

**Supplemental Materials for  
“Population Displacement Strategies in Civil War: A  
Cross-National Analysis”**

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# 1 SDCC DATASET

## 1.1 Sample of Civil Wars

The SDCC dataset covers instances of strategic population displacement during civil wars between 1945-2008. It uses a sample of 147 wars drawn from Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) (K&B)'s TR dataset. I added 13 additional conflicts from K&B's PRIO100 dataset (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014) that generated 1,000 more battle deaths in at least one year of the conflict. These included France v. Vietnam (1945-54); France v. Cameroon (1955-60); Portugal v. Guinea Bissau (1962-74); Portugal v. Angola (1961-75); Portugal v. Mozambique (1962-75); France v. Tunisia (1952-54); U.K. v. Kenya (Mau Mau, 1952-56); U.K. v. Malaya (1950-60); France v. Algeria (1954-62); Rwanda v. ALiR (1996-2002); India v. MNF (1966-68); India v. NNC (1955-62); and Pakistan v. TTP (2007-).

All 160 conflicts meet the following definitional criteria of civil war: (1) fighting between state actors and non-state groups that were able to mount an organized military challenge for control over a government or region; and (2) at least 1,000 battle deaths in at least one year of the conflict. Since I assume that combatants are unlikely to consider displacing civilians unless a conflict has reached a certain level of intensity, I selected this universe of cases over those that use lower battle death thresholds (e.g., UCDP/PRIO). Coding strategic displacement accurately at the dyad level was not possible because, when state actors engaged in these methods, sources were not always specific about which rebel group(s) displacement was intended to combat. While K&B deliberately exclude colonial wars from their dataset, I include them because they constitute important contexts in which displacement was (or could have) been used, and some have been the subject of extensive case study research.<sup>1</sup> However, in the manuscript I remove these conflicts from the sample as a robustness check.

## 1.2 Coding Procedure for Strategic Displacement

A four-person research team identified cases of strategic displacement using the following sources:

- Case histories for each individual conflict.
- Country reports from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (<http://www.internal-displacement.org/>). While IDMC reports only go back to 2003, many contain descriptions of wartime displacement throughout the country's history.
- Case studies on forced displacement from Robert Cohen and Francis M. Deng's seminal volume on internal displacement (Cohen and Deng 2010).

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<sup>1</sup> These cases were not selected on the dependent variable, however, as some colonial wars excluded from the dataset (due to the low death threshold) included instances of strategic displacement (e.g., U.K. v. Aden/Yemen, 1963-67; U.K. vs. Cyprus/EOKA, 1954-59; U.K. v. Shifra, 1945-52) and instances where it was not employed (e.g., France v. Morocco; France v. Madagascar; Netherlands v. Indonesia).

- For conflicts between 1975-2008, we consulted annual human rights reports from the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International (AI), and Human Rights Watch (HRW). The State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are published annually, and AI and HRW both publish annual reports by country and periodic special reports by country and/or human rights issue. These sources are widely considered trustworthy and reliable sources of data on human rights violations (Cohen 2013; Cohen and Nordås 2014; Stanton 2016). We used the Human Rights Text Data Repository to conduct keyword searches of all reports for all years in countries experiencing active conflict (Fariss et al. 2015).
- Newspaper reports from LexisNexis Academic.

Keywords used to identify potential cases included the following: Burn\* Ho\*; Burn\* Vill\*; Displace\*; Evict\*; (Forced) Reloc\*; (Forced/forcible) Resettle\*; Expel\*; Expul\*; Evac\*; Scorch\*; Protected Vill\*; Hamlet; Concentra\*; Concentration Camp; Regroupment; Cleansing; Population Removal; Population Movement; Scorched; Demol\*. The terms we used were generated through an extensive examination of anecdotal evidence and case studies.

For each conflict, the research team examined patterns and descriptions of displacement, violence, and human rights violations to determine if the displacement of civilian populations was at least partly due to state or non-state actors deliberately triggering their flight. Following the conceptual discussion in the paper, several criteria must be met for an instance of civilian displacement to qualify as strategic wartime displacement. First, displacement must be related to the conflict. This excludes planned population movements due to natural disasters or development projects, and evictions of urban squatters or other civilians that occur outside the conflict zone.

Second, following Greenhill (2010)'s approach to coding strategic engineered migration, there must be evidence of orchestration and intent to displace. *Orchestration* means that civilian flight was promoted or executed by armed actors, whether through explicit threats, evacuation orders, sustained destruction of property, or the physical removal and/or resettlement of residents by bus, truck, or train. Displacement must also be *intentional*, in that sources indicate that displacement due to government or rebel actions was deliberate. I therefore do not include instances of displacement as collateral damage, in which civilians spontaneously flee in anticipation of, or during, battles between warring parties. Reports that fighting or military operations "led to displacement" or "displaced" a certain number of people may indicate orchestration, but they do not within themselves constitute evidence of intent. Such cases were therefore investigated further.

Finally, the International Criminal Court defines criminal displacement as that committed as part of a "widespread or systematic attack" against civilians.<sup>2</sup> This implies a certain scale and incidence for a case to qualify as strategic displacement. In coding cases the research team focused on general patterns of violence and

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<sup>2</sup> See ICC Rome Statute, Article 7(2)(d).

displacement, as opposed to estimates of the number of civilians uprooted (which can be grossly inaccurate). This made it less likely that we overlooked incidents where displacement figures were poorly documented. But as a general guide, we used a threshold of at least 1,000 civilians targeted for displacement for a period of at least one month, metrics that align with previous research on systematic violence (Ulfelder and Valentino 2008). Generally, displacement that was based on the selective targeting of specific individuals or households – the eviction or deportation of particular political adversaries, for example – was not included in the dataset.

The unit of analysis was **conflict-perpetrator-type**. For each case, the following details were coded:

- **Perpetrator.** The party or parties responsible for displacement: *government/military; pro-government militia; rebel group; or military and militia*. Cases of rebel- and government-induced displacement were therefore coded separately.
- **Location.** Details on the region, district, or general area where people were displaced from, to the greatest level of specificity possible.
- **Victim.** Information on the population targeted for displacement. This could be a specific ethnic, religious, social, or political group, or it could refer to multiple groups or a general class of people living in an area (e.g., rural peasants).
- **Timing.** Details on the year and/or month that strategic displacement was first enacted, and when it was reported to have ended, where such information was available.
- **Type.** Each instance of strategic displacement was coded by type, so a conflict could experience multiple strategies.


*Cleansing* describes the forced, permanent expulsion of a particular political, ethnic, or religious group. We therefore looked for evidence that victims were members of an identifiable group; that they were targeted due to this affiliation; and that displacement was intended to be permanent. Indicators of permanence include perpetrators preventing the displaced from returning and/or encouraging co-ethnics or political supporters to resettle in evacuated areas. For example, during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1974-75; 1985-96), government forces moved large numbers of Kurds from military zones in northern Iraq to distant areas in the south of the country. According to the U.S. State Department, “Most of the forcibly relocated have been allowed to return subsequently, although not to their original villages. Most have been resettled in government-built centers. In addition to dispersing Kurds throughout Iraq, there have been various attempts to dilute their geographic majority in the north by moving in ethnic Arabs” (U.S. State Department 1983). Even though the Kurdish population was resettled, this case resembles cleansing more than forced relocation because victims were moved far from the conflict zone, and there was a concerted effort by the perpetrator to permanently move its co-ethnics into the depopulated areas. Displacement here was clearly part of the government’s program of “Arabization” and reflected an attempt at demographic engineering.

*Depopulation* describes the temporary or permanent removal of all inhabitants from a designated area. Unlike cleansing, depopulation means that combatants made little effort to differentiate between particular groups; targeting was indiscriminate rather than collective. Depopulation is usually carried out through indirect violence, such as sustained bombing or shelling reported to be intentionally directed at populated civilian areas.

*Forced Relocation* describes displacement with an inward or “pull” orientation. These cases entailed a concerted and ongoing effort by perpetrators to draw the population into its domain. Rather than expelling people to distant areas, combatants concentrated them within the conflict zone or a nearby location.

Table 1.1 summarizes the coding for each conflict in SDCC. Figure 1.1 captures the frequency of each type of displacement strategy according to SDCC. Descriptions of each conflict, which contain details about coding decisions, are available upon request from the author. Conflicts coded as “0” (no strategic displacement) included both those that experienced little to no civilian displacement at all, and those that experienced displacement that was spontaneous but not ordered by combatants.

**Figure 1.1:** Prevalence of State-induced Displacement Strategies



**Table 1.1: SDCC Dataset (1945-2008)**

<b>Country (Conflict)</b>	<b>Years</b>	<b>State Displacement</b>	<b>Rebel Displacement</b>
Afghanistan (Mujahedeen)	1978-92	Depopulation	None
Afghanistan (Taliban I)	1992-96	None	None
Afghanistan (Northern Alliance)	1996-01	Cleansing	None
Afghanistan (Taliban II)	2001-	None	None
Algeria (v. France)	1952-62	Forced Relocation	None
Algeria (CNDR)	1962-63	None	None
Algeria (MIA/FIS/AIS, GIA)	1992-	None	None
Angola (v. Portugal)	1961-75	Forced Relocation	None
Angola (UNITA I)	1975-91	Forced Relocation	Forced Relocation
Angola (UNITA II)	1992-94	Forced Relocation	Forced Relocation
Angola (UNITA III)	1997-02	Forced Relocation	Forced Relocation
Angola (FLEC/Cabinda)	1994-99	None	None
Argentina (Peron)	1955	None	None
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabagh)	1992-94	Cleansing	Cleansing
Bangladesh (Chittagong Hills)	1974-97	Forced Relocation	Cleansing
Bolivia (MNR)	1952	None	None
Bosnia (Rep. Srpska/Croats)	1992-95	Cleansing	Cleansing
Burundi (Nyangoma faction)	1965-69	Cleansing	Cleansing
Burundi (Hutu rebels)	1972	Cleansing	None
Burundi (Org. massacres)	1988	None	None
Burundi (Palipehutu/CNDD)	1991-	Forced Relocation, Cleansing	None
Cambodia (KR)	1970-75	None	Forced Relocation
Cambodia (KR, FUNCINPEC)	1975-91	Forced Relocation	None
Cameroon (v. France)	1955-60	Forced Relocation	None
Chad (FROLINAT)	1965-79	None	None
Chad (GUNT, FAT, CDR, etc.)	1980-94	Cleansing	None
Chad (FARF; FROLINAT)	1994-97	Cleansing	None
Chad (MDJT)	2003-	None	None
China (PLA)	1946-49	None	None
China (Taiwanese rebels)	1947	None	None
China (Tibet I)	1950-51	None	None
China (Tibet II)	1956-59	None	None
Colombia (La Violencia)	1948-66	None	None
Colombia (M-19/ELN/FARC)	1978-	Cleansing	Cleansing
Costa Rica (NLA)	1948	None	None
Croatia (Krajina)	1992-95	Cleansing	Cleansing
Cyprus (GC v. TC I)	1963-67	Cleansing	None
Cyprus (GC v. TC II)	1974	Cleansing	Cleansing
Djibouti (FRUD)	1991-94	None	None
DR Congo/Zaire (Katanga)	1960-65	None	None
DR Congo/Zaire (Simbas/CNL)	1967	None	None
DR Congo/Zaire (FNLC)	1978-79	Depopulation	None
DR Congo/Zaire (AFDL)	1996-97	Cleansing	Cleansing
DR Congo/Zaire (RCD, etc.)	1998-01	None	None
El Salvador (FMLN)	1979-92	Depopulation	None
Ethiopia (Eritrea)	1974-91	Forced Relocation	None
Ethiopia (Tigrean)	1976-88	Forced Relocation	None

