Honor Among Thieves: Understanding Rhetorical and Material Cooperation Among Violent Non-State Actors

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Section A.1: MGAR Codebook

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this project is the undirected dyad-year. This level provides a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the relationship between actors that is still feasible to code. Compared to simple dyads, the undirected dyad-year allows researchers to understand the dynamics of a given relationship over time rather than assuming a static, unchanging connection. In this way it facilitates analyses into the evolution of militant relationships.

Variable Coding: Inference and Confidence

Support variables are coded according to one's confidence in the available information for a particular year. Since this is the first research initiative designed to document the exact types of support and conflict occurring between violent nonstate actors, coders are not always able to locate the year-specific information necessary to document every particular variable for every year. As such, we have built a measure of reliability into the coding mechanisms of the support and conflict variables. Each variable is coded along a 0/1/2 scale: 0 refers to no evidence of support or conflict, 1 means that there was evidence of either support or conflict but it had to be inferred, and 2 means that the coder found specific information and is highly confident in the coding. As an example, consider financial support; when a source notes that financial transfers were sent from group A to group B in 1993 then it would be coded as 2 since confidence in this instance is very high. Similarly, if the source noted that in the early 1990s financial transfers were occurring between the two groups then one would still be confident in coding these years. However, if available information only details financial support in 1990 and again in 1992, and the coder—based on previous and subsequent relationship trends and the absence of any changes in the overall relationship—can be reasonably confident that financial support is likely to have continued between these years, then it would be coded as 1 since it has to be inferred. When information such as this has to be inferred, the coders are required to justify their coding in the "notes" section so that all inferences can be double-checked.

Universe of Relationships

It is the goal of this project to codify the relationships between violent, nonstate actors and other entities using the undirected dyad-year as the unit of analysis. Consequently, relationships are included in the database when at least one actor in the dyad is a violent, nonstate group. For example, the Taliban's relationship with Pakistan can be coded post-2001 since at this point the Taliban is a nonstate actor. However, while the Taliban was the actual governing body of Afghanistan it's relationship with neighboring Pakistan would not meet the criteria for inclusion since there is no nonstate actor in the dyad. As this demonstrates, once nonstate actors transition into accepted state or regional governing bodies they are only coded if they have a relationship with some other nonstate actor.

Variable Descriptions and Coding Rules

Actor Type — *actortype*

- *Description*: Categorical variable that signifies the type of organization that group 1 or 2 is. Note: the faction and splinter categories are relational.

- *Coding Rule*: There are 9 categories.

  - 1 = Violent nonstate actor: Nonstate organization attempting to alter the status quo through violent means. Motivated by political, social, religious, or economic goals.
  - 2 = State: Recognized, sovereign nation, or representative thereof.
  - 3 = Faction: An organization that has some independence but is still considered within the umbrella of the other actor in the dyad.
  - 4 = Splinter: Splinter organizations are those groups that were created by members of the other actor in the dyad. These members created a new, violent organization that is independent of the original group.
  - 5 = Diaspora: A diaspora refers to an ethnic or religious group in a foreign country.
  - 6 = Non-violent Social Movement: Nonstate organization attempting to alter the status quo through predominantly nonviolent means.
  - 7 = Political Party: Recognized political party in a state that is actively engaged in state, regional, or local politics.
  - 8 = Criminal Organization: Nonstate actor engaged in illegal activity predominantly for organizational or personal gain. No political, social, or economic goals are evident.
  - 9 = Other: Describe in "notes."

Relationship Start — *relstart*

- *Description*: Dichotomous variable to signify the start of the relationship between the two actors.

- *Coding Rule*: Takes on the value of 1 in the first year of the dyadic relationship and 0 otherwise.

Relationship Type — *reltype*

- *Description*: The type of relationship exhibited between the two groups.

- *Coding Rule*: This variable seeks to categorize the intergroup relationship in the current year based on the type and level of cooperation, support, or conflict. There are seven relationship categories.

  - 1 = Allies: These groups exhibit extremely high cooperation a combination of financial, material, logistical, and personnel support. Formal pledges or statements of support and shared membership are common. Overall strategy and major decisions are made by a centralized organization. One group may act as a surrogate or cell of the other. Allies represent the highest form of cooperation possible between organizations.
  - 2 = Associates: Associate groups exhibit moderate to high levels of cooperation with some combination of material, financial, logistical, and personnel support, and they are sympathetic to each other's goals. Shared membership between the two groups is possible but typically minimal. One primary difference between associates and the higher-level allies is that operational planning between the groups is largely independent except for rare, cooperative attacks.

A.2

- 3 = Supporters: These organizations either support or share each other's goals and provide moderate to low levels of assistance including a combination of financial, logistical, personnel or logistical support. Unlike either allies or affiliates, there is no shared membership and each group acts entirely independently. There is no evidence of attacks being coordinated between the two organizations.

- 4 = Fan: Refers to groups that are sympathetic to each other's aims and typically make statements expressing their sympathy or support. However, there is no evidence of mutual membership flows or coordination. The fan may not be a violent nonstate actor, but some other societal actor. If support does exist between the groups, and it does not always exist, it is predominantly financial and minimally material with no evidence or personnel or logistical support.

- 5 = Host: Occurs between a nonstate actor and a state that is sympathetic to its goals. The state will generally provide territory and safety, but may also supply arms, funding, and possibly training. In return, the nonstate actor engages in violence in pursuit of shared goals.

- 6 = Rivals: Rivalries occur between two groups with differing goals. There is no cooperation between the two organizations, but they are not actively engaged in violence against each other. There is a possibility of some sporadic violence between the two but it does not appear to be coordinated by organizational leadership as part of a violent campaign to eradicate or destroy the rival group. There is likely to be evidence of antagonistic or otherwise hostile statements from group leaders.

- 7 = Competitors: Two groups with conflicting goals. In addition to opposing goals, each group is actively working to defeat the other. Violence and hostile statements are likely.

- 8 = Unknown: Cannot determine the relationship between groups.

Patron — *patron*

- *Description*: Captures whether one group in particular provides the majority of benefits in the relationship, or whether the relationship appears to more equal in terms of the distribution of benefits and resources.

