


How Authoritarian Governments Decide Who Emigrates: Evidence from East Germany

Supplemental Information

Julian Michel, Michael K. Miller, and Margaret E. Peters

1 Additional Descriptive Statistics

Figure A1: Emigration Freedom in the World, 1981–2010



Notes: This figure shows the level of emigration freedom around the world in every 10 years from 1981 to 2010 (using the Cingranelli and Richards (2014) measure of the “freedom of foreign movement”).

2 Sampling

Table A1: Sampling of Emigration Applications

Year	Open/ Withdrawn	Reject/ Accepted	Accepted Accepted	Total files to be decided	% of all decisions 1980-Oct 1989	Total number sampled	Sample open/reject/ withdrawn	Sample accepted
1980	1,663 70.05%	707 29.78%	707	2,370	6%	34	24	10
1981	1,738 68.53%	798 31.47%	798	2,536	6%	36	25	11
1982	1,819 70.72%	750 29.16%	750	2,569	6%	37	26	11
1983	2,060 76.41%	636 23.59%	636	2,696	6%	38	29	9
1984	3,165 62.45%	1,903 37.55%	1,903	5,068	12%	72	45	27
1985	3,195 71.17%	1,295 28.84%	1,295	4,490	11%	63	45	18
1986	3,893 68.18%	1,814 31.77%	1,814	5,707	13%	81	55	26
1987	4,688 75.10%	1,554 24.90%	1,554	6,242	15%	88	66	22
1988	4,833 62.60%	2,888 37.40%	2,888	7,721	18%	109	68	41
1989	783 26.20%	2,205 73.80%	2,205	2,988	7%	42	11	31
Total	27,837	14,550	14,550	42,387	100%	600	394	206

3 Regression Tables

In this section, we include additional analyses referenced, but not shown, in the main paper:

- **Table A2** shows the main results predicting emigration approval with the bureaucracy’s judged reasons for the application instead of the applicant’s stated reasons. None of these reasons are predictive of approval.
- **Table A3** shows the applicant-year panel results with the alternative opposition measures in place of the binary measure shown in the paper. All results hold.
- **Table A4** shows the application panel results with the alternative opposition measures in place of the binary measure shown in the paper. All results hold.
- **Table A5** shows robustness checks of the main results. The main tests are run with the separate additions of four controls: married status, number of children, debt status, and previous illegal attempts at emigration. Because none of these controls are significant, the results shown (each coefficient representing a separate test) are for *Opposition (Binary)*. The results are largely unchanged except that some of the coefficients from the first-application sample are only significant at the 0.1 level due to missing data. Including married status, for instance, drops about 31% of the first-application sample.
- **Tables A6–A9** show the full regressions for the robustness checks summarized in Table 5 in the main text and Table A5. The tables respectively show the results for the first-application sample predicting emigration approval, the applicant-year panel predicting emigration approval, the application panel predicting emigration approval, and the first-application sample predicting punishment.
- **Table A10** shows the full regressions for the results summarized in Figure 9 in the main text. The models predict emigration approval in the application panel, alternately restricting the sample to specific application numbers.

- **Tables A11–A12** replicate Table 3 from the main text, predicting emigration approval for an applicant-year panel and an application panel. Table A11 shows the results when clustering standard errors by applicant. Table A12 weights each observation by the inverse of each applicant’s number of observations in the panel, thereby giving each applicant equal total weight. The opposition results hold in every model, including the rising effect of opposition by application number.

Table A2: Models Predicting GDR Emigration Approval (with Bureaucratic Judgments of Reasons for Application)

DV = <i>Emigration Approval</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Opposition (Binary)</i>	0.746** (2.63)		
<i>Opposition (Level)</i>		0.566** (2.72)	
<i>Opposition (Number)</i>			0.534** (2.79)
<i>Year of Application</i>	0.036 (1.14)	0.037 (1.15)	0.033 (1.02)
<i>Female</i>	0.496* (2.21)	0.519* (2.31)	0.486* (2.18)
<i>Age</i>	0.007 (0.57)	0.010 (0.78)	0.008 (0.66)
<i>Elderly</i>	1.597* (2.42)	1.504* (2.30)	1.549* (2.37)
<i>Occupational Class</i>	-0.434** (-3.04)	-0.437** (-3.05)	-0.423** (-2.96)
<i>Application Pages</i>	-0.008* (-2.26)	-0.008* (-2.30)	-0.008* (-2.34)
<i>Bureaucracy Reason: Economic</i>	-0.085 (-0.30)	-0.058 (-0.20)	-0.053 (-0.19)
<i>Bureaucracy Reason: Family</i>	0.457 (1.56)	0.477 (1.62)	0.512 (1.73)
<i>Bureaucracy Reason: Ideology</i>	0.049 (0.17)	0.047 (0.16)	0.048 (0.17)
<i>Bureaucracy Reason: Freedom</i>	0.371 (1.20)	0.391 (1.26)	0.408 (1.30)
N	512	512	512
Pseudo R^2	0.124	0.124	0.124

Notes: The table displays logit models predicting the East German government's approval of emigration applications. The sample is respondents' first recorded applications. t -values (based on robust standard errors) are shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3: Applicant-Year Panel Models Predicting GDR Emigration Approval

