Supporting Information for "Pool or Duel? Cooperation and Competition Among International Organizations"

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1 Appendix 1: Interviews

I chose to interview officials who were involved in the negotiation of cooperation arrangements with other IOs during the time period under study. This includes both current and former officials from several prominent international financial institutions. Because only experienced, senior officials are involved in these high-level decisions and negotiations, I only spoke to a handful of decisionmakers – a convenience sample.

ID	Interviewee	Date	Mode of Contact
Interview A	Current Senior Economist at World Bank	February 28, 2020	Phone
Interview B	Former Senior Economist at IMF	February 25, 2020	Phone
Interview C	Former Project Team Economist at IMF	April 15, 2020	Phone

Table A1: **Interviews.**

Interviews were semi-structured and focused on the following questions:

1. How are co-financing and information sharing arrangements negotiated? I am particularly interested in which staff and member states are most involved?

2. What types of organizations does your organization like to cooperate with? Are some preferable to others? If so, why?

2 Appendix 2: Coding Procedures

My coding effort covers two forms of cooperation that are common among development IOs: co-financing and information sharing. I discuss the coding procedures relevant to each form of cooperation subsequently.

With respect to co-financing, I utilized program documents, annual reports, and press releases. Each development IO publishes an annual report, and most are available online for all years post-2000. These reports contain detailed information about lending in each year, and they often contain sections on collaboration with other IOs and lenders, including the number of instances of co-financing pursued with each IO. Similarly, development IOs often publish program documentation for each of their operations, and these documents include information about the funding breakdown for each program. Therefore, I manually examined each program document and annual report for evidence of co-financing. Last, to ensure that my coding was as complete as possible, I utilized keyword searches of press releases, which are typically available for all years post-1990 on each IO's website. I searched for each of the other organizations' names and abbreviations as well as the words "cooperation," and "co-financing."

To code information sharing among development organizations, I made use of press releases and annual reports. Most often, information sharing agreements are publicized with the publication of a memorandum of understanding, and they are accompanied by a signing ceremony. Therefore, I searched press releases for the terms "memorandum" and "information" as well as the names and abbreviations of peer organizations. Next, I again examined annual reports, as they sometimes contain sections on cooperation and coordination with other IOs.

3 Appendix 3: Variable Descriptions and IO Lists

Institution	**Date**	**Members**
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)	1944	189
Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)	1956	41
European Investment Bank (EIB)	1958	27
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)	1959	48
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)	1960	14
African Development Bank (AfDB)	1965	80
Asian Development Bank (ADB)	1966	68
East African Development Bank (EADB)	1967	4
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)	1968	21
Andean Development Corporation (CAF)	1968	18
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)	1970	27
Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)	1973	57
West African Development Bank (BOAD)	1973	8
Development Bank of the Central African States (BDEAC)	1975	6
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)	1975	11
Development Bank of the Great Lakes States (BDEGL)	1976	3
OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)	1976	12
Nordic Investment Bank (NIB)	1976	8
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	1977	177
Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB)	1985	22
Nordic Development Fund (NDF)	1989	5
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	1991	69
Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB)	1992	11
North American Development Bank (NADB)	1993	2
Economic Cooperation Organization Trade and Development Bank (ETDB)	2005	10
Eurasian Development Bank (EDB)	2006	6
New Development Bank (NDB)	2013	5
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)	2015	75

Table A2: **Development Banks List.** The membership data is accurate as of February 2020 and includes only shareholding members of each institution.

Variable	Definition	Source
Co-financing	Hand-coded measure of number of programs co-financed by two IOs in a given year.	IO websites.
Information sharing	Hand-coded measure of number of information sharing agreements active between two IOs in a given year.	MDB websites.
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	Ideal pt. distance between leading stakeholders in each IO based on voting in the UNGA in a given year.	Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2017).
Rivalry-peace	Measure of geopolitical hostility where 0 is complete rivalry and 1 peace between leading stakeholders in each IO.	Goertz, Diehl and Balas (2016).
Alliance	Binary indicating whether leading stakeholders in each IO have an active formal defense treaty with one another in a given year.	Leeds et al. (2002).
Difference in IO size	Hand-coded measure of absolute value of the difference in number of members in each IO in a given year.	MDB websites.
HQ distance	Geographic distance in KM between headquarters locations of each IO in a given year.	Data comes from `https://bit.ly/38YmE36`.
Member overlap	Ratio of total unique member states in a given IO dyad that belong to both IOs	MDB websites.