- *Coding Rule*: Trichotomous variable that represents whether the relationship is largely reciprocal, or whether group 1 or group 2 is the primary patron and provides the majority of benefits to its counterpart. 0 = reciprocal relationship, 1 = group 1 primary patron, 2 = group 2 primary patron, 3 = unknown.

Financial Support — *finsupport*

- *Description*: Denotes evidence of financial support between groups in a given year.

- *Coding Rule*: This variable identifies whether there is evidence of financial transfers between nonstate actors in a given year. The focus of this variable is direct financial transfers between groups intended for assistance or the conduct of operations, for instance. This variable does not include money transferred as payment for weapons or other goods; it is intended to capture money that is provided without material compensation in return. 0 = no financial support, 1 = inferred financial support, 2 = confident of financial support, 3 = unknown.

Material Support — *matsupport*

- *Description*: Denotes evidence of material support between groups in a given year.

- *Coding Rule*: Material support is defined as the transfer of arms, munitions, or other goods between groups. Such support includes the sale or trade of weapons between groups as well as donations and gifts (non-monetary) that are provided without direct compensation. Thus, weapons that are either sold or more simply supplied to another organization would fit into this category. 0 = no material support, 1 = inferred material support, 2 = confident of material support, 3 = unknown.

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Training Support — *trainsupport*

- *Description*: Denotes evidence of training or sharing strategic, tactical, or operational information between actors in a given year.

- *Coding Rule*: This variable identifies evidence of training or the intentional transfer of useful information between actors. This might include actions such as: sending members abroad to train under another organization, providing information or advice on how to establish financial networks, allowing members of other groups to attend one's training camps, and leaders meeting to share information, plans, strategies and/or general organizational advice. 0 = no training or logistical support, 1 = inferred training or logistical support, 2 = confident of training or logistical support, 3 = unknown.

Operational Support — *opsupport*

- *Description*: Denotes evidence of personnel support between groups in a given year.

- *Coding Rule*: Personnel support is when members from one group assist with or carry out operations designed by another actor. This would include: members from one group carrying out a suicide attack planned by a different group, providing scouts or reconnaissance for another group, or providing shelter to members of another group. In other words, personnel support is when members from one group aid in the actual operations or conduct of a separate group. 0 = no personnel support, 1 = inferred personnel support, 2 = confident of personnel support, 3 = unknown.

Territorial Support — *terrsupport*

- *Description*: Denotes evidence of one actor—either a state or any other variety of nonstate actor—providing territory or safe haven to another actor.

- *Coding Rule*: Territorial support is when one group, which controls land of its own, permits another actor to use that land. Land can be used for: training, as a safe haven, to rearm and reequip, or to launch operations. 0 = no territorial support, 1 = inferred territorial support, 2 = confident of territorial support, 3 = unknown.

Rhetorical Conflict — *conflict*

- *Description*: Denotes whether groups are in a state of conflict but have not yet resorted to physical attacks on one another.

- *Coding Rule*: Conflict that is short of physical represents groups that are verbally antagonistic or preparing to engage in conflict. This can include actions such as: preparations with the intent of engaging in future conflict that does not transpire in the current year, verbally antagonistic declarations against others such as fatwas or similar calls to arms, or denunciations of other groups. 0 = none, 1 = inferred non-physical conflict, 2 = confident of non-physical conflict, 3 = unknown.

Physical Conflict — *physconflict*

- *Description*: Denotes whether groups are engaged in physical conflict with one another in a given year.

- *Coding Rule*: Physical conflict refers to actual or attempted attacks on the property or members of rival nonstate groups. Thus, a failed attack still represents that two groups are engaged in physical conflict. Examples include: attacks on rival group members or headquarters, attempts to destroy the equipment and arms of competitor organization, and assassination attempts. 0 = no physical conflict, 1 = inferred physical conflict, 2 = confident of physical conflict, 3 = unknown.

Left — *left*

- *Description*: Denotes whether group 1 or 2 is a leftist organization.

- *Coding Rule*: Leftist groups are organizations that advocate policies related to wealth redistribution, socialism, communism and Marxism. 0 = no, 1 = yes, 2 = unknown.

Right — *right*

- *Description*: Denotes whether group 1 or 2 is a right-wing organization.

- *Coding Rule*: Rightist groups are organizations that advocate policies related to capitalism, free market economics, or others that preserve the status quo. 0 = no, 1 = yes, 2 = unknown.

Environmental — *environ*

- *Description*: Denotes whether group 1 or 2 is an environmental organization.

- *Coding Rule*: Environmental organizations are those groups with objectives and goals related to environmental or climate concerns. 0 = no, 1 = yes, 2 = unknown.

Nationalist — *nation*

- *Description*: Denotes whether group 1 or 2 is a nationalist organization.

- *Coding Rule*: Nationalist organizations are those with goals relating to self-determination, secession, or regime change. 0 = no, 1 = yes, 2 = unknown.

Religion — *relig*

- *Description*: Denotes the religious identity of group 1 or 2.

- *Coding Rule*: Actors are coded with a particular religion when it is a driving force behind the organization, significantly influencing their goals, actions, membership, or rhetoric. 0 = none, 1 = Sunni, 2 = Shia, 3 = Salafist, 4 = other Islamic (e.g. Sufi), 5 = Christian, 6 = Jewish, 7 = other (e.g. Hindu, Buddhist), 8 = unknown. We consider Sunni and Salafi groups as sharing religion.

Organizational Split — *orgsplit*

- *Description*: Denotes whether group 1 or 2 witnessed an organizational split creating a new violent nonstate actor in the current year.

- *Coding Rule*: This variable concerns organizational splits that result in new groups or entities that are separate from the structure and membership of the original group. This includes new organizations and splinter groups that are formed by members of the original group. This variable should also include the formation of new wings, division, or cells that act separately and to a large degree independently from the old organization. Members of the original group form these new organizations – possibly along with outside members – but these new groups are significantly independent from their parent organization. This variable is only concerned with new, violent nonstate actors; it does not consider the formation of a political party from group members as an organizational split. 0 = no split, 1 = organization split, 2 = organizational split with leaders involved, 3 = unknown.

Defections — *defect*

- *Description*: Denotes whether group 1 or 2 experienced defections in a given year.

