"Where You Work Is Where You Stand" Supplemental Information

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Contents

1 Descriptive Statistics

In this section, we present descriptive statistics for data used in analyses appearing in the main text. First, in section 1.1, we present descriptive statistics for the JGSS data used in our analyses. Specifically, Table A.1 shows summary statistics and Table A.2 and Table A.3 show the distribution of the outcome variable and predictor of interest respectively for JGSS specifications.

1.1 JGSS 2008 Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: JGSS 2008 Summary Statistics

variable	mean	sd	p50	min	max
PROTECTION	4.25523	1.143816	4	1	7
FEMALE	.5293839	.499195	1	0	1
AGE	3.817062	1.667472	4	1	7
COLLEGE GRADUATE	.2077825	.4057709	0	0	1
REDISTRIBUTION	3.825756	.9584776	4	1	5
UNION	.191786	.3937798	0	0	1
COSMOPOLITANISM INDEX	.5735429	.3075328	.7222222	0	1
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	.2566338	.4368584	0	0	1
JOB INSECURITY	1.652451	.8024428	1	1	4
TEMPORARY WORKER	.252529	.4345444	0	0	1
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY	.2070004	.4052321	0	0	1
MANAGEMENT	.217806	.4128369	0	0	1

Source: JGSS 2008

Table A.2: JGSS 2008 Trade Opinion Frequencies

Japan should limit imports

Response Category	Number Respondents	% Respondents
Strongly Disagree	35	2
Disagree	113	5
Somewhat Disagree	243	11
Neither Agree nor Disagree	990	46
Somewhat Agree	474	22
Agree	239	11
Strongly Agree	57	3
(Don't Know/Refused)	9	0
Total	2,160	100

Source: JGSS 2008

Table A.3: JGSS 2008 Employer Globalization Frequencies

Employer Globalization Level

Response Category	Number Respondents	% Respondents
Domestic Firm	1,971	75
Import Only	297	11
Export Only	130	5
Import and Export Only	62	2
Offshore Affiliate Only	58	2
Offshore and Import Only	28	1
Offshore, Import, and Export	71	3
(Don't Know/Refused)	21	1
Total	2,638	100

Source: JGSS 2008

2 Ordered Logit Regression Results

In this section, we present equivalent tables based on ordered logistic estimations here to show that the results presented in the main text are not artifacts of OLS estimation. In these tables, we trichotomize the outcome variable PROTECTION, to take values of "Disagree" (oppose limiting imports), "Neutral" (neither agree nor disagree with limiting imports), and "Agree" (support limiting imports). We do this to facilitate interpretation of the results. Specifically, Table A.4 and replicates results from Table 2 of the main text, Table A.5 replicates Table 3 of the main text, and Table A.6 replicates results shown in Table 4 of the main text. These results are substantively consistent with those presented in the main text.

As noted in footnote 23 of the manuscript, Table A.6 also includes an additional specification (Model 4) including GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER × JOB SATISFACTION, showing that employees of globalized firms who say they are "very satisfied" with their jobs are particularly opposed to protection. JOB SATISFACTION is a dichotomous variable coding whether a respondent is "very satisfied" with their job or not.

2.1 Table 1: Ordered Logit Equivalent

Table A.4: Firm Characteristics and Support for Protection (Ordered Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PROTECTION						
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.35***	-0.32***	-0.35***	-0.40***	-0.39***	-0.35***
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.44**	-0.54***	-0.44**	-0.44**	-0.32*	-0.43**
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.20)
FEMALE	0.47***	0.42***	0.47***	0.49***	0.54***	0.55***
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.17)
AGE	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.08	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
UNION	0.39**	0.38**	0.38**	0.44**	0.41*	0.42*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.22)
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY		0.27***				
		(0.10)				
LOCALISM			0.00			
			(0.05)			
LDP				0.24**		
				(0.11)		
TASK ROUTINENESS					-0.00	
					(0.03)	
TASK OFFSHORABILITY					0.06	
					(0.06)	
SOCIOTROPIC TRADE						-0.10**
						(0.05)
REDISTRIBUTION						0.12**
						(0.06)
COSMOPOLITAN INDEX						-0.40***
						(0.14)
JOB INSECURITY						-0.04
						(0.07)
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1265	1265	1263	1167	1003	1054

