Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating Conflict over Self-Determination

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Online Appendix

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1 CONIAS

This section provides an extended discussion of the CONIAS data on extra-institutional mobilization (Schwank et al. 2013) and the reasons we believe CONIAS is problematic for the study of conflict escalation.

First, and as noted in the paper, CONIAS does not include conventional claims, which is problematic as violence may grow from institutional contention, including elections or referendums.

Furthermore, CONIAS includes extra-institutional conflicts only if they cross an ambiguously defined intensity threshold. First, CONIAS excludes all nonviolent claims that involve "mechanisms of conflict management [i.e., actions or communications] that are accepted by the conflict actors" (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2015: 8). Second, CONIAS includes nonviolent conflicts only if the conflict actors are "decisive" in the sense that they significantly affect the behavior of other conflict actors (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2015: 8). A general problem with these criteria is that they are difficult to code reliably.[1] More problematically, though, these criteria render nonviolent claims endogenous to the risk of violence. In democracies, protest and strikes are generally accepted means of claims-making, and "acceptable" protest in democracies and elsewhere presumably has a low ex-ante risk of escalation. The decisiveness criterion leads to the exclusion of many nonviolent claims in their formative stages, when governments can easily choose to ignore weak dissident groups. If nonviolent conflicts reach a stage where they feature unacceptable means of contention and where dissident groups have a significant impact on the behavior of the government, they are likely to have moved far on the nonviolence-violence continuum.

A critical implication of its focus on decisive actors and unacceptable means of contention is that CONIAS is bound to miss the nonviolent formative stages of conflicts, even if they involved extra-institutional mobilization. Take the example of Northern Ireland. CONIAS covers the Catholic mobilization for unification with Ireland only from 1968, a year that saw large-scale Catholic-led civil rights marches that led to the onset of a major civil war just one year later. CONIAS thereby overlooks decades of earlier electoral mobilization by the Nationalist Party and Sinn Féin, but also protests in the early 1950s, the Border Campaign of 1956-1962, and the onset of the civil rights movement in the mid-1960s directed against discrimination of Catholics in areas such as public housing and voting rights (Hennessey 1997: 99ff). Corsica constitutes another example. Organizations such as the Regional Front of Corsica began to mobilize for increased self-rule in the late 1960s, when they started to participate, often with little success, in elections and engaged in a series of (extra-institutional) protest actions (De La Calle & Fezi 2010; Hossay 2004). However, CONIAS covers this conflict only from 1975, the year low-level hostilities and a campaign of terrorism broke out, perhaps because coders deemed all earlier nonviolent mobilization "acceptable" and/or because the relevant dissident groups had little impact and where therefore "not decisive".

While these issues are likely to be pronounced in democracies such as France, where nonviolent protest is generally considered "acceptable", they are not limited to democracies. For example, the Mayas in Mexico began to stage nonviolent protests in the 1980s and early 1990s demanding increased autonomy (Mattiace 1997), but CONIAS codes this conflict as starting only in 1994, the

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[1] Notably, the CONIAS coding rules do not specify what actions should be considered "acceptable" other than stating that participation in election and court proceedings are typically acceptable whereas physical violence never is (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2015: 8).

year of the Zapatistas' (violent) uprising.[2] CONIAS covers the conflict over the (Armenian-dominated) Nagorno-Karabakh region in today's Azerbaijan only from 1988, when low-level hostilities began that transformed to full-scale civil war three years later. CONIAS therefore neglects nonviolent mobilization going back as far as the mid-1960s[3], including a large-scale petition drive initiated in 1987 by the Karabakh Committee aimed at the unification of Karabakh with what was then the Soviet republic of Armenia.[4] A dataset with biased coverage of the nonviolent formative stages of violent conflicts clearly constitutes a poor choice for the study of conflict escalation.

The same intensity thresholds also make it likely that less intense nonviolent conflicts are not included altogether, even if they involve extra-institutional mobilization. Possibly due to this, CONIAS does not include the separatist conflicts over Andalusia in Spain, Britanny in France, and Hawaii in the U.S., all of which have featured demonstrations, strikes, or other extra-institutional actions, but are of comparatively low intensity (Minahan 2002: 113, 328, 724).

Finally, our review of the CONIAS data provides several indications for ambiguous coding decisions and possible coding error. For example, CONIAS does not include the highly contentious, nonviolent independence movements in Lithuania and Georgia, which both featured large-scale protest campaigns and unilateral independence referendums that were deemed illegal by the government of the Soviet Union (Mendez & Germann 2018). Coding error is an especially likely explanation in these cases given that the similarly contentious independence movements in Estonia and Latvia are included. In other cases, CONIAS includes nonviolent conflicts even though it is questionable whether the coding criteria are met. For example, CONIAS includes the secessionist conflicts over Scotland and Flanders even though they have both been primarily contested at the ballot box. Moreover, CONIAS includes the conflict over Catalonia from 1979 onwards, but whereas this conflict has involved highly contentious means in recent years – in particular the unilateral referendum held in 2017 – much of the contention in earlier years was limited to electoral mobilization. A possible reason for the inclusion of these cases is their high visibility in Western media.

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[2] According to Polity, Mexico only became a democracy (with a polity2 score of 6) in 1997. During the 1980s, Mexico's polity2 score ranged from -3 to 0; and during the early 1990s it ranged from 0 to 4.
[3] The National Unification Party (NUP), an organization that made claims for an independent Armenia including Nagorno-Karabakh, was formed in 1966.
[4] Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh were part of the Soviet Union until 1991, which could never be considered a democracy (with a polity2 score of 6 or larger) according to the Polity project.

2   Comparing SDM with Other Sources of Data on Separatism

This section compares the coverage of separatist conflicts in the SDM dataset with other extant sources of data on separatism.

SDM vs. CONIAS

Simple counts are sufficient to highlight important differences between SDM and CONIAS (see Table S1). CONIAS codes a total of 182 conflicts over "autonomy" or "secession" between 1945 and 2008. By contrast, SDM identifies a total of 461 ethnic groups that have made claims for increased self-determination during the same period. These figures are not directly comparable because some of these 461 groups were engaged in more than conflict (i.e., groups started to make claims, stopped, and re-started to make claims at a later point in time) whereas other separatist groups changed their host state and are therefore effectively counted twice (e.g. SDM codes a Hungerian movement in both Czechoslovakia and Slovakia). We recoded the SDM data so that continuing spells of contention by the same group are always coded as part of the same conflict (e.g. counting the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia/Slovakia only once) while counting conflicts separately if they movements had discontinuous activity. This suggest that the SDM data set includes more than twice the number of separatist conflicts included in CONIAS: 475.

Table S1: Comparing data on separatist conflicts from SDM and CONIAS

Dataset	**SDM**	**CONIAS**	**CONIAS**
Time frame	1945-2008	1945-2008	1945-2008
Violence indicator	SDM	CONIAS	SDM (82%), CONIAS (18%) Duplicates and decol. cases removed
SD conflicts	475	182	156
Violent conflicts[*]	32%	80%	71%
Violence in first year of conflict[*]	11%	45%	46%
If violence: after how many years (avg.)?[*]	8.7	3.6	4.1
Conflict-years in high-income country	37%	18%	18%
Conflict-years in democracy	54%	38%	37%

Note: A conflict-year is classified as in a high-income country if the host state's GDP per capita exceeded $10,000 (real, 2005 prices). A conflict-year is classified as in a democracy if the host state is coded as an electoral or liberal democracy in V-Dem.
[*] Includes violence prior to 1945 for conflicts that were ongoing in 1945.

The under-coverage in CONIAS is likely owed to a combination of coding error and CONIAS' restrictive coding rules. As noted in the paper, CONIAS includes nonviolent claims only if they involve extra- contention and cross ambigiously defined intensity thresholds. The SDM data set has no such requirements and covers all types of separatist mobilization, including institutional mobilization. As a result of CONIAS' restrictive understanding of nonviolence, almost all of the separatist conflicts included in CONIAS are coded as violent in at least one year (80%). By comparison, under a third of the separatist conflicts in SDM are coded with violence. Particularly problematic for the study of conflict escalation is that CONIAS often codes little to no nonviolent activity prior to violence; 45% of the separatist conflicts included in CONIAS are coded with violence in their first year[5], and on average it took only 3.6 years for violence to erupt. By contrast, only 11% of the conflicts included in SDM are coded as violent in their first year and it took more than 8.7 years for violence to break out on average. Finally, we also find that CONIAS tends to omit conflicts in high-income countries and democracies. For example, only 38% of the conflict-years in CONIAS are located in a democracy, compared to 54% in SDM.

These figures suffer from three limitations that, however, do not significantly affect our conclusions. First, the data on violent conflict is not necessarily compatible across data sets. Second, separatist conflicts are aggregated inconsistently in CONIAS and therefore over-counted. SDMs are often constituted by multiple organizations and, in most cases, CONIAS combines these under the same header. However ,in some cases CONIAS codes multiple, temporally overlapping conflicts, each involving a different non-state actor that makes separatist claims on behalf of the same ethnic group. For example, contrary to SDM, CONIAS codes three temporally overlapping separatist conflicts over Mindanao and as many as six separate conflicts involving the Tamils in Sri Lanka.[6] Finally, CONIAS also over-counts separatist conflicts relative to SDM because even though CONIAS includes a separate category for "decolonization conflicts", several of its "autonomy" or "secession" conflicts relate to former colonies, including the partition of India and Pakistan (1940-1947) and the movements for the independence of Cyprus (1931-1958) and Togo (1929-1956). The final column in Table S1 shows that the conclusions remain similar after i) dropping cases related to decolonization from CONIAS[7]; ii) collapsing disaggregated conflicts in CONIAS; and iii) using the SDM dataset's indicator for separatist armed conflict whenever possible instead of CONIAS's.

Overall, this comparison underlines that analyses of conflict escalation based on the CONIAS data are likely to be biased because CONIAS systematically selects nonviolent cases with a high risk of escalation and, more generally, because it systematically under-represents conflicts in democracies and high-income countries.

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[5] Across all intra-state conflicts this figure is almost two thirds (cf. Bartusevicius & Gleditsch 2019), suggesting that the problem is accentuated for center-seeking conflicts.

[6] The same issue also applies to center-seeking conflicts. For example, the Lebanese civil war and its aftermath (1975-), a case well-known for high actor fractionalization, is coded as a single conflict whereas CONIAS codes three center-seeking conflicts in Iraq after the American invasion in 2003 (Iraq vs. al-Zarqawi group/AQI; Iraq vs. al-Sadr; Iraq vs. insurgents). We found no general rule that could explain these coding decisions.

[7] We also drop two other "separatist" conflicts because they, according to the CONIAS coding notes, in fact constitute border disputes between states (Rwanda – Uganda and Tunisia – France (Bizerte)). We also drop the conflict over Taiwan because Taiwan is commonly counted as an independent state in cross-national data sets, including in SDM.

SDM vs. MAR, CIDCM, and Cunningham (2014)

The SDM dataset improves coverage also relative to other prominent sources of data on separatism. One of the most widely used such dataset is the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Gurr 2000). Another source that has become increasingly prominent in recent years particularly through the work of Kathleen Cunningham (e.g. Cunningham 2014) are the Peace and Conflict reports published by the Center of International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) – an offspring of the MAR project that, however, includes some groups that are not in MAR (e.g. Marshall & Gurr 2003). Both MAR and CIDCM provide data on autonomy and secession movements across the globe and like SDM both have a broad conception of nonviolent separatism that extends to institutional contention and does not require "unacceptable" actions or communications. But while the coding rules are therefore broadly comparable[8], both MAR and CIDCM nevertheless significantly under-cover the incidence of separatism and, in particular, of nonviolent separatism. MAR identifies a total of 177 separatist ethnic groups between 1945-2006 whereas CIDCM covers around 150-180 separatist groups, depending on the year of the report. More than half of the separatist groups identified in MAR and CIDCM employed violence against the state. Meanwhile, the SDM data set includes 2-3 times as many separatist groups, less than a third of which used violence against the state (cf. Sambanis et al. 2018 for additional details).

Neither MAR nor CIDCM exactly pinpoint the year in which separatist mobilization began, preventing us from calculating more detailed statistics such as the share of movements that were violent in their first year. To enable such a comparison, we turn to data collected by Cunningham (2014). Cunningham created a new dataset of separatism worldwide (1960-2005) that uses the 2003 CIDCM report as its basis but goes beyond it by providing annual data on separatist claims and by providing information on the number of organization or "factions" that made claims for increased self-rule on behalf of groups. Cunningham's data has quickly become the most widely used data in cross-national studies of SD disputes (e.g. Beardsley et al. 2017; Cunningham 2013, 2014). As Table S2 shows[9], Cunningham's data improves significantly over the CONIAS data: less than a quarter of all separatist conflicts are violent in their first year (compared to 70-80% in CONIAS) and it takes significantly longer for violence to erupt on average (5.1 years vs. around 4 in CONIAS). Nevertheless, the SDM dataset includes significantly more separatist conflicts during the same time frame, especially nonviolent ones. Critically, the share of conflicts that turned violent in their first year is again much smaller (10%). Furthermore, it takes almost twice as long for violence to erupt (9 years), and the SDM data also again includes more conflicts in democracies and high-income countries (though the differences are much smaller here compared to CONIAS). Overall, these comparisons suggest that while MAR, CIDCM, and Cunningham (2014) improve significantly over CONIAS, they

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[8] There are some differences, but these cannot account for all the disparities across the data sets. MAR only includes groups with a population of more than 100,000 or more than 1% of a country's population, whereas such small groups are included in SDM. However, the number of such tiny separatist groups is limited. CICDM, on the other hand, codes nonviolent movements only if they are *currently* active and if they are regionally concentrated. Given that territorial concentration constitutes close to a necessary condition for separatism, the latter is relatively inconsequential. By contrast, dropping nonviolent separatist groups that are no longer active accounts is more consequential; the SDM dataset includes around 100 such groups. Dropping consistently nonviolent groups is highly problematic as it introduces selection effects. Finally, there are some aggregation differences; for example, whereas SDM codes five different indigenous groups as separatist in the U.S., both MAR and CIDCM combine these under the same header. For more details refer to Sambanis et al. (2018).

[9] We converted both Cunningham's and the SDM data to the conflict level, thus counting multiple conflicts for the same group if the group started to make a separatist claim, the movement ended, and then restarted. As above, we also merged groups such as the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and Slovakia to one conflict. We use SDM's inclusive measure of separatist armed conflict whenever possible. In 9% of Cunningham's cases, SDM does not code an active movement and therefore includes no data on violence. In these cases we drew on Cunningham's data on armed conflict, which in turn is based on UCDP.

still implicitly select cases based on the risk of violence and underrepresent conflicts in democracies and high-income countries. Such systematic measurement error is likely to bias inferences in studies of separatism and, in particular, in studies of conflict escalation.

Table S2: Comparing data on separatist conflicts from SDM and Cunningham (2014)

Dataset	**SDM**	**Cunningham (2014)**
Time frame	1960-2005	1960-2005
Violence indicator	SDM	SDM (91%), Cunningham (9%)
SD conflicts	456	156
Violent conflicts	31%[*]	52%
Violence in first year of conflict	10%[*]	23%
If violence: after how many years (avg.)?	9[*]	5.1
Conflict-years in high-income country	38%	27%
Conflict-years in democracy	55%	47%

Note: A conflict-year is classified as in a high-income country if the host state's GDP per capita exceeded $10,000 (real, 2005 prices). A conflict-year is classified as in a democracy if the host state is coded as an electoral or liberal democracy in V-Dem.
[*] Includes violence prior to 1960 for conflicts that were ongoing in 1960.

3 SDM2EPR

Our empirical analysis is anchored on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, v2014 (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer et al. 2009; Vogt et al. 2015). This section describes how we mapped the the SDM data on separatist claims onto EPR. The supplementary materials include another file with case-by-case information (see "SDM2EPR.xls"). Overall, we code 279 of the 817 politically relevant EPR groups with separatist activity. Out of these, 126 (45%) were engaged in separatist violence at some point, but in only 22 cases were self-rule claims violent from the start.

EPR v2014 covers politically relevant ethnic groups around the world from 1946-2013, but its definition of `ethnicity' is relatively narrow and includes only linguistic, religious and racial groups. Contary to SDM, EPR does not include regionally defined groups. 87 of the 464 separatist groups SDM codes represent groups whose identity derives from their region, such as the Texans in the U.S. or the Lombards in Italy. Although regional identities can be seen as ethnic (e.g. Horowitz 1985), we cannot map these groups onto EPR and they are thus excluded from our analysis.

We have to drop another 39 SDMs because EPR does not include groups in overseas territories (e.g. the Guadeloupeans), groups in micro-states with a population of less than 500,000 (e.g. the Nevisians in St. Kitts and Nevis), and groups classified as `tribes' or `clans' rather than `ethnicities' (e.g. the Isaaqs in Somalia).

Overall, we are able to match 289 of the 464 SDMs to EPR, or 62%. About half of all SDM groups (224/464) correspond directly to a group in EPR. In around three dozen cases, EPR includes an SDM group but does not consider the group politically relevant in all years of the respective movement's activities. For example, per the SDM dataset the Germans in Belgium first mobilized for self-rule in 1970, but EPR only codes them as politically relevant from 1973 onwards. To maximize the match between SDM and EPR, we recoded all group-years that were missing from EPR, adding information on all relevant EPR-based explanatory variables (e.g. exclusion, regional autonomy). Coding notes for all changes to EPR, including some other cases where we found that EPR codes contradicted case evidence collected by us, can be found in section 15 of the online appendix.

In another 65 cases, SDM and EPR aggregate groups differently, but we can still establish a match. Typically, this scenario emerges when EPR codes an umbrella group of which we identify one large or several smaller sub-groups as separatist (52 cases). For example, while EPR codes a single umbrella indigenous group in the U.S., SDM codes several different indigenous groups. In these cases we code nonviolent separatist activity if at least one constituent group made a nonviolent claim and no other group made a violent claim. We code violent separatist activity if at least one of the constituent groups was involved in separatist violence.

In 13 cases, EPR codes two or more sub-groups of a larger separatist group. For example, SDM codes a single Anglophone movement in Cameroon whereas EPR distinguishes between the northwestern and the southwestern Anglophones. In these cases, we establish start and end dates of violent and nonviolent separatist activity separately for each constituent group based on case evidence.

There are 39 cases where EPR misses a separatist group that according to our judgment meets the criteria for inclusion in EPR. These are groups that are linguistically, religiously, or racially defined

and politically relevant[10] in EPR terms. In 10 of the 39 cases the SDM group is not missing as such from EPR, but EPR chose a much higher level of aggregation and it would be unreasonable to code this umbrella group as separatist. For example, Kenya's Maasais have made separatist claims but they constitute only 10% of the respective EPR group, which also includes the (non-separatist) Kalenjin, Turkana, and Samburu.

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[10] Note that separatist groups are by definition `politically relevant' as defined in EPR. The conditions for `political relevance' are that there must be at least one organization claiming to represent the group's interests at the national level and/or that the group must be discriminated by the state (Vogt et al. 2015).

4   New Data on Lost Autonomy

This section lays out in more detail the coding rules we used in constructing our new data on lost autonomy and includes a short discussion of some of the limitations that come with this data. A list of all autonomy losses we code, including the approximate year they occurred, can be found in the "Lost autonomy.xls" file included in the supplementary materials. Bibliographic information for all sources cited in this file can be found in the reference list below.

Coding rules:

Operationally, we define a group as having lost autonomy if it had a higher level of self-rule in the past compared to the beginning of the present year. More specifically, we code lost autonomy:

i)   if a group used to have an independent state in the past but can no longer be considered independent. For example, Estonia was an independent state from 1918-1940, when it was annexed by the former Soviet Union. Therefore, the Estonians in the former Soviet Union are coded with lost independence until and including 1991, when Estonia re-attained independence;

ii)   if a change of borders leads to ethnic groups being cut off from their "cultural motherland" (i.e., a state dominated or at least strongly influenced by members of their own group). Russians in Ukraine constitute an example;

iii)   or if a group had internal autonomy in the past but can no longer be considered to have a meaningful level of regional autonomy as defined by EPR in the present. The Crimean Tatars, who had been awarded an autonomous status within the Soviet Union in 1921 that was later revoked by Stalin, constitute an example.

For the static, historical lost autonomy variable we focus on the period from 1800 onwards. In other words, we code a group as having lost autonomy if it has experienced and continues to suffer from a loss of autonomy since 1800. For the recent autonomy loss variable we code losses of autonomy only if they occurred in the two previous years.

Importantly, losing autonomy does not necessarily imply that *all* autonomy is lost. The Estonians in the former Soviet Union were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 and thus lost their independence. However, the Soviet Union was a federal state and the Estonians kept some autonomy. Thus, until 1991, when Estonia re-gained independence, the Estonians are coded with both lost autonomy (i.e., lost independence) and regional autonomy.

Case coverage

We provide data on lost autonomy for 759 of the 853 groups included in EPR. We do not cover the remaining 94 groups because they are irrelevant to our analysis. A total of 58 of the groups included in EPR always dominated their state and never shared power with another ethnic group. Examples include the Turks in Turkey and the Austrians in Austria. We exclude these cases from our analysis because dominant groups almost by definition do not by definition claim self-determination. Therefore, we also did not code data on lost autonomy for these 58 groups. In addition, EPR lists 36 groups that it does not, however, consider politically relevant in any of the years. These are often

majority groups in countries where EPR coders judged ethnicity to be irrelevant. The Germans in Germany constitute an example. We do not provide data on lost autonomy for these 36 groups.

Sources

We drew on a broad array of sources for the coding of lost autonomy, including several encyclopedias focused on ethnic and separatist groups (e.g. Cole 2011; Minahan 2002; Shoup 2011), Griffith & Butcher's (2013) expanded list of internationally recognized states, Encyclopedia Britannica, the country studies series of the Library of Congress, country-specific historical dictionaries, EPR's regional autonomy indicator, and many case-specific sources. Where there was overlap between MAR and EPR, we also drew on MAR's AUTLOST variable while always checking conformity with our coding rules.

More detailed coding rules:

- Re lost independence:
    o Note that full Westphalian sovereignty (i.e., both internal and external sovereignty) in many ways constitutes an ideal type that is often unattainable in practice (Krasner 1999). Therefore, it is sufficient for us to code lost independence if a group was *more or less* free of foreign influence in the past (but not in the present).
    o Also note that we do not require that a group controlled an internationally recognized state. Many ethnic groups never developed centralized state structures but still used to live free of foreign influence in the past. For example, before the Scramble for Africa in the late 19ᵗʰ century many groups in Sub-Saharan Africa were divided into small chieftaincies or took the form of stateless societies that had a high degree of autonomy. We code lost independence in the years such groups came under foreign rule, typically through European colonization.
    o Finally, we include a small number of cases under this category where colonial groups were credibly promised separate independence by their colonial masters, but where this promise was not kept and the group subsequently annexed by another state. This includes groups such as the Sahrawis, which were promised separate independence by Spain but were then annexed by Morocco and Mauritania. The East Timorese constitute another example (prior to East Timor attaining independence in 2002).

- Re lost internal autonomy:
    o We consider revocations of a variety of different internal autonomy regimes, including territorial autonomy regimes in modern states (e.g., the Kosovar Albanians had internal autonomy starting in 1971 but lost it in 1989); colonial autonomy regimes (e.g. the Alawites in Syria had significant self-rule during French colonial rule (until 1937)); and protectorates, vassal or tributary states under the suzerainty of another power, such as India's former princely states.
    o However, note that we only consider *territorial* autonomy regimes. That is, we do not include revocations of non-territorial autonomy regimes as they existed, for example, in the Ottoman Empire.

- o For the period after 1945, our main source for the identification of losses of internal autonomy is EPR's regional autonomy variable (regaut). Note that we corrected several coding mistakes (see section 15 of the online appendix).
  - o A special case emerges for groups that have managed to establish their own de facto independent states. These groups have internal autonomy, but this autonomy is not the result of a concession by the state. Therefore, if de facto independent groups had a recognized form of internal autonomy in the past that was then revoked by the state, we code them with lost internal autonomy despite the fact that they de facto have a large degree of autonomy. We only stop coding them with lost internal autonomy if the state recognizes their autonomy.

- Other:
  - o Note that the lost autonomy variable does not cover changes in the ethnic composition of central governments. Thus, we do not, for example, code lost autonomy if a group loses control of a state that continues to exist. The Sunnis in Iraq, who under Saddam Hussein effectively controlled Iraq, but lost access to the state after the US invasion in 2003, constitute an example of what is not included.
  - o Lost autonomy always refers to historical political entities within the borders of contemporary states. We do not consider any potential autonomy a group had had before it migrated to the state where it resides now.

Limitations:

It is important to note that our data on lost autonomy comes with some limitations. Tracing the histories of more than 750 ethnic groups over more than two centuries constitutes a challenging enterprise. Reliable information can be difficult to get by, especially for less well-known groups in Africa, Asia, or Oceania. The problem intensifies the further we go back in time. Our choice to restrict our focus to 1800 onwards is partly motivated by this.

Moreover, to maximize coding reliability, we decided to focus on major losses of autonomy. Small changes to a group's level of autonomy are often difficult to identify, especially in the more distant past, and they may not be reported systematically in our sources. Therefore, while we do include cases where groups lost all meaningful internal autonomy (in addition to cases of "lost independence" and groups being "stranded"), we do not include cases where the level of internal autonomy of ethnic groups was reduced but not fully revoked. For example, we do not code a loss of internal autonomy for the Abkhaz in 1931, when the status of Abkhazia was downgraded from a union republic (the highest status within the former USSR's Russian-doll type federal system) to an autonomous republic (the second highest status) and incorporated into Georgia. However, we code lost internal autonomy for the Kosovar Albanians in 1989, when Milosevic revoked all of Kosovo's autonomy.

Even when disregarding more minor fluctuations in the autonomy levels of ethnic groups and focusing on 1800 onwards, the identification of historical losses of internal autonomy remains difficult. In particular, we suspect that we miss a number of cases where ethnic groups from Sub-Saharan Africa or elsewhere retained a degree of internal autonomy in the first years of colonization, but lost this autonomy some years after colonization. However, this should not be a major problem for the estimates we report in the paper because most of the candidate groups are coded with lost autonomy anyway due to the earlier colonization. Generally speaking, losses of independence or groups

becoming stranded outside their cultural motherland are easier to identify. We are also more confident that we picked up losses of internal autonomy after 1945, so this should not constitute a major problem for our inferences on the short-term implications of losing autonomy.