- *Coding Rule*: Defections are defined as members of the organization leaving the group to either pursue nonviolence (join a political or social movement), abandoning their original goals entirely, defecting to the state (often in return for amnesty or some other form of conciliation), or to join a rival violent nonstate actor. 0 = no defections, 1 = defections occur, 2 = defections occur with leaders involved, 3 = unknown.

Confidence — *confidence*

- *Description*: Ordinal variable that captures the coder's confidence in the information for a given year.

- *Coding Rule*: This variable serves as a measure of how confident the coder is in the information he or she coded for a given year. There are four categories

    - 0 = Very Low: Signifies a general lack of reliable information on the relationship and no year-specific information.

    - 1 = Low: Signifies that there is some general information available on the relationship but no information on yearly changes.

    - 2 = Medium: Signifies a mix of reliable information and some year-specific information. The coder is confident in the coding but a portion of the information has to be inferred from general descriptions of the relationship.

    - 3 = High: Signifies significant information available, both in terms of the general relationship and more specific yearly interactions, and the coder is highly confident of the information for a given year.

Notes — *notes*

- *Description*: Open field reserved for researchers' notes.

References — *references*

- *Description*: Open field reserved for researchers to input citations.

Section A.2: Where MGAR Fits

To test our hypotheses, we require fine-grained data on militant alliances over time. However, despite longstanding interest and attention, much of the research on militant alliances is limited in its ability to reach data-driven conclusions about when and why groups form connections, the specific functions of those connections, and the conditions under which those connections terminate. The inability to decisively answer these questions stems in large part from the absence of time-varying data on militant relationships. Since existing data generally only indicate whether groups allied, but not when the alliance formed or what exchange occurred within it, it is impossible to support strong, generalizable arguments. It might be, for example, that groups form alliances to learn new tactics and improve their ability to conduct attacks. Alternatively, lethal groups might be more likely to attract allies. Thus, while the first wave of data-driven research on alliances between militant groups was aware of examples of cooperation—and the impact of cooperation—the existing data was not good enough to systematically test the scope, causes, and consequences of militant group alliances.

The second wave of research on militant group ties over the last several years has made significant advances that remedy many of these longstanding deficiencies. Crenshaw advanced the state of the art by documenting militant group ties with in-depth maps that capture the shifting relationships among militant organizations in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Somalia, Italy, Pakistan, Colombia, the Philippines, North Caucasus, Syria, and the global AQ network (Crenshaw 2019).

Expanding from the regional to the global, the Big, Allied, and Dangerous (BAAD) dataset produced by Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) codes the characteristics of 275 groups, including their alliances. BAAD focuses on the years 1998 to 2012 and groups that conducted at least one attack in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) or were responsible for at least 25 deaths according to the Armed Conflict Database (ACD). While extremely comprehensive for the universe of cases it covers, it does have limits in duration and scope that we attempt to expand in the data that we introduce here.

Others, such as Sageman (2004), move in the opposite direction by digging into the mechanisms that drive particular cases rather than the patterns that emerge from aggregate data. These analyses focus more on the process by which individual networks lead potential participants to join terror groups. This research is not designed to develop causal inferences or detect general patterns of militant group behavior that can lend themselves to informed policy recommendations. The most important policy questions are not about whether militant group alliances exist and do damage, but rather about the factors that immediately precipitate group alliances, the dynamics of alliances as they shift, and the factors that lead alliances to break apart. Developing cross-sectional time series data is crucial to remedy these deficiencies.

At the same time that the available data has improved, scholars have developed more sophisticated theories to explain militant group cooperation. Bapat and Bond (2012), for example, use formal models to derive two hypotheses about militant group alliances: that stronger groups will form bilateral alliances with relatively similar groups, and that weaker groups will seek asymmetric ties with state sponsors. Importantly for our purposes, they show that one reason why groups might pursue a relationship with a sponsor state is to give that state the power to regulate relationships between groups. To test their theory, they gathered dyad-year evidence of militant group cooperation from 1946-2001 based on the ACD. Collecting evidence on 1318 dyad-years, they find evidence of alliances in 429 of them and support for their theory. This was a significant step forward, but because it is limited in scope due to the focus on ACD conflicts and rebel groups operating within those conflicts, broader research is possible.

Section A.3: Additional MGAR Coding Details

The MGAR data, in addition to the characteristics detailed in the main body of the paper, includes many additional characteristics of cooperation and competition between groups. On the cooperative side, alliances between militant organizations can take many forms. We code cooperation on five dimensions: whether it is financial, material, training, operational, or territorial. Financial support concerns the transfer of funds to support militant activities while material support means the transfer of arms or other equipment. For example, as part of its overall ties, Al Qaeda provided financial support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Training captures training from one group to another; operational support looks for coordinated operations and attacks, and tactical advising; and territorial support captures when one actor provides safe haven to another (typically a state to a nonstate actor).

We also delineate between different types of conflictual relationships. Conflict between groups can be physical—actual or attempted attacks on the property or members of rival nonstate groups—or rhetorical, which includes verbal antagonism and denunciations. Often times these forms of rhetorical conflict precede physical conflict. An example of physical conflict is the confrontation between the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) (Bhaumik 2009: 125-130).

Each of the conflict or cooperation variables are coded using a system specifically designed for the information-starved environment in which we are operating. Given that reliable information about militant relationships at the yearly level can be difficult to access, we created a transparent coding scheme designed to maximize the information we gathered and capture uncertainty in the data. Zero indicates no evidence of a given dynamic (e.g. financial support), one indicates that the coders can reasonably infer the particular relationship dynamic was ongoing, and two indicates that there is direct evidence. We also allow researchers to code "unknown" when there is insufficient information to make an informed judgment.

For example, suppose a coder encountered specific information about a relationship between two groups in 2003 and 2005, but found no direct evidence of a relationship in 2004. In this case, based on all the available information, we ask coders to infer whether or not it is likely that the same relationship dynamics continued in this intermediary year. In such cases, 2003 and 2005 would be coded as twos, and 2004 would be coded as one. This coding scheme allows researchers to analyze the data solely based on observations with the greatest confidence (e.g. when there is direct evidence) if they so desire, as well as to leverage uncertainty in the data.