Ethiopia (WSLF, OLF, SALF)	1978-91	Forced Relocation	None
Georgia (South Ossetia)	1991-92	Cleansing	None
Georgia (Abkhazia)	1992-94	Cleansing	Cleansing
Greece (DSE)	1944-49	Forced Relocation	None
Guatemala (FAR)	1966-72	None	None
Guatemala (UNRG, etc.)	1978-94	Forced Relocation	None
Guinea-Bissau (v. Portugal)	1962-74	Forced Relocation	None
Guinea-Bissau (Mil. faction)	1998-99	None	None
Haiti (Mil. coup)	1991-95	None	None
India (Naga)	1955-64	Forced Relocation	None
India (Mizoram)	1966-86	Forced Relocation	None
India (Assam/NE States)	1990-	Forced Relocation	None
India (Naxalites)	1989-	Forced Relocation	None
India (Kashmir)	1989-	Forced Relocation	Cleansing
India (Sikhs)	1984-93	None	None
Indonesia (Rep. S. Moluccas)	1950	None	None
Indonesia (Darul Islam I)	1953	None	None
Indonesia (Darul Islam II, PRRI)	1956-60	Forced Relocation	None
Indonesia (Aceh/GAM I)	1990-91	None	None
Indonesia (Aceh/GAM II)	1999-05	Forced Relocation	Cleansing
Indonesia (E. Timor)	1975-99	Forced Relocation	None
Indonesia (OPM/West Papua)	1976-78	Forced Relocation	None
Iran (KDPI)	1979-84	Depopulation	None
Iraq (KDP)	1961-70	None	None
Iraq (KDP, PUK I)	1974-75	Cleansing	None
Iraq (KDP, PUK II)	1985-96	Cleansing	None
Iraq (SCRI)	1991-93	Cleansing	None
Iraq (Sunni/Shi'a rebels)	2004-	Cleansing	Cleansing
Ivory Coast (MPCI, MPIGO, etc.)	2003-	Cleansing	None
Kenya (Mau Mau)	1952-56	Forced Relocation	None
Kenya (Shifta)	1963-67	Forced Relocation	None
Kenya (Rift Valley Violence)	1991-93	Cleansing	None
Korea (Yosu Rebellion)	1948-49	Forced Relocation	None
Laos (Pathet Lau)	1960-73	Forced Relocation	None
Lebanon (Nasserites v. Chamoun)	1958	None	None
Lebanon (Various militias)	1975-90	Cleansing	Cleansing
Liberia (NPLF)	1989-90	None	None
Liberia (NPLF, ULIMO, NPF)	1992-97	None	Forced Relocation
Liberia (LURD)	1999-03	None	Forced Relocation
Malaysia (CPM)	1950-60	Forced Relocation	None
Mali (Tuaregs)	1990-95	Forced Relocation	None
Moldova (Dniester)	1991-92	None	None
Morocco (Polisario)	1975-91	None	None
Mozambique (v. Portugal)	1962-75	Forced Relocation	None
Mozambique (RENAMO)	1976-92	Forced Relocation	Forced Relocation
Myanmar/Burma (KNU,KNLA)	1948-51	None	None
Myanmar/Burma (various)	1960-95	Forced Relocation, Cleansing	None
Myanmar/Burma (CPB)	1948-88	Forced Relocation	None
Namibia (SWAPO)	1973-89	Forced Relocation	None



Nicaragua (FSLN)	1978-79	None	None
Nicaragua (Contras)	1981-88	Forced Relocation	None
Nepal (CPN-M/UPF)	1996-06	None	None
Nigeria (Biafra)	1967-70	Cleansing	None
Nigeria (Maitatsine)	1980-85	None	None
Oman (DLF)	1971-75	Forced Relocation	None
Pakistan (Bangladesh secession)	1971	Cleansing	None
Pakistan (Baluchi)	1973-77	None	None
Pakistan (Taliban)	2007-	Depopulation	None
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	1988-98	Forced Relocation	None
Paraguay (Febreristas, Libs, Comms)	1947	None	None
Peru (Sendero Luminoso)	1980-96	Forced Relocation	Forced Relocation
Philippines (Huk)	1952-54	Forced Relocation	None
Philippines (NPA)	1972-92	Forced Relocation	None
Philippines (MNLF, MILF)	1971-	Forced Relocation	None
Russia (UPA)	1944-50	Cleansing	None
Russia (Estonia/Forest Brothers)	1944-48	Cleansing	None
Russia (Chechnya I)	1994-96	Depopulation	None
Russia (Chechnya II)	1999-09	Depopulation	None
Russia (Latvia/LTSPA, etc.)	1944-47	None	None
Russia (Lithuania/BDPS)	1944-48	None	None
Rwanda (Tutsi rebels)	1963-64	None	None
Rwanda (Hutu v. Tutsi groups)	1990-93	None	None
Rwanda (RPF, genocide)	1994	Cleansing	None
Rwanda (ALiR/FDLR)	1996-02	Forced Relocation	None
Senegal (MFDC/Casamance)	1989-99	None	None
Sierra Leone (RUF, AFRC)	1991-96	None	Depopulation, Forced Relocation
Somalia (Isaaqs)	1988-91	Depopulation	None
Somalia (USC Faction)	1991-	Cleansing	Cleansing
Sri Lanka (JVP I)	1971	None	None
Sri Lanka (JVP II)	1987-89	None	None
Sri Lanka (LTTE I)	1983-02	Depopulation	Cleansing, Forced Relocation
Sri Lanka (LTTE II)	2003-09	Depopulation	Forced Relocation
Sudan (Anyanya)	1963-72	Forced Relocation, Depopulation	None
Sudan (SPLA)	1983-02	Forced Relocation, Depopulation	None
Sudan (Darfur/JEM, SLA, etc.)	2003-11	Cleansing (Ethnic)	None
Tajikistan (UTO)	1992-97	Cleansing	None
Thailand (CPT)	1966-82	Forced Relocation	None
Thailand (Patani)	2004-	None	Cleansing
Turkey (PKK)	1984-99	Cleansing	None
Uganda (Baganda rebellion)	1966	None	None
Uganda (Fronasa, UNLF)	1978-79	None	None
Uganda (NRA, etc.)	1981-87	Forced Relocation	None
Uganda (HSM, UPA, UPDA)	1990-92	Forced Relocation	None
Uganda (LRA, ADF, West Nile, etc.)	1995-06	Forced Relocation	None
Vietnam (v. France)	1945-54	Forced Relocation	None
Vietnam (Vietcong)	1960-75	Forced Relocation	None
Yemen (Yahaya rebellion)	1948	None	None
Yemen (Royalists)	1962-70	None	None

Yemen (South Yemen)	1994	None	None
Yemen (Yemenite Socialist Party)	1986	None	None
Yugoslavia (Croatia/Krajina)	1991	Cleansing	Cleansing
Yugoslavia (UCK)	1998-99	Cleansing	Cleansing
Zimbabwe (ZANU/ZAPU)	1972-79	Forced Relocation	None
Zimbabwe (Ndebele guerrillas)	1983-87	None	None

### 1.2.1 Data Reliability Measures

We took two measures to ensure the reliability of the data. First, we cross-referenced each case with those included in previous studies and/or existing lists of strategic wartime displacements (Orchard 2010; Zhukov 2015; Downes and Greenhill 2015; Stanton 2016; Bulutgil 2016). While there was a high level of agreement, we were able to identify a number of missing cases, as noted in the next section.

Second, we included a precision ranking that reflects the degree of certainty that a case constitutes strategic displacement based on available evidence. In many instances, the strategic dimension of displacement was unambiguous: armed groups publicly issued evacuation orders, defended their plans to uproot or relocate communities, and dispatched combatants to threaten or round up residents. In other cases, the intentionality of displacement, and armed groups' complicity in it, is detectable through overt action: troops or rebels engage in the systematic burning and destruction of entire villages to drive people out, and prevent them from returning. Yet there are instances where either the extent to which displacement was the result of deliberate action, or the type of displacement strategy, was unclear. To address this ambiguity, I used the precision ranking outlined in Table 1.2.

**Table 1.2:** Precision Ranking for Cases of Strategic Wartime Displacement

Rank	Description
3	<i>High confidence</i> Strong evidence of both orchestration and intent. Confident about the type of displacement employed.
2	<i>Medium confidence</i> Strong evidence of both orchestration and intent. Type of displacement was ambiguous.
1	<i>Low confidence</i> Limited or ambiguous evidence of orchestration and/or intent.

### 1.3 Previous Data Collection Efforts

One of the most extensive lists of strategic wartime displacement to date has been compiled by citetzhukov2015population, who identifies instances of “forced population resettlement” in counterinsurgency campaigns between 1812 and 2006, drawn from Lyall and Wilson’s counterinsurgency dataset (Lyall and Wilson 2009). The sourcing of cases is unclear, however, and his typology is not systematic or exhaustive: for example, it includes several instances of “forced refugee return.” Zhukov’s dataset is also not comprehensive: SDCC identifies an additional 40 cases between 1945-2006 that were omitted from his list.

Downes and Greenhill (2015) build on Zhukov’s list to develop a dataset of “population relocation in counterinsurgency operations.” While their study constitutes a valiant effort, their typology is confusing: they have a category for “expulsion,” yet the dataset excludes important instances of ethnic or political cleansing; moreover, they code some cases as “deportation,” which usually refers to the forcible expulsion from a country, not to other areas within it. Finally, the dataset is not comprehensive: the authors only include irregular wars, and even within irregular wars, SDCC identifies an additional 28 cases omitted from their data. For those cases the authors did include, there is close agreement with SDCC.<sup>3</sup>

Another project that collected data on strategic displacement is a study on counterinsurgency from the RAND Corporation (Paul et al. 2010), which denotes instances where counterinsurgency forces “resettled/removed civilian populations for population control.” However, the study only includes a select group of post-World War II counterinsurgency campaigns. The authors found evidence that population resettlement/removal was used in 25 cases, all but one of which are included in SDCC.

Other scholars have collected data on particular types of strategic wartime displacement, or on instances of displacement for shorter periods of time. Bulutgil (2016) compiled cases of 20th century ethnic cleansing, defined as “an event in which a state kills or forcefully and permanently deports at least 20% of an ethnic group on its territory from their current location to another one within three years.” Many of her cases occurred during inter-state conflicts in Europe, but all 11 cases that took place during civil wars are included in SDCC. Orchard (2010) provides a qualitative dataset of what he calls “regime-induced displacement,” which includes episodes from 1991-2006 where “government or government-sponsored actors deliberately use coercive tactics to directly or indirectly cause large numbers of their own citizens to flee their homes.” Orchard identifies cases during both wartime and peacetime, using some of the same sources as SDCC. All but three of his wartime cases are captured in SDCC.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> There are two cases in SDCC that are coded as no strategic displacement, but are included in both the Downes and Greenhill and Zhukov datasets. These are Israel vs. Palestinian (1987-1993) and Sierra Leone v. RUF (1991-1999). The first conflict does not fall within SDCC’s universe of cases. For the second, we could find no reliable evidence of state-induced expulsion or forced relocation, despite an extensive review of available primary and secondary sources.

<sup>4</sup> Out of a total of 28 wartime cases. The four cases coded as “no strategic displacement” in SDCC are

Stanton (2016) codes multiple forms of rebel and government strategies of violence in civil wars from 1989-2010. While she uses the UCDP/PRIO definition of armed conflict to define her universe of cases, two main strategies in her dataset are of interest. The first is government- and rebel-induced “cleansing,” defined as instances where combatants “forcibly expelled civilians from a particular ethnic or religious group from contested territory and also used scorched earth tactics and/or massacres”. The second is state “high-casualty terrorism,” defined as “cases in which the government engaged in intentional bombing and shelling of populated civilian targets.” All 14 cases of government cleansing, 10 cases of rebel cleansing, and 13 cases of state high-casualty terrorism identified by Stanton are included in SDCC. footnoteSeven of Stanton’s cases experienced both government cleansing and government terrorism. She also identified eight conflicts where the government employed scorched earth tactics or forced expulsion, but not both, six of which are included in SDCC.

See Table [f](#) for a summary of these previous studies. Not included in this list is data from Bulutgil (2016). Many of her cases occurred during inter-state conflicts in Europe, but all 11 cases that took place during civil wars are included in SDCC.

Finally, there are a number of existing case studies of both cleansing (Mann 2005; Naimark 2002) and forced relocation (Jundanian 1974; Sutton 1977; Garlock 1991; Sepp 1992; Catton 1999; Markel 2006; Whittaker 2012). Yet many of these studies focus on a limited number of European cases, such as ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, or on population relocation by Western imperial powers, such as the Malayan Emergency, the French-Algerian war, and the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya.

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Congo (1997-99); Cote d’Ivoire (2002-06); Djibouti (1993); and Sierra Leone (1999-2000). For these conflicts, we could find no reliable evidence of state-induced expulsion or relocation in reviewing primary and secondary sources. With the exception of Sierra Leone, no other data collection efforts have identified these wars as experiencing strategic displacement.