Table A3: **Variables, Definitions, and Sources.**

4 Appendix 4: Robustness Checks and Supporting Statistical Information



Figure A1: **Frequency of Cooperation Among Development IOs 1944-2018.**

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Information sharing	5747	0.19	0.45	0	3
Co-financing	5747	0.43	1.51	0	18
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	5739	1.53	1.22	0.00	4.69
Rivalry-Peace	3061	0.59	0.22	0.00	1.00
Alliance	5747	0.27	0.44	0	1
Difference in IO size	5747	60.46	58.45	0	187
HQ distance	5747	5183.32	3253.79	0	14530
Member overlap	5747	0.12	0.15	0.00	0.80

Table A4: **Descriptive Statistics (Data for Regression Analyses).**

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.329^{***}		
	(0.038)		
Rivalry-Peace		0.344	
		(0.225)	
Alliance			-0.112
			(0.090)
Difference in IO size	0.004^{***}	-0.005^{***}	0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
HQ distance	0.148^{***}	0.049	0.076^{*}
	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.041)
Member overlap	4.129^{***}	3.003^{***}	3.995^{***}
	(0.185)	(0.227)	(0.169)
Year	0.066^{***}	0.058^{***}	0.064^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
N	5238	2558	5244

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table A5: **Same Most Powerful Shareholder Dropped Robustness Check (Information Sharing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level. I drop all observations for which the two IOs share the same most powerful stakeholder.

	Co-financing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.106^{**}		
	(0.050)		
Rivalry-Peace		0.006	
		(0.346)	
Alliance			-0.131
			(0.121)
Difference in IO size	0.008^{***}	0.009^{***}	0.007^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
HQ distance	0.100	0.005	0.074
	(0.064)	(0.081)	(0.063)
Member overlap	5.081^{***}	5.280^{***}	5.162^{***}
	(0.269)	(0.361)	(0.249)
Year	0.076^{***}	0.086^{***}	0.076^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)
N	5238	2558	5244

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table A6: **Same Most Powerful Shareholder Dropped Robustness Check (Co-financing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level. I drop all observations for which the two IOs share the same most powerful stakeholder.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.393^{***}		
	(0.038)		
Rivalry-Peace		0.317^{*}	
		(0.169)	
Alliance			-0.295^{***}
			(0.089)
Difference in aid budgets	-0.074^{***}	-0.173^{***}	-0.116^{***}
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)
HQ distance	0.059^{***}	-0.018	-0.029
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Member overlap	1.198^{***}	1.936^{***}	2.049^{***}
	(0.173)	(0.162)	(0.135)
Year	0.044^{***}	0.038^{***}	0.042^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
N	1644	1238	1644

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table A7: **Aid Budget Robustness Check (Information Sharing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

	Co-financing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.121^{**}		
	(0.050)		
Rivalry-Peace		0.782^{**}	
		(0.339)	
Alliance			-0.026
			(0.150)
Difference in aid budgets	0.233^{***}	0.200^{***}	0.211^{***}
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.042)
HQ distance	-0.109^{***}	-0.104^{***}	-0.142^{***}
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Member overlap	1.716^{***}	1.595^{***}	2.004^{***}
	(0.241)	(0.256)	(0.219)
Year	0.121^{***}	0.122^{***}	0.123^{***}
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
N	1644	1238	1644

$^{***}p < .01$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{*}p < .1$

Table A8: **Aid Budget Robustness Check (Co-financing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