We also code a "patron" variable that captures whether one actor in the dyad is providing the majority of benefits. This is commonly the case when states are supporting militant organizations, or when established and more powerful groups like al-Qaeda (AQ) send advisers and funds to affiliates abroad. This is a meaningful dynamic of the relationship, shedding light on the direction of support in the dyadic connection. For example, in our data, AQ had patron relationships with groups such as the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB), Harakat ul- Mujahidin (HuM), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

MGAR Relationships Over Time

Figure A.4: Relationships Between Militant Groups Over Time

Note: The top left panel depicts the total number of relationships between militant groups over time. Alliances are cooperative relationships and rivalries are conflictual/competitive relationships. The top right panel normalizes the number of relationships over time by the total number of undirected dyads per year. The bottom panel reproduces the bottom panel of Figure 1 in the main text, but adds a line for the number of groups in GTD over time in order to highlight alliance initiation in relation to the total number of active militant groups.

Correlates of Missingness in Alliance Content Data

Table A.5: Correlates of Missing Data on Alliance Content

Variable	(1) No Interaction	(2) Interaction
Shared Ideology	1.401*	0.490
	(0.807)	(0.956)
Repression	0.024	-0.639
	(0.194)	(0.398)
Shared Ideology x Repression		0.735**
		(0.347)
Capability Ratio	2.761***	2.771***
	(0.370)	(0.368)
Age Difference	-0.043*	-0.043*
	(0.023)	(0.022)
Age (Group 1)	0.023***	0.023***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age (Group 2)	0.012	0.012
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Inter-capital Distance	-0.493***	-0.493***
	(0.068)	(0.067)
Polity (Group 1)	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.085)	(0.085)
Polity^2 (Group 1)	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Polity (Group 2)	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.089)	(0.090)
Polity^2 (Group 2)	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Ethnic Fractionalization (Group 1)	-0.979	-0.933
	(0.669)	(0.675)
Ethnic Fractionalization (Group 2)	0.674	0.655
	(1.068)	(1.081)
Population (Group 1)	-0.366	-0.370
	(0.294)	(0.295)
Population (Group 2)	0.146	0.147
	(0.347)	(0.347)
GDP/Capita (Group 1)	0.389*	0.391*
	(0.224)	(0.224)
GDP/Capita (Group 2)	0.276	0.273
	(0.228)	(0.228)
U.S. Troops (Group 1)	-0.059	-0.056
	(0.169)	(0.168)
U.S. Troops (Group 2)	-0.028	-0.030
	(0.160)	(0.161)
Constant	-14.676***	-13.862***
	(3.334)	(3.368)
Observations	4428583	4428583
Pseudo R^2	0.258	0.260

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; logit coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses; time-variant covariates are lagged one year; shared sponsor term omitted as a perfect predictor of non-missingness.

Cross-Tabulation of Dependent Variables

In a small number of observations (n = 376), coders could find insufficient information to make a reliable judgment about any alliance content within a undirected-dyad year. In 185 of these 376, coders left the content and relationship type variables as missing, but in 191 of these 376 observations, coders still made a guess (via the categorical variable) as to the alliance type. Our main dependent variable based on alliance content treats all observations where content is missing as 0 (i.e. no alliance). In the 191 cases with relationship type coded but content missing, a discrepancy emerges between our content dependent variable used in the main analyses and the more subjective, alliance type categorical variable that research assistants coded. This occurred when RAs coded the alliance type variable as probably cooperative (i.e. one of the alliance categories), but the content as unknown. Results are robust to treating these observations as missing and dropping them, rather than filling them with 0.

**Table A.6:** Cross-Tabulation of Dependent Variables

		DV: Alliance Content		
		No Alliance	Rhetorical Alliance	Material Alliance
DV: Alliance Type	No Alliance	7,396,285		
	Rhetorical Alliance	63	456	288
	Material Alliance	128	292	4,691

Table A.7: Cross-Tabulation of Dependent Variable and Relationship Type

		DV: Alliance Content		
		No Alliance	Rhetorical Alliance	Material Alliance
Relationship Type	No Alliance	7,394,609		
	Allies	47	47	1,577
	Associates	32	99	1,762
	Supporters	49	128	1,335
	Fans	63	456	288
	Hosts		18	17
	Rivals	640		
	Competitors	851		
	Unknown	185		

The Distribution of Repression

Figure A.8: Histogram of Our Main Repression Measure from Fariss (2019) (Top Panel) and Our Alternate Repression Measure from CIRI (Bottom Panel)

Note: Mean = 1.825 (Fariss), 6.308 (CIRI); Median = 1.961 (Fariss), 7 (CIRI); Standard Deviation = 0.776 (Fariss), 1.886 (CIRI)

Variable Definitions and Sources

Table A.9: Variable Definitions and Sources

Variable	Definition	Source
Dependent Variables		
Alliance Initiation	Alliance between groups 1 and 2 begins	MGAR
Alliance Termination	Groups 1 and 2 were allied in year $t-1$ but not in year t	MGAR
Independent Variables		
Shared Ideology	Groups 1 and 2 are co-religionists, or share leftist/communist, right-wing, nationalist/separatist, or environmentalist aims	MGAR
Repression	max(reverse-scaled latent human rights score in base countries of Group 1 and 2)	Fariss (2019)
Control Variables		
Capability Ratio	$\frac{\text{(Group 1 Attacks + 1)}}{\text{((Group 1 Attacks + 1) + (Group 2 Attacks + 1))}}$	GTD
Shared Sponsor	Groups 1 and 2 have the same state sponsor	MGAR
Age	Age of Group 1 or 2	MGAR
Age Difference	| Group 1 Age - Group 2 Age |	MGAR
Inter-capital Distance	Log (1 + intercapital distance between base countries of Groups 1 and 2)	CShapes
Polity	Polity 2 score in base countries of Groups 1 and 2	Polity
Polity^2	(Polity 2 score in base countries of Groups 1 and 2)^2	Polity
Ethnic Fractionalization	Ethnic fractionalization in base countries of Groups 1 and 2	Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)
Population	Log (1 + population in base countries of Groups 1 and 2)	PWT
GDP/Capita	Log (1 + PPP-adjusted GDP/capita in base countries of Groups 1 and 2)	PWT
US Troops	Log (1 + US troops deployed in base countries of Groups 1 and 2)	Kane (2016)

Descriptive Statistics

Summary statistics based on key variables from the full MGAR dataframe are presented below. The dependent variables are the categorical outcome measures used in multinomial logit regressions described in the main text and based on the alliance content measure in MGAR. Summary statistics based on the hazard models used in the main text are omitted for space. Those analyses subset from the full dataframe to undirected dyad-years with cooperative relationships, and study the time-to-alliance termination as the outcome.