**Table 1.3: Other Data Collection Efforts**

Downes/Greenhill 2015 "Population Relocation in Counterinsurgency Ops"	Zhukov 2015 "Population Resettlement in Counterinsurgency"	Orchard 2010 "Regime-induced Displacement"	Paul et al. 2010 "Resettlement in COIN"	Stanton 2016 "Cleansing, Scorched Earth/Expulsion"
<p>Afghanistan (Mujahedeen) Algeria (v. France) Angola (v. Portugal) Burundi (Palipehutu/CNDD) Cambodia (KR) DR Congo/Zaire (AFDL) El Salvador (FMLN) Ethiopia (Eritrea) Greece (DSE) Guatemala (UNRG, etc.) Guinea-Bissau (v. Portugal) India (Mizoram) India (Naga) Indonesia (Aceh/GAM) Indonesia (East Timor) Iran (KDPH) Iraq (KDP, PUK II) Israel v. Palestinian Kenya (Mau Mau) Kenya (Shifta) Kenya (Shifta) Malaysia (CPM) Mali (Tuaregs) Mozambique (v. Portugal) Myanmar/Burma (ethnic groups) Namibia (SWAPO) Nicaragua (Contras) Oman (DLF) Philippines (Huk) Russia (Estonia/Forest Brothers) Russia (UPA) Sierra Leone (RUF, AFRC) Uganda (NRA, etc.) Uganda (ADF, LRA, West Nile) Vietnam (Vietcong) Yugoslavia (UCK) Zimbabwe (ZANU/ZAPU)</p>	<p>Afghanistan (Mujahedeen) Algeria (v. France) Angola (v. Portugal) Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabagh) Bosnia (Rep. Srpska/Croats) Burundi (Hutu rebels) Burundi (Palipehutu/CNDD) Cambodia (KR) Cambodia (KR, FUNCINPEC) Croatia (Krajina) DR Congo/Zaire (AFDL) El Salvador (FMLN) Ethiopia (Eritrea) Georgia (Abkhazia) Greece (DSE) Guinea-Bissau (v. Portugal) Indonesia (Aceh/GAM) Indonesia (East Timor) Iran (KDPH) Iraq (KDP, PUK II) Indonesia (East Timor) Iran (KDPH) Iraq (KDP, PUK II) Israel v. Palestinian (Intifada) Kenya (Mau Mau) Kenya (Shifta) Malaysia (CPM) Mali (Tuaregs) Mozambique (v. Portugal) Namibia (SWAPO) Philippines (Huk) Russia (Estonia/Forest Brothers) Russia (UPA) Rwanda (Tutsi rebels) Rwanda (RPF, genocide) Rwanda (ALiR/FDLR) Sierra Leone (RUF, AFRC) Sudan (SPLA) Sudan (Darfur/JEM, SLA) Tajikistan (UTO) Turkey (PKK) Uganda (NRA, etc.) Uganda (LRA, ADF, West Nile) Vietnam (Vietcong) Yugoslavia (Croatia/Krajina) Yugoslavia (UCK) Zimbabwe (ZANU/ZAPU)</p>	<p>Afghanistan (Northern Alliance) Angola (UNITA II) Angola (UNITA III) Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabagh) Bosnia (Rep. Srpska/Croats) Myanmar/Burma (ethnic) Colombia (M-19/ELN/FARC) DR Congo/Zaire (AFDL) DR 1999-2004 (refugee return) DR Congo/Zaire (RCD, MLC) Ivory Coast (MPCI, MPIGO) Djibouti (FRUD) Ethiopia (Eritrea) Georgia (Abkhazia) India (Assam/NE States) Indonesia (East Timor) Iraq (KDP, PUK II) Iraq (Scri) Kenya (Rift Valley Violence) Philippines (MNLF, MILF) Russia (Chechnya I) Russia (Chechnya II) Rwanda (RPF, genocide) Rwanda (ALiR/FDLR) Sierra Leone (RUF, AFRC) Somalia (USC Faction) Sudan (SPLA) Sudan (Darfur/JEM, SLA) Uganda (LRA, ADF, West Nile) Yugoslavia (UCK)</p>	<p>Afghanistan (Mujahedeen) Afghanistan (Northern Alliance) Algeria (v. France) Angola (v. Portugal) Burundi (Palipehutu/CNDD) Cambodia (KR) Cambodia (KR, FUNCINPEC) Ethiopia (Eritrea) Greece (DSE) Guatemala (UNRG, etc.) Indonesia (Aceh/GAM) Indonesia (East Timor) Iraq (KDP, PUK II) Guinea-Bissau (v. Portugal) Kenya (Mau Mau) Malaysia (CPM) Morocco (Polisario) Mozambique (v. Portugal) Mozambique (RENAMO) Nicaragua (Contras) Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) Peru (Sendero Luminoso) Turkey (PKK) Sudan (SPLA) Vietnam (Vietcong) Zimbabwe (ZANU/ZAPU) Turkey (PKK) Uganda (LRA, ADF, West Nile) Yugoslavia (Croatia/Krajina)</p>	<p>Angola (UNITA) Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabagh) Bangladesh (Chittagong Hills) Bosnia (Rep. Srpska/Croats) Chad (FARE; FROLINAT) Colombia (M-19/ELN/FARC) Croatia (Krajina) DR Congo/Zaire (AFDL) Ethiopia (Eritrea) Iraq (KDP, PUK II) Iraq (Scri) Iraq (Sunni/Shi'a rebels) Ivory Coast (MPCI, MPIGO) Liberia (LURD, NPFL) Mozambique (RENAMO) Myanmar/Burma (ethnic groups) Philippines (NPA) Russia (Chechnya I) Russia (Chechnya II) Rwanda (RPF, genocide) Senegal (Casamance) Somalia (USC Faction) South Africa/ANC Sri Lanka (LTTE) Sudan (Darfur/JEM, SLA) Sudan (SPLM)</p>

## 2 CODING NOTES ON OTHER VARIABLES

### 2.1 Ethnic War

To measure *ethnic war*, I used a dichotomous measure from Kalyvas and Balcells (2010). As shown in Table 2.1, nearly all instances of state-induced expulsion (both cleansing and depopulation) have occurred in ethnic wars, which have experienced much higher rates of cleansing (27 percent) than non-ethnic wars (2 percent). Yet non-ethnic wars have experienced a higher rate of forced relocation (21 of 54, or 39 percent) than ethnic wars (31 of 106, or 29 percent).

**Table 2.1:** Strategic Displacement in Ethnic Wars, 1945-2008 (State Perpetrators)

	<i>Non-Ethnic War</i>		<i>Ethnic War</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	30	55.6	37	34.9	67	41.9
Cleansing	1	1.9	29	27.4	30	18.8
Depopulation	2	3.7	9	8.5	11	6.9
Relocation	21	38.9	31	29.2	52	32.5
<i>Total</i>	54	100.0	106	100.0	160	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 18.27, p < 0.001^{***}$$

### 2.2 Technologies of Rebellion

I rely on Kalyvas and Balcells (2010)'s coding of military technologies of rebellion, which they separate into three categories: irregular or "guerrilla" civil wars, conventional wars, or symmetric non-conventional (SNC) conflicts. These measures reflect the technologies employed by insurgent forces at the beginning of the war. Table 2.2 displays cross-tabulations of strategic displacement and technologies of rebellion for SDCC. In ten conflicts, technologies of rebellion change over the course of the war. Table 2.3 displays cross-tabs using this alternative measure.

**Table 2.2:** Strategic Displacement and Technologies of Rebellion (1945-2008)

	<i>Conventional</i>		<i>Irregular</i>		<i>SNC</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	24	47.1	31	34.1	12	66.7	67	41.9
Cleansing	19	37.3	7	7.7	4	22.2	30	18.8
Depopulation	5	9.8	6	6.6	0	0.0	11	6.9
Relocation	3	5.9	47	51.6	2	11.1	52	32.5
<i>Total</i>	51	100.0	91	100.0	18	100.0	160	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 45.46, p < 0.001^{***}$$

**Table 2.3:** Strategic Displacement and Technologies of Rebellion (Alternative)

	<i>Conventional</i>		<i>Irregular</i>		<i>SNC</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	25	43.9	31	35.2	11	73.3	67	41.9
Cleansing	19	33.3	8	9.1	3	20.0	30	18.8
Depopulation	5	8.8	6	6.8	0	0.0	11	6.9
Relocation	8	14.0	43	48.9	1	6.7	52	32.5
<i>Total</i>	57	100.0	88	100.0	15	100.0	160	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 33.02, p < 0.001^{***}$$

### 2.3 Border Conflict and Distance

*Border conflict* is a dummy variable set equal to one if the conflict zone (a) primarily falls outside the capital city, (b) abuts an international or coastal border, and (c) has a significant rural component. While wars in distant borderlands tend to be waged in the countryside, there are several exceptions where fighting primarily occurred in urban areas, such as India (1984-93), Algeria (1992-), and Chechnya (1999-2009). I therefore did not code a war as a border conflict if it was primarily urban in nature.

For (b), I referred to the coding by Buhaug et al. (2009) of whether or not the conflict zone includes a country's borders. Note that this is a conservative coding procedure,

and may actually underestimate the effect of border conflict on the incidence of forced relocation. Because of how the authors use GIS, their variable only captures areas adjacent to a border with another state. This means that several wars in island nations are not coded even though the insurgencies were concentrated in regions along the country’s coastal periphery – including Aceh and Timor in Indonesia, Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, Jaffa in Sri Lanka, and Mindanao in the Philippines. Several of these cases have also experienced the strategic use of forced relocation. For cases in SDCC that are not included in Buhaug et al. (2009)’s dataset, I relied on conflict histories and other case sources to ascertain whether the conflict zone included a border region.

For (c), a measure of the rurality of the rebellion is included in the SDCC dataset (*urbrur*). To code this variable, I relied on multiple qualitative and quantitative classifications of rural and urban insurgencies, since geo-coded datasets such as ACLED and UCDP GED are too limited in country and temporal scope. I first examined classifications of rural and urban insurgencies by Calluzzo (2010). Calluzzo looked at overall insurgent strategy, relative emphasis of counterinsurgent activity, relative tactical emphasis of insurgent activity, and location of bases of support to determine whether an insurgency primarily focused on urban areas, primarily focused on rural areas, or focused equally on both rural and urban areas. A classification of rural or mixed insurgency indicated that the conflict zone had a significant rural component. To cross-check this coding, I consulted a RAND study of counterinsurgency campaigns (Paul et al. 2010) – which includes an indicator for whether a campaign was “primarily urban” – along with qualitative classifications of urban and rural insurgencies described by Staniland (2010) and Hoffman and Taw (1991). Insurgencies coded as primarily rural or a mix of urban and rural were considered border conflicts, as along as they also met the criteria specified in (a) and (b).

Table 2.4 provides the cross-tabulation for *border conflict* and the primary type of displacement employed in each conflict.

**Table 2.4:** Strategic Displacement and Border Conflicts, 1945-2008

	<i>Non-Border Conflict</i>		<i>Border Conflict</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	51	58.0	16	22.2	67	41.9
Cleansing	24	27.3	6	8.3	30	18.8
Depopulation	5	5.7	6	8.3	11	6.9
Relocation	8	9.1	44	61.1	52	32.5
<i>Total</i>	88	100.0	72	100.0	160	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 53.03, p < 0.001^{***}$$



*Distance*, which measures the distance, in kilometers (logged) between the capital city and the conflict zone, is also based on data from Buhaug et al. (2009). To fill in missing data, I used information on distance provided by the Correlates of Insurgency dataset (Lyall and Wilson 2009). Note that the results of the main analysis do not change if only the data from Buhaug et al. (2009) is used.

## 2.4 Parallel Conflict

*Parallel conflict* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether incumbents were fighting another domestic insurgency or a conflict with another state during each war, according to UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Table 2.5 provides the cross-tabulation for *parallel conflict* and the primary type of displacement employed in each conflict.

**Table 2.5:** Strategic Displacement and Parallel Conflict, 1945-2008

	<i>No Parallel Conflict</i>		<i>Parallel Conflict</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	58	54.7	9	16.7	67	41.9
Cleansing	23	21.7	7	13.0	30	18.8
Depopulation	7	6.6	4	7.4	11	6.9
Relocation	18	17.0	34	63.0	52	32.5
<i>Total</i>	106	100.0	54	100.0	160	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 37.13, p < 0.001^{***}$$

## 2.5 Rebel Forced Recruitment

For *rebel forced recruitment*, I relied mostly on data collected by Cohen (2013). However, since her data only covers conflicts after 1980, I also used studies by Thomas and Bond (2015) and Beber and Blattman (2013), which code abduction and forced recruitment by rebel groups since the 1950s, mostly in Africa. For conflicts on which data was missing, I used case histories to determine whether rebels engaged in forced recruitment. If the evidence was unclear, the variable was coded as missing. Table 2.6 provides the cross-tabulation for *rebel forced recruitment* and each type of strategic displacement.

**Table 2.6:** Strategic Displacement and Rebel Forced Recruitment (FR), 1945-2008

	<i>No Rebel FR</i>		<i>Rebel FR</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	36	43.9	24	33.8	60	39.2
Cleansing	17	20.7	13	18.3	30	19.6
Depopulation	3	3.7	8	11.3	11	7.2
Relocation	26	31.7	26	36.6	52	34.0
<i>Total</i>	82	100.0	71	100.0	153	100.0

$$\chi^2 = 4.44, p = 0.22$$

## 2.6 Elections

*Elections* is a dummy variable indicating whether a competitive national or local election took place during or within five years prior to the conflict, according to Steele and Schubiger (2018). The authors identified competitive national elections (presidential or legislative) in civil wars after 1945 based on NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012), and local elections based on a World Bank database. Non-competitive elections were not included. Table 2.7 provides the cross-tabulation for *elections* and strategic displacement. Table 2.8 provides the cross-tabulation for local elections only and strategic displacement. Note that this coding biases in favor of the punishment argument, since it does not account for the possibility that elections may have been held *after* displacement was employed. Taking timing into account attenuates the relationship between elections and strategic displacement: within the sub-sample of cases where the year of displacement onset is known, only 12 of 23 instances of cleansing (52%), and 17 of 31 forced relocations (55%), occurred following elections. It is possible, however, that even non-competitive elections reveal information about community loyalties, and thus could provide a marker for collective expulsion. Table 2.9 therefore provides a cross-tab using an indicator for whether any election occurred during or before the conflict, according to the NELDA database. When incorporating non-competitive contests, forced relocation continues to be less likely in conflicts that experience elections.

