	
					Israel (Hezbollah)	1982	2008	1982–2006	1982–88, 1993, 1996,

									2005–06
Ivory Coast	PMIC	2002	2005	2002–05	Cote d'Ivoire	1999	2008	1999–2007	2002–04
Italy					Italy (South Tyrol)	1960	1992	1961–67	
					Italy (Red Brigades)	1970	2008	1978–84, 2002	1978–80
					Italy (Lega Nord/northern Italy)	1991	2008		
Jamaica					Jamaica (elections)	1980	1980	1980	1980
Japan					Japan (JRA)	1971	2001	1971–75, 1977–88	
Jordan	Palestinian activists	1970	1970	1970	Jordan (Putsch attempt)	1955	1957	1955, 1957	
					Jordan (Palestinians)	1970	1971	1970–71, 1970–71	
					Jordan (al-Qaeda)	2005	2008	2005, 2008	
					Jordan (militant group)	2006	2008		
Kazakhstan					Kazakhstan (opposition)	2004	2008	2005–06	
Kenya	Mau Mau Rebellion	1952	1956	1952–56	Kenya (ethnic groups)	1991	2008	2003, 2005–08	2005–06
	NFDLM secessionists	1964	1968	1964–68	Kenya (Rift Valley)	1991	1995	1991–95	
	Anti-Arap Moi	1990	1991		Kenya (Mungiki)	1994	2008	2000–08	
					Kenya (FEM, FERA)	1995	1999	1995, 1997–98	
					Kenya (opposition)	1999	2008	2004–05, 2008	2008
					Kenya (SLDF)	2007	2008	2007–08	2008
Kiribati					Kiribati (Banaba Island)	1977	1979		
Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement	1990	1991		Kyrgyzstan (opposition)	2005	2008	2005–06	
	Tulip Revolution	2005	2005						

Country	Movement				Conflict				
Laos	Pathet Lao	1960	1975	1960–75	Laos (Pathet Lao–Neutralists, Royalists–Rightists)	1953	1975	1953–75	1953–57, 1959–72, 1975
					Laos (Hmong, Royalists)	1975	2008	1990–92, 2000–01, 2003–07	1992, 2000–01, 2003
Latvia	Latvia pro-dem movement	1989	1991		Latvia (Russian-speaking minority)	1991	2008		
Lebanon	Anti-Shamun	1958	1958	1958	Lebanon (first civil war)	1957	1958	1957–58	1958
	Lebanon leftists	1975	1975	1975	PLO–Lebanon	1969	1973	1969	1969
	Hizballah	1982	2000	1982–2000	Lebanon (religious groups)	1975	2008	1975–91, 1996–2008	1975–83, 2008
	Cedar Revolution	2005	2005		Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam)	2006	2008	2007–08	2007
Liberia	Anti-Doe rebels	1989	1990	1989–90	Liberia (Doe)	1979	1980	1979–80	
	NPFL & ULIMO	1992	1995	1992–95	Liberia (Putsch Quiwonkpa 1983)	1983	1985	1983, 1985	
	National patriotic forces	1996	1996	1996	Liberia (Taylor/Johnson)	1989	1997	1989–97	1989–96
	LURD	2003	2003	2003	Liberia	1999	2006	1999–2004	2000–03
Lithuania	Sajudis/Lithuanian pro-democracy movement	1989	1991						
Macedonia					Macedonia (Albanian minority/northwestern Macedonia)	1991	2008	2001–07	2001
					Macedonia (Kosovo)	2001	2008		
Madagascar	Franco-Madagascan	1947	1948	1947–48	Madagaskar	2001	2006	2002, 2004	
	Active Forces	1991	1993						
	Madagasar pro-democracy movement	2002	2003						
Malawi	Nyasaland African Congress	1958	1959						
	Anti-Banda	1992	1993						

Malaysia	Malayan Emergency	1948	1960	1948–60	Malaya (Ethnic Predominance)	1946	2008	1969	1969
					Malaysia (democratic opposition)	1998	2008	1998–99	
					Malaysia (KMM)	1998	2008		
Maldives	Anti-Gayoom	2003	2006		Maldives (MDP)	2003	2008	2003–05	
Mali	Tauregs	1989	1994	1989–94	Mali (Tuareg)	1962	2008	1990–2008	2008
	Mali Anti-Military	1990	1992						
Mexico	Anti-PRI	1987	2000		Mexico (Cabanas Guerrilla)	1967	1974	1974	
	Anti-Calderon	2006	2006		Mexico (student riots)	1968	1968	1968	
					Mexico (EZLN)	1994	2008	1994–98	
					Mexico (EPR)	1995	2008	1995–99	
					Mexico (APPO)	2006	2008	2006–07	
					Mexico (drug cartels)	2006	2008	2007–08	2007–08
					Mexico (election)	2006	2008	2006	
Moldova	Dniestr	1992	1992	1992	Moldova (Transdniestria)	1989	2008	1990–92	1992
Mongolia	Mongolian Anti-communist	1989	1990		Mongolia (status)	1911	1950	1919–20	1919–20
Morocco	Moroccan Independence War	1953	1956	1953–55	Morocco (POLISARIO Front/Western Sahara)	1975	2008	1975–91	1975–87
	Ifni war	1957	1958	1957–58	Morocco (Al-Qaeda organization in the Islamic Maghreb)	2003	2008	2003, 2007	
Mozambique	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique	1963	1974	1964–74	Mozambique (Civil War)	1975	1994	1976–92	1976–90
	Renamo	1979	1992	1979–92					
Namibia	SWAPO	1976	1988	1976–88	Namibia (Caprivi strip)	1998	2008	1998	

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Country									
Nepal	The Stir	1990	1990		Nepal Panchayat SystemII	1946	1990	1950–51, 1960–63, 1979, 1985, 1989–90	1961–62
	CPN-M/UPF	1996	2006	1996–2005	Nepal (Maoists)	1990	2008	1996–2007	2001–05
	Nepalese anti-government	2006	2006		Nepal (opposition)	2002	2008	2006, 2008	
					Nepal (Madheshis)	2006	2008	2006–08	
Mauritania					Mauritania (coup plotters)	2003	2008	2003, 2005	
					Mauritania (Al-Quaida des Maghreb)	2007	2008	2007–08	
Nicaragua	FSLN	1978	1979	1978–79	Nicaragua (revolutionaries)	1959	1959	1959	
	Contras	1980	1990	1980–90	Nicaragua (Somoza)	1973	1979	1977–79	
					Nicaragua (Contras)	1981	1994	1981–93	1981–88
					Nicaragua (ARDE)	1982	1986	1983–84	
					Nicaragua (Recompas)	1990	1990		
					Nicaragua (Recompas)	1993	1993	1993	
					Nicaragua (various opposition groups)	2008	2008	2008	
Niger	Niger Anti-Military	1991	1992		Niger (various Touareg groups)	1990	2008	1990–95, 2004, 2007–08	1990–95
Nigeria	Nigerian Independence Movement	1945	1950		Nigeria (Biafra)	1960	2008	1965–70	1966–70
	Biafrans	1967	1970	1967–70	Nigeria (Putsch Ironsi)	1965	1966	1965–66	
	Nigerian Muslim fundamentalists	1980	1984	1980–84	Nigeria (Nigerdelta-Ogoni)	1990	2008	1993–95, 2002	
	Ogoni movement	1990	1995		Nigeria (Nigerdelta-Ijaw)	1997	2008	1997–99, 2003–08	1999, 2003–04, 2006–08
	Nigeria Anti-Military	1993	1998						
Oman	Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG)	1964	1976	1964–76	Oman (Dhofar)	1962	1979	1963–79	1965–75
Pakistan	Anti-Khan	1968	1969		Pakistan (Baluchistan I)	1920	1983	1948, 1958–81	1958–59, 1973, 1975–81

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	Bengalis	1971	1971	1971	Pakistan (Sindh)	1977	2003	1986–92, 1995	1986–87, 1989–90
	Baluchi rebels	1973	1977	1973–77	Pakistan (opposition)	1998	2008		
	Pakistan pro-dem movement	1983	1983		Paktistan (Islamists)	2001	2008	2003–08	2007–08
	Mohajir	1994	1995	1994–95	Pakistan (North and South Waziristan)	2002	2008	2002–08	2004–08
					Pakistan (BLA, BRA, BLF/Baluchistan)	2005	2008	2005–08	2005–08
Palestinian Territories	Jewish resistance	1945	1948	1945–48					
	Palestinian Liberation	1973	2006	1973–86, 1993–2006					
Palau					Palau (CFA)	1987	1993	1987	
Panama	Anti-Noriega	1987	1989		Panama (Arias invasion)	1959	1959	1959	
					Panama (Noriega dictatorship)	1982	1990	1984–89	1989
					Panama (opposition)	2008	2008	2008	
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville Revolt	1988	1998	1988–97	Papua New F (Bougainville I)	1975	1977	1976	
					Papua New Guinea (Bougainville II)	1988	2001	1989–97	1989–97
Paraguay	Paraguay leftist rebellion	1947	1947	1947	Paraguay (civil war)	1936	1961	1947, 1959–60	1947
					Paraguay (landless farmers)	1989	2008	2006–08	
Peru	Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path) Senderista Insurgency	1980	1995	1980–95	Peru (APRA)	1924	1965	1932–33, 1945–48	
	Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)—Senderista Insurgency	1996	1997	1996–97	Peru (Shining Path)	1980	2008	1980–92, 2003–08	1986–92
	Anti-Fujimori	2000	2000		Peru (opposition)	2008	2008	2008	
Philippines	Hukbalahap Rebellion	1946	1954	1946–54	Philippines (Huk)	1945	1954	1945–51	1947–51
	Moro National Liberation Front	1970	1980	1970–75, 1977–80	Philippines (CPP, NPA)	1968	2008	1977–2003, 2005–08	1977–993, 2008
	New People's Army	1972	2006	1972–2006	Philippines (MNLF)	1969	2008		

Country	Campaign				Conflict				
	People Power	1983	1986		Philippines (MILF/Mindanao)	1984	2008	1984–2008	2003, 2008
	Second People Power Movement	2001	2001		Philippines (Abu Sayyaf/Mindanao)	1991	2008	1969–75, 1977–96, 2001, 2005, 2007	1969–75, 1977–82
Poland	Poznan Protests	1956	1956		Poland (Communist takeover)	1945	1947		
	Poland Anti-Communist I	1968	1968		Poland (democratization)	1980	1990		
	Poland Anti-Communist II	1970	1970						
	Poland Warsaw worker uprising	1976	1976						
	Solidarity	1980	1989						
Portugal	Carnation Revolution	1973	1974		Portugal (democratization)	1973	1982	1975	
Qatar					Qatar (Putsch)	1995	2001	1995–96	
Romania	Anti-Ceaucescu rebels	1987	1989	1989	Romania (democratization)	1989	1989	1989	
					Romania (Hungarian minority/Transylvania)	1989	2008		
Russia	Russia pro-dem movement	1990	1991		Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya)	1989	2008	1991, 1993–2008	1994–96, 1998–2006
	Chechen separatists	1994	2006	1994–96, 1998–2006	Russia (parliament)	1991	1993	1993	
					Russia (Islamist rebels/Dagestan)	1999	2008	1999–2008	
					Russia (opposition)	2001	2008	2007	
					Russia (Islamist rebels/Ingushetia)	2004	2008	2004–08	2008
					Russia (Islamist rebels/Kabardino-Balkaria)	2004	2008	2004–08	
					Russia (Islamist rebels/North Ossetia-Alania)	2006	2008	2006–08	
					Russia (Islamist rebels/Karachay-Cherkessia)	2007	2008	2007–08	
Rwanda	Rwandan independence	1956	1961	1959–61	Rwanda (various Hutu rebel groups)	1990	2008	1990–2004, 2008	1990–2001, 2004
	Watusi	1961	1964	1961–64					
	Tutsi rebels	1990	1994	1990–94					

	Patriotic Front	1994	1994	1994				
Sao Tome and Principe					Sao Tome and Principe	2003	2003	2003	
Saudi Arabia					Saudi Arabia (Islamists)	1990	2008	2003–07	
					Saudi Arabia (reformers)	2001	2008		
Senegal	Anti-Diouf	2000	2000		Senegal (Senghor-Dia)	1962	1962	1962	
					Senegal (MFDC/Casamance)	1982	2008	1982–93, 1995–2004, 2006–08	1992–93, 1995, 1997–98, 2001, 2003, 2006
Serbia	Anti-Milosevic	1996	2000		Serbia (Kosovo)	1989	2008	1989, 1993, 1996–2001, 2003–08	1998–2000
					Serbia (ZzV/Vojvodina)	1989	2008		
					Serbia (Bosniak minority/Sandzak)	1991	2008	1992–95	
					Serbia (Hungarian minority/northern Vojvodina)	1998	2008		
					Serbia (Albanian minority/Presevo Valley)	2000	2008	2000–01, 2005	
					Serbia (Wahhabis/Sandzak)	2007	2008	2007	
Sierra Leone	RUF	1991	1996	1991–96	Sierra Leone	1991	2008	1991–2002	1991–94, 1996–2000
Singapore					Singapore (Malays)	1965	2007		
					Singapore (Jemaah Islamiah)	1999	2008		
Slovakia	Public Against Violence	1989	1992		Slovakia (Hungarian minority/southern Slovakia)	1993	2008		
Slovenia	Slovenia Anti-Communist	1989	1990						
	Slovenian Independence	1990	1991						

Country	Campaign				Regime/Opposition				
Solomon Islands					Solomon Islands (opposition)	1998	2008	1998, 2003, 2006	
Somalia	Somalia clan factions; SNM	1982	1991	1982–91	Somalia (Putsch 1978)	1978	1978	1978	
	Somalia militia insurgencies	1993	1994	1993–94	Somalia (various rebel groups)	1980	2008	1982–2005	1988–95, 1998–2004
					Somalia (Somaliland)	1991	2008	1992–95, 2004	1992–95, 2004
					Somalia (Puntland)	1998	2001	2001	2002
					Somalia (Puntland)	2001	2002		
					Somalia (Puntland)	2002	2003	2002–03	2002
					Somalia (Puntland)	2003	2008		
					Somalia (UIC)	2006	2008	2006–08	2006–08
South Africa	South Africa First Defiance Campaign	1952	1961	1960–61	South Africa (Apartheid)	1948	1998	1953, 1956, 1960–62, 1976–88, 1992–93, 1997	
	South Africa Second Defiance Campaign	1984	1994	1984–89	South Africa (Bophuthatswana)	1990	1994	1990–92, 1994	1992, 1994
					South Africa (Ciskei)	1990	1994	1990, 1992–94	
South Korea	South Korea Student Revolution	1960	1960		South Korea (Rhee Dictatorship)	1946	1954	1946–54	
	South Korea Anti-Junta	1979	1980		South Korea (democracy)	1979	1981	1979–80	
	South Korea Anti-Military	1987	1987						
South Vietnam					South Vietnam (Internal Opposition)II	1957	1976	1957–75	1960–75
Spain	ETA	1968	2006	1968–2006	Spain (civil war aftermath)	1945	1950	1945–46	
					Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)	1959	2008	1968–2008	
					Spain (democratization)	1965	1982		
					Spain (Catalonia)	1979	2008		
					Spain (Islamist terrorists)	2004	2008	2004	
Sri Lanka	JVP	1971	1971	1971	Sri Lanka (Sinhalese nationalists)	1948	2008	1987, 2004–05	

