Supporting Information for "Political Side-taking by Outside Powers and Mass Attitudes Towards International Economic Engagement," *International Organization*

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Contents

1 Economic statistics for Tunisia and the United States

	Tunisia	United States
GDP per capita	$4,261	$54,306
Economy: % Agriculture	15	1
Economy: % Industry	29	20
Economy: % Services	62	78
Unemployment Rate	15	6
Human Capital Country Ranking	101	24

Table 1: **Economic Statistics for Tunisia and the United States, 2014-2015**. Notes: Data are from United Nations (2016) and World Economic Forum (2016).

2 Sample composition

Readers may be interested in how representative the samples of the surveys are.[1] For both Tunisia and the United States, we compare the sample of our surveys to the national population on several dimensions. We use available annual data from the *CIA World Factbook*, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and other sources. Our comparisons focus on the sample in the second wave of the surveys (i.e., the respondents who completed both waves of the panel surveys).

2.1 Tunisia, 2014

In Tunisia, our survey partner was ELKA Consulting, a Tunisian survey firm. The Tunisia survey was designed to be nationally representative and was a face-to-face survey. Though of course there are some small differences between our survey sample and the Tunisian population (e.g., respondents were less likely to men), we conclude from these comparisons that our survey enumerators successfully sampled the country as a whole.

- Median age: Survey = 40; Country = 32

- Unemployment[2] rate: Survey = 17%; Country = 15%

- Proportion urban: Survey = 68; Country = 67

- Sex ratio: Survey = 0.89; Country = 0.99

- Proportion of Nidaa Tounes voters in presidential election (runoff): Survey = 59%; Country = 56%

2.2 United States, 2016

In the United States, we implemented the 2016 survey in cooperation with Survey Sampling International. We also compare the sample in our online survey to the overall American population. Although online surveys tend to have somewhat unrepresentative samples of the U.S. population, we find that our survey was broadly similar to the population on several dimensions, while being somewhat skewed towards older and female respondents.

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[1]Some of the text in this section and our analysis of the sample in Tunisia draws verbatim on a discussion in the supporting information from Bush and Prather (2018).

[2]The unemployment rate in Tunisia is calculated based on responses to questions about whether the respondent is currently employed and whether he or she is currently seeking work.

- Median age: Survey = 46; Country = 38

- Unemployment rate: Survey = 6%; Country = 5%

- Sex ratio: Survey = 0.88; Country = 0.95

- Proportion of Trump voters in presidential election: Survey = 45%; Country = 46%

We focus on the 2016 survey in the United States in this section since that is the main U.S. survey in the paper. The 2018 survey in the United States was conducted using a different sample drawn from Amazon's Mechanical Turk. This survey is discussed in more detail below.

3 Survey questions

3.1 Tunisia, 2014

Below, we provide the text in English for the questions that are referenced in our paper. The questions in Arabic are available from the authors upon request. Please note that these questions were embedded in a larger survey of political attitudes in Tunisia. See Bush and Prather (2017, 2018).

3.1.1 Wave 1 Questions

1. At the last election, we noticed that a lot of people weren't able to vote for various reasons. Did you vote in the recent (i.e., parliamentary) election?

   (a) No

   (b) Yes

2. (If the previous response was yes:) Which party did you vote for in the election?

   (a) Al Mahaba

   (b) CPR

   (c) Ennahda

   (d) Ettakatol

   (e) Nidaa Tunis

   (f) Popular Front

   (g) Republican Party

   (h) Other

3. (If the response to question 1 was no:) Although you did not vote, which party would you have voted for in the election?

   (a) Al Mahaba

   (b) CPR

   (c) Ennahda

   (d) Ettakatol

    (e) Nidaa Tunis

    (f) Popular Front

    (g) Republican Party

    (h) Other

4. Now we are going to read you a series of statements. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with each statement... "Religion is a private matter, and we need to separate religious beliefs from politics."

    (a) Disagree strongly

    (b) Disagree

    (c) Agree

    (d) Agree strongly

5. Now, I am going to ask you three factual questions about politics in Tunisia.[3] Even if you aren't sure, please give me your best guess. First, do you know what was the name of the Prime Minister going into the recent election?

    (a) Ali Laarayedh

    (b) Mehdi Jomaa

    (c) Hamadi Jebali

6. Second, do you know for how many years will the Chamber of the People's Deputies elected?

    (a) Three

    (b) Four

    (c) Five

7. Third, do you know what percent of parties' lists are reserved for women?

    (a) 50

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[3]Responses to these questions were combined to create the political knowledge variable. Each accurate response was coded as '1,' whereas each inaccurate response was coded as '0.' Accordingly, the political knowledge variable ranges from 0 to 3.

(b) 33

(c) 25

8. Finally, I'd like to ask you some background questions. How old are you?

9. (Fill in sex of the respondent.)