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

2.2 Table 2: Ordered Logit Equivalent

Table A.5: Conditional Effects of Firm Productivity (Ordered Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PROTECTION						
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.24**	-0.23**	-0.29**	-0.37***		
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)		
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.53***	-0.29*	-0.30*	-0.34**	-0.20	-0.69*
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.39)
FEMALE	0.42***	0.47***	0.54***	0.53***	0.52***	0.52*
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.28)
AGE	0.04	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.18***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
UNION	0.39**	0.38**	0.40*	0.43*	0.31	0.69*
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.41)
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY	0.39***					
	(0.10)					
TASK ROUTINENESS			-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)
TASK OFFSHORABILITY			0.10	-0.09	-0.01	-0.53**
			(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.22)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER × DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY	-0.31*** (0.10)					
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER × COLLEGE GRADUATE		-0.49** (0.24)				
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER × TASK OFFSHORABILITY			-0.19* (0.10)			
TASK ROUTINENESS × TASK OFFSHORABILITY				0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.10* (0.06)
Employer Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Domestic	Globalized
Industry Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1265	1265	1003	1003	756	247

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

2.3   Table 3: Ordered Logit Equivalent

Table A.6: Employee Status and Firm Productivity (Ordered Logit)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PROTECTION				
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-1.10***	-0.36**	-0.26***	-0.19
	(0.25)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.12)
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.47**	-0.44**	-0.45**	-0.43**
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)
FEMALE	0.48***	0.47***	0.48***	0.45***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)
AGE	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
UNION	0.42**	0.39**	0.36*	0.38**
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)
JOB INSECURITY	-0.12**			
	(0.06)			
TEMPORARY WORKER		-0.00		
		(0.14)		
MANAGEMENT			0.20	
			(0.13)	
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×	0.42***			
JOB INSECURITY	(0.14)			
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×		0.04		
TEMPORARY WORKER		(0.30)		
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×			-0.59**	
MANAGEMENT			(0.26)	
JOB SATISFACTION				0.15
				(0.12)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×				-0.87***
JOB SATISFACTION				(0.29)
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1181	1265	1203	1264

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

3 Ordered Logit Plots

We present equivalent plots based on ordered logistic estimations here to show that the results presented in the main text are not artifacts of OLS estimation. In these plots, we trichotomize the outcome variable PROTECTION, to take values of "Disagree" (oppose limiting imports), "Neutral" (neither agree nor disagree with limiting imports), and "Agree" (support limiting imports). We do this to facilitate interpretation of the results. In each figure, The y-axis shows predicted probabilities for each of the three values of PROTECTION from ordered logistic specifications that are otherwise identical (in terms of covariates) to the specifications shown in Figures 2–4 of the main text. Specifically, in each figure the y-axis shows the post-estimation predicted probability that JGSS survey respondents reply "Disagree", "Neither agree nor disagree", or "Agree" to the statement that "Japan should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy."

First, Figures A.1 – A.3 show results corresponding to Figure 1 in the main text. Consistent with the results in the main text, employees of globalized firms are much less likely to support limits on imports. Moreover, the effect of GLOBALIZED EM-PLOYER compares favorably in magnitude to those of well-known predictors of trade opinion like COLLEGE GRADUATE and DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY. Moreover, these results suggest that the observed effects shown in the main text figures are monotonic such that for example, GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER predicts both significantly lower probability that respondents will "Agree" to limiting imports and significantly higher probability that respondents will "Disagree" to limiting imports.

Next, Figures A.4 – A.6 depict results corresponding to Figure 2 of the main text.

Again, the substantive effects shown here are consistent with those derived from the OLS estimations shown in the main text. The effects of sector,skill, and occupation on individual trade opinion are clearly conditioned by employer type. Further, these results suggest that the OLS results shown in the main text are monotonic.

As seen in Figures A.7 – A.9, post-estimation results from ordered logistic specifications very closely replicate those shown in the Figure 3 of the main text. The effects of firm productivity are moderated by employees' relative positions within their firms. Effects are much larger among relative winners than they are among those employees less well-positioned to benefit from employer success. Finally, these results also suggest the observed effects shown in the main text appear to be monotonic.

3.1 Figure 3: Ordered Logit Equivalents

Figure A.1: H1 - Substantive Effects Comparison (Ordered Logit with Industry Fixed Effects—except in Figure A.3c), P(PROTECTION="Agree")


(a) Employer Type

(b) Skill Level


(c) Sector

Figure A.2: H1 - Substantive Effects Comparison (Ordered Logit with Industry Fixed Effects—except in Figure A.3c), P(PROTECTION="Neutral")


(a) Employer Type

(b) Skill Level

(c) Sector

Figure A.3: H1 - Substantive Effects Comparison (Ordered Logit with Industry Fixed Effects—except in Figure A.3c), P(PROTECTION="Disagree")

(a) Employer Type

(b) Skill Level

(c) Sector

3.2 Figure 4: Ordered Logit Equivalents

Figure A.4: H2 - Conditional Effects of Employer Type (Ordered Logit with Industry Fixed Effects, P(PROTECTION="Agree")