With the aid budget measure, results are robust for UN voting and rivalry-peace. While alliance attains statistical significance in the negative direction in this test, I do not put much stock in this result given data missingness and the consistent results on the other two geopolitical measures. Moreover, the IOs that are dropped from the sample in this test include several important instances of alliance ties – specifically, 63 percent of allied IOs in the broader sample are dropped (970/1528). Much of this is driven by the Latin American MDBs (e.g. CABEI, CAF, and CDB), which are closely aligned with the U.S.-led institutions. Last, where the other geopolitical measures, which are continuous, can detect more subtle differences in the relations between the remaining IOs' leading shareholders, the alliance variable is binary. This means that the loss of IOs that are closely tied to other organizations may bias the results more aggressively.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.222^{***}		
	(0.031)		
Rivalry-Peace		0.259^{*}	
		(0.139)	
Alliance			-0.036
			(0.076)
Difference in IO size	0.001^{*}	-0.008^{***}	-0.001^{*}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
HQ co-location	0.035	0.129	0.254^{**}
	(0.098)	(0.111)	(0.113)
Member overlap	2.740^{***}	1.501^{***}	2.969^{***}
	(0.136)	(0.158)	(0.134)
Year	0.055^{***}	0.044^{***}	0.055^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
N	5739	3061	5747

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table A9: **HQ Co-location Robustness Check (Information Sharing)**. Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

	Co-financing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.151^{***}		
	(0.041)		
Rivalry-Peace		0.973^{***}	
		(0.247)	
Alliance			0.258^{**}
			(0.115)
Difference in IO size	0.009^{***}	0.008^{***}	0.007^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
HQ co-location	1.082^{***}	0.940^{***}	1.241^{***}
	(0.270)	(0.289)	(0.280)
Member overlap	4.564^{***}	4.247^{***}	4.492^{***}
	(0.188)	(0.258)	(0.197)
Year	0.083^{***}	0.097^{***}	0.086^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
N	5739	3061	5747

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table A10: **HQ Co-location Robustness Check (Co-financing)**. Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.228^{***}		
	(0.032)		
Rivalry-Peace		0.317^{**}	
		(0.138)	
Alliance			-0.004
			(0.080)
Difference in IO size	0.001^{*}	-0.008^{***}	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
HQ distance	0.011	-0.013	-0.021
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Member overlap	2.765^{***}	1.486^{***}	2.950^{***}
	(0.141)	(0.161)	(0.137)
N	5739	3061	5747

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table A11: **Year Fixed Effects Robustness Check (Information Sharing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

	Co-financing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.200^{***}		
	(0.039)		
Rivalry-Peace		1.225^{***}	
		(0.249)	
Alliance			0.193^{*}
			(0.113)
Difference in IO size	0.008^{***}	0.006^{***}	0.006^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
HQ distance	-0.028	-0.036	-0.062^{*}
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Member overlap	4.696^{***}	4.247^{***}	4.721^{***}
	(0.184)	(0.225)	(0.184)
N	5739	3061	5747

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table A12: **Year Fixed Effects Robustness Check (Co-financing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.336^{***}		
	(0.032)		
Rivalry-Peace		1.188^{***}	
		(0.136)	
Alliance			0.476^{***}
			(0.061)
Year	0.053^{***}	0.040^{***}	0.056^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
N	5739	3061	5747

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table A13: **Bivariate Robustness Check (Information Sharing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

	Co-financing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.138^{***}		
	(0.049)		
Rivalry-Peace		1.416^{***}	
		(0.235)	
Alliance			0.926^{***}
			(0.106)
Year	0.082^{***}	0.093^{***}	0.089^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
N	5739	3061	5747

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table A14: **Bivariate Robustness Check (Co-financing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.272^{***}		
	(0.029)		
Rivalry-Peace		0.433^{***}	
		(0.163)	
Alliance			-0.376^{***}
			(0.081)
Difference in IO size	-0.002^{***}	-0.009^{***}	-0.004^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
HQ distance	0.086^{***}	0.005	0.004
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Member overlap	1.037^{***}	0.680^{***}	1.590^{***}
	(0.168)	(0.181)	(0.140)
Portfolio similarity	-0.044	-0.013	-0.006
	(0.065)	(0.082)	(0.063)
Risk	0.026	-0.088	0.017
	(0.040)	(0.082)	(0.039)
Year	0.050^{***}	0.044^{***}	0.047^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
N	2248	1555	2249

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table A15: **Portfolio Similarity and Risk Robustness Check (Information Sharing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

	Co-financing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	-0.102^{***}		
	(0.036)		
Rivalry-Peace		0.667^{***}	
		(0.247)	
Alliance			0.036
			(0.104)
Difference in IO size	0.006^{***}	0.006^{***}	0.005^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
HQ distance	0.073^{***}	0.079^{***}	0.052^{*}
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Member overlap	-0.181^{**}	-0.106	-0.173^{**}
	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.072)
Portfolio similarity	0.032	0.057	0.039
	(0.059)	(0.128)	(0.060)
Risk	0.370^{***}	0.381^{***}	0.382^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Year	0.067^{***}	0.057^{***}	0.067^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
N	2192	1544	2193