**Table 2.7:** Strategic Displacement and Competitive Elections, 1945-2008

	<i>No Elections</i>		<i>Elections</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	33	47.1	34	37.8	67	41.9
Cleansing	10	14.3	20	22.2	30	18.8
Depopulation	2	2.9	9	10.0	11	6.9
Relocation	25	35.7	27	30.0	52	32.5
<i>Total</i>	70	100.0	90	100.0	160	100.0

$\chi^2 = 5.47, p = 0.14$

**Table 2.8:** Strategic Displacement and Local Elections, 1945-2008

	<i>No Elections</i>		<i>Elections</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	26	39.4	41	43.6	67	41.9
Cleansing	15	22.7	15	16.0	30	18.8
Depopulation	3	4.5	8	8.5	11	6.9
Relocation	22	33.3	30	31.9	52	32.5
<i>Total</i>	66	100.0	94	100.0	160	100.0

$\chi^2 = 2.02, p = 0.57$

**Table 2.9:** Strategic Displacement and All Elections (NELDA), 1945-2008

	<i>No Elections</i>		<i>Elections</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	48	49.0	12	30.0	60	43.5
Cleansing	18	18.4	10	25.0	28	20.3
Depopulation	6	6.1	5	12.5	11	8.0
Relocation	26	26.5	13	32.5	39	28.3
<i>Total</i>	98	100.0	40	100.0	138	100.0


$$\chi^2 = 4.78, p = 0.19$$

## 2.7 Battle Deaths

Estimates of battle fatalities vary by conflict-year (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). Using the “best” estimate, where available, and the “low” estimate otherwise, I calculated the total number of battle deaths divided by the duration of the conflict, in months. Like Balcells and Kalyvas (2014), I used a variable normalized on the duration of the conflict because I am interested in relative rather than absolute lethality. This measure primarily serves as a proxy for conflict intensity, but I also use it as an alternative measure for punishment due to the high correlation between battle deaths and civilian deaths (Weinstein 2006; Cohen 2016). Figure 2.1 displays a barplot of *average battle deaths/month* by the primary type of strategic displacement employed in each civil war.

As a separate test, for cases where I was able to identify when during a conflict displacement was employed, I calculated the average annual number of battle fatalities pre- and post-displacement (Table 2.10). If the primary aim of displacement is to punish, we should observe more lethal violence after these measures are enacted. In conflicts where data was available, the results for cleansing are consistent with this logic: the median number of fatalities skyrockets from an annual average of 378 pre-displacement to 2,315 post-displacement. For relocation, however, battle deaths actually decreased on average following displacement, from 1,431 to 1,000.

**Figure 2.1: Strategic Displacement and Battle Deaths Per Month**



**Table 2.10: Annual Battle Deaths Pre- and Post-Displacement (1945-2008)**


		<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<b>Cleansing</b>	Pre-Displacement	11	3,056	422	6,341	20	20,284
	Post-Displacement	17	9,246	2,629	12,925	379	50,000
<b>Forced Relocation</b>	Pre-Displacement	35	5,708	1,500	10,062	25	41,947
	Post-Displacement	35	4,910	1,155	9,852	49	41,947

## 2.8 Incumbent Coercive Capacity


Figure 2.2 displays a boxplot of incumbent military personnel by type of strategic displacement on a sub-sample of irregular wars. The plot suggests that within irregular wars, states that employed forced relocation possessed fewer personnel on average than those that employed other displacement strategies – though more than those that employed no displacement at all. This likely reflects the fact that a certain level of *absolute* capacity is needed to enact strategic displacement, which probably explains the lack of relocation by particularly weak incumbents with small militaries, such as Chad (1965-79; 1980-95). However, plotting incumbents' *relative* capacity compared to rebels

by using a measure of *troop ratio* (logged) provides a compelling illustration of the fact that states with limited or overstretched coercive resources tend to employ relocation. To calculate *troop ratio* I divided *military personnel* by the estimated size of the rebel group(s) in each conflict, drawn from the Non-State Actor Dataset (Cunningham et al. 2013). Figure 2.3 compares perpetrators by GDP per capita, an alternative indicator of state capacity.

**Figure 2.2:** Strategic Displacement and Military Capacity (Irregular Wars Only)



**Figure 2.3:** Strategic Displacement and GDP Per Capita



### 3 SUMMARY STATISTICS

**Table 3.1:** Summary Statistics

	Obs	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Govt Cleansing	160	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
Govt Depopulation	160	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
Govt Relocation	160	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Irregular war	160	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00
Border conflict	160	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
Distance (l)	154	5.40	1.90	1.61	9.13
Land area (l)	159	6.03	1.71	1.79	9.73
Parallel conflict	160	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
GDP/capita (l)	159	1.54	1.33	0.05	6.24
Milper	160	340.07	728.61	1.00	4015.00
Exclusionary	159	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
Rebextsupp	160	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
Rebel FR	153	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00
Elections	160	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00
Rebel claim	158	0.58	0.50	0.00	1.00
Population (l)	160	9.70	1.61	4.28	13.67
Democracy	160	-1.44	5.44	-10.00	10.00
Battle deaths	156	525.16	790.25	3.44	3000.00



## 4 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

### 4.1 Mass Killing

Previous research has suggested a possible relationship between strategic displacement and lethal violence. On the one hand, if massacres are used to orchestrate civilian flight, displacement may be more likely in conflicts with higher levels of civilian victimization. On the other hand, displacement may serve as a substitute for – and therefore correlate negatively with – mass killing because it offers combatants plausible deniability: they can claim people moved on their own volition, avoiding the condemnation that comes with killing civilians (Steele 2017). The results in Table 4.1 show that cleansing is positively and statistically significantly associated with mass killing, but only in Model 1, and the result is not robust across specifications. Forced relocation is also positively associated with mass killing, but the results are not statistically significant in any of the models.

**Table 4.1:** Strategic Wartime Displacement: Mass Killing

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<b>Cleansing</b>				
Distance (l)			-0.47 ** (0.23)	
Land area (l)			0.27 (0.20)	
Border conflict				-0.43 (0.69)
Parallel conflict			-0.22 (1.00)	0.48 (0.87)
GDP/capita (l)			0.94 *** (0.25)	0.52 *** (0.20)
Milper			0.00 ** (0.00)	0.00 ** (0.00)
Exclusionary			0.85 (0.87)	0.97 (0.76)
Rebextsupp			1.48 (0.98)	1.30 (0.84)
Rebel FR			-0.12 (0.66)	-0.06 (0.68)
Rebel claim		3.47 *** (1.12)	3.90 *** (1.32)	3.06 *** (1.16)
Mass killing	1.19 ** (0.49)	0.82 (0.53)	1.18 (0.79)	0.86 (0.69)
Elections		0.84 (0.60)	1.48 (0.91)	0.60 (0.71)
Irregular war	-0.98* (0.58)	-1.04* (0.62)	-2.47 *** (0.83)	-1.89 *** (0.72)
Population (l)	-0.00 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.15)	-0.59 *** (0.21)	-0.36 ** (0.17)
Democracy	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)
Battle deaths	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-1.27	-3.72*	-1.57	-2.41

	(1.44)	(2.13)	(2.29)	(1.94)
<b>Depopulation</b>				
Distance (l)			0.46*	
			(0.28)	
Land area (l)			0.19	
			(0.36)	
Border conflict				1.27
				(1.21)
Parallel conflict			0.54	1.56
			(0.99)	(1.06)
GDP/capita (l)			1.41 * **	1.00 * *
			(0.40)	(0.45)
Milper			0.00	0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			0.82	0.66
			(0.89)	(0.82)
Rebextsupp			-0.01	0.04
			(0.94)	(1.05)
Rebel FR			1.64	1.38
			(1.06)	(1.08)
Rebel claim		0.73	0.75	-0.36
		(0.93)	(1.45)	(1.32)
Mass killing	0.98	0.73	-0.23	0.40
	(0.85)	(0.87)	(0.81)	(1.12)
Elections		1.45*	1.63	1.63
		(0.87)	(1.86)	(1.57)
Irregular war	0.29	0.16	-1.31	-1.08
	(0.77)	(0.73)	(1.11)	(0.97)
Population (l)	0.06	0.06	-0.57 * *	-0.32
	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Democracy	0.06	0.03	0.09	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Battle deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00 * *	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-3.26	-4.55*	-5.34	-3.78
	(2.32)	(2.40)	(3.91)	(3.01)
<b>Relocation</b>				
Distance (l)			1.04 * *	
			(0.52)	
Land area (l)			-0.08	
			(0.39)	
Border conflict				2.89 * **
				(0.65)
Parallel conflict			3.17 * **	3.47 * **
			(0.72)	(0.76)
GDP/capita (l)			-0.30	-0.32
			(0.27)	(0.28)
Milper			-0.00*	-0.00 * *
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			-0.30	-0.30
			(0.59)	(0.58)
Rebextsupp			2.03 * **	1.11 * *
			(0.69)	(0.54)
Rebel FR			0.17	-0.72
			(0.71)	(0.58)
Rebel claim		-0.35	-1.01	-1.58 * *
		(0.52)	(0.78)	(0.74)
Mass killing	0.47	0.69	1.00	1.04
	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.65)	(0.67)
Elections		-0.47	-0.70	0.09

		(0.49)	(0.47)	(0.59)
Irregular war	2.08 * **	2.20 * **	2.41 * *	2.30 * *
	(0.68)	(0.67)	(0.94)	(1.09)
Population (l)	-0.06	-0.10	-0.06	-0.15
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Democracy	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Battle deaths	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-1.25	-0.62	-7.69 * *	-2.22
	(1.48)	(1.53)	(3.11)	(1.49)
Observations	156	155	142	146
Pseudo $R^2$	0.13	0.22	0.49	0.48

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.010$

## 4.2 Reduced Logit Models

**Table 4.2:** Multinomial Logit Results (Reduced Models)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<b>Cleansing</b>							
Distance (l)	-0.08 (0.17)						
Land area (l)	-0.03 (0.17)						
Border conflict		0.04 (0.54)					
Parallel conflict			0.94 (0.62)				
GDP/capita (l)			0.48 * ** (0.15)				
Milper			-0.00 (0.00)				
Exclusionary				1.33 * ** (0.43)			
Rebextsupp					0.95 * * (0.47)		
Rebel FR						0.10 (0.47)	
Elections							0.76 (0.53)
Irregular war	-0.88 (0.56)	-1.11 * * (0.52)	-1.27 * * (0.54)	-1.51 * ** (0.56)	-0.91* (0.53)	-1.25 * * (0.54)	-1.21 * * (0.58)
Rebel claim							3.46 * ** (1.04)
Constant	0.12 (0.81)	-0.43 (0.30)	-1.27 * ** (0.39)	-0.75 * * (0.31)	-1.03 * * (0.43)	-0.28 (0.36)	-3.55 * ** (0.98)
<b>Depopulation</b>							
Distance (l)	0.40 * * (0.19)						
Land area (l)	-0.07 (0.32)						
Border conflict		1.35* (0.77)					
Parallel conflict			1.50* (0.88)				
GDP/capita (l)			0.74 * ** (0.26)				
Milper			-0.00 (0.00)				
Exclusionary				0.78 (0.73)			
Rebextsupp					0.15 (0.70)		
Rebel FR						1.39* (0.74)	
Elections							1.48* (0.86)
Irregular war	-0.13 (0.75)	-0.05 (0.59)	0.11 (0.78)	0.06 (0.65)	0.30 (0.66)	0.15 (0.71)	0.14 (0.70)
Rebel claim							0.56 (0.81)
Constant	-3.49 * * (1.64)	-2.30 * ** (0.75)	-3.58 * ** (0.81)	-2.10 * ** (0.63)	-2.03 * ** (0.58)	-2.57 * ** (0.71)	-3.15 * ** (0.67)

<b>Relocation</b>							
Distance (l)	0.87 * **						
	(0.25)						
Land area (l)	-0.48 * *						
	(0.19)						
Border conflict		2.55 * **					
		(0.63)					
Parallel conflict			3.54 * **				
			(0.69)				
GDP/capita (l)			-0.33				
			(0.32)				
Milper			-0.00 * **				
			(0.00)				
Exclusionary				-0.02			
				(0.45)			
Rebextsupp					1.10 * **		
					(0.40)		
Rebel FR						0.45	
						(0.44)	
Elections							-0.11
							(0.43)
Irregular war	1.86 * *	1.54 * *	2.39 * **	2.16 * **	2.34 * **	1.98 * **	2.21 * **
	(0.76)	(0.71)	(0.81)	(0.72)	(0.73)	(0.68)	(0.68)
Rebel claim							-0.11
							(0.48)
Constant	-3.60 * **	-2.78 * **	-2.25 * **	-1.76 * **	-2.48 * **	-1.79 * **	-1.67 * *
	(1.35)	(0.59)	(0.72)	(0.63)	(0.77)	(0.59)	(0.76)
Observations	153	160	159	159	160	153	158
Pseudo $R^2$	0.17	0.19	0.28	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.20