   (a) Male

   (b) Female

10. What is the highest level of education that you have received?

    (a) Illiterate

    (b) Elementary

    (c) Primary

    (d) Secondary

    (e) Undergraduate (B.A.)

    (f) M.A. or higher

11. Are you currently employed?

    (a) No

    (b) Yes

12. (If the previous answer was no:) Are you. . . ?

    (a) Retired

    (b) Housewife

    (c) Unemployed

    (d) Student

13. How often do you read the Quran?

    (a) Everyday or almost everyday

    (b) Several times a week

    (c) Sometimes

(d) Rarely

(e) I don't read

14. What is your marital status?

    (a) Single

    (b) Married

    (c) Other

15. What is your monthly family income in Tunisian dinars?

    (a) Under 200 dinars

    (b) Between 201 and 500 dinars

    (c) Between 501 and 1,000 dinars

    (d) Between 1,001 and 1,500 dinars

    (e) Between 1,501 and 2,500 dinars

    (f) More than 2,501 dinars

3.1.2 Wave 2 Questions

The survey began with a series of questions about the presidential election and election observers. It continued with the questions used in this study.

1. To what extent do you think other countries influenced the results of the recent election?

    (a) A lot

    (b) Some

    (c) A little

    (d) None at all

2. Do you think this influence was primarily positive or negative?

    (a) Positive

    (b) Negative

(c) Both positive and negative

3. Which countries do you think had the most influence? Name the top 3.

Then followed a block of questions about political participation and election observers. See Bush and Prather (2018) for more details.

4. What do you think is the main issue for Tunisia today? (Read the options.)

    (a) Economic situation
    (b) National security
    (c) Quality of democracy
    (d) Rights of women
    (e) Religion's role in politics
    (f) Administrative reform
    (g) Other (fill in)

Then followed a block of questions about gender and political representation. See Bush and Prather (2019) for more details.

5. Now we would like to ask you some questions about the economy. At this time, *the United States/Qatar/France* is considering giving foreign aid to Tunisia.[4] To what extent do you agree or disagree that the new parliament should encourage *the United States/Qatar/France* to give foreign aid to Tunisia?

    (a) Disagree strongly
    (b) Disagree
    (c) Agree
    (d) Agree strongly

6. If *the United States/Qatar/France* gives significant amounts of foreign aid to Tunisia, how much will you personally benefit?

    (a) Not at all

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[4]Italicized text was randomly assigned to the respondents.

    (b) Not too much

    (c) Somewhat

    (d) Very much

7. If *the United States/Qatar/France* gives significant amounts of foreign aid to Tunisia, how much will the Tunisian economy improve?

    (a) Not at all

    (b) Not too much

    (c) Somewhat

    (d) Very much

8. At this time, *the United States/Qatar/France* is also considering increasing the amount of goods it trades with Tunisia. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the new parliament should encourage *the United States/Qatar/France* to increase trade with Tunisia?

    (a) Disagree strongly

    (b) Disagree

    (c) Agree

    (d) Agree strongly

9. If *the United States/Qatar/France* significantly increases trade with Tunisia, how much will you personally benefit?

    (a) Not at all

    (b) Not too much

    (c) Somewhat

    (d) Very much

10. If *the United States/Qatar/France* significantly increases trade with Tunisia, how much will the Tunisian economy improve?

    (a) Not at all

    (b) Not too much

    (c) Somewhat

    (d) Very much

3.2 United States, 2016

We focus on the 2016 survey in the United States since that is the main U.S. survey in the paper. The 2018 survey in the United States is discussed in more detail later in the appendix. Please note that these questions were embedded in a larger survey of political attitudes in the United States, similar to the Tunisia survey.

3.2.1 Wave 1 Questions

1. First, we'd like to ask you about the upcoming national election for the President, Congress, and other offices that will be held on November 8. In asking people about elections, we often find that a lot of people are not able to vote because they aren't registered, they get sick, they don't have time, or something else happens to prevent them from voting. Do you plan to vote in the election?

    (a) Yes

    (b) No

2. (If the previous response was yes:) Who do you plan to vote for in the election for U.S. President?

    (a) Hillary Clinton

    (b) Donald Trump

    (c) Other

    (d) Don't know

3. (If the response to question 1 was no:) Although you do not plan to vote, who would you vote for in the election for U.S. President if you were to vote?

    (a) Hillary Clinton

    (b) Donald Trump

    (c) Other

    (d) Don't know

4. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, or what?

   (a) Democrat

   (b) Republican

   (c) Independent

   (d) Other

   (e) None

5. Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. How often would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs?

   (a) Most of the time

   (b) Some of the time

   (c) Only now and then

   (d) Hardly at all

Then followed a block of questions about election integrity.

6. To what extent do you think other countries will influence the results of the upcoming election?

   (a) A lot

   (b) Some

   (c) A little

   (d) None at all

7. Which countries do you think will have the most influence? Name the top 3.

8. Now we have a few factual questions concerning the American government. We want to see how much information about the government gets out to the public from television, newspapers, and the like. It is important to us that you do NOT use outside sources like the Internet to search for the correct answer. Will you answer the following questions without help from outside sources?