Country	Group				Entity				
	LTTE	1972	2006	1976–2006	Sri Lanka (Upcountry Tamils)	1948	2008	2004	
					Sri Lanka (JVP)	1964	1989	1971, 1987–89	1971, 1987–89
					Sri Lanka (TNT)	1972	1976		
					Sri Lanka (TELO)	1974	1986		
					Sri Lanka (LTTE)	1976	2008	1983–2008	1983, 1987, 1989–2001, 2005–08
					Sri Lanka (TULF)	1976	1994	1983	
					Sri Lanka (PLOTE)	1979	1989		
					Sri Lanka (EPRLF)	1980	1989	1989	
					Sri Lanka (SLMC)	1981	2008		
					Sri Lanka (EROS)	1986	1989	1986–87	
Sudan	Anya Nya	1962	1972	1962–72	Sudan	1955	2008	1961–72, 1977–2008	1961–72, 1977–79, 1983–2004, 2008
	SPLA-Garang faction	1983	2005	1983–2005	Sudan (Darfur)	2003	2008	2003–08	2003–08
	Anti-Jaafar	1985	1985		Sudan (Eastern Front)	2005	2008	2005–06	
	JEM/SLA	2003	2006	2003–06					
Suriname					Suriname (guerilla groups)	1980	1998	1980–83, 1956–90, 1994	
Swaziland					Swaziland	1998	2008	2000–05, 2007–08	
Syria	Muslim Brotherhood	1980	1982	1980–82	Syria (Muslim Brotherhood)	1963	1982	1964, 1973, 1977–82	1982
Taiwan	Taiwan pro-democracy movement	1979	1985						
Tajikistan	Popular Democratic Army (UTO)	1992	1997	1992–97	Tajikistan (system)	1989	1997	1991–97	1992–96
					Tajikistan (opposition)	1997	2008	1997–2007	1997–2000

Country	Movement				Country				
Tanzania	Tanzania pro-democracy movement	1992	1995		Tanzania (Zanzibar)	1993	2008	2000–01	
Thailand	Thai communist rebels	1966	1981	1966–81	Thailand (Muslim separatists/southern border provinces)	1901	2008	1960–95, 1997–2008	1978–86, 2001–02, 2004–08
	Thai student protests	1973	1973		Thailand (CPT)	1947	1980	1962–80	1965–79
	Thai pro-dem movement	1992	1992		Thailand (Northern Hill Tribes)	1955	2008	2000	
	Anti-Thaksin	2005	2006		Thailand (democratization)	1991	1992	1992	
					Thailand (opposition)	2006	2008	2008	
Tunisia	Tunisian independence movement	1952	1954	1953–54					
Togo					Togo (regime crisis)	1991	1994	1991–94	1993
					Togo (Opposition)	2002	2008	2005	
Tonga					Tonga (opposition)	1970	2008	2006	
Turkey	Kurdish rebellion	1991	1997	1991–97	Turkey (PKK/KONGRA-GEL/Kurdish areas)	1920	2008	1920–24, 1926, 1931–36, 1967–2008	1920–24, 1926, 1931–36, 1992–99, 2005–08
USSR	Ukrainian rebellion	1946	1950	1946–50	USSR (Volga Germans)	1979	1991		
					USSR (democratization)	1986	1991	1991	
Uganda	Buganda Tribe	1966	1966	1966	Uganda (UNRF II)	1979	2002	1979–85	
	National Resistance Army	1980	1986	1980–86	Uganda (civil war)	1981	1988	1981–86	1981–86
	LRA	1986	2006	1986–2006	Uganda (ADF)	1987	2008	1987–2003, 2005–08	1987–2002, 2007
					Uganda (LRA)	1987	2008	1987–2008	1987–2005, 2008
Ukraine	Orange Revolution	2001	2004		Ukraine (Crimea)	1992	1995		
					Ukraine (Our Ukraine opposition bloc)	2004	2005		

United Kingdom	IRA	1968	2006	1969–93, 1996–98	UK (IRA et al./Northern Ireland)	1968	2008	1968–2008	1968–98
					UK (Islamist terrorists)	2005	2008	2005, 2007	
					UK (SNP/Scotland)	2007	2008		
Uruguay	Tupamaros	1963	1972	1963–72	Uruguay (Tupamaros)	1964	1967	1967	
	Uruguay Anti-Military	1984	1985		Uruguay (Tupamaros)	1969	1972	1970, 1972	
					Uruguay (democratization)	1980	1984		
USA					USA (ethnic riots)	1947	1968	1951, 1962–63, 1965, 1967	
					USA (Los Angeles ethnic riots)	1992	1992	1992	
Uzbekistan					Uzbekistan (IMU)	1991	2008	1999–2006	
					Uzbekistan (opposition)	2005	2008	2005	
Venezuela	Anti-Jimenez	1958	1958		Venezuela (Putsch Garrison of Caracas)	1945	1945	1945	
	Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN)	1958	1963	1958–63	Venezuela (Guerrilla)	1960	1970	1960–70	1962–65, 1967–68
					Venezuela (opposition) II	1992	1992	1992	
					Venezuela (opposition)	2000	2008	2002–07	
Vietnam	Indochina revolt	1945	1954	1945–54	Vietnam (KKNLF)	2002	2007		
	North Vietnam (National Liberation Front) Anti-South Vietnam	1958	1975	1958–75					
	North Vietnam (National Liberation Front) Anti-Occupation	1963	1973	1963–73					
West Papua	West Papua Anti-Occupation	1964	2006	1964–99					
Western Sahara	Western Sahara Freedom Movement (POLISARIO)	1975	1991	1975–81, 1984–91					
Yemen	Yemeni insurgency	1955	1959	1955–59	Yemen (Islamic Jihad)	1994	2008	1999, 2002–03, 2007–08	

Country	Conflict	Start	End	Years	Conflict	Start	End	Years	Years
	FLOSY, NLF in Aden	1963	1967	1963–67	Yemen (Believing Youth Movement)	2004	2008	2004–08	2004–05, 2008
Yemen Arab Republic	Yahya Family revolt	1948	1948	1948	Yemen North (civil war)	1948	1970	1948, 1962–70	1962–68
	Royalists	1962	1969	1962–69					
Yemen People's Republic	Yemen leftists	1986	1986	1986					
Yugoslavia	Croatian nationalists	1970	1971						
	Croats	1991	1992	1991–92					
	Kosovo Albanian	1989	1999	1997–99					
	Kosovo Albanian nationalist movement	1981	1981						
	Yugoslavia student protests	1968	1968						
Zaire/DRC	Katanga-led leftists	1960	1965	1960–65	Congo-Kinshasa (Kasai)	1960	1961	1960–61	1960–61
	FLNC	1977	1978	1977–78	Congo-Kinshasa (Katanga)	1960	1967	1960–62, 1967	1960–62, 1967
	Sacred Union	1991	1995	1991–95	Congo-Kinshasa (Lumumba)	1960	1961	1960–61	
	Kabila-ADFL	1996	1997	1996–97	Congo-Kinshasa (Stanleyville)	1960	1967	1960–64	1960–61, 1964
					Congo-Kinshasa (Kwilu)	1963	1967	1963–64	1963–64
					Congo-Kinshasa (Mobutu)	1965	1965		
					Zaire (Shaba)	1977	1979	1977–78	1977–78
					Congo (Civil War)	1996	1997	1996–97	1996–97
					Congo (FDLR)	1997	2008	1997–2008	1997–2008
					Congo (Mayi-Mayi)	1997	2008	1997–2008	1997–2005
					Congo (MLC, RCD, UPDS)	1997	2008	1997–2008	1998–2004
					Congo (Ituri Militias)	1999	2006	1999–2006	2001, 2003–04, 2006
					DR Congo (Bundu dia Kongo)	2000	2008	2000–08	2008
					DR Congo (CNDP)	2004	2008	2004–08	2006
Zambia	Zambia Anti-occupation	1961	1963						
	Zambia Anti-Single Party	1990	1991						

	Anti-Chiluba	2001	2001					
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe African People's Union	1974	1979	1974–79	Zimbabwe (Matabeleland)	1983	1988	1983–85
	PF-ZAPU guerillas	1982	1987	1982–87	Zimbabwe (opposition)	2000	2008	2000–08

Examining CONIAS in case studies

The above comparisons suggest that a substantial portion of the CONIAS categories overlap with the categories coded in other, better-known datasets. However, such comparisons do not allow directly assessing the validity of the CONIAS coding, as the differences between the compared datasets can be due to differing definitions. We therefore further scrutinized CONIAS against case study evidence.

Specifically, we randomly selected 10 CONIAS conflicts and assessed whether the coded values correspond to the actual circumstances/events in these cases. The selected cases are as follows:

1. Bahrain (Shia opposition): 1975–2008
2. Congo-Kinshasa (Kasai): 1960–61
3. Honduras (Arellano Putsch): 1963
4. Liberia (Doe): 1979–80
5. Nepal (Madheshis): 2006–08
6. Niger (various Touareg groups): 1990–2008
7. Papua New Guinea (Bougainville I): 1975–77
8. Singapore (Jemaah Islamiah): 1999–2008
9. Ukraine (Our Ukraine opposition bloc): 2004–05
10. Vietnam (KKNLF): 2002–07

Three of these cases are coded as non-violent for the whole conflict period (Singapore, Ukraine, and Vietnam), another four as entirely violent (Congo-Kinshasa, Honduras, Liberia, and Nepal),

and another three as violent during some years and non-violent during others (Bahrain, Niger, and Papua New Guinea). In each of these cases, we examined the following:

    i.   Whether the start and end dates coded in CONIAS correspond to the actual events in the selected cases;

    ii.   Whether the selected cases satisfy the qualitative criteria stipulated in CONIAS coding rules;

    iii.   Whether the CONIAS coding of non-violent and violent categories corresponds to the actual use of violence in the selected cases.

1. Bahrain (Shia opposition): 1975–2008

CONIAS codes a conflict between the Government of Bahrain and Shia opposition in 1975–2008, with 1994–97 coded as violent.

Bahrain gained independence from Britain in 1971 and adopted its first constitution in 1973. Under this constitution, Bahrain held its first elections for the national assembly. According to Bahry, Shia opposition "finds its origins in the subsequent history of this assembly"[11]. The elected members of the assembly, part of whom were Shias,[12] wanted full legislative powers. However, this was not in the interest of the government led by Emir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa. Therefore, Isa dissolved the assembly in 1975, marking the beginning of an organized opposition with the following goal: "Ever since [the dissolution of the assembly], restoration of the national assembly and the constitution of 1973 has been the rallying cry and

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[11] Bahry 2000, 130.

[12] Louër 2013, 246.

focal point of the opposition movement"[13]. This corresponds to the starting date of the conflict coded in CONIAS. Restoration of the assembly and the constitution with the aim to increase Shia's political power—objectives that also characterized the opposition movement during the later years (see below)—can be seen as falling under the above-discussed CONIAS conflict item "national power".

Bahrain's ruling family are Sunnis, whereas the majority of the country's population (~70%) are Shia (the economic and political elite as well as the army are all dominated by Sunnis[14]). Prior to 1979, part of the opposition was secular and included Sunni. After 1979, however, the opposition "was overtaken by a new, more populist movement that is, at its core, Shiite in composition and inspiration"[15]. CONIAS does not refer to any particular Shia organization but to "Shia opposition". However, Shia groups opposing the regime can be seen as having sufficient "internal cohesion and internally shared goals" to qualify for a political actor as defined by CONIAS. In fact, the literature we consulted while examining this case refers to "Shia opposition" more often than to particular groups/organizations constituting it.[16]

Turning to the coding of non-violent and violent years, we have found no evidence of the organized use of armed force resulting in deaths, refugees, or destruction until 1994. However, (qualifying for the non-violent CONIAS category) during this period, Shia opposition pursued their goals in a clearly manifest manner, often using means that "lie outside established regulatory procedures". For example, Neumann notes that throughout "the 1980s and 1990s,

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[13] Bahry 2000, 130.

[14] See Barany 2011, 31–32.

[15] Bahry 2000, 131.

[16] E.g., Bahry 2000; Barany 2011; Louër 2013; Neumann 2013.

there were periodic eruptions of Shia protest, the setting off of small bombs (usually without loss of life) and demonstrations against the government of the emir, Sheikh Isa bin Salman"[17]. In 1981, Shia opposition members were also allegedly on the way to carry out a coup but were arrested by security services beforehand.

Protests, bombings, and coups can be seen as falling under means that "lie outside established regulatory procedures", substantiating the CONIAS coding of this case as political conflict. Including this case in CONIAS can also be substantiated by the fact that the emir himself took power in 1975 (and maintained it at least until 2002) using means lying outside established regulatory procedures.

All of the sources we used to analyze this conflict agree that 1994 marks the start of opposition campaigns of a much greater scale.[18] Here is an excerpt from a study by Marcel:

> Trouble first erupted on 5 December 1994 when Sheikh Ali Salman, a 29-year-old cleric and one
> of the leaders of the restoration of parliament, was arrested in a dawn raid on his hours. His attest
> sparked a wave of protests throughout the country in which at least seven people were killed by
> the security forces, scores of others injured and more than 2,300 arrested… Demonstrations and
> disturbances, which continued sporadically for almost two months were violently quelled by the
> security forces, had originated in a petition, signed by more than 25,000 people, calling for the
> restoration of the constitutional institutions in abeyance since 1974.[19]

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[17] Neumann 2013, 46.

[18] Bahry 1997; 2000; Louër 2008; 2013; Marcel 1995.

[19] Marcel 1995, 16.

This indicates that in 1994 the conflict falls under the CONIAS definition of violent crisis. Note also that the conflict item, i.e., the restoration of parliament with an aim to increase Shia's access to political power, remains the same as in 1975.[20] Marcel further indicates that

> After a quiet February [of 1995], the authorities in Bahrain were once again shaken by renewed
> violence in the dominantly Shi'ite areas… According to eyewitnesses, on 2 March, police opened
> fire on a crowd of around 3,000 in the Sitra region … 'killing two and injuring scores more'.[21]

This implies that the violence continued in 1995. The following suggests that it also continued in 1996:

> Since December 1994, the Shia have repeatedly descended into the streets of Bahrain to protest
> various actions of the government and to formulate demands for change… It is these Shia actors
> who are confronting riot police to achieve their objectives. And it is Shia who are being arrested
> and killed. By the end of 1996, these tactics had resulted in at least forty deaths.[22]

The same report indicates that unrest continued in 1997, although, "the violence had lessened by the end of 1996"[23].