(a) Sector Competitiveness

(b) Skill Level

(c) Task Offshorability

(d) Task Routineness

Figure A.5: H2 - Conditional Effects of Employer Type (Ordered Logit with Industry Fixed Effects, P(PROTECTION="Neutral")

(a) Sector Competitiveness

(b) Skill Level

(c) Task Offshorability

(d) Task Routineness

Figure A.6: H2 - Conditional Effects of Employer Type (Ordered Logit with Industry Fixed Effects, P(PROTECTION="Disagree")


(a) Sector Competitiveness

(b) Skill Level

(c) Task Offshorability

(d) Task Routineness

3.3 Figure 5: Ordered Logit Equivalents

Figure A.7: H3 - Intra-Firm Variation (Ordered Logit with Industry Fixed Effects, P(PROTECTION="Agree")

(a) Job Security

(b) Temporary Worker

(c) Manager

Figure A.8: H3 - Intra-Firm Variation (Ordered Logit with Industry Fixed Effects, P(PROTECTION="Neutral")

(a) Job Security

(b) Temporary Worker

(c) Manager

Figure A.9: H3 - Intra-Firm Variation (Ordered Logit with Industry Fixed Effects, P(PROTECTION="Disagree")

(a) Job Security

(b) Temporary Worker

(c) Manager

4   Ordinal Education Coding

In the following section, we present results replicating the analyses in the main text with an ordinal coding of educational attainment (EDUCATIONAL LEVEL) rather than the dichotomous variable COLLEGE GRADUATE. We preferred COLLEGE GRADUATE first, because it is the standard measure of educational attainment (and thus, human capital endowment) in the trade preferences literature; second, because the educational attainment categories in the JGSS include those under the pre-war Imperial system. These levels do not always obviously correspond to those of the current system. Rather than attempt to (imperfectly) translate between these categories, we instead chose to exclude these respondents from these analyses. However, this choice comes at the cost of throwing out data.

Thus, the results presented in chapter 4: Table A.7, Table A.8, and Table A.9 (corresponding to model specifications in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 in the main text, respectively) exclude respondents reporting educational attainment under the old Imperial system. Reassuringly, these results are substantively identical to those presented in the main text, increasing our confidence in their robustness.

Table A.7: Firm Characteristics and Support for Protection (Ordinal Education)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PROTECTION						
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.17***	-0.21***	-0.17***	-0.22**	-0.19**	-0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
FEMALE	0.33***	0.30***	0.33***	0.35***	0.37***	0.37***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)
AGE	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
UNION	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.21*	0.18	0.18
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.14)
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY		0.15*				
		(0.09)				
LOCALISM			0.02			
			(0.04)			
LDP				0.21***		
				(0.05)		
TASK ROUTINENESS					0.00	
					(0.02)	
TASK OFFSHORABILITY					0.04	
					(0.04)	
REDISTRIBUTION						0.06*
						(0.04)
COSMOPOLITANISM INDEX						-0.30**
						(0.11)
SOCIOTROPIC TRADE						-0.08*
						(0.04)
JOB INSECURITY						-0.03
						(0.04)
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1243	1243	1241	1145	992	1039

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

22

Table A.8: Conditional Effects of Firm Productivity (Ordinal Education)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PROTECTION						
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.13**	0.23	-0.13	-0.18**		
	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.07)		
EDUCATION (ORDINAL)	-0.14***	-0.09***	-0.11***	-0.12***	-0.08***	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
FEMALE	0.30***	0.33***	0.37***	0.36***	0.35***	0.35**
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.17)
AGE	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.09*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
UNION	0.17	0.14	0.17	0.18	0.09	0.38
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.26)
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY	0.27***					
	(0.09)					
TASK ROUTINENESS			-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.03
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
TASK OFFSHORABILITY			0.07*	-0.02	0.03	-0.35***
			(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.12)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×	-0.28***					
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY	(0.08)					
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×		-0.14***				
EDUCATION (ORDINAL)		(0.04)				
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×			-0.12**			
TASK OFFSHORABILITY			(0.05)			
TASK ROUTINENESS ×				0.02		
TASK OFFSHORABILITY				(0.01)		
TASK ROUTINENESS ×					0.01	0.07**
TASK OFFSHORABILITY					(0.02)	(0.03)
Employer Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Domestic	Globalized
Industry Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1243	1243	992	992	746	246

