SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX
"REBEL GROUPS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND CIVIL WAR OUTCOMES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA"

This appendix supplements the article, "Rebel Groups, International Humanitarian Law, and Civil War Outcomes in the Post-Cold War Era." Section I of the appendix provides additional details on the coding of civil war outcomes. Sections II and II probe the reliability of the statistical results reported in the main text. Section II shows the results of a series of robustness tests for the analyses of conflict outcomes. Section III shows the results of a series of robustness tests for the analyses of international diplomatic actions. Section IV shows the results of analyses disaggregating violence against civilians into different forms of violence directed against civilian populations.

I.   CODING CIVIL WAR OUTCOMES

To code conflict outcomes, I begin with the Non-State Actor (NSA) Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009), which distinguish between conflicts that end in government victory, rebel group victory, formal agreement (either ceasefire or peace agreement), fizzle out in periods of low activity, or are ongoing. Appendix Table A1 shows how the 103 conflicts in the data set are distributed across these categories of conflict termination.

Appendix Table A1: Conflict Termination, using Non-State Actor Data

Termination Type	Number of Conflicts
Formal agreement (ceasefire or peace agreement)	42
Government victory	4
Rebel group victory	10
Ended through low activity	21
Ongoing	26
Total	103

For the 63 conflicts coded by the NSA data set as ending in formal agreement or periods of low activity, I code whether this conclusion to the conflict favored the government, favored the rebel group, or favored neither side. I do so by comparing the rebel group's primary stated goals at the beginning of the conflict to the political settlement ending the conflict.

This coding scheme produces three categories of conflict outcome: 1) outcomes favorable to the government, which include both government military victories and negotiated settlements favorable to the government; 2) outcomes favorable to the rebel group, which include both rebel group military victories and negotiated settlements favorable to the rebel group; and 3) outcomes involving significant concessions from each side.

Appendix **Table A2: Coding Guidelines for Separatist Conflicts** and **Table A3: Coding Guidelines for Revolutionary Conflicts**, shown below, provide information on the rules used to assign conflicts to each of the three outcome categories and provide examples of conflicts falling into each category.

The 26 conflicts that were ongoing as of December 31, 2010 are coded as missing.

Guidelines for Coding Conflict Outcomes

0   = outcome favoring government
1   = outcome favoring neither side, in which both sides made concessions
2   = outcome favoring rebel group
missing = conflict was ongoing as of 2010

To categorize conflict outcomes, I begin by identifying the rebel group's stated goals at the start of the conflict. To do so, I rely on the group's stated incompatibility as recorded in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Database, available online at: http://ucdp.uu.se/.

Broadly, I distinguish between separatist conflicts, in which rebel groups seek autonomy or independence for a particular region, and revolutionary conflicts, in which rebel groups seek power in the central government.

Coding Conflict Outcomes – Separatist Conflicts

All of the separatist groups in the data set began by demanding full independence. Thus, for separatist conflicts, I code formal or de facto independence as an outcome favoring the rebel group; regional autonomy within the exiting territorial borders of the state as the intermediate category of conflict outcome; and no regional autonomy as an outcome favoring the government. Appendix Table A2 illustrates the rules for coding separatist conflict outcomes; details on each of the case examples are provided below.

Appendix Table A2:
Coding Guidelines for Separatist Conflicts

Type of Outcome	Outcome Coding
Independence for separatist region	Outcome = 2 *Examples:* Fretilin (East Timor) in Indonesia SPLA (South Sudan) in Sudan
De facto independence for separatist region	Outcome = 2 *Examples:* Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan KDP, PUK (Kurdistan) in Iraq
Autonomy for separatist region	Outcome = 1 *Examples:* GAM (Aceh) in Indonesia Chechen insurgents (Chechnya) in Russia
No autonomy for separatist region	Outcome = 0 *Examples:* ULFA (Assam) in India MFDC (Casamance) in Senegal

Coding Examples – Separatist Conflicts:
The following provides the relevant language from the agreement ending the war, for each of the cases referenced in Table A2:

Independence for separatist region (outcome = 2):

Fretilin (East Timor) in Indonesia:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor, 5 May 1999. The full text of the agreement is available in: United Nations General Assembly, 53rd Session and United Nations Security Council, 54th year, "Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General," 5 May 1999 (A/53/951, S/1999/513). Available online at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
Annex I, Article 6:
If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.

Outcome:
The UN facilitated the popular consultation on East Timor's status, with a vote taken on 30 August 1999. The UN estimated that about 95 percent of registered voters participated in the vote, with 78.5 percent voting against the proposal for East Timor to remain within Indonesia under a special autonomy agreement. This rejection of the special autonomy proposal led to the invocation of Annex I, Article 6, paving the way for East Timor's transition to independence. (Source: United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/etimor.htm)

SPLA (South Sudan) in Sudan:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between The Government of The Republic of The Sudan and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army, 9 January 2005. The full text of the agreement is available online at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
Part A, 1.3 of Chapter I: The Machakos Protocol, 20 July 2002:
That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, *inter alia*, through a referendum to determine their future status.

Part B, 2.5 of Chapter I: The Machakos Protocol, 20 July 2002:
At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.

Outcome:
In accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, at the end of the six year interim period, the parties held a referendum on the status of South Sudan (in January 2011). In the referendum, 98.83 percent voted in favor of independence for South Sudan. South Sudan became independent on 9 July 2011. (Source: United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmis/background.shtml)

De facto independence for separatist region (outcome = 2):

Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
The Bishkek Protocol, 5 May 1994. Full text available online at: peacemaker.un.org.

Joint Declaration of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, 2 November 2008. Full text provided in United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 10 November 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 11 November 2008 (S/2008/702). Available online at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
The parties to the conflict signed a ceasefire agreement, the Bishkek Protocol, in 1994. This agreement ended the fighting, but did not resolve any of the political issues at stake in the conflict. The parties to the conflict continued to negotiate with one another in the years that followed, but have not reached a formal peace agreement (thus, why this case is considered a case of de facto independence rather than de jure independence). The 2008 Joint Declaration is not a peace treaty, but does indicate that the two sides will continue to work towards a settlement.

Outcome:
When the parties to the conflict signed the ceasefire agreement in 1994, ethnic Armenian forces fighting for independence for Nagorno-Karabakh had succeeded in pushing Azerbaijani forces out of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since 1994, ethnic Armenian forces have controlled the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as some of the surrounding territory captured during the war. Nagorno-Karabakh has thus functioned as a de facto independent territory since the conclusion of the war; Azerbaijani government structures do not function in the region. (Source: International Crisis Group, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War," Europe Report No. 187, 14 November 2007)

KDP, PUK (Kurdistan) in Iraq
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
No formal agreement ending the war.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
No formal agreement ending the war.

Outcome:
Following the defeat of Saddam Hussein's government in the first Gulf War, the United States established a no-fly zone in the Kurdish region of Iraq. This facilitated the development of a de facto independent state in the Kurdish region of Iraq from 1991 through 2003. According to Minorities at Risk: "their internationally supported autonomous region in the north was largely free of any interference from Saddam Hussein's regime." (Minorities at Risk Database, available online at: www.mar.umd.edu; see also Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)

Autonomy for separatist region (outcome = 1):

GAM (Aceh) in Indonesia:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 15 August 2005. The full text of the agreement is available online at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
Article 1   Governing of Aceh
1.1   Law on the Governing of Aceh
1.1.1   A new Law on the Governing of Aceh will be promulgated and will enter into force as soon as possible and not later than 31 March 2006.
1.1.2   The new Law on the Governing of Aceh will be based on the following principles:

a) Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs, which will be administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial administration, except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies of which belong to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution.

b) International agreements entered into by the Government of Indonesia which relate to matters of special interest to Aceh will be entered into in consultation with and with the consent of the legislature of Aceh.

c) Decisions with regard to Aceh by the legislature of the Republic of Indonesia will be taken in consultation with and with the consent of the legislature of Aceh.

d) Administrative measures undertaken by the Government of Indonesia with regard to Aceh will be implemented in consultation with and with the consent of the head of the Aceh administration.

Outcome:
The autonomy provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding were implemented in 2006, with the passage of national legislation formalizing the autonomy provisions. This national legislation – the Law on the Governing of Aceh – was passed by the Indonesian Parliament on 11 July 2006 and signed by the President on 1 August 2006. An EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) helped to implement these and other provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding. In accordance with these agreements, Aceh held local elections in December 2006. (Source: EU Council Secretariat, Background: EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia), 15 December 2006. Available online at: eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/index_en.htm).

Chechen insurgents (Chechnya) in Russia (first conflict):
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Khasavyourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations, 31 August 1996.
Follow-up agreement: Russian-Chechen Agreement, 23 November 1996.
Follow-up agreement: Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between Russian Federation and Chechen Republic Ichkeria, 12 May 1997.
The full text of each of these agreements is available online at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
All three agreements refer to the "Russian Federation" and the "Chechen Republic," indicating that that Chechnya remains a republic under the control of Russia. The Russian-Chechen Agreement of 23 November 1996 is most explicit on this point, indicating that this agreement is to establish "principles of relations between the federal center and the Chechen Republic."

Outcome:
Chechnya was permitted to maintain its own parliament and president, but remained within the Russian Federation. In the Russian-Chechen Agreement (23 November 1996) the two sides agreed to "agree actions in the defense sector."

No autonomy for separatist region (outcome = 0):

ULFA (Assam) in India:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Several ceasefire agreements, but no formal peace agreement ending the war.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
No formal peace agreement.

Outcome:
Beginning in 2005 the Indian government and the ULFA participated in several rounds of peace negotiations, but did not reach agreement on a political settlement of the conflict. During negotiations, government counterinsurgency operations against the ULFA continued. Ceasefires halted fighting sporadically during the years that negotiations were ongoing, but no permanent ceasefire was in place at the end of the war. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset marks the end of the conflict in 2010, ending through low activity. The Indian government did not grant any political concessions to the ULFA. (Source: Sanjib Baruah, "Separatist Militants and Contentious Politics in Assam, India: The Limits of Counterinsurgency," *Asian Survey*, vol. 49, no. 6 (2009).)

MFDC (Casamance) in Senegal:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC), 30 December 2004. The full text of the agreement is available online at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
Clause one: The Purpose of the Present Agreement
1. As the law of amnesty is already in force the State engages to provide general security, free circulation of people and goods, in the Casamance as well as in all the rest of the territory, in accordance with the Constitution and to guarantee the exercise of fundamental freedoms in particular freedom of speech and expression in order to favour the political dialogue in the resource-rich region of the Casamance.

2. The MFDC solemnly decides to definitively give up armed combat and the use of violence as a means to conduct the political combat which it wants to conduct.

Outcome:
The peace agreement ending the war between the Senegalese government and the MFDC did not grant any form of political autonomy or independence to the Casamance region. The government pledged to maintain security in the region and to promote "political dialogue" while the MFDC agreed to end its armed challenge to the government. Additional provisions of the agreement dealt with procedures for demobilization and reintegration of MFDC forces, as well as government pledges to facilitate landmine clearance and economic reconstruction in the Casamance region.