According to Bahry, the uprising ended in February 1997[24] (in line with CONIAS coding), although we note that he refers to the "1994–1996 uprising"[25]. Other authors refer to the

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[20] See also Bahry 2000, 131.

[21] Marcel 1995, 16.

[22] Bahry 1997, 44.

[23] Ibid.: 48–9.

[24] Bahry 2000, 132.

[25] Ibid., 136.

"1994–1999 uprising"[26] or the "1994–1998 uprising"[27]. All sources seem to agree, however, that violence markedly decreased in early 1997. Lawson, who provides perhaps the most elaborate account of the uprising, classifies the various periods of it in the following way:

> A period characterized by an especially violent repertoire of contention (September 1995–April 1997) was followed by another that featured a markedly less violent repertoire (May 1997–March 1998), which was in turn succeeded by a phase in which comparatively peaceful demonstrations reemerged as the dominant contentious activity (April 1998–January 1999).[28]

The above excerpt indicates that the conflict in Bahrain continued in (mainly) non-violent form until at least 1999 (as noted above, CONIAS codes non-violent conflict in Bahrain again in 1998–2008).

In March 1999, Emir Isa died and was succeeded by his son Hamad bin Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa. The new emir proclaimed many reforms, including a new constitution that instituted elections for parliament (after a 2001 referendum, Bahrain became a constitutional monarchy and held elections in 2002). The ruling family retained most of the strategically important positions, however, continuing the Sunni domination in the government.[29] The expectations of the Shia opposition were therefore not met[30] and protests and demonstrations continued, the 2002 and 2006 elections being boycotted by some groups.[31] To our knowledge, throughout this

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[26] Louër 2008.

[27] Lawson 2004.

[28] Ibid., 107.

[29] Katzman 2010, 1.

[30] Ibid.; Neuman 2013, 47.

[31] E.g., Katzman 2010, 1–10.

period (at least until 2008, the last year coded in CONIAS), conflict parties did not use armed force resulting in considerable casualties, refugees, or destruction.

2. Congo-Kinshasa (Kasai): 1960–61

CONIAS codes a conflict between the Government of the Congo and Kasai separatists in 1960–61, with both years coded as violent.

In June 1960, Republic of the Congo (known as Congo-Léopoldville until 1964) gained independence from Belgium. Immediately after gaining independence, in August, the Congolese National Movement-Kalonji (*Mouvement National Congolais-Kalonji,* MNC-K), led by Albert Kalonji, declared a secession of the Autonomous State of South Kasai in the southeastern parts of the Kasai region. Within days, the central government sent in *Armée Nationale Congolaise* (ANC) troops to suppress the secession, resulting in the use of armed force.

The ANC offensive in August could have involved between 1,000[32] and 2,000[33] troops, and the army already controlled the breakaway state by the end of the month. During the offence and occupation, the ANC troops carried out massacres[34] that the UN Secretary-General characterized as a likely genocide. By the end of September, the ANC withdrew. Armed clashes between supporters and non-supporters of the MNC-K continued. By December, violence resulted in 300,000 displaced persons[35] (although this number most likely includes people

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[32] Packham 1996, 54.

[33] Zeilig 2008, 114.

[34] Packham 1996, 54.

[35] Packham 1996, 56.

fleeing other conflicts within the country, including one in the neighboring Katanga region). In total, over the course of the entire period, the conflict could have resulted in 3,000–7,000 deaths; although, a substantial portion of this violence was one-sided, against civilians, or between non-state actors.[36]

Taken together, the above indicates that 1960 passes the CONIAS threshold of violence and is correctly coded as the onset year of violent conflict. Furthermore, in line with the CONIAS coding rules, MNC-K can be seen as a cohesive political actor acting towards an internally shared goal—falling under the CONIAS conflict item "secession". The use of armed force in Kasai continued in 1961. For example, Arnold and Wienner indicates that by "the end of summer of 1961… Mobutu defeated Gizenga's rebel regime and ended the Kasai secession"[37]. More specifically, Lemke writes that

> In a second ripple, Katanga and South Kasai expanded their military alliance (on 27 February 1961) to include Congolese government in Leopoldville as a third ally. Katanga and South Kasai were at war with the Republic of Congo, and the Congolese army was active on Katangan and South Kasaiian territory (committing massacres of civilians as well as contesting these two APEs' armed forces). But, true to orthodox enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend logic, these three united against the larger common threat of a rising Stanleyville APE. Its successful incursions into Latanga and Kasai, and the threat this expansion subsequently posed to the 'official state', overcame ongoing antagonisms among Leopoldvile, Katanga and Kasai… Also… as soon as the Stanleyville APE began to decline, the alliance between Katanga and South Kasai reverted to a dyadic commitment and conflict between both APEs with Leopoldvile resumed.[38]

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[36] Ndikumana and Emizet 2005, 68.

[37] Arnold and Wienner 2012, 45.

[38] Lemke 2011, 58.

Note that UCDP/PRIO also codes armed conflict between the Government of the Congo and

Kasai state in 1961. However, UCDP/PRIO codes the end of conflict in August 1962, which

raises questions regarding the CONIAS coding of the end date as 1961. In fact, citing Young and

Ndikumana and Emizet,[39] Lemke points out that

> Negotiations between South Kasai and Leopoldvile were a low priority, because military
>
> operations against South Kasai began to bear fruit in late 1961. By February 1962 South Kasai's
>
> military forces were debilitated, and by August 1962 South Kasai was reintegrated into Congo.[40]

Indeed, Ndikumana and Emizet refer to the "Kasai Secession War: August 8, 1960–February

2"[41]. However, it is not clear whether the end date of 1962 reflects the occurrence of violence in

early 1962 or some salient event that ended the conflict.

Packham reports continuing violence in South Kasai in 1962,[42] although the extent of this

violence and whether it actually falls under the CONIAS definition of violent conflict remains

unclear (e.g., whether violence was over one of the CONIAS conflict items, between state or

non-state actors, etc.). Kalonji, the leader of the breakaway state, was arrested in December

1961, potentially explaining why CONIAS codes 1961 as the conflict end. His arrest also

precipitated an internal power struggle within South Kasai, potentially generating the violence

referred to by Packham.

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[39] Young 1965, 359; Ndikumana and Emizet 2005, 68.

[40] Lemke 2012, 59.

[41] Ndikumana and Emizet 2005, 67.

[42] Packham 1996, 40.

3. Honduras (Arellano Putsch): 1963

CONIAS codes a conflict between the Government of Honduras and a group of militaries led by López Arellano in 1963, the conflict year coded "violent".

This case refers to the military coup led by Honduran Army Colonel Oswaldo Enrique López Arellano, who deposed the elected national government. According to Bowman,

> Cognisant of the democratic support of civil society and students in the previous coup attempts, the military unleashed an exceptionally violent coup. Scores of civil guards were killed as they slept and violence against civilians continued for days. Attempts by students and Liberal Party supporters to challenge the overthrow of democracy were met with brutal reactions by *los gloriosos.*[43]

According to di Iorio[44] and Leonard,[45] the coup resulted in "several hundred" deaths, which qualifies for the CONIAS violent conflict category. Arellano-led army officers can also be seen as a cohesive political actor acting towards an internally shared goal of maintaining power in the government (which falls under the CONIAS conflict item "national power"). The sources we relied on to examine this case all seem to agree that the coup was carried out pre-emptively when the civilian government attempted to limit the political influence of the military.[46]

Since the coup, the "the military ruled the country with only the briefest interruptions from 1963 to 1982"[47]. Seizing and maintaining power via means of a military coup falls under

[43] Bowman 2001, 559.

[44] Di Iorio 2010, 196.

[45] Leonard 2011, 146.

[46] Bowman 2001; di Iorio 2010, 196; Leonard 2011, 146; Posas 1980, 50; Ruhl 1996, 36.

[47] Bowman 2001, 559–560.

conflict means that lie "outside established regulatory procedures". Note that CONIAS does not code a continuation of non-violent conflict since 1963. We believe (but cannot confirm without additional details from CONIAS) this to be due to the lack of any organized opposition that challenged the military regimes since the coup. The literature we use to analyze this case does not speak about any cohesive actor that opposed the regimes during the post-1963 period.[48] In fact, the opposition might have been crushed or severely repressed after the 1963 coup:

> On October 3, 1963, 10 days before the scheduled presidential election, López Arellano seized all powers of the state in a *coup d'état* that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of citizens. He appointed his confidante… as a secretary of the presidency. Together, they centralized authority through patronage, careful delegation of powers and control of the national budget… López Arellano set out to silence the so-called radical political elements, a factor he used to justify the *coup d'état*. The government quickly disbanded alleged Communists, pro-Castro organizations, and other leftist groups.[49]

4. Liberia (Doe): 1979–80

CONIAS codes a conflict between the Government of Liberia and the group led by Samuel Doe in 1979–80, both years coded as violent.

This case refers to the incompatibility that culminated in the violent coup in 1980 by Doe-led officers of the Liberian army. Since its foundation in 1847, Liberia was dominated by Americo-Liberians (freed black slaves from the United States or their descendants), a minority ethnic group that composed less than 5% of Liberia's population. The one-party state, ruled by

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[48] Ibid.; di Iorio 2010; Leonard 2011; Posas 1980; Ruhl 1996.

[49] Leonard 2011: 146.

the True Whig Party (TWP), primarily represented the interests of this group, marginalizing indigenous Liberians who composed the majority of the population.

Doe and his group were members of an indigenous Krahn ethnic group. Capitalizing on grievances over indigenous subordination, Doe successfully overthrew the TWP regime. During the coup, the President, William Tolbert, was killed, together with 26 or 27 members of his guard.[50] This suggests that 1980 in Liberia qualifies for the CONIAS category of violent conflict. The incompatibility also fulfils other criteria stipulated in the CONIAS coding rules: the coup was carried out in a manifest manner by a cohesive political actor with a goal of overthrowing the regime (which fell under the CONIAS conflict item "national power").

As noted above, however, CONIAS codes the start of this conflict in 1979. This most likely refers to the mass demonstrations and violent riots that ensued after the government increased rice prices in April 1979 (the so called "Rice Riots"). The initially peaceful demonstration of some 2,000 activists turned into violent riots of more than 10,000 people. The government responded with force, killing 40 and injuring 500.[51] It is documented that the Liberian army (of which Doe and his collaborators were members) refused to open fire against the demonstrators. The regime therefore had to rely on police units and even foreign (Guinean) troops.[52]

The Times Magazine indicates that "one of Doe's first acts after seizing power was to order the release of some 50 leaders of the opposition Progressive People's Party"[53]. The

[50] Nelson 1985: The 12 April Coup; Time Magazine 1980.

[51] Nelson 1985: The Rice Riots.

[52] Kandeh 1996, 389; also Nelson 1985: The Rice Riots.

[53] The Times Magazine 1980.

Progressive People's Party (PPP) organized the April protests (prior to 1980, it was called Progressive Alliance of Liberia). Nelson also writes that

> In March [1980] the PPP launched a dramatic but ill-considered offensive against the administration, calling for a general strike to reinforce its demands for the resignation of the president and vice president… some army personnel were reportedly sympathetic. The PPP leaders, including Matthews and Chea Cheapoo, the onetime protégé of Minister of Justice Joseph Chesson, were arrested under the Sedition Law, and a trial date was set for April 14, the first anniversary of the Rice Riots.[54]

Nelson also notes that

> Executive authority in the new government installed after the coup was vested in the PRC, which was assisted by a cabinet of 17 members, of whom 11 were civilians. These included representatives of […] the PPP.[55]

We have not found any evidence that PPP and Doe coordinated their actions or acted together; therefore, the PPP and Doe's group cannot be seen as constituting a single actor following either the UCDP/PRIO or NAVCO approaches. However, the above excerpts indicate that PPP and Doe's group were part of the broader opposition movement, together confronting the TWP regime, and so the coding of conflict start in 1979 is potentially justified if we follow the CONIAS approach.

5. Nepal (Madheshis): 2006–08

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[54] Nelson 1985: The Rice Riots.

[55] Nelson 1985: The 12 April Coup.

CONIAS codes a conflict between the Government of Nepal and groups representing the Madheshi in 2006–08, both years coded as violent.

This case refers to a conflict between the Nepalese government and a number of groups representing the Madhesi people of the Terai region in the south. One of the main militant organizations involved in the conflict was *Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha* ("Terai People's Liberation Front") (JTMM), which sought increased autonomy or a separate state for Madhesi. JTMM was created in 2004 by Jaya Krishna Goit from a splinter group from the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M),[56] who did not commit to JTMM's cause to gain autonomy/secession of Terai.[57]

In 2006, JTMM itself split into two factions: JTMM-G (led by Goit) and JTMM-J led by Jwala Singh. Later, Bishfot Singh formed JTMM-B, another splinter group.[58] All three factions were militant. Other violent groups, who allegedly fought for autonomy or the secession of Madhesi in Terai, include "The Madhesi Tigers", "The Terai Army", and "The Terai Cobras". Between 2006 and 2008, more than 20 militant organizations were active in the region.[59]

There were also numerous political organizations—Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), Terai Madhesh Loktrantrik Party (TMLP), Nepal Sadhvawana Party (SP), and Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Madhesh (MJF-M)—and political alliances—United Democratic Madhesi

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[56] CPN-M was the main actor opposing the government during the Nepalese Civil War, which ended in 2006. CPN-M laid down their arms in 2006, but JTMM continued fighting.

[57] South Asia Terrorism Portal 2017a.

[58] International Crisis Group 2007, 9.

[59] See Miklian 2008, 15.

Front (UDMF) and Federal Republican National Front (FRNF)—that, on occasion, opposed the government in ways that led to violence.[60]

As noted above, JTMM was created in 2004; however, we found no evidence suggesting that it used violence against the government in 2004 or 2005. Note, however, that JTMM was fighting CPN-M prior to 2006, with the latter declaring "war" against the former in 2006.[61] In September 2006, JTMM assassinated Krishna Charan Shrestha, a member of parliament, who is the first casualty that can directly be linked to the government.[62] Subsequently, in November 2006, JTMM detonated a series of explosions, one targeting a government office, injuring one official.[63] There is evidence that JTMM also organized strikes in 2006.[64]

Violence on a greater scale was recorded in 2007, involving many of the groups mentioned above:

> The promulgation of the interim constitution spurred 21 days of protest in January-February 2007… Activists looted government offices, police posts, banks, mainstream parties' district offices and media organizations… The blocking of Kathmandu's key supply routes had a more direct impact, leading to travel disruptions, price rises and a petrol shortage… Communalism was not a defining feature of the unrest. The state response was harsh; police shot dead more than 30 people and wounded 800… The MJF emerged as the movement's leading group… Participation in the protests cut across political divides; activists of other groups, from NC and UML to both JTMM factions, played a major role. Madhesis' long-standing grievances, aggravated by

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[60] Ibid.