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.9: Employee Status and Firm Productivity (Ordinal Education)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROTECTION			
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.56***	-0.19**	-0.09
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.07)
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
FEMALE	0.33***	0.38***	0.33***
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
AGE	0.00	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
UNION	0.16	0.13	0.15
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
JOB INSECURITY	-0.06**		
	(0.03)		
TEMPORARY WORKER		-0.17*	
		(0.10)	
MANAGEMENT			0.23***
			(0.07)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×	0.21**		
JOB INSECURITY	(0.08)		
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×		0.10	
TEMPORARY WORKER		(0.18)	
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×			-0.49***
MANAGEMENT			(0.16)
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1161	1243	1183

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5 Alternative Employer Type Codings

In this section, we present results from a series of analyses replicating the analyses presented in the main text, but with alternate codings of GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER. We present results from analyses employing an ordinal coding of GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER, which we call GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER (ORD). This variable is a three-point ordinal scale, constructed such that firms that engage in no globalized economic activity (firms that do not import, export, or invest abroad and that are wholly-domestically-owned) are coded as 0, while firms that import goods from abroad or export goods, but do not invest abroad (and have domestic ownership) are coded as 1, and firms that invest abroad or are foreign-owned are coded as 2. Table A.10, Table A.11, and Table A.12 replicate model specifications from Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 of the main text, respectively. We do not replicate Models 5 and 6 of Table 3 as we are using the ordinal coding of GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER here. Reassuringly, the results of these analyses are virtually unchanged by the adoption of this alternate variable coding.

Table A.10: Firm Characteristics and Support for Protection

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PROTECTION						
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER (ORD)	-0.22***	-0.21***	-0.22***	-0.25***	-0.20***	-0.23***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.34**	-0.39***	-0.35**	-0.35**	-0.27**	-0.33***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)
FEMALE	0.28***	0.24**	0.28***	0.29***	0.33***	0.33***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
AGE	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
UNION	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.20	0.16	0.17
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.15)
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY		0.19**				
		(0.07)				
LOCALISM			-0.00			
			(0.04)			
LDP				0.21***		
				(0.04)		
TASK ROUTINENESS					-0.00	
					(0.02)	
TASK OFFSHORABILITY					0.03	
					(0.04)	
REDISTRIBUTION						0.05
						(0.03)
COSMOPLITANISM INDEX						-0.34**
						(0.12)
SOCIOTROPIC TRADE						-0.09**
						(0.03)
JOB INSECURITY						-0.02
						(0.05)
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1184	1184	1183	1095	953	990

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.11: Conditional Effects of Firm Productivity (Ordinal Employer Type)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PROTECTION				
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ALT	-0.13**	-0.14*	-0.12*	-0.20**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.37***	-0.23*	-0.26**	-0.28**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
FEMALE	0.25***	0.29***	0.33***	0.32***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
AGE	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UNION	0.17	0.14	0.14	0.17
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.17)
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY	0.34***			
	(0.06)			
TASK ROUTINENESS			-0.01	-0.00
			(0.02)	(0.02)
TASK OFFSHORABILITY			0.07*	-0.01
			(0.04)	(0.06)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ALT × DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY	-0.26***			
	(0.06)			
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ALT × COLLEGE GRADUATE		-0.28***		
		(0.10)		
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ALT × TASK OFFSHORABILITY			-0.12***	
			(0.03)	
TASK ROUTINENESS × TASK OFFSHORABILITY				0.01
				(0.01)
TASK ROUTINENESS × TASK OFFSHORABILITY				
Employer Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full
Industry Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1184	1184	953	953

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.12: JGSS 2008 - Hypothesis 3

	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROTECTION			
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER (ORD)	-0.48***	-0.22**	-0.18**
	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.06)
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.36**	-0.35**	-0.37**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
FEMALE	0.28***	0.32***	0.29***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
AGE	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
UNION	0.16	0.14	0.14
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)
JOB INSECURITY	-0.05		
	(0.05)		
TEMPORARY WORKER		-0.09	
		(0.09)	
MANAGEMENT			0.16*
			(0.08)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER (ORD) ×	0.14*		
JOB INSECURITY	(0.08)		
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER (ORD) ×		0.01	
TEMPORARY WORKER		(0.14)	
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER (ORD) ×			-0.24*
MANAGEMENT			(0.11)
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1106	1184	1134

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

6   Controls for Local Economic Interests

Table A.13 presents results from a series of robustness checks designed to address concerns that individuals employed by globalized firms may be distinctive in some way that is both unaccounted for by our theory and systematically related to their trade opinions. First, Model 1 attempts to disentangle the effects of firm involvement in global economic activities (importing, exporting, and outbound FDI) from sheer size. Because more productive firms are simultaneously more likely to be globalized and larger, it is possible that employees of large firms just hold distinctive view on trade that have little or nothing to do with the economic activities of their employers. However, as the results of Model 1 make clear, controlling for the size of firm does not change the effect of GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER. This suggests that the association of GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER with decreased support for limits on imports is distinct from that of firm size.

