

ONLINE APPENDIX

A1 Data Description

This section describes key variables included in the analysis. **Tables ??-??** present summary statistics of key county-level variables and individual-level variables from the survey.

A1.1 Summary Statistics

Table A1: Summary Statistics of Key County-Level Variables

	count	mean	sd	min	max
%, Employees targeted by China Tariffs (April)	3143	1.13	4.14	0.00	59.18
%, Employees targeted by China Tariffs (June)	3143	3.10	6.72	0.00	91.41
%, Employees targeted by China Tariffs (August)	3143	2.59	4.73	0.00	64.61
%, Employees targeted by China Tariffs (September)	3143	15.02	11.66	0.00	91.41
%, Employees targeted by China Tariffs (by June)	3143	3.27	6.80	0.00	91.41
%, Employees targeted by China Tariffs (by August)	3143	5.63	7.79	0.00	91.41
%, Employees targeted by China Tariffs (by September)	3143	16.66	12.07	0.00	91.41
%, Employees protected by US Tariffs (by June)	3143	3.62	5.57	0.00	69.53
%, Employees protected by US Tariffs (by August)	3143	4.93	6.44	0.00	69.53
%, Employees protected by US Tariffs (by September)	3143	16.62	12.03	0.00	91.41
%, Employees targeted by EU Tariffs	3143	1.72	3.33	0.00	48.37
%, Employees targeted by Canada Tariffs	3143	4.62	7.22	0.00	91.28
%, Employees targeted by Mexico Tariffs	3143	2.39	5.57	0.00	59.18
Log(Export)	3143	4.88	1.61	0.01	11.20
Log(Agricultural Export)	3143	2.55	1.21	-5.42	7.31
%, GOP Vote (2014-16 Average)	3106	67.51	19.71	0.00	100.00
Swing District	3143	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 18-16	3098	-6.39	12.49	-74.58	51.26
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 16-14	3106	3.45	14.76	-57.68	76.50

For sector-level employment measures, we use the 2016 County Business Patterns (CBP) dataset. The CBP provides information on employment by county and industry, excluding self-employed individuals, employees of private households, railroad employees, agricultural production employees, and most government employees. When the CBP reports only an interval instead of an exact count of employees, we impute the employment size following the procedure described in Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013). As the CBP does not cover agricultural production employees, we supplement the data with the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which provides annual average employment data for private sector agricultural production industries. When county-level information is not available due to non-disclosure policy, we apportion employment at the superordinate level in proportion to the size of the employment at the state-level.


Table A2: Summary Statistics of the Survey Data

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Industry Workers Targeted	1,492	0.041	0.180	0	0.885
County Workers Targeted	1,492	0.100	0.078	0.002	0.531
Protected by U.S. Tariffs	1,492	0.098	0.077	0.002	0.531
<i>Negative impact of Trade War</i>					
on USA	1,492	0.409	0.492	0	1
on Area	1,492	0.253	0.435	0	1
on Family	1,492	0.189	0.392	0	1
<i>Responsible for Trade War</i>					
Trump	1,492	0.698	0.459	0	1
Republicans in Congress	1,492	0.460	0.499	0	1
Democrats in Congress	1,492	0.217	0.412	0	1
Education	1,492	3.404	1.531	1	6
Female	1,492	0.562	0.496	0	1
White	1,492	0.656	0.475	0	1
Black	1,492	0.129	0.335	0	1
Hispanic	1,492	0.139	0.346	0	1
Asian	1,492	0.048	0.213	0	1
Other	1,492	0.029	0.167	0	1
Paid employee	1,492	0.414	0.493	0	1
Self-employed	1,492	0.094	0.292	0	1
Not working (temporary layoff)	1,492	0.011	0.106	0	1
Not working (looking for work)	1,492	0.094	0.292	0	1
Retired	1,492	0.206	0.405	0	1
Not working (other)	1,492	0.079	0.405	0	1
Disabled	1,492	0.085	0.270	0	1
Other	1,492	0.016	0.279	0	1
Age	1,492	45.288	18.180	19	92
US Native	1,492	0.930	0.255	0	1


A1.2 Geographical Distribution of Exposure to US-Initiated Tariffs

Figure ?? illustrates the geographical variation in the level of employment share protected by the U.S.-initiated tariffs imposed by: (a) June, (b) August and (c) September. We collected the list of US-initiated tariffs imposed on Chinese products from the United States Trade Representatives. We mapped 6-digit HS tariff line items to 6-digit NAICS codes, and calculated the share of workers employed in 6-digit NAICS sectors affected by the US-initiated tariffs. As illustrated in the maps, there is a considerable difference between the exposure to the tariffs initiated by the U.S. and Chinese retaliatory tariffs by June and August. By September, there was a considerable overlap between the Chinese tariff list and the US-initiated list.


Figure A1: County-Level Employment Share Protected by the US-Initiated Tariffs



(a) June



(b) August



(c) September

Note: The figures illustrate county-level variation in the percentage of workers employed in the industries protected by the US-initiated tariffs. Sub-figures (a)-(c) illustrate the percentage of workers affected by the tariffs imposed by June, August and September, respectively. For each round, we cumulatively add the percentage of workers affected by all previous rounds of retaliations.

A1.3 Campaign Communications Examples

This section presents additional illustrative examples from the campaign communications dataset we analyzed in Section ??.