(a) Yes

(b) No

9. Which political party currently has the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington, D.C.?[5]

(a) Democratic Party

(b) Republican Party

10. Which political party currently has the most members in the Senate in Washington, D.C.?

(a) Democratic Party

(b) Republican Party

11. How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto?

(a) A bare majority (50% + 1)

(b) A two-thirds majority

(c) A three-fourths majority

12. In the next five years, do you see yourself doing any of the following? Choose all that apply.

(a) Attend a political meeting

(b) Put up a political sign

(c) Work for a candidate, campaign, or political organization

(d) Contact a local representative or other politician

(e) Vote in an election

(f) Other (please describe)

(g) Nothing

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[5]This question was combined with the next two questions to measure political knowledge.

13. On the next page, we are going to describe a situation the United States could face in the future. The situation is not about a specific event in the news today. Some parts of the description may seem important to you; other parts may seem unimportant. Please read the details very carefully.

    Here is the situation:

    - *Germany/Russia* has *opposed/supported* Donald Trump's candidacy for U.S. President.[6]

    - *Germany/Russia* is considering increasing the amount *of goods it trades with/it invests in* the United States.

    - The size of the increase will be substantial compared to previous levels.

    - *Germany/Russia* is an important economic partner of the United States.

    To what extent do you agree or disagree that the U.S. should encourage *Germany/Russia* to increase the amount *of goods it trades with/it invests in* in the United States?

    (a) Strongly agree

    (b) Somewhat agree

    (c) Somewhat disagree

    (d) Strongly disagree

14. If *Germany/Russia* increases the amount *of goods it trades with/it invests in* the United States, how much will you personally benefit?

    (a) Very much

    (b) Somewhat

    (c) Not too much

    (d) Not at all

15. If *Germany/Russia* increases the amount *of goods it trades with/it invests in* the United States, how much will the American economy benefit?

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[6]Italicized text was randomly assigned to the respondents. Recall that this first bullet point only appeared for half of the respondents; the other half of the sample did not receive any information about side-taking.

(a) Very much

(b) Somewhat

(c) Not too much

(d) Not at all

16. If *Germany/Russia* increases the amount *of goods it trades with/it invests in* the United States, which political party in the United States will benefit most?

   (a) Democratic Party

   (b) Republican Party

   (c) Both parties will benefit

   (d) Neither party will benefit

17. You stated that you (response to question 13) that the U.S. government should encourage *Germany/Russia* to increase the amount *of goods it trades with/it invests in* the United States. Would you be willing to contact President Barack Obama to let him know your opinion?

   (a) Yes

   (b) No

18. We will now ask you to tell us about the stances a number of governments have taken towards Donald Trump's candidacy for U.S. president. What sort of stance has Russia taken towards Donald Trump's candidacy for U.S. President?

   (a) Supported Donald Trump's candidacy for U.S. President

   (b) Opposed Donald Trump's candidacy for U.S. President

   (c) Neither supported nor opposed Donald Trump's candidacy for U.S. President

19. What sort of stance has Germany taken towards Donald Trump's candidacy for U.S. President?

   (a) Supported Donald Trump's candidacy for U.S. President

   (b) Opposed Donald Trump's candidacy for U.S. President

   (c) Neither supported nor opposed Donald Trump's candidacy for U.S. President

Additional questions concerning the election appeared here, and then the demographic questions began.

20. Are you currently employed?

    (a) Full-time employee

    (b) Part-time employee

    (c) Self-employed

    (d) Unemployed

    (e) Retired

    (f) Student

    (g) Homemaker

21. Can you give us an estimate of your household income in 2015 before taxes?

    (a) Before $30,000

    (b) $30,000-$40,000

    (c) $40,000-$50,000

    (d) $50,000-$60,000

    (e) $60,000-$75,000

    (f) $75,000-$90,000

    (g) $90,000-$110,000

    (h) $110,000-$130,000

    (i) $130,000-$150,000

    (j) Over $150,000

    (k) Not sure

22. What racial or ethnic group best describes you?

    (a) White

    (b) Black or African-American

    (c) Hispanic or Latino

(d) Asian or Asian-American

(e) Native American

(f) Middle Eastern

(g) Mixed Race

(h) Other

23. What is your gender?

(a) Male

(b) Female

24. What if your age?

25. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

(a) None

(b) Some high school

(c) High school graduate

(d) Some college

(e) Four year college degree

(f) Graduate or professional degree

3.2.2 Wave 2 Questions

1. First, we'd like to ask you about the recent national election for the President, Congress, and other offices that will be held on November 8. In asking people about elections, we often find that a lot of people are not able to vote because they aren't registered, they get sick, they don't have time, or something else happens to prevent them from voting. Did you vote in the election?