Finally, assigning historic losses of autonomy to contemporary ethnic groups implicitly assumes that today's ethnic groups have a reference in the past. However, note that we do not assume that historic and contemporary group identities are the same. As is well established, ethnic identities are fluid and changeable. For example, many contemporary groups in places like Sub-Saharan Africa historically had much more local identities, say at the village level. But while a contemporary group may not have a 1:1 referent in the past, contemporary identities are often inferred backwards. There may or may not have been a Macedonian identity two centuries back (see e.g. Roudometof 2002), but from today's perspective many Macedonians are likely to find it plausible to trace back "their" history to the "proto-Macedonians" that had existed in the 19th century. Analogously to Hobsbawm & Ranger's (1983) invented traditions, we contend that group histories, even if partly imagined, are likely to matter for today's political outcomes.

5   Two-Step Approaches and Sample Selection Models

Two-step approaches such as the one we implement in the paper highlight the possibility of selection bias due to unobserved factors correlated with both explanatory variables and selection into the nonviolent conflict stage. To tackle the resulting endogeneity concerns, Reed (2000) suggested to draw on Heckman-type sample selection models. Sample selection models involve the estimation of a two-equation system wherein the first equation models selection into the sample (e.g. nonviolent claims) and the second equation models the outcome (e.g. conflict escalation) including a correction factor that accounts for the disturbances between the two equations. The core advantage of selection models is that they allow to control for unobserved confounders related with selection into the sample.

However, selection models require at least one valid instrument, that is, a variable that determines selection into the first stage but not the second-stage outcome (exclusion restriction). Bartusevicius & Gleditsch (2019) argue that country population meets the exclusion restriction. However, for population size to be valid as an instrument, it must be argued that population size is unlikely to be correlated with any *observed or unobserved* factor that could affect escalation. That is an implausible assumption. For example, other things equal, a larger population should lower the per capita cost of public goods provision, which could enable a government to provide more public goods and thus lower the risk of rebellion. The size of a government's military is usually larger in more populous countries, which could deter conflict escalation. Minority groups may be larger in large countries, and prior research suggests that larger minority groups are better able to challenge the state violently (Cederman et al. 2010).

In contrast to Bartusevicius & Gleditsch, we do not believe that country population satisfies the exclusion restriction. More generally, we do not believe that it is possible to identify a valid instrument for nonviolent (separatist) claims in the context of cross-national research. In the absence of a valid instrument, selection models are identified solely on the basis of strong distributional assumptions regarding the error terms of the two equations and have been shown to often yield increased rather than decreased bias (Stolzenberg & Relles 1990). Therefore, we eschew selection models and instead provide a correlational analysis of the effects of ethnic grievances on conflict escalation while reporting a large number of robustness checks including models with many additional possible confounders as well as a formal sensitivity analysis quantifying the amount of unobserved confounding necessary to overturn our main results.

6 Variable Descriptions

Nonviolent Separatist Claim Onset

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 in the year an ethnic group starts to make a nonviolent claim for increased self-determination (i.e., transitions from "no separatist claim" to "nonviolent separatist claim"), 0 otherwise. All cases of ongoing separatist claims, violent or nonviolent, are coded missing. Separatist claims that start out as violent are also dropped (e.g. Tajiks in Afghanistan in 1979). However, we include separatist claim onsets if there was violence in the first year of the claim, but where the initial claim was nonviolent. This applies to the following 7 cases: Luba Kasai (DRC), Afars and Oromos (Ethiopia), Amboinese (Indonesia), Arabs (Iran), Mons (Myanmar), and Fur (Sudan). For more information on these cases refer to the SDM coding notes file included in the supplementary materials.

Source: Sambanis et al. (2018).

Conflict escalation

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 in the year an ongoing separatist conflict transitions from a nonviolent separatist claim to separatist war, 0 otherwise. For example, the Chechens in Russia, who started to make a nonviolent claim in 1989, are coded with 1 in 1994, when the First Chechen War started. Cases of ongoing separatist violence are dropped, as are cases of separatist claims that emerged as violent without prior nonviolent claim-making. By contrast, the 7 instances of quick escalation in the first year are included (see above under nonviolent SDM onset). Cases with no ongoing separatist movement are coded missing.

Source: Sambanis et al. (2018).

First-time escalation

Description: The same as conflict escalation but counting only "first-time" escalations. All observations after the first time a separatist conflict escalated from a nonviolent claim to violence are dropped. For example, in the case of the Chechens the first war that started in 1994 is coded as 1 but all subsequent years, including the second war onset in 1999, are coded missing. Note that the first escalation variable takes violence that occurred prior to the first year we observe into account. The Tibetans in China, for example, have continuously made claims for increased self-determination since at least 1912, when the Dalai Lama declared Tibet's independence. COW codes two wars over Tibet in subsequent years, one in 1912-1913 and the other one in 1918. There was also low-level violence in 1930-1931 (cf. the SDM Coding Notes, p. 58). In our data set, Tibet is observed only from 1946 and coded with a nonviolent claim until 1950, when China invaded and violently annexed Tibet. We do not code this as a "first escalation" due to the violence that occurred prior to 1946.

Source: Sambanis et al. (2018).

Exclusion

Description: Dummy variable indicating whether members of an ethnic group did (0) or did not (1) have meaningful representation in the national executive at the beginning of each calendar year. Critically, the exclusion variable tracks effective access to state power; therefore, formal (e.g. constitutional) provisions stipulating an ethnic power-sharing regime are insufficient by themselves to code a group as included in government. Rather, a group must have actual and meaningful representation in the central state's executive to be considered included. "Token" inclusion (mere symbolic representation without actual influence over decisions) is not coded as inclusion. Depending on the country, the body qualifying as the national executive may be the presidency, the cabinet, senior posts in the administration, or the army.

Source: EPR (Vogt et al. 2015; Wimmer et al. 2009). Note that we revised EPR's exclusion variable in a number of cases where we found contradictory case evidence (see section 15 of the online appendix).

Recent exclusion

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if an ethnic group lost access to the central state executive and therefore became excluded from state power in the previous two years. If a group was downgraded in the year it began to make a separatist claim, we code a downgrade in the same year if, and only if, the downgrade preceded the onset of the separatist claim. Analogously, we apply the same rule to escalation.

Source: EPR (Vogt et al. 2015; Wimmer et al. 2009). Note that we revised EPR's exclusion variable in a number of cases where we found contradictory case evidence (see section 15 of the online appendix).

Lost autonomy (since 1800)

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if an EPR group had a higher level of self-rule in the past compared to the present (that is, lost independence, became stranded, and/or had internal autonomy in the past but not in the present), considering the period from 1800 onwards. The lost autonomy variable generally reflects the situation on January 1 of each calendar year. Exceptions emerge in the year of a country's independence or if a group's territory is joined to a country during the ongoing year (e.g. the Papuans only became part of Indonesia in 1963 after Indonesia's annexation of West Papua). In some cases we also deviate from the first of January rule to better reflect case histories. Specifically, if a group lost autonomy and in the same year starts to make a nonviolent or violent claim for self-rule, we code the loss of autonomy in the year of the claim/violence onset if, and only if, the loss of autonomy preceded the claim/violence.

Sources: See section 4 of the online appendix.

Recent autonomy loss (2 years)

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if an ethnic group lost autonomy in the previous two years. This includes cases where groups lost independence, became stranded, and lost internal autonomy within the previous two years. If a group lost autonomy in the year it began to make a

separatist claim, we code a downgrade in the same year if, and only if, the loss of autonomy preceded the onset of the separatist claim. Analogously, we apply the same rule to escalation.

Sources: See section 4 of the online appendix.

Regional concentration

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if members of an ethnic group are concentrated in a spatially contiguous region of a country that is larger than an urban area and in which at least 25% of all group members reside. Regional concentration does not preclude that members of another ethnic group reside in the same territory.

Source: GeoEPR (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011). Note that we revised GeoEPR's regional concentration codes in a number of cases where we found contradictory evidence (see section 15 of the online appendix).

Relative group size

Description: An ethnic group's population size as a proportion of the country's total population.

Source: EPR (Vogt et al. 2015; Wimmer et al. 2009). Note that we revised EPR's group size estimates in a number of cases where we found contradictory evidence (see section 15 of the online appendix).

Separatist kin$_{t-1}$

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if an ethnic group has a kin group adjacent to its settlement area that makes a separatist claim against its host state. Adjacency means that the settlement areas of a group and its kin group must either share a land border or be connected through a body of water of no more than 150km. For dispersed groups which do not have a distinguishable settlement area, separatist kin is by definition coded 0. Kin relations are determined based on information provided by EPR. The variable is lagged one year, except in the first year of a country series.

Sources: SDM (Sambanis et al. 2018) ; EPR (Vogt et al. 2015; Wimmer et al. 2009).

Regional autonomy

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if an ethnic group had a meaningful level of regional autonomy at the beginning of each calendar year. A group is coded as regionally autonomous if there is a regional government of some type that operates below the central state level but above the local (municipal) level that has significant (but not necessarily exclusive) policy autonomy in some areas of government, such as culture, security, or the economy, and in which members of the group have significant, though not necessarily exclusive, representation.

Source: EPR (Vogt et al. 2015; Wimmer et al. 2009). Note that we revised EPR's regional autonomy cases in a number of cases where we found contradictory evidence (see section 15 of the online appendix).

Hydrocarbon reserves *t-1*

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if a group's regional base overlaps with a giant oil or natural gas field (from the year of discovery). An oil or gas field is considered giant if it has a minimum of 500 million barrels (79,000,000 m3) of ultimately recoverable oil or gas equivalent. The variable is only available for regionally concentrated groups and is lagged one year, except in the first year of a country series.

Sources: Horn (2010); Hunziker & Cederman (2017).

Mountainous terrain

Description: The fraction of a group's settlement area that is covered by mountainous terrain. The variable is only available for regionally concentrated groups.

Sources: Hunziker & Cederman (2017); UNEP-WCMC (2002).

Noncontiguity

Description: Dummy variable that is coded 1 if a group's regional base is separated from the main body of its host state by land belonging to another state or by a significantly sized body of water (in particular, more than a river). The variable is only available for regionally concentrated groups.

Source: Coded based on GeoEPR (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011) settlement area polygons.

ln(GDP per capita*t-1*)

Description: The natural logarithm of a country's gross domestic product per capita in constant 2005 dollars (1,000s), lagged one year except in the first year of a country series.

Sources: Gleditsch's (2002) expanded trade and GDP data (v6.0); we imputed missing country-years using real GDP growth statistics from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) (The World Bank 2017), Angus Maddison's Historical Statistics of the World Economy (Maddison 2010), including the updates in the Maddison-Project (2013), and Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2015).

ln(country population*t-1*)

Description: The natural logarithm of a country's population in 1,000s, lagged one year except in the first year of a country series.

Sources: Gleditsch's (2002) expanded trade and GDP data (v6.0); we imputed missing country-years using population growth statistics from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) (The World Bank 2017), Angus Maddison's Historical Statistics of the World Economy (Maddison 2010), the Correlates of War (COW) project's National Material Capabilities Dataset, v4.0 (Singer et al. 1972), and Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2015).

Democracy$_{t-1}$

Description: A country's level of democracy, lagged one year except in the first year of a country series.

Source: V-Dem's (v. 7.1) electoral democracy index (Teorell et al. 2016).

Federal state$_{t-1}$

Description: Dummy variable coded 1 if a group's host state qualified as a federal state in the previous calendar year.

Source: Roeder (2009).

Number of rel. groups

Description: The total number of politically relevant ethnic groups at the start of a country-year.

Source: EPR (Vogt et al. 2015; Wimmer et al. 2009). Note that we revised EPR's political relevance variable in a number of cases where we found evidence for an active separatist movement but EPR (erroneously) codes the group as politically irrelevant (see section 15 of the online appendix).

Cold War

Description: Dummy variable coded 1 until and including 1989.

Analysis time (nonviolent separatist claim onset)

Description: A count of the number of years since the beginning of the sampling period[11] or, where applicable, since the last time group members made a claim for increased self-determination.

Source: Sambanis et al. (2018).

Analysis time (conflict escalation)

Description: A count of the number of years since the group first made a nonviolent claim to increased self-determination[12] or, where applicable, since the last spell of violent separatist conflict between the group and the state.

Source: Sambanis et al. (2018).

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[11] Depending on the case, the sampling period may begin in 1946, at a country's independence, or the year a group's homeland was joined to the state.

[12] Or, if the claim emerged before any of the following, 1946, the year of a country's independence, or the year a group's homeland was joined to the state.

7 Summary Statistics for Control Variables

Table S3: Summary statistics (controls)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Regional concentration	32290	0.819	0.385	0	1
Relative group size	32290	0.120	0.185	<0.001	1.019
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	32290	0.128	0.334	0	1
Regional autonomy	32290	0.242	0.428	0	1
Hydrocarbon reserves $_{t-1}$	26503	0.101	0.301	0	1
Mountainous terrain	26494	0.364	0.346	0	1
Noncontiguity	32290	0.039	0.193	0	1
ln(GDP per capita $_{t-1}$)	32290	1.156	1.123	-2.019	6.45
ln(country population $_{t-1}$)	32290	10.073	1.936	5.391	14.1
Democracy$_{t-1}$	32210	0.355	0.261	0.01	0.928
Federal state$_{t-1}$	32290	0.261	0.439	0	1
Number of rel. groups	32290	13.210	15.854	1	58
Cold War	32290	0.560	0.496	0	1
Analysis time (nonviolent claim ons)	23709	26.834	18.102	0	66
Analysis time (conflict escalation)	6685	15.209	14.312	0	66

Note: All non-missing group-years are included in the calculation of summary statistics, under two conditions. First, groups must be coded as politically relevant. Second, as we do in the paper, we exclude all groups that dominated their polity (that is, we only include group-years where ethnic groups share power with other ethnic groups or are excluded).

8   Further Robustness Checks: Nonviolent Separatist Claim Onset

This section shows additional robustness checks for separatist claim onset that are referenced in the paper, but not shown.

Table S4 reports the results when all models in Table 2 in the paper are re-estimated while controlling only for time dependence and region or country fixed effects. The results remain similar; both the static and recent autonomy loss variables increase the probability that ethnic groups start to make nonviolent separatist claims; whereas the effect of exclusion is more tenuous and recent exclusion has no effect at all.

Table S5 shows the results when dropping countries with many nonviolent separatist claim onsets. All models are restricted to geographically concentrated groups, include region dummies, and are estimated with logit regression. We find that whereas the effects of both historical and recent autonomy loss are robust to dropping influential countries, the effect of exclusion is dependent on a small number of countries and especially Russia/USSR (recent exclusion never has a significant effect). More than a quarter of all cases of nonviolent separatist claim onset (51 out of a total of 192) occurred in Russia and the former Soviet Union (USSR). Almost all of these onsets occurred during the final years of the Soviet Union's existence as repression eased under Gorbachev and the country embarked on democratization and decentralization (1986-1991). With a single exception (Ukrainians in 1989), all cases involved excluded groups. If Russia/USSR is dropped, the coefficient for exclusion decreases in size and is no longer statistically significant. Meanwhile, dropping Nigeria – which has a total of 9 nonviolent separatist claim onsets – also reduces the effect of exclusion, whereas dropping Indonesia and India does not noticeably affect the exclusion estimate.

Table S4: Models with only region/country dummies; DV = Nonviolent separatist claim onset

	(1) Logit	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) OLS	(5) Logit	(6) OLS	(7) Logit	(8) OLS
Exclusion	0.654[+]	0.004[+]	0.796[*]	0.007[*]				
	(0.334)	(0.002)	(0.332)	(0.003)				
Lost autonomy (1800)	1.257[***]	0.015[***]	0.869[*]	0.014[**]				
	(0.350)	(0.003)	(0.342)	(0.004)				
Recent exclusion (2 years)					0.574	0.006	0.711	0.008
					(0.590)	(0.007)	(0.583)	(0.009)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)					2.501[***]	0.068[*]	2.479[***]	0.074[*]
					(0.389)	(0.026)	(0.421)	(0.031)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Groups	687	687	529	529	687	687	529	529
Countries	141	141	121	121	141	141	121	121
Observations	23687	23687	18204	18204	23687	23687	18204	18204

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. [+] $p < 0.10$, [*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$.

Table S5: Dropping influential countries; DV = Nonviolent separatist claim onset

	(1) W/o Russia	(2) W/o Russia	(3) W/o Nigeria	(4) W/o Nigeria	(5) W/o Indonesia	(6) W/o Indonesia	(7) W/o India	(8) W/o India
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	0.364		0.642$^+$		0.763*		0.763*	
	(0.267)		(0.349)		(0.329)		(0.329)	
Lost autonomy (1800)	1.215***		0.866**		0.815**		0.815**	
	(0.301)		(0.298)		(0.292)		(0.292)	
Recent exclusion (2 years)		0.559		0.057		0.598		0.601
		(0.508)		(1.053)		(0.499)		(0.503)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)		1.984***		1.908***		2.166***		2.166***
		(0.396)		(0.485)		(0.459)		(0.491)
Group-level controls:								
Relative group size	-0.294	-1.767*	-0.510	-1.936*	-0.256	-1.743*	-0.256	-1.938*
	(0.831)	(0.813)	(0.810)	(0.860)	(0.789)	(0.801)	(0.789)	(0.834)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.741**	0.814***	0.640**	0.707**	0.574*	0.662**	0.574*	0.752**
	(0.242)	(0.233)	(0.236)	(0.252)	(0.233)	(0.250)	(0.233)	(0.245)
Regional autonomy	-0.353	-0.568	0.084	-0.171	0.178	-0.124	0.178	-0.017
	(0.533)	(0.448)	(0.398)	(0.428)	(0.307)	(0.354)	(0.307)	(0.350)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.760*	0.813**	0.634*	0.567	0.673*	0.634*	0.673*	0.620$^+$
	(0.302)	(0.279)	(0.323)	(0.356)	(0.287)	(0.315)	(0.287)	(0.339)
Mountainous terrain	0.590	0.482	0.204	0.178	0.141	0.135	0.141	0.008
	(0.377)	(0.405)	(0.387)	(0.355)	(0.342)	(0.317)	(0.342)	(0.306)
Noncontiguity	2.043**	1.980***	2.041**	2.128**	1.659	1.636$^+$	1.659	1.943*
	(0.685)	(0.597)	(0.762)	(0.717)	(1.081)	(0.987)	(1.081)	(0.759)
Country-level controls:								
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	0.123	0.075	0.448$^+$	0.413$^+$	0.374	0.346	0.374	0.286
	(0.177)	(0.183)	(0.240)	(0.245)	(0.257)	(0.269)	(0.257)	(0.257)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	0.473***	0.484***	0.274*	0.261*	0.316**	0.323**	0.316**	0.359**
	(0.114)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.117)	(0.121)	(0.117)	(0.125)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-1.231	-1.480*	-1.788*	-2.041**	-1.632$^+$	-1.919*	-1.632$^+$	-1.461*
	(0.851)	(0.739)	(0.799)	(0.732)	(0.834)	(0.775)	(0.834)	(0.738)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.454	0.413	0.420	0.375	0.478	0.407	0.478	0.602$^+$
	(0.350)	(0.322)	(0.352)	(0.359)	(0.359)	(0.365)	(0.359)	(0.349)
Number of rel. groups	-0.105***	-0.116***	-0.031***	-0.027***	-0.035***	-0.031***	-0.035***	-0.033***
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Systemic conditions:								
Cold War	-0.297	-0.471	-0.115	-0.178	-0.226	-0.299	-0.226	-0.407
	(0.407)	(0.396)	(0.355)	(0.332)	(0.367)	(0.363)	(0.367)	(0.357)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groups	475	475	522	522	513	513	513	513
Countries	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	120
Observations	15838	15838	17985	17985	17860	17860	17860	17474

Note: All models are estimated with logit regression and include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table S6 shows the results if further controls are added to the models reported in Table 2 in the paper (data sources in brackets). The only minor difference to the results reported in the paper is that recent exclusion is significant in 2 models, but the effect is not robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects.

- *Kin in power$_{t-1}$:* Coded 1 if an ethnic group had ethnic kin in an adjacent country[13] in the previous year that had access to its respective central government, 0 otherwise (Vogt et al. 2015; Wimmer 2009);
- *Armed conflict over gov. (group)$_{t-1}$:* Coded 1 if an ethnic group was engaged in an armed conflict over governmental control in the previous year, 0 otherwise (Vogt et al. 2015; Wimmer 2009);
- *Prior separatism:* Coded 1 if an ethnic group has made a separatist claim in any previous year, 0 otherwise (Sambanis et al. 2018);
- *Int. land border:* Coded 1 if a group's regional base includes a land border with an internationally recognized country, including borders constituted by lakes and rivers, 0 otherwise. This variable is only available for regionally concentrated groups (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011);
- *Sea shore:* Coded 1 if a group's regional base has a sea outlet.[14] This variable is only available for regionally concentrated groups (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011);
- *Gov. military personnel$_{t-1}$:* The number of military personnel as a proportion of a country's total population in the previous year (COW National Material Capabilities Dataset, v5.0 (Singer et al. 1972));
- *New state:* Coded 1 in the first three years after a country's independence, 0 otherwise (Gleditsch & Ward 1999);
- *PR electoral system$_{t-1}$:* Coded 1 if a country was a democracy and had a proportional electoral system in the previous year, 0 otherwise (Bormann & Golder 2013);
- *ln(oth. SDMs (dom.)$_{t-1}$):* Natural logarithm of the number (+1) of ethnic groups in the same country other than the group itself that made a separatist claim in the previous year (Sambanis et al. 2018);
- *Civil armed conflict (ctry)$_{t-1}$:* Coded 1 if there was an internal armed conflict over territory and/or over government in the same country in the previous year, 0 otherwise. The variable combines data on internal armed conflict from UCDP (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson & Eck 2018), SDM (Sambanis et al. 2018), and Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2015);
- *Int. rival$_{t-1}$:* Coded 1 if a country was involved in an international rivalry in the previous year, 0 otherwise (Dreyer & Thompson 2012);
- *ln(oth. SDMs (int.)$_{t-1}$):* Natural logarithm of the number (+1) of ethnic groups that made separatist claims in adjacent countries[15] in the previous year (Sambanis et al. 2018);
- *Civil armed conflict (int.)$_{t-1}$:* Coded 1 if there was an internal armed conflict over territory and/or over government in an adjacent[16] country in the previous year, 0 otherwise (same data sources as above);
- *Calendar year:* The calendar year.

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[13] Including both countries that share a land border and countries connected through a body of water of no more than 150km.

[14] While geographers use the term "sea" to refer to a "second rank body of saltwater", we use the term more broadly to refer to all oceans (Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, Arctic, and Southern) as well as any large body of saltwater that is connected to the oceans (e.g. the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea). Access to the Caspian Sea is not coded because the Caspian Sea is not connected to the oceans.

[15] Same definition of adjacency as above.

[16] Same definition of adjacency as above.