- Colin Allred (Texas-32, D)
 - “Every corner of Texas will be hurt by the disastrous trade war this President has created. Pete Sessions has done nothing to stand up and fight for North Texans. In Congress, I will be a champion for the people of #TX32 and the businesses that employ them.”
- Dan Feehan (MN-01, D)
 - “This isn’t the idea about China, we can have that discussion. We can talk about what we can do to make sure that China is held accountable. [...] I do not accept the idea that we here in Southern Minnesota take the brunt of this trade war; that we’re the ones taking one for the team because again, at the end of the day, that impacts all of us.”
- Brendan Kelly (IL-12, D)
 - “Bost endorses President Donald Trump’s trade war because it has helped add a few hundred steel jobs to the district. Meanwhile, thousands of Southern Illinois corn and soybean farmers have seen their export markets evaporate. Bost’s solution? A budget-busting, \$12 billion government bailout.”
- Karen McCormick (CO-04, D)
 - “Too many middle-class families are still struggling and feel left behind. Wages are stagnant, and inflation has already eaten up whatever small gains working people got from the tax cuts. The farm bill mostly helps big business, not small farmers. And I’m concerned that a trade war and tariffs will hurt Colorado agriculture.”
- Kathleen Williams (MT-AT LARGE, D)
 - “Congressman Gianforte isn’t standing up for our farmers. He had a chance to sign a letter with 107 other members of his caucus, urging caution over the trade war. He didn’t sign it. Montana has worked so hard for our export markets; now they’re under threat. #mtpol #mtal”

- Kara Eastman (NE-02, D)
 - “... He should demand a roll back on the tariffs that have caused this crisis in the Heartland and instead work to repair trade relationships so Nebraska farmers can succeed.”

Figure A2: Press Release by Kara Eastman on the Trade war



Wednesday, July 25, 2018
For Immediate Release
Contact: Heather Aliano, 301.659.0659
heather@eastmanforcongress.com

Nebraska’s Farmers Betrayed by Administration
Farmers want to sell their products, not accept a hand-out

Omaha, NE: Today, Democratic Congressional candidate Kara Eastman (NE-02) responded to the current administration’s plan for a \$12 billion bailout for farmers struggling to sell their products at a fair price due to the trade war the President himself started.

Eastman calls for a long-term solution solution to the toll this trade war has taken on farmers:

“Nebraska’s farmers don’t want an ineffective hand-out. They have worked hard to sell their products and compete in the global economy,” said Eastman. “A band-aid doesn’t make up for the long-term damage caused by this trade war and our current congressperson’s complicity in it. He should demand a roll back on the tariffs that have caused this crisis in the Heartland and instead work to repair trade relationships so Nebraska farmers can succeed.”

A2 Retaliatory Tariffs by China, the EU, Canada and Mexico

This section focuses on comparing the retaliatory tariffs imposed by the EU, Canada and Mexico, to the tariffs imposed by China. In **Table ??**, we examine the effects of exposure to the retaliatory tariffs imposed by the different trade partners separately by timing of the introduction of the tariffs. The EU imposed tariffs on June 20, 2018 and Canada and Mexico imposed tariffs on July 1st and July 5th, respectively. The findings are largely similar to those we obtain when we examine the effects of only the retaliatory tariffs imposed by China. This suggests that the findings reported in **Table ??** are largely driven by China’s retaliatory tariffs and not by tariffs imposed by the other trade partners.

Table A3: Retaliatory Tariffs and Mid-term Election, All Economic Players Combined

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>							
	Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 18-16							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	by April		by June		by August		by September	
% Targeted by Retaliatory Tariffs	-0.470**	-0.358**	-0.217**	-0.147*	-0.085	-0.039	-0.132	-0.188 ⁺
	(0.150)	(0.113)	(0.076)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.120)	(0.102)
% Protected by US Tariffs			-0.070	-0.066	-0.021	-0.001	0.070	0.181 ⁺
			(0.082)	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.122)	(0.103)
Δ Weekly Wage, 18-17	0.091	0.147*	0.077	0.136 ⁺	0.080	0.140 ⁺	0.083	0.146*
	(0.090)	(0.073)	(0.091)	(0.072)	(0.091)	(0.073)	(0.090)	(0.072)
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 16-14		-0.470**		-0.471**		-0.473**		-0.473**
		(0.045)		(0.045)		(0.045)		(0.045)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3098	3096	3098	3096	3098	3096	3098	3096

Note: Dependent variables are the continuous measures of the change in the Republican two-party vote share between 2016 and 2018. The primary independent variable, *Targeted by Retaliatory Tariffs*, measures the percentage of workers targeted by the retaliatory tariffs imposed by all counterparts (Canada, China, the EU, and Mexico) by April in models (1)-(2), by June in models (3)-(4), by August in models (5)-(6), and by September in models (7)-(8). All regressions are weighted by counties’ total voting age population in 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$

A2.1 Product-Level Analysis

This section compares the degree of political targeting of the retaliatory tariffs introduced by four trading partners: China, Mexico, Canada and the US. This comparison uses the HS 6-digit *product* as the unit of analysis. We examine how the degree of industrial concentration in Republican-leaning areas was correlated with the inclusion of the product in the retaliatory tariff list, controlling for the export volume to each trading partner and the degree of import dependence on the U.S.