(a) Yes

(b) No

2. (If the previous response was yes:) Who did you vote for in the election for U.S. President?

(a) Hillary Clinton

(b) Donald Trump

(c) Other

(d) Don't know

3. (If the response to question 1 was no:) Although you did not vote, who would you have voted for in the election for U.S. President if you were to vote?

(a) Hillary Clinton

(b) Donald Trump

(c) Other

(d) Don't know

The survey continued with questions related to election integrity.

4 Balance tests

Variable	Mean & Standard Deviation				P-Value for test that:	N
	Mean (Secularist)	SD (Secularist)	Mean (Islamist)	SD (Islamist)	Secularist=Islamist	N
Nidaa Tounes	0.564	0.496	0.561	0.497	0.913	1,107
Age	40.049	16.473	40.328	15.912	0.789	1,084
Education	3.066	1.347	3.087	1.369	0.809	1,084
Female	0.550	0.498	0.488	0.501	0.053	1,084
Rural	1.323	0.468	1.317	0.466	0.841	1,084
Employed	0.358	0.480	0.382	0.487	0.436	1,084
Political Interest	2.265	0.939	2.298	0.957	0.586	1,080
Political Knowledge	2.015	0.939	2.298	0.957	0.910	1,107
Voted	0.628	0.484	0.626	0.485	0.950	1,084

Note: Averages for each treatment condition of key variables. Standard deviation in brackets. P-Value based on OLS regressions of variable on treatments.

Table 2: **Balance table for Tunisia survey.**

Variable	Mean & Standard Deviation								P-Value for test that:						N
	Mean (G-ST)	SD (G-ST)	Mean (G-NST)	SD (G-NST)	Mean (R-ST)	SD (R-ST)	Mean (R-NST)	SD (R-NST)	G-ST = G-NST	G-ST = R-ST	G-ST = R-NST	G-NST = R-ST	G-NST = R-NST	R-ST = R-NST	
Income	4.443	2.705	4.224	2.907	4.220	2.794	4.047	2.647	0.377	0.382	0.105	0.988	0.474	0.495	971
Female	0.527	0.500	0.546	0.499	0.539	0.500	0.515	0.501	0.661	0.780	0.787	0.884	0.480	0.588	1,015
Age	45.432	16.680	45.275	17.115	45.381	17.077	47.667	16.515	0.916	0.973	0.125	0.945	0.105	0.130	1,016
Children	0.700	0.459	0.673	0.470	0.667	0.472	0.693	0.462	0.522	0.433	0.862	0.876	0.637	0.535	1,015
Education	4.299	1.119	4.311	1.023	4.312	1.025	4.233	1.144	0.904	0.898	0.482	0.992	0.415	0.419	1,016
Left–Right Scale	5.731	2.682	5.845	2.596	5.506	2.596	5.552	2.700	0.627	0.346	0.434	0.161	0.207	0.848	1,016
Political Interest	3.213	0.843	3.215	0.863	3.29	0.773	3.200	0.865	0.976	0.308	0.859	0.328	0.837	0.231	1,015
Internationalism	0.595	0.492	0.618	0.487	0.543	0.499	0.563	0.497	0.600	0.250	0.458	0.101	0.208	0.660	1,015
Economy Important	3.504	0.708	3.498	0.666	3.472	0.603	3.441	0.758	0.924	0.607	0.291	0.677	0.344	0.615	1,016
Voted	0.856	0.352	0.912	0.283	0.913	0.282	0.856	0.352	0.047	0.048	0.985	0.971	0.044	0.045	1,016

Note: G = Germany; R = Russia; ST = side-taking treatment ; NST = no side-taking treatment. P-Value based on OLS regressions of variable on treatments. **=p<0.05

Table 3: **Balance table for 2016 U.S. survey.**

5 Further analyses in Tunisia

5.1 With control variables

5.1.1 Support for foreign aid

	Model 1
Pro-Islamist Partner	0.20
	(0.259)
Nidaa Tounes Supporter	0.47**
	(0.188)
Pro-Islamist Partner X Nidaa Tounes Supporter	-1.13***
	(0.327)
Age	0.02***
	(0.005)
Woman	0.08
	(0.164)
Employed	0.24
	(0.170)
Rural	0.10
	(0.158)
Political Interest	0.04
	(0.084)
Political Knowledge	0.16
	(0.098)
Voted	-0.07
	(0.170)
Constant cut1	-0.24
	(0.430)
Constant cut2	0.17
	(0.429)
Constant cut3	1.65***
	(0.434)
Observations	661

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: **The correlates of support for foreign aid among Tunisian respondents.**