Models 2-4 address concerns that due to the geographic clustering of globalized firms (Figure A.10b, Figure A.11b), the apparent effect of employer characteristics on individual trade opinion might be, at least in part, attributable to concerns about local economic interests, whether wholly self-interested (*e.g.,* Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Fordham and Kleinberg 2012) or sociotropic (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Thus, drawing on prefectural-level data from Japan, we include controls for PREFECTURAL TFP, PREFECTURAL LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, and TFP coded at both the prefectural and industry level (INDUSTRY-LEVEL PREFECTURAL TFP). In each of these specifications, GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER remains strongly and highly significantly predictive of opposition to limits on imports.

Figure A.10: Distribution of JGSS 2008 respondents employed by globalized firms, shown with prefectural productivity data.

(a) Geographic Distribution of Employees of Globalized Firms

Total Number of Globalized Employers

	0
	10
	20
	30
	40
	50

(b) Total Factor Productivity by Prefecture

Total Factor Productivity

	-0.1
	0.0
	0.1
	0.2
	0.3

30

Figure A.11: Distribution of JGSS 2008 respondents employed by globalized firms, shown with prefectural productivity data.

(a) Geographic Distribution of Employees of Globalized Firms

Total Number of Globalized Employers

	0
	10
	20
	30
	40
	50

(b) Labor Productivity by Prefecture

Labor Productivity

	-0.1
	0.0
	0.1
	0.2
	0.3

31

Table A.13: Local Productivity and Support for Protection

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PROTECTION				
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.17**	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.21*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.36**	-0.33**	-0.33**	-0.38***
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
LARGE FIRM	-0.15			
	(0.13)			
FEMALE	0.29**	0.29***	0.29***	0.31***
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
AGE	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
UNION	0.23**	0.14	0.14	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.15)
PREFECTURAL TFP		-0.55		
		(0.48)		
PREFECTURAL			-0.49	
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY			(0.33)	
INDUSTRY-LEVEL				-0.21
PREFECTURAL TFP				(0.25)
Industry-Level Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	1091	1265	1265	544

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

7 Alternative Task Measures

In chapter 7, we present results with alternative measures of task-level attributes. Specifically, we employ a measure of task offshorability first introduced in Blinder (2007), which we term BLINDER OFFSHORABILITY as a substitute for TASK OFF-SHORABILITY, a measure derived from Autor and Dorn (2013). This variable is scaled from 0 to 100, with higher values reflecting greater task offshorability. We favor TASK OFFSHORABILITY over BLINDER OFFSHORABILITY as the number of respondents whose JGSS-reported occupation codes (ISCO-88) can be matched to Autor and Dorn's task offshorability measures and for whom we have observations on the outcome variable PROTECTION and key explanatory variable GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER (as well as additional demographic covariates) is much larger the number we can match to Blinder's.

Thus, Table A.14 reproduces analyses shown in Table 3 of the main text. Encouragingly, our results are substantively very similar. The one obvious difference in these results is in Model 3, where in contrast to the results shown in the main text using the TASK OFFSHORABILITY variable, the product term GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER × BLINDER OFFSHORABILITY is no longer a statistically significant predictor of PROTECTION. However, this is due to a great increase in the standard errors around the coefficient values, which is likely the result of the greatly decreased number of observations in these specifications. While there are 1003 observations in Table 3 of the main text, there are only 383 observations in Table A.14.

Likewise, Table A.15 reproduces Table 3 of the main text with the substitution of an earlier measure of task routineness, as described in Acemoglu and Autor (2011),

which we label TASK ROUTINENESS 2011. Our results are robust to this substitution and are, in fact, substantively identical. This increases our confidence in the robustness of the findings reported in the main text of the article.

Finally, Table A.16 similarly replicates Table 3 of the main text using yet another measure of task routineness, "routine task intensity", introduced in Autor and Dorn (2013) and employed *e.g.*, in Owen and Johnston (2017). Again, our results are substantively identical to those presented in the main text, increasing our confidence in their robustness.[1]

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[1]We do not replicate Models 5 and 6 of Table 3 of the main text in Table A.14 due to insufficient sample size.