Table ?? presents the results. We consider the selection of retaliatory tariffs by China (the first three rounds), the EU, Canada and Mexico in Models (1)-(4), respectively. (The number of observations differs across the models because the observations are excluded when a country has no imports of a given product). The results show that China's selection was unique in terms of its high degree of political targeting. The marginal effect of *Republican Concentration* is most sizable for China's selection of tariffs. Another notable factor is *Imports Dependence on the US* which proxies the potential economic cost of retaliatory tariffs to the imposing country. The coefficient on this measure is positive and sizable in Model (1), which suggests that China focused on the political targeting while willing to bear the potential costs to its domestic market. This is in stark contrast with the EU's approach for tariff selection, as suggested by the negative coefficient on *Import Dependence on the US* in Model (2). Put differently, the EU seems to have been more concerned with the implications of the tariffs on the bloc's own economy.

Table A4: Product-Level Analysis of All Tariffs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	China	The EU	Canada	Mexico
Republican Concentration	0.680** (0.122)	0.012 (0.032)	-0.222* (0.103)	-0.130 (0.201)
Log(Imports Volume from the US)	0.000 (0.001)	0.004** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.004** (0.001)
Imports Dependence on the US	0.106** (0.017)	-0.036** (0.009)	0.006* (0.002)	0.010 ⁺ (0.006)
Observations	4231	4988	5081	4928

Note: Dependent variables in models (1)-(4) are the binary indicators for being included in the tariff list of China (April, June and August), the EU, Canada, and Mexico, respectively. *Republican Concentration* measures the industry's degree of concentration in Republican districts. Marginal effects in the main entries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$

A2.2 Comparing Targeting of Tariff ‘Baskets’: A Simulation Approach

This section considers how the actual selection of retaliatory tariffs differs from other alternative tariff lists (‘baskets’) in terms of the degree of political targeting and other economic considerations. The findings reported in section ?? might simply reflect a correlation between the industries’ geographical concentration and the areas’ level of support for the Republican Party. To address this possibility, we follow a simulation approach introduced in ?, by randomly choosing alternative sets of tariff baskets that could have been chosen by each trading partner. We then estimate the above models with simulated datasets to examine the effects of *Republican Concentration* and *Import Dependence on the U.S.*, and then compare the marginal effects with the ones from the actual list of tariffs.

Specifically, the simulation proceeds as follows. We randomly select a set of 6-digit HS products whose total US export volume to a given trading partner is within 5% of deviation from the actual targeted export volume.⁴⁷ For each selection, we estimate a binary probit model with a hypothetical binary dependent variable that takes the value 1 if a product is included in the simulated basket and 0 otherwise. As in **Table ??**, we include three right-hand side variables, namely, *Republican Concentration*, *Imports Volume from the US (log)* and *Import Dependence on the U.S.*. For each estimation, we calculate the marginal effect of *Republican Concentration* and that of *Import Dependence on the US*. We repeat this step 1,000 times for each trading partner. Comparing the actual marginal effects with those from randomly simulated baskets allows us to examine the extent to which the selected items were distinctive in terms of the degree of political targeting and the potential costs to the domestic market.


⁴⁷We did not constrain the number of targeted items. For an alternative approach, see ? that impose constraints both on the export volume and the number of targeted items.

We present the distribution of the calculated marginal effects of *Republican Concentration* and *Import Dependence on the U.S.* in **Figures ?? and ??**, respectively. The marginal effects were calculated based on the analysis of 1,000 randomly simulated tariff baskets for each trading partner. Although our approach differs from the one employed by ?, the findings are largely consistent.


First, China appears to be unique in its high degree of political targeting of Republican-leaning areas, as shown in panel (a) in **Figure ??**. The actual basket of selected tariffs is at the 99.1 percentile compared to the simulated marginal effects of Republican concentration. This suggests that China's political targeting was close to the maximal level, according to our simulation. The EU's tariffs are also targeted toward Republican-leaning areas, but the degree of targeting is less significant. Its simulated marginal effects are at the 62.6 percentile compared to the simulated marginal effects. Notably, the other two trade partners, Canada and Mexico, do not seem to have placed much weight on targeting Republican-leaning areas.

Second, the EU appears to have been the most concerned with minimizing the potential cost of the tariffs to its own market, as shown in panel (b) in **Figure ??**. While the degree of import dependence on the U.S. is only an imperfect proxy for the estimated costs of tariff imposition, the simulation results provide suggestive evidence that the EU selected items that were not heavily dependent on the US as the exporter. In contrast, China seems to have been the least concerned with minimizing the domestic costs. given that its targeted items were more heavily dependent on U.S. exports.


Figure A3: Simulated Marginal Effects of Republican Concentration




(a) China



(c) Canada




(b) The EU




(d) Mexico

Note: Each sub-figure presents the kernel density distribution of the simulated marginal effects of *Republican concentration* on the probability of being included in the tariff baskets. The distribution is based on 1,000 hypothetical tariffs baskets for: (a) China, (b) the EU, (c) Canada, and (d) Mexico. The navy vertical line indicates the marginal effects of *Republican concentration* based on the actual selection of tariffs, as estimated in Table ??.


Figure A4: Simulated Marginal Effects of Import Dependence on the US




(a) China



(c) Canada



(b) The EU



(d) Mexico

Note: Each sub-figure presents the kernel density distribution of the simulated marginal effects of *Import dependence on the US* on the probability of being included in the tariff baskets. The distribution is based on 1,000 hypothetical tariff baskets for: (a) China, (b) the EU, (c) Canada, and (d) Mexico. The navy vertical line indicates the marginal effects of *Import dependence on the US* based on the actual selection of tariffs, as estimated in Table ??.