5.1.2 Support for trade

	Model 1
Pro-Islamist Partner	0.19
	(0.266)
Nidaa Tounes Supporter	0.61***
	(0.199)
Pro-Islamist Partner X Nidaa Tounes Supporter	-1.22***
	(0.340)
Age	0.01*
	(0.005)
Woman	-0.13
	(0.174)
Employed	0.07
	(0.180)
Rural	0.03
	(0.168)
Political Interest	0.04
	(0.089)
Political Knowledge	0.08
	(0.101)
Voted	-0.16
	(0.178)
Constant cut1	-1.76***
	(0.462)
Constant cut2	-1.37***
	(0.456)
Constant cut3	0.37
	(0.449)
Observations	668

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: **The correlates of support for trade among Tunisian respondents.**

5.2 With alternative measure of secularism/Islamism

5.2.1 Support for foreign aid

	Secularist	Islamist	Difference
Pro-Islamist Partner	2.86	3.08	-0.21
Pro-Secular Partners	3.21	3.05	0.15†
Difference	-0.34*	0.02	
N	776	247	

Table 6: **Mean support for foreign aid among Tunisian respondents.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

5.2.2 Support for trade

	Secularist	Islamist	Difference
Pro-Islamist Partner	3.23	3.33	-0.10
Pro-Secular Partners	3.55	3.33	0.22*
Difference	-0.32*	0.01	
N	775	253	

Table 7: **Mean support for trade among Tunisian respondents.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

5.3 Sub-setting analysis by political knowledge

5.3.1 Low-knowledge respondents

We pool across the two types of economic engagement due to the small sample size.

	Nidaa Tounes Supporter (Secular Party)	Ennahda Supporter (Islamist Party)	Difference
Pro-Islamist Partner	2.85	3.31	-0.45*
Pro-Secular Partners	3.38	3.14	0.25*
Difference	-0.53*	0.17	
N	310	152	

Table 8: **Mean support for economic engagement, Tunisia.** The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4. * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

5.3.2 High-knowledge respondents

	Nidaa Tounes Supporter (Secular Party)	Ennahda Supporter (Islamist Party)	Difference
Pro-Islamist Partner	2.97	3.30	-0.33
Pro-Secular Partners	3.58	3.28	0.30*
Difference	-0.61*	0.03	
N	114	75	

Table 9: **Mean support for engagement, Tunisia.** The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4. * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

5.4 Using binary outcome measure

5.4.1 Support for foreign aid

	Nidaa Tounes Supporter (Secular Party)	Ennahda Supporter (Islamist Party)	Difference
Pro-Islamist Partner	0.65	0.82	-0.17*
Pro-Secular Partners	0.83	0.76	0.07†
Difference	-0.18*	0.06	
N	431	231	

Table 10: **Proportion support for increased foreign aid, Tunisia.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

5.4.2 Support for trade

	Nidaa Tounes Supporter (Secular Party)	Ennahda Supporter (Islamist Party)	Difference
Pro-Islamist Partner	0.76	0.93	-0.17*
Pro-Secular Partners	0.95	0.87	0.08*
Difference	-0.19*	0.06	
N	433	235	

Table 11: **Proportion support for increased trade, Tunisia.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

5.5 Sub-setting analysis by perceptions that engagement is personally beneficial

Here, the analysis is restricted to respondents who perceive economic engagement as having an above-average personal benefit. Responses to questions about perceived personal benefits from aid and trade are answered four-point scales, with 4 being the maximum personal benefit and 1 being the least. If respondents' mean perceived benefit was at least 3, then they are coded as perceiving engagement as personally beneficial. 41 percent of respondents fall into this category.

5.5.1 Support for foreign aid

	Nidaa Tounes Supporter (Secular Party)	Ennahda Supporter (Islamist Party)	Difference
Pro-Islamist Partner	3.44	3.69	-0.26†
Pro-Secular Partners	3.69	3.67	0.02
Difference	-0.25*	0.03	
N	164	96	

Table 12: **Proportion support for increased foreign aid, Tunisia.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

5.5.2 Support for trade

	Nidaa Tounes Supporter (Secular Party)	Ennahda Supporter (Islamist Party)	Difference
Pro-Islamist Partner	3.68	3.75	-0.07
Pro-Secular Partners	3.83	3.66	0.17*
Difference	-0.15†	0.09	
N	165	95	

Table 13: **Proportion support for increased trade, Tunisia.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

6 Further analyses in the United States, 2016

6.1 With control variables

6.1.1 Support for investment

	Model 1
Germany	1.22**
	(0.577)
Clinton Supporter	-0.78
	(0.561)
Germany x Clinton Supporter	3.11***
	(0.880)
Age	-0.03**
	(0.014)
Woman	-0.88*
	(0.455)
Household Income	0.11
	(0.073)
Employed	0.22*
	(0.117)
Political Interest	0.17
	(0.285)
Political Knowledge	-0.38
	(0.231)
Voted	1.07
	(1.168)
Constant cut1	-2.47
	(1.651)
Constant cut2	0.36
	(1.608)
Constant cut3	3.65**
	(1.673)
Observations	109

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 14: **The correlates of support for investment among U.S. respondents.**