Table S6: Additional controls; DV = Nonviolent separatist claim onset

	(1) Logit	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) OLS	(5) Logit	(6) OLS	(7) Logit	(8) OLS
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	1.024**	0.006+	0.801*	0.007+				
	(0.359)	(0.003)	(0.343)	(0.004)				
Lost autonomy (1800)	1.142**	0.014***	0.836**	0.014**				
	(0.375)	(0.003)	(0.323)	(0.004)				
Recent exclusion (2 years)					1.050*	0.008	1.292*	0.011
					(0.534)	(0.008)	(0.554)	(0.011)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)					2.041***	0.063*	1.781**	0.071*
					(0.537)	(0.028)	(0.608)	(0.033)
Group-level controls:								
Regional concentration	1.461***	0.010**			1.922***	0.015***		
	(0.424)	(0.003)			(0.412)	(0.003)		
Relative group size	0.633	-0.005	-0.863	-0.012	-1.299+	-0.015*	-2.401*	-0.026**
	(0.765)	(0.006)	(1.079)	(0.009)	(0.674)	(0.006)	(1.044)	(0.009)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.823***	0.009**	0.797**	0.008*	0.854***	0.010**	0.811**	0.008*
	(0.235)	(0.003)	(0.268)	(0.004)	(0.239)	(0.003)	(0.287)	(0.004)
Regional autonomy	0.203	0.003	0.024	0.002	-0.163	-0.001	-0.297	-0.001
	(0.354)	(0.006)	(0.402)	(0.007)	(0.430)	(0.006)	(0.489)	(0.008)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$			0.690*	0.004			0.645+	0.001
			(0.311)	(0.003)			(0.351)	(0.003)
Mountainous terrain			0.348	-0.003			0.328	-0.001
			(0.428)	(0.004)			(0.372)	(0.004)
Noncontiguity			1.742*	0.022			1.888*	0.020
			(0.809)	(0.024)			(0.777)	(0.023)
Kin in power$_{t-1}$	-0.251	-0.004+	-0.336	-0.007*	-0.209	-0.003	-0.335	-0.006*
	(0.253)	(0.002)	(0.302)	(0.003)	(0.242)	(0.002)	(0.300)	(0.003)
Armed conflict over gov. (group)$_{t-1}$	0.087	0.001	0.399	0.004	0.297	0.003	0.474	0.004
	(0.752)	(0.006)	(0.851)	(0.008)	(0.793)	(0.006)	(0.932)	(0.008)
Prior separatism	1.069**	0.012	1.148**	0.014	1.089**	0.014	1.143**	0.017
	(0.361)	(0.011)	(0.386)	(0.012)	(0.350)	(0.010)	(0.363)	(0.011)
Int. land border			0.420*	0.006**			0.485**	0.007***
			(0.193)	(0.002)			(0.171)	(0.002)
Sea shore			0.385	0.003			0.330	0.003
			(0.243)	(0.004)			(0.263)	(0.004)
Country-level controls:								
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	0.391*	0.005+	0.211	0.007+	0.340+	0.005	0.194	0.006
	(0.164)	(0.003)	(0.189)	(0.004)	(0.178)	(0.003)	(0.200)	(0.004)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	0.206	0.003	0.146	0.004	0.238	0.002	0.174	0.002
	(0.133)	(0.008)	(0.132)	(0.015)	(0.149)	(0.008)	(0.135)	(0.015)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-1.702+	-0.034*	-2.377**	-0.034+	-1.981*	-0.035*	-2.562**	-0.037*
	(0.889)	(0.015)	(0.910)	(0.017)	(0.850)	(0.016)	(0.917)	(0.018)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	-0.075	0.000	-0.034	-0.001	-0.138	0.001	-0.023	0.001
	(0.398)	(0.013)	(0.372)	(0.017)	(0.438)	(0.012)	(0.411)	(0.017)
Number of rel. groups	-0.044***	0.000	-0.044***	0.001	-0.041***	0.000	-0.042***	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.002)
Gov. military personnel$_{t-1}$	-42.904	-0.222*	-33.741	-0.241*	-29.271	-0.227*	-25.588	-0.226*
	(26.573)	(0.088)	(24.710)	(0.107)	(24.102)	(0.093)	(22.718)	(0.098)
New state	2.294***	0.025***	2.452***	0.031**	2.359***	0.022**	2.501***	0.030**
	(0.514)	(0.007)	(0.586)	(0.010)	(0.465)	(0.008)	(0.514)	(0.010)
PR electoral system$_{t-1}$	0.061	0.001	0.317	-0.002	0.016	0.001	0.299	-0.002
	(0.409)	(0.006)	(0.455)	(0.008)	(0.427)	(0.006)	(0.493)	(0.008)

ln(oth. SDMs (dom.)$_{t-1}$)	1.022**	0.021	1.155**	0.033	1.008**	0.019	1.163**	0.032
	(0.340)	(0.022)	(0.402)	(0.028)	(0.387)	(0.023)	(0.442)	(0.028)
Civil armed confl. (ctry)$_{t-1}$	-0.694	-0.006	-0.934^{+}	-0.007	-0.674	-0.007	-0.923^{+}	-0.008
	(0.542)	(0.006)	(0.551)	(0.007)	(0.535)	(0.006)	(0.552)	(0.007)
Int. rival$_{t-1}$	-0.047	-0.005	-0.179	-0.006	-0.118	-0.004	-0.188	-0.006
	(0.340)	(0.004)	(0.368)	(0.005)	(0.341)	(0.004)	(0.350)	(0.005)
ln(oth. SDMs (int.)$_{t-1}$)	-0.438*	-0.001	-0.324^{+}	-0.002	-0.463*	-0.000	-0.361*	-0.001
	(0.182)	(0.006)	(0.172)	(0.009)	(0.190)	(0.006)	(0.165)	(0.009)
Civil armed confl. (int.)$_{t-1}$	0.413	0.005^{+}	0.472^{+}	0.009*	0.434^{+}	0.005	0.521^{+}	0.008*
	(0.251)	(0.003)	(0.277)	(0.004)	(0.262)	(0.003)	(0.281)	(0.004)
Systemic conditions:								
Cold War	-0.261	-0.002	-0.187	-0.003	-0.231	-0.002	-0.176	-0.003
	(0.434)	(0.003)	(0.458)	(0.004)	(0.432)	(0.003)	(0.481)	(0.004)
Calendar year	-0.032*	-0.001	-0.025^{+}	-0.001	-0.026^{+}	-0.001	-0.021	-0.001
	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.001)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Groups	668	668	514	514	668	668	514	514
Countries	137	137	119	119	137	137	119	119
Observations	22026	22026	17029	17029	22026	22026	17029	17029

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

There is a large number of additional, difficult-to-observe factors that could confound our estimates. To evaluate to what extent our results are robust to hidden bias from unobserved factors, we conducted a formal sensitivity analysis whereby we repeatedly simulated an unobserved confounder, included it in logit models with the same controls as reported in the paper, and re-estimated the relevant coefficients and standard errors.[17] Figure S1 shows the results. The y-axes show correlations of the simulated confounder with the outcome (nonviolent separatist claim onset) and the x-axes with the different endogenous regressors (exclusion, lost autonomy since 1800, recent loss of autonomy). [18] Grey dots indicate simulations where the effects of exclusion and lost autonomy lose statistical significance at the 5% level but remain positive whereas black dots indicate simulations where the effect estimates drop below zero. The hollow circles indicate simulations where the effects remain positive and statistically significant. For comparison, we also plot correlations of all measured covariates with the endogenous regressors and the outcome (blue triangles).

The findings suggest that the effect of exclusion is sensitive, especially when restricting the sample to regionally concentrated groups. In the latter case, an unmeasured confounder with correlations of just 0.1 with exclusion and 0.05 with the dependent variable would be sufficient for the coefficient to lose statistical significance (though larger correlations would be necessary for the effect to become zero). As can be seen from the blue triangles, several of the measured controls have correlations in this vicinity, which can be taken as a sign of sensitivity to hidden bias (Clarke 2009).

By comparison, significantly larger correlations would be needed to overturn the effects of lost autonomy, and in most cases none of the measured covariates comes even close to the correlations necessary to overturn the results. This can be interpreted as a sign of robustness to hidden bias (Clarke 2009), though the fact that an unobserved variable with relatively modest correlations with autonomy loss and nonviolent separatist claim onset in the vicinity of $r = 0.2$ and 0.1, respectively, remains sufficient to overturn the results still suggests a degree of caution.

[17] We adapt statistical code from Beber et al. (2014) for the formal sensitivity analysis.
[18] As recent exclusion has no significant effect, it is not included in the sensitivity analysis.

Figure S1: Sensitivity to hidden bias (DV = nonviolent separatist claim onset)

All groups

Concentrated groups

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

We conducted a series of additional robustness checks varying several of our measurement choices. We invariably get similar results. Our preferred way of coding whether a separatist movement emerged as nonviolent or violent relies on SDM's inclusive measure of separatist armed conflict that combines data on separatist violence from various sources, including UCDP, MAR, and Marshall & Gurr (2003). Table S7 shows the results if we re-estimate all models reported in Table 2 in the paper while relying on data on separatist violence from the UCDP armed conflict database (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson & Eck 2018) and no other source. This leads us to code more SDMs as nonviolent at birth – 207 compared to 192. Only 7 instances of SDM onset remain coded as violent based on UCDP. Static exclusion now has a stronger effect in the models with country dummies, but lost autonomy continues to have stronger effects.

The static autonomy loss variable captures any autonomy loss since 1800. Table S8 shows that the results are similar if the variable is recoded so that only autonomy losses since 1900 are captured.

The "recent exclusion" and "recent autonomy loss" results reported in the paper consider events from the the previous two years. Table S9 shows the results when events from only the previous year are considered; the previous 3 years; and the previous 5 years. All models include the full set of controls. We find that recent autonomy loss strongly increases the probability of nonviolent separatist claim onset irrespectively of the cut-off whereas recent exclusion never has a robust effect. It is worth noting that the effect of recent autonomy loss decreases as more years are considered. This suggests that the immediate aftermath of autonomy revocations is most likely to see the emergence of a nonviolent separatist movement.

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Table S7: Nonviolent separatist claim onset coded based on UCDP and no other source

	(1) Logit	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) OLS	(5) Logit	(6) OLS	(7) Logit	(8) OLS
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	1.119***	0.005*	0.864**	0.005+				
	(0.293)	(0.002)	(0.297)	(0.003)				
Lost autonomy (1800)	1.099**	0.014***	0.890**	0.015***				
	(0.339)	(0.003)	(0.292)	(0.004)				
Recent exclusion (2 years)					0.716	0.009	0.807+	0.012
					(0.470)	(0.008)	(0.465)	(0.010)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)					2.319***	0.073**	2.092***	0.083**
					(0.393)	(0.027)	(0.406)	(0.032)
Group-level controls:								
Regional concentration	1.571***	0.010**			1.848***	0.015***		
	(0.361)	(0.003)			(0.371)	(0.003)		
Relative group size	0.463	-0.008	-0.324	-0.012	-1.427*	-0.017**	-1.973*	-0.025**
	(0.643)	(0.005)	(0.758)	(0.009)	(0.658)	(0.006)	(0.804)	(0.008)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.632***	0.010**	0.685**	0.010*	0.721***	0.011**	0.781**	0.010**
	(0.188)	(0.004)	(0.223)	(0.004)	(0.199)	(0.003)	(0.241)	(0.004)
Regional autonomy	0.335	0.003	0.155	0.005	-0.043	0.000	-0.129	0.002
	(0.268)	(0.005)	(0.334)	(0.006)	(0.304)	(0.005)	(0.351)	(0.006)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$			0.708*	0.005			0.701*	0.003
			(0.278)	(0.003)			(0.321)	(0.003)
Mountainous terrain			0.305	-0.002			0.283	-0.000
			(0.363)	(0.004)			(0.330)	(0.004)
Noncontiguity			2.096**	0.017			2.238***	0.015
			(0.687)	(0.023)			(0.643)	(0.023)
Country-level controls:								
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	0.391+	0.007	0.320	0.009+	0.351	0.007+	0.279	0.009+
	(0.213)	(0.004)	(0.236)	(0.005)	(0.221)	(0.004)	(0.248)	(0.005)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	0.316**	-0.007	0.286**	-0.012	0.316**	-0.007	0.271*	-0.010
	(0.109)	(0.007)	(0.110)	(0.009)	(0.116)	(0.007)	(0.116)	(0.009)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-1.137	-0.024*	-1.892*	-0.022+	-1.647*	-0.027*	-2.236**	-0.026+
	(0.703)	(0.010)	(0.744)	(0.013)	(0.654)	(0.010)	(0.697)	(0.013)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.508	0.003	0.566+	-0.000	0.369	0.003	0.520	0.002
	(0.362)	(0.013)	(0.325)	(0.017)	(0.394)	(0.013)	(0.341)	(0.016)
Number of rel. groups	-0.036***	-0.000	-0.036***	0.000	-0.031***	-0.000	-0.032***	-0.000
	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)
Systemic conditions:								
Cold War	0.052	0.001	-0.167	-0.000	-0.064	0.000	-0.251	-0.001
	(0.315)	(0.004)	(0.349)	(0.005)	(0.311)	(0.004)	(0.344)	(0.005)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Groups	691	691	533	533	691	691	533	533
Countries	140	140	121	121	140	140	121	121
Observations	23627	23627	18184	18184	23627	23627	18184	18184

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table S8: Autonomy loss since 1900; DV = Nonviolent separatist claim onset

	(1) Logit	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) OLS
Ethnic grievances:				
Exclusion	1.023**	0.004*	0.747*	0.005+
	(0.320)	(0.002)	(0.314)	(0.003)
Lost autonomy (1900)	0.998***	0.013***	0.834***	0.015***
	(0.214)	(0.003)	(0.209)	(0.003)
Group-level controls:				
Regional concentration	1.814***	0.012***		
	(0.364)	(0.003)		
Relative group size	0.183	-0.009+	-0.539	-0.013
	(0.613)	(0.005)	(0.759)	(0.008)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.575**	0.009*	0.620*	0.008*
	(0.222)	(0.003)	(0.269)	(0.004)
Regional autonomy	0.196	0.003	0.026	0.003
	(0.319)	(0.005)	(0.377)	(0.006)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$			0.619*	0.004
			(0.278)	(0.003)
Mountainous terrain			0.305	0.000
			(0.332)	(0.004)
Noncontiguity			2.163**	0.024
			(0.755)	(0.023)
Country-level controls:				
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	0.484*	0.007	0.416+	0.009+
	(0.220)	(0.004)	(0.241)	(0.005)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	0.287**	-0.006	0.259*	-0.011
	(0.109)	(0.007)	(0.110)	(0.010)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-0.877	-0.019+	-1.697*	-0.016
	(0.725)	(0.010)	(0.778)	(0.013)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.512	0.002	0.634+	-0.000
	(0.361)	(0.012)	(0.334)	(0.015)
Number of rel. groups	-0.025***	-0.000	-0.027***	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)
Systemic conditions:				
Cold War	-0.116	0.000	-0.355	-0.002
	(0.314)	(0.004)	(0.345)	(0.005)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	No	No	Yes	Yes
Groups	686	686	528	528
Countries	140	140	121	121
Observations	23612	23612	18169	18169

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table S9: Different cut-offs for recent exclusion/autonomy loss; DV = Nonviolent separatist claim onset

	(1) Logit	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) OLS	(5) Logit	(6) OLS
Recent exclusion (1 year)	1.056*	0.018				
	(0.527)	(0.017)				
Recent exclusion (3 years)			0.321	0.003		
			(0.503)	(0.006)		
Recent exclusion (5 years)					0.311	0.003
					(0.378)	(0.004)
Recent aut. loss (1 year)	2.576***	0.124*				
	(0.483)	(0.049)				
Recent aut. loss (3 years)			1.949***	0.061*		
			(0.416)	(0.024)		
Recent aut. loss (5 years)					1.611***	0.039**
					(0.423)	(0.015)
Group-level controls:						
Relative group size	-1.767*	-0.021**	-1.827*	-0.021**	-1.801*	-0.021**
	(0.806)	(0.008)	(0.841)	(0.008)	(0.830)	(0.008)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.707**	0.008*	0.669**	0.008*	0.676**	0.008*
	(0.251)	(0.004)	(0.250)	(0.004)	(0.250)	(0.004)
Regional autonomy	-0.254	-0.000	-0.192	0.001	-0.192	0.001
	(0.391)	(0.006)	(0.392)	(0.006)	(0.401)	(0.006)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.634*	0.002	0.661*	0.002	0.662*	0.002
	(0.298)	(0.003)	(0.308)	(0.003)	(0.308)	(0.003)
Mountainous terrain	0.175	-0.001	0.196	-0.001	0.185	-0.001
	(0.329)	(0.004)	(0.326)	(0.004)	(0.323)	(0.004)
Noncontiguity	2.228**	0.021	2.162**	0.021	2.187**	0.022
	(0.687)	(0.021)	(0.699)	(0.022)	(0.705)	(0.022)
Country-level controls:						
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	0.336	0.009+	0.351	0.010+	0.361	0.010*
	(0.250)	(0.005)	(0.252)	(0.005)	(0.250)	(0.005)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	0.297**	-0.008	0.298**	-0.008	0.297**	-0.009
	(0.115)	(0.010)	(0.115)	(0.010)	(0.115)	(0.010)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-2.119**	-0.021	-2.098**	-0.021	-2.137**	-0.021
	(0.743)	(0.013)	(0.741)	(0.013)	(0.744)	(0.013)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.595+	0.002	0.564	0.002	0.572+	0.001
	(0.343)	(0.014)	(0.346)	(0.015)	(0.344)	(0.015)
Number of rel. groups	-0.031***	0.000	-0.031***	0.000	-0.031***	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)
Systemic conditions:						
Cold War	-0.366	-0.002	-0.376	-0.002	-0.393	-0.002
	(0.353)	(0.005)	(0.356)	(0.005)	(0.360)	(0.005)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groups	528	528	528	528	528	528
Countries	121	121	121	121	121	121
Observations	18169	18169	18169	18169	18169	18169

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Finally, Table S10 reports the results when we disaggregate the (static) exclusion and lost autonomy variables.[19] EPR distinguishes between three types of exclusion: "powerless" (elite representatives of the group have no representation in the central government, but there is no explicit discrimination against the group), "discriminated" (group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination with the intention of excluding them from state power), and "self-exclusion" (groups de facto control a territory within the state which they have declared independent and they have therefore self-excluded themselves from their host state's central government). Wald tests of the equality of coefficients generally suggest no statistically significant differences between being powerless and discriminated against. Meanwhile, self-exclusion is irrelevant in the present context because a separatist claim is a precondition for de facto independence.

Table S10 also distinguishes between three types of autonomy loss (all since 1800): lost independence, being stranded, and lost internal autonomy (for definitions see section 4 of the online appendix).[20] Lost internal autonomy has the largest coefficient across models whereas the effect of groups being stranded outside of the borders of their cultural motherland never reaches statistical significance. However, Wald tests suggests that the null hypothesis of equal coefficients cannot be rejected. That said, it is important to refrain from too strong conclusions given that our data for historical losses of internal autonomy may be incomplete in contexts such as Sub-Saharan Africa, as noted in section 4 of the online appendix.

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[19] The number of cases is too small for similar disaggregation of the variables tracking recent exclusion and recent autonomy loss.

[20] Note that whereas the different types of exclusion are mutually exclusive (e.g., a group cannot be both powerless and discriminated against), multiple of these categories may apply to the same group. For example, the Papuans in Indonesia had no foreign rulers until the late 19th century, when they lost their independence due to colonization, but at the same time they lost internal autonomy after Indonesia's annexation of West Papua in 1963.

Table S10: Disaggregating exclusion and lost autonomy; DV = Nonviolent separatist claim onset

	(1) Logit	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) OLS
Powerless	1.027**	0.004+	0.720*	0.004
	(0.314)	(0.002)	(0.326)	(0.003)
Discriminated	1.076*	0.003	0.818	0.005
	(0.483)	(0.004)	(0.499)	(0.005)
Lost independence (1800)	0.778*	0.010*	0.621*	0.010**
	(0.382)	(0.004)	(0.265)	(0.004)
Stranded (1800)	0.525	0.007	0.514	0.011
	(0.363)	(0.005)	(0.384)	(0.009)
Lost internal aut. (1800)	1.346***	0.017***	1.192***	0.018***
	(0.235)	(0.004)	(0.253)	(0.005)
Group-level controls:				
Regional concentration	1.498***	0.009**		
	(0.381)	(0.003)		
Relative group size	0.362	-0.008	-0.438	-0.011
	(0.656)	(0.005)	(0.848)	(0.009)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.595**	0.008*	0.667**	0.008*
	(0.215)	(0.003)	(0.245)	(0.004)
Regional autonomy	0.597	0.005	0.427	0.007
	(0.504)	(0.007)	(0.500)	(0.008)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$			0.708*	0.006+
			(0.283)	(0.003)
Mountainous terrain			0.114	-0.002
			(0.338)	(0.004)
Noncontiguity			1.987*	0.024
			(0.781)	(0.023)
Country-level controls:				
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	0.494*	0.007	0.403+	0.009+
	(0.212)	(0.004)	(0.235)	(0.005)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	0.287**	-0.005	0.241*	-0.010
	(0.108)	(0.007)	(0.112)	(0.009)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-1.059	-0.020*	-1.787*	-0.017
	(0.714)	(0.010)	(0.815)	(0.013)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.489	0.002	0.589+	-0.001
	(0.374)	(0.012)	(0.338)	(0.015)
Number of rel. groups	-0.035***	-0.000	-0.033***	0.000
	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)
Systemic conditions:				
Cold War	-0.120	0.000	-0.342	-0.001
	(0.313)	(0.004)	(0.340)	(0.005)
Wald tests:				
$p(\beta_{Powerless}=\beta_{Discriminated})$	0.888	0.866	0.778	0.739
$p(\beta_{Lost\ indep.}=\beta_{Stranded})$	0.546	0.639	0.789	0.868
$p(\beta_{Lost\ indep.}=\beta_{Lost\ intern.\ auton.})$	0.209	0.134	0.131	0.150
$p(\beta_{Stranded}=\beta_{Lost\ intern.\ auton.})$	0.056	0.110	0.124	0.510
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only conc. groups	No	No	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	686	686	528	528
No. of countries	140	140	121	121
Observations	23612	23612	18169	18169

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

9   Further Robustness Checks: Conflict Escalation

This section shows additional robustness checks that are referenced in the paper, but not shown.

All models reported in Table 4 in the paper restrict the sample to regionally concentrated groups. Table S11 shows that the results remain similar if nonviolent separatist groups are included that lack regional concentration. All models control for regional concentration. Note that regional concentration never reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. This result contradicts Toft's (2003: p. 32) argument that regional concentration constitutes the key to understanding separatist violence as concentrated groups are likely to perceive of their territory as indivisible.

Table S12 shows that we get results in models with a reduced set of controls (region or country fixed effects and time controls).

Tables S13 and S14 show that the results remain similar also when dropping countries with many instances of separatist conflict escalation: India (14), Myanmar (11), Iran (9), and Russia/USSR (8). All models are based on logit regression, restrict the sample to concentrated groups, and include region dummies.

Table S11: Models including dispersed (etc.) groups; DV = Escalation

	First-time escalation				All escalations			
	(1) Logit	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) OLS	(5) Logit	(6) OLS	(7) Logit	(8) OLS
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	1.011*	0.027*			0.544+	0.025*		
	(0.409)	(0.011)			(0.287)	(0.010)		
Lost autonomy (1800)	0.365	0.001			0.317	0.007		
	(0.370)	(0.006)			(0.273)	(0.006)		
Recent exclusion (2 years)			1.176*	0.063			0.629	0.042
			(0.593)	(0.042)			(0.495)	(0.038)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)			1.099*	0.063			1.845***	0.173***
			(0.501)	(0.042)			(0.362)	(0.050)
Group-level controls:								
Regional concentration	1.636+	0.015	1.360	0.013	1.111	0.008	0.896	0.004
	(0.913)	(0.014)	(1.021)	(0.014)	(0.694)	(0.009)	(0.724)	(0.010)
Relative group size	1.474	0.041*	0.250	0.019	0.164	0.034+	-0.466	0.008
	(1.121)	(0.017)	(1.148)	(0.020)	(0.867)	(0.018)	(0.917)	(0.019)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.231	0.000	0.572	0.006	0.356+	0.004	0.543**	0.010
	(0.378)	(0.009)	(0.362)	(0.009)	(0.193)	(0.007)	(0.186)	(0.006)
Regional autonomy	0.558	0.014	0.512	0.011	0.411	0.017	0.396	0.015
	(0.489)	(0.013)	(0.460)	(0.012)	(0.304)	(0.011)	(0.281)	(0.010)
Country-level controls:								
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	-0.658*	-0.012	-0.579*	-0.013	-0.373*	-0.006	-0.317+	-0.007
	(0.269)	(0.008)	(0.230)	(0.009)	(0.184)	(0.007)	(0.182)	(0.008)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	-0.036	-0.019	-0.014	-0.016	0.017	-0.017	0.019	-0.015
	(0.158)	(0.021)	(0.137)	(0.020)	(0.102)	(0.014)	(0.100)	(0.014)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-0.392	0.010	-0.879	0.006	-0.642	-0.014	-0.785	-0.017
	(1.030)	(0.015)	(0.874)	(0.014)	(0.669)	(0.018)	(0.674)	(0.018)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	-0.065	0.005	-0.150	0.000	0.131	0.013	0.083	0.007
	(0.424)	(0.031)	(0.341)	(0.028)	(0.317)	(0.025)	(0.297)	(0.023)
Number of rel. groups	-0.004	0.000	-0.003	0.000	-0.012	-0.001	-0.009	-0.000
	(0.017)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.001)
Systemic conditions:								
Cold War	0.473	0.016*	0.563+	0.015*	0.066	0.010	0.131	0.009
	(0.341)	(0.007)	(0.317)	(0.007)	(0.188)	(0.006)	(0.188)	(0.007)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
No. of groups	232	232	232	232	272	272	272	272
No. of countries	90	90	90	90	94	94	94	94
Observations	4771	4771	4771	4771	6685	6685	6685	6685

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S12: Models with only region/country dummies; DV = Escalation

	First-time escalation				All escalations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	0.932*	0.022*			0.522+	0.021*		
	(0.393)	(0.010)			(0.277)	(0.009)		
Lost autonomy (1800)	0.255	-0.000			0.271	0.005		
	(0.383)	(0.005)			(0.254)	(0.005)		
Recent exclusion (2 years)			1.014	0.066			0.547	0.045
			(0.641)	(0.044)			(0.497)	(0.039)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)			0.962+	0.068			1.825***	0.181***
			(0.502)	(0.045)			(0.360)	(0.050)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	221	221	221	221	260	260	260	260
No. of countries	86	86	86	86	89	89	89	89
Observations	4452	4452	4452	4452	6352	6352	6352	6352

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table S13: Dropping influential countries I; DV = Escalation

	W/o India				W/o Myanmar			
	First escal.		All escal.		First escal.		All escal.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	1.222**		0.568+		1.103*		0.630*	
	(0.445)		(0.318)		(0.439)		(0.294)	
Lost autonomy (1800)	0.295		0.360		0.443		0.386	
	(0.466)		(0.323)		(0.410)		(0.310)	
Recent exclusion (2 years)		1.125+		0.534		0.897		0.357
		(0.578)		(0.487)		(0.735)		(0.560)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)		1.236*		1.995***		0.941+		1.888***
		(0.542)		(0.358)		(0.541)		(0.412)
Group-level controls:								
Relative group size	1.210	-0.694	-0.128	-1.046	1.243	-0.346	0.134	-0.796
	(1.136)	(1.262)	(0.939)	(1.108)	(1.082)	(1.196)	(0.837)	(1.009)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.343	0.682+	0.344+	0.538**	0.337	0.687+	0.375+	0.595**
	(0.381)	(0.374)	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.397)	(0.380)	(0.213)	(0.201)
Regional autonomy	0.389	0.252	0.200	0.134	0.933*	0.800*	0.476	0.448+
	(0.596)	(0.541)	(0.320)	(0.271)	(0.386)	(0.374)	(0.309)	(0.266)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.029	0.082	0.253	0.202	0.242	0.335	0.205	0.157
	(0.385)	(0.326)	(0.324)	(0.279)	(0.367)	(0.334)	(0.285)	(0.244)
Mountainous terrain	0.286	0.291	0.562	0.515	0.457	0.613	0.580	0.590
	(0.614)	(0.674)	(0.391)	(0.419)	(0.584)	(0.581)	(0.378)	(0.391)
Noncontiguity	-0.767	-0.373	-0.597	-0.566	-0.614	-0.232	-0.577	-0.549
	(0.677)	(0.631)	(0.467)	(0.492)	(0.727)	(0.727)	(0.489)	(0.541)
Country-level controls:								
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	-0.540*	-0.504*	-0.277	-0.225	-0.462+	-0.453+	-0.212	-0.149
	(0.247)	(0.224)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.277)	(0.274)	(0.169)	(0.168)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	-0.077	-0.044	-0.033	-0.024	0.015	0.006	0.054	0.050
	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.175)	(0.177)	(0.107)	(0.108)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-1.051	-1.554+	-0.916	-1.123	-0.858	-1.119	-0.718	-0.881
	(1.102)	(0.861)	(0.744)	(0.717)	(1.006)	(0.943)	(0.680)	(0.700)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.168	-0.031	0.236	0.183	-0.263	-0.330	0.040	0.013
	(0.454)	(0.365)	(0.324)	(0.304)	(0.371)	(0.365)	(0.300)	(0.299)
Number of rel. groups	-0.015	-0.009	-0.016	-0.014	-0.015	-0.009	-0.020	-0.016
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Systemic conditions:								
Cold War	0.359	0.435	0.041	0.095	0.362	0.496	0.030	0.101
	(0.357)	(0.307)	(0.208)	(0.204)	(0.371)	(0.343)	(0.209)	(0.211)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	211	211	248	248	216	216	252	252
No. of countries	85	85	88	88	85	85	88	88
Observations	4264	4264	6067	6067	4418	4418	6198	6198