7.1 Blinder (2007) Task Offshorability

Table A.14: Conditional Effects of Firm Productivity (Blinder Measures)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PROTECTION				
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.13	-0.11	-0.15	-0.36**
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.32)	(0.15)
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.38***	-0.20**	-0.35*	-0.39*
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.20)
FEMALE	0.27**	0.32***	0.40	0.39
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.23)	(0.24)
AGE	0.02	0.03	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UNION	0.20*	0.17	0.26	0.27
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.20)
DISADVANTAGED SECTOR	0.28***			
	(0.04)			
TASK ROUTINENESS			-0.04	-0.18
			(0.05)	(0.15)
BLINDER OFFSHORABILITY			0.00	-0.01
			(0.00)	(0.01)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×	-0.31***			
DISADVANTAGED SECTOR	(0.09)			
GOOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×		-0.46***		
COLLEGE GRADUATE		(0.12)		
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×			-0.00	
BLINDER OFFSHORABILITY			(0.00)	
TASK ROUTINENESS ×				0.00
BLINDER OFFSHORABILITY				(0.00)
Industry Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1326	1326	383	383

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

7.2 Acemoglu and Autor (2011) Task Routineness

Table A.15: Conditional Effects of Firm Productivity (A & A (2011) Measures)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PROTECTION						
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.13*	-0.09	-0.11	-0.19**		
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)		
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.34***	-0.21*	-0.28***	-0.30***	-0.22**	-0.37
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.21)
FEMALE	0.25**	0.28***	0.34***	0.33***	0.32***	0.40*
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.20)
AGE	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
UNION	0.18*	0.16	0.18	0.19	0.11	0.35
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.22)
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY	0.24***					
	(0.06)					
A & A TASK ROUTINENESS			-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.18***	-0.09
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.23)
TASK OFFSHORABILITY			0.09**	0.05	0.10**	-0.13
			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×	-0.22***					
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY	(0.07)					
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×		-0.36***				
COLLEGE GRADUATE		(0.08)				
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×			-0.16***			
TASK OFFSHORABILITY			(0.04)			
A & A TASK ROUTINENESS ×				0.02	-0.00	0.15
TASK OFFSHORABILITY				(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.18)
Employer Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Domestic	Globalized
Industry Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1308	1308	1046	1046	788	258

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

7.3 RTI : Autor and Dorn (2013)

Table A.16: Conditional Effects of Firm Productivity (Routine Task Intensity)

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PROTECTION						
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.13*	-0.09	-0.12*	-0.20***		
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)		
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.34***	-0.21*	-0.23**	-0.25**	-0.16	-0.43**
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.16)
FEMALE	0.25**	0.28***	0.34***	0.33***	0.32***	0.48**
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.21)
AGE	0.02	0.03	0.05*	0.05*	0.01	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
UNION	0.18*	0.16	0.17	0.19	0.10	0.38
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.22)
DISADVANTAGED SECTOR	0.24***					
	(0.06)					
RTI			-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.08
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.07)
TASK OFFSHORABILITY			0.06*	0.04	0.06	0.17
			(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.12)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×	-0.22***					
DISADVANTAGED SECTOR	(0.07)					
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×		-0.36***				
COLLEGE GRADUATE		(0.08)				
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×			-0.15***			
TASK OFFSHORABILITY			(0.04)			
RTI×				-0.01	-0.00	-0.17***
TASK OFFSHORABILITY				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)
Employer Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Domestic	Globalized
Industry Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1308	1308	1046	1046	788	258

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

8 Manufacturing vs. Services Employment

In this section, we address concerns that apparent effects or GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER on trade opinion are due to the inclusion of workers in services industries. While nearly all of the empirical results presented in both the main text and appendices include industry-level fixed effects–which we believe adequately addresses this concern empirically, Figure A.12 shows predicted values of support for trade protection using our base model (*e.g.*, Model 1 of Table 2 in the main text), stratified by GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER as well as a dummy variable indicating whether respondents worked in services or manufacturing industries. This makes clear that first, workers employed by globalized firms in both manufacturing and services industries are less supportive of trade protection than those employed by domestic firms in those industries. Second, this gap is particularly distinctive for manufacturing workers. Rather than biasing our results in favor of a negative effect of employer productivity on support for protection, inclusion of services workers has the opposite effect.

Figure A.12: H1 - OLS Substantive Effects Comparison: Manufacturing vs. Services

9 Multiple Imputation

Following Lall (2016), we include model specifications based on multiply-imputed data (using the `MI` software package in Stata) in chapter 9. However, model specifications based on multiply-imputed data using both the Hmisc and Amelia II packages in R produced very similar results to those shown in Table A.17, Table A.18, and Table A.19. Because we do not impute the dependent variable PROTECTION, the number of observations for our imputed data is 1353. From our full sample of 1,361 respondents who were asked both for their trade opinion and about the employer traits we used to code GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER, only 8 individuals did not answer the trade opinion question. As shown in Table A.17, Table A.18, and Table A.19, results from specifications using multiply-imputed data are substantively near-identical to those presented in the main text. [2]

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[2]We do not replicate Models 5 and 6 of Table 3 of the main text in Table A.18 since with imputation sub-setting on GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER becomes impossible.