6.1.2 Support for trade

	Model 1
Germany	-1.40**
	(0.566)
Clinton Supporter	-1.23**
	(0.571)
Germany x Clinton Supporter	3.70***
	(0.840)
Age	-0.03**
	(0.013)
Woman	-0.81**
	(0.404)
Household Income	-0.04
	(0.071)
Employed	0.16*
	(0.095)
Political Interest	0.40
	(0.259)
Political Knowledge	0.00
	(0.212)
Voted	0.47
	(1.221)
Constant cut1	-3.41**
	(1.579)
Constant cut2	-1.44
	(1.548)
Constant cut3	1.11
	(1.540)
Observations	113

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 15: **The correlates of support for trade among U.S. respondents.**

6.2 With party identification instead of vote choice

6.2.1 Support for investment

	Republican	Democrat	Difference
Russia	2.58	2.22	0.36†
Germany	2.90	3.32	-0.41*
Difference	-0.33†	-1.10*	
N	75	81	

Table 16: **Mean support for foreign investment among American respondents, side-taking treatment condition.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

6.2.2 Support for trade

	Republican	Democrat	Difference
Russia	2.90	2.64	0.26
Germany	2.91	3.20	-0.30†
Difference	0.00	-0.56*	
N	74	104	

Table 17: **Mean support for trade among American respondents, side-taking treatment condition.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

6.3 Sub-setting analysis by political knowledge

We pool across the two types of economic engagement due to the small sample size.

6.3.1 Low-knowledge respondents

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Russia (Pro-Trump)	2.67	2.50	0.17
Germany (Anti-Trump)	2.65	3.45	-0.81*
Difference	0.02	-0.95*	
N	55	65	

Table 18: **Mean support for economic engagement, U.S., side-taking treatment condition.** The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4. * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

6.3.2 High-knowledge respondents

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Russia (Pro-Trump)	2.68	2.20	0.48*
Germany (Anti-Trump)	2.57	3.28	-0.71*
Difference	-0.11	-1.08*	
N	53	55	

Table 19: **Mean support for economic engagement, U.S., side-taking treatment condition.** The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4. * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

6.4 Using binary outcome measure

6.4.1 Support for investment

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Russia (Pro-Trump)	0.44	0.26	0.18
Germany (Anti-Trump)	0.68	0.96	-0.28*
Difference	-0.24†	-0.70*	
N	53	58	

Table 20: **Proportion support for foreign investment, U.S., side-taking treatment condition.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

6.4.2 Support for trade

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Russia (Pro-Trump)	0.79	0.52	0.28*
Germany (Anti-Trump)	0.52	0.90	-0.39*
Difference	0.28*	-0.39*	
N	55	62	

Table 21: **Proportion support for trade, U.S., side-taking treatment condition.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

6.5 Sub-setting analysis by perceptions that engagement is personally beneficial

Here, the analysis is restricted to respondents who perceive economic engagement as having an above-average personal benefit. Responses to questions about perceived personal benefits from investment and trade are answered four-point scales, with 4 being the maximum personal benefit and 1 being the least. If respondents' perceived benefit was at least 3, then they are coded as perceiving engagement as personally beneficial. 31 percent of respondents fall into this category.

Since the number of observations is too small for analysis if we divide up the analysis by foreign economic policy type, the table below pools across the investment and trade conditions.

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Russia (Pro-Trump)	3.36	3.00	0.36
Germany (Anti-Trump)	3.20	3.78	-0.58*
Difference	0.16	-0.78*	
N	26	26	

Table 22: **Proportion support for foreign investment, U.S., side-taking treatment condition.** * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

6.6   Analysis of the control condition

The control condition did not prime respondents to consider side-taking by the potential partner country. This analysis focuses on the respondents within the control condition who accurately perceived side-taking as measured by questions asked post-experiment. We pool across the two types of economic engagement due to the small sample size.

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Russia (Pro-Trump)	2.93	2.54	0.39†
Germany (Anti-Trump)	2.70	3.44	-0.74*
Difference	0.23	-0.90*	
N	40	64	

Table 23: **Mean support for economic engagement, U.S., no-side-taking treatment condition.** The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4. * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

6.7   Figures showing Republican benefits

(a) Clinton Supporters

(b) Trump Supporters

Figure 1: **Probability of viewing Republicans as benefiting from economic engagement among U.S. respondents, by side-taking treatment and vote choice.**

7 2018 U.S. Survey

In December 2018 we fielded a small survey on Amazon's Mechanical Turk to test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of the name of the foreign partner country. In the robustness check, we did not name the country, but we randomized whether the country was described as having supported Donald Trump's candidacy for president in the 2016 U.S. election or opposed it.