Table A.10: Descriptive Statistics

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent Variables:					
Alliance Initiation	7,397,610	.0002	.018	0	2
Alliance Ongoing	7,402,203	.002	.053	0	2
Independent Variables:					
Shared Ideology	14,804,406	.576	.494	0	1
Repression	12,136,592	6.308	1.886	0	8
Control Variables:					
Capability Ratio	7,402,203	.628	.216	.5	.1
Shared Sponsor	6,083,384	.0003	.018	0	1
Age (Group 1)	7,402,203	15.722	14.504	1	151
Age (Group 2)	7,402,203	14.806	15.981	1	151
Age Difference	7,402,203	14.728	15.153	0	150
Inter-capital Distance	7,189,391	8.220	1.762	0	9.897
Polity (Group 1)	6,914,343	3.004	6.439	-10	10
Polity^2 (Group 1)	6,914,343	50.490	28.321	0	100
Polity (Group 2)	6,957,993	4.284	6.039	-10	10
Polity^2 (Group 2)	6,957,993	54.820	34.211	0	100
Ethnic Fractionalization (Group 1)	7,364,643	.516	.300	.004	.925
Ethnic Fractionalization (Group 2)	7,387,934	.401	.289	.004	.925
Population (Group 1)	6,864,874	4.128	1.778	-2.714	7.222
Population (Group 2)	6,827,992	3.566	1.503	-2.714	7.222
GDP/Capita (Group 1)	6,864,874	8.325	1.046	4.959	12.317
GDP/Capita (Group 2)	6,827,992	8.886	1.217	4.959	12.319
US Troops (Group 1)	7,170,402	4.022	2.820	0	12.295
US Troops (Group 2)	6,706,523	4.312	3.005	0	12.295

Full Model Results from Figure 5

Table A.11: Full Model Results from Figure 5

	DV: Rhetorical Alliance Termination		DV: Material Alliance Termination	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Shared Ideology	0.236	0.732	-0.051	0.638
	(0.470)	(2.309)	(0.183)	(0.474)
Repression	-0.195	0.061	-0.108*	0.220
	(0.262)	(1.203)	(0.060)	(0.175)
Shared Ideology x Repression		-0.267		-0.362*
		(1.202)		(0.194)
Capability Ratio	-0.403	-0.400	0.062	0.050
	(1.011)	(1.015)	(0.241)	(0.240)
Shared Sponsor	-0.525	-0.548	0.078	0.103
	(0.757)	(0.775)	(0.272)	(0.269)
Age Difference	-0.008	-0.008	0.017*	0.016*
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age (Group 1)	-0.002	-0.003	-0.017**	-0.017**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age (Group 2)	-0.014	-0.013	-0.016**	-0.016*
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Inter-capital Distance	0.024	0.024	0.019	0.020
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Polity (Group 1)	0.045	0.046	-0.013	-0.012
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Polity^2 (Group 1)	-0.027***	-0.028***	0.001	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Polity (Group 2)	0.002	0.001	-0.027**	-0.025**
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Polity^2 (Group 2)	-0.004	-0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Ethnic Fractionalization (Group 1)	0.296	0.313	-0.376	-0.390
	(1.055)	(1.050)	(0.238)	(0.239)
Ethnic Fractionalization (Group 2)	-0.539	-0.556	0.306	0.279
	(1.368)	(1.371)	(0.281)	(0.276)
Population (Group 1)	-0.615*	-0.619*	0.053	0.054
	(0.368)	(0.367)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Population (Group 2)	0.494*	0.497*	-0.091	-0.088
	(0.263)	(0.262)	(0.061)	(0.061)
GDP/Capita (Group 1)	0.356	0.338	-0.205	-0.229*
	(0.504)	(0.515)	(0.126)	(0.131)
GDP/Capita (Group 2)	-0.783*	-0.776*	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.452)	(0.449)	(0.103)	(0.104)
US Troops (Group 1)	0.457***	0.458***	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.035)	(0.035)
US Troops (Group 2)	-0.254*	-0.253*	0.011	0.010
	(0.144)	(0.142)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Observations	551	551	3490	3490
AIC	219.775	221.760	1202.423	1203.565

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, , * $p<0.10$; robust standard errors clustered by undirected dyad in parentheses; the table displays standardized coefficients rather than hazard ratios; models in columns 1 through 2 also include a control for the number of rhetorical alliance terminations a dyad has experienced; models in columns 3 and 4 are stratified by the number of material alliance terminations a dyad has experienced; Efron's method is used for ties; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Competing Risks

Our primary modeling strategy is the variance-corrected Cox approach. This is a preferred method to estimate repeated-failure duration models in the presence of event dependence (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). These benefits of the variance-corrected Cox approach notwithstanding, these models do not take competing risks into account. Competing risks occur when other events alter the probability or hinder the observation of an event of interest (e.g. alliance termination). When the occurrence of one event alters the probability or precludes the observation of the focal, failure events, competing risks models are required. In the presence of competing risks, standard Cox models are upwardly biased because they treat competing events as censored. By contrast, competing risks models estimate cause-specific hazards. The drawback of competing risks estimators is that they do not take repeated failures into account. In other words, selecting between conditional frailty and competing risks estimators entails a trade-off: flexible handling of event dependence but not competing risks, or flexible handling of competing risks but not unit event dependence. We employ variance-corrected Cox models in our main specifications because of the numerous repeated failures in our data, which generate event dependence. Nevertheless, in Table A.10 we show that our core results are robust to competing risks estimation. Competing risks models in Table A.10 follow the approach outlined by Fine and Gray (1999), who describe a method of estimating the cumulative incidence function based on the subdistribution hazard.