$^{***}p < .01$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{*}p < .1$

Table A16: **Portfolio Similarity and Risk Robustness Check (Co-financing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

I would have preferred to use credit ratings rather than inflation to measure risk, but many are proprietary, and data is only publicly available for the most recent years. Inflation is adequate because it is one of the few economic indicators for which there is little missing data among low-capacity developing countries, and it is considered to be a decent proxy for creditworthiness – see Haque, Nadeem Ul, Mathieson, Donald, and Mark, Nelson. "Rating the Raters of Creditworthiness." March 1997. *Finance and Development*. With the co-financing DV, alliance is negative and attains statistical significance, contrary to expectations. However, I again attribute this to the loss of observations with important alliance ties when utilizing AidData.



Figure A2: **Results If Iteratively Drop Each IO (Information Sharing).** All covariates from Table 1 are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.



Figure A3: **Results If Iteratively Drop Each IO (Co-financing).** All covariates from Table 2 are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

5 Appendix 5: Survey Materials and Supporting Evidence

5.1 LinkedIn Ad

The text of the LinkedIn advertisement that I used to recruit bureaucrats from development IOs is as follows:

"Hello! I am fielding a short survey experiment exclusively targeting experts from the field of global development as a part of an academic study. Click to take the survey here.

I am hoping to learn about how experts like yourself would respond to various hypothetical development scenarios. The survey is completely anonymous and administered through Qualtrics. It will only take a few moments to complete, and you can provide your email address at the end of the survey to be entered into a lottery to win a $250 Amazon gift card as a reward for your participation. Thank you in advance for your time and assistance."

Institution	Number of Respondents
African Development Bank	7
Asian Development Bank	31
Central American Bank for Economic Integration	1
Eurasian Development Bank	1
Inter-American Development Bank	9
International Fund for Agricultural Development	9
Islamic Development Bank	1
Other	28
World Bank	51

Table A17: **Number of Respondents by IO of Employment.** The "Other" category encompasses bureaucrats who serve as consultants at various IOs or otherwise work for multiple institutions. They drop out of the sample for the regression analysis.

HQ/Shareholder Country	Number of Members	Disbursements ($USD mil)	Number of Responses
China	5	500	85
China	50	500	83
China	100	500	79
China	5	10000	82
China	50	10000	82
China	100	10000	81
China	5	20000	81
China	50	20000	81
China	100	20000	80
Russia	5	500	81
Russia	50	500	79
Russia	100	500	81
Russia	5	10000	80
Russia	50	10000	86
Russia	100	10000	85
Russia	5	20000	83
Russia	50	20000	80
Russia	100	20000	81
United States	5	500	83
United States	50	500	79
United States	100	500	80
United States	5	10000	77
United States	50	10000	88
United States	100	10000	83
United States	5	20000	80
United States	50	20000	80
United States	100	20000	82

Table A18: **Number of Responses by Treatment Group.**

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Information sharing	595	6.49	2.57	0.00	10.00
Co-financing	595	6.83	2.52	0.00	10.00
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	487	1.79	1.32	0.00	3.57
Rivalry-Peace	454	0.43	0.33	0.00	1.00
Alliance	668	0.08	0.27	0	1
Difference in memberships	487	87.56	60.28	1.00	184.00
Difference in disbursements	487	21812.37	16677.47	38.00	48735.00
HQ distance	487	7293.64	4512.64	0.00	13834.00
Tenure	663	2.94	1.87	1.00	8.00
Male	668	0.63	0.48	0	1
Age	668	41.30	12.06	22	73

Table A19: **Descriptive Statistics (Experimental Data).**

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
U.S.	0.869***		
	(0.323)		
China		−0.199	
		(0.263)	
Russia			−0.321
			(0.265)
Difference in disbursements	0.076	0.080	0.060
	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.119)
Number of members	0.003	0.004	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HQ distance	−0.080*	−0.156***	−0.153***
	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Male	0.023	0.014	0.035
	(0.248)	(0.251)	(0.251)
Tenure	−0.028	−0.018	−0.022
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Age	0.019	0.017	0.018
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Iteration	−0.066	−0.057	−0.054
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
N	476	476	476