A3 Robustness Tests

This section presents a set of tests to ensure that our results are robust to different model specifications. **Section ??** varies the threshold of defining counties as located within swing district(s). **Section ??** uses the measure of competitiveness following the Cook Political Report for defining swing district(s). **Section ??** controls for county-level export values. **Section ??** examines the effects of tariffs on the 2018 mid-term elections by excluding uncontested elections. **Section ??** uses different weights for counties. **Section ??** controls for swing districts.

A3.1 Varying Thresholds for Swing Districts

In the main analyses presented in Table ?? we consider a county that has at least 20% of overlap with a swing district(s) as located within a swing district(s). In this section we presents the results when we vary this threshold to 10% in **Table ??** or to 30% in **Table ??**.

Table A5: Counties Targeted by Tariffs: Swing District with 10% of Overlap as a Threshold

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>								
Workers Employed in Targeted Industries (%)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	April		June		August		September	
GOP Vote Share (%)	0.018**	0.012**	0.033**	0.028**	0.019**	0.020**	0.134**	0.134**
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Swing District	-0.225	-1.851*	-0.199	-1.610*	-0.167	0.172	-0.581	-0.756
	(0.233)	(0.725)	(0.268)	(0.809)	(0.115)	(0.336)	(0.413)	(0.999)
GOP Vote Share (%) * Swing District		0.036*		0.031+		-0.008		0.004
		(0.015)		(0.018)		(0.007)		(0.021)
Observations	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106

Note: Dependent variable in models (1)-(2) is the percentage of workers employed in industries targeted by the first round of Chinese retaliation in April. The next models focus on the second, third and last round of retaliation in June, August and September, respectively. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$

Table A6: Counties Targeted by Tariffs: Swing District with 30% of Overlap as a Threshold

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>								
Workers Employed in Targeted Industries (%)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	April		June		August		September	
GOP Vote Share (%)	0.018**	0.014**	0.034**	0.029**	0.019**	0.019**	0.136**	0.133**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Swing District	-0.131	-2.442**	-0.115	-2.463**	-0.237*	0.067	-0.082	-1.466
	(0.277)	(0.837)	(0.314)	(0.924)	(0.110)	(0.316)	(0.449)	(1.331)
GOP Vote Share (%) * Swing District		0.051**		0.052**		-0.007		0.030
		(0.016)		(0.019)		(0.007)		(0.027)
Observations	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106

Note: Dependent variable in models (1)-(2) is the percentage of workers employed in industries targeted by the first round of Chinese retaliation in April. The next models focus on the second, third and last round of retaliation in June, August and September, respectively. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$

A3.2 Cook’s Measure of Competitive Districts

We use an alternative measure of swing district by following the Cook Political Report’s ratings on the competitiveness of each House seat. The report classifies each seat as (1) solid Democratic, (2) likely Democratic, (3) lean Democratic, (4) Democratic toss-up, (5) Republican toss-up, (6) lean Republican, (7) likely Republican and (8) solid Republican. We create an indicator for *Competitive District* for toss-up and lean/likely Republican districts, as defined in the report published on March 8, 2018.⁴⁸ We expect retaliatory tariffs to be concentrated in strong Republican counties within these districts. **Table ??** and **??** show that our results are robust to an alternative measure of competitive district.

Table A7: Counties Targeted by Tariffs: Swing District (Cook Rating, 20% of Overlap)

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>							
	Workers Employed in Targeted Industries (%)							
	April		June		August		September	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Vote Share (%)	0.018** (0.004)	0.014** (0.004)	0.034** (0.005)	0.030** (0.005)	0.019** (0.003)	0.017** (0.003)	0.137** (0.008)	0.137** (0.009)
Competitive District	-0.404+ (0.209)	-1.835* (0.719)	-0.719** (0.241)	-1.901** (0.731)	-0.262+ (0.135)	-0.919* (0.410)	-1.585** (0.428)	-1.495 (1.435)
GOP Vote Share (%) * Competitive District		0.028* (0.013)		0.023+ (0.014)		0.013 (0.009)		-0.002 (0.025)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106

Note: Dependent variables in models (1)-(2) are the percentage of workers employed in industries targeted by the first round of Chinese retaliation. The next models focus on the second, third and last rounds, respectively. All regressions are weighted by counties’ total voting age population in 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Counties Targeted by Tariffs: Swing District (Cook Rating, 30% of Overlap)

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>							
	Workers Employed in Targeted Industries (%)							
	April		June		August		September	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GOP Vote Share (%)	0.018** (0.004)	0.014** (0.004)	0.034** (0.005)	0.031** (0.005)	0.019** (0.003)	0.017** (0.003)	0.137** (0.008)	0.135** (0.009)
Competitive District	-0.554* (0.215)	-1.885** (0.686)	-0.841** (0.246)	-1.970** (0.699)	-0.242+ (0.139)	-0.929* (0.434)	-1.585** (0.435)	-1.989 (1.549)
GOP Vote Share (%) * Competitive District		0.026* (0.012)		0.022+ (0.013)		0.014 (0.009)		0.008 (0.027)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106	3106

Note: Dependent variables in models (1)-(2) are the percentage of workers employed in industries targeted by the first round of Chinese retaliation. The next models focus on the second, third and last rounds, respectively. All regressions are weighted by counties’ total voting age population in 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

⁴⁸The ratings are available at <https://cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/182753>.

A3.3 Controlling for County-level Export Value

To examine the possibility of Chinese tariffs targeting the largest exporting counties, we control also for county-level export value (Table ??) and county-level agricultural export value (Table ??). The results remain substantively similar, ruling out an alternative explanation that exporting industries just happened to be located in the targeted areas.