Table A.12: Competing Risks Estimates

	DV: Rhetorical Alliance Termination	DV: Material Alliance Termination
	(1)	(2)
Shared Ideology	-2.108	0.960
	(2.459)	(0.764)
Repression	-1.894	0.725**
	(1.250)	(0.350)
Shared Ideology x Repression	1.290	-0.901**
	(1.273)	(0.363)
Capability Ratio	-0.289	-0.029
	(0.895)	(0.295)
Shared Sponsor	0.038	-0.322
	(0.855)	(0.304)
Age Difference	0.026	0.054***
	(0.028)	(0.011)
Age (Group 1)	0.028	-0.056***
	(0.019)	(0.011)
Age (Group 2)	-0.073**	-0.048***
	(0.032)	(0.010)
Inter-capital Distance	0.090	0.045*
	(0.080)	(0.024)
Polity (Group 1)	0.107**	0.037**
	(0.053)	(0.018)
Polity^2 (Group 1)	-0.034***	-0.004
	(0.011)	(0.003)
Polity (Group 2)	-0.044	0.004
	(0.032)	(0.018)
Polity^2 (Group 2)	-0.012	-0.007*
	(0.008)	(0.004)
Ethnic Fractionalization (Group 1)	0.693	-0.437
	(0.919)	(0.418)
Ethnic Fractionalization (Group 2)	-2.232*	-0.733*
	(1.301)	(0.442)
Population (Group 1)	-0.441	0.045
	(0.288)	(0.095)
Population (Group 2)	0.674**	0.031
	(0.284)	(0.099)
GDP/Capita (Group 1)	-0.006	-0.364***
	(0.396)	(0.134)
GDP/Capita (Group 2)	-0.396	-0.037
	(0.334)	(0.115)
US Troops (Group 1)	0.376***	0.074*
	(0.103)	(0.039)
US Troops (Group 2)	-0.278***	-0.011
	(0.084)	(0.040)
Observations	551	3490

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, , * p<0.10; robust standard errors clustered by undirected dyad in parentheses; the table displays standardized coefficients rather than subhazard ratios; column 1 also includes a control for the number of rhetorical alliance terminations a dyad has experienced; column 2 also includes a control for the number of material alliance terminations a dyad has experienced; the model in column 1 treats rhetorical alliance termination as the focal event and alliance downgrades (shift from material to rhetorical alliance), upgrades (shift from rhetorical to material alliance), and material termination as competing events; column 2 treats material alliance termination as the focal event and alliance downgrades (shift from material to rhetorical alliance), upgrades (shift from rhetorical to material alliance), and rhetorical termination as competing events; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Parametric Hazard Models

Our main analyses in Table 3 employ the variance-corrected gap-time *Cox* estimator, which makes no additional parametric assumptions about the shape of the underlying hazard function. To ensure the robustness of our results to assumptions about the distribution of the hazard, we repeat our analyses using parametric survival models. Specifically, in Figure A.13 we present results from exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz models of rhetorical and material alliance termination.

The results show that shared ideology has a significant negative effect on the probability of material alliance breakdown as repression increases. This effect is attenuated and insignificant for rhetorical alliance breakdown. These results build evidence that shared ideology helps sustain material—but not rhetorical—alliances under repression.

Figure A.13: Parametric Exponential, Weibull, and Gompertz Models

Note: Thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals respectively. The dashed line marks 0. Black triangles are exponential estimates, circles are Weibull estimates, and squares are Gompertz estimates.

Full Model Results for Figure 6

Table A.14: Full Model Results for Figure 6

	Alliance Initiation		Alliance Termination	
	(1) Rhetorical	(2) Material	(3) Rhetorical	(4) Material
Shared Religion	-2.139	0.536	0.484	0.237
	(1.844)	(0.607)	(1.308)	(0.572)
Repression	-0.111	0.316**	0.195	0.161
	(0.207)	(0.158)	(0.368)	(0.232)
Shared Religion x Repression	1.592*	0.338	-1.435*	-0.364
	(0.832)	(0.300)	(0.836)	(0.300)
Dyadic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Country Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	-9.651***	-8.929***	—	—
	(0.854)	(0.467)	—	—
Observations	2,626,982	2,626,982	275	2019
Pseudo R^2	0.201	0.201	—	—
AIC	—	—	133.531	640.497

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, , * p<0.10; robust standard errors clustered by undirected dyad in parentheses; results in columns 1 and 2 are from a multinomial logistic regression; results in columns 3 and 4 are standardized coefficients from variance-corrected Cox models; the model in column 3 also includes a control for the number of rhetorical alliance terminations a dyad has experienced; the model in column 4 is stratified by the number of material alliance terminations a dyad has experienced; Efron's method is used for ties; time-variant covariates are lagged one year; we omit controls for population, GDP/capita, and US troops to avoid missingness.

Shared Religion and Rhetorical Alliance Durability

Figure A.15: Shared Religion and Rhetorical Alliance Durability

Note: Rugs show the distribution of the repression variable. We plot repression over its 2nd to 98th percentiles. Exponentiated AMEs are calculated using Gandrud's `simPH` package based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are composed of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation.

Full Model Results for Figure 7

Table A.16: Full Model Results for Figure 7

	Alliance Initiation		Alliance Termination	
	(1) Rhetorical	(2) Material	(3) Rhetorical	(4) Material
Shared Leftism	1.895***	1.194***	-0.282	0.541**
	(0.529)	(0.284)	(0.955)	(0.249)
Repression	-0.861***	-0.315**	0.445	0.098
	(0.324)	(0.146)	(0.662)	(0.117)
Shared Leftism x Repression	0.155	0.407**	-0.167	-0.239*
	(0.299)	(0.172)	(0.368)	(0.133)
Dyadic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Country Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	-9.457***	-8.033***	—	—
	(1.069)	(0.456)	—	—
Observations	1,030,824	1,030,824	193	965
Pseudo R^2	0.184	0.184	—	—
AIC	—	—	39.742	247.365

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, , * p<0.10; robust standard errors clustered by undirected dyad in parentheses; results in columns 1 and 2 are from a multinomial logistic regression; results in columns 3 and 4 are standardized coefficients from variance-corrected Cox models; the model in column 3 also includes a control for the number of rhetorical alliance terminations a dyad has experienced; the model in column 4 is stratified by the number of material alliance terminations a dyad has experienced; Efron's method is used for ties; time-variant covariates are lagged one year; we omit controls for population, GDP/capita, and US troops to avoid missingness.