DV = <i>Emigration Approval</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Opposition (Threat)</i>	0.530*** (5.34)	0.527*** (5.18)	0.484*** (3.53)			
<i>Opposition (Number)</i>				0.485*** (3.84)	0.604** (3.22)	0.643** (2.67)
<i>Opposition × Year</i>		0.055 (1.67)	0.054 (1.61)		0.038 (1.25)	0.038 (1.25)
<i>Opposition × Years Since First Application</i>			0.024 (0.45)			-0.020 (-0.54)
<i>Year</i>	0.126*** (7.14)	0.112*** (5.95)	0.113*** (5.96)	0.125*** (7.12)	0.115*** (6.17)	0.115*** (6.17)
<i>Years Since First Application</i>	0.063* (2.57)	0.062* (2.56)	0.056* (2.09)	0.057* (2.34)	0.058* (2.36)	0.064* (2.40)
<i>Female</i>	0.319** (2.68)	0.306* (2.56)	0.304* (2.55)	0.299* (2.53)	0.289* (2.43)	0.289* (2.44)
<i>Age</i>	0.016** (2.65)	0.015* (2.56)	0.016** (2.58)	0.015* (2.57)	0.015* (2.48)	0.015* (2.44)
<i>Elderly</i>	1.155** (2.85)	1.143** (2.84)	1.133** (2.81)	1.149** (2.85)	1.146** (2.85)	1.160** (2.88)
<i>Occupational Class</i>	-0.251*** (-3.40)	-0.258*** (-3.48)	-0.258*** (-3.48)	-0.247*** (-3.36)	-0.250*** (-3.40)	-0.248*** (-3.37)
<i>Application Pages</i>	-0.005** (-3.15)	-0.006** (-3.19)	-0.006** (-3.16)	-0.005** (-2.84)	-0.005** (-2.85)	-0.005** (-2.87)
N	1,576	1,576	1,576	1,576	1,576	1,576
Pseudo R^2	0.073	0.075	0.075	0.068	0.068	0.069

Notes: The table displays panel logit models predicting the East German government's approval of emigration applications. The panel sample includes all applicant-years with an open application. t -values (based on robust standard errors) are shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4: Application Panel Models Predicting GDR Emigration Approval

DV = <i>Emigration Approval</i>	All Apps (1)	2nd+ App. (2)	3rd+ App. (3)	All Apps (4)	2nd+ App. (5)	3rd+ App. (6)
<i>Opposition (Threat)</i>	0.573*** (4.27)	0.726*** (3.63)	0.805** (3.10)			
<i>Opposition (Number)</i>				0.485*** (3.84)	0.604** (3.22)	0.643** (2.67)
<i>Year</i>	0.163*** (6.50)	0.176*** (4.91)	0.182*** (3.57)	0.162*** (6.51)	0.175*** (4.90)	0.183*** (3.60)
<i>Application Number</i>	0.269*** (5.13)	0.103 (1.50)	0.023 (0.23)	0.262*** (4.97)	0.095 (1.38)	0.013 (0.13)
<i>Female</i>	0.485** (3.09)	0.382 (1.64)	0.366 (1.00)	0.479** (3.06)	0.394 (1.70)	0.375 (1.03)
<i>Age</i>	0.017* (1.97)	0.018 (1.48)	0.043* (2.22)	0.016 (1.91)	0.018 (1.52)	0.044* (2.27)
<i>Elderly</i>	1.347** (2.62)	0.104 (0.12)	-1.659 (-1.26)	1.362** (2.64)	0.052 (0.06)	-1.731 (-1.31)
<i>Occupational Class</i>	-0.262** (-2.70)	-0.159 (-1.11)	-0.316 (-1.43)	-0.253** (-2.62)	-0.150 (-1.05)	-0.312 (-1.42)
<i>Application Pages</i>	-0.005* (-2.27)	-0.006* (-1.99)	-0.003 (-0.91)	-0.004* (-2.04)	-0.004 (-1.71)	-0.002 (-0.64)
N	977	467	228	977	467	228
Pseudo R^2	0.101	0.072	0.099	0.098	0.067	0.091

Notes: The table displays panel logit models predicting the East German government's approval of emigration applications. The panel sample includes all applications as separate observations. t -values (based on robust standard errors) are shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A5: Robustness Checks for Emigration Approval and Punishment

DV =	<i>Emigration Approval</i>			<i>Surveil/ Imprison</i>
	1st Apps (1)	Year Panel (2)	App Panel (3)	1st Apps (4)
Add Married Status	0.536 [#] (1.72)	0.601 ^{***} (4.07)	0.645 ^{**} (3.06)	0.603 [#] (1.83)
Add Number of Children	0.721 ^{**} (2.66)	0.731 ^{***} (5.51)	0.771 ^{***} (4.16)	0.704 [*] (2.44)
Add Debt Status	0.539 [#] (1.70)	0.693 ^{***} (4.48)	0.755 ^{***} (3.47)	0.818 [*] (2.44)
Add Illegal Attempts	0.614 [#] (1.89)	0.845 ^{***} (5.34)	0.697 ^{**} (3.16)	0.565 [#] (1.71)

Notes: The table displays robustness checks for the estimated effect of *Opposition (Binary)* on emigration approval and punishment. The variations are listed at left. Results are shown for a sample of first applications for both outcomes. For the approval outcome, we also use panels constructed from all applicant-years and all applications. *t*-values (based on robust standard errors) are shown in parentheses. [#] $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

Table A6: Models Predicting GDR Emigration Approval (1st Applications)