[61] See Shresta 2006.

[62] International Crisis Group 2007, 38.

[63] Nepal News 2006a.

[64] Nepal News 2006b.

exclusion from the peace process, even spurred CPN(M) cadres to join in, despite the anti-maoist theme of many protests.[65]

Violence continued in 2008,[66] in line with the CONIAS coding. The groups involved in the conflict with the government, whether taken together or separately (consider, for example, JTMM), can be seen as cohesive political actors acting towards an internally shared goal of gaining autonomy or a separate state for the Madheshi. This fulfils the CONIAS criteria qualifying for the category of violent political conflict.

6. Niger (various Touareg groups): 1990–2008.

CONIAS codes a conflict between the Government of Niger and various Touareg groups in 1990–2008, with 1990–95, 2004, and 2007–08 coded as violent.

The armed confrontation between the Government of Niger and Touaregs between 1990 and 1995 is often referred to as the "Second Touareg Rebellion"[67]. The sources we used to examine this case all agree on 1990 as the onset year.[68] The use of armed force in 1990 was substantial (and so falls under the CONIAS category of violent conflict):

> In the spring of 1990, for example, a veritable uprising ensued as Nigerien officials responded to the Touareg's frustration by arresting and detaining numerous members of the minority community. A subsequent pattern of conflict evolved with both "rebel" and government forces

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[65] International Crisis Group 2007, 12–13.

[66] See, for example, the chronologies in South Asia Terrorism Portal 2017a; b.

[67] E.g., Emerson 2011, 673; Tanchum 2012, 82.

[68] Emerson 2011, 672; Krings 1995, 60; Pietrowski and Angole 1991, 44; Tanchum 2012, 82.

launching attacks against one another. Due to their alleged political activities, an estimated 400 people, mostly members of Niger's Touareg community, were arrested in April and there was great fear that the detained individuals might be victims of torture and/or extrajudicial executions. One of the most violent confrontations took place on May 7 in the small town of Tchin Tabaraden when government forces arrested numerous Touaregs in connection with attacks on official buildings. Killings began between the two factions, resulting in the deaths of several dozen individuals. Subsequently, the government detained approximately 380 individuals in army barracks in Tahoua where the victims were allegedly being tortured. By mid-May, several hundred Touaregs were imprisoned throughout Niger. More dramatic, however, is Amnesty International's estimation that more than one hundred Touaregs were summarily executed by Nigerien authorities in the month of May alone. In other events, the army has reportedly opened fire indiscriminately on Touareg settlements.[69]

All of the sources we analyzed refer to the "1990–95 rebellion", and there is clear evidence of substantial use of armed violence during this period, resulting in numerous casualties, displacement, and destruction. For example, Krings writes

> There are estimates of some thousands of deaths on both sides. Even if the fear of genocide among the Tuareg formulated by Amnesty International seems premature, the persecution and discrimination of the civilian Tuareg population has provoked several mass refugee movements into Algeria and Mauritania in the last years. Between 1990 and 1994 about 160 000 Tuareg und Moorish refugees fled to adjacent areas of Algeria, Mauritania and Burkina Faso, where they live in miserable camps.[70]

CONIAS codes 1995 as the end of this episode of violence, corresponding to the so-called "Ouagadougou Accords" signed between the Government of Niger and most of the Touareg

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[69] Pietrowski and Angole 1991, 44.

[70] Krings 1995, 57.

groups. These accords ended the main armed confrontation between the two parties. It also provided amnesty for the fighters on both sides and for disarming and integrating Touareg combatants into the national army and security services.

In line with the CONIAS coding rules, Touareg groups opposing the government in the 1990–95 period can be seen as a cohesive political actor acting towards an internally shared goal that falls under the CONIAS conflict item "autonomy". The sources we relied on to examine this case all seem to agree that the Second Touareg Rebellion concerned greater autonomy or self-governance for Touaregs.[71]

We note that the 1995 accords were not signed by some of the Touareg factions (2 out of 14 did not sign), and so the confrontation between some Touareg groups and the government continued in 1996 and 1997.[72] In most cases, these were small-scale clashes with one or two casualties. However, one accident in 1997 reportedly generated 30 deaths (although the army only reported three deaths).[73] This potentially raises question about the CONIAS coding of 1996–97 as non-violent.

One likely reason why CONIAS does not account for these clashes is that the warrying Touareg factions may not have constituted a cohesive political actor acting towards a goal that corresponds to one of the CONIAS conflict items. Note that most of the Touareg groups that fought the government in 1990–95 were integrated into the national army. During these clashes, Touareg soldiers therefore fought against their former rebel counterparts. The goals of these splinter Touareg groups are difficult to identify.

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[71] E.g., Emerson 2011, 673; Pietrowski and Angole 1991, 44; Krings 1995, 62.

[72] See Minorities at Risk Project 2010.

[73] Ibid.

The last Touareg group was disarmed in 1998 and clashes between the Touaregs and government forces effectively ended. In line with the CONIAS coding, we found no reports of related violence in 1998–2003. In 2004 (when CONIAS again codes violence), there were a series of small-scale attacks claimed by Air and Azawak Liberation Front (FLAA),[74] which was one of the Touareg groups fighting the government during the Second Touareg Rebellion. It is unclear why CONIAS codes this episode as violent. The attacks were of small-scale, only in one instance resulting in (two) casualties. The government referred to these attacks as "banditry", as rebels attacked civilian vehicles and looted passengers.[75] According to some reports, however, FLAA attacks were aimed at achieving political goals. In fact, during one attack, FLAA kidnaped four army soldiers and required the release of a jailed ex-minister (who was Touareg) in exchange.[76] PANA reports that

> A fortnight ago, media reports claimed that former Tuareg rebels had massively deserted the army
> of Niger and revived the Front for the Liberation of Azawak and Air (FLAA), one of the armed
> Tuareg rebel groups that operated in the country's north in the 1990s. Niger's interior ministry...
> denied the alleged widespread desertion of soldiers, saying only five former Tuareg rebels close to
> the former tourism minister Rhissa Ag Boula had left the army. Ag Boula was imprisoned last
> February for his complicity in murder. However, travelers reported that armed groups had
> simultaneously attacked passenger and cargo transport vehicles during the night of 6 June along
> the Agadez-Arlit road 950 km north of Niamey and on the Agadez-Zinder route further south. At
> least two people were wounded during one of the incidents. While the government has not
> officially reacted to the reported incidents, authorities affirmed in Niamey that defence and

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[74] IRIN 2005; Minorities at Risk Project 2010.

[75] Minorities at Risk Project 2010.

[76] Minorities at Risk Project 2010.

security forces were pursuing the assailants. A privately owned weekly, l'Evenement, reported that

a group of "resistance fighters", who held an extraordinary council in the Air from 24–26 April,

decided to revive the Front for the Liberation of Air and Azawak (FLAA), a Tuareg liberation

movement founded by Rhissa Ag Boula. The Tuareg's accused President Mamadou Tandja's

government of failing to fully apply the decentralisation clause contained in the 24 April 1995

peace agreement. They also accused the government of failing to abide with the clause on the re-

insertion of former Air and Azawak fighters and denounced the diversion of funds from the

"Special Presidential Programme" established for that purpose.[77]

While the CONIAS coding of 2004 as violent remains ambivalent, its coding of 2007–08

violence is straightforward. In fact, the armed confrontation between the Touaregs and the

government in 2007–09 is commonly referred to as the "Third Touareg Rebellion"[78] (note that

Touareg rebellion also took place in the neighboring Mali). Violence started on

8 February 2007 when a small group of Nigerien Tuareg attacked a government position near the

traditional Tuareg stronghold of Iferouane, which lies on the western edge of the Air Mountains in

the far north of the country. A heretofore unknown group, the *Mouvement des Nigerien pour la*

Justice (Niger Movement for Justice or MNJ in French) claimed responsibility for the attack. The

MNJ claimed its actions was the result of the Nigerien government's inability to address

longstanding Tuareg political and economic grievances. According to a MNJ spokesman, 'The

movement was created because nothing has been done by the government. There is no work, no

schools, not even drinking water in all Niger. It's terrible, it's a genocide, and the government is

corrupt.' The next several months witnessed a series of sporadic MNJ attacks on towns and

government garrisons… The rebels also began laying anti-vehicle land mines in an effort to

interdict road traffic between key towns and attacked a power plant… An uptick in rebel activity

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[77] PANA 2004.

[78] E.g., Emerson 2011; Tanchum 2012, 82.

in June and July resulted in the deaths of 15 soldiers and the capture another 70 after the MNJ overran a government outpost… And… about two dozen Tuareg rebels attacked the Agadez airport… The Nigerien government reacted to this 'increased banditry', as it was officially characterized, by rushing 4000 troops to the north in July 2007.[79]

Violence continued in 2008,[80] in line with the CONIAS coding. The conflict involved significant levels of violence (falling under the CONIAS violent conflict category):

> In Niger some 300 Tuareg fighters and 80 government soldiers were believed to killed, as well as several hundred—the majority civilians—killed or seriously maimed by land mines. The fighting also displaced 11,000 people, damaged the country's limited infrastructure in the north, and disrupted Niger's critical mining and tourism sectors.[81]

Whereas the CONIAS coding of violence closely corresponds to the actual use of armed force in Niger, the coding of non-violent political conflict between periods of violence is more difficult to evaluate. As indicated above, in 1995 most Touareg groups signed the peace accord with the government, and 1995 (considering the above qualifications) can therefore be coded as the end violence. The question remains, however, why 1996–2003 and 2005–06 are coded as a (non-violent) "political conflict".

One possibility is that Touareg groups, despite signing the peace accords, continued to oppose the government's policies with means that lie outside established regulations short of violence. Indeed, many Touaregs were dissatisfied with the implementation of the peace accords,

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[79] Emerson 2011, 674.

[80] Ibid., 675–6.

[81] Emerson 2011, 685.

threatening on several occasions to withdraw from the peace process and to resume armed fighting,[82] which qualifies for the CONIAS non-violent crisis.

7. Papua New Guinea (Bougainville I): 1975–77

CONIAS codes a conflict between the government of Papua New Guinea and Bougainville in 1975–77, 1976 being coded as violent (note that CONIAS also codes "Bougainville II", another conflict in Papua New Guinea in 1988–2001, which is not examined here).

On 16 September 1975, Papua New Guinea became an independent state (it previously had status as a UN Trust Territory under the control of Australia). Just two weeks before receiving its independence, the Bougainville Provincial Assembly unilaterally declared independence of "The North Solomons Republic" in what is now the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (the region consists of several islands northeast of the Papua New Guinea mainland; Bougainville being the largest of these islands).[83] The declaration of secession can be seen as a conflict lying "outside established regulatory procedures", justifying the CONIAS coding of this case as a political conflict in 1975 (note that secessionist claims were already aired prior to 1975, but Papua New Guinea first became an independent state in 1975).[84] Further, the Bougainville Provincial Assembly can be seen as a cohesive political actor acting towards an internally shared goal of gaining secession (which falls under CONIAS conflict item

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[82] Minorities at Risk Project 2010.

[83] Premdas 1977, 64–65.

[84] Ibid.

"secession"). In line with the CONIAS coding, we have found no evidence of the use of armed

force resulting in casualties, destruction, or displacement in 1975.

There is evidence of conflict escalation in 1976

Bougainville unilaterally declared its independence on September 1, less than three weeks before

PNG's own date of independence. On October 16, the central government suspended the

Bougainville Provincial Assembly and froze all funds allocated to it. As the conflict intensified

between October 1975 and the end of January 1976, both sides mobilized for military action

which appeared inevitable.[85]

However, the sources we used to examine this case do not report any casualties or displacement

resulting from the 1976 confrontation.[86] This potentially raises questions regarding the CONIAS

coding of 1976 as violent. According to the CONIAS coding rules, however, a conflict can be

considered violent if it results in significant destruction—and there is evidence of "burned

government buildings and destroyed airfields"[87].

In August 1976, the government of Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville secessionists

signed an agreement establishing Bougainville as the North Solomons Province of Papua New

Guinea with expanded autonomy rights. This agreement has deescalated tensions, and we have

not found any evidence of either side using conflict means lying outside of the established

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[85] Premdas 1977, 78.

[86] Ibid.; Regan 2003, 142. Although, Standish reports that "a mainlander was grimly murdered

near the Panguan mine by secessionists as a warning to others to keep out of the issue"; see

1976, 117.

[87] Premdas 1977, 65. Regan also reports "destruction of government property"; see 2003, 142.

See also Laracy 1991, 55.

regulatory procedures since.[88] Without further details from CONIAS, we therefore do not know why 1977 is considered a (non-violent) conflict year.

One likely possibility is that only in 1977 the central government formally initiated provincial governing bodies in Bougainville. The *Organic Law of Provincial Government* authorized a Bougainville Constituent Assembly, which (same year) adopted a provincial constitution (*Constitutions of North Solomons Province*) and formally established a provincial government.[89]

8. Singapore (Jemaah Islamiah), 1999–2008

CONIAS codes a conflict between the Government of Singapore and Jemaah Islamiah (JI) in 1999–2008, none of these years coded as violent.

The Singaporean Ministry of Home Affairs provides the most detailed account of JI activities in Singapore, written in the aftermath of an uncovered JI plot to bomb a number of targets in the country.[90] JI is a transnational Islamist terrorist organization (designed as such by the UN), having cells in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore. According to the ministerial report, JI was founded in the late 1980s in Malaysia by the former members of Darul Islam, another Indonesia-based Islamist organization. The Singapore JI branch started its activities in Singapore already in 1988–89, calling into question the CONIAS coding of the conflict start in 1999; although it is known that, until the mid-1990s, Singaporean JI's activities

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[88] Laracy 1991; Regan 2003.

[89] Regan and Griffin 2015, xviii.

[90] Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore 2003.

were limited to membership recruitment, networking with other organizations such as Taliban, and military training abroad.[91]

Even so, one might already argue at this point that JI constituted a cohesive actor with a shared goal (of changing the "system/ideology"—one of the CONIAS conflict items), engaging in activities that "lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions". It should be noted, however, that Singapore JI did not start any active planning of concrete military attacks in Singapore until the mid-1990s[92]—one likely reason why CONIAS does not code the start of this conflict earlier than 1999.