Table A9: Counties Targeted by Retaliatory Tariffs (Export Value Controlled)

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>								
Workers Employed in Targeted Industries (%)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	April		June		August		September	
GOP Vote Share (%)	0.006 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.016** (0.006)	0.012* (0.006)	0.019** (0.003)	0.020** (0.003)	0.106** (0.009)	0.106** (0.009)
Swing District	0.050 (0.219)	-2.114** (0.718)	0.081 (0.248)	-1.936* (0.758)	-0.243* (0.106)	0.011 (0.321)	-0.142 (0.435)	0.040 (1.432)
GOP Vote Share (%) * Swing District		0.048** (0.015)		0.044** (0.017)		-0.006 (0.007)		-0.004 (0.028)
Log(Export)	-0.300** (0.052)	-0.277** (0.046)	-0.432** (0.060)	-0.410** (0.057)	0.018 (0.036)	0.015 (0.037)	-0.740** (0.109)	-0.742** (0.108)
Observations	3105	3105	3105	3105	3105	3105	3105	3105

Note: Dependent variables in models (1)-(2) are the percentage of workers employed in industries targeted by the first round of Chinese retaliation in April. The next models focus on the second, third and last round of retaliation in June, August and September, respectively. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$

Table A10: Counties Targeted by Retaliatory Tariffs (Agricultural Export Value Controlled)

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>								
Workers Employed in Targeted Industries (%)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	April		June		August		September	
GOP Vote Share (%)	0.012* (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.025** (0.006)	0.019** (0.005)	0.019** (0.003)	0.019** (0.003)	0.121** (0.009)	0.119** (0.009)
Swing District	-0.229 (0.272)	-2.760** (0.846)	-0.286 (0.308)	-2.841** (0.907)	-0.240* (0.108)	0.031 (0.313)	-0.780 ⁺ (0.451)	-1.571 (1.299)
GOP Vote Share (%) * Swing District		0.056** (0.016)		0.056** (0.018)		-0.006 (0.006)		0.017 (0.026)
Log(Agricultural Export)	0.267** (0.081)	0.273** (0.081)	0.338** (0.096)	0.344** (0.095)	0.003 (0.037)	0.002 (0.037)	0.591** (0.136)	0.593** (0.137)
Observations	3105	3105	3105	3105	3105	3105	3105	3105

Note: Dependent variables in models (1)-(2) are the percentage of workers employed in industries targeted by the first round of Chinese retaliation in April. The next models focus on the second, third and last round of retaliation in June, August and September, respectively. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses. $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$

A3.4 Excluding Uncontested Elections

Our main specifications include uncontested elections in calculating county-level change in election outcomes, by recording 100% as the vote share of unopposed candidate (Table ??). This section presents the results when we exclude those uncontested districts in calculating county-level change in the Republican vote share between 2016 and 2018. **Table ??** presents the results. The results remain largely unchanged as compared to the original specification.

Table A11: Tariffs and Mid-term Election: Excluding Uncontested Elections

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>							
	Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 18-16							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	by April		by June		by August		by September	
% Targeted by Chinese Tariffs	-0.263 ⁺	-0.287 [*]	-0.160 ⁺	-0.214 ^{**}	-0.059	-0.072	0.032	-0.094
	(0.134)	(0.122)	(0.083)	(0.076)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.117)	(0.113)
% Protected by US Tariffs			0.031	0.080 [*]	0.008	0.048	-0.043	0.117
			(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.118)	(0.114)
Δ Weekly Wage, 18-17	0.046	0.098	0.043	0.098	0.041	0.095	0.040	0.097
	(0.083)	(0.071)	(0.083)	(0.071)	(0.084)	(0.072)	(0.083)	(0.071)
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 16-14		-0.382 ^{**}		-0.384 ^{**}		-0.382 ^{**}		-0.383 ^{**}
		(0.050)		(0.050)		(0.050)		(0.050)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2954	2909	2954	2909	2954	2909	2954	2909

Note: Dependent variables are the continuous measures of the change in the percentage of two-party Republican vote share between 2016 and 2018. The primary independent variable, *Targeted by Chinese Tariffs*, measures the percentage of workers targeted by the retaliatory tariffs imposed by April in models (1)-(2), by June in models (3)-(4), by August in models (5)-(6), and by September in models (7)-(8). All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses $+p < 0.10$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$

A3.5 Different Weightings

Throughout the main analyses, we weight the observations by the total number of voting age population in each county. This sections presents the results when we do not use weights (**Table ??**) and when observations are weighted by the total votes cast in each county in the 2016 House election (**Table ??**). While the size of coefficients is different when we use different weighting strategies, our chief findings remain unchanged across alternative specifications.