Note: All models are estimated with logit regression and include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table S14: Dropping influential countries II; DV = Escalation

	W/o Iran				W/o Russia/USSR			
	First escal.		All escal.		First escal.		All escal.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	1.065**		0.560*		1.187**		0.617*	
	(0.404)		(0.271)		(0.378)		(0.266)	
Lost autonomy (1800)	0.353		0.308		0.232		0.137	
	(0.394)		(0.265)		(0.426)		(0.228)	
Recent exclusion (2 years)		1.234*		0.575		1.178*		0.566
		(0.557)		(0.486)		(0.563)		(0.492)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)		1.238*		1.945***		1.068*		1.915***
		(0.503)		(0.357)		(0.515)		(0.363)
Group-level controls:								
Relative group size	1.269	-0.309	0.332	-0.418	1.090	-0.595	-0.159	-1.000
	(1.026)	(1.099)	(0.798)	(0.932)	(1.016)	(1.179)	(0.881)	(1.076)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.493	0.830*	0.356	0.537*	0.221	0.547	0.343+	0.514**
	(0.372)	(0.360)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.390)	(0.375)	(0.201)	(0.199)
Regional autonomy	0.381	0.298	0.329	0.306	0.533	0.445	0.314	0.320
	(0.513)	(0.475)	(0.309)	(0.288)	(0.491)	(0.476)	(0.308)	(0.282)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.220	0.318	0.174	0.131	0.148	0.240	0.232	0.187
	(0.385)	(0.363)	(0.329)	(0.275)	(0.456)	(0.405)	(0.314)	(0.263)
Mountainous terrain	0.060	0.165	0.374	0.364	-0.064	0.042	0.377	0.339
	(0.599)	(0.637)	(0.354)	(0.378)	(0.626)	(0.645)	(0.351)	(0.363)
Noncontiguity	-0.931	-0.462	-0.752	-0.675	-0.855	-0.435	-0.728	-0.708
	(0.673)	(0.614)	(0.483)	(0.484)	(0.693)	(0.655)	(0.483)	(0.496)
Country-level controls:								
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	-0.677**	-0.629**	-0.391*	-0.348*	-0.644**	-0.607**	-0.343*	-0.302+
	(0.244)	(0.234)	(0.175)	(0.171)	(0.249)	(0.227)	(0.174)	(0.173)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	-0.148	-0.126	-0.039	-0.033	-0.103	-0.066	-0.003	0.015
	(0.153)	(0.156)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.184)	(0.191)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-0.115	-0.617	-0.263	-0.387	-0.285	-0.729	-0.380	-0.500
	(0.975)	(0.882)	(0.633)	(0.651)	(0.971)	(0.858)	(0.651)	(0.676)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.255	0.029	0.294	0.223	0.178	-0.057	0.241	0.157
	(0.378)	(0.312)	(0.289)	(0.274)	(0.400)	(0.340)	(0.312)	(0.297)
Number of rel. groups	-0.003	0.002	-0.013	-0.009	0.007	0.004	-0.021	-0.022
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Systemic conditions:								
Cold War	0.580	0.617+	0.098	0.155	0.436	0.530	0.091	0.161
	(0.359)	(0.324)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.381)	(0.344)	(0.201)	(0.203)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FEs	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	217	217	255	255	174	174	213	213
No. of countries	85	85	88	88	85	85	88	88
Observations	4395	4395	6260	6260	3799	3799	5663	5663

Note: All models are estimated with logit regression and include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table S15 shows that the results also remain similar when adding further controls to the models reported in the paper. We include the same additional covariates as above in the nonviolent separatist claim onset models, except that we now control for prior violence instead of prior separatism (only in the "all escalations" models). Note that most added controls do not have statistically significant effects on conflict escalation. There are two noteworthy exceptions. First, we find some evidence that adjacency of a group's settlement area to an international land border increases the risk of conflict escalation. A possible reason is that the possibility of seeking shelter across borders increases a group's capability to wage war (e.g. Salehyan 2007). Second, we find evidence that especially first-time escalations are less likely in democratic countries with a proportional electoral system. This result could reflect the relative ease by which smaller separatist groups can gain parliamentary representation in PR systems. By contrast, in majoritarian systems small groups may find it more difficult to participate via conventional electoral channels, thus rendering unconventional forms of mobilization, including violence, a more attractive option (e.g. Saideman et al. 2002).

Next, we again conducted a formal sensitivity analysis to quantify the amount of hidden bias needed to overturn the two significant effect estimates (exclusion and recent autonomy downgrades). Figure S2 shows the results. For a description of the method see the discussion in section 8 of the online appendix. We find that especially the result of recent autonomy loss on first-time escalation – which is based on a very small number of cases – is sensitive to unobserved confounding. By contrast, the effects of recent autonomy loss in the all escalation model, as well as exclusion (especially on first-time escalation), are more robust. That said, an unobserved variable that has moderate correlations with these variables and conflict escalation could be sufficient to overturn the result (e.g. a missing confounder that has correlations of 0.25 with exclusion and 0.15 with conflict escalation would be sufficient for exclusion to lose statistical significance). Clearly, we cannot preclude that such a variable exists. However, similar correlations would suffice to overturn the effect of GDP per capita in the first escalation model (see Figure S2e), and GDP per capita is widely regarded as the most robust predictor of civil wars. Moreover, none of the observed control variables has a combination of correlations that would be sufficient to overturn the results (though missing a variable like GDP per capita would bring us close in either case).

Table S15: Additional controls; DV = Escalation

	First-time escalation				All escalations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	1.199**	0.031*			0.703*	0.025+		
	(0.405)	(0.015)			(0.302)	(0.014)		
Lost autonomy (1800)	0.219	0.002			0.321	0.005		
	(0.368)	(0.007)			(0.280)	(0.008)		
Recent exclusion (2 years)			1.404*	0.072			0.713	0.055
			(0.648)	(0.045)			(0.533)	(0.042)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)			0.814+	0.065			1.928***	0.169**
			(0.460)	(0.043)			(0.395)	(0.055)
Group-level controls:								
Relative group size	0.088	0.028	-1.697	-0.003	0.150	0.024	-0.727	-0.005
	(1.147)	(0.026)	(1.259)	(0.031)	(0.909)	(0.022)	(0.983)	(0.023)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.026	-0.010	0.347	-0.005	0.181	-0.004	0.411+	0.002
	(0.376)	(0.009)	(0.369)	(0.009)	(0.224)	(0.008)	(0.219)	(0.007)
Regional autonomy	0.541	0.017	0.445	0.013	0.331	0.014	0.315	0.012
	(0.500)	(0.014)	(0.489)	(0.013)	(0.309)	(0.012)	(0.280)	(0.010)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.228	0.011	0.304	0.012	0.421	0.022*	0.339	0.023*
	(0.431)	(0.010)	(0.399)	(0.011)	(0.357)	(0.011)	(0.288)	(0.011)
Mountainous terrain	0.413	-0.001	0.516	0.001	0.588	0.012	0.573	0.016+
	(0.569)	(0.014)	(0.601)	(0.014)	(0.390)	(0.009)	(0.388)	(0.009)
Noncontiguity	-0.117	0.018	0.493	0.032*	0.018	0.019	0.142	0.030*
	(0.682)	(0.015)	(0.620)	(0.015)	(0.507)	(0.012)	(0.497)	(0.012)
Kin in power$_{t-1}$	0.522+	0.006	0.520+	0.007	0.121	0.000	0.113	0.000
	(0.309)	(0.008)	(0.302)	(0.007)	(0.224)	(0.009)	(0.208)	(0.008)
Armed conflict over gov. (group)$_{t-1}$	0.070	0.017	0.353	0.020	0.014	-0.018	-0.227	-0.019
	(0.690)	(0.020)	(0.677)	(0.019)	(0.872)	(0.030)	(1.021)	(0.034)
Int. land border	0.812+	0.011+	0.905*	0.012*	0.635*	0.010	0.687*	0.011+
	(0.415)	(0.006)	(0.407)	(0.006)	(0.317)	(0.006)	(0.333)	(0.006)
Sea shore	0.287	0.007	0.383	0.004	0.179	0.003	0.232	0.003
	(0.378)	(0.010)	(0.376)	(0.010)	(0.238)	(0.008)	(0.231)	(0.007)
Prior violence					0.298	-0.005	0.337	-0.005
					(0.233)	(0.011)	(0.225)	(0.010)
Country-level controls:								
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	-0.630**	-0.011	-0.589**	-0.014	-0.349+	-0.005	-0.262	-0.005
	(0.225)	(0.009)	(0.221)	(0.009)	(0.195)	(0.009)	(0.199)	(0.010)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	-0.063	0.008	-0.028	0.007	-0.056	0.000	-0.048	0.001
	(0.166)	(0.025)	(0.170)	(0.025)	(0.132)	(0.016)	(0.126)	(0.016)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	0.738	0.024	0.081	0.021	0.256	0.007	-0.022	0.003
	(0.888)	(0.022)	(0.881)	(0.022)	(0.644)	(0.024)	(0.667)	(0.025)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.029	-0.001	-0.219	-0.006	0.220	0.015	0.143	0.010
	(0.410)	(0.031)	(0.356)	(0.029)	(0.349)	(0.022)	(0.329)	(0.020)
Number of rel. groups	-0.008	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.007	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.019)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.001)
Gov. military personnel$_{t-1}$	-13.306	0.691	-8.615	0.698	-12.937	0.277	-10.836	0.256
	(35.491)	(0.558)	(33.491)	(0.550)	(19.120)	(0.514)	(18.106)	(0.494)
New state	0.191	0.018	0.073	0.015	0.721	0.050	0.402	0.033
	(0.581)	(0.034)	(0.602)	(0.034)	(0.518)	(0.035)	(0.526)	(0.033)
PR electoral system$_{t-1}$	-2.265*	-0.005	-2.018*	-0.008	-1.198+	-0.013	-1.138+	-0.015
	(0.895)	(0.010)	(0.886)	(0.009)	(0.646)	(0.010)	(0.633)	(0.010)
ln(oth. SDMs (dom.)$_{t-1}$)	0.020	0.023+	0.047	0.020+	0.005	0.016*	-0.001	0.014*
	(0.255)	(0.012)	(0.262)	(0.012)	(0.152)	(0.007)	(0.148)	(0.007)

Civil armed confl. (ctry)$_{t-1}$	0.401	0.003	0.320	-0.001	0.170	-0.003	0.172	-0.004
	(0.474)	(0.012)	(0.457)	(0.011)	(0.291)	(0.010)	(0.273)	(0.009)
Int. rival$_{t-1}$	-0.093	0.023	-0.255	0.023	-0.292	0.017	-0.323	0.016
	(0.433)	(0.017)	(0.432)	(0.017)	(0.256)	(0.012)	(0.250)	(0.012)
ln(oth. SDMs (int.)$_{t-1}$)	0.110	0.013	0.142	0.014	0.178	0.010	0.179	0.010
	(0.260)	(0.009)	(0.268)	(0.009)	(0.187)	(0.008)	(0.175)	(0.008)
Civil armed confl. (int.)$_{t-1}$	-0.233	-0.001	-0.174	-0.002	-0.231	-0.005	-0.224	-0.006
	(0.483)	(0.008)	(0.496)	(0.008)	(0.361)	(0.007)	(0.364)	(0.007)
Systemic conditions:								
Cold War	0.701	0.008	0.685	0.008	0.332	0.002	0.387	0.002
	(0.562)	(0.009)	(0.536)	(0.009)	(0.407)	(0.010)	(0.395)	(0.009)
Calendar year	0.007	-0.002*	0.004	-0.001*	0.003	-0.001	0.002	-0.001
	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	218	218	218	218	257	257	257	257
No. of countries	83	83	83	83	87	87	87	87
Observations	4141	4141	4141	4141	5830	5830	5830	5830

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure S2: Sensitivity to hidden bias (DV = conflict escalation)

First-time escalation

All escalations

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Our preferred measure of conflict escalation combines data from a variety of sources and includes armed conflicts with mixed motives (i.e., overthrowing the central government in addition to greater self-rule). Table S16 shows that the results remain similar if armed conflicts with mixed motives are dropped. Table S17 shows that we get similar results also when drawing data on separatist armed conflict from the UCDP armed conflict database (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson & Eck 2018) instead of SDM.

The static autonomy loss variable captures autonomy losses since 1800. Table S18 shows the results if the variable is recoded so that only autonomy losses since 1900 are captured. Consistent with the idea that autonomy losses affect the escalation risk more strongly if they are more recent, the coefficient estimates are now somewhat larger, but are only significantly different from zero in 2/4 models.

The results for recent exclusion and autonomy loss reported in the paper are based on variables that consider events over the course of the previous two years. Table S19 shows the results when instead events from i) only the previous year only, ii) the previous 3 years, and iii) the previous 5 years are considered. The results confirm that the recent autonmy revocation result is fragile in the "first escalation" models. However, in the "all escalations" models recent autonomy downgrades have highly statistically significant effects irrespectively of the cut-off. Note that the coefficients decrease the more years are considered, suggesting that autonomy downgrades are most likely to lead to conflict escalation in their immediate aftermath. Recent exclusion has no robust effect irrespectively of the cut-off, but as stated in the paper we refrain from strong conclusions due to the small number of cases.

Finally, Table S20 shows the results when we disaggregate the (static) exclusion and lost autonomy (since 1800) variables. The EPR dataset allows us to distinguish between three types of exclusion: being powerless (elite representatives of the group have no representation in the central government, but there is no explicit discrimination against the group), being discriminated (group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination with the intention of excluding them from state power), and self-exclusion (groups de facto control a territory within the state which they have declared independent and they have therefore self-excluded them from their host state's central government). We find that active discrimination tends to have a stronger, more consistent effect on the risk of conflict escalation (though Wald tests of the equality of coefficients are not always statistically significant). Given that active discrimination should go hand in hand with strong resentments against the state, this result provides additional support to our theoretical expectations. We also find that the risk of conflict escalation is especially high if groups have declared independence and unilaterally severed ties with the rest of the state. Meanwhile, Table S20 suggests no statistically significant differences between the three three sub-components of the lost autonomy variable: lost independence, stranded, and lost internal autonomy (for definitions section 4 of the online appendix).

Table S16: Dropping wars with mixed motives; DV = Escalation

	First-time escalation				All escalations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	1.109**	0.026*			0.792**	0.022*		
	(0.387)	(0.012)			(0.299)	(0.010)		
Lost autonomy (1800)	0.420	0.002			0.412	0.010$^+$		
	(0.386)	(0.005)			(0.279)	(0.006)		
Recent exclusion (2 years)			1.260*	0.072			0.516	0.033
			(0.564)	(0.043)			(0.566)	(0.035)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)			1.106*	0.067			1.924***	0.168**
			(0.518)	(0.043)			(0.376)	(0.050)
Group-level controls:								
Relative group size	0.751	0.022	-1.113	-0.006	-0.492	0.027	-1.813	-0.005
	(1.132)	(0.018)	(1.383)	(0.019)	(0.983)	(0.019)	(1.257)	(0.020)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.232	-0.004	0.547	0.002	0.262	-0.004	0.461$^+$	0.002
	(0.412)	(0.009)	(0.416)	(0.009)	(0.230)	(0.006)	(0.237)	(0.006)
Regional autonomy	0.412	0.010	0.325	0.007	0.309	0.014	0.255	0.011
	(0.519)	(0.013)	(0.499)	(0.012)	(0.315)	(0.011)	(0.295)	(0.010)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.111	0.007	0.211	0.008	0.100	0.013	0.127	0.014
	(0.338)	(0.008)	(0.292)	(0.009)	(0.289)	(0.008)	(0.266)	(0.009)
Mountainous terrain	0.090	0.001	0.227	0.003	0.328	0.011	0.368	0.016$^+$
	(0.592)	(0.013)	(0.612)	(0.012)	(0.342)	(0.009)	(0.362)	(0.008)
Noncontiguity	-0.834	0.020	-0.396	0.029	-0.872$^+$	0.016	-0.751	0.026*
	(0.688)	(0.015)	(0.663)	(0.018)	(0.509)	(0.011)	(0.525)	(0.012)
Country-level controls:								
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	-0.606*	-0.010	-0.550*	-0.011	-0.320$^+$	-0.005	-0.264	-0.006
	(0.253)	(0.009)	(0.230)	(0.009)	(0.177)	(0.007)	(0.169)	(0.008)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	-0.073	-0.025	-0.056	-0.021	0.034	-0.018	0.029	-0.016
	(0.168)	(0.021)	(0.165)	(0.021)	(0.114)	(0.014)	(0.115)	(0.015)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-0.131	0.016	-0.628	0.012	-0.064	-0.003	-0.281	-0.006
	(0.985)	(0.015)	(0.834)	(0.013)	(0.609)	(0.016)	(0.622)	(0.016)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.250	0.009	0.048	0.004	0.461	0.014	0.358	0.009
	(0.430)	(0.029)	(0.362)	(0.026)	(0.303)	(0.024)	(0.292)	(0.023)
Number of rel. groups	-0.008	0.001	-0.003	0.001	-0.019	-0.000	-0.015	0.000
	(0.017)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)
Systemic conditions:								
Cold War	0.507	0.013*	0.546$^+$	0.012$^+$	0.228	0.012*	0.279	0.011$^+$
	(0.349)	(0.006)	(0.303)	(0.006)	(0.186)	(0.005)	(0.187)	(0.005)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	221	221	221	221	260	260	260	260
No. of countries	86	86	86	86	89	89	89	89
Observations	4447	4447	4447	4447	6335	6335	6335	6335

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S17: UCDP data on separatist armed conflict; DV = Escalation

	First-time escalation				All escalations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	0.767*	0.013+			0.981***	0.030**		
	(0.356)	(0.007)			(0.282)	(0.010)		
Lost autonomy (1800)	0.958+	0.008+			0.320	0.012*		
	(0.551)	(0.005)			(0.356)	(0.006)		
Recent exclusion (2 years)			0.823+	0.040			0.882*	0.048+
			(0.439)	(0.032)			(0.363)	(0.028)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)			2.069***	0.121*			1.637***	0.155***
			(0.442)	(0.059)			(0.380)	(0.042)
Group-level controls:								
Relative group size	0.623	0.029*	-0.262	0.011	0.550	0.051+	-0.697	0.010
	(1.086)	(0.014)	(1.171)	(0.014)	(0.933)	(0.028)	(0.974)	(0.020)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.569+	0.006	0.798*	0.009	0.347	-0.000	0.535*	0.006
	(0.328)	(0.007)	(0.345)	(0.007)	(0.241)	(0.008)	(0.258)	(0.008)
Regional autonomy	0.838+	0.010	0.650+	0.008	0.463+	0.018+	0.439*	0.014+
	(0.495)	(0.010)	(0.379)	(0.009)	(0.264)	(0.009)	(0.216)	(0.008)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.188	0.010	0.155	0.009	0.188	0.016*	0.083	0.018*
	(0.372)	(0.007)	(0.376)	(0.007)	(0.197)	(0.007)	(0.219)	(0.008)
Mountainous terrain	0.272	-0.006	0.353	-0.004	0.614+	0.007	0.639+	0.013
	(0.494)	(0.011)	(0.531)	(0.011)	(0.353)	(0.009)	(0.384)	(0.009)
Noncontiguity	-0.246	0.010	-0.018	0.015	0.275	0.013	0.448	0.027
	(0.748)	(0.013)	(0.662)	(0.015)	(0.444)	(0.016)	(0.453)	(0.018)
Country-level controls:								
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	-0.675*	-0.009	-0.548*	-0.010	-0.409*	-0.008	-0.319+	-0.009
	(0.267)	(0.009)	(0.237)	(0.008)	(0.198)	(0.008)	(0.177)	(0.008)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	-0.153	-0.030*	-0.148	-0.028+	-0.018	-0.017	0.030	-0.017
	(0.153)	(0.015)	(0.143)	(0.014)	(0.101)	(0.013)	(0.098)	(0.014)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-0.915	-0.000	-1.133	-0.001	-0.092	-0.009	-0.461	-0.015
	(1.101)	(0.019)	(1.030)	(0.018)	(0.786)	(0.020)	(0.833)	(0.020)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	-0.159	0.012	-0.265	0.007	-0.072	0.004	-0.201	-0.006
	(0.630)	(0.037)	(0.484)	(0.033)	(0.369)	(0.030)	(0.309)	(0.023)
Number of rel. groups	0.010	0.001+	0.016	0.001*	-0.006	-0.001	-0.003	-0.000
	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)
Systemic conditions:								
Cold War	0.162	0.001	0.335	0.001	-0.440	-0.013	-0.355	-0.014
	(0.380)	(0.007)	(0.372)	(0.007)	(0.284)	(0.009)	(0.288)	(0.009)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	251	251	251	251	267	267	267	267
No. of countries	88	88	88	88	90	90	90	90
Observations	5444	5444	5444	5444	7034	7034	7034	7034

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table S18: Autonomy losses since 1900; DV = Escalation

	First-time escalation		All escalations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
Ethnic grievances:				
Exclusion	1.168**	0.024+	0.648*	0.021+
	(0.394)	(0.012)	(0.271)	(0.011)
Lost autonomy (1900)	0.057	0.006	0.465*	0.015+
	(0.273)	(0.008)	(0.209)	(0.008)
Group-level controls:				
Relative group size	1.033	0.028+	0.162	0.027
	(0.998)	(0.017)	(0.795)	(0.020)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.362	-0.001	0.339+	0.004
	(0.372)	(0.009)	(0.186)	(0.007)
Regional autonomy	0.535	0.014	0.459	0.016
	(0.512)	(0.013)	(0.291)	(0.010)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.184	0.009	0.270	0.022+
	(0.365)	(0.009)	(0.270)	(0.011)
Mountainous terrain	0.330	0.004	0.491	0.013
	(0.562)	(0.013)	(0.353)	(0.010)
Noncontiguity	-0.828	0.020	-0.730	0.017
	(0.628)	(0.015)	(0.456)	(0.011)
Country-level controls:				
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	-0.577*	-0.012	-0.279	-0.005
	(0.246)	(0.009)	(0.172)	(0.008)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	-0.067	-0.019	-0.008	-0.017
	(0.150)	(0.022)	(0.101)	(0.014)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-0.369	0.016	-0.376	-0.010
	(0.935)	(0.016)	(0.615)	(0.018)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.150	0.004	0.223	0.014
	(0.409)	(0.031)	(0.310)	(0.025)
Number of rel. groups	-0.012	0.000	-0.014	-0.001
	(0.017)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.001)
Systemic conditions:				
Cold War	0.456	0.015*	0.135	0.011+
	(0.340)	(0.007)	(0.190)	(0.006)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	221	221	260	260
No. of countries	86	86	89	89
Observations	4452	4452	6351	6351

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$.