Coding Conflict Outcomes – Revolutionary Conflicts

It might seem possible to differentiate among revolutionary conflicts based on their goals – whether they wanted to overthrow the government or simply share power, but in fact, much like separatist conflicts, nearly all revolutionary rebellions in the data set began by demanding the removal of the government in power. Revolutionary groups differ in the types of governments they wish to install in the old government's place – Islamic, socialist, democratic – but all insist that they wish to see a change in the nature of the government.

Thus, for revolutionary conflicts, if the old government was removed from power at the end of the conflict or if the country undertook a major political transition at the national level, I code this as an outcome favoring the rebel group. Many of the conflicts in this category are conflicts in which the rebel group was fighting against a dictatorship, and the conflict ended with a negotiated settlement to launch a major political transition to multiparty democracy. If conflict ended with some degree of rebel group integration into the government, but without a larger political transition at the national level, I code this as the intermediate category of conflict outcome, involving concessions from both sides. Finally, if the conflict ended without any major political concessions to the rebel group and with the rebel group excluded from participation in politics or government, I code this as an outcome favoring the government. Appendix Table A3 illustrates the rules for coding revolutionary conflict outcomes; details on each of the case examples are provided below.

Appendix Table A3:
Coding Guidelines for Revolutionary Conflicts

Type of Outcome	Outcome Coding
Government removed from power or major political transition at the national level (e.g., transition from dictatorship to multiparty democracy)	Outcome = 2 *Examples:* FMLN in El Salvador NPFL in Liberia CPN-M in Nepal
Some degree of integration of rebel group into the government without major political transition (e.g., integration of rebel forces into national military; rebel group transition to legal political party, but without major constitutional changes or guarantee of representation in government)	Outcome = 1 *Examples:* UNITA in Angola CNDP in DR Congo UTO in Tajikistan
No political concessions granted to rebel group; representatives of rebel group not permitted to participate in politics	Outcome = 0 *Examples:* AIS/FIS in Algeria Sendero Luminoso in Peru LRA in Uganda

Coding Examples – Revolutionary Conflicts:

The following provides the relevant language from the agreement ending the war, for each of the cases referenced in Table A3:

Government removed from power or major national political transition (outcome = 2):

FMLN in El Salvador:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Chapultepec Agreement, 16 January 1992. Full text of the agreement is available in United Nations General Assembly, 46th Session, and United Nations Security Council, 47th Year, "Letter dated 27 January 1992 from the Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," 30 January 1992 (A/46/864, S/23501). Available online at peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
Chapter IV: Electoral System
The parties reaffirm their commitment, made in the Mexico Agreements, to promote a comprehensive proposal for reform of the electoral system…

Chapter VI: Political Participation by FMLN
The following agreements have been reached concerning political participation by FMLN, and shall be subject to the implementation timetable contained in this Agreement:
1. Adoption of legislative or other measures needed to guarantee former FMLN combatants the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political, and institutional life of the country…
5. Cessation of the armed conflict implies the commitment and the right of FMLN to full political participation, without any restrictions other than those deriving from the new institutional and legal framework established by the agreements reached during the negotiations.
6. Legalization of FMLN as a political party, through the adoption of a legislative decree to that end…

Outcome:
The El Salvadoran government and the FMLN signed a series of peace agreements ending the civil war. The Chapultepec Agreement, signed in January 1992, was the final agreement, and laid out detailed provisions for a political, military, and economic reform, including reform and integration of the Salvadoran military and police forces, reform of the judiciary and the electoral system, and full integration of the FMLN into the political system. These reforms constituted a major political transition for El Salvador, consistent with the demands the FMLN had made for political and economic reform in the country.

NPFL in Liberia:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Abuja Agreement to supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement, August 1995. Full text of the agreement available in United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 25 August 1995 from the permanent representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," 28 August 1995 (S/1995/742). Full text available at: peacemaker.un.org.

Akosombo Agreement, 12 September 1994. Full text of the agreement available in United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 14 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," 16 October 1994 (S/1994/1174). Full text available at: peacemaker.un.org.

Cotonou Agreement, 25 July 1993. Full text of the agreement available in United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1993 from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Benin to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," 9 August 1993 (S/26272). Full text available at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
Cotonou Agreement
Section B, Article 14: Structure of Government
1. The Parties observe that Liberia is a unitary State and as such agree to form a single transitional Government, styled THE LIBERIA NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. The authority of the transitional Government shall extend throughout the territorial limits of the Republic of Liberia.

2. The mandate of the transitional Government is to provide essential government services during the transitional period and to also hold and S/26272 English Page 9 supervise general and presidential elections in accordance with the ECOWAS peace plan. The Transitional Legislature Assembly or the Council of State shall have power to enact or cause to be enacted any rule(s), regulation(s) or law, or take any action(s) which may facilitate the holding of free and fair democratic elections.

Outcome:
The peace agreements included provisions for the installment of a transitional government, followed by the holding of legislative and presidential elections. The NPFL engaged in widespread intimidation in the lead up to elections in July 1997. Ultimately, the leader of the NPFL, Charles Taylor, won the presidential election, while his political party, the National Patriotic Party, won a majority of seats in the legislature. Thus, the war ended with a major political transition and the NPFL gaining control over the government of Liberia, as it had demanded throughout the war. (Source: International Crisis Group, "Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability," Africa Report No. 43, 24 April 2002).

CPN-M in Nepal:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Comprehensive Peace Accord signed between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 22 November 2006. Full text available online at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
Section 3. Political - Economic - Social Transformation and Conflict Management

Both the parties are in agreement to adopt the following policies and programs for political-economic-social transformation and to creatively manage conflict existing in the country:

3.1. To ensure progressive political, economic and social transformation on the basis of the decisions reached at the meeting of senior leaders of seven political parties and the CPN (Maoist) on Nov. 8, 2006 (Addendum-6)

3.2. To form an interim legislature-parliament on the basis of interim constitution, and hold elections to the constituent assembly in a free and fair manner by the month of Jestha, 2064 BS and practically ensure sovereignty inherent in the Nepali people.

3.3. None of the authorities related to the country's rule to remain with the King. To use the properties of late King Birendra, late queen Aishworya and their family for national interest by bringing the properties under the Nepal Government and forming a trust. To nationalize all properties (like palaces situated in different places, forests and reserves, heritages with historical and archeological importance) obtained by King Gyanendra in his capacity as the King. To decide whether or not to retain the monarchy by a simple majority in the first meeting of the constituent assembly.

3.4. To adopt a political system that fully abides by the universally accepted principles of fundamental human rights, multiparty competitive democratic system, sovereignty of the people and supremacy of the people, constitutional balance and control, rule of law, social justice, equality, independent judiciary, periodic elections, monitoring by civil society, complete press freedom,

people's right to information, transparency and accountability in the Comprehensive Peace Accord: 21-11-06 4 activities of political parties, people's participation, impartial, competent, and clean bureaucracy.

3.5. To carry out an inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring of the state by ending the current centralized and unitary form of the state in order to address the problems related to women, Dalit, indigenous people, Janajatis, Madheshi, oppressed, neglected and minority communities and backward regions by ending discrimination based on class, caste, language, gender, culture, religion, and region.

3.6. To gradually implement by deciding through mutual agreement a minimum common program for the economic and social transformation to end all forms of feudalism…

Outcome:
In the peace agreement, the Government of Nepal and the CPN-M agreed to a major political transition for Nepal, including the ending of the monarchy, the holding of elections to a constituent assembly to write a new constitution, and the full incorporation of the rebel group into politics. Along with other Nepali political parties, the CPN-M participated in elections to the constituent assembly in April 2008, and won a majority of seats in the assembly, and then began working with the other political parties to draft a new constitution. The head of the Maoist insurgency was elected prime minister. (Sources: International Crisis Group, "Nepal's Peace Agreement: Making It Work," Asia Report No. 126, 15 December 2006; International Crisis Group, "Nepal's New Political Landscape," Asia Report No. 156, 3 July 2008; International Crisis Group, "Nepal's Peace Process: The Endgame Nears," Asia Briefing No. 131, 13 December 2011).

Integration of rebel group into government without major political transition (outcome = 1):

UNITA in Angola:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Luena Memorandum of Understanding, signed 4 April 2002. Full text of the agreement available in United Nations Security Council, "Identical letters dated 25 April 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council," 26 April 2002 (S/2002/483).

Lusaka Protocol, signed 15 November 1994. Full text available in United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 9 December 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," 22 December 1994 (S/1994/1441).

Relevant Provision of Agreement:

Lusaka Protocol:
Annex 6
Agenda Item II.4: National Reconciliation
I. General Principles:
4. National Reconciliation implies:
(c) That, in the pursuit of national interest, UNITA members participate adequately at all levels and in the various institutions of political, administrative and economic activity.

II. Specific Principles:
7. In the context of national reconciliation, all the first 70 deputies elected on the lists of UNITA candidates in the September 1992 legislative elections shall, except in the cases provided for under article 165 (3) of Law 5/92 of 16 April, be installed in their functions in the National Assembly…

III. Modalities:
1. In application of the relevant provisions of Article 4 (c) of the general principles of National Reconciliation above, the concrete modalities of participation by UNITA in the various posts in the Government, State administration and diplomatic missions abroad, as agreed between the Government and UNITA and which appear in a document which is an integral part of the annex of the Lusaka Protocol relating to National Reconciliation, shall be specified in a letter to be written by the Angolan authorities to the leaders of that party.

Outcome:
The Lusaka Protocol (and the follow-up agreements affirming the parties' commitment to the terms of the Lusaka Protocol) provided for the conversion of UNITA into a legal political party, and its incorporation into the national legislature. UNITA was guaranteed four cabinet minister posts as well as a number of other posts in the national government. The Angolan government (led by the MPLA) resisted granting any additional government posts to UNITA and by 2004, only one UNITA member remained in the cabinet. This outcome involved concessions from both sides: UNITA did not secure a complete overthrow of the government or major political transition as it had sought, but was able to secure representation in the government (Source: Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, available online at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu).

CNDP in DR Congo:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the CNDP, Goma, 23 March 2009. Full text available online at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
Article 1: Transformation of the CNDP

1.1. The CNDP confirms the irreversible nature of its decision to cease its existence as a politico-military movement. It undertakes to: a) integrate its police force and its armed units into the Congolese National Police and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, respectively; b) transform into a political party and complete the necessary legal formalities to that end; c) from now on, seek solutions to its concerns strictly through political means and in accordance with the institutional order and laws of the Republic.

1.2. The Government undertakes to respond swiftly to the CNDP's request for recognition as a political party.

1.3. Furthermore, the Parties agree with the principle of the CNDP's participation in DRC politics. The terms will be determined by mutual agreement.

Outcome:
The peace agreement permitted the CNDP to become legal political party, integrated the CNDP into the military and police forces, provided for return of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, allowed for the release of political prisoners, and provided amnesty for participants in the conflict. This settlement involved political concessions from both sides: the CNDP had originally called for the government to step down and for the establishment of a new government. The government offered the CNDP promises of integration into political and military structures, but did not undertake a major political transition. (Sources: "Government of DR Congo (Zaire) – CNDP in UCDP Conflict Database at ucdp.uu.se; International Crisis Group, "Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy," Africa Report No. 150, 11 May 2009).