Other details of the survey experiment and question wording were kept the same. We chose to keep the context of the side-taking (the 2016 election) the same to parallel the 2016 study. However, given that we asked about engaging economically with the partner country in 2018, we included a question that asked respondents whether they thought the foreign country in the scenario currently supports Donald Trump's presidency. 75 percent of the respondents "passed" the manipulation check believing that a country that supported (opposed) Donald Trump's candidacy for president *currently* supports (opposes) his presidency. All of the other details of the scenario remained identical to the 2016 study, as did the measurement of the dependent variable and the follow-up questions about beliefs about benefits. We also included an independently randomized treatment that again manipulated whether respondents considered encouraging investment from the foreign country or trading with the foreign country. Because the sample size was small, we pool across this treatment in the analysis below. The results are similar if we look at each type of foreign economic policy separately.

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Pro-Trump Partner	3.21	2.46	0.74*
Anti-Trump Partner	2.91	3.26	-0.35*
Difference	0.30	-0.80*	
N	80	140	

Table 24: **Mean support for economic engagement among American respondents in 2018.** The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating the respondent strongly disagreed that engagement should be encouraged and 4 indicating the respondent strongly agreed. * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

Table 24 shows that when the partner country is not named and side-taking is primed that the results continue to be consistent with the theory. Clinton supporters continue

to have strong aversion to engaging economically with a partner country that supported Donald Trump's presidency, whereas they are much more enthusiastic about engaging with a supportive side-taker. Although the effect sizes are not as large for Trump supporters, they are in the expected direction. In other words, Trump supporters prefer engaging with a supportive side-taker over an opposing side-taker. Looking within the partner country treatment, we also see results consistent with the theory. Trump supporters are significantly more likely to want to engage with a pro-Trump partner country than are Clinton supporters. The reverse holds for the anti-Trump partner country.

These results strongly indicate that the results we present in the main text do not hinge on the particularities of the countries that were explicitly named in the treatment scenarios. Next, we investigate the mechanisms to see if removing the name of the country alters any of the results regarding mechanisms. We begin with a consideration of which party was viewed as benefiting from engagement with a side-taker.


Figure 2: **Predicted probability of viewing Democrats as benefiting from economic engagement among U.S. respondents in 2018.**

Again, when the partner country is not named and side-taking information is provided, we find results consistent with our theory. First, and as Figure 2 shows, respondents believed

Democrats alone were more likely to benefit when engagement was with a partner that opposed Trump rather than a partner that supported Trump. However, we note that the majority of respondents believed that both parties will benefit from engagement. Similarly, respondents believed Republicans alone were more likely to benefit when engagement was with a partner that supported Trump rather than a partner that opposed him.

Second, there is some evidence that the side-taking treatment shifted respondents' beliefs about their own personal benefits. Again, however, few people believe they will benefit personally from increased engagement with these partners. These results are presented in Table 25.

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Pro-Trump Partner	2.43	1.90	0.53*
Anti-Trump Partner	2.27	2.17	0.10
Difference	0.16	-0.27*	
N	80	140	

Table 25: **Beliefs about personal economic benefits from increased engagement in 2018 (pooling trade and investment)**. Each variable ranged from 1-4 with 1 corresponding to "not at all" and 4 corresponding to "very much." * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$. Respondents from side-taking condition only.

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Pro-Trump Partner	3.34	2.61	0.74*
Anti-Trump Partner	2.73	3.12	-0.39*
Difference	0.62*	-0.51*	
N	80	140	

Table 26: **Beliefs about benefits to U.S. economy from increased engagement in 2018 (pooling trade and investment)**. Each variable ranged from 1-4 with 1 corresponding to "not at all" and 4 corresponding to "very much." * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$. Respondents from side-taking condition only.

Third, the most promising mechanism is the sociotropic mechanism. As the results in Table 26 show, individuals believe engagement will benefit the U.S. economy as a whole and side-taking appears to affect people's views of the magnitude of these benefits in ways that are consistent with our theory. These results suggest that the patterns of support for

engagement that we document are most likely driven by sociotropic concerns in our 2018 survey.

Overall, the evidence from this additional survey experiment shows that the results we report in the main text were not specific to the countries named in our 2016 U.S. study. Moreover, it shows that side-taking continues to matter for individual support for economic engagement in 2018. We believe this evidence therefore offers strong support for our theory that side-taking shapes individual preferences for economic engagement.

8 Behavioral outcome

The 2016 U.S. survey included a behavioral outcome designed to assess support for economic engagement with partner countries. This section presents the results for the respondents who said that they would be willing to contact President Obama with their opinion. We pool across the investment and trade conditions due to the small sample size.