DV = Emigration Approval	1989 Removed (1)	1984 Removed (2)	Year FE (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
<i>Opposition (Binary)</i>	0.655* (2.39)	0.591* (2.00)	0.627* (2.30)	0.727** (2.69)	0.876** (2.76)	0.653* (2.41)	0.660* (2.45)	0.536# (1.72)	0.721** (2.66)	0.539# (1.70)	0.614# (1.89)
<i>Year of Application</i>	0.069# (1.93)	0.076* (2.34)	0.227 (0.77)	0.034 (1.08)	0.085# (1.92)	0.044 (1.36)	0.035 (1.11)	0.032 (0.77)	0.034 (1.07)	0.083# (1.81)	0.059 (1.27)
<i>Female</i>	0.684** (3.00)	0.595* (2.52)	0.561* (2.50)	0.652** (2.95)	0.540* (2.03)	0.597** (2.68)	0.596** (2.69)	0.596* (2.29)	0.660** (2.98)	0.408 (1.56)	0.731** (2.68)
<i>Age</i>	0.010 (0.80)	0.008 (0.62)	0.007 (0.57)	0.009 (0.76)	0.001 (0.07)	0.008 (0.66)	0.010 (0.85)	0.001 (0.07)	0.009 (0.73)	0.012 (0.92)	0.009 (0.63)
<i>Elderly</i>	1.630* (2.41)	1.753* (2.51)	1.648* (2.49)	1.698** (2.58)	1.851* (2.35)	1.759* (2.54)	1.568* (2.40)	1.834* (2.38)	1.665* (2.49)	1.200 (1.57)	1.685* (2.10)
<i>Occupational Class</i>	-0.507*** (-3.50)	-0.367* (-2.42)	-0.388** (-2.76)	-0.393** (-2.80)	-0.316# (-1.77)	-0.410** (-2.85)	-0.392** (-2.66)	-0.364* (-2.09)	-0.388** (-2.77)	-0.444* (-2.46)	-0.283 (-1.49)
<i>Application Pages</i>	-0.008* (-2.24)	-0.004 (-0.96)	-0.009* (-2.20)	-0.006# (-1.89)	-0.011* (-2.33)	-0.007* (-2.12)	-0.006# (-1.93)	-0.009* (-2.20)	-0.006# (-1.94)	-0.017** (-3.07)	-0.012* (-2.36)
<i>Family Application</i>				-0.134 (-0.58)							
<i>East Germany Family</i>					-0.468 (-1.16)						
<i>West Germany Family</i>					0.042 (0.14)						
<i>Education</i>					0.019 (0.22)						
<i>Industry: Primary</i>							-0.737# (-1.75)				
<i>Industry: Government</i>							-0.189 (-0.25)				
<i>Industry: Social Services</i>							0.034 (0.10)				
<i>Married</i>								0.203 (0.72)			
<i>Number of Children</i>									-0.094 (-0.59)		
<i>Debt</i>										-0.461 (-1.07)	
<i>Illegal Emigration Attempt</i>											0.257 (0.39)
N	476	441	512	505	341	495	512	352	504	330	314
Pseudo R ²	0.139	0.119	0.142	0.121	0.114	0.101	0.123	0.093	0.121	0.128	0.101

Notes: The table displays logit models predicting the East German government's approval of emigration applications. The sample is respondents' first recorded applications. *t*-values (based on robust standard errors) are shown in parentheses. # $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7: Models Predicting GDR Emigration Approval (Applicant-Year Panel)

DV = Emigration Approval	1989		1984		Year		(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Removed	FE	Removed	FE	(1)	(2)					
<i>Opposition (Binary)</i>	0.782*** (5.54)	0.750*** (5.29)	0.755*** (5.65)	0.739*** (5.59)	0.930*** (5.87)	0.706*** (5.30)	0.714*** (5.39)	0.601*** (4.07)	0.731*** (5.51)	0.693*** (4.48)	0.845*** (5.34)
<i>Year</i>	0.112*** (5.68)	0.132*** (7.20)	-0.003 (-0.03)	0.123*** (6.88)	0.156*** (6.58)	0.129*** (7.17)	0.124*** (7.02)	0.114*** (5.22)	0.121*** (6.80)	0.136*** (5.82)	0.109*** (4.56)
<i>Years Since First Application</i>	0.019 (0.72)	0.034 (1.30)	0.056* (2.27)	0.062* (2.53)	0.016 (0.59)	0.060* (2.44)	0.063* (2.55)	0.071* (2.39)	0.059* (2.42)	0.038 (1.39)	0.061* (1.98)
<i>Female</i>	0.362** (2.83)	0.239# (1.86)	0.297* (2.46)	0.344** (2.88)	0.277# (1.90)	0.300* (2.49)	0.283* (2.33)	0.337* (2.40)	0.338** (2.81)	0.306* (2.10)	0.525*** (3.48)
<i>Age</i>	0.016* (2.45)	0.017** (2.74)	0.015* (2.45)	0.017** (2.71)	0.016* (2.28)	0.014* (2.31)	0.015* (2.45)	0.015* (2.27)	0.015* (2.39)	0.018** (2.67)	0.009 (1.26)
<i>Elderly</i>	1.086** (2.61)	1.223** (2.75)	1.173** (2.84)	1.207** (2.94)	0.786# (1.65)	1.208** (2.73)	1.202** (2.95)	1.044* (2.22)	1.191** (2.87)	0.723# (1.58)	1.009* (2.05)
<i>Occupational Class</i>	-0.319*** (-4.01)	-0.255** (-3.22)	-0.259*** (-3.47)	-0.216** (-2.88)	-0.247** (-2.65)	-0.241** (-3.08)	-0.277*** (-3.53)	-0.186* (-2.13)	-0.227** (-3.02)	-0.228* (-2.46)	-0.180 (-1.91)
<i>Application Pages</i>	-0.009*** (-4.18)	-0.004* (-2.30)	-0.005** (-2.91)	-0.004** (-2.79)	-0.008** (-3.03)	-0.005** (-3.03)	-0.005** (-3.13)	-0.006** (-2.81)	-0.005** (-2.91)	-0.013*** (-3.65)	-0.008** (-3.00)
<i>Family Application</i>				-0.260* (-2.18)							
<i>East Germany Family</i>					-0.591** (-2.75)						
<i>West Germany Family</i>					0.084 (0.57)						
<i>Education</i>						0.015 (0.34)					
<i>Industry: Primary</i>						0.085 (0.46)					
<i>Industry: Government</i>						0.459 (1.20)					
<i>Industry: Social Services</i>						0.090 (0.45)					
<i>Married</i>							-0.004 (-0.03)				
<i>Number of Children</i>								-0.098 (-1.20)			
<i>Debt</i>										-0.547** (-2.62)	
<i>Illegal Emigration Attempt</i>											-0.291 (-0.89)
N	1.409	1.396	1.576	1.562	1.115	1.546	1.576	1.167	1.557	1.110	1.041
Pseudo R ²	0.083	0.082	0.090	0.077	0.088	0.069	0.075	0.060	0.075	0.089	0.070