UTO in Tajikistan:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, signed in Moscow on 27 June 1997. Full text of agreement available in United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 1 July 1997 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," 2 July 1997 (A/52/219, S/1997/510). Full text available at: peacemaker.un.org.

Annex I to the General Agreement: Protocol on Political Questions, signed in Bishkek on 18 May 1997. Full text of the protocol (which includes the details of the political settlement) available in United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 20 May 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," 20 May 1997 (S/1997/385). Full text available at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
Annex I:
2: The Central Electoral Commission on Elections and the Holding of a Referendum shall be established for a transitional period with the inclusion in its membership of 25 per cent of the representatives of the United Tajik Opposition and shall conduct the elections and referendum before the beginning of the work of the new professional Parliament and the establishment of the new Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Tajikistan.

3. The reform of the Government shall be carried out by incorporating representatives of the United Tajik Opposition into the structures of the executive branch, including ministries, departments, local government bodies and judicial and law-enforcement bodies on the basis of a quota. The candidates put forward shall be appointed in accordance with a proposal by the United Tajik Opposition following consultations between the President and the Chairman of the Commission on National Reconciliation.

4. The bans and restrictions on activities by the political parties and movements of the United Tajik Opposition and the mass information media shall be lifted by the authorities of Tajikistan after the completion of the second phase of the implementation of the Protocol on Military Questions. The political parties and movements of the United Tajik Opposition shall function within the framework of the Constitution and the laws in force of the Republic of Tajikistan and in accordance with the norms and guarantees set forth in the general agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord in the country.

Outcome:
The peace agreement allowed for the full participation of the UTO in politics in Tajikistan, and guaranteed the UTO representation in the parliament. However, the peace agreement allowed for the Rakhmonov government to remain in power. Therefore, this is a case in which both sides made political concessions: the UTO agreed to a settlement that left the Rakhmonov government in place, while the government agreed to a settlement that permitted UTO participation in politics.

No political concessions granted to rebel group; rebel group not permitted to participate in politics (outcome = 0):

AIS/FIS in Algeria:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
The AIS negotiated a ceasefire agreement with Algerian military forces, effective 21 September 1997. The government formally recognized the ceasefire agreement in 1999 and offered an amnesty to members of the rebel group.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
No specific provisions of agreement dealing with political integration.

Outcome:
The AIS/FIS announced a ceasefire on 21 September 1997. The government formally recognized the ceasefire in 1999, leading to formal processes for demobilizing members of the rebel group. The government also offered a general amnesty to former members of the AIS. The ceasefire agreement did not address any of the political issues at stake in the conflict; the FIS was not permitted to participate in politics and AIS forces were not integrated into the military. Apart from the general amnesty, the government did not grant any political concessions to the rebel group. (Sources: John Daniszewski, "Algerian Insurgents Declare a Cease-Fire," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 September 1997; Mohammed M. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," Middle East Journal, vol. 54, no. 4 (2000): pp.572-591.)

Sendero Luminoso in Peru:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
No formal ceasefire or peace agreement ending the conflict; conflict ends through low activity.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
No formal ceasefire or peace agreement ending the conflict.
Outcome:
In 1992, the Peruvian government captured the leader of Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán, as well as a number of senior members of the rebel group. Following the capture of these group leaders, violence declined substantially and eventually fell below the levels used by UCDP/PRIO to identify ongoing armed conflicts. The government did not grant any political concessions to Sendero Luminoso and members of the rebel group are not permitted to participate in politics. (Source: Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, Princeton University Press, 2009).

LRA in Uganda:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
No formal ceasefire or peace agreement ending the conflict; conflict ends through low activity.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
No formal ceasefire or peace agreement ending the conflict.

Outcome:
Despite a number of attempts at peace negotiations between the Ugandan government and the LRA – including a lengthy period of negotiations from 2006 to 2008 – the two sides did not sign a formal peace agreement. Following the failure to reach agreement in 2008, the Ugandan government launched a renewed military offensive against LRA bases in South Sudan. The offensive pushed the LRA out of South Sudan and into neighboring territory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. Although scattered LRA forces remain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, the LRA has been severely weakened and is no longer active in Uganda. The Ugandan government did not grant any political concessions to the LRA and has not incorporated LRA members into the political system in Uganda. (Source: International Crisis Group, "LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony," Africa Report No. 157, 28 April 2010).

Sources for coding conflict outcomes:

To identify the details of the political settlement ending the conflict, I relied on the following sources:

University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Peace Accords Matrix, available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/. This database provides detailed information on peace agreements and their implementation throughout the world.

United Nations Peacemaker, Peace Agreements Database, created by the UN Department of Political Affairs, available at: peacemaker.un.org. This database provides the text of major peace agreements submitted to the United Nations.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Database, available online at: http://ucdp.uu.se/. This database provides information on conflict termination, including details of negotiations to end the conflict. This source is particularly useful in coding political outcomes for conflicts that ended through low activity or through a ceasefire, and therefore, are not captured in the Peace Accords Matrix database.

International Crisis Group reports, available online at: www.crisisgroup.org. These reports focus on particular conflicts, providing detailed information on conflict mediation, peace negotiations, terms of political settlements, and the implementation of peace agreements.

Multiple secondary sources, detailing the terms of settlement in particular conflicts. Full list available from author.

Comparison to Existing Data on Conflict Outcomes

As noted above, the starting point for coding of conflict outcomes is the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham et al. 2009), which distinguishes between conflicts ending through government or rebel group military victory, negotiated settlement, or low activity. The Non-State Actor Data are the most comprehensive data available on civil war outcomes, updated in 2012 to cover all civil wars from 1946 through 2010. Most other existing data sources on civil war outcomes take a similar conceptual approach, differentiating between conflicts ending through military victory and those ending through negotiated settlement. These sources of data on civil war outcomes do not distinguish among negotiated settlements based on the terms of settlement; nor do these sources of data distinguish among conflicts ending through low activity based on the political outcome at the time of conflict termination.

Prorok (2016), however, takes an approach similar to that of this study, differentiating among negotiated settlements based on whether their terms are more favorable to the government or the rebel group. Although Prorok's approach is similar to that of this study, her data on conflict outcomes differ in several important respects from the data used in this paper, as I discuss in more detail below. For the most part, these differences are related to differences in the research questions driving each project, leading to differences in the structure of the data sets designed to answer these questions.

Prorok (2016) focuses on the relationship between leader responsibility and civil war outcomes, arguing that leaders who are responsible for starting a war are more likely to be punished if they fail to achieve their war aims. Fearing punishment, these leaders less likely to make concessions and more likely to continue fighting, leading to more extreme war outcomes. To test this argument, Prorok collects original data on civil war outcomes. Prorok's data differ from the data used in this paper in two key ways:

First, because Prorok is interested in the behavior of individual leaders, her data code conflict outcomes separately for each side the conflict, based on that side's stated war aims at the beginning of the conflict and the degree to which that side achieved its objectives. The outcome variable for combatant is a seven-point index, ranging from -3 (outcome least favorable to the combatant) to +3 (outcome most favorable to the combatant). My data, in contrast, code a single outcome for each conflict dyad. This involves a *comparison* of the war aims of the two sides and an evaluation of the political outcome of the conflict in light of these competing war aims. The coding of the conflict outcome indicates the extent to which the political outcome of the conflict favored the stated war aims of one side or the other.

Second, because Prorok's argument makes predictions about the likelihood of extreme conflict outcomes – either extreme victory or extreme defeat – her coding of civil war outcomes focuses on identifying these categories of conflict outcome. Prorok's coding of conflict outcomes thus takes into account both the military and the political outcome of the conflict, ranking an outcome in which one side was defeated militarily as a more extreme outcome than an outcome in which one side failed to achieve any of its political objectives but technically did not experience full military defeat. My theoretical argument, in contrast, makes predictions about the political outcome of the conflict, positing that the behavior of the belligerents will influence the terms of political settlement. In addition, as noted in the paper, during the period of study – 1989-2010 – external involvement in civil wars has been extensive, often urging combatants to come to the negotiating table rather than

fighting the civil war to its military conclusion. For this reason, my conflict outcome data focus on the political outcome of the conflict, and the extent to which the combatants are able to achieve their political objectives.

Although the different structure of the two data sets makes a direct comparison difficult, in robustness tests, I replicate the analyses using Prorok's measure of the civil war outcome from the perspective of the rebel group (the extent to which the rebel group was able to achieve its stated objectives). The results of these analyses are similar to the results using my measure of civil war outcomes, and are reported in full in Appendix Table A5 below.

II.   ROBUSTNESS TESTS FOR ANALYSES OF CONFLICT OUTCOMES

Below is Table 2 from the main text, provided for ease of comparison with the robustness tests.

Table 2: Ordered Logit Analyses – Conflict Outcome

	MODEL 1 Basic Model	MODEL 2 Interaction Term	MODEL 3 Additional Controls
Rebel Group Restraint	1.043** (0.431)	− 0.043 (0.675)	− 0.052 (0.693)
Government Civilian Targeting	0.275 (0.459)	− 0.571 (0.668)	− 1.091 (0.755)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	2.212** (1.096)	2.993** (1.308)
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths	0.255 (0.176)	0.255 (0.188)	0.255 (0.186)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Government to Rebel Group Troops	− 0.276** (0.132)	− 0.390*** (0.138)	− 0.572*** (0.183)
Military Intervention on Rebel Group Side	0.664 (0.845)	0.660 (0.824)	1.505 (1.103)
Military Intervention on Government Side	− 0.110 (0.582)	0.012 (0.554)	− 0.184 (0.620)
Per Capita GDP, logged	0.035 (0.267)	0.063 (0.301)	− 0.089 (0.273)
Separatist Conflict	----	----	− 0.341 (0.836)
Multiparty Conflict	----	----	− 0.778 (0.718)
Conflict Duration	----	----	0.007** (0.003)
Non-Western Aid to Rebel Group	----	----	− 0.052 (0.597)
Wald Chi²	19.28***	23.22***	31.06***
Pseudo R²	0.1388	0.1665	0.2100
N	76	76	76

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A4. This reports the results of multinomial logit analyses using the categorical formulation of the dependent variable: *Conflict Outcome.* The multinomial logit coefficients estimate the effect of the independent variables on the log odds of an outcome favorable to the rebel group, and an outcome involving concessions from both sides, relative to the base category, which is an outcome that favors the government. The results of the multinomial logit are similar to the results of the ordered logit. Model 2 shows that in conflicts in which the rebel group exercises restraint but the government commits atrocities, the likelihood of an outcome favoring the rebel group is substantially higher compared with the likelihood of an outcome favoring the government.

Appendix Tables A5 and A6. These tables show the results of analyses testing alternate measures of the primary dependent variable, *Conflict Outcome.* Table A5 tests a dichotomous measure of conflict outcomes. Table A6 test the measure of conflict outcomes constructed by Prorok (2015). The results of these analyses are remarkably similar to the results of the analyses using the main measure, demonstrating the robustness of the findings on conflict outcomes.