Table S19: Different cut-offs for recent exclusion/autonomy loss; DV = Escalation

	First-time escalation						All escalations					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
Recent exclusion (1 year)	1.178	0.071					0.576	0.051				
	(0.900)	(0.063)					(0.776)	(0.063)				
Recent exclusion (3 years)			1.019$^+$	0.052					0.731$^+$	0.051		
			(0.592)	(0.038)					(0.419)	(0.034)		
Recent exclusion (5 years)					0.439	0.028					0.367	0.027
					(0.665)	(0.030)					(0.485)	(0.029)
Recent aut. loss (1 year)	1.121	0.050					2.258***	0.250**				
	(0.714)	(0.067)					(0.506)	(0.085)				
Recent aut. loss (3 years)			0.762	0.037					1.418***	0.114**		
			(0.512)	(0.034)					(0.346)	(0.037)		
Recent aut. loss (5 years)					0.750	0.036					1.015***	0.075**
					(0.508)	(0.030)					(0.290)	(0.024)
Group-level controls:												
Relative group size	-0.514	0.002	-0.534	0.002	-0.443	0.002	-0.972	-0.002	-1.034	-0.002	-1.037	-0.002
	(1.171)	(0.019)	(1.165)	(0.019)	(1.120)	(0.019)	(1.049)	(0.020)	(1.050)	(0.020)	(1.030)	(0.020)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.620$^+$	0.004	0.625$^+$	0.004	0.633$^+$	0.004	0.516**	0.008	0.534**	0.008	0.518**	0.008
	(0.361)	(0.008)	(0.368)	(0.008)	(0.363)	(0.008)	(0.198)	(0.006)	(0.196)	(0.006)	(0.195)	(0.006)
Regional autonomy	0.439	0.009	0.455	0.009	0.448	0.010	0.305	0.012	0.318	0.012	0.306	0.012
	(0.470)	(0.012)	(0.486)	(0.012)	(0.497)	(0.012)	(0.273)	(0.010)	(0.275)	(0.010)	(0.272)	(0.010)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.261	0.010	0.275	0.010	0.268	0.010	0.179	0.021$^+$	0.211	0.022$^+$	0.219	0.022$^+$
	(0.343)	(0.010)	(0.331)	(0.010)	(0.332)	(0.010)	(0.242)	(0.011)	(0.241)	(0.012)	(0.244)	(0.012)
Mountainous terrain	0.367	0.006	0.370	0.006	0.358	0.006	0.503	0.017$^+$	0.511	0.016$^+$	0.504	0.016$^+$
	(0.600)	(0.012)	(0.606)	(0.012)	(0.602)	(0.012)	(0.368)	(0.009)	(0.370)	(0.009)	(0.367)	(0.009)
Noncontiguity	-0.393	0.028	-0.423	0.029	-0.493	0.028	-0.618	0.026*	-0.619	0.026*	-0.633	0.025*
	(0.600)	(0.018)	(0.600)	(0.018)	(0.600)	(0.018)	(0.479)	(0.012)	(0.477)	(0.012)	(0.473)	(0.012)
Country-level controls:												
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	-0.551*	-0.013	-0.561*	-0.013	-0.546*	-0.013	-0.267$^+$	-0.006	-0.268	-0.007	-0.251	-0.006
	(0.218)	(0.009)	(0.225)	(0.009)	(0.223)	(0.009)	(0.160)	(0.008)	(0.167)	(0.008)	(0.166)	(0.008)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	-0.044	-0.017	-0.039	-0.016	-0.046	-0.015	0.006	-0.017	0.002	-0.015	-0.002	-0.014
	(0.150)	(0.022)	(0.150)	(0.022)	(0.150)	(0.022)	(0.101)	(0.014)	(0.101)	(0.014)	(0.101)	(0.014)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-0.756	0.009	-0.735	0.011	-0.721	0.010	-0.571	-0.015	-0.578	-0.015	-0.615	-0.017

	(0.835)	(0.014)	(0.865)	(0.014)	(0.866)	(0.014)	(0.617)	(0.017)	(0.637)	(0.018)	(0.628)	(0.018)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	-0.029	0.000	-0.052	-0.000	-0.027	-0.000	0.204	0.010	0.182	0.009	0.190	0.009
	(0.331)	(0.028)	(0.345)	(0.028)	(0.342)	(0.029)	(0.274)	(0.022)	(0.284)	(0.023)	(0.285)	(0.024)
Number of rel. groups	-0.005	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.012	-0.000	-0.012	-0.000	-0.013	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)
Systemic conditions:												
Cold War	0.546$^+$	0.014$^+$	0.550$^+$	0.014$^+$	0.561$^+$	0.014$^+$	0.162	0.009	0.157	0.009	0.148	0.009
	(0.305)	(0.008)	(0.310)	(0.008)	(0.310)	(0.008)	(0.187)	(0.007)	(0.189)	(0.007)	(0.186)	(0.006)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	221	221	221	221	221	221	260	260	260	260	260	260
No. of countries	86	86	86	86	86	86	89	89	89	89	89	89
Observations	4452	4452	4452	4452	4452	4452	6351	6351	6351	6351	6351	6351

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. $^+$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table S20: Disaggregating (static) exclusion and lost autonomy; DV = Escalation

	First-time escalation		All escalations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
Ethnic grievances:				
Powerless	0.579	0.017	0.247	0.013
	(0.374)	(0.012)	(0.291)	(0.012)
Discriminated	1.228**	0.033*	0.921*	0.037*
	(0.476)	(0.016)	(0.361)	(0.015)
Self-exclusion	3.036**	0.228	2.057***	0.137*
	(1.008)	(0.226)	(0.579)	(0.053)
Lost independence (1800)	0.298	0.009	0.243	0.010
	(0.342)	(0.007)	(0.281)	(0.008)
Stranded (1800)	-0.571	0.004	-0.208	0.011
	(0.641)	(0.010)	(0.338)	(0.011)
Lost internal autonomy (1800)	0.246	0.002	0.214	0.007
	(0.361)	(0.013)	(0.243)	(0.012)
Group-level controls:				
Relative group size	0.349	0.029	0.025	0.030
	(1.139)	(0.020)	(0.843)	(0.019)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.399	0.000	0.330	0.004
	(0.397)	(0.009)	(0.229)	(0.007)
Regional autonomy	0.012	0.006	0.028	0.006
	(0.569)	(0.013)	(0.404)	(0.010)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.109	0.010	0.166	0.026*
	(0.388)	(0.009)	(0.294)	(0.011)
Mountainous terrain	0.049	0.000	0.321	0.011
	(0.621)	(0.012)	(0.359)	(0.010)
Noncontiguity	-0.534	0.017	-0.594	0.017
	(0.724)	(0.015)	(0.490)	(0.013)
Country-level controls:				
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	-0.480+	-0.015+	-0.231	-0.005
	(0.287)	(0.009)	(0.185)	(0.008)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	-0.076	-0.020	0.011	-0.018
	(0.168)	(0.021)	(0.101)	(0.014)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	0.199	0.021	-0.165	-0.010
	(1.014)	(0.016)	(0.731)	(0.019)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.412	0.022	0.348	0.022
	(0.467)	(0.035)	(0.308)	(0.026)
Number of rel. groups	-0.003	0.001	-0.007	-0.000
	(0.015)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)
Systemic conditions:				
Cold War	0.481	0.014+	0.129	0.008
	(0.300)	(0.007)	(0.195)	(0.006)
Recent autonomy loss (2 years)				
Wald tests:				
$p(\beta_{Powerless}=\beta_{Discriminated})$	0.096	0.199	0.015	0.051
$p(\beta_{Powerless}=\beta_{Selfexclusion})$	0.019	0.359	0.000	0.015
$p(\beta_{Discriminated}=\beta_{Selfexclusion})$	0.107	0.401	0.070	0.055
$p(\beta_{Lost\ indep.}=\beta_{Stranded})$	0.218	0.662	0.319	0.932
$p(\beta_{Lost\ indep.}=\beta_{Lost\ intern.\ auton.})$	0.917	0.663	0.934	0.867
$p(\beta_{Stranded}=\beta_{Lost\ intern.\ auton.})$	0.241	0.912	0.298	0.821
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes

Only concentrated groups	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	221	221	260	260
No. of countries	86	86	89	89
Observations	4452	4452	6351	6351

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. [+] $p < 0.10$, [*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$.

10 Additional Results: Interactions

This section investigates whether the associations of exclusion with both our stage 1 (nonviolent separatist claim onset) and stage 2 (escalation) outcomes are conditional on groups having lost autonomy; and, conversely, whether the associations of lost autonomy with both our stage 1 and stage 2 outcomes are stronger or weaker for excluded groups. We do not have strong theoretical priors: although it is plausible that the two grievance factors reinforce each other if they are both present, they could also have additive effects. Note that due to the low number of cases, we cannot explore interactions involving recent exclusion and/or recent autonomy loss. Therefore, this analysis is limited to the the static version of exclusion and autonomy loss since 1800.

Descriptive statistics reported in Tables S21 and S22 suggest a possible interactive effect for the case of nonviolent separatist claim onset, but not escalation. To further investigate interactive effects, we add the product of exclusion and autonomy loss since 1800 to all of the regression models reported in Tables 2 and 4 in the paper that include these two variables. Figures S3 and S4 show second difference estimates for the various models, i.e., estimates of the difference between the effect of exclusion on stage 1/stage 2 outcomes depending on whether lost autonomy is or is not present (or vice versa). We find that second difference estimates are never statistically significant, suggesting that exclusion and lost autonomy do not have significantly different correlations with stage 1 and stage 2 outcomes depending on whether or not the respective other grievance factor is also present.

Table S21: Descriptive interrelationship between (static) exclusion, (static) lost autonomy, and the onset of nonviolent separatist claims

	Obs.	# of claim onsets	
Neither exclusion nor lost autonomy	4212	14	0.33%
Only exclusion	8329	41	0.49%
Only lost autonomy	4315	21	0.49%
Both exclusion and lost autonomy	6831	116	1.70%
Total	23687	192	0.81%

Figure S3: Second difference estimates from regression models (DV = nonviolent separatist claim onset)

Note: The spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Models 1 and 3 are estimated with logit regression including region fixed effects whereas models 2 and 4 are linear probability models with country fixed effects. All models include the full set of controls used in the paper.

Table S22: Descriptive interrelationship between (static) exclusion, (static) lost autonomy, and escalation of nonviolent separatist claims

	First-time escalation			All escalations		
	Obs.	# of escalations		Obs.	# of escalations	
Neither exclusion nor lost autonomy	449	2	0.45%	595	4	0.67%
Only exclusion	850	9	1.06%	1200	20	1.67%
Only lost autonomy	639	9	1.41%	890	23	2.58%
Both exclusion and lost autonomy	2833	57	2.01%	4000	112	2.90%
Total	4771	77	1.61%	6685	159	2.38%

Figure S4: Second difference estimates from regression models (DV = escalation/first-time escalation)

Note: The spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Models 1 and 5 are estimated with logit regression and include region fixed effects. Models 2 and 6 are linear probability models with country fixed effects. All models include the full set of controls used in the paper.

11 Additional Results: Direct Transitions from "No Separatist Claim" to "Violent Separatist Claim"

While almost all (90%) separatist claims are nonviolent initially, a total of 22 of the separatist conflicts in our data are violent from the start. Many of these direct transitions from no separatist claim to a violent separatist claim occur in the context of an ongoing civil war. For example, in the mid-1980s Igorot rebels in the Philippines that had previously participated in a Communist uprising formed their own rebel group and started to make claims for greater self-rule. Consistent with our argument that ethnic grievances make violence more likely, the table below provides descriptive evidence that exclusion and lost autonomy make such direct transitions much more likely. All ongoing separatist claims are dropped, as are the 192 cases of nonviolent separatist claim onset. As in the analysis of nonviolent separatist claim onset, we also groups that dominate the central state without sharing power with any other group (e.g., Turks in Turkey). The number of cases is too small for a formal regression analysis.

Table S23: Propensity of direct transitions to violent separatism by exclusion and lost autonomy (1946-2012)

	Obs.	# of direct transitions	
Exclusion:			
No	8493	1	0.01%
Yes	15024	21	0.14%
Lost autonomy (since 1800):			
No	12489	3	0.02%
Yes	11028	19	0.17%
Recent exclusion (2 years)			
No	23271	20	0.09%
Yes	226	2	0.88%
Recent autonomy loss (2 years)			
No	23356	19	0.08%
Yes	161	3	1.86%
Total	23517	22	0.09%

13 Additional Results: Standard Civil War Onset Model

Table S24 shows the effects of our ethnic grievance variables in "standard civil war onset models" comparing the onset of separatist armed conflict (coded as 1) to an encompassing 0 category that combines cases of "no separatist conflict" and "nonviolent separatist conflict". The set-up is analogous to prior studies of the role of ethnic grievances in triggering ethnic civil wars, but unlike prior studies we draw on our new, more complete data on lost autonomy and our more inclusive measure of violent separatist conflict that combines data from various sources. Cases of ongoing armed conflict are dropped. We also drop all groups that dominate the central government without giving any real representation to other groups, such as the Turks in Turkey. We control for the same battery of possible confounders as in the paper and, to account for time dependence, all models include cubic polynomials of counting the number of years since the beginning of the sampling period or, where applicable, the last spell of separatist violence ("peace years"). Standard errors are clustered by country.

The results are broadly in line with prior studies. Like Wimmer et al. (2009) and Cederman et al. (2010), we find that political exclusion leads to a statistically significant increase in the risk of separatist armed conflict. In line with results reported, for example, by Saxton & Benson (2005), we also find that autonomy loss increases the risk of separatist civil war. Finally, in deviation to Cederman et al. (2010) (but like Cederman et al. 2015), we find no robust evidence to suggest that recent downgrades from inclusion to exclusion in the past two years are related with separatist armed conflict.

Table S24: Standard civil war onset models

	(1) Logit	(2) OLS	(3) Logit	(4) OLS	(5) Logit	(6) OLS	(7) Logit	(8) OLS
Ethnic grievances:								
Exclusion	1.147***	0.006*	1.127***	0.007*				
	(0.272)	(0.003)	(0.254)	(0.003)				
Lost autonomy (1800)	1.062***	0.006***	0.986***	0.006***				
	(0.282)	(0.001)	(0.282)	(0.001)				
Recent exclusion (2 years)					0.925*	0.014	0.938*	0.016
					(0.453)	(0.010)	(0.447)	(0.012)
Recent aut. loss (2 years)					2.017***	0.064**	2.009***	0.075**
					(0.325)	(0.020)	(0.337)	(0.024)
Group-level controls:								
Regional concentration	2.487**	0.005**			2.765***	0.007***		
	(0.773)	(0.002)			(0.774)	(0.002)		
Relative group size	-0.377	-0.001	-0.874	-0.003	-2.230**	-0.009**	-2.786***	-0.013**
	(0.680)	(0.003)	(0.672)	(0.005)	(0.702)	(0.003)	(0.736)	(0.004)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.535**	0.004	0.495*	0.003	0.798***	0.006*	0.767***	0.005
	(0.185)	(0.003)	(0.201)	(0.003)	(0.181)	(0.003)	(0.195)	(0.003)
Regional autonomy	0.858**	0.003	0.786**	0.004	0.628**	0.003	0.530**	0.003
	(0.264)	(0.002)	(0.251)	(0.003)	(0.212)	(0.002)	(0.202)	(0.002)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$			0.542*	0.008**			0.524**	0.007*
			(0.268)	(0.003)			(0.193)	(0.003)
Mountainous terrain			0.537	0.004			0.658+	0.006+
			(0.361)	(0.003)			(0.371)	(0.003)
Noncontiguity			-0.109	0.003			0.261	0.006
			(0.488)	(0.006)			(0.472)	(0.005)
Country-level controls:								
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	-0.175	0.004*	-0.184	0.004+	-0.102	0.005*	-0.117	0.004
	(0.167)	(0.002)	(0.165)	(0.002)	(0.177)	(0.002)	(0.175)	(0.003)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	0.160+	0.009**	0.123	0.008*	0.189*	0.009*	0.158+	0.008*
	(0.086)	(0.003)	(0.088)	(0.004)	(0.091)	(0.003)	(0.095)	(0.004)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-0.583	-0.002	-0.433	-0.003	-0.955+	-0.003	-0.798	-0.006
	(0.602)	(0.005)	(0.594)	(0.006)	(0.558)	(0.005)	(0.575)	(0.006)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.274	0.008	0.243	0.008	0.330	0.008	0.285	0.009
	(0.305)	(0.006)	(0.325)	(0.007)	(0.309)	(0.007)	(0.316)	(0.008)
Number of rel. groups	-0.043***	-0.001***	-0.043***	-0.001***	-0.045***	-0.001***	-0.044***	-0.001***
	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.000)
Systemic conditions:								
Cold War	-0.627**	-0.003	-0.615**	-0.003	-0.738***	-0.004	-0.696**	-0.004
	(0.222)	(0.003)	(0.216)	(0.003)	(0.214)	(0.003)	(0.224)	(0.003)
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Country FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Only conc. groups	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
No. of groups	757	757	597	597	757	757	597	597
No. of countries	140	140	124	124	140	140	124	124
Observations	30127	30127	24360	24360	30127	30127	24360	24360

Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

14 Additional Results: Multinomial Logit Models

Table S25 reports the results of multinomial logit models comparing group-years without separatist conflict (coded as 0), cases where groups made a nonviolent separatist claim (coded as 1), and cases where separatist groups engaged in violence against the state (coded as 2). This set-up allows us to directly compare the effects of ethnic grievances on nonviolent versus violent separatist claims in the same model. We focus on incidences of nonviolent and violent separatism rather than their onset because separatist violence is typically preceded by nonviolent conflict, which renders a similar analysis focused on onset infeasible because dropping ongoing cases of nonviolent conflict would mean that we lose most violent conflict onsets. We show results for regionally concentrated groups and use the same batteries of controls as in the paper. Standard errors are clustered by country. All models include region dummies and, to account for time dependence, two binary variables capturing nonviolent and violent separatist claims in the previous year. The reference category is "no claim"; that is, the coefficients represent changes in the probability of nonviolent and violent separatism relative to no separatism.

We find that exclusion, lost autonomy (since 1800), and recent autonomy loss (2 years) lead to highly statistically significant increases in the probability of both nonviolent and violent separatism. The coefficient estimates are larger for violent conflict, suggesting that exclusion and lost autonomy have a stronger association with separatist violence. The differences in estimated coefficients are all statistically significant at the 5% level according to Wald tests. Overall, and analogously to the results reported in the paper, these results suggest that while ethnic grievances are related any type of separatist conflict, including nonviolent claims, they help to explain why separatist conflicts take violent forms. Notably, and contrary to the onset models reported in the paper, this even applies to the static lost autonomy variable that includes more historic autonomy losses, though recent autonomy loss continues to have much stronger effects.

Table S25: Multinomial logit models comparing no separatist conflict, nonviolent separatism (NVIOLSD), and violent separatism (VIOLSD)

	(1)		(2)	
	NVIOLSD	VIOLSD	NVIOLSD	VIOLSD
Ethnic grievances:				
Exclusion	0.951***	1.809***		
	(0.268)	(0.341)		
Lost autonomy (since 1800)	0.803***	1.221***		
	(0.199)	(0.223)		
Recent exclusion (2 years)			0.656	0.944
			(0.469)	(0.909)
Recent autonomy loss (2 years)			1.718***	3.297***
			(0.464)	(0.414)
Group-level controls:				
Relative group size	-0.254	0.248	-1.915***	-2.449***
	(0.539)	(0.754)	(0.557)	(0.712)
Separatist kin$_{t-1}$	0.514**	0.594**	0.624**	0.787***
	(0.191)	(0.227)	(0.191)	(0.223)
Regional autonomy	0.170	0.045	-0.072	-0.298
	(0.294)	(0.347)	(0.274)	(0.332)
Hydrocarbon reserves$_{t-1}$	0.677***	0.777**	0.699***	0.759**
	(0.197)	(0.285)	(0.212)	(0.281)
Mountainous terrain	0.104	0.606*	0.125	0.707*
	(0.245)	(0.285)	(0.251)	(0.295)
Noncontiguity	1.416**	1.347**	1.609***	1.663***
	(0.510)	(0.457)	(0.471)	(0.402)
Country-level controls:				
ln(GDP per capita$_{t-1}$)	0.256	-0.036	0.258	0.049
	(0.223)	(0.250)	(0.236)	(0.272)
ln(country population$_{t-1}$)	0.142+	0.199	0.123	0.178
	(0.077)	(0.130)	(0.079)	(0.133)
Democracy$_{t-1}$	-0.858	-0.492	-1.343*	-1.245*
	(0.570)	(0.631)	(0.561)	(0.608)
Federal state$_{t-1}$	0.365	0.244	0.272	0.078
	(0.276)	(0.364)	(0.273)	(0.345)
Number of rel. groups	-0.027***	-0.035***	-0.023***	-0.028*
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Systemic conditions:				
Cold War	-0.233	0.223	-0.254	0.220
	(0.195)	(0.207)	(0.199)	(0.208)
Lagged dependent variables:				
Nonviolent SD claim$_{t-1}$	9.280***	7.486***	9.341***	7.737***
	(0.419)	(0.318)	(0.414)	(0.350)
Violent SD claim$_{t-1}$	6.715***	10.794***	6.920***	11.242***
	(0.378)	(0.472)	(0.427)	(0.548)
Wald tests:				
$p(\beta_{Exclusion[NVIOLSD]}=\beta_{Exclusion[VIOLSD]})$	0.000			
$p(\beta_{Lost\ aut.[NVIOLSD]}=\beta_{Lost\ aut.[VIOLSD]})$	0.014			
$p(\beta_{Incl.\ downgr.[NVIOLSD]}=\beta_{Incl.\ downgr.[VIOLSD]})$			0.704	
$p(\beta_{Aut.\ downgr.[NVIOLSD]}=\beta_{Aut.\ downgr.[VIOLSD]})$			0.000	
Region FEs	Yes		Yes	
Only concentrated groups	Yes		Yes	
No. of groups	599		599	
No. of countries	124		124	
Observations	26393		26393	

Note: Constant not shown. SEs clustered by ctry in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

15   Changes to EPR Data (Coding Notes)

The SDM2EPR mapping, along with our work on the SDM dataset (Sambanis et al. 2018) and coding of autonomy retractions, revealed several coding errors in the EPR dataset. This includes cases of groups that EPR coders judged as "politically irrelevant" during some years despite the existence of an active separatist claim per SDM. In some cases, case evidence also contradicted EPR codings of political exclusion, regional autonomy, group sizes, and geographical concentration. This section lists all changes made to the EPR dataset and provides justifications.

Afghanistan: Tajiks (1996-2001)

- In 1996, the Tajiks lost power to the (mostly Pashtun) Taliban and the latter began to dismantle the autonomy of non-Pashtun groups (Bleuer 2007). As a result of this, a Tajik separatist movement emerged. Due to the 1st of January rule, EPR codes the Tajiks as senior partners and with regional autonomy in 1996, but this clearly misrepresents the case dynamics. I recode the Tajiks as discriminated and without autonomy in 1996. We also start coding the Tajiks with (de facto) autonomy again in 1997 and until the US invasion in 2001: The Tajiks constitute the dominant ethnic group of the Northern Alliance, and as a result of the civil war they gained de facto control of 10 percent of the Afghan territory in the Panjshir Valley and some pockets of the Hazarajat highlands.

Afghanistan: Uzbeks (1996)

- SDM codes a civil war onset in this year based on Doyle & Sambanis (2006). The civil war refers to the rebellion that ensued after the Taliban had overthrown the government in 1996. The Taliban are dominated by Pashtuns, so EPR codes all other groups as excluded from 1997 onward. EPR's current coding misrepresents the case dynamics as the civil war was a reaction to the coup d'état by the Taliban and We therefore recode the Uzbeks as excluded in 1996 (ie, discriminated, as in 1997).

Afghanistan: various groups (1979)

- EPR starts coding several groups (the Hazaras, the Pashtuns, the Tajiks, the Turkmen, and the Uzbeks) with regional autonomy in 1979. SDM also suggests evidence in this direction, but no evidence to code autonomy already in 1979. Bleuer (2007), for example, argues that the Pashtun-dominated central government disintegrated as a result of the 1979 Soviet invasion, thus effectively giving regional governors and warlords autonomy. According to Bleuer, the Uzbeks and other groups "had full political and administrative autonomy […] by the late 1980s." However, because autonomy emerged only after the Soviet invasion in 1979, it is against EPR's coding rules to code autonomy in 1979 (as there was no autonomy on January 1). To remain as close as possible to the existing EPR codes, Ie code autonomy from 1980 onwards while noting that based on Bleuer, it could also be defended to code autonomy only from the late 1980s onwards.

Belgium: Germans

- SDM codes an active separatist movement starting in 1970, but EPR only codes the group from 1973 onwards. We therefore recode the group as politically relevant in 1970-72.
- The Germans are coded as powerless in EPR in 1973. We could not find evidence for German representation in the central government prior to 1973, but also not of active discrimination, so we code them as powerless also in the period prior to 1973.
- We use the 1973 group size estimate (0.01) also for 1970-1972. [1970-1972: .01 (group size)]
- EPR codes the Germans as autonomous from 1973 onwards. The justification for the EPR coding is that the 1970 constitutional reform set up a cultural council for each language group, which had the power to legislate over cultural and linguistic matters. The respective council was set up in 1973 in the German-speakers' capital of Eupen (Blanpain 2010: 75; Deutsche Welle 2008; Witte et al. 2009). However, the cultural councils had relatively limited powers and the treatment of the Germans is inconsistent compared to the treatment of the Flemings and the Walloon, which both are coded as autonomous only from 1981 onwards - even if the 1970 reform established cultural councils for all language groups and if anything gave the Flemings and the Walloons more autonomy, given that it established semi-autonomous regions for both the Flemings and the Walloons, but not for the Germans. Therefore, we code autonomy for the Germans only from 1981 onwards, which greatly expanded the competencies of the Germans' cultural council (Blanpain 2010; Witte et al. 2009).

Bolivia: Whites/mestizos (1994-2009)

- EPR codes regional autonomy from 1994 onwards, but there is very limited evidence for regional autonomy until at least 2009, when Bolivia moved into the direction of a federal state with the 2009 constitution (Eaton 2013; Faguet 2013). Regional elections were introduced in 2009, and administrative and (limited) legislative competencies were devolved. It has to be noted, however, that the exact division of powers remains somewhat ill-defined, and overall, the competencies attributed to departments remain limited. Bolivia cannot be considered a federal state, even if it is the most decentralized unitary state in the region. So, it could be argued that one should not code regional autonomy at all.

Bosnia: Croats (1992-1995)

- We recode the Croats with "SELF-EXCLUSION" during these years. A separate Herzeg-Bosna was proclaimed in late 1991. The entity functioned as a de facto independent state (even if it never formally declared independence - the 1991 proclamation spoke of an autonomous entity within Bosnia - though it should be noted that the ICTY has ruled that the actual intention was to merge with Croatia). "The de facto entity adopted the Croatian currency, state symbol and educational curriculum, and it moreover implemented a policy of persecution against the Bosniak population" (Caspersen n.d.). Herzeg-Bosna was formally reintegrated into Bosnia after the 1994 Washington Agreement. Yet the institutions of the Federation have only been introduced slowly and under strong international pressure. According to Caspersen (n.d.): "although 'Herceg-Bosna' had officially ceased to exist in 1994, when the Washington Agreement was signed, a de facto Croat entity continued to exist" (also see International Crisis Group 1998: 3). Thus, de-facto independence did not end in 1994. We peg the end of de facto independence to 1995 since according to Caspersen (n.d.): "[a]t Dayton, the Bosniak-Croat Federation was reaffirmed: the Croats abandoned their separate entity, Herceg-Bosna, at least for the foreseeable period, and the Bosniaks agreed to equal representation and to devolution of power" (also see Bieber 2002: 211).

Brazil: Indigenous peoples (1970-77)

- SDM codes an active separatist movement starting in 1970, but EPR only codes the group from 1978 onwards. Therefore, we recode the group as politically relevant in 1970-77.
- Whites dominated the Brazilian polity until the 2000s (see EPR coding notes), so we code the group as powerless during these years.
- We use EPR's 1978 group size estimate for 1970-1977.
- EPR does not code regional autonomy in 1978-2012; we found no evidence suggesting that the situation would have been different in 1970-1977 and so code the group as having no autonomy during these years.

Brazil: Whites

- Brazil has a federal decentralized form of government and whites control most, if not all, of the regional governments, so we recode the Whites with regional autonomy throughout. Brazil has oscillated between a federal and unitary form of government since its independence, but a federal form of government has been reinstated in 1946. Autonomy was more limited under the military regimes from 1965 onwards, but there was again more autonomy from 1982 onwards (Hudson 1997).