Table A12: Tariffs and Mid-term Election: No Weighting

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>								
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 18-16								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	by April		by June		by August		by September	
% Targeted by Chinese Tariffs	-0.160**	-0.137**	-0.087*	-0.073**	-0.044	-0.037 ⁺	-0.028	-0.054
	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.088)	(0.056)
% Protected by US Tariffs			-0.055 ⁺	-0.054*	-0.025	-0.017	0.012	0.053
			(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.088)	(0.056)
Δ Weekly Wage, 18-17	0.079	0.040	0.079	0.040	0.080	0.041	0.082	0.043
	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.039)
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 16-14		-0.580**		-0.580**		-0.580**		-0.580**
		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.022)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3098	3096	3098	3096	3098	3096	3098	3096

Note: Dependent variables are the continuous measures of the change in the percentage of two-party Republican vote share between 2016 and 2018. The primary independent variable, *Targeted by Chinese Tariffs*, measures the percentage of workers targeted by the retaliatory tariffs imposed by April in models (1)-(2), by June in models (3)-(4), by August in models (5)-(6), and by September in models (7)-(8). All models include state-fixed effects and demographic controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses $+p < 0.10$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$

Table A13: Tariffs and Mid-term Election: Weighting by Total County-Level Votes of 2016

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>								
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 18-16								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	by April		by June		by August		by September	
%, Targeted by Chinese Tariffs	-0.420**	-0.332**	-0.225**	-0.219**	-0.126*	-0.102 ⁺	-0.112	-0.161 ⁺
	(0.146)	(0.115)	(0.086)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.109)	(0.097)
%, Protected by US Tariffs			0.017	0.060 ⁺	-0.021	0.004	0.073	0.166 ⁺
			(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.072)	(0.061)	(0.111)	(0.098)
Δ Weekly Wage, 18-17	0.109	0.149*	0.102	0.146*	0.099	0.142*	0.103	0.149*
	(0.080)	(0.069)	(0.080)	(0.069)	(0.080)	(0.069)	(0.080)	(0.068)
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 16-14		-0.435**		-0.438**		-0.437**		-0.438**
		(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.049)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3098	3096	3098	3096	3098	3096	3098	3096

Note: Dependent variables are the continuous measures of the change in the two-party Republican vote share between 2016 and 2018. The primary independent variable, *Targeted by Chinese Tariffs*, measures the percentage of workers targeted by the retaliatory tariffs imposed by April in models (1)-(2), by June in models (3)-(4), by August in models (5)-(6), and by September in models (7)-(8). All models include state-fixed effects and demographic controls. All regressions are weighted by counties' total votes of 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$

A3.6 Electoral Effects in Swing Districts

One possible alternative explanation for the tariffs' electoral impact is that vulnerable districts might have seen a larger decline in Republican support. As the Chinese tariffs were concentrated in those swing districts, the electoral effect may simply reflect a general tendency of declining Republican support in the swing districts. **Table ??** examines this possibility by including an additional control for a binary *Swing District* indicator. The results reveal the opposite pattern: counties in swing districts showed higher support for Republican candidates than non-swing districts, relative to the previous election. The average value for the dependent variable (Δ Republican Vote (%), 16-14) is -2.08 for swing districts and -7.10 for non-swing districts. Also, our findings remain intact when controlling for *Swing District*. The results rule out the alternative explanation that vulnerable districts experienced a larger decline in Republican support.

Table A14: Vulnerable Districts and Change in Republican Support

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>							
	Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 18-16							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	by April		by June		by August		by September	
% Targeted by Chinese Tariffs	-0.454** (0.145)	-0.346** (0.111)	-0.230** (0.081)	-0.172** (0.066)	-0.144* (0.067)	-0.109* (0.055)	-0.148 (0.119)	-0.201 ⁺ (0.103)
% Protected by US Tariffs			-0.092 (0.086)	-0.079 (0.068)	-0.018 (0.076)	0.014 (0.062)	0.096 (0.120)	0.203* (0.103)
Δ Weekly Wage, 18-17	0.095 (0.090)	0.150* (0.074)	0.080 (0.091)	0.138 ⁺ (0.074)	0.083 (0.091)	0.143 ⁺ (0.075)	0.089 (0.091)	0.151* (0.073)
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 16-14		-0.469** (0.045)		-0.470** (0.045)		-0.471** (0.045)		-0.473** (0.045)
Swing District	1.717* (0.774)	1.371* (0.679)	1.696* (0.792)	1.350* (0.682)	1.747* (0.803)	1.414* (0.686)	1.789* (0.806)	1.503* (0.690)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3098	3096	3098	3096	3098	3096	3098	3096

Note: Dependent variables are the continuous measures of the change in the percentage of two-party Republican vote share between 2016 and 2018. The primary independent variable, *Targeted by Chinese Tariffs*, measures the percentage of workers targeted by the retaliatory tariffs imposed by April in models (1)-(2), by June in models (3)-(4), by August in models (5)-(6), and by September in models (7)-(8). All models include state-fixed effects and demographic controls. All regressions are weighted by counties' total votes of 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses $+p < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$

A3.7 Analysis at the Commuting-Zone Level

As one's place of residence may differ from their place of work, we re-run the analyses with commuting zones as the unit of analysis instead of counties. Commuting zones (CZ) are clusters of counties that are characterized by a high degree of internal commuting ties. Each county is mapped to one CZ based on cross-county commuting patterns. Using the 2000 boundary of commuting zones, **Table ??** re-estimates the models on the electoral consequences of the retaliatory tariffs at the commuting-zone level. The results are largely unchanged from the original specifications. The effects of Chinese retaliatory tariffs appear to be consistently negative across the different models.