Notes: The table displays logit models predicting the East German government's approval of emigration applications. The sample is a panel with each applicant-year with an open application. *t*-values (based on robust standard errors) are shown in parentheses. # $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8: Models Predicting GDR Emigration Approval (Application Panel)

DV = Emigration Approval	1989 Removed (1)	1984 Removed (2)	Year FE (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
<i>Opposition (Binary)</i>	0.822*** (4.12)	0.973*** (4.56)	0.748*** (3.99)	0.787*** (4.28)	0.827*** (3.68)	0.776*** (4.20)	0.781*** (4.26)	0.645** (3.06)	0.771*** (4.16)	0.755*** (3.47)	0.697** (3.16)
<i>Year</i>	0.172*** (6.43)	0.187*** (5.73)	0.094 (1.06)	0.161*** (6.40)	0.218*** (6.24)	0.175*** (6.81)	0.161*** (6.45)	0.192*** (5.95)	0.162*** (6.40)	0.225*** (6.45)	0.217*** (6.33)
<i>Application Number</i>	0.213*** (3.80)	0.292*** (5.15)	0.287*** (5.24)	0.272*** (5.17)	0.337*** (4.09)	0.277*** (5.25)	0.270*** (5.10)	0.284*** (4.05)	0.304*** (5.43)	0.246** (3.14)	0.218*** (3.37)
<i>Female</i>	0.417* (2.44)	0.649*** (3.56)	0.482** (2.99)	0.501** (3.17)	0.480* (2.45)	0.489** (3.06)	0.473** (2.94)	0.535** (2.80)	0.560*** (3.51)	0.430* (2.22)	0.544** (2.73)
<i>Age</i>	0.015# (1.64)	0.014 (1.40)	0.015# (1.72)	0.015# (1.64)	0.014 (1.30)	0.016# (1.88)	0.015# (1.72)	0.017# (1.70)	0.015# (1.66)	0.022* (2.13)	0.016# (1.59)
<i>Elderly</i>	1.795** (2.94)	1.454** (2.60)	1.550** (2.92)	1.448** (2.75)	1.103# (1.83)	1.411* (2.57)	1.433** (2.75)	1.210* (1.99)	1.461** (2.74)	0.958 (1.57)	1.204* (1.97)
<i>Occupational Class</i>	-0.219* (-2.09)	-0.387*** (-3.40)	-0.247* (-2.48)	-0.244* (-2.47)	-0.274* (-2.04)	-0.230* (-2.25)	-0.252* (-2.42)	-0.221 (-1.83)	-0.243* (-2.47)	-0.292* (-2.18)	-0.222# (-1.68)
<i>Application Pages</i>	-0.002 (-1.04)	-0.013*** (-3.66)	-0.005* (-2.20)	-0.005* (-2.12)	-0.005* (-1.98)	-0.005* (-2.18)	-0.005* (-2.18)	-0.005# (-1.96)	-0.005* (-2.16)	-0.009* (-2.48)	-0.006* (-2.04)
<i>Family Application</i>				-0.045 (-0.27)							
<i>East Germany Family</i>					-0.625* (-2.20)						
<i>West Germany Family</i>					0.340# (1.61)						
<i>Education</i>						-0.022 (-0.38)					
<i>Industry: Primary</i>							-0.057 (-0.24)				
<i>Industry: Government</i>							-0.150 (-0.32)				
<i>Industry: Social Services</i>							0.059 (0.25)				
<i>Married</i>								0.079 (0.42)			
<i>Number of Children</i>									0.023 (0.21)		
<i>Debt</i>										-0.298 (-1.01)	
<i>Illegal Emigration Attempt</i>											0.321 (0.68)
N	832	789	977	969	666	956	977	693	960	655	634
Pseudo R ²	0.108	0.140	0.122	0.102	0.124	0.100	0.101	0.100	0.105	0.122	0.105

Notes: The table displays logit models predicting the East German government's approval of emigration applications. The sample is a panel with each applicant-year with an open application. *t*-values (based on robust standard errors) are shown in parentheses. # $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A9: Models Predicting GDR Punishment for Applying to Emigrate (1st Applications)