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.010$

### 4.3 Restricted Sample (1975-2008)

**Table 4.3:** Strategic Wartime Displacement: Multinomial Logit Results

	Model 1 (Assortative)	Model 2 (Assortative)	Model 3 (Nationalism)	Model 4 (Denial)	Model 5 (Punishment)	Model 6 (Full Model)	Model 7 (Full Model)
<b>Cleansing</b>							
Distance (l)	-0.40					-0.79*	
	(0.25)					(0.41)	
Land area (l)	0.16					0.59*	
	(0.23)					(0.33)	
Border conflict		0.35					-0.05
		(0.82)					(0.86)
Parallel conflict	0.18	0.47				0.93	0.16
	(0.98)	(0.81)				(1.08)	(0.89)
GDP/capita (l)	0.79 * **	0.52*				1.20 * **	0.55 * *
	(0.28)	(0.29)				(0.41)	(0.26)
Milper	0.00	0.00				0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			1.33*			0.45	0.49

			(0.72)			(0.82)	(1.01)
Rebextsupp				0.83		2.32 * **	1.41
				(0.63)		(0.85)	(0.94)
Rebel FR				0.08			-0.14
				(0.71)			(0.79)
Rebel claim					3.18 * **		2.88 * *
					(1.21)		(1.30)
Elections					1.01	2.26	0.64
					(0.72)	(1.67)	(0.82)
Irregular war	-1.20*	-1.42 * *	-1.60 * *	-1.00	-1.49*	-1.37 * *	-1.35*
	(0.71)	(0.64)	(0.70)	(0.67)	(0.78)	(0.69)	(0.77)
Population (l)	-0.10	0.04	0.07	0.15	-0.03	-0.24	-0.19
	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.21)
Democracy	0.01	0.02	0.09	0.03	0.05	-0.04	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Battle deaths	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.46	-1.62	-0.98	-2.20	-2.89	-3.03	-2.93
	(2.76)	(1.85)	(1.88)	(1.98)	(2.22)	(3.71)	(2.28)
<b>Depopulation</b>							
Distance (l)	0.54					0.58	
	(0.34)					(0.40)	
Land area (l)	-0.02					0.00	
	(0.51)					(0.60)	
Border conflict		1.69*					1.26
		(0.92)					(1.26)
Parallel conflict	0.56	1.07				0.89	1.25
	(0.71)	(0.77)				(1.00)	(1.04)
GDP/capita (l)	1.03 * **	0.80 * *				1.23 * **	0.81*
	(0.29)	(0.40)				(0.42)	(0.43)
Milper	0.00	0.00				0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			1.07			0.40	0.45
			(0.71)			(1.27)	(1.12)
Rebextsupp				-0.61		0.48	0.21
				(0.76)		(1.08)	(1.01)
Rebel FR				1.20*			1.31
				(0.62)			(1.13)
Rebel claim					0.74		-0.50
					(0.95)		(1.26)
Elections					0.50	0.42	0.39
					(1.12)	(1.70)	(1.42)
Irregular war	0.14	-0.10	0.27	0.64	0.47	0.27	-0.12
	(1.13)	(1.04)	(0.93)	(0.94)	(0.99)	(1.30)	(1.26)
Population (l)	-0.25	-0.22	0.08	0.22	0.07	-0.37	-0.28
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.25)
Democracy	-0.00	0.01	0.06	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.11)
Battle deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-4.51	-2.31	-2.53	-4.15	-3.04	-4.90	-2.60
	(4.24)	(2.77)	(2.83)	(3.07)	(2.69)	(5.31)	(2.85)
<b>Relocation</b>							
Distance (l)	0.71*					0.97 * *	
	(0.43)					(0.45)	
Land area (l)	-0.05					-0.01	
	(0.30)					(0.42)	
Border conflict		3.15 * **					2.91 * **
		(0.76)					(0.68)
Parallel conflict	2.66 * **	3.01 * **				3.06 * **	3.28 * **

	(0.92)	(0.90)			(0.81)	(0.89)
GDP/capita (l)	-0.46	-0.43			-0.43	-0.54
	(0.39)	(0.47)			(0.37)	(0.40)
Milper	-0.00	-0.00			-0.00 **	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			0.82		1.21	0.89
			(0.55)		(0.75)	(0.94)
Rebextsupp				0.53	1.58*	0.89*
				(0.58)	(0.81)	(0.53)
Rebel FR				0.48		-0.16
				(0.63)		(0.86)
Rebel claim					0.26	-0.92
					(0.65)	(0.79)
Elections					-1.24	-0.42
					(0.78)	(0.93)
Irregular war	1.76	1.78	1.60*	1.99 **	2.32 **	2.19
	(1.10)	(1.28)	(0.84)	(0.85)	(1.07)	(1.46)
Population (l)	0.06	-0.05	-0.03	0.04	-0.02	0.14
	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Democracy	0.03	0.06	0.01	-0.03	-0.00	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Battle deaths	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.29*	-2.57	-0.84	-1.98	-0.27	-8.34*
	(3.21)	(2.64)	(1.73)	(1.83)	(1.83)	(4.35)
Observations	93	97	97	97	96	93
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.35	0.37	0.13	0.14	0.21	0.43

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.010

## 4.4 Additional Controls

**Table 4.4:** Strategic Wartime Displacement: Multinomial Logit Results

	Model 1 (Assortative)	Model 2 (Assortative)	Model 3 (Nationalism)	Model 4 (Denial)	Model 5 (Punishment)	Model 6 (Full Model)	Model 7 (Full Model)
<b>Cleansing</b>							
Distance (l)	-0.08					-0.56 **	
	(0.22)					(0.22)	
Land area (l)	0.02					0.42*	
	(0.18)					(0.22)	
Border conflict		0.10					-0.55
		(0.65)					(0.72)
Parallel conflict	0.77	1.17*				0.25	0.88
	(0.66)	(0.67)				(0.98)	(0.91)
GDP/capita (l)	0.53 ***	0.44 **				1.00 ***	0.51 **
	(0.19)	(0.17)				(0.29)	(0.22)
Milper	-0.00	-0.00				0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			1.72 ***			1.17	1.18*
			(0.46)			(0.78)	(0.70)
Rebextsupp				1.20 ***		2.11*	1.73*
				(0.46)		(1.15)	(0.91)
Rebel FR				-0.09		-0.12	0.05
				(0.54)		(0.79)	(0.74)
Rebel claim					3.70 ***	4.73 ***	3.35 ***
					(1.06)	(1.78)	(1.20)
Elections					0.73	1.18	0.35

					(0.49)	(0.76)	(0.64)
Irregular war	-0.92	-1.08 **	-1.44 **	-0.75	-0.95*	-1.90 **	-1.33*
	(0.60)	(0.54)	(0.57)	(0.53)	(0.58)	(0.84)	(0.69)
Population (l)	-0.06	-0.01	0.03	0.09	0.04	-0.42*	-0.23
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.18)
Democracy	-0.00	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.10	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Battle deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Region	-0.48 **	-0.49 **	-0.62 **	-0.63 **	-0.66 **	-0.91 ***	-0.65 **
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.26)
Constant	0.63	0.04	0.61	-0.44	-2.50	-1.19	-1.67
	(1.83)	(1.62)	(1.81)	(2.17)	(2.57)	(2.18)	(1.99)
<b>Depopulation</b>							
Distance (l)	0.38 **					0.46	
	(0.19)					(0.31)	
Land area (l)	0.15					0.13	
	(0.37)					(0.32)	
Border conflict		1.48*					0.97
		(0.86)					(1.33)
Parallel conflict	1.05	1.66 **				0.50	1.75
	(0.76)	(0.83)				(1.07)	(1.22)
GDP/capita (l)	0.96 ***	0.86 ***				1.56 ***	1.04 **
	(0.26)	(0.31)				(0.48)	(0.47)
Milper	-0.00	-0.00				-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			1.07*			0.62	0.86
			(0.62)			(1.03)	(1.07)
Rebextsupp				-0.25		-0.05	0.21
				(0.76)		(1.08)	(1.16)
Rebel FR				1.34 **		1.83	1.60
				(0.54)		(1.47)	(1.22)
Rebel claim					0.88	0.86	-0.23
					(0.97)	(1.49)	(1.30)
Elections					1.55*	1.64	1.41
					(0.84)	(1.83)	(1.49)
Irregular war	-0.28	-0.21	-0.02	0.14	0.15	-1.21	-0.90
	(1.17)	(0.92)	(0.81)	(0.80)	(0.78)	(1.13)	(1.04)
Population (l)	-0.27	-0.16	0.04	0.13	0.08	-0.69*	-0.37
	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.38)	(0.33)
Democracy	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Battle deaths	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Region	-0.19	-0.25	-0.18	-0.03	-0.18	-0.27	-0.21
	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Constant	-3.64	-2.25	-1.99	-3.67	-3.85*	-3.69	-2.56
	(2.63)	(2.22)	(1.87)	(2.63)	(2.20)	(3.72)	(2.72)
<b>Relocation</b>							
Distance (l)	0.80 **					0.98 **	
	(0.34)					(0.49)	
Land area (l)	-0.11					0.00	
	(0.31)					(0.39)	
Border conflict		2.68 ***					2.75 ***
		(0.65)					(0.64)
Parallel conflict	3.16 ***	3.43 ***				3.37 ***	3.81 ***
	(0.76)	(0.69)				(0.74)	(0.89)
GDP/capita (l)	-0.34	-0.26				-0.35	-0.36
	(0.40)	(0.32)				(0.33)	(0.27)
Milper	-0.00 ***	-0.00 ***				-0.00 **	-0.00 ***



	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			0.17 (0.45)			-0.21 (0.61)	0.04 (0.60)
Rebextsupp				0.99 ** (0.42)		2.21 *** (0.68)	1.35 *** (0.52)
Rebel FR				0.20 (0.46)		0.11 (0.71)	-0.78 (0.69)
Rebel claim					-0.26 (0.49)	-0.91 (0.77)	-1.48 ** (0.64)
Elections					-0.36 (0.45)	-0.83 (0.51)	-0.03 (0.55)
Irregular war	2.20 ** (0.87)	2.11 ** (1.01)	2.08 *** (0.75)	2.16 *** (0.74)	2.20 *** (0.71)	2.88 ** (1.15)	2.68 ** (1.26)
Population (l)	0.06 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.18)	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.22)	-0.17 (0.17)
Democracy	0.03 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Battle deaths	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Region	-0.43 (0.29)	-0.25 (0.23)	-0.09 (0.20)	-0.03 (0.19)	-0.04 (0.20)	-0.68 ** (0.31)	-0.43 (0.32)
Constant	-4.78 ** (2.32)	-2.39 (1.80)	-0.91 (1.61)	-1.90 (1.56)	-0.14 (1.57)	-4.98 (3.16)	-0.16 (1.55)
Observations	149	155	155	149	155	142	146
Pseudo $R^2$	0.35	0.37	0.16	0.16	0.23	0.51	0.49

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.010$

**Table 4.5: Multinomial Logit Results (Post-Cold War)**

	Model 1 (Assortative)	Model 2 (Assortative)	Model 3 (Nationalism)	Model 4 (Denial)	Model 5 (Punishment)	Model 6 (Full Model)	Model 7 (Full Model)
<b>Cleansing</b>							
Distance (l)	-0.13 (0.20)					-0.44 ** (0.22)	
Land area (l)	-0.02 (0.18)					0.27 (0.22)	
Border conflict		-0.02 (0.67)					-0.55 (0.69)
Parallel conflict	0.71 (0.67)	1.06 (0.66)				0.13 (0.89)	0.64 (0.83)
GDP/capita (l)	0.58 *** (0.17)	0.50 *** (0.17)				0.91 *** (0.24)	0.54 *** (0.21)
Milper	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)				0.00* (0.00)	0.00 ** (0.00)
Exclusionary			1.77 *** (0.49)			1.07 (0.80)	1.17* (0.71)
Rebextsupp				0.99* (0.51)		1.66* (0.94)	1.50* (0.81)
Rebel FR				-0.08 (0.56)		0.21 (0.68)	0.18 (0.71)
Rebel claim					3.57 ***	3.71 ***	3.03 ***