The primary measure of *Conflict Outcome* described in the main text captures the degree to which the rebel group was able to achieve a favorable conflict outcome. This variable has three categories, as described above and in the main text: outcome favoring the rebel group (coded as 2), outcome involving concessions from both sides (coded as 1), and outcome favoring the government (coded as 0). The main text treats this variable as an ordinal variable, using an ordered logit model. It is also possible to treat this variable as a categorical variable, using a multinomial logit model as shown in Table A5.

Appendix Table A5. This table uses an alternate, dichotomous measure of conflict outcomes, which captures simply whether the rebel group achieved a favorable conflict outcome or not. This is a more restrictive measure of outcomes favoring the rebel group, coded as 1 if the outcome favored the rebel group and 0 if the outcome favored the government or if the outcome involved concessions from both sides. Using this measure, 33 (42.9 percent) ended with an outcome favoring the rebel group, while the remaining 44 civil wars (57.1 percent) ended with an outcome that did not favor the rebel group.

Appendix Table A6. This table uses an alternate measure of conflict outcomes, constructed by Prorok (2016). Prorok's measure is a seven-point scale, ranging from −3 to +3, with +3 representing the most favorable outcome for the combatant and −3 the least favorable outcome for the combatant. Prorok distinguishes between military victories (coding of +3) and conflicts in which the combatant achieved all of its war aims through a negotiated settlement (coding of +2). Similarly, she distinguishes between military defeats (coding of −3) and conflicts ending through settlement, in which the combatant did not achieve any of its war aims (coding of −2). Because I am interested in the political outcome of the conflict, and do not differentiate between cases in which rebel groups achieved a favorable outcome through military victory versus through agreement, I collapse Prorok's coding scale to combine values of +3 and +2, and values of −3 and −2. This produces a five-point scale, ranging from −2 to +2, with +2 representing the most favorable outcome for the rebel group.

Appendix Table A4: Multinomial Logit Analyses – Conflict Outcome
Alternate Model Specification

| | OUTCOMES – MODEL 1 | | OUTCOMES – MODEL 2 | |
	Outcome with Concessions from Both Sides	Outcome Favorable to Rebel Group	Outcome with Concessions from Both Sides	Outcome Favorable to Rebel Group
Rebel Group Restraint	0.490	1.466**	− 0.501	− 0.231
	(0.678)	(0.647)	(0.803)	(0.978)
Government Restraint	− 0.296	0.352	− 0.854	− 0.981
	(0.678)	(0.707)	(0.785)	(1.000)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	----	1.847	3.319*
			(1.647)	(1.876)
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths	0.017	0.336	0.006	0.326
	(0.266)	(0.268)	(0.285)	(0.284)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Govt to Rebel Troops	− 0.182	− 0.411**	− 0.284	− 0.586***
	(0.184)	(0.197)	(0.207)	(0.220)
Military Intervention on Rebel Group Side	0.196	1.083	0.153	1.112
	(1.499)	(1.142)	(1.519)	(1.100)
Military Intervention on Government Side	0.230	− 0.037	0.336	0.164
	(0.922)	(0.839)	(0.918)	(0.793)
Per Capita GDP, logged	0.533	0.056	0.565	0.016
	(0.419)	(0.393)	(0.422)	(0.415)
Constant	− 3.506	− 2.346	− 3.031	− 0.838
	(3.418)	(2.736)	(3.804)	(3.291)
Wald Chi²	20.12		25.38*	
Pseudo R²	0.1695		0.1945	
N	76		76	

Note: The comparison group is outcome favoring the government.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$,   * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table A5: Binary Logit Analyses – Conflict Outcome
Alternate Measure of Dependent Variable, Binary Coding of Conflict Outcomes

	MODEL 1 Basic Model	MODEL 2 Interaction Term	MODEL 3 Additional Controls
Rebel Group Restraint	1.171** (0.533)	0.127 (0.885)	0.373 (0.926)
Government Civilian Targeting	0.548 (0.565)	− 0.436 (0.839)	− 0.870 (0.827)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	2.139 (1.300)	3.141** (1.485)
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths	0.333 (0.247)	0.324 (0.250)	0.284 (0.240)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Government to Rebel Group Troops	− 0.304** (0.149)	− 0.411*** (0.156)	− 0.741*** (0.248)
Military Intervention on Rebel Group Side	0.930 (1.146)	0.992 (1.086)	2.321 (1.573)
Military Intervention on Government Side	− 0.171 (0.743)	− 0.021 (0.698)	− 0.208 (0.671)
Per Capita GDP, logged	− 0.258 (0.361)	− 0.331 (0.372)	− 0.396 (0.387)
Separatist Conflict	----	----	− 0.461 (0.981)
Multiparty Conflict	----	----	− 0.897 (0.847)
Conflict Duration	----	----	0.010* (0.006)
Non-Western Aid to Rebel Group	----	----	− 0.500 (0.657)
Constant	− 1.071 (2.754)	0.260 (2.972)	1.060 (3.266)
Wald Chi²	14.42**	17.65**	21.30**
Pseudo R²	0.2211	0.2488	0.3207
N	76	76	76

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A6: Ordered Logit Analyses – Conflict Outcome
Alternate Measure of Dependent Variable, Using Data from Prorok (2015)

	MODEL 1 Basic Model	MODEL 2 Interaction Term	MODEL 3 Additional Controls
Rebel Group Restraint	1.217** (0.494)	− 0.012 (0.678)	− 0.053 (0.728)
Government Civilian Targeting	− 0.041 (0.454)	− 1.101* (0.576)	− 1.260** (0.591)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	2.570** (1.263)	2.722** (1.312)
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths	0.291 (0.180)	0.267 (0.200)	0.269 (0.203)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Government to Rebel Group Troops	− 0.292* (0.170)	− 0.472** (0.218)	− 0.457** (0.218)
Military Intervention on Rebel Group Side	1.215* (0.709)	1.174 (0.722)	1.435 (0.897)
Military Intervention on Government Side	− 0.355 (0.605)	− 0.146 (0.653)	− 0.362 (0.602)
Per Capita GDP, logged	− 0.257 (0.278)	− 0.217 (0.292)	− 0.221 (0.295)
Separatist Conflict	----	----	− 0.574 (0.535)
Multiparty Conflict	----	----	− 0.357 (0.471)
Conflict Duration	----	----	0.001 (0.003)
Non-Western Aid to Rebel Group	----	----	0.255 (0.504)
Wald Chi²	33.30***	29.02***	35.24***
Pseudo R²	0.1493	0.1763	0.1838
N	74	74	74

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$,   * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A7. Table A7 tests alternate measures of government and rebel group violence, taken from the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset (Eck and Hultman 2007). The One-Sided Violence Dataset provides annual counts of the number of civilians killed in direct, intentional attacks on civilians by each combatant. I sum these annual counts of civilians killed in one-sided violence, creating measures of the total number of civilians killed in one-sided violence by the government and the total number of civilians killed in one-sided violence by the rebel group. For rebel groups, the total number of civilians killed in one-sided violence ranges from 0 to 35,126; while for governments, the total number of civilians killed in one-sided violence ranges from 0 to 503,581. I add one to these totals and take the natural log.

To test the interactive relationship between government and rebel group violence posited in the paper, I use a measure of the total number of civilians killed in government one-sided violence as a proportion of the total number of civilians killed in one-sided violence by the government and the rebel group. Higher values of this measure thus indicate that the government was responsible for a greater proportion of the total violence directed against civilians in the conflict, and that the rebel group was responsible for a lower proportion of the total violence against civilians. In 24 conflicts, the variable takes a value of 0. The data set does not include any cases in which neither side used one-sided violence, thus all 24 of the cases with a proportional measure of "0" are cases in which the rebel group was responsible for all of the one-sided violence against civilians and the government was not responsible for any one-sided violence against civilians. In 20 conflicts, the variable takes a value of 1, indicating that the government was responsible for all of the one-sided violence against civilians and the rebel group did not use any one-sided violence against civilians.

Consistent with the predictions of the main hypothesis put forth in the paper, the proportional measure of violence is positive and statistically significant in Models 2 and 3, indicating that the likelihood of an outcome favoring the rebel group is higher when the contrast between rebel group and government behavior is stark – in particular, when the rebel group refrains from violence against civilians in the face of government abuses.

Appendix Table A8. Table A8 tests an alternate measure of the relative strength of the belligerents, taken from the Non-State Actor (NSA) Data (Cunningham et al. 2009). The NSA measure of relative strength is five-category scale, ranging from the rebel group is much stronger than the government at one end of the scale to the rebel group is much weaker than the government at the other end of the scale. I construct the measure such that higher values represent weaker rebel groups, in order to facilitate comparison with the measure of relative strength used in the main text. The results of the analyses using the NSA measure of relative strength are similar to the results of the analyses using the measure of relative troop strength described in the text: in all of the models, the relative strength measure is negative and statistically significant, indicating that weaker rebel groups are less likely to achieve favorable conflict outcomes. The results for the primary variables of interest remain robust.

Appendix Table A9. Table A9 tests alternate measures of government capacity, or state capacity. The results reported in the main text use per capita GDP to capture government capacity. Hendrix (2010) argues that in measuring state capacity, the two best alternatives to per capita GDP are measures of bureaucratic quality and total taxes as a proportion of GDP. Unfortunately, data on bureaucratic quality and total taxes as a proportion of GDP are unavailable for many countries. Despite these problems with missing data, I reran the analyses of conflict outcomes, substituting these alternate measures of state capacity. Table A9 shows the results of these analyses. The main

findings are robust to the substitution of these measures of state capacity, but these findings should be interpreted with caution in light of the small sample size.

Appendix Table A10. This table shows the results of analyses incorporating two additional control variables – *Islamic Political Goals* and *Government Alliance with West* – both of which are intended to capture rebel groups that are unlikely to have access to support from Western international actors. *Islamic Political Goals* measures whether the rebel group was fighting to install a more Islamic form of government. Rebel groups fighting to install more Islamic forms of government, such as the GIA in Algeria or the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, are unlikely to seek support from Western international actors. These groups have political goals at odds with the political agenda of Western actors, and also often have ties to transnational Islamic extremist networks. *Government is Western Ally* measures whether the government had a formal alliance with Australia, New Zealand, the United States, or any European democracy while the civil war was ongoing, according to the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Dataset (Leeds et al. 2002). Rebel groups fighting against governments that are allied with the United States or with European governments are unlikely to be able to appeal to Western international actors for support. As the analyses in Table A10 show, including these additional control variables in the model does not alter significantly the results for the main variables of interest capturing government and rebel group behavior toward civilians.