Table A15: Retaliatory Tariffs and Mid-term Election at the Commuting-Zone Levels

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>								
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 18-16								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	by April		by June		by August		by September	
% Targeted by Chinese Tariffs	-0.652*	-0.451*	-0.487*	-0.309*	-0.368*	-0.230 ⁺	-0.881 ⁺	-0.374
	(0.288)	(0.221)	(0.199)	(0.154)	(0.172)	(0.139)	(0.460)	(0.367)
% Protected by US Tariffs			-0.153	-0.117	-0.028	0.001	0.743	0.318
			(0.270)	(0.194)	(0.241)	(0.169)	(0.471)	(0.374)
Δ Weekly Wage, 18-17	-0.119	0.182	-0.110	0.183	-0.170	0.147	-0.190	0.133
	(0.345)	(0.277)	(0.352)	(0.280)	(0.357)	(0.283)	(0.357)	(0.283)
Δ Republican Vote (%), 16-14		-0.483**		-0.482**		-0.483**		-0.484**
		(0.060)		(0.060)		(0.060)		(0.060)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	691	691	691	691	691	691	691	691

Note: Dependent variables are the continuous measures of the change in the percentage of two-party Republican vote share between 2016 and 2018. The primary independent variable, *Targeted by Chinese Tariffs*, measures the percentage of workers targeted by the retaliatory tariffs imposed by April in models (1)-(2), by June in models (3)-(4), by August in models (5)-(6), and by September in models (7)-(8). All models include state-fixed effects and demographic controls. All regressions are weighted by commuting zones' total voting age population in 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses $+p < 0.10$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$

A3.8 Campaign Communications on Trade and China

In Section ??, we examined campaign communications on the trade war by Democratic and Republican candidates who ran for the House seats in the 2018 mid-term election. Our main dependent variable in Table ?? is the proportion of official campaign communications that contained the phrase “trade war” anywhere in the text. Yet, it is possible that Republican candidates might have talked about the same issue without referring to it as a ‘trade war.’ To address this possibility, we also examine the proportion of official campaign communications that contained the word “trade” and “china” anywhere in the text in **Table ??** and “tariff” and “china” in **Table ??**. While Republican candidates were more likely to discuss “trade” and “china” instead of “trade war,” some of them turned out to be only remotely related to the issue of the trade war and tariffs.⁴⁹ Yet, as presented in **Tables ??-??**, our results remain largely intact using this alternative dependent variable which adds noise to the measurement. We find that the interaction term between *Targeted by Tariffs* and *Democratic* is positive across the models, suggesting that Democratic candidates in areas more exposed to retaliatory tariffs were more likely to communicate on the trade issue with China.

⁴⁹For instance, Dan David of Pennsylvania’s 4th District tweeted “ China is pursuing infrastructure projects across Asia and beyond, gaining it leverage over smaller countries. China has enough ill-gotten leverage through unfair trade and military saber-rattling.” Similarly, Paul Dikes wrote on the campaign’s Facebook page: “ Chinese spy caught in ‘rare’ sting after ‘plot to steal U.S. trade secrets’ – South China Morning Post.”

Table A16: Campaign Communications on the Trade War: Trade and China

		<i>Dependent Variable:</i>							
		Campaign Communications on Trade and China (%)							
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		by April		by June		by August		by September	
Democratic Candidate		0.041	0.025	0.041 ⁺	0.015	0.042 ⁺	-0.016	0.044 ⁺	-0.001
		(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.040)
%, Targeted by Tariffs		0.011	-0.003	0.011 ⁺	0.000	0.025 ^{**}	0.005	0.010 ^{**}	0.007 ⁺
		(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.004)
%, Targeted by Tariffs * Democratic			0.025		0.020 ⁺		0.037 ^{**}		0.005
			(0.016)		(0.011)		(0.014)		(0.005)
Observations		840	840	840	840	840	840	840	840

Note: Dependent variables are the percentage of campaign communications that contain the terms “trade” and “China” anywhere in the text. *Democratic Candidate* denotes the partisanship of House candidate (coded 1 for the Democratic Party and 0 for the Republican Party). *Targeted by Tariff* measures the percentage of workers targeted by Chinese retaliatory tariffs imposed by April in models (1)-(2), by June in models (3)-(4), by August in models (5)-(6) and by September in models (7)-(8). Robust standard errors in parentheses $+p < 0.10$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$

Table A17: Retaliatory Tariffs and Campaign Communications Regarding the Trade War: Tariff and China

		<i>Dependent Variable:</i>							
		Campaign Communications on Tariff and China (%)							
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		by April		by June		by August		by September	
Democratic Candidate		0.069 ^{**}	0.058 ^{**}	0.069 ^{**}	0.044 [*]	0.070 ^{**}	0.012	0.072 ^{**}	-0.023
		(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.035)
%, Targeted by Tariffs		0.007	-0.003	0.010 [*]	-0.000	0.023 ^{**}	0.004	0.009 ^{**}	0.004
		(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)
%, Targeted by Tariffs * Democratic			0.018		0.019 ⁺		0.037 ^{**}		0.010 ^{**}
			(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.014)		(0.004)
Observations		840	840	840	840	840	840	840	840

Note: Dependent variable is the percentage of campaign communications that contain “tariff” and “China” anywhere in the text. *Democratic Candidate* denotes the partisanship of House candidate (coded 1 for the Democratic Party and 0 for the Republican Party). *Targeted by Tariff* measures the percentage of workers targeted by Chinese retaliatory tariffs imposed by April in models (1)-(2), by June in models (3)-(4), by August in models (5)-(6) and by September in models (7)-(8). Robust standard errors in parentheses $+p < 0.10$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$

A4 Heterogeneous Effects

This section examines the effects of retaliatory tariffs separately for agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (**Table ??**). The results suggest that the electoral effects are largely driven by the agricultural sector. This is not entirely surprising given that the retaliatory tariffs had a far more substantial impact on the agricultural sector than on the non-agricultural sector.