9.1 Multiple Imputation Table 1

Table A.17: Firm Characteristics and Support for Protection (OLS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PROTECTION						
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.16***	-0.17***	-0.16***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.32**	-0.37***	-0.32**	-0.32**	-0.33**	-0.27**
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)
FEMALE	0.31***	0.26**	0.31***	0.32***	0.30***	0.30***
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
AGE	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
UNION	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.15
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
DISADVANTAGED INDUSTRY		0.14*				
		(0.07)				
LOCALISM			0.00			
			(0.04)			
LDP				0.17**		
				(0.06)		
TASK ROUTINENESS					0.00	
					(0.02)	
TASK OFFSHORABILITY					0.02	
					(0.04)	
SOCIOTROPIC TRADE						-0.09**
						(0.03)
REDISTRIBUTION						0.09***
						(0.03)
COSMPOLITAN INDEX						-0.19
						(0.11)
JOB INSECURITY						0.01
						(0.03)
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1353	1353	1353	1353	1353	1353

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

9.2 Multiple Imputation Table 2

Table A.18: Conditional Effects of Firm Productivity (OLS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PROTECTION				
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.10	-0.07	-0.11*	-0.17***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.36***	-0.20*	-0.32**	-0.33**
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)
FEMALE	0.27***	0.31***	0.31***	0.30***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
AGE	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
UNION	0.16	0.13	0.14	0.14
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
DISADVANTAGED SECTOR	0.24***			
	(0.06)			
TASK ROUTINENESS			0.00	0.00
			(0.02)	(0.02)
TASK OFFSHORABILITY			0.05	-0.02
			(0.04)	(0.06)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×	-0.26***			
DISADVANTAGED SECTOR	(0.06)			
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×		-0.40***		
COLLEGE GRADUATE		(0.10)		
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×			-0.12**	
TASK OFFSHORABILITY			(0.04)	
TASK ROUTINENESS ×				0.01
TASK OFFSHORABILITY				(0.01)
Industry Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1353	1353	1353	1353

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

9.3 Multiple Imputation Table 3

Table A.19: Employee Status and Firm Productivity (OLS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
PROTECTION			
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER	-0.56***	-0.19**	-0.11*
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.06)
COLLEGE GRADUATE	-0.32**	-0.33**	-0.32**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
FEMALE	0.31***	0.33***	0.31***
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
AGE	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
UNION	0.15	0.13	0.14
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
JOB INSECURITY	-0.04		
	(0.03)		
TEMPORARY WORKER		-0.09	
		(0.09)	
MANAGEMENT			0.13
			(0.08)
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×	0.22***		
JOB INSECURITY	(0.07)		
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×		0.09	
TEMPORARY WORKER		(0.20)	
GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER ×			-0.34**
MANAGEMENT			(0.16)
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1353	1353	1353

Industry-clustered SEs in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

10   Interaction Term Diagnostics

Recent research has begun to highlight challenges to interpreting results from statistical models utilizing multiplicative interaction terms. In particular, this research has highlighted potentially problematic assumptions of linearity in conditional marginal effects and extrapolation beyond common support. Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019) have developed diagnostic tools to aid applied researchers in interpreting effects from multiplicative interaction terms.

Because nearly all the interaction terms we include in our analysis are between categorical variables (in fact, between binary variables), we do not make assumptions of linearity in marginal effects. Similarly, as seen in the summary statistics provided in chapter 1, the distribution of the treatment variable (GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER) along with the categorical moderating variables with which it is interacted (*e.g.*, DISADVANTAGED SECTOR, COLLEGE GRADUATE, JOB INSECURITY) is more than sufficient to reassure us that substantive interpretation of marginal effects does not extrapolate beyond common support for such categorical $\times$ categorical interactions.

The exceptions to this general rule are the model specifications including task characteristic interactions (*i.e.,* models with JOB OFFSHORABILITY interactions). This is because unlike the other variables of theoretical interest, this moderating variable is continuously measured. Thus, in the following section, we present results from Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu's diagnostic tests for the GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER $\times$ TASK OFFSHORABILITY interaction.