Appendix Table A7: Ordered Logit Analyses – Conflict Outcome
Alternate Measure of Rebel Group Restraint and Government Civilian Targeting,
Using Data from UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset

	MODEL 1 Basic Model	MODEL 2 Proportional Violence Measure	MODEL 3 Additional Controls
Rebel Group One-Sided Violence, Logged	− 0.209*** (0.071)	----	----
Government One-Sided Violence, Logged	0.189*** (0.063)	----	----
Government One-Sided Violence, as Proportion of Total One-Sided Violence	----	1.919*** (0.623)	2.163*** (0.623)
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths	0.275 (0.198)	0.287 (0.196)	0.286 (0.187)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Government to Rebel Group Troops	− 0.307** (0.132)	− 0.303** (0.133)	− 0.436** (0.180)
Military Intervention on Rebel Group Side	0.643 (0.967)	0.697 (0.982)	0.924 (1.045)
Military Intervention on Government Side	− 0.071 (0.537)	− 0.031 (0.561)	− 0.052 (0.618)
Per Capita GDP, logged	− 0.142 (0.312)	− 0.150 (0.313)	− 0.244 (0.313)
Separatist Conflict	----	----	− 0.022 (0.848)
Multiparty Conflict	----	----	− 0.599 (0.661)
Conflict Duration	----	----	0.004* (0.002)
Non-Western Aid to Rebel Group	----	----	− 0.118 (0.577)
Wald Chi²	28.67***	18.99***	29.34***
Pseudo R²	0.1769	0.1605	0.1844
N	75	75	75

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A8: Ordered Logit Analyses – Conflict Outcome
Alternate Measure of Relative Strength of the Belligerents;
Using Data from Cunningham et al. (2009)

	MODEL 1 Basic Model	MODEL 2 Interaction Term	MODEL 3 Additional Controls
Rebel Group Restraint	1.192*** (0.429)	0.295 (0.605)	0.490 (0.616)
Government Civilian Targeting	0.201 (0.466)	− 0.573 (0.739)	− 1.019 (0.755)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	1.954* (1.159)	2.338** (1.175)
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths	0.247 (0.181)	0.257 (0.186)	0.245 (0.168)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Government to Rebel Group Troops	− 0.724** (0.329)	− 0.926** (0.392)	− 1.254** (0.543)
Military Intervention on Rebel Group Side	0.953 (0.835)	1.052 (0.808)	1.878** (0.943)
Military Intervention on Government Side	0.068 (0.532)	0.275 (0.509)	− 0.085 (0.576)
Per Capita GDP, logged	0.028 (0.299)	0.051 (0.345)	− 0.073 (0.298)
Separatist Conflict	----	----	− 0.496 (0.726)
Multiparty Conflict	----	----	− 0.214 (0.687)
Conflict Duration	----	----	0.007** (0.003)
Non-Western Aid to Rebel Group	----	----	0.198 (0.609)
Wald Chi²	16.69**	14.01*	25.16**
Pseudo R²	0.1412	0.1640	0.2039
N	77	77	77

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A9: Ordered Logit Analyses – Conflict Outcome
Alternate Measure of State Capacity;
Using Data on Bureaucratic Quality and Tax Revenues

	BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY INDEX		TAX REVENUE AS % OF GDP	
	MODEL 1 Basic Model	MODEL 2 Interaction Term	MODEL 3 Basic Model	MODEL 4 Interaction Term
Rebel Group Restraint	1.179* (0.681)	− 0.144 (0.822)	1.214* (0.696)	− 2.511* (1.481)
Government Civilian Targeting	0.606 (0.594)	− 0.484 (0.843)	1.043 (0.865)	− 1.636 (1.585)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	2.636* (1.543)	----	7.412*** (2.611)
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths	0.262 (0.309)	0.209 (0.351)	0.243 (0.346)	0.366 (0.512)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Government to Rebel Group Troops	− 0.327* (0.192)	− 0.517** (0.233)	− 0.627** (0.258)	− 1.020*** (0.370)
Military Intervention on Rebel Group Side	0.163 (1.228)	0.521 (1.436)	17.354*** (1.660)	18.820*** (2.244)
Military Intervention on Government Side	− 0.612 (0.804)	− 0.647 (0.844)	− 1.690 (1.611)	− 0.821 (2.362)
Bureaucratic Quality	0.032 (0.309)	0.142 (0.353)	----	----
Tax Revenues as Percent of GDP	----	----	− 4.095 (5.446)	5.151 (7.077)
Wald Chi²	16.03**	13.67*	319.01***	419.83***
Pseudo R²	0.1548	0.1872	0.3443	0.4611
N	42	42	35	35

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01,   ** p < 0.05,   * p < 0.10.

Appendix Table A10: Ordered Logit Analyses – Conflict Outcome
Additional Controls: Islamic Political Goals and Government Alliance with West

	MODEL 1 Control for Islamic Political Goals	MODEL 2 Control for Government Alliance with West	MODEL 3 Both Controls
Rebel Group Restraint	− 0.029 (0.701)	− 0.050 (0.693)	− 0.028 (0.701)
Government Civilian Targeting	− 1.052 (0.785)	− 1.093 (0.756)	− 1.053 (0.787)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	2.911** (1.354)	3.002** (1.318)	2.921** (1.364)
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths	0.261 (0.185)	0.254 (0.188)	0.260 (0.187)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Government to Rebel Group Troops	− 0.568*** (0.182)	− 0.574*** (0.194)	− 0.570*** (0.193)
Military Intervention on Rebel Group Side	1.416 (1.144)	1.497 (1.104)	1.407 (1.142)
Military Intervention on Government Side	− 0.187 (0.615)	− 0.196 (0.638)	− 0.200 (0.631)
Per Capita GDP, logged	− 0.042 (0.291)	− 0.082 (0.272)	− 0.034 (0.286)
Separatist Conflict	− 0.347 (0.826)	− 0.327 (0.865)	− 0.331 (0.861)
Multiparty Conflict	− 0.739 (0.741)	− 0.790 (0.721)	− 0.752 (0.745)
Conflict Duration	0.007** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
Non-Western Aid to Rebel Group	− 0.049 (0.596)	− 0.064 (0.637)	− 0.062 (0.637)
Islamic Political Goals	− 0.214 (0.549)	----	− 0.218 (0.544)
Government Alliance with West	----	− 0.067 (0.538)	− 0.075 (0.542)
Wald Chi²	31.38***	34.41***	36.18***
Pseudo R²	0.2106	0.2101	0.2107
N	76	76	76

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

III. ROBUSTNESS TESTS FOR ANALYSES OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS

Table 4 from the main text is provided here for ease of comparison with the robustness tests.

Table 4: Binary Logit Analyses – International Diplomatic Actions against Government

	SANCTIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT		UN CONDEMNATION OF GOVERNMENT	
	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4
Character of Violence:				
Rebel Group Restraint	1.012**	− 0.403	0.931	− 0.607
	(0.503)	(0.726)	(0.614)	(0.849)
Government Civilian Targeting	2.217***	1.227*	2.749**	1.816*
	(0.678)	(0.696)	(1.066)	(1.101)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	2.579**	----	2.465*
		(1.246)		(1.393)
Conflict Characteristics:				
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths, Logged	0.169	0.199	0.051	0.011
	(0.254)	(0.302)	(0.207)	(0.236)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Govt to Rebel Troops	− 0.198	− 0.298*	− 0.485**	− 0.596**
	(0.171)	(0.179)	(0.221)	(0.245)
Government Characteristics:				
P5 Ally	− 0.490	− 0.691	− 2.238***	− 2.520***
	(0.622)	(0.671)	(0.698)	(0.760)
Per Capita GDP, Logged	0.866**	1.001**	0.789*	0.862*
	(0.372)	(0.397)	(0.462)	(0.487)
Level of Democracy	− 0.073	− 0.066	0.034	0.054
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.070)
Constant	− 9.365**	− 9.645**	− 7.536*	− 6.830*
	(3.873)	(4.356)	(4.099)	(4.075)
Wald Chi²	19.41***	19.75**	22.22***	22.62***
Pseudo R²	0.2792	0.3171	0.3399	0.3679
N	102	102	102	102

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A11. Table A11 tests an alternate measure of the dependent variable measuring sanctions against the government. The measure of sanctions used in the analyses in the main text captures economic sanctions and arms embargoes imposed against the government while the civil war was ongoing. Table A11 uses an alternate measure of sanctions, which includes economic sanctions that were threatened, but not imposed. As in the main text, the source for data on sanctions is the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set (Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 2009; Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014). The findings for the main variables of interest remain consistent using this alternate measure of sanctions.

Appendix Table A11: Binary Logit Analyses – International Diplomatic Actions
Alternate Measure of Sanctions against Government, which includes Threats of Sanctions

	SANCTIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT	
	MODEL 1	MODEL 2
Character of Violence:		
Rebel Group Restraint	0.819*	− 0.357
	(0.495)	(0.705)
Government Civilian Targeting	2.343***	1.532**
	(0.644)	(0.666)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	2.124*
		(1.171)
Conflict Characteristics:		
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths, Logged	0.146	0.167
	(0.249)	(0.281)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Govt to Rebel Troops	− 0.211	− 0.293*
	(0.167)	(0.174)
Government Characteristics:		
P5 Ally	− 0.469	− 0.626
	(0.613)	(0.644)
Per Capita GDP, Logged	0.764**	0.855**
	(0.343)	(0.356)
Level of Democracy	− 0.060	− 0.054
	(0.060)	(0.062)
Constant	− 8.243**	− 8.297**
	(3.617)	(3.966)
Wald Chi²	21.58***	21.68***
Pseudo R²	0.2758	0.3024
N	102	102

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;
        *** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$,   * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A12. Table A12 shows the results of analyses of sanctions and UN condemnation, dropping Russia and the United Kingdom from the analyses. Russia and the United Kingdom, both of which are permanent members of the UN Security Council, experienced civil wars between 1989 and 2010. Because these governments have the power to veto UN Security Council resolutions, it is unlikely that the UN would take diplomatic action against these governments, even if Russia or the United Kingdom were to engage in high levels of violence against civilians when fighting against a restrained rebel group. Although other Western intergovernmental organizations such as NATO or the European Union might take diplomatic action against these governments, the posited link between belligerent behavior and international diplomatic intervention might be weaker in these cases.

For this reason, one would expect the relationship between belligerent behavior and international diplomatic action to be even stronger when these cases are dropped from the analyses. Table A12 replicates the analyses in Table 4 from the main text, but drop the conflicts involving Russia and the United Kingdom. Consistent with expectations, the *Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting* coefficient is even larger in these analyses than in the analyses in the main text, and remains positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Appendix Table A13. This table shows the results of analyses of sanctions and UN condemnation, for conflicts that took place prior to 1998 as compared with conflicts that began or were ongoing after July 1998. With the signing of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in July 1998, international actors strengthened international humanitarian law by laying out precise standards of behavior during wartime and by establishing a permanent court to hold individuals accountable for violations of these standards. One could argue that this was an expression of the growing strength of international humanitarian norms. Rebel groups should thus have even greater opportunity to use restraint as a means of appealing to Western international actors for support. The relationship between belligerent behavior and civil war outcomes should thus be even stronger after the negotiation of the Rome Statute.