Shared Leftism and Rhetorical Alliance Durability

Figure A.17: Shared Religion and Rhetorical Alliance Durability

Note: Rugs show the distribution of the repression variable. We plot repression over its 2nd to 98th percentiles. Exponentiated AMEs are calculated using Gandrud's `simPH` package based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are composed of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation.

Shared Nationalist/Separatist Ideology

Figure A.18: The Effects of Shared Nationalism/Separatism on Alliance Initiation and Durability


Note: In the top panel, thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals respectively. The dashed line marks 0. Low and high repression are the 10th and 90th values of the repression variable. In the bottom panel, we plot repression over its 2nd to 98th percentiles. Exponentiated AMEs are calculated using Gandrud's `simPH` package based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are composed of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation.

Shared Right-Wing and Environmentalist Ideologies

       The main text disaggregates shared ideology into shared religion and shared leftism. We focus on these because they are overwhelmingly most common in the data. Right-wing ideology is shared in 5% of alliance dyad-years and environmentalism in .07% of alliance dyad-years. We do not assess durability for shared environmentalist dyads or right-wing rhetorical alliances as there are too few observations. Groups sharing right-wing and environmentalist aims are significantly less likely than groups sharing other ideologies to ally. The durability of right-wing material alliances increases in repression, but these alliances are still more likely to terminate than alliances based on other shared ideologies.

Figure A.19: AME of Shared Right-Wing (Left) and Environmentalism (Right) on Initiation

Note: Thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals respectively. The dashed line marks 0. Low and high repression are the 10th and 90th percentiles of the repression variable.

Figure A.20: Shared Right-Wing Ideology and Material Alliance Durability

Note: Rugs show the distribution of the repression variable. We plot repression over its 2nd to 98th percentiles. Exponentiated AMEs are calculated using Gandrud's `simPH` package based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are composed of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation.

Marginal Structural Model

We re-estimate our core specifications using a semi-parametric marginal structural model (MSM). The MSM is fitted in two stages. First, we define the "treatment" as high repression, taking an indicator for the top quartile of the repression measure. We estimate the probability that a group experiences high repression, and use these estimates to construct inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW). Then, we re-estimate the effect of shared ideology with IPTW from the first-stage. In this way, inverse probability weighting controls for time-dependent confounding between repression and our dependent variables (Robins, Hernán, and Brumback 2000; Blackwell 2013). The weights are well-behaved, centered with a mean around 1 (mean = 1.324; median = 0.970; 10th percentile = 0.452; 90th percentile = 1.932). Weights are constructed from a series of regressions available upon request.

Table A.21: Multinomial Logistic Estimates of Alliance Initiation Using IPTW

	DV: Rhetorical Alliance Initiation	DV: Material Alliance Initiation
	(1)	(1)
Shared Ideology	2.764***	2.427***
	(0.626)	(0.609)
Repression	0.221	0.552*
	(0.238)	(0.289)
Shared Ideology x Repression	-0.421**	-0.441
	(0.213)	(0.286)
Dyadic Controls	Y	Y
Country Controls	Y	Y
IPTW	Y	Y
Constant	-7.795***	-10.973***
	(2.818)	(1.254)
Observations	4,423,274	4,423,274
Pseudo R^2	0.203	0.203

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, , * p<0.10; multinomial logit coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by undirected dyad in parentheses; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Figure A.22: AME of Shared Ideology on Rhetorical (Left Panel) and Material (Right Panel) Alliance Termination Using IPTW

Note: Bars are 90% confidence intervals. AMEs are calculated based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are comprised of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation. Coefficients on marginal effects are exponentiated.

Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI)

We re-estimate our models using two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI). In a two-stage set-up where we model the level of repression and the effect of repression on militant cooperation, repression is correlated with errors in the outcome equation through the stochastic dependence of the disturbance terms in each stage. 2SRI models a function of this dependence on observables using residuals from the first-stage equation (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 2004; Wooldridge 2014). Because our measure of repression is continuous, we estimate the first-stage selection equation using an OLS regression with country-level covariates. 2SRI is a preferred choice for our purposes because it yields consistent estimators for nonlinear models with endogenous regressors (Terza, Basu, and Rathouz 2008). Results from the second-stage equations are presented below.

Table A.23: 2SRI Multinomial Logit Models of Alliance Initiation

	DV: Rhetorical Alliance Initiation	DV: Material Alliance Initiation
	(1)	(1)
Shared Ideology	2.013***	2.007***
	(0.521)	(0.460)
Repression	-0.072	0.246
	(0.197)	(0.204)
Shared Ideology x Repression	-0.311*	-0.343*
	(0.180)	(0.207)
Dyadic Controls	Y	Y
Country Controls	Y	Y
Repression Residuals	1.195**	1.161***
	(0.592)	(0.206)
Constant	-10.982***	-7.536***
	(1.814)	(0.970)
Observations	4,426,788	4,426,788
Pseudo R^2	0.184	0.184

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, , * p<0.10; multinomial logit coefficients with standard errors clustered by undirected dyad; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Figure A.24: AME of Shared Ideology on Rhetorical (Left Panel) and Material (Right Panel) Alliance Termination Using 2SRI

Note: Bars are 90% confidence intervals. AMEs are calculated based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are comprised of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation. Coefficients on marginal effects are exponentiated.

Ordered Logistic Estimates

Ordered logit models use our categorical dependent variables, but assume proportional odds.

Table A.25: Ordered Logistic Estimates

	DV: Alliance Initiation
	(1)
Shared Ideology	2.044***
	(0.405)
Repression	0.246
	(0.171)
Shared Ideology x Repression	-0.358**
	(0.174)
Dyadic Controls	Y
Country Controls	Y
Cut 1	7.832***
	(0.910)
Cut 2	8.040***
	(0.913)
Observations	4,426,788
Pseudo R^2	0.180

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, , * p<0.10; ordered logit coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by undirected dyad in parentheses; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Two-Way Fixed Effects Linear Probability Estimates

Linear probability models with fixed effects for undirected dyads and years yield substantively similar results. The constituent term for shared ideology is absorbed by the undirected dyad fixed effects.