DV = <i>Surveil/Imprison</i> (Binary)	1989 Removed (1)	1984 Removed (2)	Year FE (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
<i>Opposition (Binary)</i>	0.685* (2.40)	0.568# (1.88)	0.621* (2.16)	0.712* (2.47)	0.758* (2.24)	0.729* (2.53)	0.718* (2.51)	0.603# (1.83)	0.704* (2.44)	0.818* (2.44)	0.565# (1.71)
<i>Year of Application</i>	0.072* (2.22)	0.042 (1.38)	-0.643# (-1.85)	0.037 (1.25)	0.014 (0.32)	0.034 (1.11)	0.035 (1.17)	0.039 (1.01)	0.038 (1.25)	0.029 (0.72)	0.055 (1.37)
<i>Female</i>	-0.268 (-1.25)	-0.057 (-0.26)	-0.260 (-1.22)	-0.187 (-0.89)	-0.085 (-0.32)	-0.226 (-1.06)	-0.276 (-1.31)	-0.208 (-0.81)	-0.173 (-0.82)	-0.266 (-1.00)	-0.186 (-0.70)
<i>Age</i>	-0.012 (-1.04)	-0.008 (-0.65)	-0.008 (-0.67)	-0.010 (-0.82)	-0.004 (-0.26)	-0.010 (-0.86)	-0.009 (-0.80)	-0.008 (-0.57)	-0.011 (-0.96)	-0.007 (-0.50)	-0.003 (-0.25)
<i>Elderly</i>	-2.372*** (-3.38)	-2.497*** (-3.50)	-2.703*** (-3.87)	-2.386*** (-3.45)	-2.328*** (-2.84)	-2.352** (-3.14)	-2.426*** (-3.50)	-2.132*** (-2.66)	-2.324*** (-3.33)	-2.468** (-2.98)	-2.028* (-2.48)
<i>Occupational Class</i>	-0.244# (-1.79)	-0.400** (-2.82)	-0.281* (-2.05)	-0.271* (-2.07)	-0.319# (-1.90)	-0.274* (-1.99)	-0.329* (-2.38)	-0.318# (-1.94)	-0.277* (-2.12)	-0.410* (-2.34)	-0.310# (-1.76)
<i>Application Pages</i>	0.002 (0.45)	0.010# (1.95)	0.004 (0.79)	0.005 (0.86)	0.005 (0.80)	0.005 (0.90)	0.004 (0.79)	0.007 (0.90)	0.005 (0.88)	0.004 (0.68)	0.004 (0.66)
<i>Family Application</i>				-0.025 (-0.12)							
<i>East Germany Family</i>				-0.062 (-0.17)							
<i>West Germany Family</i>				-0.327 (-1.16)							
<i>Education</i>											
<i>Industry: Primary</i>							0.046 (0.14)				
<i>Industry: Government</i>							0.273 (0.39)				
<i>Industry: Social Services</i>							0.339 (1.06)				
<i>Married</i>								-0.173 (-0.63)			
<i>Number of Children</i>									0.061 (0.48)		
<i>Debt</i>										-0.475 (-1.38)	
<i>Illegal Emigration Attempt</i>											0.372 (0.61)
N	456	419	489	484	328	473	489	340	483	316	304
Pseudo R ²	0.097	0.103	0.127	0.089	0.082	0.076	0.092	0.075	0.089	0.093	0.056

Notes: The table displays logit models predicting the East German government's punishment for emigration applications. The sample is respondents' first recorded applications. *t*-values (based on robust standard errors) are shown in parentheses. #*p* < 0.10, **p* < 0.05, ***p* < 0.01, ****p* < 0.001

Table A10: Application Panel Models Predicting GDR Emigration Approval

DV = <i>Emigration Approval</i>	1st App. (1)	2nd+ App. (2)	3rd+ App. (3)	4th+ App. (4)
<i>Opposition (Threat)</i>	0.685* (2.56)	0.981*** (3.66)	1.224*** (3.43)	1.466** (2.73)
<i>Year</i>	0.037 (1.18)	0.172*** (4.78)	0.180*** (3.47)	0.229* (2.31)
<i>Application Number</i>		0.106 (1.54)	0.034 (0.34)	0.078 (0.51)
<i>Female</i>	0.593** (2.71)	0.385# (1.65)	0.387 (1.03)	0.432 (0.69)
<i>Age</i>	0.009 (0.78)	0.017 (1.41)	0.044* (2.25)	0.021 (0.60)
<i>Elderly</i>	1.642* (2.53)	0.143 (0.17)	-1.642 (-1.24)	-0.202 (-0.11)
<i>Occupational Class</i>	-0.414** (-3.00)	-0.143 (-1.00)	-0.319 (-1.42)	-0.186 (-0.41)
<i>Application Pages</i>	-0.007* (-2.09)	-0.005# (-1.90)	-0.003 (-0.90)	0.001 (0.29)
N	512	467	228	98
Pseudo R^2	0.117	0.072	0.106	0.129

Notes: The table displays panel logit models predicting the East German government's approval of emigration applications. The panel sample includes all applications as separate observations. *t*-values (based on robust standard errors) are shown in parentheses. # $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A11: Panel Models Predicting GDR Emigration Approval

DV = <i>Emigration Approval</i>	Year Panel			Application Panel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	All Apps (4)	2nd+ App. (5)	3rd+ App. (6)
<i>Opposition (Binary)</i>	0.718** (3.13)	0.707** (3.01)	0.656* (2.40)	0.778*** (3.89)	0.981*** (3.36)	1.224** (3.12)
<i>Year</i>	0.125*** (4.31)	0.115*** (3.78)	0.115*** (3.78)	0.162*** (6.01)	0.172*** (4.41)	0.180** (3.13)
<i>Years Since First Application</i>	0.060 (1.47)	0.060 (1.46)	0.054 (1.22)			
<i>Application Number</i>				0.270*** (4.23)	0.106 (1.87)	0.034 (0.47)
<i>Female</i>	0.303 (1.69)	0.294 (1.64)	0.293 (1.64)	0.479** (2.91)	0.385 (1.58)	0.387 (1.01)
<i>Age</i>	0.015 (1.53)	0.014 (1.51)	0.015 (1.54)	0.015 (1.79)	0.017 (1.45)	0.044* (2.37)
<i>Elderly</i>	1.204 (1.85)	1.196 (1.84)	1.184 (1.83)	1.421* (2.37)	0.143 (0.17)	-1.642* (-2.51)
<i>Occupational Class</i>	-0.250* (-2.32)	-0.252* (-2.36)	-0.252* (-2.36)	-0.255* (-2.53)	-0.143 (-1.03)	-0.319 (-1.48)
<i>Application Pages</i>	-0.005** (-2.69)	-0.005** (-2.68)	-0.005** (-2.70)	-0.005* (-2.40)	-0.005* (-2.20)	-0.003 (-0.99)
<i>Opposition × Year</i>		0.046 (0.58)	0.044 (0.53)			
<i>Opposition × Years Since First Application</i>			0.027 (0.23)			
N	1,576	1,576	1,576	977	467	228
Pseudo R^2	0.074	0.075	0.075	0.101	0.072	0.106

Notes: The table displays panel logit models predicting the East German government's approval of emigration applications. The models are identical to Table 3 in the main paper but now shows t -values based on robust standard errors clustered by applicant. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A12: Panel Models Predicting GDR Emigration Approval