Appendix Table A13 shows the results of analyses of international diplomatic activity – sanctions and UN condemnation – by time period. Stratifying the data in this way reduces the number of observations considerably – particularly for the pre-1998 period – so results must be interpreted with caution. But the analyses do suggest that – as the theoretical argument would predict – the relationship between belligerent behavior and the likelihood of international diplomatic activity is stronger in post-1998 conflicts as compared with conflicts that took place prior to 1998. The findings indicate that after July 1998, Western international actors were more likely to take coercive diplomatic action against governments committing atrocities in conflicts in which the rebel group exercised restraint. In contrast, prior to 1998, belligerent behavior is not as strongly tied to the likelihood of international coercive diplomatic action against the government.

Appendix Table A14. This table shows the results of analyses of sanctions and UN condemnation, controlling for conflicts involving multiple rebel groups fighting for similar political objectives (multiparty conflicts). Including this control does not alter significantly the results of the analyses of sanctions against the government (Models 1 and 2). The *Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting* coefficient remains positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In addition, the coefficient for *Multiparty Conflict* is not statistically significant, indicating that Western governments and intergovernmental organizations are not any more (or less) likely to impose sanctions against governments fighting against multiple rebel groups. In the analyses of UN condemnation, the *Rebel*

Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting coefficient drops below standard levels of statistical significance (Model 4), but the coefficient remains positive and substantively large. In Models 3 and 4, the coefficient for *Multiparty Conflict* does not reach standard levels of statistical significance, but it is positive, suggesting that the UN may be more likely to take action against governments in more complex, multiparty conflicts.

Appendix Table A12: Binary Logit Analyses – International Diplomatic Actions
Dropping Permanent Members of UN Security Council from Analysis
(Russia and United Kingdom)

	SANCTIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT		UN CONDEMNATION OF GOVERNMENT	
	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4
Character of Violence:				
Rebel Group Restraint	1.125**	− 0.512	0.955	− 0.609
	(0.545)	(0.741)	(0.627)	(0.820)
Government Civilian Targeting	2.486***	1.332*	2.774***	1.809*
	(0.731)	(0.710)	(1.066)	(1.093)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	3.203**	----	2.544*
		(1.410)		(1.405)
Conflict Characteristics:				
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths, Logged	0.421**	0.521*	0.152	0.133
	(0.209)	(0.271)	(0.235)	(0.264)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Govt to Rebel Troops	− 0.055	− 0.152	− 0.426**	− 0.533**
	(0.159)	(0.177)	(0.210)	(0.228)
Government Characteristics:				
P5 Ally	− 0.424	− 0.718	− 2.177***	− 2.472***
	(0.673)	(0.783)	(0.696)	(0.762)
Per Capita GDP, Logged	1.073***	1.277***	0.810*	0.892*
	(0.375)	(0.403)	(0.456)	(0.491)
Level of Democracy	− 0.068	− 0.057	0.043	0.065
	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.072)
Constant	− 13.200***	− 14.385***	− 8.539*	− 8.024*
	(3.739)	(4.204)	(4.458)	(4.589)
Wald Chi²	19.23***	17.79**	22.87***	22.29***
Pseudo R²	0.3233	0.3749	0.3394	0.3698
N	98	98	98	98

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;
       *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A13: Binary Logit Analyses – International Diplomatic Actions
Comparing Pre- and Post-1998 Conflicts

	SANCTIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT		UN CONDEMNATION OF GOVERNMENT	
	MODEL 1 Pre-July 1998 Conflicts	MODEL 2 Post-July 1998 Conflicts	MODEL 3 Pre-July 1998 Conflicts	MODEL 4 Post-July 1998 Conflicts
Character of Violence:				
Rebel Group Restraint	− 2.768 (2.363)	0.493 (0.890)	− 0.767 (1.326)	0.140 (0.577)
Government Civilian Targeting	− 0.333 (2.446)	1.710* (0.903)	2.730 (2.456)	2.323 (1.445)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	3.205 (3.313)	5.325 (3.428)	1.269 (2.520)	4.171** (1.799)
Conflict Characteristics:				
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths, Logged	0.388 (0.282)	− 0.0004 (0.344)	0.366 (0.360)	− 0.324 (0.353)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Govt to Rebel Troops	− 0.436 (0.377)	− 0.418 (0.294)	− 0.967** (0.477)	− 0.664** (0.264)
Government Characteristics:				
P5 Ally	− 0.818 (1.355)	− 2.541* (1.349)	− 1.963* (1.145)	− 4.409*** (0.854)
Per Capita GDP, Logged	0.917* (0.480)	1.788* (1.018)	1.540 (1.064)	1.057 (0.761)
Level of Democracy	− 0.167 (0.103)	− 0.020 (0.103)	− 0.0005 (0.154)	0.068 (0.091)
Constant	− 8.464 (5.716)	− 14.496* (8.065)	− 15.026* (8.660)	− 6.107 (6.330)
Wald Chi²	13.02	9.12	16.42**	40.72***
Pseudo R²	0.3298	0.4696	0.4602	0.4452
N	39	63	39	63

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$,   * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A14: Binary Logit Analyses – International Diplomatic Actions
Controlling for Multiparty Conflicts

	SANCTIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT		UN CONDEMNATION OF GOVERNMENT	
	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4
Character of Violence:				
Rebel Group Restraint	1.014**	− 0.406	0.811	− 0.490
	(0.503)	(0.732)	(0.606)	(0.866)
Government Civilian Targeting	2.217***	1.206*	2.832***	1.999*
	(0.678)	(0.718)	(1.092)	(1.180)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	2.619**	----	2.123
		(1.273)		(1.451)
Conflict Characteristics:				
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths, Logged	0.169	0.199	0.103	0.065
	(0.255)	(0.306)	(0.216)	(0.236)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Govt to Rebel Troops	− 0.198	− 0.303*	− 0.487**	− 0.582**
	(0.168)	(0.175)	(0.243)	(0.269)
Multiparty Conflict	− 0.023	− 0.164	0.989	0.834
	(0.592)	(0.621)	(0.648)	(0.653)
Government Characteristics:				
P5 Ally	− 0.495	− 0.733	− 2.214***	− 2.446***
	(0.605)	(0.639)	(0.736)	(0.800)
Per Capita GDP, Logged	0.865**	1.000**	0.816*	0.886*
	(0.372)	(0.397)	(0.472)	(0.502)
Level of Democracy	− 0.073	− 0.065	0.034	0.049
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.074)	(0.077)
Constant	− 9.347**	− 9.514**	− 8.717**	− 8.018**
	(3.897)	(4.437)	(3.935)	(3.921)
Wald Chi²	21.36***	22.82***	21.09***	21.15**
Pseudo R²	0.2792	0.3178	0.3631	0.3833
N	102	102	102	102

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;
         *** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$,   * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Tables A15 and A16. These tables further probe the causal mechanism linking belligerent behavior to conflict outcomes.

Appendix Table A15. This table shows the results of analyses of Western government and intergovernmental organization mediation in civil wars. The main argument in the paper posits that when the government targets civilians, but the rebel group exercises restraint, international actors should intervene diplomatically against the government and in favor of the rebel group, leading to political outcomes favoring the rebels. The analyses of international diplomatic action against the government provide support for this argument.

However, international actors intervene diplomatically in civil wars for a variety of reasons, and not all forms of intervention are likely to be associated with belligerent behavior. For example, international actors often serve as mediators during negotiations without pressing for specific terms of settlement. Thus, international diplomatic intervention *in general* should not be associated with belligerent behavior. To test this extension of the theoretical argument, I use data on Western international mediation in civil wars from two different sources: Svensson (2007) and the Civil War Mediation Dataset collected by DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna (2011). As expected, these analyses do not show a strong relationship between belligerent behavior and the likelihood of mediation by Western international actors.

Appendix Table A16. This table shows the results of analyses of conflict outcomes, with measures capturing international diplomatic actions against the government incorporated as independent variables in the model. The main argument in the paper posits that when the government targets civilians, but the rebel group exercises restraint, international actors should intervene diplomatically against the government and in favor of the rebel group, leading to political outcomes favoring the rebels. The results of analyses of civil war outcomes (Table 2 in the main text) provide support for this argument, showing that belligerent behavior – in particular, government violence and rebel group restraint – is associated with an increased likelihood of an outcome favoring the rebel group. Analyses of international diplomatic action against the government (Table 4 in the main text) provide support for the posited causal mechanism, showing that the likelihood of international diplomatic intervention is higher in conflicts involving government violence and rebel group restraint. However, these analyses do not directly link international diplomatic actions against the government to conflict outcomes.

Appendix Table A16 extends the analysis in the main text and further probes this posited causal mechanism, by examining the relationship between international diplomatic actions against the government (independent variable) to conflict outcomes (dependent variable). Consistent with expectations, international diplomatic actions against the government are associated with an increased likelihood of an outcome favoring the rebel group. These results are particularly strong when using the combined measure, capturing cases in which Western international actors imposed either economic sanctions, arms embargoes, and/or publicly condemned the government.

Appendix Table A15: Binary Logit Analyses – Western Mediation in Civil Wars

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2
Character of Violence:		
Rebel Group Restraint	0.053	0.134
	(0.484)	(0.663)
Government Civilian Targeting	0.270	0.332
	(0.518)	(0.643)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	----	− 0.154
		(1.036)
Conflict Characteristics:		
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths, Logged	0.336*	0.337*
	(0.203)	(0.202)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Govt to Rebel Troops	− 0.438**	− 0.432**
	(0.171)	(0.171)
Government Characteristics:		
P5 Ally	0.556	0.561
	(0.560)	(0.570)
Per Capita GDP, Logged	0.268	0.267
	(0.272)	(0.270)
Level of Democracy	− 0.023	− 0.024
	(0.055)	(0.056)
Constant	− 3.432	− 3.477
	(2.933)	(2.911)
Wald Chi²	24.32***	24.11***
Pseudo R²	0.2066	0.2068
N	102	102

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A16: Ordered Logit Analyses – Conflict Outcome
International Diplomatic Actions Incorporated as Independent Variables

	MODEL 1 Sanctions	MODEL 2 Condemnation	MODEL 3 Sanctions and/or Condemnation
Rebel Group Restraint	0.040 (0.693)	0.103 (0.719)	0.135 (0.708)
Government Civilian Targeting	− 0.842 (0.706)	− 0.731 (0.659)	− 0.857 (0.654)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	1.641 (1.133)	2.004* (1.150)	1.757 (1.113)
Sanctions against the Government	1.509*** (0.480)	----	----
UN Condemnation of the Government	----	0.886 (0.678)	----
Sanctions and/or Condemnation of the Government	----	----	1.407*** (0.517)
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths	0.230 (0.183)	0.255 (0.187)	0.240 (0.187)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Government to Rebel Group Troops	− 0.355** (0.141)	− 0.345** (0.145)	− 0.347*** (0.131)
Military Intervention on Rebel Group Side	0.279 (0.844)	0.409 (0.847)	0.396 (0.834)
Military Intervention on Government Side	0.072 (0.570)	0.159 (0.531)	0.220 (0.518)
Per Capita GDP, logged	− 0.056 (0.295)	0.034 (0.296)	0.028 (0.271)
Wald Chi²	24.78***	23.03***	22.67***
Pseudo R²	0.2100	0.1789	0.2084
N	76	76	76

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

IV.   ANALYSES EXAMINING FORMS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS

Appendix Tables A17, A18, and A19. These tables differentiate between types of government violence against civilians. The measure of *Government Civilian Targeting* used in the main analyses in the paper indicates whether the government used any of the following four forms of violence against civilians: massacres, scorched earth strategies, bombing or shelling of populated civilian targets, or cleansing of civilians from territory. For a detailed discussion of the coding of government civilian targeting, as well as different forms of government violence against civilians, see Stanton (2016).