While we do not know exactly why CONIAS codes 1999 as the start date of the conflict, by that year Singapore JI had well-developed plans to attack a number of foreign and Singaporean targets within Singapore and were poised to proceed (Ibid.).[93] We note, however, that the report indicates that already in "1997, Singapore JI member… conceived a plan to attack a shuttle-bus that conveyed US military personnel"; though, only by "1999, the plan was well drawn up"[94]. Hastings also notes that

> Singaporean targets were among the first bombings conceived by members of the organization, in
> the mid-1990s. For several years, it seems they were the centerpiece of JI's future plans for terror.
> Khalim Jaffar… first thought about attacking the Yishun Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station… in
> 1997 when JI Singapore went operational and was deemed ready to take part in terrorist attacks.[95]

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[91] Ibid., 10–11.

[92] Ibid., 11.

[93] Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore 2003, 11.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Hastings 2008, 522.

On the other hand, he also notes that the plan was first presented to the leadership of Al Qaeda and approved by the JI military council in 1999.[96]

Taken together, we cannot associate the CONIAS coding of conflict start in 1999 with any particularly salient event. Thus, without additional details from CONIAS, we cannot establish exactly why it codes 1999 as an onset year, and not, for example, 2001 (when the major JI attack was intercepted underway by Singaporean security services).[97] Unlike in 1999, JI was already at the armament stage in 2001 and had procured explosives for the attack.[98] This can clearly be considered as reaching the level of CONIAS crisis (i.e., when a party to a conflict threatens to use armed force).

We have not identified any other salient event related to JI since the 2001 bombing plot. Indeed, according to Jones, the "combined efforts of the Singaporean and Malaysian governments may have effectively crushed Mantiqi I [JI's division in Malaysia and Singapore]… and many of its top leaders… are behind bars"[99]. However, a list of arrests published in Wikipedia indicates that Singaporean JI members (or suspected members) were continually detained until 2005, suggesting at least some JI activity (note, however, that not all of the indicated arrests are referenced; the reliability of this information should therefore be treated with caution).[100] Moreover, one of the Singaporean JI leaders reportedly escaped from a

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[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid., 2; for details on the plot see also Hastings 2008, 521–528.

[98] Hastings 2008, 521–528.

[99] Jones 2005, 170.

[100] Wikipedia 2016.

Singaporean detention facility in February 2008 and managed to evade police and security services for at least 12 months,[101] which again indicates at least some level of activity.

Furthermore, while the JI cell in Singapore might have been crushed (or significantly diminished) during the 2001 arrests, the JI leadership and militants continued to be active in neighboring countries until at least 2008 (i.e., the last year coded in CONIAS), planning and executing major terrorist attacks in 2002–05.[102]

None of the sources we examined indicate that military force was used in this conflict (besides the arrest operations) in 1999–2008, which is in line with CONIAS coding of this case as non-violent political conflict.

9. Ukraine (Our Ukraine opposition bloc): 2004–05

CONIAS codes a conflict between the Government of Ukraine and the Our Ukraine opposition bloc in 2004–05, both years coded as non-violent.

This case refers to the so-called Orange Revolution, a series of mass protests in Ukraine between November 2004 and January 2005 that led to a peaceful regime change. This incompatibility received extensive media coverage and has been extensively analyzed in the scientific literature.[103]

The protests started in the aftermath of the second run-off vote of the presidential election, incumbent Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko the two leading

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[101] Ismail and Ungerer 2009, 1.

[102] E.g., Chalk et al. 2009, 87–103.

[103] For book-length treatments, see e.g., Aslund and McFaul 2006 or Wilson 2005.

candidates. The run-off vote was widely perceived as fraudulent, providing markedly different results from the exit poll in favor of Yanukovych. The opposition block, led by Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party, immediately issued a public call for protest. In a matter of days, some 1,000,000 people took to the streets in support of Yushchenko.[104] Across Ukraine, up to 18.4% of population took part in the revolution.[105] The mass protests were accompanied by general strikes and sit-ins. Furthermore, the local councils in a number of cities refused to accept the legitimacy of the election results. Yushchenko himself took a symbolic presidential oath in the parliament, which was immediately denounced as illegitimate by Yanukovych and his supporters. Note also that during the public call for protests, Yushchenko "urged militia and the military to stand with the people, and called on local governments to transfer their allegiance to him and his council"[106].

This all falls under the conflict means that "lie outside established regulatory procedures" accepted by both conflict actors, qualifying this case as CONIAS political conflict (note that a significant portion of the Ukrainian population regarded the Orange Revolution as a Western funded coup[107]). Furthermore, the opposition bloc was clearly a cohesive actor acting towards a shared goal of gaining access to national power (which corresponds to the CONIAS conflict item "national power"). The incompatibility ended in January 2005, when, a re-election resulted in Yushchenko being elected President. Throughout the November–January events, no use of

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[104] E.g., Beissinger 2013, 578; Kuzio 2005, 61, fn. 22.

[105] Wilson 2005, 127.

[106] Karatnycky 2005, 45.

[107] See White and McAllister 2010.

armed force resulting in casualties, displacement, or destruction was recorded—in line with the CONIAS coding of this conflict as non-violent.

10. Vietnam (KKNLF)

CONIAS codes a conflict between the Government of Vietnam and Kampuchea Krom National Liberation Front (KKNLF) in 2002–07, with all of these years coded as non-violent. The coverage of this case in scientific literature is rather limited; our analysis of his case therefore relies primary on online media sources (which are also very limited).

KKNLF represents the Khmer Krom, ethnic Khmer people living in "Kampuchea Krom" or the Mekong Delta region in southern Vietnam. In line with the CONIAS coding, KKNLF was created (or appeared in public) in 2002.[108] That year, Thach Sang, the US/based leader of the KKNLF, proclaimed the KKNLF intention to attain self-governance for the Khmer Krom. While Sang claimed that the KKNLF would pursue their objectives via non-violent means, he also mentioned/threatened that the use of armed force was an option if self-governance demands were not met:

> "This front is not to create instability in Cambodia or Kampuchea Krom," Thach Sang said by
> telephone from the city of Lowell in the US state of Massachusetts. "I created the front without
> armed forces at this time. But if the movement continues and Kampuchea Krom is not handed self
> governance, the front will become an armed force movement," Thach Sang said.[109]

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[108] Sambath and Doyle 2002; see also Rodriguez and McKinney 2002; and Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2002.

[109] Sambath and Doyle 2002.

Demanding self-governance and threatening the use of armed force can be considered as conflict means lying outside established regulations, in line with CONIAS coding this case as political conflict. "Self governance" also falls under the CONIAS conflict item "autonomy" or "secession". The size and cohesiveness of KKNLF in 2002 is difficult to assess due to a lack of data. There is a report from 2003 claiming that 99 KKNFL members were arrested in Cambodia:

> The 99 KKNLF members… led by Danh Thek… a Khmer Kampuchea Krom man, were arrested when they were tenting near Barang Thlak Mountain… in Phnom Prek district in Battambang province. Danh Thek, who claimed himself the leader of the group, said he has received a support from Soeung Sarath who lives in the United States to set up the refugee camp. He said he received $200 monthly from his Khmer-American superior for three months started from June to August. He said the aim of his group is to topple Vietnamese government who didn't grant self-government of the ethnic Khmer population of Vietnam's Mekong Delta regime. "My movement wants a peaceful transition of power to ethnic Khmers in southern Vietnam," he said. "But was prepared to fight if that failed." There have been 100,000 members joining the movement throughout Cambodia, he said. "This is our first group to tent here and they all come with their families," Danh Threk said. Former Funcinpec lawmaker Thach Sang, who formed KKNLF in July 2002, said he would use force if Kampuchea Krom is not handed self-governance.[110]

CONIAS continued to code this conflict as active until 2007, indicating in *Conflict Barometers* of 2002–07 some KKNLF activity. The *Conflict Barometer* of 2008 reports that the KKNLF conflict ended. We have thus far been unable to confirm this independently, as we were unable to locate any sources, online or elsewhere, referring to the KKNLF since 2003.

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[110] The Khmer Krom Network 2003.

Summary

To sum up, we found that the CONIAS data closely corresponds to circumstances/events in 10 randomly selected cases, even if we could not unambiguously identify in some incompatibilities why CONIAS codes conflict start or end in some years and not others and why some years are coded violent while others are non-violent. The few mismatches identified in the above narratives may reflect incorrect coding by CONIAS, but we cannot rule out that the CONIAS coding may reflect better knowledge of particular cases and/or alternative qualitative material that we did not have access to while investigating these incompatibilities.

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2. Total Population Size as Exclusion Restriction

We argue in the main text that total population size can satisfy both the relevance criteria for incompatibilities and the exclusion restriction for subsequent militarization in our two-stage approach. In the following, we attempt to substantiate the latter claim.

First, we identified all of the possible mechanisms through which population size could influence the outbreak of civil war or civil conflict—as proposed in extant research. To achieve this aim, we started with a systematic literature search following the protocol below.

A. Identify the candidate list of articles:

1. Access http:/webofknowledge.com;

2. In the search field, enter "Civil War" in the first field AND "Population" in the second field (choose "AND" from the drop-down list);

3. Set timespan 2000–17;

4. SEARCH;

5. When results appear, on the left panel, select "Political Science" and "International Relations" under Web of Science Categories;

6. Then, select "Article" under Document Types;

7. REFINE. This should generate the candidate list of 222 articles (as of 20 March 2017).

B. Select relevant articles from the initial candidate list:

1. Read titles, abstracts, and, if needed, main texts to identify articles that have civil war (or civil conflict, intrastate armed conflict, etc.) as the dependent variable (or one of the dependent variables), and population size and/or density as one of the independent/control variables;

2. In most if not all cases, these articles will use quantitative research designs, so identify the dependent and independent/control variables by examining the tables reporting regression results (look for "civil war/conflict" and "population" in covariate lists);

3. In other cases, read articles in detail to identify whether they focus on the outbreak of civil war/conflict and whether population size or density is one of the explanatory variables. When in doubt, consider the article relevant (a more inclusive than restrictive list is preferred).

C. Copy relevant information into a separate document:

1. Open relevant articles, use search function with the key word "population" to find all relevant parts of text where the relationship between population and civil war/civil conflict is discussed;

2. Copy all of the relevant bits of information (whether a single sentence or a whole page) into a separate document and group according to themes.

Among the 222 candidate articles, we identified 31 studies that explicitly refer to the population-civil conflict link, and one study entirely devoted to this relationship.[111] We first discuss the arguments presented in the 31 studies and then separately consider arguments presented by Raleigh and Hegre. The direct quotes of the arguments and references to the 31 studies are presented below. For the arguments by Raleigh and Hegre see the original article.

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[111] Raleigh and Hegre 2009.

10 of the 31 studies do not specify mechanisms through which population characteristics relate to civil conflict.[112] Examples of such claims include: "We… use the natural log of the population of a country, which is expected to be positively correlated with the likelihood of all varieties of conflict onset"[113]; "A large body of macroscale evidence supports the claim that per capita GDP and population size are associated with civil war onset and duration"[114].

Among the remaining 21 studies, 11 focus on population density or dispersion.[115] Given that there is no clear relationship between population density (or dispersion) and population size (i.e., populous countries can be dense or sparse with various population geographies), we found these arguments tangential to our current discussion.

Four of the 31 studies focus on population growth or pressure.[116] Just like density or dispersion, population growth does not clearly relate to population size; therefore, we did not consider these arguments while considering population size as exclusion restriction. Two studies

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[112] Brunte and Vinson 2016, 54; Braithwaite et al. 2015, 703; Hegre and Nygård 2015, 995; de Juan and Bank 2015, 98; Baten and Mumme 2013, 60; Hegre et al. 2013, 254; Kocher et al. 2011, 214; Hegre and Sambanis 2006, 508–9; 514–15; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, 354.

[113] Braithwaite et al. 2015, 703.

[114] Kocher et al. 2011, 214.

[115] Linke et al. 2015, 30, 35; Detges 2014, 62–3; Baten and Mumme 2013, 69; Daly 2012, 476; 484–5; Deiwiks et al. 2012, 298; Theisen et al. 2011, 98; Vadlamannati 2011, 612; Theisen 2008, 804–5, 808; Raleigh and Urdal 2007, 686, 689, 691.

[116] Joshi 2013, 830; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012, 42–43; Urdal 2008, 592–4; Raleigh and Urdal 2007, 678–9, 680–1, 686, 689, 691.

relate population size to conflict via preference heterogeneity,[117] in line with our claims presented in the main body of text. One study relates population size to conflict via governance—"I propose that the Collier-Hoeffler result in the size of the population is perhaps capturing the effects of institutional (governance) variables"—but attributes this to economic openness rather than heterogeneity per se, "since the size of the country is inversely related to the level of openness to trade"[118].

Nine studies explicitly refer to the effects of population size on militarization or opportunities for armed violence.[119] Three of these studies do not specify how population size influences civil conflict or violence as opposed to incompatibilities, only indicating that larger populations provide "greater opportunity for rebellion"[120], "offer additional possibilities for insurgents to fight against the state"[121], or "factors that negatively affect state access, such as country size, population distributions… are assumed to positively influence the occurrence of rebellion by virtue of opportunity"[122].

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[117] Braithwaite 2010, 318; Urdal 2005, 425. See also Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 7; 2004, 572; Sambanis 2002, 221–2, 238.

[118] De Soysa 2002, 400.

[119] Reeder 2015, 821; Nieman 2015, 441; Nemeth et al. 2014, 305; De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio 2012, 589; Daly 2012, 475–6, 482–4; Ward et al. 2010, 365; Raleigh 2010, 387, 405; Aslam 2010, 254; Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75, 81.

[120] Reeder 2015, 821.

[121] De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2012, 589.

[122] Raleigh 2010, 405.

One study, referring to research by Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner,[123] suggests that population size may actually have negative effect on the outbreak of civil war: "state security benefits from an economy-of-scale effect in larger countries, establishing that smaller countries are at greater risk for internal conflict"[124].

Only five of the 31 studies explicitly refer to mechanisms via which population size may contribute to Sage 2.[125] Even here, the mechanisms are not fully specific (descriptions are only one- or two-sentence long), and all refer to the following sentence in the Fearon and Laitin study:

> A larger country population, which makes it necessary for the center to multiply layers of agents to keep tabs on who is doing what at the local level and, also, increases the number of potential recruits to an insurgency for a given level of income.[126]

Essentially, thus, the association between population size and violence, as proposed in the 31 studies, boils down to a single sentence. Even here, we do not find the indicated mechanisms entirely plausible.

The quote above contains two claims. The first suggests that states face greater logistical challenges to control large populations, and one may interpret that this *by itself* can contribute to

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[123] Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; note that our systematic search did not include articles within economics; therefore, several well-known studies on civil war did not appear in our list. We return to this issue below.

[124] Nemeth et al. 2014, 305.