					(1.13)	(1.23)	(1.14)
Elections					0.85	1.40	0.57
					(0.55)	(0.90)	(0.66)
Irregular war	-0.67	-0.99*	-1.34 **	-0.79	-0.95	-2.19 ***	-1.81 ***
	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.75)	(0.69)
Population (l)	-0.13	-0.10	-0.08	0.02	-0.09	-0.56 ***	-0.37 **
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.17)
Democracy	0.01	-0.00	0.06	-0.01	0.00	0.08	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Battle deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Post-Cold War	0.73	0.56	0.74	0.41	0.36	0.01	0.01
	(0.58)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.50)	(0.71)	(0.63)
Constant	-0.11	-0.95	-0.52	-1.50	-3.40	-1.44	-2.02
	(1.81)	(1.63)	(1.49)	(1.67)	(2.19)	(2.36)	(2.06)
<b>Depopulation</b>							
Distance (l)	0.38*					0.53*	
	(0.20)					(0.30)	
Land area (l)	0.16					0.14	
	(0.36)					(0.34)	
Border conflict		1.46*					1.11
		(0.84)					(1.23)
Parallel conflict	1.09	1.63*				0.47	1.61
	(0.77)	(0.83)				(0.90)	(1.10)
GDP/capita (l)	1.00 ***	0.87 ***				1.57 ***	1.02 **
	(0.24)	(0.31)				(0.37)	(0.40)
Milper	-0.00	-0.00				-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			1.11*			0.79	0.78
			(0.62)			(0.89)	(0.96)
Rebextsupp				-0.21		-0.21	0.13
				(0.71)		(1.14)	(1.06)
Rebel FR				1.28 **		2.13 **	1.60
				(0.54)		(1.02)	(0.98)
Rebel claim					0.79	0.52	-0.36
					(0.93)	(1.44)	(1.31)
Elections					1.49*	1.61	1.54
					(0.88)	(1.74)	(1.59)
Irregular war	-0.43	-0.05	0.22	0.31	0.29	-2.16	-1.17
	(1.17)	(1.08)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.83)	(1.32)	(1.37)
Population (l)	-0.30	-0.17	0.00	0.12	0.06	-0.69 **	-0.34
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.30)
Democracy	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.10	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Battle deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00 **	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Post-Cold War	-0.25	0.58	0.84	0.40	0.41	-1.64*	-0.32
	(0.88)	(1.07)	(0.92)	(0.89)	(0.90)	(0.99)	(1.21)
Constant	-3.93	-3.30	-2.82	-4.01	-4.40*	-3.85	-3.20
	(2.63)	(2.74)	(2.16)	(2.50)	(2.34)	(4.10)	(3.67)
<b>Relocation</b>							
Distance (l)	0.75 **					0.91*	
	(0.34)					(0.50)	
Land area (l)	-0.16					-0.05	
	(0.30)					(0.39)	
Border conflict		2.68 ***					2.72 ***
		(0.67)					(0.61)
Parallel conflict	3.10 ***	3.38 ***				3.23 ***	3.55 ***
	(0.76)	(0.63)				(0.79)	(0.78)
GDP/capita (l)	-0.27	-0.24				-0.37	-0.37

	(0.33)	(0.33)			(0.27)	(0.27)
Milper	-0.00 ***	-0.00 ***			-0.00 **	-0.00 **
	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			0.17		0.02	0.09
			(0.45)		(0.61)	(0.60)
Rebextsupp				0.97 **	2.26 ***	1.28 **
				(0.42)	(0.76)	(0.54)
Rebel FR				0.21	0.24	-0.62
				(0.45)	(0.69)	(0.56)
Rebel claim					-0.27	-1.47 **
					(0.48)	(0.64)
Elections					-0.34	0.04
					(0.49)	(0.57)
Irregular war	2.09 **	2.00	2.03 ***	2.09 ***	2.21 ***	2.39*
	(0.94)	(1.26)	(0.71)	(0.72)	(0.67)	(1.41)
Population (l)	0.01	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.11	-0.12
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Democracy	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Battle deaths	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Post-Cold War	0.16	0.04	-0.05	-0.16	0.11	0.08
	(0.66)	(0.94)	(0.55)	(0.51)	(0.58)	(0.89)
Constant	-5.22 **	-3.00	-1.05	-1.89	-0.26	-6.13 **
	(2.31)	(2.11)	(1.58)	(1.52)	(1.57)	(2.99)
Observations	149	155	155	149	155	142
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.34	0.36	0.15	0.14	0.21	0.49

Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.010

**Table 4.6: Multinomial Logit Results (Successionist War)**

	Model 1 (Assortative)	Model 2 (Assortative)	Model 3 (Nationalism)	Model 4 (Denial)	Model 5 (Punishment)	Model 6 (Full Model)	Model 7 (Full Model)
<b>Cleansing</b>							
Distance (l)	-0.26					-0.48*	
	(0.20)					(0.26)	
Land area (l)	0.04					0.33	
	(0.17)					(0.21)	
Border conflict		-0.04					-0.60
		(0.57)					(0.71)
Parallel conflict	0.54	0.74				0.15	0.74
	(0.70)	(0.65)				(1.02)	(0.87)
GDP/capita (l)	0.40 **	0.39 **				0.86 ***	0.60 ***
	(0.18)	(0.16)				(0.24)	(0.23)
Milper	-0.00	-0.00				0.00*	0.00 **
	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			1.54 ***			1.07	1.19*
			(0.46)			(0.77)	(0.70)
Rebextsupp				0.92*		1.56*	1.60*
				(0.50)		(0.91)	(0.84)
Rebel FR				0.35		0.26	0.11

				(0.58)		(0.71)	(0.67)
Rebel claim					3.29 ***	3.75 ***	3.16 ***
					(1.09)	(1.29)	(1.15)
Elections					0.89	1.28	0.57
					(0.56)	(0.79)	(0.63)
Irregular war	-1.10 **	-1.28 **	-1.88 ***	-1.44 **	-1.25 **	-2.18 ***	-1.78 **
	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.61)	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.78)	(0.69)
Population (l)	-0.14	-0.12	-0.14	-0.03	-0.11	-0.57 **	-0.38 **
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.18)
Democracy	-0.02	-0.02	0.05	-0.04	-0.00	0.08	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Battle deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Successionist	1.85 ***	1.34 **	1.43 ***	1.95 ***	0.75	0.28	-0.42
	(0.65)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.59)	(0.54)	(1.01)	(0.70)
Constant	0.34	-0.66	-0.03	-1.69	-3.02	-1.39	-2.06
	(1.73)	(1.51)	(1.59)	(1.64)	(2.16)	(2.21)	(2.01)
<b>Depopulation</b>							
Distance (l)	0.41 **					0.49	
	(0.18)					(0.32)	
Land area (l)	0.08					0.10	
	(0.37)					(0.33)	
Border conflict		1.49*					1.06
		(0.82)					(1.25)
Parallel conflict	1.07	1.67*				0.70	1.93
	(0.71)	(0.96)				(0.94)	(1.36)
GDP/capita (l)	0.94 ***	0.92 ***				1.37 ***	1.13 **
	(0.24)	(0.34)				(0.41)	(0.50)
Milper	-0.00	-0.00				0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			0.99			0.62	0.92
			(0.64)			(1.02)	(1.09)
Rebextsupp				-0.26		0.22	0.43
				(0.70)		(0.94)	(1.12)
Rebel FR				1.65 **		1.38	1.34
				(0.64)		(1.22)	(1.11)
Rebel claim					0.50	0.86	0.07
					(0.95)	(1.44)	(1.33)
Elections					1.65*	1.57	1.58
					(0.96)	(1.71)	(1.58)
Irregular war	-0.28	-0.21	-0.18	-0.16	0.01	-1.02	-1.01
	(0.98)	(0.96)	(0.83)	(0.81)	(0.77)	(0.95)	(0.96)
Population (l)	-0.30	-0.20	-0.02	0.10	0.03	-0.59 **	-0.39
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.26)
Democracy	0.08	0.11	0.07	-0.00	0.01	0.09	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Battle deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Successionist	-0.18	-0.45	0.59	1.31	0.67	-0.67	-1.24
	(0.96)	(1.25)	(0.97)	(0.95)	(1.02)	(1.18)	(1.82)
Constant	-3.66	-2.57	-2.22	-4.05 **	-4.04*	-4.76	-3.25
	(2.41)	(2.22)	(1.83)	(2.03)	(2.17)	(3.46)	(2.36)
<b>Relocation</b>							
Distance (l)	1.08 **					1.28 **	
	(0.48)					(0.58)	
Land area (l)	-0.26					-0.15	
	(0.35)					(0.41)	
Border conflict		2.65 ***					2.75 ***
		(0.64)					(0.60)
Parallel conflict	3.32 ***	3.46 ***				3.55 ***	3.61 ***

	(0.80)	(0.76)			(0.73)	(0.85)
GDP/capita (l)	-0.26	-0.21			-0.34	-0.36
	(0.30)	(0.33)			(0.26)	(0.27)
Milper	-0.00 * **	-0.00 * **			-0.00*	-0.00 * *
	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			0.13		0.07	0.07
			(0.46)		(0.61)	(0.61)
Rebextsupp				0.97 * *	2.21 * **	1.28 * *
				(0.42)	(0.66)	(0.51)
Rebel FR				0.37	-0.33	-0.66
				(0.45)	(0.70)	(0.61)
Rebel claim					-0.41	-1.42 * *
					(0.54)	(0.71)
Elections					-0.25	0.06
					(0.49)	(0.56)
Irregular war	2.18 * **	2.22 * *	2.00 * **	2.00 * **	2.08 * **	2.39 * *
	(0.78)	(0.99)	(0.73)	(0.74)	(0.69)	(1.13)
Population (l)	0.03	-0.05	-0.07	-0.04	-0.12	-0.17
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Democracy	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Battle deaths	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Successionist	-1.42	-0.35	0.26	0.61	0.35	-0.22
	(0.88)	(0.83)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.84)
Constant	-6.36 * *	-3.06*	-0.94	-2.01	-0.14	-1.45
	(2.85)	(1.79)	(1.59)	(1.51)	(1.52)	(1.47)
Observations	149	155	155	149	155	146
Pseudo $R^2$	0.37	0.37	0.16	0.18	0.22	0.48

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.010$

## 4.5 Binary Logit Results

I run two sets of binary logit models for both cleansing and forced relocation. The first set uses the same reference category of no strategic displacement. For example, in the forced relocation model, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the country has experienced forced relocation – no matter if it has also endured cleansing or depopulation – and 0 if it has not experienced strategic displacement. Cases in which a country has experienced either cleansing or depopulation but not forced relocation are omitted from the relocation model, which is similar to the way multinomial models are estimated. These results are presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.

The second set of logit models controls for whether the conflict also experienced one of the other two displacement strategies. For example, in the cleansing model, I include control variables for whether depopulation or forced relocation was employed by state forces during the same conflict. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 provide results for cleansing and forced relocation on the full sample of civil wars.

**Table 4.7: Logistic Regression Results: Cleansing (Set One)**

	Model 1 (Assortative)	Model 2 (Assortative)	Model 3 (Nationalism)	Model 4 (Denial)	Model 5 (Punishment)	Model 6 (Full Model)	Model 7 (Full Model)
Distance (l)	-0.07 (0.22)					-0.36 (0.26)	
Land area (l)	0.17 (0.22)					0.51 (0.33)	
Border conflict		-0.13 (0.66)					-1.44 (0.90)
Parallel conflict	0.07 (0.65)	0.36 (0.65)				-3.25* (1.78)	-1.07 (1.36)
GDP/capita (l)	0.86 *** (0.26)	0.71 *** (0.22)				1.92 ** (0.76)	1.11 ** (0.45)
Milper	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)				0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Exclusionary			1.63 *** (0.49)			1.79 (1.61)	1.62* (0.85)
Rebextsupp				0.67* (0.40)		1.46* (0.87)	1.57 ** (0.79)
Rebel FR				0.50 (0.51)		1.76 (1.19)	1.36 (0.86)
Rebel claim					2.60 *** (0.74)	4.28 *** (1.54)	2.79 *** (1.00)
Elections					0.78 (0.54)	1.44 (1.18)	0.18 (0.94)
Irregular war	-0.70 (0.53)	-0.72 (0.50)	-1.02 ** (0.46)	-0.40 (0.48)	-0.40 (0.46)	-1.46* (0.84)	-0.64 (0.50)
Population (l)	-0.06 (0.18)	0.02 (0.17)	0.07 (0.18)	0.27 (0.17)	0.13 (0.18)	-0.88 (0.56)	-0.39 (0.29)
Democracy	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.22 (0.15)	0.08 (0.09)
Battle deaths	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-2.40 (1.70)	-2.42 (1.59)	-1.86 (1.88)	-4.07 ** (1.88)	-4.71 ** (2.01)	-3.02 (2.68)	-3.33 (2.20)
Observations	101	106	105	99	105	94	97
Pseudo $R^2$	0.19	0.17	0.10	0.07	0.19	0.51	0.42

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.010$

**Table 4.8: Logistic Regression Results: Relocation (Set One)**

	Model 1 (Assortative)	Model 2 (Assortative)	Model 3 (Nationalism)	Model 4 (Denial)	Model 5 (Punishment)	Model 6 (Full Model)	Model 7 (Full Model)
Distance (l)	0.54 * *					0.55	
	(0.24)					(0.34)	
Land area (l)	-0.35					-0.29	
	(0.27)					(0.34)	
Border conflict		2.17 * **					1.97 * **
		(0.53)					(0.60)
Parallel conflict	2.74 * **	2.95 * **				2.68 * **	2.91 * **
	(0.72)	(0.76)				(0.80)	(0.87)
GDP/capita (l)	-0.21	-0.11				-0.24	-0.16
	(0.23)	(0.23)				(0.25)	(0.25)
Milper	-0.00 * **	-0.00 * **				-0.00	-0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			0.14			-0.22	-0.30
			(0.46)			(0.74)	(0.78)
Rebextsupp				0.87*		1.15*	0.67
				(0.44)		(0.61)	(0.53)
Rebel FR				0.66		0.98*	0.75
				(0.46)		(0.55)	(0.57)
Rebel claim					-0.25	-0.16	-0.54
					(0.53)	(0.74)	(0.75)
Elections					-0.52	-0.79*	-0.28
					(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.58)
Irregular war	1.11	1.25	1.62 * *	1.79 * **	1.72 * **	1.59*	1.50
	(0.77)	(0.88)	(0.64)	(0.65)	(0.63)	(0.96)	(0.92)
Population (l)	0.08	0.10	-0.00	0.05	-0.04	0.11	0.13
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Democracy	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.03	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Battle deaths	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-3.69 * *	-4.41 * **	-1.67	-2.97*	-0.90	-5.16 * *	-4.90 * **
	(1.78)	(1.59)	(1.52)	(1.67)	(1.55)	(2.31)	(1.54)
Observations	113	118	118	112	118	106	109
Pseudo $R^2$	0.37	0.44	0.11	0.13	0.12	0.39	0.45