Appendix Tables A14-A16 examine each of these forms of government violence against civilians separately, in order to assess whether international responses to civil war violence vary depending on the type of violence used. Perhaps it is the case that international actors find some forms of government violence against civilians more unacceptable than others.

Appendix Table A17. This table analyzes the relationship between these different forms of government violence against civilians and civil war outcomes. Apart from using different measures of government violence against civilians, these analyses replicate the analyses shown in Table 2, Model 3 (with all of the control variables included). The results shown in Appendix Table A17 suggest that Western international actors respond most forcefully to government violence involving massacres of civilians or scorched earth strategies – the burning and destruction of civilian homes and crops – helping rebel groups in these conflicts to secure favorable conflict outcomes. The positive interaction term in Model 1 indicates that the likelihood of an outcome favoring the rebel group is higher in conflicts involving rebel group restraint and government massacres, as compared with other conflicts. Similarly, the positive interaction term in Model 2 indicates that the likelihood of an outcome favoring the rebel group is higher in conflicts involving rebel group restraint and government scorched earth strategies, as compared with other conflicts. However, the interaction between rebel group restraint and government violence is not as strongly tied to civil war outcomes when the government engages in bombing or shelling of civilian targets or cleansing of territory.

Appendix Tables A18 and A19. These tables analyze the relationship between different forms of government violence against civilians and international diplomatic actions against the government. Table A18 shows the results of analyses of sanctions against the government, while Table A19 shows the results of analyses of UN condemnation of the government. These analyses are consistent with the findings on civil war outcomes, showing that the forms of government violence most likely to prompt international diplomatic action are massacres of civilians and the burning or destruction of civilian homes and crops (scorched earth strategies). In these conflicts, when the rebel group exercises restraint, but the government commits massacres or uses scorched earth strategies, international actors are more likely to impose economic sanctions or arms embargoes against the government and more likely to publicly condemn the government through a UN Security Council resolution. The analyses of UN condemnation show that international actors are also likely to condemn government bombing or shelling of civilian targets; however, this type of violence is not as strongly linked to the likelihood of sanctions.

Appendix Table A17: Ordered Logit Analyses – Conflict Outcome
Forms of Government Violence against Civilians

	MODEL 1 Government Civilian Targeting = Massacres of Civilians	MODEL 2 Government Civilian Targeting = Scorched Earth Strategies	MODEL 3 Government Civilian Targeting = Bombing or Shelling of Civilians	MODEL 4 Government Civilian Targeting = Cleansing
Rebel Group Restraint	0.818 (0.509)	0.289 (0.609)	1.071** (0.524)	1.246** (0.482)
Government Civilian Targeting	− 0.261 (0.916)	− 0.437 (0.753)	− 0.519 (1.278)	0.200 (1.360)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	2.118* (1.103)	2.272* (1.187)	1.408 (1.516)	0.470 (1.712)
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths	0.196 (0.198)	0.251 (0.180)	0.226 (0.194)	0.259 (0.174)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Government to Rebel Group Troops	− 0.450*** (0.166)	− 0.526*** (0.172)	− 0.406** (0.171)	− 0.374** (0.172)
Military Intervention on Rebel Group Side	1.146 (1.044)	1.298 (1.075)	1.350 (1.002)	1.174 (1.139)
Military Intervention on Government Side	− 0.191 (0.596)	− 0.069 (0.657)	− 0.292 (0.584)	− 0.290 (0.613)
Per Capita GDP, logged	− 0.058 (0.273)	− 0.061 (0.252)	− 0.072 (0.259)	− 0.108 (0.270)
Separatist Conflict	− 0.295 (0.831)	− 0.320 (0.831)	− 0.304 (0.850)	− 0.229 (0.784)
Multiparty Conflict	− 0.545 (0.666)	− 0.748 (0.720)	− 0.547 (0.646)	− 0.526 (0.718)
Conflict Duration	0.005 (0.003)	0.006 (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.005** (0.003)
Non-Western Aid to Rebel Group	0.011 (0.631)	− 0.053 (0.585)	0.057 (0.611)	0.053 (0.605)
Wald Chi²	55.27***	36.52***	32.83***	37.78***
Pseudo R²	0.1888	0.1966	0.1735	0.1687
N	76	76	76	76

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A18:
Binary Logit Analyses – International Diplomatic Actions (Sanctions against Government)
Forms of Government Violence against Civilians

	SANCTIONS AGAINST GOVERNMENT			
	MODEL 1 Government Civilian Targeting = Massacres of Civilians	MODEL 2 Government Civilian Targeting = Scorched Earth Strategies	MODEL 3 Government Civilian Targeting = Bombing or Shelling of Civilians	MODEL 4 Government Civilian Targeting = Cleansing
Character of Violence:				
Rebel Group Restraint	0.008	− 0.666	0.230	0.870*
	(0.582)	(0.711)	(0.520)	(0.460)
Government Civilian Targeting	− 0.284	0.886	0.723	2.694**
	(0.674)	(0.546)	(0.699)	(1.226)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	2.806**	2.926**	1.841	− 1.115
	(1.360)	(1.193)	(1.375)	(1.802)
Conflict Characteristics:				
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths, Logged	0.071	0.206	0.067	0.103
	(0.217)	(0.307)	(0.255)	(0.237)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Govt to Rebel Troops	− 0.227	− 0.298*	− 0.227	− 0.072
	(0.181)	(0.177)	(0.189)	(0.170)
Government Characteristics:				
P5 Ally	− 0.366	− 0.698	− 0.494	0.146
	(0.733)	(0.659)	(0.619)	(0.639)
Per Capita GDP, Logged	0.723*	0.983**	0.669	0.677
	(0.412)	(0.402)	(0.418)	(0.417)
Level of Democracy	− 0.066	− 0.058	− 0.072	− 0.078
	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.060)
Constant	− 6.104*	− 9.271**	− 5.775	− 6.977*
	(3.350)	(4.284)	(3.917)	(3.556)
Wald Chi²	18.50**	21.06***	16.79**	22.23***
Pseudo R²	0.2060	0.3053	0.2096	0.2017
N	102	102	102	102

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$,   * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A19:
Binary Logit Analyses – International Diplomatic Actions
(UN Condemnation of the Government)
Forms of Government Violence against Civilians

	UN CONDEMNATION OF GOVERNMENT			
	MODEL 1 Government Massacres of Civilians	MODEL 2 Government Scorched Earth Strategies	MODEL 3 Government Bombing or Shelling of Civilians	MODEL 4 Government Cleansing
Character of Violence:				
Rebel Group Restraint	− 0.434	− 0.782	− 0.137	0.172
	(0.621)	(0.896)	(0.606)	(0.574)
Government Civilian Targeting	0.834	1.894*	0.048	1.588
	(0.989)	(1.003)	(0.634)	(1.187)
Rebel Group Restraint * Government Civilian Targeting	2.638*	2.505*	2.161*	1.663
	(1.515)	(1.384)	(1.191)	(1.764)
Conflict Characteristics:				
Conflict Intensity – Average Annual Battle Deaths, Logged	− 0.102	0.080	− 0.050	0.017
	(0.226)	(0.249)	(0.215)	(0.231)
Relative Strength – Ratio of Govt to Rebel Troops	− 0.537***	− 0.578**	− 0.426*	− 0.332
	(0.194)	(0.242)	(0.246)	(0.232)
Government Characteristics:				
P5 Ally	− 2.108**	− 2.651***	− 1.919**	− 1.331
	(1.005)	(0.778)	(0.782)	(0.842)
Per Capita GDP, Logged	0.812	0.794	0.644	0.495
	(0.521)	(0.483)	(0.479)	(0.494)
Level of Democracy	0.052	0.081	0.014	0.049
	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Constant	− 4.968	− 6.641*	− 4.121	− 4.068
	(4.515)	(3.889)	(4.187)	(4.866)
Wald Chi²	12.18	22.82***	13.47*	21.89***
Pseudo R²	0.2900	0.3723	0.2209	0.2700
N	102	102	102	102

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** $p < 0.01$,   ** $p < 0.05$,   * $p < 0.10$.

Appendix Table A20: List of Cases and Coding of Key Variables

Government	Rebel Group	Start	End	Outcome	Government Civilian Targeting	Rebel Group Restraint	Sanctions against Government	UN Condemnation of Government	Military Intervention
Afghanistan (Najibullah gov't)	Mujahideen	1978	1992	Favors Rebels		X			backing government
Afghanistan (Rabbani gov't)	Taliban	1994	1996	Favors Rebels		X			
Afghanistan (Taliban gov't)	Northern Alliance	1996	2001	Favors Rebels	X	X	X	X	backing rebels
Afghanistan (Karzai gov't)	Taliban	2003	---						backing government
Algeria	AIS/FIS	1992	1997	Favors Government		X			
Algeria	GIA	1992	2006	Favors Government					
Algeria	GSPC, AQIM	1998	---						backing government
Angola	UNITA	1975	2002	Concessions from Both Sides	X				backing both sides
Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh	1992	1994	Favors Rebels			X	X	backing rebels
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hills/ Shanti Bahini	1975	1997	Favors Rebels	X				
Bosnia	Croat Republic/ HVO	1992	1994	Concessions from Both Sides	X		X	X	backing rebels
Bosnia	Serb Republic/ BSA	1992	1995	Concessions from Both Sides	X		X	X	backing rebels
Burma	Karens/KNU	1948	---		X	X	X		
Burma	Shan/SSA	1959	---		X	X	X		
Burma	Kachins/KIO	1961	1992	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
Burma	Karenni/KNPP	1992	2005	Concessions from Both Sides	X	X	X		

Appendix Table A20: List of Cases and Coding of Key Variables

Government	Rebel Group	Start	End	Outcome	Government Civilian Targeting	Rebel Group Restraint	Sanctions against Government	UN Condemnation of Government	Military Intervention
Burundi	CNDD, CNDD-FDD	1994	2003	Favors Rebels	X			X	
Burundi	Palipehutu	1997	---	Concessions from Both Sides	X			X	
Cambodia (Hun Sen gov't)	FUNCINPEC	1978	1991	Favors Rebels		X	X		backing government
Cambodia (Hun Sen gov't)	KPNLF	1978	1991	Favors Rebels		X	X		backing government
Cambodia (Hun Sen gov't)	Khmer Rouge	1978	1993	Concessions from Both Sides			X		backing government
Cambodia (coalition gov't)	Khmer Rouge	1993	1998	Favors Government					
Chad	MPS	1982	1990	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
Chad	MDD	1991	1997	Concessions from Both Sides	X	X			
Chad	MDJT	1999	2005	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
Chad	FUCD	2005	2006	Concessions from Both Sides					
Colombia	EPL	1965	1989	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
Colombia	ELN	1965	---		X	X			
Colombia	FARC	1965	---		X				
Congo-Brazzaville	Cobras	1997	1997	Favors Rebels		X			backing both sides
Congo-Brazzaville	Cocoyes	1997	1999	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
Congo-Kinshasa	AFDL	1996	1997	Favors Rebels	X		X		backing rebels
Congo-Kinshasa	RCD, RCD-ML	1998	2001	Favors Rebels			X	X	backing both sides
Congo-Kinshasa	MLC	1998	2001	Favors Rebels		X	X	X	backing both sides