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A20: **Country Effects (Information Sharing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

	Co-financing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
U.S.	1.087***		
	(0.276)		
China		−0.215	
		(0.251)	
Russia			−0.434*
			(0.252)
Difference in disbursements	−0.019	−0.017	−0.040
	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.115)
Number of members	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HQ distance	−0.017	−0.115***	−0.107***
	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Male	−0.125	−0.135	−0.108
	(0.225)	(0.227)	(0.226)
Tenure	0.064	0.076	0.071
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Age	0.006	0.004	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Iteration	−0.031	−0.020	−0.016
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.076)
N	476	476	476

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A21: **Country Effects (Co-financing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad-level.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	0.305**		
	(0.143)		
Rivalry-Peace		1.350**	
		(0.685)	
Alliance			1.005*
			(0.536)
Difference in disbursements	0.024	−0.015	0.054
	(0.133)	(0.147)	(0.131)
Number of members	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HQ distance	−0.274***	−0.066	−0.177***
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.032)
Male	−0.164	−0.290	−0.175
	(0.272)	(0.277)	(0.269)
Tenure	0.003	0.019	−0.003
	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.076)
Age	0.026**	0.028**	0.028**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Iteration	0.029	0.035	0.020
	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.084)
N	405	372	405

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A22: **Restricted Sample Robustness Check (Information Sharing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the organization-level. The sample is restricted to only those respondents who completed the survey in full.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	0.354***		
	(0.133)		
Rivalry-Peace		1.755***	
		(0.603)	
Alliance			1.328***
			(0.446)
Difference in disbursements	−0.068	−0.047	−0.033
	(0.124)	(0.136)	(0.122)
Number of members	0.002	0.001	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HQ distance	−0.256***	0.0002	−0.145***
	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.033)
Male	−0.368	−0.373	−0.379
	(0.238)	(0.245)	(0.236)
Tenure	0.089	0.093	0.080
	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.071)
Age	0.005	0.007	0.008
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Iteration	0.026	0.013	0.016
	(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.078)
N	405	372	405

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A23: **Restricted Sample Robustness Check (Co-financing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the respondent-level. The sample is restricted to only those respondents who completed the survey in full.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	0.201		
	(0.159)		
Rivalry-Peace		1.878**	
		(0.738)	
Alliance			0.976*
			(0.501)
Difference in disbursements	0.121	0.113	0.139
	(0.182)	(0.183)	(0.179)
Number of members	0.005*	0.005*	0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HQ distance	−0.245***	−0.030	−0.184***
	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.033)
Male	0.110	−0.035	0.076
	(0.298)	(0.302)	(0.292)
Tenure	−0.038	−0.032	−0.045
	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Age	0.028**	0.030**	0.030**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Iteration	−0.083	−0.076	−0.089
	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.088)
N	405	376	405

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A24: **Restricted Staff Robustness Check (Information Sharing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the organization-level. Respondents are restricted by job title such that those who are likely not involved in the negotiation and implementation of cooperation arrangements are excluded from the analysis.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	0.227		
	(0.152)		
Rivalry-Peace		2.446***	
		(0.646)	
Alliance			1.239***
			(0.432)
Difference in disbursements	−0.047	−0.017	−0.026
	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.165)
Number of members	0.003	0.002	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HQ distance	−0.203***	0.064	−0.135***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.035)
Male	−0.198	−0.227	−0.240
	(0.258)	(0.262)	(0.254)
Tenure	0.066	0.067	0.056
	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.070)
Age	0.015	0.019	0.017
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Iteration	−0.006	−0.026	−0.013
	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.083)
N	405	376	405

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A25: **Restricted Staff Robustness Check (Co-financing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the organization-level. Respondents are restricted by job title such that those who are likely not involved in the negotiation and implementation of cooperation arrangements are excluded from the analysis.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	0.041		
	(0.167)		
Rivalry-Peace		1.777*	
		(0.946)	
Alliance			0.750*
			(0.424)
Difference in disbursements	0.017	−0.012	0.092
	(0.122)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Number of members	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HQ distance	−0.177***	−0.021	−0.168***
	(0.057)	(0.081)	(0.031)
Male	−0.006	−0.025	−0.025
	(0.272)	(0.275)	(0.270)
Tenure	−0.014	−0.015	−0.021
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.076)
Age	0.043***	0.043***	0.042***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
iteration	−0.049	−0.044	−0.047
	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.087)
N	476	443	476

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A26: **Weighted Response Robustness Check (Information Sharing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the respondent-level.