Readers should note that these diagnostics are currently only available for OLS estimators. As a result, rather than treating our outcome variable, PROTECTION

as an ordered categorical variable, we treat it as a numeric (interval) variable and employ an OLS estimator. This makes interpretation of the first set of diagnostic plots, presented in section 10.1 less intuitive. This can be seen in Figure A.13, which simply plots the bivariate relationship between the outcome variable, PROTECTION and TASK OFFSHORABILITY, stratified by GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER. Rather than showing a "cloud" of values across the entire range of PROTECTION, as in a true interval variable, it should be apparent that because PROTECTION is actually an ordered categorical variable, observations only take integer values.

More importantly, we emphasize that the significance and size of the moderating effect of TASK OFFSHORABILITY are not of primary theoretical interest to us. As detailed in the main text, our primary theoretical interest in including interactions of these variables with GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER is to ensure that the overall effect of firm characteristics on trade opinion is not an artifact of treatment effect heterogeneity *e.g.*, due to the clustering of employees performing commonly-offshored tasks within certain kinds of firms. Thus, in the main text, our primary interest is in the direction, magnitude, and significance of the "main effect" of GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER in these specifications, rather than in that of the product terms. Nonetheless, a negative coefficient for the product terms provides some suggestive evidence that the effect of firm productivity on opposition to PROTECTION increases with increasing employee vulnerability to international labor competition.

In Figure A.13, the blue lines represent the linear extrapolation of the marginal effect, while the curves plotted in red are LOESS curves. In these cases, because the fit between the linear regression line and the LOESS curves are quite close over

almost the entire range of variation for the moderating variable (TASK OFFSHORA-BILITY), this suggests that the conditional expectation function is well-approximated by the linear extrapolation. The area of common support is depicted by the twinned boxplots (bottom of the top panel and top of the bottom panel) in Figure A.13. Mean values of the moderating variable is shown by the hollow circles, while the 25th to 75th percentile ranges are indicated by the thickened bars. This plot suggests that for employees of domestically-oriented firms, support for PROTECTION may increase very slightly with increasing TASK ROUTINENESS and TASK OFFSHORABILITY, while support for PROTECTION decreases slightly for employees of globalized firms. More-over, they indicate that assumptions of linearity in conditional marginal effects are unlikely to be violated and that estimates of interaction effects draw upon substantial common support.

Next, in section 10.2, we present plots from a "binning estimator" in which the moderating variable TASK OFFSHORABILITY in Figure A.14) is discretized into three "bins" corresponding to "high", "medium", and "low" values at which the conditional marginal effect of GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER can be evaluated. Next, an evaluation point (the median of the moderating variable within the bin) is selected for each bin. Finally, models are estimated separately for each bin, allowing conditional marginal effects to vary freely across the three bins, potentially highlighting any non-linear or non-monotonic patterns in treatment effects.[3]

Figure A.14 plots the marginal conditional effect of GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER, cal-culated at the median values of each binned value of TASK OFFSHORABILITY. These

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[3]For details on this procedure, see Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (2019).

are shown with the marginal conditional effect implied by linear extrapolation from the product term. At the bottom of Figure A.14 is plotted a histogram showing the distributions of the moderating variable (the white bars show their distributions for employees of domestically-oriented firms and the red bars for employees of globalized firms). What the results from the binned estimator suggest is that while (consistent with results from linear extrapolations from the product terms) the marginal conditional effects of GLOBALIZED EMPLOYER may not be statistically significant across the entire range of values of TASK OFFSHORABILITY, they are nonetheless consistently negative (with respect to support for PROTECTION) and are significant at higher values of the moderating variables. It is noteworthy that working for a globalized firm is always associated with decreased demand for protectionism, regardless of workers' levels of exposure to offshoring, though the effect is particularly pronounced at higher levels of task offshorability.

Next, in section 10.3, we present plots based on a kernel-smoothing estimation of the marginal effect of the interaction of TASK OFFSHORABILITY with EMPLOYER TYPE. This semi-parametric estimator allows for the flexible estimation of the functional form of the interaction term's effects on individual trade preferences across the range of values of TASK OFFSHORABILITY by estimating a series of local effects with a kernel reweighting scheme (see Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu for additional details).

In Figure A.15, it is clear that the marginal effects of the interaction terms are negative and monotonically decreasing over regions of values of greater common support. In fact, the effects are roughly linear over substantial regions of values. This

47

gives us greater confidence in the validity of our results for estimations employing this interaction term.

10.1   Raw Data Scatterplots

Figure A.13: Task Offshorability × Employer Type Raw Scatterplot

10.2 Binning Estimation Plots

Figure A.14: Task Offshorability × Employer Type Binning Estimation Plot

10.3 Kernel Estimation Plots

Figure A.15: Task Offshorability × Employer Type Kernel Estimation Plot

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