DV = <i>Emigration Approval</i>	Year Panel			Application Panel		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	All Apps (4)	2nd+ App. (5)	3rd+ App. (6)
<i>Opposition (Binary)</i>	0.637*** (4.27)	0.606*** (4.03)	0.564** (2.72)	0.664** (3.24)	0.791** (2.80)	1.079** (2.95)
<i>Year</i>	0.028 (1.32)	0.010 (0.43)	0.010 (0.44)	0.072** (2.70)	0.111** (2.96)	0.110* (2.06)
<i>Years Since First Application</i>	0.167*** (5.06)	0.163*** (4.96)	0.156*** (4.26)			
<i>Application Number</i>				0.283*** (4.14)	0.053 (0.69)	-0.021 (-0.20)
<i>Female</i>	0.480*** (3.51)	0.457*** (3.34)	0.456*** (3.33)	0.456** (2.65)	0.358 (1.50)	0.337 (0.88)
<i>Age</i>	0.005 (0.77)	0.005 (0.72)	0.005 (0.74)	0.014 (1.48)	0.009 (0.73)	0.042* (2.12)
<i>Elderly</i>	1.877*** (3.83)	1.853*** (3.80)	1.846*** (3.78)	1.547** (2.67)	0.719 (0.80)	-1.877 (-1.37)
<i>Occupational Class</i>	-0.165 (-1.94)	-0.170* (-2.00)	-0.169* (-1.99)	-0.240* (-2.25)	-0.068 (-0.46)	-0.301 (-1.33)
<i>Application Pages</i>	-0.001 (-0.97)	-0.002 (-1.12)	-0.002 (-1.09)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.005 (-1.74)	-0.002 (-0.50)
<i>Opposition × Year</i>		0.099* (1.97)	0.097 (1.89)			
<i>Opposition × Years Since First Application</i>			0.035 (0.41)			
N	1,576	1,576	1,576	977	467	228
Pseudo R^2	0.071	0.073	0.073	0.077	0.039	0.077

Notes: The table displays panel logit models predicting the East German government's approval of emigration applications. The models are identical to Table 3 in the main paper but now weight each observation by the inverse of each applicant's number of observations in the panel. This thereby gives equal weight to each applicant in the estimation. t -values (based on robust standard errors) are shown in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

4 Codebook for Emigration Applications

Precoded

1. Archival depository (“Bestand“)
2. Archival Number (“Nummer“)
3. Title (anonymized)
4. Years for which records exist (“Laufzeit”)

To be coded in the archive

5. Month of first application (MM/YYYY)
6. Month of final application (MM/YYYY)
7. Number of applications

Code the following separately for both the first and the last application

8. Family Application?
 - (a) Yes
 - (b) No (= single person applied)
9. If family, number of minor children (under 18 years old)
10. Reason for application (given by applicant; multiple selections possible)
 - (a) Family reunification (1)
 - (b) Cross-border marriage (2)
 - (c) Ideological opposition to socialism (3)
 - (d) Rejection of limitations to the freedom to travel (4)
 - (e) Economic – limitations to consumption (5)
 - (f) Economic – lacking trajectories of career advancement (6)
 - (g) Limited quality of housing (7)
 - (h) Sexuality (8)
 - (i) Medical (9)
 - (j) previous time limit exceeded (10)
 - (k) Other, not listed (11)
 - (l) Reason for application – Other (specify in general terms)

Code only with respect to the main applicant (still separately for first and last application):

11. Age at the time of application:

- (a) 18-24
- (b) 25-30
- (c) 31-40
- (d) 41-50
- (e) 51-60
- (f) 61-64
- (g) 65+

12. Gender

- (a) Male (1)
- (b) Female (2)

13. Highest level of education:

- (a) None (less than secondary school) (0)
- (b) Secondary school (“Polytechnische Oberschule”) (1)
- (c) Vocational training (“Ausbildung”/“Lehre”/“Facharbeiterabschluss”) (2)
- (d) High school (“Erweiterte Oberschule” und “Berufsausbildung mit Abitur”) (3)
- (e) Applied college („Fachschulausbildung“) (4)
- (f) University degree (5)

14. Current position

- (a) Not working – pensioner or invalid (0)
- (b) Not working – other (e.g., unable to find work or unwilling to work) (1)
- (c) Not working – homemaker (e.g., spouse with household responsibilities) (2)
- (d) Student (3)
- (e) Manual laborer (4)
- (f) Semi-skilled/ skilled worker (5)
- (g) Management (6)
- (h) Bureaucracy, government, military or party position (as primary occupation) (7)

15. Current industry (if employed)

- (a) Agriculture (1)
- (b) Consumer manufacturing (2)

- (c) Defense industry (3)
 - (d) Education (4)
 - (e) Health care (5)
 - (f) Other services (6)
 - (g) Government (7)
16. Reason for application (as evaluated by the bureaucracy)
- (a) Family reunification (1)
 - (b) Cross-border marriage (2)
 - (c) Ideological opposition to Socialism (3)
 - (d) Rejection of limitations to the freedom to travel (4)
 - (e) Economic – limitations to consumption (5)
 - (f) Economic – lacking trajectories of career advancement (6)
 - (g) Limited quality of housing (7)
 - (h) Sexuality (8)
 - (i) Medical (9)
 - (j) previous time limit exceeded (10)
 - (k) Other, not listed (11)
 - (l) Reason for application - Other (if so, specify in general terms)
17. Was surveillance process initiated? (only OV= “operativer Vorgang“; OPK = “Operative Personenkontrolle“)
- (a) Yes (1)
 - (b) No (0)
18. Was applicant detained or imprisoned in relation to the application?
- (a) Yes (1)
 - (b) No (0)
19. Processed to the national level?
- (a) Yes (1)
 - (b) No (0)
20. Indication that applicant actively opposed the regime (multiple selections possible)
- (a) Joined opposition group (e.g., pacifist or environmentalist groups; churches) (1)
 - (b) Leadership in opposition group (2)