	Co-financing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	−0.002		
	(0.160)		
Rivalry-Peace		2.379***	
		(0.819)	
Alliance			1.387***
			(0.359)
Difference in disbursements	−0.031	−0.083	0.076
	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.103)
Number of members	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HQ distance	−0.114**	0.078	−0.123***
	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.034)
Male	−0.198	−0.181	−0.224
	(0.281)	(0.285)	(0.280)
Tenure	0.100	0.099	0.087
	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.077)
Age	0.027**	0.028**	0.026**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Iteration	−0.005	−0.005	−0.002
	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.092)
N	476	443	476

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A27: **Weighted Response Robustness Check (Co-financing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the respondent-level.

	Information sharing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	0.245*		
	(0.133)		
Rivalry-Peace		1.374**	
		(0.582)	
Alliance			0.516
			(0.449)
Difference in disbursements	0.059	0.038	0.079
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Number of members	0.002	0.003	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
HQ distance	−0.195***	−0.007	−0.116***
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.021)
Male	10.062***	9.639***	10.057***
	(1.106)	(1.111)	(1.071)
Tenure	−1.045***	−0.851**	−1.026***
	(0.348)	(0.349)	(0.329)
Age	−0.101	−0.090	−0.104
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.091)
Iteration	−0.004	0.001	−0.013
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)
N	476	443	476

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A28: **Respondent Fixed-Effects Robustness Check (Information Sharing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the respondent-level.

	Co-financing		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
UN voting (ideal pt. dist)	0.182		
	(0.125)		
Rivalry-Peace		1.416***	
		(0.544)	
Alliance			0.493
			(0.411)
Difference in disbursements	−0.020	−0.036	−0.049
	(0.296)	(0.297)	(0.296)
Number of members	0.005	0.003	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
HQ distance	0.086	0.049	−0.040
	(0.157)	(0.134)	(0.074)
Male	−0.349	−0.263	−0.412
	(0.482)	(0.503)	(0.497)
Tenure	0.096	0.095	0.092
	(0.146)	(0.156)	(0.145)
Age	−0.003	−0.001	−0.003
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
N	476	443	476

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Table A29: **Respondent Fixed-Effects Robustness Check (Co-financing).** Robust standard errors are clustered at the respondent-level.

5.2 Survey Questionnaire

5.2.1 Consent Script

This survey is directed at experts from the field of global development. It will present hypothetical development scenarios for you to evaluate. Responses will be utilized for academic research only.

Your participation in this research is voluntary. Please direct questions to [AUTHOR NAME AND EMAIL]. All questionnaires are anonymous and confidential, and I will work to make sure that no one sees your online responses without approval. But since we are using the internet, there is a chance that someone could access your online responses without permission. In some cases, this information could be used to identify you.

To print or save a copy of this page, select the print button on your web browser.

Providing consent: I have read this page and I am aware that I am being asked to participate in a research study. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have had them answered to my satisfaction. I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. I am not giving up any legal rights by agreeing to participate.

5.2.2 IO Identification

1. Do you currently work or have you recently worked for a multilateral development organization?

   ☐ Yes

   ☐ No

2. IF YES: For which organization do you or have you recently worked?

   Select from dropdown list of organizations

3. IF YES: For how many years have you worked or did you work for the aforementioned organization?

   ☐ less than 1

   ☐ 1-3

   ☐ 3-5

   ☐ 5-7

   ☐ 7-10

   ☐ 10-15

   ☐ 15-20

   ☐ more than 20

5.2.3 Demographic Variables (order is randomized)

1. What is your gender?

   ☐ Male

   ☐ Female

   ☐ Other

2. What is your age?

   Select from dropdown list 18-100

3. Which country are you from (your nationality)?

   Select from dropdown list of all countries in the world

5.2.4 Treatment Vignettes

GENERAL PROMPT PROVIDED TO ALL RESPONDENTS

You are about to view a series of profiles for several hypothetical multilateral development organizations. Imagine that each of the organization's activities substantively and geographically overlap with those of your own organization. Please carefully consider the organizational characteristics listed in each table before responding to the subsequent questions.