Table A18: Tariffs on Agricultural vs. Non-agricultural Products and Mid-term Election

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>							
	Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 18-16							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	by April		by June		by August		by September	
% Targeted by Tariffs on Agriculture	-1.047**	-0.834**	-0.871**	-0.691**	-0.872**	-0.686**	-0.671**	-0.598**
	(0.284)	(0.203)	(0.227)	(0.176)	(0.226)	(0.176)	(0.208)	(0.175)
% Targeted by Tariffs on Non-agriculture	-0.156	-0.100	-0.053	-0.029	-0.001	0.003	-0.089	-0.154
	(0.147)	(0.101)	(0.076)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.119)	(0.101)
%, Protected by US Tariffs			-0.137	-0.116 ⁺	-0.088	-0.041	0.070	0.181 ⁺
			(0.084)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.060)	(0.120)	(0.102)
Δ Weekly Wage, 18-17	0.084	0.141 ⁺	0.078	0.136 ⁺	0.081	0.141 ⁺	0.094	0.154*
	(0.089)	(0.072)	(0.090)	(0.072)	(0.090)	(0.072)	(0.090)	(0.072)
Δ GOP Vote Share (%), 16-14		-0.468**		-0.468**		-0.468**		-0.470**
		(0.045)		(0.045)		(0.045)		(0.045)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3097	3095	3097	3095	3097	3095	3097	3095

Note: Dependent variable is the continuous measure of the change in the Republican two-party vote share between 2016 and 2018. The primary independent variable, *Targeted by Chinese Tariffs*, measures the percentage of workers targeted by the retaliatory tariffs imposed by April in models (1)-(2), by June in models (3)-(4), by August in models (5)-(6), and by September in models (7)-(8). All models include state-fixed effects and demographic controls. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses $+p < 0.10$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$

A5 Counterfactual Analysis

This section discusses the counterfactual analysis to assess the implications of the shift in vote induced by the tariffs. We consider two scenarios where: (1) No Chinese retaliatory tariffs were imposed but the US-initiated tariffs are kept in place; (2) No tariffs were imposed by the U.S. or by China. We carry out the computation using the estimated coefficients on *Targeted by Chinese Tariffs* and *Protected by U.S. Tariffs* as obtained from Models (4)-(8). While the results vary depending on the scenario and model, the estimates indicate that the Republican Party might have won between three to eight more seats under these hypothetical scenarios.

As an example, we illustrate the computation procedure focusing on Model (7). For the case of *Targeted by Chinese Tariffs*, the computation is based on the coefficient estimate of -0.132 from Model (7) in Table ???. The counterfactual Republican gain in the two-party vote share is equivalent to the product of 0.132 multiplied by the magnitude of exposure to tariffs in each county. For instance, if 5% of a county's workers were exposed to the retaliatory tariffs, this implies that the Republican candidate would have obtained $0.132 \times 5 = 0.66$ percentage points more in the two-party vote share in the counterfactual world without Chinese tariffs. Similarly, we also calculate the vote share of each Republican candidate had there been no U.S. tariffs, using the coefficient estimate of 0.070 from the same model. We do the computation using the county-by-district cells and aggregate them at the district level.⁵⁰

Having run the analysis on all congressional races, the results show that had China not imposed its retaliatory tariffs, the Republican Party would have gained eight more seats (See **Table ???**). We also consider a more realistic scenario whereby neither the U.S.-initiated nor the Chinese retaliatory tariffs been imposed. In this case, the Republican Party would have won three seats. For instance, in California's 21st district the Republican candidate obtained 49.6% of the two-party votes in the 2018 elections, but would have obtained 50.8% of votes had there been no US-initiated nor Chinese retaliatory tariffs. These results show the tariff war had a modest, albeit non-negligible impact on the House elections, particularly when one considers the gerrymandered and highly polarized nature of U.S. electoral geography, where only a small number of seats is truly up for grabs.

⁵⁰Our regression analysis is based on the county-level dataset that combines votes cast for different districts when a county straddles across multiple districts. In such cases, we take the coefficient from this estimation, but calculate the two-party vote share and the composition of votes in the counterfactual scenario at the county-by-district cells and aggregate them to the district-level.

Table A19: Counterfactual Outcomes of Selected Congressional Districts

Congressional District	A. Actual Outcome GOP Share	B. Counterfactual Outcome			
		No Chinese Tariffs		No Chinese & US Tariffs	
		GOP Share	Winner	GOP Share	Winner
California's 21st	49.62%	51.82%	R	50.79%	R
Minnesota's 7th	47.86%	50.11%	R	48.86%	D
New Jersey's 3rd	49.34%	50.11%	R	49.72%	D
New Mexico's 2nd	49.06%	50.14%	R	49.56%	D
New York's 22nd	49.11%	50.81%	R	50.01%	R
Oklahoma's 5th	49.30%	50.25%	R	49.74%	D
South Carolina's 1st	49.31%	50.33%	R	49.81%	D
Utah's 4th	49.87%	51.01%	R	50.43%	R

Note: The table presents the counterfactual election outcomes of the eight competitive congressional districts in which the winning candidate changes in some of the scenarios. Panel A presents the actual outcomes of the 2018 House election with district-level Republican vote share and the winning party. Panel B presents the counterfactual election outcomes: (1) had there been no Chinese retaliatory tariffs; and (2) had there been no Chinese retaliatory tariffs nor US-initiated tariffs. Calculation of counterfactual outcomes is based on Model (7) in Table ??.