Chad: various groups (1979)

- While this rule does not seem to be applied very consistently (the scenario is applied in but three cases), EPR does not code ethnic groups in a state if the state collapses. Chad in 1979 constitutes an example. All four groups active in these years are affected. The EPR coding notes suggest that warlordism was rampant in this year and that central authority was virtually absent. EPR continues to code all groups in 1980 because a transitional government had been agreed in late 1979. However, EPR seems to violate its own coding rules here. FROLINAT, the main rebel organization, had control of roughly half the country by January 1, 1979, but not the capital. The government of Malloum was only overthrown in early 1979 (Collelo 1988) and the state cannot thus be said to have collapsed by January 1, the cut-off date in EPR for coding power access etc. Therefore, we apply the 1978 power access (etc.) codes also to 1979.

China: Hui (1951-1958)

- EPR codes the Hui as autonomous from 1951 onwards whereas SDM coding notes suggest that the Hui cannot be considered autonomous either until 1955 or 1959 because i) in 1954 autonomous Hui prefectures were established and because ii) in 1958 the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningsia was established (Minahan 2002: 747; Encyclopedia Britannica). EPR does not give a justification for the 1951 coding, so we changed the autonomy code to 0 in 1951-1954 and only code autonomy from 1955 onwards (1959 onwards could also be justified but we wanted to remain as close as possible to EPR).

China: Mongols (1946-48)

- SDM codes an active separatist movement 1946-1948, but EPR only codes the group from 1949 onwards. We therefore recoded the group as politically relevant in 1946-48.
- The Mongolians did not have access to central state power but had de facto independence between 1945 and 1947. In January 1938, the Japanese had taken control of the region and

erected a puppet state. The Mongol puppet state collapsed with the Japanese defeat in 1945 (Minahan 2002: 1282). In 1945 the (Southern/Chinese) Mongols erected a provisional government with the intention to join it to Mongolia (they also organized a referendum). Given the civil war the center appears to have had no influence in Inner Mongolia. However, Stalin managed to block the unification. The provisional government appears to have lasted until 1947, when the Communists recaptured the area. Based on this, we code the Mongolians with self-exclusion in 46-47, and as powerless in 48.

- We code regional autonomy throughout, first due to the de facto independence and then due to the establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomus Region in 1947 (Encyclopedia Britannica; Minahan 2002: 1783).
- For the group size we draw on EPR's estimate for 1949.

China: Tibetans (1946-48)

- SDM codes an active separatist movement 1946-1948, but EPR only codes the group from 1949 onwards. We therefore recoded the group as politically relevant in 1946-48.
- Tibet was invaded by China in 1950. Up to this point (and since 1912), Tibet can variously be considered an independent state (though with very limited international recognition) or a de facto independent state within China (Minahan 2002: 1891-1892; Goldstein 1998). EPR follows to the latter interpretation and codes the Tibetans with "SELF-EXCLUSION" in 1949/1950. Thus, we code the Tibetans with SELF-EXCLUSION in 1946-48. Self-exclusion implies regional autonomy, so I also code regional autonomy. For group size we rely on EPR's 1949 estimate.

China: Uyghur (1946-48; 1950-55)

- SDM codes an active separatist movement 1946-1948, but EPR only codes the group from 1949 onwards. We therefore recoded the group as politically relevant in 1946-48.
- In 1945 Uyghur rebels declared their own state, East Turkestan. Most sources suggest that the East Turkestan Republic remained de-facto independent until 1949, when the communist People's Liberation Army took over Xinjiang (Minorities at Risk Project; Minority Rights Group International; Minahan 2002: 1961; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 1065). The unilaterally declared East Turkestan was dissolved in 1949, after negotiations with the Chinese government. Thus, the period of 1946-1948 constitutes self-exclusion from the political center (de facto independence). Note: we also code 1949 with self-exclusion. Self-exclusion implies regional autonomy, so we also code regional autonomy. For group size we rely on EPR's 1949 estimate.
- EPR codes autonomy in 1950-1955 but it is not clear why. The de facto independence of the Uyghurs had ended in 1949 (see above) and only in 1955 was the Xinjiang Autonomous Region established (Encyclopedia Britannica; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 310). As we found no evidence for autonomy in 1950-1955, we change regaut to 0 during these years.

Cyprus: Turks (1963)

- In December 1963 separatist violence broke out involving the Turks. While EPR is correct that the Turks were included in early 1963, the same does not hold for the end of 1963, when the violence broke out. The violence that erupted in 1963 was the result of a proposal by the Greek Cypriot president that aimed to sideline the Turks and establish Greek dominance. Although the Supreme Court declared the constitutional amendments illegal, the president began implementation, thus effectively ending the consociational system and provoking the outburst of violence (Solsten 1991). EPR codes the Turks as powerless from 1964 onwards but we move the exclusion code forward to 1963 so as to better reflect the case history.

Czechoslovakia: Slovaks (1946-1948)

- EPR codes the Slovaks as not autonomous until 1968 and then autonomous from 1969 to 1992. SDM coding notes suggest an additional phase of autonomy in 1946-1948 because the First Prague Agreement, signed on June 2, 1945, gave Slovakia significant (asymmetric) autonomy (Kirschbaum 1980: 237). Slovakia's autonomy was then curtailed in 1946 and, in 1948, the asymmetric autonomy system was completely ended (Kirschbaum 1980: 241-242; Minahan 2002; World Directory of Minorities; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 270).

DRC: Lunda-Yeke (1960-97)

- EPR considers the Lunda-Yeke politically irrelevant from 1966-1997, but SDM suggests an active separatist movement during these years and, thus, political relevance. Following MAR, we code the Lunda-Yeke as powerless throughout this period. MAR reports that the Mobutu regime used the Lunda and Yeke as pawns by encouraging them to drive out the Luba-Kasai but without giving them representation within the central government. We found no evidence for active discrimination by the central government, however, and thus code the group as powerless during these years. EPR estimates the Lunda and Yeke's population share at .056.
- EPR codes the Lunda-Yeke as autonomus from 1960-1965, but we found no evidence for regional autonomy except for 1961-1963. Katanga was declared independent on July 11, 1960, a few days after Congo-Zaire's independence, which came at the end of June. Katanga operated as a de-facto independent state until 1963, when it was forcibly reintegrated into the DRC (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 151).

Ethiopia: Anuaks (1979-2003)

- SDM codes an active separatist movement from 1979 onwards, but EPR only codes the group from 2004 onwards. We therefore recoded the group as politically relevant in 1979-2003.
- We found no evidence suggesting that the Anuaks had access to central state power during these years. Until 1991, the only group with access to central state power was the Amharas. After 1991, the regime opened up ethnically, but the Anuaks continued to be left out. According to Young (1999: 322), for example, Gambella (where most Anuaks live) has "generally been ignored" by the government. We found no evidence of active discrimination before 2004 and therefore code the group as powerless. The post-2004 discriminated code is due to massacres, abuses, and executions of Anuaks by the federal army following an ambush by armed ethnic Anuaks against a group of highlanders.
- We do not code the group with regional autonomy during 1979-2003. The 1994 constitution introduced an ethnically based federal system. However regional autonomy was far from being implemented in every state. According to Young (1999: 344), an (unofficial) two-tier federal system developed that distinguishes between highland and lowland states. Whereas the former are zealous in protecting their regional autonomy, the latter (among which Gambella, but also Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Somali) welcome central government assistance and remain placed under the Prime Minister's Office. As a consequence, Gambella cannot be described as regionally autonomous. We found no evidence suggesting the situation has changed since Young's (1999) assessment. If anything, the degree of self-determination has decreased. According to Human Rights Watch (2005), the government has stationed several thousand ENDF troops in Gambella in December 2003 and has assumed "de facto control over the regional government".

Ethiopia: Beni-Shugal-Gumez (1995-2012)

- SDM associates a separatist movement with this group starting in 1995, but EPR only codes the group as politically relevant from 1996 onwards. We found no evidence suggesting that the situations in 1995 and 1996 would have been significantly different and therefore use the 1996 power access, regional autonomy, and group size codes also for 1995.

- EPR codes the Beni-Shugal-Gumez with autonomy but the evidence we have collected suggests otherwise. The 1994 constitution introduced an ethnically based federal system. However genuine regional autonomy was far from being implemented in every state. According to Young (1999: 344), there seems to have developed an (unofficial) two-tier federal system that distinguishes between highland and lowland states. Whereas the former are zealous in protecting their regional autonomy, the latter (among which Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Afar, Somali, and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPRS) that houses the `Other Southern Nations' group (see below)) remain placed under the Prime Minister's Office. As a consequence, Benishangul-Gumuz cannot be described as regionally autonomous.

Ethiopia: Other Southern Nations (1994-2012)

- EPR codes the Other Southern Nations with autonomy but case evidence suggests otherwise (see above).

Ethiopia: Somali (Ogaden) (1946-1947)

- The Ogaden territory was controlled by Britain until 1948, so we recode 1946-1947 as inactive and irrelevant.

Ethiopia: Tigreans (1979-1991)

- EPR codes the Tigreans as discriminated from 1979-1991 but case evidence suggests a self-exclusion and autonomy coding. In the process of seizing power at the center, the TPLF took over the entire Tigre region (Minorities at Risk Project). According to Minahan (2002), Ethiopian forces had been driven out of 90% of Tigre by 1978. In their attempt to mobilize the Tigrean population and to isolate Tigray from the regime, the TPLF introduced land reforms and reforms that aimed at equality of women and Muslims in a previously Christian-patriarchal dominated society. Furthermore, they set in place elected people's councils' (baitos) that administered villages and confirmed laws and directives presented by the TPLF. Due to this "monopolization of power in Tigrai by the TPLF" (Berhe 2009: 281) by 1978, we code de facto independence (ie, self-exclusion) as of 1979, following the first of January rule.

Georgia: Abkhaz (1991-1993)

- EPR codes the Abkhaz as self-excluded (de facto independent) right from Georgia's independence, but case evidence suggests that this was only the case from 1993. In 1991-1993, there was significant contention between the Abkhaz and Georgia, but contrary to South Ossetia (whose autonomy had been abolished by the Georgian government in 1990) the Abkhaz retained their autonomous status initially (MRGI). Then, in 1992 and in response to an Abkhaz declaration of independence, Georgian forces occupied Abkhazia. With Russian support, the Abkhaz forces eventually were able to force the Georgian military out of (most of) Abkhazia by the end of 1993 and Georgia lost control of Abkhazia. According to Caspersen (2012: 12) and Jones (1997: 513), Abkhazia has been de facto independent since 1993 onwards. Following the first of January rule, we code self-exclusion from 1994 onwards.
- We retain the autonomy code in 1991-1992, but code no autonomy in 1993 for two reasons. First, because in early 1992, a short-lived consociational agreement had broken down that had given the Abkhaz guaranteed representation in Abkhazia and a veto for constitutional change. Instead, the new Georgian leaders reinstated Georgia's 1921 constitution, which does not

make mention of minority self-rule (Grigoryan 2015: 186). Second, due to the Georgian occupation.

Georgia: South Ossetians (1991-1992)

- EPR codes the South Ossetians as de facto independent (ie, self-excluded) in 1991-1992 (and hence also as autonomous), but case evidence suggests de facto independence should only be coded from 1993 onwards. In 1990, the Georgian government had revoked South Ossetia's autonomy (Jones 1997: 536; George 2009: 110-111; Jones 2013: 45; Minority Rights Group International). After Georgia's independence in 1991, South Ossetia declared itself independent but, according to Caspersen (2012: 12), South Ossetia only achieved de facto control at some point in 1992. Following the first of January rule, we code de facto independence from 1993 onwards and recode 1991-1992 with discriminated (Georgia blockaded South Ossetia throughout 1991 and implemented other discriminatory practices, such as the revocation of autonomy).

India: Indigenous Tripuri (1947-1949; 1964-1986)

- EPR codes autonomy only from 1987 onwards, but autonomy appears to have existed earlier. In 1963 Tripuras got a legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers by way of the Union Territories Act (Das 2001: 226-227). By this, Tripuras attained substantial autonomy. In 1972 Tripuras became a state. In 1982, the Tripuris received their own autonomous district within Tripuras. This suggests an autonomy code from 1964 onwards, following the January 1 rule.
- In addition, we code autonomy in 1947-1949. Tripuras only formally integrated with India in 1949; before that it had remained under nominal British rule and had the status of an autonomous princely state (Minahan 2002). After the merger Tripura became a part C state, meaning that it came under central administration and lost its autonomy (Das 2001: 224-225).

India: Kashmiri Muslims (1947-48; 1987-2012)

- EPR does not code the Kashmiri Muslims in 1947-1948 as politically relevant. However, SDM codes an active separatist movement during this time.
- Clearly, the Kashmiri Muslims were not represented in the central government at the time, so we code the group as powerless during the first two years after India's independence.
- EPR codes a group size of 0.0045 from 1949 onwards. The number of Kashmiri Muslims must have been higher between 1947 and 1949, however, because significant parts of Kashmir were annexed by Pakistan in 1949 (Azad Kashmir and most of Balawaristan). As we found no contemporary primary source population data, we draw on data from Minahan (2002) on the number of Kashmiri Muslims in both Pakistan and India today to derive a group size estimate for the number of Kashmiri Muslims in India in 1947-1949, before Pakistan's annexation of parts of Kashmir. Specifically, according to Minahan (2002: 954), there are 5.663 million Kashmiris in India and 3.015 mio in Pakistan. In addition, Minahan (2002: 242) reports that there are 785,000 Balawaris in Pakistan and 70,000 in India. The Balawaris are a closely related group that EPR seems to combine with the Kashmiris in other years. Combined with the 2002 population estimate for India provided by the World Bank (1,077 million), this suggests a group size estimate of 0.0088 for 1947-49.
- We code regional autonomy in 1947-1948. Immediately after Kashmir's accession to India in late October 1947 a provisional emergency government was set up, with the Kashmiri Muslim leader (Sheikh Abdulla) appointed as head of the administration (Tremblay 2009: 928).
- EPR does not code the Kashmiri Muslims as autonomous beyond 1986 because India meddled in Kashmir's 1987 state elections to manipulate events in the region. However, New Delhi had been strongly involved in Kashmir also before 1987, and Kashmiri Muslims have remained

represented in the regional governments after 1987 (International Crisis Group 2003a: 9), so we code autonomy also beyond 1986.

India: Manipuri (1947-1949; 1964-1971)

- EPR codes the Manipuri as autonomous from 1972 onwards, which coincides the with the formation of Manipur state. However, in 1963 Manipur got a legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers by way of the Union Territories Act (Das 2001: 226-227). By this, Manipur attained substantial autonomy, and so we code autonomy from 1964 onwards.
- In addition, we code autonomy in 1947-1949. Manipur only formally integrated with India in 1949; before that it had remained under nominal British rule and had the status of an autonomous princely state. In 1949 Manipur formally accessed the Indian Union and became a Part C state. This implies a loss of autonomy: Part C states were directly administered by the center and did not enjoy significant autonomy (Kumar 1991).

India: Mizo (1953-1986)

- EPR codes the Mizos as autonomous from 1987 onwards due to the formation of Mizoram state. However, while this was a clear and very significant autonomy upgrade, the Mizos had autonomy already earlier. In November 1949, the Indian Constitution and with it the Sixth Schedule was adopted, which foresaw the creation of six autonomous district councils in Assam, including one for the Mizos. The autonomous district councils became functional in 1952. Autonomous district councils have limited legislative powers, in particular with regard to cultural matters. The first elections to the district council were held in 1952 (Prudaite 2005: 162-163). Further, in 1972, Mizoram was separated from Assam and became a union territory (Minahan 2012). Union territories are ruled directly by the central government, but have held a certain extent of autonomy since 1963 (Kumar 1991: 48-61). Based on this, we code autonomy from 1953 onwards.

India: Nagas (1947-1962)

- EPR codes the Nagas as autonomous from 1963 onwards, which coincides with the formation of Naga state. However, there is evidence for autonomy already since 1947. In late June 1947, shortly before India's formal independence, the governor of Assam and representatives of the Naga National Council signed the Hydari Agreement (see SATP). The agreement gave the Nagas relatively far-reaching autonomy within Assam (with judicial, executive, and legislative competencies; in particular, land and taxation matters were put in the hands of the Nagas). Further, in 1957, an agreement was reached between Naga leaders and the Indian government. The agreement involved the creation of a single separate region of the Naga Hills, the Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA). The NHTA was separated from Assam and became a union territory directly administered by the central government, but with a large degree of autonomy (Kumar 2007: 19). Based on this, we code autonomy throughout 1947-1962.

India: Scheduled Castes and Tribes (1947-2000)

- This aggregate group combines a large number of small groups, several of which have made separatist claims. EPR codes this group as included throughout, but according to information in SDM the particular scheduled group that turned violent in 1960 (due to which we code an onset of separatist war in 1960), the Jharkahndis, did not have representation in India's national cabinet. Until the 1990s, only the Scheduled (lower) Castes were represented in the

national cabinet. Scheduled Tribe members were represented in the Council of Ministers, India's bigger but much less powerful executive body, but none had cabinet rank. In 1994, the first Scheduled Tribe member attained cabinet rank: P.A. Sangma, an ethnic Garo (Jayal 2006). However, we found no evidence of Jharkhandi representation in the cabinet before 2004, when Shibu Soren became minister for coal (Encyclopedia Britannica). Therefore, we recode the scheduled castes and tribes with exclusion during the period this group is associated with the Jharkahndis separatist movement (ie, 1947-2000).

Indonesia: Acehnese (1950-1956; 1999-2001)

- EPR codes the Acehnese as autonomous from 1949-1966, but based on evidence we have collected Aceh can be considered also between 1950/1951 and 1956. Aceh was granted the status of an autonomous republic upon incorporation in Indonesia in 1949, but this status was revoked in the following year when Aceh was incorporated into the larger province of North Sumatra (Graf et al. 2010; Minahan 2002). Aceh therefore had little autonomy until late 1956, when the Indonesian government reinstated Aceh's provincial status and gave back military regional command in order to undermine the nationalist movement and appease the rebellion that had broken out three years before (Minahan 2002: 27; Bertrand 2004: 167). Autonomy continued until 1965 and Suharto's New Order (1965-1998), which meant the establishment of a highly centralized government (Ferrazzi 2000: 67-68). Suharto tightened the constraints on Aceh continuously and made its special status fade rapidly due to centralization of political, economic and military power. Autonomy could thus be coded as having ended in 1965, but 1966 is also reasonable and this follows general EPR practice with other groups in Indonesia.
- Further, we add autonomy already in 2001. The decentralization process started in 1999, and autonomy became effective in 2001 (see below). EPR only codes autonomy 2002 onwards, which coincides with a special autonomy law that was adopted in 2001. But while this (and especially the 2005 arrangement) gave Aceh a very high share of autonomy, there is no apparent reason why the 1999 decentralization reform would be too insignificant to code in the case of the Acehnese but not in the case of other groups.

Indonesia: Amboinese (1949-1958; 1967-98)

- EPR codes the Amboinese as self-excluded from 1949-1958 but we found no supporting evidence. The information we have found suggests a very short-lived period of de facto independence in 1950. April 25, 1950, the Amboinese leadership declared the independence of the Republic of the South Moluccas and appealed to the UN and the Dutch government for support. For the next couple of months, South Molucca was de facto independent from Indonesia (Minahan 2012: 10; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 277). But de facto independence ended in November, when Indonesia recaptured the territory (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 277). Thus, we recode the Amboinese as powerless throughout 1949-1958.
- The South Moluccans (Amboinese) are not coded in EPR in 1967-1998, but SDM suggests an active separatist movement and we therefore recoded the group as politically relevant during these years. During these years the Javanese dominated the Indonesian polity and all other groups were excluded and lacked autonomy (Ferrazzi 2000: 72-73; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 5); therefore, the group is coded powerless and without autonomy.

Indonesia: Balinese (1999-2012)

- EPR considers the Balinese politically irrelevant from 1999-2012, but SDM suggests an active separatist movement during these years and, thus, political relevance.
- According to EPR, the Javanese dominated the Indonesian polity until 2004. Thus the Balinese are coded as excluded (powerless) until and including 2004. In 2004, the Indonesian executive became much more ethnically inclusive. This is reflected in EPR, which begins to

code an ethnic power-sharing system in 2005, with the Javanese as senior partner and a number of different groups as junior partners (including the Acehnese, the Malays and the Sundanese). According to the EPR documentation this appears to apply to the Balinese too. Specifically, the EPR documentation reports a Balinese cabinet member in the 'Second United Cabinet' (2009-2014) (Jero Wacik, initially Culture and Tourism minister (see The Jakarta Post 2009) and later, after a cabinet reshuffle, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources). The same guy, Jero Wacik, was also in the First United Cabinet, where he had the rank of a state minister (also for Culture and Tourism, see The Jakarta Post 2004). The extent of Balinese representation in government was limited (only one minister), but on the other hand the Balinese also make up only 1.5% of the population. To reflect the change to a more inclusive style of government in 2005, we code the Balinese with junior partner from 2005 onwards.
- We code regional autonomy from 2001 onwards. In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001.

Indonesia: Bataks (1988-98)

- EPR considers the Bataks politically irrelevant from 1988-98, but the evidence we found suggests an active separatist movement during these years and, thus, political relevance.
- According to EPR, the Javanese dominated the Indonesian polity until 2004, when the government became much more ethnically inclusive. Thus we code the Bataks as excluded (powerless) until and including 1998. Moreover, we code no regional autonomy. Under his "New Order" (1965-1998), Suharto continued and even intensified the centralization policy initiated by his predecessor (Ferrazzi 2000: 72-73; Sulistiyanto & Erb 2005: 5). Thus, there was no meaningful regional autonomy for the Bataks.

Indonesia: Dayaks (1949-1957)

- EPR codes regional autonomy from 1949-1966, but case evidence suggests that the Dayaks had autonomy only from 1957 onwards (1958 following the 1st of Jan rule), when a separate province for the Dayaks was created in Borneo, West Kalimantan, where they formed a majority (Minahan 2002: 523).

Indonesia: East Timorese (1975, 2002)

- Per SDM the East Timorese had an active separatist movement from 1975-2002, when East Timor became independent. EPR does not include the first and last year of activity of this movement (1975/2002), so the group is recoded as politically relevant during these two years.
- There are no differences between 1975 and 1976 so the 1976 codes for power access, group size, and regional autonomy can be used for 1975 too.
- The East Timorese remained powerless in 2002 and the 2001 group size estimate can also be used for 2002.
- The East Timorese should be considered autonomous from December 2000 onwards, suggesting a regional autonomy code in 2001-2002. October 19, 1999, the Indonesian assembly agreed that ET should be allowed to secede from the Indonesian Federation. October 25, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor was set up to prepare for independence. In December, a consultative body composed of East Timorese leaders was created to advise the Transitional Administration; in 2000 it became a proper legislative body. In August 2000, an executive body consisting of four East Timorese and four international members was set up (Stephan 2005).

Indonesia: Gorontalos (1999-2012)

- EPR considers the Gorontalos politically irrelevant from 1999-2012, but SDM suggests an active separatist movement during these years and, thus, political relevance.
- According to EPR, the Javanese dominated the Indonesian polity until 2004, when the government became much more ethnically inclusive. However, we found no evidence that the Gorontalos had meaningful representation in the national cabinet even after 2004.
- The Gorontalos can be considered autonomous from 2001 onwards as they received their own province (Gorontalo) in 2000.

Indonesia: Makassarese and Bugis (1967-2012)

- EPR considers this group politically irrelevant from 1967-2012, but SDM suggests an active separatist movement during these years and, thus, political relevance.
- The EPR coding notes suggest that the South Sulawesis had representation in the Indonesian cabinet from 2004, but not before.
- EPR pegs the group size of the Makassarese and Bugis at 1% of Indonesia's population. In contrast, Minahan (2002: 1752) suggests a much higher estimate of around 4.5% (9.755 million out of Indonesia's approximately 215 million in 2002 according to the World Bank). Other sources suggest that the South Sulawesis make up more than the 1% in EPR, too. Hence, group size is recoded with 0.045.
- In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions, including South Sulawesi, where the Makassarese and Bugis make up the most populous ethnicity. The 1999 laws went into force on January 1, 2001, suggesting autonomy from 2001 onwards.

Indonesia: Papuans (1963)

- EPR codes the Papuans only as of 1964, but West Papua was annexed by Indonesia in 1963 and there was also an active separatist movement in this year per SDM. Therefore, the Papuans are recoded as politically relevant in 1963 (while using 1964 codes on other variables as there were no substantial differences).

Indonesia: several groups (1999-2000)

- In May 1999, after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta issued two laws on decentralization, one on regional government and one on center-region financial relations. The laws conferred significant autonomy to the regions. Based on this, EPR codes several groups with autonomy from 1999. Yet the 1999 laws went into force only on January 1, 2001 (see eg Ferrazzi 2000), suggesting no autonomy in 1999/2000.

Israel: Palestinian Arabs (1967)

- The first year after Israel's annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip in 1967 is not coded in EPR, so we add this year and recode the group as politically relevant (there was an active separatist movement per SDM).

Italy: Aostans (1946-1947)

- EPR codes the Aostans as autonomous from 1946 onwards, but case evidence suggests autonomy should only be coded from 1948 onwards, when the Aosta Valley gained autonomy

by way of the Republican Act, which had entered into force on January 1, 1948. EPR codes 1946-1947 with "SELF-EXCLUSION", citing MRGI which argues that the French had occupied the Aosta Valley at the very end of WWII with the intention of annexing it to France. MRGI claims that the French occupation lasted until 1947 or even 1948. According to Benvenisti (2012: 88), however, the Val d'Aosta had already "reverted to the control of the Italian government by the end of 1945", which is supported by Truman (1955). In sum, it appears that self-exclusion had ended by late 1945 and thus the Aostans are re-coded as powerless in 1946-1947.

Italy: Friulis (1948-1963)

- EPR codes the Friulis as autonomous from 1948 onwards, but case evidence suggests autonomy became effective only later. The 1948 Republican Constitution (Art. 131) created five 'special' regions (the islands Sicily and Sardinia as well as the three regions Aosta Valley, Trentino Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venetia which all had ethno-linguistic minorities) and 15 'ordinary' regions. Four of the five autonomous regions with special statute (with the exception of Friuli-Venetia Giulia) were immediately set up and were granted significant autonomy, which included recognition of the minority languages (Baldini and Baldi 2014; Minority Rights Group International). But contrary to the other four special regions, Friuli-Venetia only obtained autonomy and the special statute in 1963 (Minahan 2002: 621; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 140; Bilancia et al. 2010: 124). The Friuli make up around 80 per cent of Friuli-Venetia, thus the Friulis can be seen as autonomous from 1964 onwards.