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Russia	2.68	2.42	0.26
Germany	2.58	3.42	-0.84*
Difference	0.10	-0.99*	
N	48	69	

Table 27: **Mean support for economic engagement among American respondents.** This table reports the mean levels of support for respondents in the side-taking condition who said they would be willing to contact President Obama with their opinion. The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating the respondent strongly disagreed that engagement should be encouraged and 4 indicating the respondent strongly agreed. * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

9 Comparing side-taking effects to self-interest and sociotropic concerns

We examine in this section how economic self-interest and sociotropic concerns influence support for economic engagement. As can be seen in Table 28, both beliefs about personal benefits (*Self-interest*) and also beliefs about the benefits to the economy as a whole (*National Economy*) are significantly correlated with support for foreign economic engagement in Tunisia, whereas only beliefs about the benefits to the national economy are correlated with support for engagement in the U.S. These patterns provide some support for the findings in the literature that instrumental heuristics are used by individuals to inform their preferences about international economic policy.

	Tunisia	United States, 2016
Self-interest	0.13***	0.09
	(0.025)	(0.069)
National Economy	0.71***	0.58***
	(0.031)	(0.077)
Constant	0.38**	0.60
	(0.168)	(0.497)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	584	231
R-squared	0.65	0.40

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 28: **The relationship between support for foreign economic engagement and interests in Tunisia and the United States.** Note: The dependent variable pools aid and trade for the Tunisian sample and investment and trade for the U.S. sample. The U.S. sample is restricted to the control condition.

The effects of side-taking on support for foreign economic engagement compare favorably in terms of substantive size to the effects of these instrumental heuristics. We can use the OLS regression models from Table 28 to estimate the substantive size of the effects of interests on support for foreign economic engagement. For the Tunisian sample, moving from the 25 to the 75 percentile of the *Self-interest* variable produces a 0.26-point change in the level of support for engagement, which is measured on a 4-point scale. Perceptions of benefits to

the Tunisian economy from engagement have a much larger substantive effect than beliefs about personal benefits. The effect of that same change in the *National Economy* variable produces a 0.78-point change in the level of support. This is comparable to the size of the side-taking treatment among Nidaa Tounes supporters at 0.55 (for trade) and 0.53 (for aid). In fact the effects of side-taking are much larger than the effects of perceived self-interest and fairly close to being as large as the effects for national interests.

Turning to the U.S. sample, we can make the same comparison. Going from the 25 to the 75 percentile of the *Self-interest* variable produces a 0.19-point change in support foreign economic engagement, which is measured on a 4-point scale. In the U.S. case, self-interest is not significantly correlated with support for engagement and the size of the effect is small. On the other hand, the size of the effect for the *National Economy* variable is similar at 0.58 to that in the Tunisian sample. We can again compare these effect sizes to the size of the effect of side-taking on support for engagement. In this case, we can see that side-taking has a much larger effect than either the effect of perceived self-interest or beliefs about the benefits to the U.S. economy. For Clinton supporters the size of the effect of side-taking is 1.32 (for investment) and 0.73 (for trade). This makes the average size of the effect among Clinton supporters across the two forms of engagement nearly double that of perceived national interests and significantly larger than the effect of either perceived self-interest or national interests. Taken together, this comparison suggests that side-taking by outside powers is an important omitted variable explaining variation in individual preferences towards foreign economic engagement.

10   Effects of side-taking by skill level

In the below tables we show the effects of side-taking for respondents in our sample who would be most likely to benefit from increased economic engagement. In Tunisia, according to Open Economic Politics theory, individuals who have lower levels of skill are more likely to benefit from open trade and aid than individuals with higher skill levels. As such, if the findings are similar when we restrict the analysis to lower-skilled Tunisians, then we can conclude that even the individuals most likely to benefit from open economic engagement consider the side-taking position of the potential partner. Conversely, in the United States, a developed economy, highly-skilled workers should be more likely to benefit from open trade and investment. Again, if we find similar results among these individuals, then it suggests that people likely to benefit from foreign economic engagement still care about side-taking.

We use education as a proxy for skill level, as is common in the literature. For Tunisia, we show the results for respondents who have as their highest level of education only a secondary education or below. Secondary education is the mean level of education in the Tunisian sample. For the United States, we show the results for respondents who have at least a college degree or higher. A college degree is the mean level of education in the sample. Both tables largely replicate the findings in the main manuscript, suggesting that side-taking shapes individuals' support for economic engagement even among those respondents that open economic theory suggests would benefit most from that engagement.

	Nidaa Tounes Supporter (Secular Party)	Ennahda Supporter (Islamist Party)	Difference
Pro-Islamist Partner	2.94	3.28	-0.34*
Pro-Secular Partners	3.47	3.23	0.24*
Difference	-0.54*	0.05	
N	344	167	

Table 29: **Mean support for engagement among low-skilled respondents, Tunisia.** The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4 and is the combined aid and trade measure. * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

	Trump Supporter	Clinton Supporter	Difference
Pro-Trump Partner	2.64	2.32	0.31
Anti-Trump Partner	2.81	3.35	-0.54*
Difference	-0.17	-1.02*	
N	48	57	

Table 30: **Mean support for engagement among high-skilled respondents, United States.** The dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4 and pools the investment and trade treatments. * indicates difference is significant at $p < 0.05$, † at $p < 0.10$.

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