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.010$

**Table 4.9: Logistic Regression Results: Cleansing (Set Two)**

	Model 1 (Assortative)	Model 2 (Assortative)	Model 3 (Nationalism)	Model 4 (Denial)	Model 5 (Punishment)	Model 6 (Full Model)	Model 7 (Full Model)
Distance (l)	-0.12 (0.19)					-0.56 ** (0.25)	
Land area (l)	-0.05 (0.19)					0.15 (0.26)	
Border conflict		-0.12 (0.58)					-1.59* (0.85)
Parallel conflict	1.27 ** (0.62)	1.34 ** (0.59)				1.37 (1.18)	0.83 (0.84)
GDP/capita (l)	0.52 *** (0.19)	0.49 *** (0.16)				1.17 *** (0.35)	0.80 *** (0.27)
Milper	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)				0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Exclusionary			1.56 *** (0.44)			0.57 (0.62)	1.12 (0.73)
Rebextsupp				0.92 ** (0.40)		1.88* (1.00)	1.89 ** (0.92)
Rebel FR				0.27 (0.47)		0.95 (0.82)	1.01 (0.78)
Rebel claim					3.70 *** (1.08)	4.27 *** (1.32)	3.79 *** (1.26)
Elections					0.96* (0.50)	1.56 ** (0.76)	0.58 (0.59)
Govt depopulation	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Govt relocation	-2.34 *** (0.76)	-2.39 *** (0.75)	-2.00 ** (0.86)	-2.21 *** (0.77)	-1.63* (0.90)	-1.34* (0.81)	-0.84 (0.86)
Irregular war	-0.84* (0.50)	-1.06 ** (0.47)	-1.38 *** (0.43)	-0.78* (0.46)	-1.09 ** (0.52)	-1.59 ** (0.65)	-1.54 ** (0.73)
Population (l)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.15)	0.04 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.18)	-0.65 ** (0.26)	-0.50 ** (0.26)
Democracy	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)
Battle deaths	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-0.14 (1.64)	-1.05 (1.36)	-0.08 (1.54)	-1.59 (1.60)	-3.48 (2.15)	-1.06 (2.24)	-2.40 (2.24)
Observations	138	143	143	137	143	131	134
Pseudo $R^2$	0.24	0.22	0.19	0.19	0.36	0.54	0.50

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.010$



**Table 4.10: Logistic Regression Results: Forced Relocation (Set Two)**

	Model 1 (Assortative)	Model 2 (Assortative)	Model 3 (Nationalism)	Model 4 (Denial)	Model 5 (Punishment)	Model 6 (Full Model)	Model 7 (Full Model)
Distance (l)	0.75 * *					0.91*	
	(0.36)					(0.53)	
Land area (l)	-0.23					-0.09	
	(0.32)					(0.41)	
Border conflict		2.82 * **					3.12 * **
		(0.64)					(0.69)
Parallel conflict	2.88 * **	3.00 * **				3.31 * **	3.63 * **
	(0.73)	(0.64)				(0.78)	(0.89)
GDP/capita (l)	-0.50	-0.45				-0.57 * *	-0.53 * *
	(0.34)	(0.30)				(0.27)	(0.27)
Milper	-0.00 * **	-0.00 * **				-0.00 * *	-0.00 * *
	(0.00)	(0.00)				(0.00)	(0.00)
Exclusionary			-0.02			0.04	0.14
			(0.44)			(0.61)	(0.61)
Rebextsupp				1.13 * *		2.25 * **	1.59 * **
				(0.44)		(0.70)	(0.60)
Rebel FR				0.28		0.17	-0.67
				(0.48)		(0.72)	(0.67)
Rebel claim					-0.40	-1.06	-1.72 * *
					(0.49)	(0.78)	(0.75)
Elections					-0.41	-0.81*	0.27
					(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.66)
Govt depopulation	-0.88	-2.13*	-1.54	-1.91*	-1.34	-0.97	-2.53*
	(1.07)	(1.28)	(1.01)	(1.00)	(1.03)	(0.97)	(1.36)
Govt cleansing	-2.30 * **	-2.96 * **	-1.94 * *	-2.32 * **	-1.71 * *	-2.72 * **	-3.46 * **
	(0.88)	(0.85)	(0.81)	(0.70)	(0.86)	(0.95)	(1.10)
Irregular war	2.01 * **	2.18 * *	2.18 * **	2.36 * **	2.26 * **	2.66 * **	2.74 * **
	(0.77)	(0.89)	(0.73)	(0.76)	(0.68)	(0.92)	(1.03)
Population (l)	-0.00	-0.08	-0.08	-0.06	-0.12	0.02	-0.19
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Democracy	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Battle deaths	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00*	-0.00 * *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-4.33*	-2.44	-0.87	-1.87	-0.10	-6.71 * *	-1.55
	(2.45)	(2.08)	(1.51)	(1.52)	(1.50)	(2.96)	(1.63)
Observations	149	155	155	149	155	142	146
Pseudo $R^2$	0.50	0.57	0.24	0.27	0.25	0.55	0.61

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.010$

## 4.6 Alternative Measures for Competing Explanations

Table 4.11 shows the multinomial results for alternative measures of ethnic nationalism, *ethnic polarization* (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005) and *inclusive government*. To code *inclusive government*, I followed Stanton (2016) and used the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set. The EPR data set provides data on the extent to which different ethnic groups have access to political power in a given country over time. A government is coded as having an exclusionary regime (= 0) if the EPR data set indicates that one or more ethnic groups has “dominant” or “monopoly” control. A government is coded as

having an inclusive regime (= 1) if the EPR data set indicates that no ethnic group has “dominant” or “monopoly” control. Table 4.11 also shows results for two alternative measures of denial – *drugs* (Fearon 2004) and *rebel concen* (Stanton 2016) – along with an alternative measure of punishment: whether the state committed *genocide* during the conflict (according to Marshall et al.).

**Table 4.11: Multinomial Logit Results (Other Variables)**

	Model 1 (Nationalism)	Model 2 (Nationalism)	Model 3 (Denial)	Model 4 (Denial)	Model 5 (Punishment)	Model 6 (Full Model)	Model 7 (Full Model)
<b>Cleansing</b>							
Distance (l)						-0.68 ** (0.27)	
Land area (l)						0.44* (0.26)	
Border conflict							0.41 (0.95)
Parallel conflict						-0.54 (1.81)	-0.17 (1.37)
Milper						0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
GDP/capita (l)						1.33 *** (0.39)	0.72 ** (0.36)
Inclusive govt	-0.35 (0.47)					-0.33 (0.97)	-0.33 (0.70)
Ethpol		1.62 (1.40)				-0.61 (1.96)	0.56 (2.03)
Drugs			-0.16 (0.54)			1.35 (1.30)	1.14 (1.20)
Rebel concen				0.01 (0.49)		0.25 (0.87)	-0.87 (0.82)
Genocide					1.56 *** (0.58)	1.95* (1.03)	2.06 ** (0.88)
Rebel claim						5.38 ** (2.36)	3.32 *** (1.08)
Elections						2.09 ** (0.97)	0.97 (1.00)
Irregular war	-0.97* (0.56)	-0.98 (0.61)	-0.96* (0.54)	-1.01* (0.54)	-1.21 ** (0.61)	-2.46 *** (0.91)	-2.16 *** (0.79)
Population (l)	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.17)	0.01 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.14)	0.03 (0.13)	-0.57* (0.29)	-0.27 (0.26)
Democracy	0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.11 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Battle deaths	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-0.34 (1.53)	-1.70 (2.18)	-0.55 (1.43)	-0.43 (1.49)	-0.93 (1.41)	-2.44 (3.81)	-2.94 (3.23)
<b>Depopulation</b>							
Distance (l)						0.14 (0.42)	
Land area (l)						-0.65 (0.46)	
Border conflict							2.48 (2.58)
Parallel conflict						3.52* (1.80)	2.76 (1.74)
Milper						-0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)

GDP/capita (l)						1.42 * **	1.46 * **
						(0.51)	(0.40)
Inclusive govt	1.03					3.08 * **	4.26 * **
	(0.94)					(1.04)	(1.64)
Ethpol		2.98				2.40	1.35
		(2.31)				(3.95)	(2.73)
Drugs			0.07			0.49	1.02
			(0.88)			(1.19)	(1.34)
Rebel concen				1.75 * **		0.73	0.14
				(0.66)		(1.10)	(1.22)
Genocide					2.51 * **	4.72 * **	3.69*
					(0.79)	(1.27)	(1.89)
Rebel claim						-0.01	-0.72
						(1.79)	(1.52)
Elections						1.43	1.26
						(1.35)	(1.08)
Irregular war	0.28	0.23	0.32	0.41	-0.16	-2.76	-1.96
	(0.76)	(0.94)	(0.76)	(0.85)	(0.75)	(1.95)	(1.68)
Population (l)	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.08	-0.18	-0.31
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.46)	(0.30)
Democracy	0.04	-0.00	0.05	0.06	0.10	-0.07	0.17
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Battle deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00 * *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-3.03	-4.71*	-2.50	-3.60*	-3.30 * *	-6.92	-8.64 * *
	(2.11)	(2.41)	(1.86)	(2.06)	(1.67)	(5.15)	(4.02)
<b>Relocation</b>							
Distance (l)						0.88*	
						(0.52)	
Land area (l)						-0.39	
						(0.49)	
Border conflict							3.98 * **
							(0.64)
Parallel conflict						3.36 * **	3.82 * **
						(1.17)	(1.36)
Milper						-0.00	-0.00
						(0.00)	(0.00)
GDP/capita (l)						0.01	-0.10
						(0.29)	(0.30)
Inclusive govt	-0.48					-0.98	-1.18
	(0.38)					(0.76)	(0.87)
Ethpol		-2.36*				-3.30 * *	-4.51*
		(1.22)				(1.56)	(2.34)
Drugs			0.38			0.86	0.74
			(0.79)			(0.70)	(0.91)
Rebel concen				0.25		-0.08	-1.72*
				(0.49)		(0.72)	(0.96)
Genocide					0.76	1.52	1.82
					(0.55)	(0.97)	(1.27)
Rebel claim						-0.30	-0.93
						(0.71)	(0.94)
Elections						-0.15	0.23
						(0.56)	(0.66)
Irregular war	2.02 * **	2.19 * **	2.11 * **	2.06 * **	1.98 * **	1.78 * **	2.16*
	(0.70)	(0.77)	(0.66)	(0.68)	(0.71)	(0.80)	(1.10)
Population (l)	-0.10	-0.19	-0.07	-0.07	-0.06	-0.26	-0.29
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.26)
Democracy	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Battle deaths	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)

Constant	-0.40 (1.60)	1.61 (1.62)	-0.95 (1.52)	-0.99 (1.42)	-1.01 (1.54)	-0.06 (2.68)	1.91 (2.65)
Observations	153	134	155	155	156	123	127
Pseudo $R^2$	0.12	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.15	0.52	0.55

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.010$

## 4.7 Desperation

Table 4.12 shows the results for two measures of the desperation logic. The first is an ordinal ranking of the strength of a rebel group relative to the government, accounting not only for its number of fighters but also its military and mobilizational capacities (*rebel strength*). The second is a measure of the extent to which rebels controlled territory during the conflict (*rebel terrcont*). *rebel terrcont* takes the following values: 0 = none, 1 = low, 2 = moderate, 3 = high. Testing rebel territorial control is also important for ensuring the validity of my measures of rural, peripheral insurgency in the main analysis. Because rural hinterlands often serve as insurgent strongholds – and combatants are more likely to perpetuate indiscriminate violence in areas dominated by the other side (Kalyvas 2006, 419) – the *distance* and *border conflict* variables may actually reflect a tendency for states to utilize displacement where and when rebels control territory. Both of these variables, which were drawn from the Non-State Actor Dataset, reflect the level of threat faced by incumbents (Cunningham et al. 2013).