[125] Nieman 2015, 441; Daly 2012, 475–6; Ward et al. 2010, 365; Aslam 2010, 254; Fearon and Laitin 2003, 81.

[126] Fearon and Laitin 2003, 81.

violence, irrespective of incompatibilities. We find this difficult to defend in the face of research

demonstrating a relationship between plausible measures of grievances and civil conflict. Group-

level studies show that relative group size (arguably, a better proxy of opportunities) is unrelated

to civil conflict if motivation or incompatibilities are absent.[127] A more plausible interpretation,

we believe, is that the risk of militarization increases with population because we see increasing

motives to challenge (or incompatibilities). Moreover, a greater need for military control can be

overcome by increasing military capacity, and more populous countries tend to have larger

armies and higher capacity (consider, for example, China or the Soviet Union).

The second claim in the quote pertains to the availability of potential recruits in large

countries. However, we see it doubtful that larger populations (per se) indeed imply larger pools

of potential recruits. The history record shows that rebel organizations can effectively operate

with a relatively small N of recruits.[128] The median rebel troop estimate in the UCPD data is only

approximately 4,000, while the median non-violent NAVCO campaign is 100,000. The

asymmetric nature of civil conflict often lead rebel organization to limit themselves to a small

but well-motivated and well-equipped set of members, sometimes selected based on family ties

or established loyalties.[129] Most analyses suggest that recruitment depends on the pool of

individuals with sufficient grievances/motivation to join a rebellion rather than total population

size N. People without sufficient motivation are very unlikely to start or join an armed fight that

poses risks of injury and death. In the absence of incompatibilities (which we argue increase with

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[127] Cederman et al. 2013.

[128] Cunningham, Salehyan, and Gleditsch 2009.

[129] Gates 2002; Karyotis 2007.

increasing N of people), sheer numbers of individuals therefore do not indicate the size of likely

"recruitment pools".[130]

Moreover, if larger population size favors the capacity of violence it should favor the

government side more than rebels. If N of people increases the recruitment pool for rebellion,

then it should also increase the recruitment pool for governments' armies (or militias), who

typically have greater resources than rebels to attract recruits. Following the same logic,

increasing size of national armies should decrease the would-be rebels' willingness to start an

armed fight against the state.

Raleigh and Hegre

Raleigh and Hegre cover most of the mechanisms discussed above. Specifically, they discuss

how population density and dispersion influence incompatibilities and armed violence, how

demographic heterogeneity increases the likelihood of incompatibilities, and how greater

populations contribute to civil conflict by facilitating violence. However, their analysis focuses

on population characteristics at the sub-national level such as population clusters in particular

locations and their geographic dispersion. Thus, most of their theory and focus is not directly

relevant to our current discussion. We therefore only focus here on points that can be seen as

challenging our claim that population size does not have an independent effect at Stage 2.

Raleigh and Hegre start their theoretical discussion with the following:

> The simplest explanation of the national-level relationship between population size and the risk
>
> and extent of conflict is based on the assumption of a constant and homogenous 'per-capita

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[130] Gates 2002.

conflict propensity'. If there is a given probability that a randomly picked individual starts or joins

a rebellion, then the risk of rebellion increases with population… There are several mechanisms

through which a constant per-capita risk of rebellion may emerge. First, a potential rebel group

can only recruit up to a certain fraction of a population. The larger the recruitment pool, the

greater the chances of recruiting a sufficiently large group to initiate rebellion… [Other

mechanisms presented in the following sentences concern population concentration in particular

locations and so are irrelevant]… Proposition 1 Constant Per-Capita Risk of Conflict: … At the

national level, it suggests that the risk of conflict in a country is exactly proportional to the size of

its total population.[131]

Here, the assumption of "per-capita conflict propensity" is formulated as specifically pertaining

to armed violence (i.e., Stage 2), but we think the underlying idea is similar to our concept of

incompatibilities. We find it implausible that individuals would "start or join a rebellion" without

having prior grievances or incompatibilities (otherwise, political violence would be purposeless

and targeted random objects). In other words, presence of incompatibilities is a necessary

condition for organized political violence—and the "per-capita conflict propensity" increases not

with the total N of individuals but the population share with grievances or incompatibilities.

The first mechanism "through which a constant per-capita risk of rebellion may emerge",

as formulated in the above quote, assumes that rebel organizations require large N of recruits and

that larger pools of recruits only favor rebels, but not governments—which we find implausible

(as discussed above). The subsequent discussion in the Raleigh and Hegre study focuses on

demographic heterogeneity, which is in line with our discussion in the main text, before turning

to population density, clustering, and geographic dispersion, which is largely irrelevant to our

discussion, as there is no clear relationship between these factors and total population size.

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[131] Raleigh and Hegre 2009, 225.

Other Considerations

Our systematic search in the ISI Web of Science was restricted to studies within "Political Science" and "International Relations". However, we have identified several other influential studies published in economics journals that are relevant for our discussion.

Collier and Hoeffler suggest that larger populations could increase the pool of recruits through lower wages for rebels, but this seems implausible. Research suggests that larger firms tend to pay higher wages, and that more densely populated areas tend to have higher wages. [132] A larger state would generally tend to require a proportionally larger rebel force. In a more recent study, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner have suggested that larger populations can actually reduce the risk of violence via an economy-of-scale effect.[133]

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[132] Brown and Medoff 1989, 1028.

[133] Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009.

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Quantitative Literature on Civil War. *Defence and Peace Economics* 13(3): 215–43.

Direct Quotes of the Arguments Identified in the Comprehensive Literature Search

Underspecified Arguments

1. Bunte, Jonas B, and Laura Thaut Vinson. 2016. Local Power-Sharing Institutions and

Interreligious Violence in Nigeria." *Journal of Peace Research* 53 (1) 49–65.

> In addition, the total population of each district is included as a control for the possibility that
>
> feelings of competition and insecurity might be manifest more easily in more populated states
>
> (54).

2. Braithwaite, Alex et al. 2015. The Conditioning Effect of Protest History on the Emulation of Nonviolent Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 52 (6) 697–711.

> We also use the natural log of the population of a country, which is expected to be positively correlated with the likelihood of all varieties of conflict onset (703).

3. Hegre, Håvard, and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård. 2015. Governance and Conflict Relapse. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (6): 984–1016.

> We control for whether a neighboring country has conflict, log GDP per capita, whether one ethnic group is demographically dominant, log population size, and the presence of United Nations peace keeping operations (PKOs) (995).

4. De Juan, Alexander, and André Bank. 2015. The Ba'athist Blackout? Selective Goods Provision and Political Violence in the Syrian Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research* 52 (1): 91–104.

> Countries and subnational administrative units display a higher risk of experiencing political violence when more people live within their boundaries (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). We have included log-transformed population size in our analyses in order to account for excessive variations in population size across Syrian subdistricts (98).

5. Baten, Joerg, and Christina Mumme. 2013. Does Inequality Lead to Civil Wars? A Global Long-Term Study Using Anthropometric Indicators (1816–1999). *European Journal of Political Economy* 32: 56–79.

In addition, we include population size as a control variable, because a larger population makes it more likely that the critical threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths will be reached (60).

6. Hegre, Håvard et al. 2013. Predicting Armed Conflict, 2010–2050. *International Studies Quarterly* 57: 250–70.

> Greater populations are associated with increased conflict risks, and a country with the population size of Nigeria has an estimated risk that is about three times higher than a country the size of Liberia. The increase in the risk of conflict does not increase proportionally with population, however—the per-capita risk of civil war onset decreases with population size (254).

7. Hendrix, Cullen S., and Idean Salehyan. 2012. Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict in Africa". *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (1): 35–50.

> Third, we control for population… For any given level of grievance, we would expect that larger populations would see more political protest (42).

8. Kocher, Matthew Adam et al. 2011. Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War. *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (2): 201–19.

> A large body of macroscale evidence supports the claim that per capita GDP and population size are associated with civil war onset and duration (Hegre and Sambanis 2006) (214).

9. Hegre, Håvard, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on

Civil War Onset. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (4): 508–35.

Replication studies, to some extent, address this issue: in the empirical study of civil war onset, there is now consensus that the risk of war decreases as average income increases and the size of a country's population decreases (508–9).

We control for population size because, for a constant per capita propensity to initiate armed resistance, the definition of a civil war, which classifies armed conflict as a civil war only if there is a high threshold of deaths, implies that civil wars are more likely to occur in populous countries (514–15).

10. Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2006. Refugees and the Spread of Civil War. *International Organization* 60 (2): 335–66.

Finally, we include a variable for total country population (logged). Several studies have found population size to be related to conflict (354).

Arguments Referring to Heterogeneity

1. Braithwaite, Alex. 2010. Resisting Infection: How State Capacity Conditions Conflict Contagion. *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (3): 311–9.

Fourth, we can see that the prospects for new conflict onsets are higher among those states with greater populations. Each of these findings suggests – in line with the conclusions of Buhaug & Gleditsch (2008) – that state heterogeneity has a greater bearing upon new conflict onsets than does regional heterogeneity (318).

2. Urdal, Henrik. 2005. People vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Revisited. *Journal of Peace Research* 42 (4): 417–34.

> To account for differences in conflict propensity potentially embedded in size of a country, a variable measuring *total population size* is included. The larger the size of a state´s population, the greater the likelihood of a large geographical area, and the greater the chance of linguistic, religious, ethnic, or cultural fractionalization (425).

Arguments Referring to Militarization

1. Reeder, Bryce W. 2015. Rebel Behavior in the Context of Interstate Competition: Exploring Day-to-Day Patterns of Political Violence in Africa. *International Interactions* 41 (5): 805–31

> The next control variable is the natural log of the total population for the year in question. This control is included for the simple reason that a larger population provides greater opportunity for rebellion, as well as attacks against civilians (821).

2. Nieman, Mark David. 2015. Statistical Analysis of Strategic Interaction with Unobserved Player Actions: Introducing a Strategic Probit with Partial Observability. *Political Analysis* 23 (3): 429–48.

> Fearon and Laitin identify a number of variables affecting the opposition's choice to violently challenge the central government: population size, mountains, a state's oil export, ethnic and religious fractionalization, and prior war. Population size has a positive effect on the utility for war, as it proxies the number of the potential recruits available to rebel organizations (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 81) (441).

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3. Nemeth, Stephen C. et al. 2014. The Primacy of Local: Identifying Terrorist Hot Spots Using Geographic Information Systems. *Journal of Politics* 76 (2): 304–17.

> This uncertainty is also echoed for human geography variables. Both Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) associate large populations with an increased risk of civil war. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) later contest this, finding that state security benefits from an economy-of-scale effect in larger countries, establishing that smaller countries are at greater risk for internal conflict (305).

4. De la Calle, Luis, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. 2012. Rebels Without a Territory: An Analysis of Nonterritorial Conflicts in the World, 1970-1997. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56 (4): 580–603.

> The literature on political violence has discussed other factors that may play a role in conflict onset (see the reviews of Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Mason 2009). Population size and the presence of rugged terrain help promote civil wars: larger, more mountainous countries offer additional possibilities for insurgents to fight against the state (589).

5. Daly, Sarah Zukerman. 2012. Organizational Legacies of Violence: Conditions Favoring Insurgency Onset in Colombia, 1964-1984. *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (3): 473–91.

> Large municipal populations further make 'keep[ing] tabs on who is doing what at the local level' more difficult and the pool of potential recruits deeper (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 81)…H8: Holding all else constant, larger populations should correlate with higher likelihood of civil war (475–6).

Holding the other measures constant, population level correlates in a highly significant statistical, but not substantive, sense, partially confirming H8. A one unit increase in population size multiplies the odds of experiencing an insurgency by 1; in other words, it leaves the odds unchanged. Theoretically, the direction of this coefficient makes sense. To keep tab on a larger number of people, counter-insurgency forces must literally spread themselves thin (482–4).

6. Ward, Michael D. et al. 2010. The Perils of Policy by P-value: Predicting Civil Conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (4): 363–75.

> While Fearon & Laitin share Collier & Hoeffler's rejection of grievance-based arguments, they propose more of a state-centric perspective. Their central argument is that conflicts in the post-World War II era are a result of favorable insurgency conditions, by which they refer to circumstances that are hypothesized to ease mobilization by limiting the central state's ability to control its territory. Such conditions include mountainous terrain, large populations, political instability, the newness of the state, and low levels of economic development (365).

7. Raleigh, Clionadh. 2010. Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Does Physical Geography Affect a State's Conflict Risk? *International Interactions* 36 (4): 384–410.

> In contrast, other physical characteristics of a state may positively affect the ability of government to control their territory. Small state size, infrastructure, natural resource wealth, and population geography are believed to bolster state capacity (Herbst 2000). It follows that conditions that promote state capacity should reduce rebel viability, and aspects of physical geography are considered proxy indicators for the strength of both: physical/human geography related explanations for civil war patterns based on terrain, state size, distance, resource endowments and settlement patterns, and strategic zones are reviewed in turn (387).

Previous conflict studies have reduced access measures to a form of physical geography. Much of this work (Buhaug and Lujala 2005; Buhaug and Rød 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 2004) positions state access and rebel opportunity as opposing forces. Factors that negatively affect state access, such as country size, population distributions, and difficult terrain, are assumed to positively influence the occurrence of rebellion by virtue of opportunity, without mention of the particular motivations this lack of state access may engender. These dimensions of state access are therefore cast as apolitical, without reference to how the physical geography and infrastructure underlie a motive of differential incorporation across a state's territory (405).

8. Aslam, Rabia. 2010. US Military Interventions and the Risk of Civil Conflict. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33 (3): 246–67.

A large country population makes it difficult for the center to keep a check on who is doing what at the local level, and also increases the number of potential recruits to an insurgency for a given level of income (254).

9. Fearon, James D, and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97 (1): 75–90.

The factors that explain which countries have been at risk for civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favor insurgency. These include poverty – which marks financially and bureaucratically weak states and also favors rebel recruitment – political instability, rough terrain, and large populations (75).

H10: The political and military technology of insurgency will be favored, and thus civil war made more likely, when potential rebels face or have available the following… (d) A larger country

population, which makes it necessary for the center to multiply layers of agents to keep tabs on who is doing what at the local level and, also, increases the number of potential recruits to an insurgency for a given level of income (81).

Arguments Focusing on Population Density/Dispersion

1. Linke, Andrew M. et al. 2015. Population Attitudes and the Spread of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. *International Studies Review* 17 (1): 26–45.

> Many observers consider population size to be an important explanation for the spatial distribution and observed levels of violence. This may be due to a simple probabilistic relationship; the chances that a perpetrator of violence will be found in an area rise with the total number of people living there. Other explanations include an information-sharing phenomenon, where ideologies and knowledge (for example, about an attack) are disseminated more effectively in densely populated areas than in sparsely populated and remote regions (Shapiro and Weidmann 2011). Even in large marginalized or remote areas, the population-conflict link has been established (Raleigh and Hegre 2009; Theisen 2012; Tollefsen and Buhaug this issue) (30).