Japan: Ainu (1997-2012)

- EPR considers this group politically irrelevant from 1997-2012, but SDM suggests an active separatist movement during these years and, thus, political relevance.
- EPR codes the Ainu as discriminated until 1996. The 1997 Ainu Culture Promotion Act, passed on May 8 (Nuttall 2005: 19), led to a significant improvement of the Ainu's situation. Therefore, the group is coded as powerless rather than discriminated from 1998 onwards. No evidence for meaningful regional autonomy.

Japan: Okinawans and Burakumin

- Okinawa was transferred back to Japan in 1972 (since WWII it had been under US control). The Okinawans have an active separatist movement that had developed while Okinawa was still under US rule and continues to be active. However, while the Okinawans are coded in EPR, a first problem emerges as EPR coders conflated the Okinawans with another group, the Burakumins. The latter are coded as concentrated in Okinawa, which makes no sense (the Burakumins are a dispersed social caste located in Japan proper) whereas the Okinawans are coded as dispersed. Therefore, these groups are interachanged.
- Furthermore, EPR does not code the Okinawans (Burakumin) as relevant after 1983, which contradicts SDM, which suggests that they had an active separatist movement during these years. We therefore recode the Okinawans as politically relevant from 1984-2012. We found no evidence for access to the central state and therefore continue to code the group as powerless.
- Regional autonomy is ambiguous. EPR codes the Okinawans and the Burakumin with autonomy, but with very weak justifications. Japan is a unitary state with very limited regional competences (Kamo 2000). We found no supporting evidence that Okinawa would have a special status and recode both groups with "no autonomy".

Kenya: Somali (2012)

- EPR's regaut code is missing in this year. EPR does not code the Somali as autonomous in any year before that, and we found no evidence that the situation changed.

Kuwait

- EPR codes three groups in Kuwait: Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Bedouins. Taken together, they are coded as making up 38.5% of Kuwait's population. The remaining 61.5% of Kuwait's population consists of foreign workers (Encyclopedia Britannica). These are not included in EPR, which follows EPR coding rules:
  - From the EPR codebook: "Note that EPR-ETH does not include non-citizens, such as migrant workers. The only exceptions to this rule are nomadic people with a long-standing presence in the perti-nent country (like the Roma in France, Italy, Spain, and many other countries), and "stranded" populations of former states who lost their citizenship in a successor state (like Russians in Estonia and Latvia)."
- However, if foreign workers are not included in the dataset they should also not be considered when calculating relative group sizes. This is the standard when it comes to other countries with significant foreign worker populations, such as Switzerland. Thus, the group sizes are re-coded so that the three autochthonous groups add up to 100 (ie all group size estimates were multiplied with 100/38.5).

Kosovo: Serbs (2008-2012)

- Case evidence suggests a self-excluded code in 2008-2012. The authorities of Kosovo have no (or little) control over the Serb-dominated municipalities in the North and little control of the Serb municipalities in the rest of Kosovo. "Over the past 14 years, North Kosovo has developed in isolation from the rest of the country. Here Serbian flags fly and signs in Cyrillic and English proclaim "This is Serbia." A system of parallel structures, funded by Belgrade, provides everything from schools and health to the courts system" (Geoghegan 2013). The Serbian government does not recognize Kosovo's independence (neither do Russia or China) and supports the Serbs in Kosovo (until 2013). Note that EPR does not code the Serbs with self-exclusion because the "northern Serbs do not constitute the majority of Serbs in Kosovo, who are spread across the country ". However, Kosovo's ethnic demographics are far from certain. The northern Serbs make up a significant part of Kosovo's Serbs and, more importantly, are the epicenter of the separatist activity. Coding the Serbs with de facto independence is essential to understand center-movement interactions.

Malaysia: Dayaks (1963)

- EPR codes the Dayaks only as of 1964, but Sarawak was joined to Malaysia in 1963 and per SDM there was an active separatist movement in this year, so 1963 is recoded as politically relevant (using 1964 codes for other variables)

Malaysia: Kadazans (1963)

- EPR codes the Kadazans only as of 1964, but Kadazan was joined to Malaysia in 1963 and per SDM there was an active separatist movement in this year, so 1963 is recoded as politically relevant (using 1964 codes for other variables)

Mauritania: Black Africans

- The Black Africans are coded as included in government throughout, but case evidence suggests an excluded cod. The dominant group in Mauritania are the White Moors, though Black Moors (or Haratins) sometimes also had access to power. Black Africans, by contrast, are often described as third class citizens and their access to power is strictly limited (HRW 1994; MAR).

Mauritania: Sahrawis (1975-76)

- Mauritania annexed part of the Western Sahara in 1975. SDM codes an active separatist movement from this year onwards, but EPR only codes the group as relevant from 1977 onwards. Therefore, the Sahrawis are recoded as pol. relevant in 75-76.
- The EPR coding notes suggest that the Sahrawis were discriminated against and did not have meaningful regional autonomy in 75-76: "Mauritania never managed to achieve de facto control of the Western Saharan territoriy and even struggled to defend its own state territory in the period from 1976-1979. In 1978 a truce was reached and in 1979 Mauritania pulled out its troops and recognized POLISARIO as the official representative of the Western Sahara, although it never recognized the state itself. Moroccan troops moved quickly into the former Mauritanian territory and holds it since 1979. Neither were Sahwari representatives ever included into a Mauritanian government nor were citizenship rights ever extended to Sahwari people. The political status of Sahwari people can thus be coded as discriminated."

Mexico: Maya (1995-1997)

- EPR codes the Maya with self-exclusion from 1998 onwards, but case evidence suggests self-exclusion also in 1995-1997. Starting in late 1994, de facto autonomy arrangements were established by means of civil disobedience or violence in the state of Chiapas (Mattiace 1997: 45). The Zapatistas (EZLN) claimed that there are at least 38 such "autonomous" municipalities, and two "autonomous" regions. The EZLN is strongly supported by Mayans (Minorities at Risk Project). Other organizations claim to have established de-facto autonomies in another six regions of Chiapas. While only some of the claimed territories can be considered de facto independent from Mexico (in particular those in the Highlands, the North, and the East of Chiapas), the territory controlled by indigenous, in particular Mayan, organizations is substantial (Trejo 2002: 6-7).

Morocco: Sahrawis (1975)

- EPR codes the Saharawis only as of 1976, but Morocco's annexation of (parts of) the Western Sahara dates to 1975. SDM codes an active separatist movement from 1975 onwards and so we recode the group as pol. relevant in 1975. I found no evidence that the Sahrawis' situation would have been different in 1975 compared to early 1976, and therefore use the 1976 codes on power access, regional autonomy, etc. also for 1975.

Myanmar

- We found several inconsistencies in Myanmar and thus recode most groups.
- EPR codes the Buddhist Arakanese as "self-excluded" and autonomous from 1960-2011. We found no corroborating evidence and the EPR coding notes do not give any justification for this code. The one thing we did find is that in 1974, the Arakanese received their own state (Rakhine), but the extent of actual autonomy conferred to the Buddhist Arakanese is very

limited (IRIN 2012). Based on this, we recode the Arakanese with powerless and no autonomy from 1960-2011.

- o Further, EPR codes the group size of the Buddhist Arakanese with 2%, but the CIA World Factbook estimate (4%) is backed up by more sources. The International Crisis Group (2014: 1), for example, suggests that the Buddhist Arakanese (or Rakhine) presently make up around 60% of the population of Rakhine state (approx. 3.2 million), suggesting that in Rakhine alone, there are 1.9 million Rakhines. EPR would suggest that there are only 1.1 million Rakhines in Myanmar (the CIA estimates Myanmar's total population at 56 million in 2015). Thus, we use 4% as our group size estimate.

- EPR codes the Kachins as discriminated in 1962, powerless from 1963-1989, self-excluded from 1990-2011, and then powerless again in 2012. The evidence we have found suggests that the Kachins should instead be coded as self-excluded from 1962-1994, powerless from 1995-2009, self-excluded in 2010-2011, and then again powerless in 2012. Meanwhile, we code autonomy throughout 1962-2011.

  - o According to Florea (2014), Kachin State (aside from the major towns) became de facto independent in 1961, when the KIA ousted government forces. As a consequence, large parts of Kachinland were "only under nominal government control throughout the 1970s" (Minahan 2002: 873). In the 1980s the KIA even extended the area under its control (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000) and when renewed government offensives in 1989 and 1991 were defeated, it claimed an area larger than the official Kachin state ("Greater Kachinland"). According to Human Rights Watch (2012) and the International Crisis Group (2003b), the KIA maintained a civilian administration with departments of health, education, justice, agriculture, women's affairs and development. Via cease-fires in 1989, 1991, and 1994, the Burmese government officially recognized the Kachins' autonomy. Thus we end the de facto independence code in 1994.

  - o The Kachins again self-excluded themselves after the the KIO's refusal to integrate its forces into the Burmese army under the BGF program (which the government moved to implement in 2009). In 2011, the central government broke the cease-fire and entered the KIO-controlled territory; thus (de facto) autonomy ended (see South 2011; Myanmar Peace Monitor).

- EPR codes the Karenni as without autonomy and discriminated throughout 1948-2012. We recode the Karenni as having enjoyed autonomy from 1953-1959 and for these years also recode the Karennis as powerless instead of discriminated. In 1952 the Karenni received autonomy which based on Minahan (2002) was limited but appears sufficient to warrant an autonomy code. In 1959, much of the Karenni's autonomy was revoked, thus the end of regional autonomy.

  - o We also recode the Karenni with regional autonomy from 1995-2009, and again also recode them as powerless (instead of discriminated). During this period, the Karenni enjoyed some degree of self-government in the Special Region 2, Kayah (Karenni) State and the Special Region 3, Kayah (Karenni) State (Callahan 2007; Kudo 2013). Autonomy ended in 2009 due to the Border Guard Force scheme (see South 2011), which meant that the Karenni's ethnic army was integrated with Myanmar's army. According to the Myanmar Peace monitor, this meant that these groups "were required to give up most of their autonomy".

- EPR codes the Kayins (Karens) as self-excluded from 1948-2011, but the evidence we found only partly corroborates this coding. Several sources suggest that the Karens established a de facto independent state in 1949 (see e.g. Florea 2014; Minahan 2002; MAR). Thus 1948-1949 should not be coded with autonomy/self-exclusion, given the first of January rule; instead we employ a powerless code.

  - o We again code the Karens as powerless in 1955-1962, but this time with autonomy, because during these years their autonomy was officially recognized. The 1947 constitution had promised the Karens autonomy, but this was not implemented until 1954 (Silverstein 1958: 43). Autonomy lasted until 1962, when powers were

centralized after General Ne Win's coup d'état (Minahan 2002; Minority Rights Group International).

  o However, the Karens refused to give up their autonomy, and so from 1963 onwards we again revert to self-exclusion/autonomy. De facto independence ended in the mid-1990s when several rebel groups signed cease-fires with the government. Autonomy is very ambiguous after 1995 and thus we code an end not only to self-exclusion but also to autonomy in 1995. In many Karen territories, the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) exercised some autonomy until 2009, but it is unclear to what extent this was meaningful (see e.g. South 2011). For example, schools in the DKBA controlled areas do not teach the Karen language but use the government curriculum. Based on this, 1996-2011 is coded with no autonomy and powerless.

- EPR codes the Mons as de facto independent from 1960-2011 but our research suggests the Mons should instead be coded as powerless from 1960-2009 and then self-excluded from 2010-2012. Further, autonomy should be coded from 1996 onwards but not before that.

  o The EPR coding notes do not clarify why 1960-2009 was coded with self-exclusion, and while rebels did control some part of the Mons' territory, rebel control appears insufficient to warrant a self-exclusion code. In 1995, the government signed a cease-fire with Mon rebels and South (2011) suggests that this conferred a significant amount of autonomy to the Mons.

  o In 2009, Myanmar sought to implement the BGF program, which meant an end to rebel autonomy (see above). However, the Mon rebels resisted effectively and continued to de facto exercise autonomy, therefore the self-exclusion code for 2010-2012.

- EPR codes the Muslim Arakanese as self-excluded and autonomous from 1958-2012. We found no evidence for either autonomy or self-exclusion. Most Muslim Arakanese live in Rakhine state, which was established in 1974 and enjoys little more than nominal autonomy (see above). Further, the Muslim Arakanese only form a minority in this state, which is dominated by the Buddhist Arakanese. We found no indications either that the Muslim Arakanese had de facto autonomy. Thus, we recode the Muslim Arakenese as not autonomous throughout.

  o Moreover, we code the Muslim Arakanese as powerless through 1978, and discriminated in subsequent years, because the military Junta killed tens of thousands of Rohingyas in this year and forced an estimated 200,000 to leave the country (Parnini 2013: 287). The 1982 Citizenship Law classified Arakan's Muslims as illegal immigrants and denied them Burmese citizenship. Claiming that the Rohingya are in fact Bengalis, they were not considered a recognized "national race" and therefore had to prove that their ancestors settled in Burma before 1948, an almost impossible task. As a consequence of this law, the Rohingya have been deprived of many fundamental rights. Their property was confiscated, they were religiously persecuted and they face restrictions on freedom of movement, education, marriage and employment (Human Rights Watch 2013, Minahan 2002).

- EPR codes the Shan as junior partner (+autonomy) from 1948-1957, then as discriminated (1958) and powerless (1959-1962; both w/o autonomy), then as self-excluded (with autonomy) from 1963-2011, and powerless w/o autonomy in 2012. We leave the initial years (-1962) as is. One could argue that the Shans retained autonomy until 1959, when the Shan territories came under military administration. However, the exact year the Shans lost their autonomy is not clear because centralization was a gradual process, so 1958 can be defended. According to the evidence we collected, the de facto independence code can also be defended, at least from 1972-1989. 1963-1971 is somewhat ambiguous because the Communists and with them the Shan only had full control of the Shan territories from 1971 onwards (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Still, we also leave this as is. However, we do change the self-exclusion code from 1990-2009 to powerless while leaving autonomy intact: in 1989, the Shan rebels signed a ceasefire agreement with the government that effectively recognized their rule under the framework of Special Region 3, Shan State (South 2011; Kudo 2013). In 2009, the Myanmar government initiated the BGF program, which would have abolished the ethnic

armies' autonomy (see above). The Shan resisted this program successfully, thus we again code self-exclusion in 2010-2012.

- EPR codes the Wa as powerless throughout and with autonomy from 1990-2011. We add a period of self-exclusion (implying also autonomy) from 1972-1989. From 1971 to 1989, the Wa territories were controlled by Communist rebels and the Wa exercised significant de facto autonomy (see South 2008; Callahan 2007; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; Lintner 1990). Following the 1st of January rule, we code self-exclusion from 1972 onwards. EPR correctly codes an autonomy regime from 1990-2009, which resulted from a cease-fire agreement with the government and led to the establishment of the Shan State Special Region-2 and granted the Wa rebels not only to keep their territory and weapons but also granted them a high degree of autonomy and the freedom to expand drug trafficking operations that helped the rebel army fund itself. In return, the government could focus on containing insurgencies elsewhere while hoping that the UWSA would concentrate on attacking the Shan insurgent leader Khun Sa (Minahan 2002; Stratfor; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In 2009, the Myanmar government initiated the BGF program, which would have abolished the ethnic armies' autonomy (see above). The Wa resisted this program successfully, thus we again code self-exclusion in 2010-2012 while coding autonomy throughout 1972-2012.

  o Further, we code a higher group size because the EPR group size (0.2%) appears to be way off. Minahan (2002: 2024) suggests that there are approx. 615,000 Wa in Myanmar, which in combination with the World Bank's estimate of Myanmar's population in 2002 (49.3 mio) yields a group size of 1.25%. This figure is more in line with most of the other sources we consulted, and so we use 0.0125 as our group size estimate for the Wa.

- Finally, EPR codes the Zomi (Chin) as self-excluded and autonomous from 1963-2011 and powerless and without autonomy in 2012. We found no corroborating evidence nor do the EPR coding notes explain this coding. To the contrary, the Zomis had autonomy before 1963 but not thereafter. After WWII, in the process of negotiating independence, the Chins demanded separate independence and separation from the Union of Burma. In 1947 representatives of the Chins participated in the Panglong Conference along with many other ethnic minorities of the country. Under British pressure, the Chins accepted autonomy within the Union of Burma and joined the union as an equal constituent state, the Chin Special Division. However, the spirit of Panglong and the federal principles were reversed in the years following independence, particularly after the 1962 coup d'état by General Ne Win, who imposed military rule on the Chin heartland (Minahan 2002). Based on this, we code the Zomis as autonomous up until 1962 and then powerless and w/o autonomy throughout 1963-2012.

Nigeria: Ibos and Hausa/Fulani:

• We revise the exclusion and autonomy codings for the Ibos and the Hausa and Fulani in Nigeria in 1966 to better reflect the case dynamics. According to EPR, the Hausa and Fulani dominated the Nigerian polity in 1965-1966 and then entered into a power-sharing agreement with the Yorubas from 1967-1970, whereas the Ibos are coded as powerless in 1965-1966, discriminated in 1967, and with self-exclusion from 1968-1970. While these codings are correct, according to the evidence we found, they miss important elements of the case dynamics because EPR always codes the situation on January 1. There was a coup by Ibo officers in 1966 and they centralized power within their own ethnicity, which led to a Hausa/Fulani attempt at secession. The situation was quickly contained, however: Nigeria's Muslims re-established their predominance shortly after the coup (within the same year). This halted the Hausa and Fulani's separatist activity, but initiated Ibo separatism. In 1967, the Ibos declared themselves independent and had de-facto independence until 1970. In short, in both cases loss of power played an instrumental role in the emergence of separatism, but this is only partly reflected in EPR. To resolve the situation, we recode the Hausa and Fulani as powerless in 1966 (so that in line with the qualitative information the Hausa are coded as out of power when separatism emerged) and code a power downgrade in 1966 (further, we change

regaut from missing to 0 because General Ironsi effectively abolished the federal system during the short-lived and ultimately failed Ibo coup attempt). We change the Ibos to discriminated in 1966 and regaut = 0 and add downgrades. For references see the EPR coding notes and the SDM Coding Notes I.

- EPR codes the Hausa/Fulani as dominant from 1984-1998, but we change this to "Senior partner" in 1994-1998. Further, we change regaut from missing to 0 because there was no meaningful autonomy under the military. The 1984-1998 period coincides with three successive military dictatorships: the ones led by Buhari (1984-1985), Babangida (1985-1993), and Abacha (1993-1998). Only one of the three is unambiguously an ethnic Hausa/Fulani, however: Buhari (ethnic Fulani to be more exact). Babangida, by contrast, was an ethnic Gwari, a separate linguistic group in Nigeria (see Ethnologue). Abacha, finally, was an ethnic Kanuri (see Paden 2005: ch. 2). The EPR coding notes provide two arguments why the Hausa and Fulani are nonetheless coded with exclusive access to the Nigerian polity throughout 1984-1998. First, because all three regimes mainly represented the Muslim north. Second, because EPR does not include the Kanuris and the Gwaris (though for the latter see below). These are not very good arguments. While several sources confirm that the military dictatorships indeed mainly represented the Muslim north (see eg Joseph 1999), this is not the same as saying that the Hausa and Fulani had exclusive access to the central state. There are other northern Muslim groups, including the Kanuri and the Gwaris, and they also had access to central state power. Further, the fact that EPR does not include these other groups can obviously not be used as an argument for stating that only the Hausa/Fulani had access to power. Based on this (and following the first of January rule), the Hausa and Fulani clearly cannot be seen as "DOMINANT" in 1994-1998, but as sharing power with the Kanuris and possibly other groups not included by EPR. Analogously, the Hausa and Fulani clearly did not have exclusive access during 1986-1993, given the Gwari ethnicity of the military dictator. However, EPR's Hausa and Fulani group actually does not only include Hausa and Fulanis, but also some smaller, related peoples from the "Muslim Middle Belt", and according to the EPR coding notes this explicitly includes the Gwaris. Thus, we leave 1986-1993 unchanged.

Panama: Ngobe-Bugle (1946-1959)

- EPR considers the Ngobe-Bugle politically irrelevant from 1946-59, but SDM suggests an active separatist movement during these years and, thus, political relevance.
- Following information provided in the EPR coding notes we code the group as powerless and w/o autonomy during these years. According to the EPR coding notes, "Panama's largest indigenous community is the Ngobe-Bugle group. It makes up about two-thirds of the whole indigenous population (Vakis and Lindert 2000, 1) […] Panama (along with Colombia) has granted the greatest degree of political autonomy to indigenous peoples in Latin America regarding the geographic extension of autonomy, its institutionalization, and access to state resources. [Though the Ngoebe-Bugle only achieved autonomy in the late 1990s] Consequently, she places Panama in the category of Latin America's "strongly multicultural" countries (Van Cott 2007, 132). Nevertheless, although some indigenous leaders have achieved political posts at the national level, and a few seats are reserved for them in the National Assembly (World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2005b), indigenous groups remain mostly powerless at the national level."

Pakistan: Bengalis

- EPR codes the territorial expansion of the Bengalis as statewide, but in fact the Bengalis were highly concentrated in eastern Pakistan, where they make up >98% of the population according to post-independence figures. Therefore, we recode them as regionally concentrated.

Peru: Indigenous peoples (Highlanders and Amazonian)

- EPR codes the indigenous peoples of the Amazon with regional autonomy from 1980 onwards and the indigenous peoples of the Andes from 2003-2010. Both decisions are questionable and we recode these cases with no regional autonomy. The EPR coder justifies the regional autonomy codes with representation in local governments, which has increased for the indigenous peoples of the Amazon and Andes from 1980 and 2002 onwards, respectively. Other sources confirm this, but the competencies of municipal governments in Peru are limited. Hudson (1992), for example, states that while municipalities have some autonomy, their autonomy remains strictly limited due to their financial dependence on the central government. "Most municipalities can hardly generate the revenue to cover operating costs, much less to provide desperately needed services." Furthermore, the EPR coding rules explicitly state that municipal autonomy cannot form the basis for a regional autonomy code. And while there are regional governments in Peru since the 1979 constitution, their power is even more limited. According to Hudson (1992), "The process of regionalization [after 1979] was more one of administrative shuffling than of substance [and] the regional governments faced the same resource constraints that substantially limited the ability of municipal governments to implement independent activities. The central government is in theory supposed to transfer funds and assets, such as state sector enterprises, to the regions, but in practice this has only happened piecemeal." More recent sources confirm that indigenous autonomy in Peru is limited; while there have e.g. been initiatives towards bilingual education, they come from the central government in Lima; and there have not been any collective land rights grants (see e.g. Garcia 2003; MRGI).

Philippines: Indigenous (1984-85)

- SDM codes a separatist movement from 1984 onwards, but EPR only codes the group as pol. relevant from 1986 onwards. We recode 1984-85 with political relevance.
- EPR codes the Christian Lowlanders (Filipinos) as dominant in both years since the highest executive posts circulate among Christian lowlanders and representation of other groups is minimal. Hence, we code the group as powerless during these years.
- We found no evidence for regional autonomy in 1984-1985 (see Minority Rights Group International). There were several discriminatory policies in place during the Marcos era (1965-1986), including policies regarding language, religion, and education.

Philippines: Moros (1971-1990)

- EPR codes the Moros as self-excluded from 1971-1988 but the evidence we found suggests otherwise. EPR is correct that Moro rebels controlled certain areas of Mindanao, but the Philippine government does not lose control of all, or even most, of Mindanao (e.g., Mindanao participated in the 1986 elections, and Marcos successfully installed leaders loyal to his regime in Mindanao) (Santos 2005; Walter 2009). We therefore recode the Moros as powerless and without autonomy from 1971-1988 (the 1976 Tripoli autonomy agreement, which had promised autonomy to the Moros, was never really implemented). Further, we also code the autonomy variable as zero in 1989 and 1990, but follow EPR and code it 1 from 1991 onwards. In 1989, the Organic Act establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was adopted, and the entity was officially established in 1990. The entity is much smaller compared to the one envisaged in the 1976 Tripoli agreement, and also falls short of the competencies promised back in 1976. However, this time there was at least some actual devolution and the Moros can be considered (partially) autonomous (Walter 2009).

Russia (USSR): Chechens (2001-2003)

- EPR codes the Chechens with "SELF-EXCLUSION" from 1992-2002. However, a number of sources suggest that Chechen de facto independence ended in late 1999/early 2000, with the Russian victory in the Second Chechen War (see eg Caspersen 2012). In February 2000, Russian forces took control of Grozny, the capital (Minahan 2002: 441; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia), thus we stop coding the Chechens as self-excluded in 2000. In 2000, Putin introduced president's rule, which effectively meant that Chechnya's autonomy was abolished. Presidential rule ended in 2003 with the new constitution and the election of Kadyrov as president (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). Based on this, in 2001-2003 we code power status = discriminated. Regaut could be coded with 0 in these years, but as autonomy was re-installed shortly thereafter and b/c EPR does not code interruptions of autonomy due to president's rule as ending autonomy (see e.g. India, where interruptions of autonomous regional rule are common but EPR still codes autonomy throughout), we continue to code autonomy. 2004 onwards is coded with powerless and autonomy, which is the status quo in EPR.

Russia (USSR): Chukchi (1990-91)

- SDM codes an active separatist movement from 1990 onward, but EPR only codes the group from 1992 onwards. We recode the Chukchi as politically relevant in 1990-91. We found no evidence that this small group would have had access to central state power, but there is evidence for regional autonomy, given that Chukotka had the status of an Autonomous Okrug throughout the movement's activity and due to this EPR codes autonomy during other years. Note, however, that the Chukots make up only a minority within their homeland. In 1989 the Chukots made up only 7 per cent of the region's population (Fondahl 1997: 194). Due to massive Slavic out-migration in the 1990s, the Chukots' population share increased to about 27 per cent in 2012, but Russians continue to make up the majority of the area's population. The Chukots' actual influence over the regional government could not be determined, though it has to be noted that titular nationalities generally have a privileged position within their own homeland (Frank & Wixman 1997: 170). Fondahl (1997: 203), by contrast, suggests that the influence of the Siberian peoples on their regional governments is limited. Noting the ambiguity, we still code the Chukots as regionally autonomous throughout (as noted, this follows EPR practice).