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Beijing, China
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	China
Number of Members:	5
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$500 million

Table A30

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Beijing, China
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	China
Number of Members:	5
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$10 billion

Table A31

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Beijing, China
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	China
Number of Members:	5
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$20 billion

Table A32

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Beijing, China
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	China
Number of Members:	50
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$500 million

Table A33

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Beijing, China
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	China
Number of Members:	50
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$10 billion

Table A34

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Beijing, China
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	China
Number of Members:	50
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$20 billion

Table A35

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Beijing, China
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	China
Number of Members:	100
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$500 million

Table A36

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Beijing, China
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	China
Number of Members:	100
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$10 billion

Table A37

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Beijing, China
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	China
Number of Members:	100
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$20 billion

Table A38

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Washington, D.C., United States
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	United States
Number of Members:	5
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$500 million

Table A39

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Washington, D.C., United States
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	United States
Number of Members:	5
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$10 billion

Table A40

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Washington, D.C., United States
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	United States
Number of Members:	5
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$20 billion

Table A41

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Washington, D.C., United States
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	United States
Number of Members:	50
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$500 million

Table A42

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Washington, D.C., United States
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	United States
Number of Members:	50
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$10 billion

Table A43

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Washington, D.C., United States
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	United States
Number of Members:	50
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$20 billion

Table A44

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Washington, D.C., United States
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	United States
Number of Members:	100
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$500 million

Table A45

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Washington, D.C., United States
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	United States
Number of Members:	100
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$10 billion

Table A46

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Washington, D.C., United States
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	United States
Number of Members:	100
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$20 billion

Table A47

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Moscow, Russia
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	Russia
Number of Members:	5
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$500 million

Table A48

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Moscow, Russia
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	Russia
Number of Members:	5
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$10 billion

Table A49

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Moscow, Russia
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	Russia
Number of Members:	5
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$20 billion

Table A50

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Moscow, Russia
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	Russia
Number of Members:	50
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$500 million

Table A51

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Moscow, Russia
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	Russia
Number of Members:	50
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$10 billion

Table A52

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Moscow, Russia
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	Russia
Number of Members:	50
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$20 billion

Table A53

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Moscow, Russia
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	Russia
Number of Members:	100
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$500 million

Table A54

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Moscow, Russia
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	Russia
Number of Members:	100
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$10 billion

Table A55

Organizational Profile	
Headquarters Location:	Moscow, Russia
Largest Contributing Shareholder:	Russia
Number of Members:	100
Total Disbursements ($USD) in 2018:	$20 billion

Table A56

5.2.5 Support for Cooperation (order is randomized)

1. Suppose that your organization is initiating a loan program that would finance an infrastructure project in one of your member state's territories. Suppose that member state is also a member of the organization described above. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate your support for a co-financing arrangement with the organization described above?

   ☐ 1
   ☐ 2
   ☐ 3
   ☐ 4
   ☐ 5
   ☐ 6
   ☐ 7
   ☐ 8
   ☐ 9
   ☐ 10

2. Suppose that your organization is also considering signing a memorandum of understanding that would establish an information sharing arrangement with the organization described above. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate your support for an information sharing arrangement with the organization described above? Please answer openly and truthfully.

   ☐ 1
   ☐ 2
   ☐ 3
   ☐ 4
   ☐ 5
   ☐ 6

☐ 7

☐ 8

☐ 9

☐ 10

Note: respondents will view 5 iterations of profiles and answer the two questions above for each of those organizations.

5.2.6 Open-Ended Responses

1. What factors did you consider while evaluating whether or not your organization ought to pursue cooperation with the organizations described in the study? Which characteristics were most important? Please be as detailed as possible.

2. Thank you for your participation in this study. If you would like to be entered into a lottery to win a $250 Amazon gift card, please provide your email address below.

Figure A4: **Word Cloud.** The cloud is constructed from the open-ended LinkedIn survey responses. English stop words and numbers are removed.