Appendix Table A20: List of Cases and Coding of Key Variables

Government	Rebel Group	Start	End	Outcome	Government Civilian Targeting	Rebel Group Restraint	Sanctions against Government	UN Condemnation of Government	Military Intervention
Congo-Kinshasa	CNDP	2006	2008	Concessions from Both Sides				X	
Cote D'Ivoire	MPCI, MPIGO, MJP, FN	2002	2004	Favors Rebels	X	X	X	X	
Croatia	Serbian Republic of Krajina	1992	1995	Favors Government	X		X	X	backing rebels
Djibouti	FRUD	1991	1994	Concessions from Both Sides		X			
Egypt	al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya	1993	1998	Favors Government	X				
El Salvador	FMLN	1979	1991	Favors Rebels		X			
Ethiopia	Eritrea	1972	1991	Favors Rebels	X	X	X		
Ethiopia	TPLF	1976	1991	Favors Rebels	X	X	X		
Ethiopia	Oromo/OLF	1992	---			X			
Ethiopia	Ogaden/ONLF	1994	---		X	X			
Georgia	Abkhazia	1992	1994	Favors Rebels					backing rebels
Georgia	Ossetia	1992	1994	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
Guatemala	URNG	1966	1995	Favors Rebels			X		
Guinea	RFDG	2000	2001	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
Guinea Bissau	Military faction	1998	1999	Favors Rebels		X			backing government
India	Manipur/PLA	1982	2007	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
India	Sikhs	1983	1993	Favors Government					
India	Kashmir	1989	---		X				
India	Assam/ULFA	1990	---	Favors Government					

Appendix Table A20: List of Cases and Coding of Key Variables

Government	Rebel Group	Start	End	Outcome	Government Civilian Targeting	Rebel Group Restraint	Sanctions against Government	UN Condemnation of Government	Military Intervention
India	Naxalites	1990	---			X			
India	Tripura/ATTF	1992	1999	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
India	Nagaland/NSCN	1992	2000	Concessions from Both Sides					
India	Manipur/UNLF	1993	2009	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
India	Bodoland/NDFB	1993	2010	Favors Government					
India	Tripura/NLFT	1995	2006	Favors Government					
Indonesia	East Timor/ Fretilin	1975	1999	Favors Rebels	X	X	X	X	
Indonesia	Aceh/GAM	1989	2005	Concessions from Both Sides	X	X	X		
Iran	KDPI	1979	1996	Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
Iraq	Kurds/KDP	1961	1991	Favors Rebels	X	X	X	X	
Iraq	Kurds/PUK	1976	1996	Favors Rebels	X	X	X	X	
Iraq	Shiites/SCIRI	1991	1996	Favors Government	X	X	X	X	
Iraq	Al-Mahdi Army	2004	2008	Concessions from Both Sides					
Iraq	Ansar al-Islam	2004	----						backing government
Iraq	ISI	2004	---						backing government
Israel	Fatah	1965	---	Concessions from Both Sides	X		X	X	
Israel	Hamas	1993	----		X		X	X	
Israel	PIJ	1995	----		X		X	X	

Appendix Table A20: List of Cases and Coding of Key Variables

Government	Rebel Group	Start	End	Outcome	Government Civilian Targeting	Rebel Group Restraint	Sanctions against Government	UN Condemnation of Government	Military Intervention
Israel	Hezbollah	1990	2006	Concessions from Both Sides	X		X		
Lebanon	Multiple factions			Insufficient information on violence; coded as missing					
Liberia	NPFL	1989	1995	Favors Rebels	X		X	X	
Liberia	INPFL	1990	1992	Favors Government	X	X	X		
Liberia	LURD	2000	2003	Favors Rebels	X	X	X	X	
Moldova	Dniester Republic	1992	1992	Favors Rebels		X			
Morocco	Western Sahara/ Polisario	1975	1989	Concessions from Both Sides		X			
Mozambique	RENAMO	1976	1992	Favors Rebels	X				backing government
Nepal	CPN-M, UPF	1996	2006	Favors Rebels		X			
Nicaragua	Contras	1981	1990	Concessions from Both Sides		X	X		
Pakistan	Baluchistan/BLA	2004	----			X			
Pakistan	TTP	2007	----						
Peru	Sendero Luminoso	1981	2000	Favors Government	X				
Philippines	MNLF	1972	1993	Concessions from Both Sides					
Philippines	CPP/NPA	1972	----		X				
Philippines	MILF	1990	----						
Philippines	ASG	1993	----						
Russia	Chechnya	1994	1996	Concessions from Both Sides	X	X			

Appendix Table A20: List of Cases and Coding of Key Variables

Government	Rebel Group	Start	End	Outcome	Government Civilian Targeting	Rebel Group Restraint	Sanctions against Government	UN Condemnation of Government	Military Intervention
Russia	Chechnya	1999	2007	Concessions from Both Sides	X				
Russia	Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	2007	----						
Rwanda	RPF	1990	1994	Favors Rebels	X		X	X	backing government
Rwanda	Former FAR, interahamwe	1997	2004	Favors Government	X				backing government
Senegal	Casamance/ MFDC	1990	2003	Favors Government	X				
Sierra Leone	RUF	1991	2000	Concessions from Both Sides					backing government
Somalia	SNM	1981	1991	Favors Rebels	X	X			
Somalia	USC faction led by Aideed	1991	2002	Concessions from Both Sides			X		
Somalia	ARS/UIC	2006	----	Concessions from Both Sides		X			backing government
Somalia	Al-Shabaab	2008	----						backing government
South Africa	ANC	1976	1994	Favors Rebels	X	X	X	X	
Sri Lanka	LTTE	1983	2009	Favors Government	X				backing government
Sri Lanka	JVP	1987	1990	Favors Government		X			
Sudan	SPLA	1983	2004	Favors Rebels	X		X		
Sudan	Darfur/JEM	2003	----		X	X	X	X	backing government
Sudan	Darfur/SLA	2003	----		X	X	X	X	backing government

Appendix Table A20: List of Cases and Coding of Key Variables

Government	Rebel Group	Start	End	Outcome	Government Civilian Targeting	Rebel Group Restraint	Sanctions against Government	UN Condemnation of Government	Military Intervention
Tajikistan	UTO	1992	1998	Concessions from Both Sides		X			
Thailand	Patani insurgents	2003	----						
Turkey	Kurds/PKK	1984	----		X		X		
Uganda	UPA	1987	1991	Favors Government	X				
Uganda	LRA	1987	----	Favors Government	X				backing government
Uganda	ADF	1996	----						backing rebels
United Kingdom	PIRA	1970	1999	Concessions from Both Sides					
Yemen	South Yemen	1994	1994	Favors Government		X		X	
Yugoslavia	Croatia	1991	1991	Favors Rebels	X	X	X	X	
Yugoslavia	Kosovo/KLA	1998	1999	Favors Rebels	X		X	X	backing rebels

Appendix Table A21: Conflicts Involving Rebel Group Restraint and Government Violence

Government	Rebels	Rebel Group Restraint?	Government Targeting of Civilians?	Sanctions Against Government?	UN Condemnation of Government?	Outcome
Afghanistan	Northern Alliance	Y	Y	Y	Y	Favors Rebels
Burma	KNPP	Y	Y	Y	N	Concessions from Both Sides
Chad	*MDD*	*Y*	*Y*	*N*	*N*	*Concessions from Both Sides*
Cote D'Ivoire	MPCI	Y	Y	Y	Y	Favors Rebels
Ethiopia	Eritrea	Y	Y	Y	N	Favors Rebels
Ethiopia	TPLF and others	Y	Y	Y	N	Favors Rebels
Indonesia	East Timor	Y	Y	Y	Y	Favors Rebels
Indonesia	Aceh	Y	Y	Y	N	Concessions from Both Sides
Iraq	KDP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Favors Rebels
Iraq	PUK	Y	Y	Y	Y	Favors Rebels
Iraq	Shiites	Y	Y	Y	Y	Favors Government
Liberia	INPFL	Y	Y	Y	N	Favors Government
Liberia	LURD	Y	Y	Y	Y	Favors Rebels
Russia	*Chechnya*	*Y*	*Y*	*N*	*N*	*Concessions from Both Sides*
Somalia	*SNM*	*Y*	*Y*	*N*	*N*	*Favors Rebels*
South Africa	ANC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Favors Rebels
Yugoslavia	Croatia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Favors Rebels

Appendix Table A21. Of the 17 terminated conflicts in which the government targeted civilians and the rebel group used restraint, 11 cases ended with a political outcome favoring the rebels and an additional four cases ended with a political outcome involving concessions from both sides (what many would consider partial victory for the rebels). In only two cases did the government secure a

favorable outcome to the conflict, and in both of these cases, a longer term view of the conflict shows that the government did ultimately lose ground to the political opposition (including former rebels) under pressure from international actors.

For example, the 1990s conflict between the Iraqi government and the Shiite armed opposition is coded as ending with an outcome favoring the government because Saddam Hussein's government did not allow for Shiite participation in government at the time the conflict ended in 1996. However, in 2003 when the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein's government, the Shiites – including many who had been involved in the 1990s conflict – secured key positions of power in the Iraqi government. Similarly, in the conflict between the Liberian government and the INPFL, the outcome is coded as favoring the government because the INPFL demobilized in 1992 and did not achieve any of its political objectives. However, the leader of the INPFL later returned to Liberia following the internationally mediated resolution to Liberia's 2000-2003 conflict; he has since participated in Liberian politics at a high level, including securing election to Liberia's Senate and running for president in 2011.

In addition, in the 17 terminated conflicts in which the government targeted civilians and the rebel group exercised restraint, all but three conflicts involved international diplomatic pressure against the government in the form of sanctions or formal UN condemnation of government behavior. Not surprisingly, international actors did not take diplomatic action against the Russian government during the conflict in Chechnya in the mid-1990s, even though the Chechen rebels did exercise restraint toward civilians while the Russian government engaged in extensive bombardment of civilian targets in Grozny and elsewhere. Russia's veto power on the UN Security Council would have allowed it to block any UN-authorized sanctions or arms embargoes, as well as any formal UN condemnation. The other two conflicts without diplomatic against the government – Chad and Somalia – are likely related to protection from powerful international actors. The Chadian regime under Idriss Déby received strong backing from France, while Siad Barre's regime in Somalia maintained close ties to the United States.

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