Russia (USSR): Circassians (1992-2012)

- EPR codes the Circassians, a generic name used for the Cherkess and Abaza, as autonomous until and including 1991, but not after 1992. This coding is ambiguous and inconsistent with the coding of the Karachais, which are coded as autonomous both before and after 1991. Most Karachais, Cherkess, and Abazas live in Karachai-Cherkessia, which had the status of an autonomous oblast sub-ordinated to Stavropol Krai before 1991, and then was elevated to the status of an autonomous soviet socialist republic, which are the regions within Russia with the highest level of autonomy. EPR is correct in stating that there were significant changes regarding the access of the Karachais and Circassians to the regional government, but EPR's coding does not reflect these changes properly. Between 1956 and approximately the fall of the USSR, the Karachais had reduced power in the region. Karachai-Cherkessia has two titular nationalities – the Karachais (around a third of the local population in 1989) and the Cherkess (around ten per cent in 1989) – and a significant Russian/Slavic population. And according to Comins-Richmond (2002: 70; also see Richmond 2008: 122-123), the Karachais had faced difficulties mounting to advanced positions within their own republic before 1991. In particular, the region's party secretary (de facto the most powerful position) consistently was ethnic Russian from 1957 to 1991. In contrast, the Cherkess – despite their relatively small numbers –had stronger influence over the regional government prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Richmond 2008: 133). Notably, EPR codes the Karachais as autonomous

before 1991 despite this. While ambiguous, this can be defended because while the Karachais were underrepresented they still had meaningful representation in the regional government (see eg Pustilnik (1995). However, if the Karachais are coded as autonomous before 1991, then the Cherkess/Circassians should also be coded as autonomous after 1991. It is true that after 1991, the tables turned and the Karachais mounted to a more influential position within the region (see e.g. Minahan 2002: 911; Comins-Richmond 2002: 76). Yet an ethnic power-sharing system, while fundamentally re-negotiated, has remained in place. According to Ormrod (1997: 112), for example, in 1994 the parliamentary executive – in striking resemblance to the ethno-demographics – comprised 11 Russians, eight Karachai, four Cherkess, three Abazin, and three Nogai. Ethnic representation was deeply contested, for example in the context of the 1999 presidential election, which pitted an ethnic Karachai against an ethnic Cherkess. But in the end, and after a Muscovite intervention the conflict was brought under control (Orttung et al. 2000: 201) and the presidency went to a Karachai while the prime ministry went to a Cherkess and the vice-presidency and parliament speaker positions went to ethnic Russians (Fuller 2008). In 2008, the prime ministry went to an ethnic Greek, contrary to the prior deal (Radio Free Europe 2010a). Having caused massive protest, in 2010 an ethnic Cherkess was again named prime minister in 2010 (Radio Free Europe 2010b). Based on this, we recode the Circassians as autonomous in 1992-2012.

Russia (USSR): Finns (1946-1956; 1992-2012)

- EPR codes regional autonomy from 1946-1956 but we see no basis for this. Most Finns in the USSR were located in the Ingria region near Leningrad. In 1928, the Soviets had established a national district for the 115,000 Ingrian Finns. But in 1938 the autonomous district was abolished and Ingria incorporated into Leningrad Oblast. Between 1941 and 1944, Finland controlled the area; when the Red Army returned, many Ingrians sought refuge in Finland while Stalin deported the rest of the Ingrian Finns to Siberia. In 1956, after Stalin's death, the Ingrians were allowed to return to their homeland (Minahan 2002: 776ff). We code no autonomy in 1946-1956 and also change the power status to discriminated to reflect the deportation.
- EPR considers the Finns politically irrelevant after 1991, SDM suggests an active separatist movement during these years and, thus, political relevance. Throughout 1992-2012, the only group with access to central state power were the Russians (see EPR coding notes), so we code the Finns as powerless in 92-12. Almost all Finns are located in Leningrad Oblast (Ingrian Finns). Minahan (2002: 776) reports about 85,000 Ingrians in Russia in 2002. Combined with Russia's population (145.2 million according to the 2002 census) this yields a group size estimate of about .0006 for 1992-2012. The Finns do not have their own autonomous region in Russia and so are coded as not autonomous (Minahan 2002: 776).

Russia (USSR): Komi-Permyaks

- EPR considers the Komi-Permyaks politically irrelevant after 1991, but SDM suggests an active separatist movement during these years and, thus, political relevance. We found no evidence for inclusion in the central government (which is dominated by Russians). According to Minority Rights Group International, there are 125,235 Komi-Permyaks in the Russian Federation in 2002. According to Minahan (2002: 1505) it is 160,000. We draw on the latter estimate. Russia's population is 145.2 million according to the 2002 census, suggesting a group size estimate of 0.0011.
- Komi-Permyak had the status of an Autonomous Okrug until 2005, when it was integrated with Perm Oblast to form Perm Krai. Autonomous okrug status is the lowest status in the hierarchy of ethnic autonomous, but it does confer at least a moderate level of autonomy (MRGI). EPR does not code the Komi-Permyaks as autonomous in 1946-1991, but this appears to be a mistake. The Chukchi also have autonomous okrug status and are coded as

autonomous throughout. Thus, we code the Komi-Permyaks as autonomous in 1992-2005 and extend this code to 1946-1991. We code no autonomy after 2005.

Russia (USSR): Lezgins (1946-2012)

- EPR codes the Lezgins as autonomous throughout based on the argument that they have participated in a power-sharing arrangement in the republic of Dagestan that has involved Avars, Dargins, and Kumyks, in addition to the Lezgins. This does not match with the evidence we have found, and so we recode the Lezgins as without autonomy throughout. According to Minahan, the Lezgins are located in the North Caucasus, with significant populations in Russia's Dagestan Republic and adjacent Azerbaijan (Minahan 2002: 1084). The Lezgin do not have titular status in any of the regions they live, and they do not have significant power in Russia's Dagestan, where the Avars and Dargins (Ware & Kisriev 2011: 111; Yemelianova 2005: 613; Cornell 2001: 270) along with the Kumyks (Roeder 2007: 105; Minority Rights Group International) effectively control the regional government. Nor were they included in Azerbaijan's regional government during the USSR period.

Russia (USSR): Pamir Tajiks (1946-1991)

- EPR codes the Pamir Tajiks as not autonomous throughout 1946-1991, but this is inconsistent with case evidence. During Soviet rule, Gorno-Badakhshan (the Pamir Tajik entity) had the status of an autonomous oblast under the administration of the Tajik SSR. While the AO status is clearly not at the top of the hierarchies in the Soviet multi-layered federal system, ethnic entities had a certain measure of power as well as language protection and educational and cultural institutions in their own language (Brown 1996: 257; Brubaker 1994: 52-53; Suny 1993: 101, 117). Further, other groups with the same status, such as the Adyghe, are coded as autonomous throughout in EPR. Based on this, we recode the Pamir Tajiks as autonomous in 1946-1991.

Saudi Arabia: Hejazis (1946-1952)

- According to Minahan (2002: 735), the Hejazis in Saudi Arabia retained internal autonomy until the centralization of the Saudi kingdom in 1952, so we code the Hejazis as autonomous from 1946-1952.

Serbia and Montenegro: Albanians (1967-1971; 1987-1989)

- EPR codes the Albanians as autonomous from 1967-1986 but the evidence we have collected suggests they should instead be coded as autonomous from 1972-1989:
  - In 1963 Kosovo became an autonomous province and thus got symmetrical status to Vojvodina, but this change was largely symbolic (Pula 2004: 800). In 1968, the Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia made some first concessions to the demands of the Albanians in Kosovo: the use of the Albanian flag was legalized and the Kosovo Communist Party became independent (Pula 2004). Moreover, Muslims were recognized as a nationality of Yugoslavia and Albanian as an official language (Mitchell 2010: 311). In 1969, the Yugoslav Constitution was amended. Now, Kosovo was recognized as a territorial unit at the federal level, but again autonomy remained relatively limited. Only in 1971, by way of a constitutional amendment, did Kosovo get extensive legislative and judicial powers (Ramet 1984). Autonomy lasted until 1989, when the Serbian Legislative amended the Serbian

constitution and thus revoked much of Kosovo's autonomy (Troebst 1998; Pula 2004; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 326). Ethnic Albanians were fired from the state administration. Whatever little autonomy was left was revoked when the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved after the adoption of Serbia's constitution in July 1990 (Minorities at Risk Project).

Serbia and Montenegro: Bosniaks (1946-1974; 1992), Croats (1992)

- EPR codes the Bosniaks as regionally autonomous before 1974, but this is ambiguous. Even though Muslims constituted the majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic diversity was not fully recognized in Bosnia after 1945. Muslims were not recognized as a distinct nation in Yugoslavia until 1968, and it was mainly Bosnian Serbs that dominated the administration. This changed with the further decentralization of Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s, and, as a result, the 1974 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina foresaw a strict system of proportional representation of all three peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) in the republican administration and the Party (Bieber & Keil 2009). Based on this, we recode the Bosniaks as lacking autonomy until and including 1974. Further, we extend the autonomy code to 1992 (EPR erroneously codes no autonomy in 1992, but Bonsia was still an autonomous part of Yugoslavia in early 1992). For the same reason, we also code the Croats with autonomy in 1992 - EPR stops coding the Croats with autonomy after Croatia's secession in 1991, but the majority of the Croats who remained in Yugoslavia were in Bosnia, where they were included in the power-sharing system mentioned above.

Serbia and Montenegro: Hungarians (1967-1971; 1987-1989; 2000-2002)

- The same dynamic as with Kosovo applies analogously to Vojvodina and thus to the Hungarians (the Hungarians form a minority in Vojvodina but participated in the regional governments when there was one). Thus, we code autonomy from 1972-1989 instead of 1967-1986. Further, we recode 2000-2002 with no autonomy while leaving the autonomy code in 2003-2012 unchanged. EPR is correct that Vojvodina regained much of its autonomy in the early 2000s by way of the Omnibus Law, but this law was passed only in 2002, not 2000 (Minority Rights Group International).

Serbia: Albanians (2009-2012)

- For 2009-2012, EPR's estimate of the Albanian population in Serbia is 0.1% , or 6,000. This figure is too low because it bases on the 2011 census, which was boycotted by most Albanians. Instead, we draw on the 2002 census. According to the 2002 census, there were approx. 62,000 Albanians in Serbia, not counting Kosovo, or 0.82% of Serbia's population (again w/o Kosovo).

South Africa: Blacks

- Blacks in RSA are coded as geographically concentrated but the GeoEPR group polygon actually suggests that the Blacks are a statewide group, so we recode the group as statewide and not geographically concentrated.

South Africa (1994-2012)

- EPR codes all groups in South Africa as "not autonomous" in post-Apartheid South Africa, but this appears to be a mistake. South Africa, while not formally a federal state, is often considered a quasi-federation, and together with Nigeria and Ethiopia, among the most decentralized countries in Africa. The 1993 interim constitution gave the provinces significant competencies. The 1996 constitution maintained the quasi-federal structure (Dickovick 2007). Based on this, we recode all groups that clearly dominate one of the provinces population-wise as autonomous from 1994 onwards (one could also code from 1995 onwards, but the process had been initiated by early 1994):
  - Zulus (Kwa Zulu Natal)
  - Xhosa (Eastern Cape)
  - Pedi (North Soto) (Limpopo)
  - South Soto (Free State)
  - Tswana (North West)

Spain: Spanish (1976-2012)

- EPR does not provide a regaut code during these years. EPR's Spanish are an umbrella group that in essence includes Castilians and Andalusians. With the 1978 constitution, Spain moved to a decentralized form of government. Some groups had more autonomy than others - the so-called fast-track autonomies. In principle, the fast track was reserved to the historic nations (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia); other regions could also go with the fast track, but under very restrictive provisions that were basically impossible to meet. Andalusia still managed to jump on the fast track, though formally it did not meet the requirements (a referendum was required in which in all provinces an absolute majority votes in favor – in one province, the absolute majority was missed by a mere 20,000 votes and after inter-party negotiations was allowed to proceed with the fast track anyway). The remaining regions also got autonomy, but at least initially somewhat less (after five years they could gain more) (Aparico n.d.; Minahan 2002: 113; Keating & Wilson 2009). Therefore, we code the Spanish as autonomous from 1979 onwards (autonomy was not actually implemented in 1979, but only after the respective autonomy statutes went into force, which varied from region to region but always was in the late 1970s or early 1980s; however, EPR codes autonomy from 1979 also for other groups, so this follows general EPR practice).

Sri Lanka: Sri Lankan Tamils

- EPR codes the Tamils as self-excluded in 1984-1986 (with autonomy), then powerless (with autonomy) in 1987-2005, and discriminated without autonomy in 2006-2012. Case evidence we have collected suggests different start and end dates for de facto independence (1987-2009), so we extend the 1983 discriminated code to 1986 (and code no autonomy), then self-exclusion with autonomy between 1987 and 2009, and then follow EPR and code the Tamils as discriminated without autonomy in 2010-2012. According to Caspersen (2012), Eelam was a de-facto state from 1986 until the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, when the civil war was officially declared terminated after the LTTE had to give up its remaining territory and all of its leaders were killed. During the period from 1986 to 2009, many characteristics of a de-facto independent state were present. McConell (2008) mentions an own police force, legal system, education and health systems, law school, courts as well as welfare organizations, which made the LTTE a 'de facto administration' in the controlled areas.

Sudan: Azande, Bari, Latoka, Nuer, and Shilluk (2005-2011); Dinka (2005)

- EPR codes the Dinkas as regionally autonomous after the signing of the CPA in 2005, but none of the other Southern groups. This contrasts with the earlier period of autonomy in the 1970s/early 1980s, when all southern groups except for the Nubas and the Other Southern groups are coded with autonomy. According to the EPR coding notes: "Most importantly the vice-president in the autonomous South Sudan is Riek Machar from the Nuer group." The influence of other southern groups is not fully clear, but to be consistent with the earlier period, we recode the Azande, Bari, Latoka, Nuer, and Shilluk as autonomous in 2006-2011. Further, we code all these groups and the Dinkas as autononmous already from 2005 because the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government had already signed the Protocol on Power-Sharing in 2004, which stipulates the formation of a South Sudan regional government that would "exercise authority in respect of the people and States in the South."

Sudan: Dinkas and Other Southern groups (2012)

- South Sudan became independent in 2011. However, separatist agitation continued in some of the southern areas that had remained with Sudan, namely by i) the Nubas in South Kordofan, ii) the Ngok (a sub-group of the Dinkas) in Abyei, and iii) by various smaller Southerner tribes in the Blue Nile state (these are subsumed under the Other Southern groups in EPR). EPR, however, stops coding all Southerner groups in 2011, except for the Nubas. We recode the Dinkas and the other Southern groups as politically relevant in 2012.
- The Nubas are coded as powerless in 2012, and the International Crisis Group (2013a, b) reports that also the other Southerner groups remaining in Sudan were marginalized, hence we code both the Dinkas and the Other Southern groups as powerless in 2012.
- Population estimates are difficult to get by for post-independence Sudan, thus we mainly rely on population estimates for the two regions in questions, Abyei and Blue Nile State.
    o Abyei, on the one hand, is estimated to have a population of about 100,000 (WHO). This estimate may include non-Dinkas, but we were unable to get a more detailed estimate.
    o The ethnically heterogeneous Blue Nile state, on the other hand, is home to more than a million (1 to 1.2 million according to International Crisis Group 2013b: 2), again including non-Southerners. The International Crisis Group (2013b: 3) estimates that around half of Blue Nile are "indigenous", that is, Southerners.
    o The group sizes are calculated by dividing the combination of the two by Sudan's total post-independence population of around 30 million.
- We code autonomy for the Dinkas. The 2004 agreement on power-sharing gave autonomy to the South and the Abyei Protocol also gave autonomy to Abyei (Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area 2004), which continues to be part of the North.
- However, the southerner groups in Blue Nile State did not profit from a similar arrangement, so we code no regional autonomy in 2012.

Sudan: Rashaida (1999-2005)

- The Rashaida, a group in eastern Sudan, developed a separatist movement in 1999 according to SDM. EPR does not include the group until 2006, so we recode the group with political relevance from 1999 onwards.
- Throughout 1999-2005, the only group with access to central state power in Sudan was the "Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin and Danagla" (see EPR coding notes), so the powerless code can be extended to 1999-2005. We also code no autonomy, given that Sudan was highly centralized at the time (see eg ICG 2006).

Syria: Alawites (1946-1948)

- EPR codes autonomy in 1946-1948, arguing that this was a heritage of the French colonial rule. However, case evidence we have collected suggests that the Alawis had lost their autonomy earlier. Specifically, according to Shambrook (1998) Alawite autonomy came to an end in 1937, when the Alawite state was re-incorporated into Syria as a consequence of a Franco-Syrian treaty of 1936 and as a concession of the French to Syrian nationalists. We recode 1946-48 with no autonomy.

Syria: Druze (1946-1948)

- EPR codes autonomy in 1946-1948, arguing this was a heritage of the French colonial rule. However, the evidence we have collected suggests that the Druze's autonomy had ended already before 1946. Jabal al-Druze had an autonomous status under the French Mandate of Syria from 1922 until 1936, when the territory – against Druze petitions insisting on remaining separate from Syria (see e.g. Firro 1997: 92-93) – was incorporated into Syria. Jabal al-Druze retained a special status - initially. In 1944 the Syrian government dismantled much of Jabal al-Druze's autonomy, though guaranteeing the Druze cultural and religious rights (Minahan 2002: 547). Based on this, we recode the Druze as lacking autonomy in 1946-1948.

Syria: Kurds (1957)

- EPR codes the Kurds as included until the beginning of the year of 1957, and as excluded from early 1958 onwards. The EPR coding notes mention waning Kurdish representation from 1954 onwards and that the Kurds became completely sidelined as Syria joined with Egypt in the United Arab Republic in 1958. As Syria became increasingly dominated by Sunni Arabs, the Syrian Kurds founded the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS) in 1957 and began to claim SD. To reflect the case history, we move the 1958 excluded (powerless) code forward to 1957.

Taiwan: Indigenous/Aboriginal Taiwanese (1988-95)

- EPR considers Taiwan's indigenous peoples pol. relevant only from 1996 onwards, but SDM suggests that this group started to make separatist claims in 1988. Therefore, we recode the group with political relevance from 1988-1995.
- EPR codes the Aboriginal Taiwanese as powerless from 1996 onwards. Since the Taiwanese polity was dominated by the local Han Chinese as well as those Han Chinese that came in after the KMT's retreat to Taiwan in 1949, the powerless code also aptly describes the Aboriginal Taiwanese' position pre-1996 (see EPR coding notes). Moreover, we found no evidence for meaningful regional autonomy during these years (see e.g. IWGIA 2011).

Thailand: Hill Tribes (1997-98)

- EPR considers Thailand's Hill Tribes pol. relevant only from 1999 onwards, but the evidence we found suggests this group started to make separatist claims already in 1997. Therefore, we recode the group with political relevance from 1997-98.
- EPR codes the Hill Tribes as powerless from 1999; there is no evidence that the situation would have been different in 1997-1998 (the polity was dominated by Thais; see EPR coding notes). We also found no evidence for autonomy in 1997-1998, similarly to subsequent years (see EPR coding notes).

Thailand: Malay Muslims (1980-2001)

- EPR codes the Malay Muslims as regionally autonomous from 1980 until 2001 due to the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), which was operating during this period. However, according to several sources, there was no meaningful autonomy (see Wheeler 2010: 208; Melvin 2007; Human Rights Watch 2007: 16). Thus, we recode the Malay Muslims as lacking autonomy throughout these years.

UK: Catholics in Northern Ireland (1974; 1999)

- EPR codes autonomy for the Catholics in Northern Ireland from 1998 onwards, but there was no autonomy on January 1, 1998 for the Northern Ireland Catholics and, strictly speaking, also not in 1999:
  - The Belfast Agreement, which gave Northern Ireland autonomy and foresaw a consociational agreement, was adopted in May 1998 via a twin referendum and then implemented in late 1999 (see "The Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Appointed Day) Order 1999"). We peg the start of autonomy to 1999 as this is consistent with the Scots and the Welsh (there, too, EPR codes autonomy once it was decided but before the full implementation).
- Further, we add a regaut code for 1974. On March 20, 1973, the British government proposed a 78-member Northern Ireland Assembly, to be elected in a proportional system. The proposal became law on May 3, 1973, and the first elections were held on June 28. While radical Ulster Unionists were opposed to the agreement, pro-agreement forces won the election. In November, pro-agreement parties reached a compromise about a power-sharing regime whereunder both Protestants and Catholics would be represented in the regional executive. Moreover, in December 1973 the Sunningdale Agreement was signed. The Sunningdale Agreement revived the idea of (limited) Irish involvement in the Northern Irish government: it foresaw both a joint Irish-Northern-Irish executive and legislative council, though with very limited competencies in the areas of tourism, conservation, and aspects of animal health (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project). The consociational agreement was shortlived, however. A Protestant general strike led to the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement and the consociational Northern Irish government on May 28, 1974. Direct British rule was imposed (Minahan 2002; Minorities at Risk Project). Based on this we code autonomy in 1974.

UK: Protestants in Northern Ireland (1974; 1999)

- EPR codes the Protestants in Northern Ireland as autonomous from 1946-1971 and then again from 1998 onwards. We make two changes. First, we add a regaut code for 1974 due to the short-lived consociational agreement that held from 1973-1974 (see above). Further, we code autonomy due to the Belfast Agreement only from 1999 onwards (again, see above).

UK: Welsh (1946-1963)

- SDM suggests that there was an active Welsh separatist movement throughout 1946-2012, but EPR only codes the Welsh from 1964 onwards. We recode 1946-63 with political relevance.
- We code the Welsh as junior partner in 1946-1963: Gwilym Lloyd George, for example, was Minister of Fuel and Power (1942–1945), Minister of Food (1951–1954), and Home Secretary and Minister for Welsh Affairs (1954-1957).
- The Welsh had no regional autonomy until after Blair's devolution reforms in the late 1990s (Minahan 2002; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000).

US: Whites

- EPR codes the American Whites as not autonomous but the US is a federal state with white majorities in 49 of its 50 states, so we recode whites with regional autonomy.

Venezuela: Indigenous peoples (1972)

- EPR codes the group from 1973, but the evidence we found suggests that the group began to make separatist claims already a year before this, so we recode the group as pol. relevant in 1972. We apply the 1973 codes for power access etc. as there were no major differences.

Vietnam: Gia Rai (1975)

- The Gia Rai constitute one of the groups associated with the "Montagnards" separatist movement that had developed in South Vietnam. North Vietnam annexed South Vietnam in 1975. EPR only codes the group from 1976; following SDM, we add 1975, recode the group with political relevance, and use the 1976 codes for power access etc. also for 1975.

Vietnam: Khmer (1975)

- Accordign to SDM, there was a Khmer separatist movement in South Vietnam that continued to exist after the north's annexation in 1975. EPR only codes the group from 1976; we add 1975, recode the group with political relevance, and use the 1976 codes for power access etc. also for 1975.

Yemen

- The EPR group size estimates for unified Yemen appear to be incorrect. From 1991-1994, this is the breakdown according to EPR: Southerners (55%), Northerners (44%), and Al-Akhdam (1%). From 1995-2013 it is: Southerners (55%), Northern Zaydis (Shiites) (24%), Northern Shafi (Sunnis) (20%), and Al-Akhdam (1%). Thus, EPR consistently codes the Southerners as the majority group in Yemen. Population statistics for Yemen are surrounded by significant muddle (Minority Rights Group International), but this is clearly wrong. When the two Yemens united in 1990, the south had a population of about 2.5 mio and the north a population of about 9.1 mio according to Gleditsch (2002) and 2.5 mio vs 11 mio according to Dresch (2005: 186).
- According to MRGI, the Shafi Muslims make up 65-70% of Yemen's population, Zaydis 30-35%, and Akhdams 2-5%. The CIA World Factbook suggests a similar breakdown. The problem is that most sources don't make a distinction between Southern and Northern Shafis.
    o One source that provides an estimate for the Southern Yemenis is Minahan (2002: 702), according to whom there were 1.923 mio Southern Shafis (Southerners/Hadhramis) in Yemen in 2002. In combination with the World Bank estimate for Yemen's population in 2002 (18.55 mio), this suggests a group size for the Southern Shafis of 10.37% and for the Northern Shafis about 55%. This estimate appears on the lower end for the Southerners and on the higher end for the Northern Shafis.
    o Another, higher, estimate can be derived by combining estimates for the Shafi populations in the former North and South Yemen at the time of unification with today's estimates by MRGI.

- According to EPR, Shafis made up 69% of North Yemen before unification and almost the whole population of South Yemen. If we take Dresch's population figures as a baseline, this would suggest that in 1990 there were 7.6 mio Northern Shafis in Yemen and 2.5 mio Southern Shafis, or a 75/25 ratio.
- As stated above, MRGI reports that the Shafi Muslims make up 65-70% of Yemen's population, the Zaydis 30-35%, and the Akhdams 2-5%. Using in-between figures for all three groups (66/31/3), this suggests the following group count: [group sizes for Yemen: Northern Shafis (49.5%), Zaydis (31%), Southern Shafis (16.5%), and Akhdams (3%). For 1991-1994, the group sizes of the Northern Shafis and the Zaydis are combined (80.5%).

Yemen: Southerners (1990)

- According to SDM there was a Southerner separatist movement from 1990, but EPR only codes the Southerners from 1991 onwards. We add 1990 and code the group as politically relevant in this year. A power-sharing agreement was in place that guaranteed the Southerners government representation (ICG 2011: 3); therefore, we code the Southerners as included (senior partner), as EPR does from 1991 onwards. The south lost its autonomy after the merger, so we code no regional autonomy.

Zimbabwe: Africans

- Africans in Zimbabwe are coded as geographically concentrated but the GeoEPR group polygon actually suggests that Africans are a statewide group, so we recode the group as statewide and not geographically concentrated.

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