- (c) Other opposition organizing (e.g., in social movements; mobilizing others for “Monday demonstrations”) (3)
- (d) Active protest involvement (4)
- (e) Passive protest: Display of opposition symbolism (5)
- (f) Previous flight attempt (6)
- (g) Contacted Western Politicians/ NGOs/ Media (7)
- (h) Contacted or entered embassy of a non-socialist country (8)
- (i) Contacted GDR officials to voice opposition (e.g., letters to Honecker or other prominent GDR representatives) (9)
- (j) Quit job for political reasons (either to take up a new one under their qualifications or to be jobless) (10)
- (k) Left SED or associated mass organizations (11)

21. Decision

- (a) Approved (1)
- (b) Rejected (2)
- (c) Withdrawn (3)
- (d) Not processed – applicant had left GDR illegally already (4)
- (e) Not processed – other (5)
- (f) Not processed – imprisoned instead (6)

22. Month of final decision (if any) (MM/YYYY)

23. If approved, reason for approval (multiple selections possible)

- (a) Pensioner or invalid (1)
- (b) Dependent is pensioner or invalid (2)
- (c) Low potential for ties back to the GDR (“Rückverbindungen”) (3)
- (d) Insurmountable ideologic opposition (4)
- (e) Economic gains for the regime (e.g., payment from West Germany) (5)
- (f) Political-strategic advantages (other than economic gains; e.g., send as a spy or emigration of non-political criminals) (6)
- (g) Humanitarian purposes (family reunions, cross-border marriages) (7)
- (h) Other (please specify) (8)

24. If rejected, reason for rejection (multiple selections possible)

- (a) Secret bearer (at least one of the applicants) (1)
- (b) Social proximity to secret bearer (e.g., first order relative who is not an applicant is secret bearer) (2)

- (c) Outstanding debt/ financial liabilities (3)
- (d) Concerns over ties back to the GDR (“Rückverbindungen”) (4)
- (e) Economic losses for the regime (that would result from emigration) (5)
- (f) Other (please specify) (6)

25. If rejected, by which agency? (multiple selections possible)

- (a) District-level Ministry of the Interior (1)
- (b) District-level or city council (“Räte der Kreise/ Städte”) (2)
- (c) BZK (“Berzirkskoordinierungsgruppe”) (3)
- (d) District-level police (4)
- (e) Economic Unit (in which applicant was employed) (5)
- (f) National-level Ministry of the Interior (6)
- (g) ZKG (“Zentrale Koordinierungsgruppe”) (7)
- (h) National-level Stasi leadership (Stasi head Mielke or his deputies (Neiber, Beater Mittag)) (8)
- (i) Other (please specify) (9)

26. If approved, for which type of emigration

- (a) “political-operative purposes”, (1)
- (b) cross-border marriages, (2)
- (c) family reunions (3)
- (d) Other (please specify) (4)

27. Destination country (only if != West Germany/ West Berlin)

28. Unusual features/ interesting details/ memorable quotes

29. Amount of pages included in file (approximation – do not count precisely)

To be coded exclusively from the BKG’s “Proposal for Emigration Form” (which only existed for those forwarded to the national level)

31. Marital Status

- (a) Married (1)
- (b) Single (2)
- (c) Widowed (3)

32. Financial obligations (debt, credits, alimony – when existent, reason to reject)

- (a) Yes (1)

- (b) No (0)
- 33. Possession in the GDR (cars, properties – assets that often would have to be left behind -> list those that bureaucracy emphasized in relation to decision to allow emigration)
 - (a) (0=No, 1=yes)
- 34. Occupation learned - listed
- 35. Occupation practiced (most recently) -listed
- 36. Place of work (sector) – see industry codes above?
- 37. Party membership (in SED)
 - (a) Ongoing (1)
 - (b) Exited in the past (2)
 - (c) Never been a SED member (0)
- 38. Organizational Memberships (list those mentioned)
- 39. Criminal record (note § that they violated if mentioned)
 - (a) No (0)
 - (b) Yes (1)
- 40. Unofficial informant for Stasi (previous or ongoing)
 - (a) No (0)
 - (b) Yes (1)
- 41. Subject to surveillance (e.g., “OPK = Operative Personenkontrolle; OV = Operative Vorgang”)
 - (a) No (0)
 - (b) Yes (1)
- 42. Imprisonment (previous or ongoing)
 - (a) No (0)
 - (b) Yes (1)
- 43. Has first-order relatives who emigrated to West Germany? (e.g. the contact person mentioned) – as listed
- 44. If so, frequent exchange of information with these first-order relatives? – as listed
- 45. Bureaucracy: extent of applicants perceived social network in the GDR (opportunity for social remittances) – list family connections left behind – as listed

Get Out: How Authoritarian Governments Decide Who Emigrates

Public registration ▾

Updates ▾



Overview (/8gcts)

Files (/8gcts/files)

Wiki (/8gcts/wiki/)

Components (/8gcts/components)

Links (/8gcts/links)

Analytics (/8gcts/analytics)

Comments (/8gcts/comments)

General Information About the Study

Title of Study

Get Out: How Authoritarian Governments Decide Who Emigrates

EGAP Registration ID

20200810AA

Timestamp of original registration

2020-08-10 18:46:00-0400

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by a grant

[Redacted Acknowledgements]

Contributors (/8gcts/contributors)

[Redacted Contributors]

Description

We examine how autocratic governments decide which individuals are allowed to emigrate from their country using archival data from East Germany. We examine individual records for emigration and code variables to test our theories of who is allowed to leave.