2. Detges, Adrien. 2014. Close-up on Renewable Resources and Armed Conflict: The spatial logic of pastoralist violence in northern Kenya. *Political Geography* 42: 57–65.

> High population densities are commonly associated with a higher risk of armed violence in spatially disaggregated research, although the reason behind this relationship remains unclear (see Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; Raleigh & Hegre, 2009; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Theisen, 2012). In the context of this analysis, I assume that violence is more likely where there are more people. As a result of ecological and economical changes in northern Kenya an increasingly higher part of local pastoralists adopt a more sedentary life- style, staying closer to towns and permanent water

sources; often in territories claimed and occupied by several groups. The resulting concentration of people and animals in these areas does not only beget increased resource degradation and competition, but also facilitates large scale raiding (Krätli & Swift, 2001: 26ff; Adano & Witsenburg, 2004). More densely populated and ethnically diverse areas are also more likely to experience electoral clashes between different communal groups, as towns and greater settlements are the primary locations of political demonstrations (c.f. Greiner, 2013) (62).

The occurrence of violent events in dry areas (red and orange areas, in the web version), on the other hand, can partly be explained by higher population densities in the vicinity of major towns such as Lodwar, Wajir and Mandera. Overall, these findings indicate that the spatial distribution of pastoralist violence in northern Kenya is closely related to the spatial distribution of opportunities for livestock raiding (62–3).

3. Baten, Joerg, and Christina Mumme. 2013. Does Inequality Lead to Civil Wars? A Global Long-term Study Using Anthropometric Indicators (1816–1999). *European Journal of Political Economy* 32: 56–79.

Low population density could, for example, be negatively correlated with civil wars, because the probability of facing a civil war decreases in sparsely populated countries (69).

4. Daly, Sarah Zukerman. 2012. Organizational Legacies of Violence: Conditions Favoring Insurgency Onset in Colombia, 1964–1984. *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (3): 473–91.

geographic dispersion of the population, cross-border sanctuaries, and large countries with regions far removed from the states' administrative military centers inhibit local policing… H9: Areas with low population density should similarly prove vulnerable to illegal militarization (476).

the coefficient on population density suggests that rebels are actually more likely to engage in offensive activity and control regions with less dispersed populations. As 1% increase in population density increases the odds of rebel violence by 22%... Together, these refuge variables indicate that insurgents do not seek out inaccessible territories with sparse settlement. They do not aim only to hide; rather, they seek to exercise influence and gain support. Regions with higher populations, closer to the country's political and economic heartland, represent strategic areas; these are generally centres of power worth controlling, especially for guerrilla armies aimed at state-takeover (484–5).

5. Deiwiks, Christa et al. 2012. Inequality and Conflict in Federations. *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (2): 289–304.

At country level, we include logged *GDP* per capita lagged by one year, since poorer states have been found to be more likely to see civil war (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006) as well as logged *Population density*, which is likely to increase collective dissent (Lichbach, 1995); a higher population density might increase social tensions arising from a scarcity of land, housing, and employment, and in turn may lower the threshold for decentralization as well as pressures for some regions to 'opt out' (298).

6. Theisen, Ole Magnus et al. 2011. Climate Wars? Assessing the Claim That Drought Breeds Conflict. *International Security* 36 (3): 79–106.

Proximity to the border, the capital city, high population density, and high infant mortality rate are other factors associated with a significantly higher risk of civil war onset. Although the result for local population density would seem to support notions of population pressure and demographic stress, we interpret this finding as a consequence of two phenomena: the tendency for local governmental bodies and assets - typical targets of initial rebel assaults - to be located in urban

centers such as towns and regional capitals, and the "urban bias" in media coverage (98).

7. Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya. 2011. Why Indian Men Rebel? Explaining Armed
Rebellion in the Northeastern States of India, 1970–2007. *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (5):
605–19.

> Following Urdal (2006), I include the log of population density in each state to control for
> population pressures (612).

8. Theisen, Ole Magnus. 2008. Blood and Soil? Resource Scarcity and Internal Armed Conflict
Revisited. *Journal of Peace Research* 45(6): 801–18.

> In the first large-n empirical investigation of environmental security theory, Hauge and Ellingsen
> (1998) found that land degradation, freshwater scarcity, population density and deforestation
> increase the risk of civil conflict (804).

> Urdal (2005) finds that high pressure on cropland is not related to civil conflict, but that
> population growth and density together increase the risk of conflict, but only for the 1970s.
> Analyzing developed and developing countries separately, he does not find the risk of conflict
> being affected by demographic pressure in either of the subsets, thus contrary to eco-scarcity
> arguments – the effect is no stronger in developing countries than in developed ones. De Soysa
> (2002a,b) and Raleigh & Urdal (2007) find a weak but positive and significant relationship
> between conflict and population density, whereas Collier & Hoeffler (1998; 2004), Hegre &
> Sambanis (2006) and Buhaug & Rød (2006) do not. Thus, the jury is still out concerning the effect
> of population density on the risk of civil conflict. However, the studies (except Hauge &
> Ellingsen's) that find population density to increase the risk of conflict use a static cross-sectional
> design. In contrast to environmental security thinking, de Soysa (2002a: 410) finds that rural

population density and renewable resource wealth interacted increase the conflict risk, whereas resource scarcity does not impact economic performance (de Soysa, 2002a: 22f.). In an analysis of Indian states, Urdal (2008) finds that rural population density and youth bulges (a high proportion of the adult population aged 15 to 24 years) increase the risk of conflict incidence (804–5).

According to Homer-Dixon, countries that experience rapid population growth are more in need of adaptation in order to avoid conflict, relative to countries with a high but stable population-to-resource ratio (Homer Dixon, 1999: 29) (808).

9. Raleigh, Clionadh, Henrik Urdal. 2007. Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict. *Political Geography* 26 (6): 674–94.

Population density is positively and significantly related to armed conflict, as in all later models. At lower levels of population density, the additional risk of conflict ranges from 2% to 6%; however at the highest levels of population density, the additional risk reaches 30%. This relationship is a common finding in all civil war studies. While density is frequently used as a proxy for land scarcity in cross-country studies, it cannot serve a similar purpose in sub-national studies of small units like this. Conflicts obviously occur where there are people, and there are several reasons why we should expect that they occur where there is a certain threshold of concentration. Hegre and Raleigh (2007) discuss thoroughly the effect of population concentration in disaggregated armed conflict studies, and point to the fact that population concentrations may help solve coordination problems and ease recruitment to rebel organizations, rebels wish to target areas that can provide supplies and a taxation base, and finally that rebels wish to target areas that are valuable to the government, which often tend to be populous locations. Buhaug and Rød (2006) found that population density was neither a statistically significant predictor of conflicts over government nor of conflicts over territory in a study of Sub-Saharan Africa using a similar design as this study… As population density is quite clearly the strongest indicator thus far, Model

1 captures the various mechanisms by which population growth may exert influence on the risk of conflict. Although actual population density is a strong indicator, absolute growth is only when interacted with absolute population levels. Areas where the population stresses are high due to high levels of both population growth and density experience an increased risk of civil conflict. The magnitude of the effect is minimal, however, at increased odds of 1.03. Although this basic model does not provide a strong assessment of the factors contributing to civil conflict risk, it is clear that of all demographic and environmental stressors assumed to be correlated with conflict, population density is the strongest and most consistent factor. But, as noted above, population density cannot be automatically assumed to relate to an environmental crisis; it can also proxy multiple other aspects of conflict such as rebel strategy, motive, or economic resources (Hegre & Raleigh, 2007) (686).

It is clear that the impact of population growth is mediated via other variables, most notably population density. At the highest levels of both, the risk of conflict more than doubles (689).

High population density, measured locally, is a consistently strong predictor of armed conflict. Population density and conflict are presumably correlated because densely populated areas and large cities are attractive conflict locations both because they provide better opportunities for organizing and financing conflict, and because they represent strategic targets (Hegre & Raleigh, 2007). From the resource scarcity literature, we hypothesized that interactions between 'demand-induced' scarcity, measured by population growth, and 'supply-induced' scarcity represented by land degradation, water scarcity and population density, were likely to produce multiple stressors that could act as triggers of resource scarcity conflicts (691).

10. Urdal, Henrik. 2005. People vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Revisited. *Journal of Peace Research* 42 (4): 417–34.

According to the neo-Malthusian conflict scenario, population pressure on natural renewable resources makes societies more prone to low-intensity civil war. On the contrary, resource-optimists concede that agricultural land scarcity caused by high population density may be a driving factor behind economic development, thus causing peace in a long-term perspective (417).

Population density then resembles a measure of *cropland scarcity*. I expect the following: H2: Countries with high population relative to potential cropland are more likely to experience domestic armed conflict than countries with low density… H3: the higher population density relative to population density relative to potential cropland a country experiences, the stronger is the conflict-conducive effect of high population growth… H4: The stronger the growth of the urban population, the more likely a country is to experience domestic armed conflict… Tir & Diehl (2001) find a significant and positive effect of population growth on the likelihood of interstate war, while there is no such effect of population density. Hauge & Ellingsen (2001) and de Soysa (2002b) find that high population density slightly increases the likelihood of domestic conflict (421–2).

When controlling for trade, de Soysa (2002a,b) finds that population density is positively associated with armed conflict. One possible interpretation is that when a country is trading less, land scarcity becomes a more pertinent issue and may instigate armed conflict. The possibly conditioning effect of a bad macroeconomic environment on the relationship between land scarcity and armed conflict may be promising avenue for further research (430).

11. De Soysa, Indra. 2002. Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989–99. *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (4): 395–416.

I include population density to model 'demand-induced scarcity', which is measured as the number of people per square kilometer (Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998) (406).

Clearly, the statistically significant effect of population density needs explanation. One

explanation is the threshold effect, whereby densely populated countries capture the 'smaller wars'

reflected by the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths utilized by this study (409)

As seen there, densely populated rural societies with access to greater per capita renewable

resource wealth tend to have more conflict, a result that is highly significant statistically ($p < .03$).

There is insufficient theory to explain this result, except that greed-related processes, such as elite

control of land working together with a bad policy environment (closed-economy policy

environment), drive this result. Real-world examples of conflict where policy-driven scarcity is

present might be countries such as Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and Nepal, where Malthussian crises are

likely to be politically caused rather than attributable to 'mother nature', at least in terms of

scarcity measured objectively (410).

Arguments Focusing on Population Growth/Pressure

1. Joshi, Madhav. 2013. Livelihood Coping Mechanisms, Local Intelligence and the Pattern of

Violence During the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25 (5): 820–

39.

> Population pressure is related to higher state repression. The existence of a larger population
>
> places stress on national resources and a state facing growing redistributive demands has no option
>
> but to use repression. Therefore, I control for the size of district population (830).

2. Hendrix, Cullen S., and Idean Salehyan. 2012. Climate Change, Rainfall, and Social Conflict

in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (1): 35–50.

Population growth is included to control for the possibility that countries undergoing rapid demographic transformation will be more prone to political disorder (Urdal, 2005) (42).

If anything, population growth is associated with less social conflict, through high levels of social conflict may lead to outmigration (43).

3. Urdal, Henrik. 2008. Population, Resources, and Political Violence—A Subnational Study of India, 1956–2002. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (4): 590–617.

According to a resource scarcity perspective, population growth and density may lead to scarcity of renewable natural resources such as productive land, freshwater, and forests. Resource scarcity is assumed to lead to increased intergroup competition, and under unfavorable economic and political conditions, such competition can take the form of violent conflict. Poor countries are argued to be particularly susceptible to resource conflicts as they often lack the capacity to adapt to environmental change. Weiner and Russell (2001b, 3) argue that societies have very different political, financial, and administrative capacity to respond adequately to increasing resource demands and that such strains can threaten stability and security. A major reference point in this debate is Thomas Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994, 1999; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998). He distinguishes between three main sources of resource scarcity (e.g., Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998, 6). Supply-induced scarcity results from degradation or depletion of natural resources. It simply becomes less of a resource as a result of nonsustainable use that does not allow the resource to regenerate.[3] Demand-induced scarcity is primarily caused by population growth. If a resource base is constant, the availability of resources per person will diminish with the increasing number of people that have to share it. Such scarcity can also arise from an increase in demand per capita. A third form is structural scarcity. This is a form of scarcity that applies only to certain groups that, relative to other groups, are excluded from equal access to particular resources. Such unequal social distribution of a resource does not presuppose actual scarcity if the resource was distributed evenly. The likelihood of violent conflict is greatest when these three forms of scarcity interact…

The resource scarcity perspective is challenged by a resource-optimistic or *cornucopian* view. Cornucopians concede the premise that more people mean fewer resources per person. They believe, however, that an increased pressure on resources leads to innovation and implementation of new technology that make resource scar city and resource dependency increasingly less likely. Population pressure is thus believed to be either a neutral factor among determinants of armed conflict or even a possible contributor to economic growth that can reduce conflict propensity in the longer run (Boserup 1981; Simon 1989; Boserup and Schultz 1990). Optimists also claim that population pressure on natural resources will be less of a problem in the future as world population growth is slowing down (Lomborg 2001, 45-49)… More rigorous empirical research has so far found ambiguous evidence for a resource scarcity and conflict scenario. Both Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) and de Soysa (2002a) have found some support for a link between high population density and internal armed conflict in large cross national time-series studies. The State Failure Task Force (Esty et al. 1998), on the other hand, found no statistical relationship between population growth and density and different forms of state failure, while Theisen (2006) found no effect of population growth and density on either civil conflict or intercommunal conflict. Urdal (2005) concluded that there was no clear support for a relationship between population pressure and internal armed conflict. On the contrary, scarcity of arable land at an aggregate level appeared to reduce the risk of conflict, as proposed by Boserup (1981) and Simon (1989). Homer-Dixon (1999) mentions India as a particularly pivotal state because of high population growth, serious water scarcity, cropland fragmentation, erosion, deforestation, and desertification. He claims that these factors threaten to cause major internal violence or disintegrate the whole state (Homer-Dixon 1999, 19-21) (592).

Furthermore, the study addresses two of Homer-Dixon's "key social effects" of resource scarcity (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998, 9). First, high rural population growth and declining agricultural return are expected to depress agricultural wages. Second, if people are less likely to be able to survive on their rural livelihood because of greater pressure on resources, this is likely to offset rural to urban migration. Both these factors may be argued to potentially increase the risk of political violence. Homer-Dixon is not very specific as to what kind of political violence that may

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be caused by resource scarcity. The analysis of several different political violence measures may tell us whether population pressure on natural resources is more likely to produce some forms of violence rather than others… Hypothesis 2: The higher the rural population density relative to productive land, the greater the risk of political violence. Hypothesis 3: High rural population density is more likely to be associated with political violence the higher the rural population growth. Hypothesis 4: High rural population density is more likely to be associated with political violence the greater the rural inequality. Hypothesis 5: High rural population density is more likely to be associated with political violence the lower the agricultural productivity (594).