**Table 4.12: Multinomial Logit Results (Desperation)**

	Model 1 (Desperation)	Model 2 (Desperation)	Model 3 (Full Model)	Model 4 (Full Model)	Model 5 (Full Model)	Model 6 (Full Model)
<b>Cleansing</b>						
Distance (l)			-0.44 ** (0.22)	-0.53 ** (0.23)		
Land area (l)			0.53 *** (0.19)	0.19 (0.21)		
Border conflict					-0.62 (0.68)	-0.64 (0.67)
Parallel conflict			0.87 (0.78)	0.48 (1.05)	0.85 (0.89)	0.84 (0.90)
GDP/capita (l)			1.01 *** (0.23)	0.88 *** (0.25)	0.67 *** (0.23)	0.61 *** (0.19)
Milper				0.00 ** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 ** (0.00)
Rebel strength	-0.17 (0.36)		-0.38 (0.50)		-0.13 (0.53)	
Rebterrcont		0.53 ** (0.23)		0.59 (0.48)		0.27 (0.38)
Exclusionary			0.36 (0.87)	0.97 (1.05)	0.40 (0.83)	1.03 (0.95)
Rebextsupp			1.63 ** (0.68)	1.60* (0.88)	1.94 ** (0.88)	1.52* (0.87)
Rebel FR			0.47 (0.70)	0.33 (0.71)	0.45 (0.70)	0.29 (0.71)

Rebel claim			3.68 * **	3.43 * **	2.90 * *	2.83 * *
			(1.31)	(1.21)	(1.16)	(1.24)
Elections			1.11	1.47*	0.54	0.73
			(0.84)	(0.86)	(0.77)	(0.68)
Irregular war	-0.76	-0.56	-1.89 * *	-1.75*	-1.52 * *	-1.69*
	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.74)	(0.91)	(0.68)	(0.87)
Population (l)	0.03	0.07	-0.41*	-0.40	-0.30	-0.31
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.21)
Democracy	-0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.05	-0.02	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Battle deaths	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-0.70	-2.00	-3.46	-2.89	-2.94	-3.10
	(1.56)	(1.54)	(2.91)	(3.03)	(2.12)	(2.23)
<b>Depopulation</b>						
Distance (l)			0.17	0.30		
			(0.29)	(0.37)		
Land area (l)			0.23	0.19		
			(0.34)	(0.33)		
Border conflict					0.99	1.42
					(1.37)	(1.50)
Parallel conflict			1.09	1.18	1.88	2.03
			(1.02)	(1.10)	(1.16)	(1.29)
GDP/capita (l)			1.37 * **	1.28 * **	1.01 * *	1.13 * **
			(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.48)	(0.41)
Milper				0.00	0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rebel strength	-0.99		-1.66		-0.71	
	(0.76)		(1.20)		(0.97)	
Rebterrcont		0.74 * *		0.85		1.41 * *
		(0.29)		(0.51)		(0.60)
Exclusionary			0.33	1.12	0.56	1.37
			(1.36)	(1.13)	(1.14)	(1.06)
Rebextsupp			0.35	0.00	0.35	-0.45
			(1.10)	(0.95)	(1.13)	(1.15)
Rebel FR			1.45	1.85	1.56	1.83
			(1.22)	(1.34)	(1.27)	(1.20)
Rebel claim			0.81	0.29	-0.36	-0.74
			(1.39)	(1.42)	(1.31)	(1.13)
Elections			1.37	1.26	1.37	1.34
			(1.88)	(1.53)	(1.67)	(1.63)
Irregular war	0.07	0.72	-1.29	-0.79	-1.02	-0.51
	(0.91)	(0.78)	(1.08)	(1.15)	(1.05)	(1.14)
Population (l)	0.04	0.14	-0.50*	-0.32	-0.27	-0.09
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.26)
Democracy	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Battle deaths	0.00	0.00	0.00 * *	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-1.10	-4.47 * *	-2.72	-8.04*	-3.06	-8.33 * *
	(2.54)	(1.74)	(4.64)	(4.47)	(3.81)	(3.82)
<b>Relocation</b>						
Distance (l)			1.55 * **	1.27 * **		
			(0.47)	(0.42)		
Land area (l)			-0.67 * *	-0.29		
			(0.34)	(0.35)		
Border conflict					2.75 * **	2.93 * **
					(0.62)	(0.67)
Parallel conflict			3.35 * **	3.48 * **	3.85 * **	3.86 * **
			(0.80)	(0.79)	(0.85)	(0.86)

GDP/capita (l)			-0.47*	-0.44	-0.28	-0.29
			(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.25)
Milper				-0.00 **	-0.00 **	-0.00 **
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rebel strength	0.13		0.48		-0.23	
	(0.52)		(0.45)		(0.59)	
Rebterrcont		0.06		-0.18		-0.10
		(0.18)		(0.29)		(0.36)
Exclusionary			-0.59	-0.07	-0.06	0.06
			(0.68)	(0.71)	(0.71)	(0.72)
Rebextsupp			2.48 **	2.31 ***	1.49 ***	1.46 ***
			(0.98)	(0.79)	(0.58)	(0.54)
Rebel FR			0.55	0.31	-0.65	-0.67
			(0.68)	(0.73)	(0.64)	(0.67)
Rebel claim			-1.43	-1.28	-1.48 **	-1.70 **
			(0.89)	(0.81)	(0.69)	(0.70)
Elections			-0.84*	-0.92*	0.08	0.14
			(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.56)	(0.55)
Irregular war	2.25 **	2.13 ***	2.62 **	2.52 **	2.24*	2.45*
	(0.91)	(0.69)	(1.10)	(1.03)	(1.27)	(1.34)
Population (l)	-0.10	-0.09	-0.18	-0.07	-0.21	-0.23
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Democracy	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.09*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Battle deaths	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-0.89	-0.74	-5.99	-6.65*	-1.02	-1.18
	(1.98)	(1.57)	(3.78)	(3.56)	(1.99)	(1.58)
Observations	145	147	133	135	136	138
Pseudo $R^2$	0.12	0.13	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.50

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.010$

## 4.8 Military Outcomes

Table 4.13 shows cross-tab results comparing the outcomes of conflicts by whether incumbents employed each type of displacement strategy. Another implication of the desperation hypothesis is that displacement strategies will be disproportionately employed by losing counterinsurgents. I use Balcells and Kalyvas (2014)'s coding of conflict outcome, which is a three-fold variable denoting whether the war ended in an incumbent victory, an incumbent loss, or a draw, when the incumbent "is forced to concede some rebel demands via a settlement and neither side obtains its maximal aims."

**Table 4.13: Strategic Displacement and Military Outcomes (1945-2008)**

<i>Displacement Type</i>	<i>War outcome</i>							
	<i>Incumbent Loss</i>		<i>Draw</i>		<i>Incumbent Victory</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	17	40.5	12	27.3	38	51.4	67	41.9
Cleansing	10	23.8	11	25.0	9	12.2	30	18.8
Depopulation	2	4.8	3	6.8	6	8.1	11	6.9
Relocation	13	31.0	18	40.9	21	28.4	52	32.5
<i>Total</i>	42	100.0	44	100.0	74	100.0	160	100.0
Pearson chi2(6) =	8.8617	Pr =	0.182					

## 5 UGANDA CASE STUDY: APPROACH AND METHODS

### 5.1 Interviews

Most existing research on forced displacement in Uganda – particularly during the LRA war – is told from the perspectives of victims and observers. The perspective of perpetrators is often lacking, and motivations for relocating civilians have been assumed either from victims’ testimonies or from brief public comments made by high-level officials. Few interviews with military officials or rank-and-file soldiers are cited as support. I therefore join other scholars who have relied on interviews with perpetrators to identify and evaluate the logic underlying violence in wartime (Wood 2003; Weinstein 2006; Stanton 2016; Cohen 2016; Straus 2015, 2006). Of course, there is a risk to this approach. People’s accounts could suffer from retrospective bias, and it is possible that motivations claimed by perpetrators are simply *ex-post* rationalizations. I took several precautions to guard against these potential biases.

First, to identify and recruit respondents I relied on snowball sampling using multiple points of insertion. In addition to going through formal channels to access high-ranking government officials, I tapped into community networks through my research assistants, other scholars and researchers, journalists, civil society organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the Refugee Law Project at Makerere University, where I served as an affiliate during my time in Uganda. Utilizing a mix of formal and informal avenues to generate referrals helped ensure that I interviewed people with diverse backgrounds, perspectives, and experiences. Potential biases are mitigated in part by the diversity of my respondents. Although they are not representative, between January 2016 and May 2017 I conducted a total of 230 interviews, which included senior state officials, military commanders, rank-and-file soldiers, members of civilian militias, human rights activists, journalists, NGO officials, and local government, tribal, and religious leaders. Many were men, though there were some women.

Second, in interviews I was never explicit about the topic of my study – only that it was about the history of the war in each region, Ugandan counterinsurgency, or military strategy. I told people that I was interested in speaking with current or former officials, soldiers, and other participants and observers about their experiences during Uganda’s rebellions. The interviews were semi-structured. Their primary purpose was to understand how displacement fit into the state’s repertoire of political and military strategies, tactics, and practices; identify the benefits and costs of uprooting civilians; and explore the circumstances on the ground leading up to these measures being enacted. I sought to explore the perspectives that gave rise to evacuation orders and examine elite decision-making, threat perception, and the implementation process. I refrained from asking directly about state-induced displacement; usually I would ask about strategies and tactics, or how people being displaced affected fighting the war, and it was common for subjects to broach the topic. If the subject did so, I asked follow-



up questions. All interviews were conducted with just me and, where necessary, a translator, though many respondents – especially high-ranking officials – spoke fluent English.

Finally, I compared observations and accounts across interviewees to ensure consistency. I also cross-checked the responses with other sources of data collected during the conflicts in question – including news articles, human rights reports, ethnographies, government records, and oral and written local histories. Some of these sources include public records of government proceedings, such as minutes from sessions of the Ugandan Parliament, and official correspondence between government and military authorities, such as local security reports. I obtained these documents, along with old newspaper articles, internal government reports, and radio transcripts, from archives in Kampala, Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, Kasese, and Bundibugyo.

## 5.2 Focus Groups

While most of my in-depth interviewees were perpetrators of displacement – including both military and government officials, along with other key observers – I also sought to capture the perspectives and experiences of victims. Unfortunately, fine-grained data on displacement and detailed maps of IDP camps in Uganda are only available for the period 2003-2008. Local census data is intermittent and ultimately unreliable. Given the sensitivities of this topic and the lack of a reliable sampling frame, I therefore did not attempt to construct a representative sample of war-affected communities. Rather, I sought to maximize the diversity of the respondent pool and ensure broad geographical coverage.


With the assistance of a local research team, I selected a total of 42 sub-counties in the 12 districts affected by insurgency in northern and western Uganda. We sought to ensure broad coverage in terms of geography, location (urban vs. rural), population size, severity of violence, and the extent of displacement. Once sub-counties were selected, we randomly selected two parishes in each sub-county. Parishes were stratified by population and distance from the sub-county headquarters. Once parishes were selected, we visited local tribal and government officials to introduce ourselves and obtain permission to conduct research, as is customary in Uganda. After receiving permission, the research team used multiple sources – local council officials, youth mobilizers, tribal leaders, and civil society groups – to identify and recruit potential participants. We wanted to avoid having local authorities handpick our respondents.

We conducted two, and sometimes three, interview sessions in each parish. For each session I sought to interview 8-10 people, although in practice the number ranged from 9-12, with some growing up to 15 people. Participants were diverse in terms of age, gender, background, and position in the local community. We relied on a focus group format, asking open-ended questions concerning local conditions during displacement; the local history of the war and displacement, including violence by both rebels and

government forces; government decision-making; the challenges faced in combating the rebellions; the strength and popularity of local rebel groups, how state-ordered displacements were carried out; and the circumstances on the ground leading up to their implementation. We then conducted a survey with each participant, using a structured questionnaire with close-ended questions, which provided an opportunity for anonymous responses and allowed us to triangulate answers to specific questions. A total of 85 focus group discussions were held across 42 sub-counties (26 in the north, and 16 in the west).

There are potential issues regarding respondents' memories, to be sure, but given the lack of archives or any other source where conflict and displacement dynamics have been systematically and thoroughly registered for a few communities – let alone for a representative sample – I have to rely in part on oral testimonies. The combination of focus groups, interviews, and secondary sources allows for triangulating sources and decreasing measurement problems.


Figure 5.1: Sample of Ugandan Subcounties Researched




### 5.3 Violent Event Data

Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 display trends in battles and violent events during the LRA and ADF wars. For the graphs disaggregated by district, the red dashed lines denote the timing of displacement orders by authorities in northern and western Uganda. Figure 5.6 shows the same analysis as Figure 3 in the paper, except it displays trends in the number of civilians killed in rebel attacks instead of the number of attacks. All data is drawn from UCDP GED (Sundberg and Melander 2013).


**Figure 5.2: LRA Violence in Uganda (1990-2008)**




**Figure 5.3: ADF Violence in Uganda (1995-2006)**




**Figure 5.4: LRA Attacks on Civilians (1989-2006)**



**Figure 5.5: ADF Attacks on Civilians (1997-2002)**



**Figure 5.6:** Civilians Deaths from Rebel Attacks (1989-2006)



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