**Figure A.26:** Linear Probability Estimates

Note: Bars are 90% confidence intervals. The dashed line marks 0. OLS coefficients depicted.

Alternative Dependent Variable

In the main text we use a dependent variable based on alliance content. Here, we study an alternative dependent variable based on coders' subjective judgments about the nature of the relationship between groups.

Figure A.27: Alliance Initiation Using an Alternative Dependent Variable

Note: Thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals respectively. The dashed line marks 0.

Figure A.28: AME of Shared Ideology on Rhetorical (Left Panel) and Material (Right Panel) Alliance Termination Using an Alternative Dependent Variable

Note: Bars are 90% confidence intervals. AMEs are calculated based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are comprised of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation. Coefficients on marginal effects are exponentiated.

Alternative Measure of Repression

In the main text we measure repression using data from Fariss (2019. Here, we study an alternative measure of repression based on the CIRI physical integrity rights index which is coded by Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay (2014).

Figure A.29: Alliance Initiation Using an Alternative Measure of Repression

Note: Thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals respectively. The dashed line marks 0.

Figure A.30: AME of Shared Ideology on Rhetorical (Left Panel) and Material (Right Panel) Alliance Termination Using an Alternative Measure of Repression

Note: Bars are 90% confidence intervals. AMEs are calculated based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are comprised of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation. Coefficients on marginal effects are exponentiated.

# Excluding Dyad-Years With Missing Capability Ratio Data

In the main text we measure capability symmetry between groups using attack data from the GTD. To avoid data loss owing to the fact that some groups we study are not in the GTD, we fill missing values with 0 in the attack variables used to create the capability ratio measure. Here, we show results are robust to dropping observations with missing values on the capability ratio measure from GTD.

Table A.31: Multinomial Logistic Estimates of Alliance Initiation Allowing Missingness in Capability Ratio Data

	DV: Rhetorical Alliance Initiation	DV: Material Alliance Initiation
	(1)	(1)
Shared Ideology	1.866***	2.232***
	(0.606)	(0.694)
Repression	0.199	0.688**
	(0.242)	(0.303)
Shared Ideology x Repression	-0.367*	-0.424
	(0.215)	(0.312)
Dyadic Controls	Y	Y
Country Controls	Y	Y
Constant	-11.375***	-8.158***
	(2.367)	(1.225)
Observations	1,673,604	1,673,604
Pseudo R^2	0.173	0.173

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, , * $p<0.10$; multinomial logit coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by undirected dyad in parentheses; time-variant covariates are lagged one year.

Figure A.32: AME of Shared Ideology on Rhetorical (Left Panel) and Material (Right Panel) Alliance Termination Allowing Missingness in Capability Ratio Data

Note: Bars are 90% confidence intervals. AMEs are calculated based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are comprised of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation. Coefficients on marginal effects are exponentiated.

Excluding Dyad-Years Involving al-Qaeda and ISIS

      al-Qaeda (AQ) and ISIS are arguably the most capable and well-connected militant groups in history, perpetrating thousands of attacks over the past two decades. Here, we verify that our results are robust to excluding all dyad-years involving either AQ or ISIS. Specifically, we drop observations involving al-Qaeda, ISIS, or any of each core group's recognized affiliates. We identify core affiliates based on Byman (2014), Miller (2017), and Chuang, Ben-Asher, and D'Orsogna (2019). In total, this results in the removal of 350,312 observations. These analyses drop the following groups:

al-Qaeda and its Core Affiliates

- 313 Brigade

- Abdullah Azzam Brigades

- Al Zawahiri Loyalists

- al-Qaeda (AQ)

- AQ in Iraq (Tawhid and Jihad)

- AQ in Lebanon

- AQ in Saudi Arabia

- AQ in Yemen

- AQ Network for Southwestern Khulna Division

- AQ Organization for Jihad in Sweden

- AQ for the Malay Archipelago

- AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

- AQ in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

- al-Shabaab

- Egyptian Tawhid and Jihad

- Islambouli Brigades of al-Qaeda

- Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Sites

- Islamic State of Iraq

- Jabhat al-Nusra

- Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)

- al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent

ISIS and its Core Affiliates

- Boko Haram

- Dagestani Shar'iah Jamaat

- ISIS

- ISIS Algeria Province

- ISIS Bahrain Province

- ISIS Bangladesh Province

- ISIS Caucasus Province

- ISIS Greater Sahara Province (ISGS)

- ISIS Khorasan Province (IS-K)

- ISIS Libya Province

- ISIS Saudi Arabia Province

- ISIS Sinai Province

- ISIS Yemen Province

- Islamic Youth Shura Council

- Maute Group

- Supporters of the Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques

Figure A.33: AME of Shared Ideology on Initiation, Excluding AQ and ISIS

Note: Thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals respectively. The dashed line marks 0. Low and high repression are the 10th and 90th percentiles of the repression variable.

Figure A.34: AME of Shared Ideology on Rhetorical (Left Panel) and Material (Right Panel) Alliance Termination, Excluding AQ and ISIS

Note: Bars are 90% confidence intervals. AMEs are calculated based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are comprised of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation. Coefficients on marginal effects are exponentiated.

Domestic Versus Transnational Alliances

Figure A.35: Domestic Versus Transnational Alliances

(a) Initiation of Domestic Alliances

(b) Initiation of Transnational Alliances

(c) Durability of Domestic Material Alliances

(d) Durability of Transnational Material Alliances

(e) Durability of Domestic Rhetorical Alliances

Note: In panels A and B, thick and thin bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals respectively. The dashed line marks 0. Low and high repression are the 10th and 90th percentiles of the repression variable. In panels C through E, bars are 90% confidence intervals. AMEs are calculated based on 1000 simulations. Confidence intervals are comprised of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation. Coefficients on marginal effects are exponentiated. There are too few observations of transnational rhetorical alliances to reliably estimate their durability.)

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