4. Raleigh, Clionadh, and Henrik Urdal. 2007. Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict. *Political Geography* 26 (6): 674–94.

Kahl (2006) identifies two distinct 'state-centric' causal pathways from resource scarcity to internal violent conflict; the state failure and the state exploitation hypotheses. Both start from the premise that resource scarcity, or what he terms demographic and environmental stress (DES), may put severe pressure on both society at large and on state institutions. When the interaction between resource degradation, population growth and unequal resource distribution leads to lower per capita availability of land resources and expansions into more marginal land, this is assumed to put a greater pressure on agricultural wages and contribute to economic marginalization as a first-order effect. Such hardship can, as a second-order effect, lead both to rural-to-rural migration, potentially causing inter-ethnic conflicts over land, and to rural-to-urban migration. While urban populations generally enjoy material standards above those in rural areas, urbanization often puts a pressure on a state's ability to provide vital services such as housing, clean water and health services. Further, the social consequences of DES may produce absolute deprivation, meaning that people do not get what they need in order to survive, as well as relative deprivation, a situation in which they do not get what they feel they are entitled to. Both forms of deprivation may produce grievances among rural and urban populations (678–9).

Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) on the contrary concluded that the same factors as well as high population density were indeed positively associated with civil war, but that the magnitude of the effects was secondary to political and economic factors… Assessing the issue of land scarcity, de Soysa (2002) found a significant effect of population density on domestic armed conflict, while Urdal (2005) reported results indicating that scarcity of potentially arable land may indeed have a pacifying effect domestically (680).

Our assumption, derived from the state failure hypothesis, is that demographic and environmental pressures are primarily associated with internal armed conflict in very poor settings and in periods of regime collapse and transitions (681).

Although actual population density is a strong indicator, absolute growth is only when interacted with absolute population levels. Areas where the population stresses are high due to high levels of both population growth and density experience an increased risk of civil conflict. The magnitude of the effect is minimal, however, at increased odds of 1.03. Although this basic model does not provide a strong assessment of the factors contributing to civil conflict risk, it is clear that of all demographic and environmental stressors assumed to be correlated with conflict, population density is the strongest and most consistent factor. But, as noted above, population density cannot be automatically assumed to relate to an environmental crisis; it can also proxy multiple other aspects of conflict such as rebel strategy, motive, or economic resources (Hegre & Raleigh, 2007) (686).

It is clear that the impact of population growth is mediated via other variables, most notably population density. At the highest levels of both, the risk of conflict more than doubles (689).

High population density, measured locally, is a consistently strong predictor of armed conflict. Population density and conflict are presumably correlated because densely populated areas and large cities are attractive conflict locations both because they provide better opportunities for organizing and financing conflict, and because they represent strategic targets (Hegre & Raleigh, 2007). From the resource scarcity literature, we hypothesized that interactions between 'demand-

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induced' scarcity, measured by population growth, and 'supply-induced' scarcity represented by land degradation, water scarcity and population density, were likely to produce multiple stressors that could act as triggers of resource scarcity conflicts (691).

Arguments Focusing on Governance

1. De Soysa, Indra. 2002. Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989–99. *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (4): 395–416.

At least one robust result provides some cause for pursuing governance as an important factor. They find a strong association between the size of the population and conflict. Larger populations have more conflict. However, larger countries are also found to be less open to trade and contain smaller governments, which suggest on the face of it that further investigation of institutional factors is warranted because trade is related to the microenvironment that fashions predatory versus productive behavior, at the societal and state levels and the public and the private spheres of life (Hall & Jones, 1996, 1999). I propose that the Collier-Hoeffler result in the size of the population is perhaps capturing the effects of institutional (governance) variables, since the size of the country is inversely related to the level of openness to trade (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1996; Wei, 2000) (400).

In column 4, when trade is dropped from the model, ethnicity, population density, and oil-exporting countries become statically insignificant. Size of the population is now significantly positively related to conflict, suggesting once again that the effects of population size work through governance factors associated with a closed economy and the macro-environment proxied by trade (411–2).

Estimations on Simulated Data

It is straightforward to show that simulated data for a two-stage data generating process (DGP) consistent with what we describe in the main body of text will return correct results for the two-part model approach.

We first generate data for an N $= 1000$ with two latent variables Y_1^* and Y_2^*, where Y_1^* is a function of three variables X_1, X_2, X_3, while Y_2^* is a function of X_1, X_2. The three variables are drawn from a random multivariate normal distribution with a common variance-covariance matrix.

$$Y_1^* = 0.5X_1 - 0.5X_2 + 0.5X_3 + \epsilon_1 \tag{1}$$

$$Y_2^* = 0.5X_1 + 0.5X_2 + \epsilon_2 \tag{2}$$

$$\tag{3}$$

where $X_1, X_2, X_3 \sim N(0, \Sigma^*); \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2 \sim N(0,1); cov(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2) = 0$, and $\Sigma^* = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0.3 & 0.3 \\ 0.3 & 1 & 0.3 \\ 0.3 & 0.3 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$.

We then define two binary variables Y_1 and Y_2 based on the later Y_1^* and Y_2^*:

$$Y_1 = 1, \text{if } Y_1^* > 0 \tag{4}$$

$$Y_2 = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } Y_2^* > 0 \text{ and } Y_1^* > 0 \\ 0, & \text{if } Y_2^* < 0 \text{ and } Y_1^* > 0 \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

In this setup, X_3 is relevant for Y_1^* and satisfies the exclusion restriction for Y_2^*. If we use a binary limited dependent variable regression such as probit/logit then we will find a clear relationship between X_3 and Y_1, as implied by $Y_1^* > 0$.

X_3 will also predict to the binary Y_2 for the full sample, as implied by the relationship between Y_2 and $Y_1^* > 0$. But this is entirely due to the effects of X_3 on Y_1^*. Once we condition the sample on $Y_1 = 1$ then we will find no relationship between X_3 and Y_2, in line with the DGP. In our code below we show a single simulation with a fixed set as well as the distribution of estimates over 1000 replications.

Now consider what will happen if we generate an alternative second stage outcome Y_3 where X_3 has a direct relationship to Y_3^*:

$$Y_3^* = 0.5X_1 + 0.5X_2 + cX_3 + \epsilon_3 \tag{6}$$

and

$$Y_3 = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } Y_3^* > 0 \text{ and } Y_1^* > 0 \\ 0, & \text{if } Y_3^* < 0 \text{ and } Y_1^* > 0 \end{cases} \tag{7}$$

It is simple to show by simulation that any non-trivial value of c for the coefficient of X_3 on Y_3^*, then a probit/logit for the sub-sample $Y_1 = 1$, will return a significant coefficient for X_3 on Y_3.

We do not claim any universality for these results, as the specific results of course will depend on the specific DGP, and these could vary in an infinite number of ways. However, this demonstrates that the 2PM approach will recover the correct estimates under the plausible DGP assumed, and that a clear second stage relationship for a postulated instrument will return a significant coefficient in a separate second stage regression.

The below code implements this simple simulated example in R. Figure OA4 shows the distribution of estimates for $\hat{\beta}$ for X_3 and $Z = \hat{\beta}/SE(\hat{\beta})$ for the specific response and samples indicated over 1000 replications.

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
Figure OA4: Distribution of estimates for $\hat{\beta}$ for X_3 and $Z = \hat{\beta}/SE(\hat{\beta})$

```
library(MASS)
# We generate X1-3 using a common variance-covariance matrix
S <- matrix(c(0.3), 3, 3)
diag(S) <- 1
rmat <- mvrnorm(n = 1000, mu= c(0, 0, 0), Sigma = S )

y1 <- 0.0 + 0.5*rmat[,1] - 0.5*rmat[,2] + 0.5*rmat[,3] + rnorm(1000, 0, 0.5)
y2 <- 0.0 + 0.5*rmat[,1] + 0.5*rmat[,2] + rnorm(1000, 0, 0.5)
y1b <- rep(0,1000)
y1b[y1>0] <- 1
y2b <- rep(0,1000)
y2b[y1>0 & y2>0] <- 1

# X3 accounts for y1b
reg1 <- glm(y1b ~ rmat, family=binomial(link=logit))

# X3 accounts for y2b
reg2 <- glm(y2b ~ rmat, family=binomial(link=logit))

# X3 no effect on y2b when y1b==1, note that coef for X2 now has right sign
```

```
reg3 <- glm(y2b ~ rmat, subset=(y1b==1), family=binomial(link=logit))


# Compare across 1000 simulations
cs.1 <- rep(NA,1000)
zs.1 <- rep(NA,length(cs.1))
cs.2 <- rep(NA,1000)
zs.2 <- rep(NA,length(cs.1))
cs.3 <- rep(NA,1000)
zs.3 <- rep(NA,length(cs.1))


for(i in 1:1000){
    # We generate X1-3 using a common variance-covariance matrix
    S <- matrix(c(0.3), 3, 3)
    diag(S) <- 1
    rmat <- mvrnorm(n = 1000, mu= c(0, 0, 0), Sigma = S )

    y1 <- 0.0 + 0.5*rmat[,1] - 0.5*rmat[,2] + 0.5*rmat[,3] + rnorm(1000, 0, 0.5)
    y2 <- 0.0 + 0.5*rmat[,1] + 0.5*rmat[,2] + rnorm(1000, 0, 0.5)
    y1b <- rep(0,1000)
    y1b[y1>0] <- 1
    y2b <- rep(0,1000)
    y2b[y1>0 & y2>0] <- 1

    # X3 accounts for y1b
    reg1 <- glm(y1b ~ rmat, family=binomial(link=logit))
    cs.1[i] <- summary(reg1)$coef[4,1]
    zs.1[i] <- summary(reg1)$coef[4,3]


    # X accounts for y2b
    reg2 <- glm(y2b ~ rmat, family=binomial(link=logit))
    cs.2[i] <- summary(reg2)$coef[4,1]
    zs.2[i] <- summary(reg2)$coef[4,3]

    # X no effect on y2b, when y1b==1, note that coef 2 now has right sign
    reg3 <- glm(y2b ~ rmat, subset=(y1b==1), family=binomial(link=logit))
    cs.3[i] <- summary(reg3)$coef[4,1]
    zs.3[i] <- summary(reg3)$coef[4,3]
}


pdf("rep1000.pdf")
par(mfrow=c(3,2))
plot(density(cs.1),main = expression(paste(beta," (X3 on Y1)")))
plot(density(zs.1),main = expression(paste(Z," (X3 on Y1)")))
plot(density(cs.2),main = expression(paste(beta," (X3 on Y2)")))
plot(density(zs.2),main = expression(paste(Z," (X3 on Y2)")))
plot(density(cs.3),main = expression(paste(beta," (X3 on Y2|Y1=1)")))
plot(density(zs.3),main = expression(paste(Z," (X3 on Y2|Y1=1)")))
dev.off()


# Loop over weights c for X3 on Y2
```

```
cs <- seq(0,1,0.1)
zs <- rep(NA,length(cs))
for(i in 1:length(cs)){
    y1 <- 0.0 + 0.5*rmat[,1] - 0.5*rmat[,2] + 0.5*rmat[,3] + rnorm(1000, 0, 0.5)
    y2 <- 0.0 + 0.5*rmat[,1] + 0.5*rmat[,2] + cs[i]*rmat[,3] + rnorm(1000, 0, 0.5)
    y1b <- rep(0,1000)
    y1b[y1>0] <- 1
    y2b <- rep(0,1000)
    y2b[y1>0 & y2>0] <- 1

    reg3 <- glm(y2b ~ rmat, subset=(y1b==1), family=binomial(link=logit))
    zs[i] <- summary(reg3)$coef[4,3]
}
```

3. Selecting Replication Studies

To identify the initial candidate list of studies for replication analyses, we reviewed all of the articles and research notes published in *International Organization* since 2005. The criteria for identifying the candidate list was onset of civil war/civil conflict as the dependent variable and time-series cross-sectional design with country-year as a unit of analysis (i.e., the design which is considered conventional in research on civil war and which we follow in our analysis). This initial step identified six studies:

1. Warren, T. Camber. 2014. Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State Sovereignty. *International Organization* 68(1): 111–41.

2. Cunningham, E. David and Douglas Lemke. 2013. Combining Civil and Interstate Wars. *International Organization* 63(3): 609–27.

3. Savun, Burcu and Daniel C. Tirone. 2012. Exogenous Shocks, Foreign Aid, and Civil War. *International Organization* 66(3): 363–93.

4. Hartzell, Caroline A., Matthew Hoddie, and Molly Bauer. 2010. Economic Liberalization via IMF Structural Adjustment: Sowing the Seeds of Civil War? *International Organization* 64(2): 339–56.

5. Brancati, Dawn. 2006. Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism? *International Organization* 60(3): 651–85.

6. Salehyan, Idean and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2006. Refugees and the Spread of Civil War. *International Organization* 60(2): 335–66.

The Cunningham and Lemke study focuses on whether intra- and inter-state conflicts have similar causes. Since inter-state conflicts have been extensively analyzed using two-stage models (and our aim was to introduce the two-stage approach to civil conflict research), we did not consider a replication of this study.

The Savun and Tirone study investigates the effects of foreign aid on the likelihood of civil conflict in countries experiencing economic shocks. This study was a less plausible candidate as it only covers a 15-year period and includes three-way interaction terms in the empirical analysis, making the two-stage stage estimation rather complex and difficult to interpret (particularly regarding marginal effects). Given that there were two other studies with more conventional research designs and much larger timespans (discussed below), we decided not to replicate the Savun and Tirone study.

The study by Hartzell, Hodie, and Bauer focuses on the relationship between economic liberalization and onset of civil conflict. We also found this study, in principle, to be replicable. However, Hartzell, Hodie, and Bauer already rely on a two-stage estimation procedure based on a bivariate probit model to account for potential endogeneity stemming from factors that affect both liberalization and civil conflict. A replication extending this study to consider the effects of liberalization on conflict origination and conflict militarization would not be possible without considerable changes to the original model.

The Brancati study investigates the effects of decentralization on ethnic conflict and secessionism. We excluded this study from the replication analyses because of its rather restricted scope (compared to conventional studies of civil war): it focuses on democratic countries and restricts the timespan to 1985–2000 (the number of observations in some of the models is below 200).

Given all this, we found the studies by Salehyan and Gleditsch and Warren the most appropriate replication candidates. Both studies follow research designs that are typical in the study of civil conflict onset. They use conventional regression models and their timespans encompass most of the post-1945 period.