Registration type

EGAP Registration

Date registered

August 10, 2020

Date created

October 23, 2020

Associated project

osf.io/dezsu (/dezsu)

Registry metadata

EGAP Registration ID: 20200810AA

Internet Archive link

https://archive.org/details/osf-registrations-8gcts-v1 (https://archive.org/details/osf

Is one of the study authors a university faculty member?

Yes

Other author affiliation

No response

Is this Registration Prospective or Retrospective?

Registration prior to researcher access to outcome data

Other description of registration timing

No response

Is this an experimental study?

With "experimental" defined as random assignment of units to treatment and control conditions.

No

Date of start of study

Understood as first date of treatment assignment or equivalent for observational study

01-01-1980

Was this design presented at an EGAP meeting?

No

registrations-8gcts-v1)

Category

 Project



Registration DOI

10.17605/OSF.IO/8GCTS (<https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/8GCTS>)

Publication DOI

No publication DOI



Subjects

Social and Behavioral Sciences

Affiliated institutions

This registration has no affiliated institutions



License

No license

Tags

No tags



Citation

osf.io/8gcts ▼

Is there a pre-analysis plan associated with this registration?

Yes

Registration Data

Background and explanation of rationale.

In the collective Western imagination—from “The Spy who Came in from the Cold” and “Escape from East Berlin” to “The Americans”—the only way to leave a communist country was to flee illegally. Yet even the most repressive regimes, including the Soviet Union, the rest of the Eastern Bloc, and North Korea today, allow individuals to leave. How do these governments decide who exits? Which individual-level characteristics explain why some individuals are allowed to leave, whereas others are forced to stay or even imprisoned?

Although recent studies highlight the trade-offs dictators face when considering emigration policies (Ahmed 2012; Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and

Wright 2015; 2018; Miller and Peters 2018), we still lack a large-N investigation of how individual characteristics determine an authoritarian bureaucracy's willingness to allow an individual to emigrate. For a dictator, whether to permit individuals to emigrate (and whom) is a non-trivial task. On the plus side, the emigration of the opposition reduces domestic challengers (Hirschman 1970; 1993; Miller and Peters 2018). Emigration can also come with many economic benefits for autocrats: it increases inflows of trade, investments, and monetary remittances, which in turn can bolster public support for the incumbent (Tertychnaya et al. 2018). Emigrants often leave behind land and capital that can be expropriated by the regime or redistributed to supporters. Finally, autocrats can dispose of individuals who are beneficiaries of social welfare services, freeing up resources to devote elsewhere. On the negative side, emigration can destabilize autocratic rule. Emigration,

especially in large numbers, may signal the illegitimacy of the regime domestically and hurt the country's international reputation. In regimes in which many people have an incentive to engage in preference falsification, emigration can signal the true level of dissatisfaction, encouraging domestic opposition (Pfaff 2006). Large-scale emigration may also have economic costs if the country loses individuals in key sectors. Finally, emigration risks the transmission of democratic norms from emigrants to their families and friends back home through social remittances (see Miller and Peters 2018).

What are the hypotheses to be tested/quantities of interest to be estimated?

H1: Individuals who held leadership positions in an opposition group already or who seemed likely to organize for an opposition group were more likely to be allowed to emigrate.

H1a: Individuals who held highest-level leadership positions in

an opposition group will be less likely to have applied for emigration, more likely to be imprisoned, and are likely to be allowed to emigrate only after the state is paid a ransom by West Germany.

H2: Individuals who were simply unhappy with the regime but seemed unlikely to join the leadership of an opposition group were unlikely to be allowed to emigrate.

H3: Individuals who are seen as large beneficiaries of the social welfare system (the elderly, disabled, those with disabled children) are more likely to be allowed to emigrate.

H4: Individuals who the West German government is likely to offer a ransom payment to are more likely to be allowed to leave.

H5: Individuals who are in strategic industries (e.g., the defense industry) or who provide key social functions (e.g., doctors) will be less likely to be allowed to emigrate.

H6: Individuals who have fewer social ties are more likely to be allowed to emigrate.

How will these hypotheses be tested?

To understand how autocrats decide who gets to leave and who doesn't, we plan to examine the secret police records of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). We propose to examine a random sample of approximately 500 applications for exit and their associated decision files from 1980-1989 from Berlin. This pre-analysis plan was filed after we selected the sample of files but before we examined them in the archives. First, we will check that the coding of the outcome and the year of application and outcome are correct. Each file should contain an application for exit, which contained a narrative CV. From this narrative CV, we will code as much as we can about the applicant; however, because there was no standard form, we do not know what covariates we can get from these yet. We can also see some of the government response. From these files we will code the following: basic demographics (in

categories to maintain privacy); date of additional applications; total page count of file; number of unique documents; types of documents in file; civilian decision; approval/ opposition by different civilian agencies; reasons given for approval/ opposition.

The narrative CV will help us understand the applicants motivation in filing to leave. The details on page count, number of documents and types of documents will help us understand how much effort the government spent on the decision. The approval/ opposition details will help us understand the government's position. The narrative CVs will also be scanned (by the German government), allowing us to do additional coding on them.

From these data, we will then examine the support for our hypotheses using a logit regression. Decisions to allow to emigrate will be coded as a 1 and all other decisions will be coded as a 0. We will include the individual level characteristics that we

code from the files along with year fixed effects, given that the regime's decision making process seemed to vary from year to year.

Country

Germany

Sample Size (# of Units)

500

Was a power analysis conducted prior to data collection?

Yes

Other power analysis information

No response

Has this research received Institutional Review Board (IRB) or ethics committee approval?

Yes

Other IRB information

No response

IRB Number

IRB#20-000191

Date of IRB Approval

02/12/2020

Will the intervention be implemented by the researcher or a third party? If a third party, please provide the name.

Researchers

Third party implementer information

No response

Did any of the research team receive remuneration from the implementing agency for taking part in this research?

No

Other remuneration information

No response

If relevant, is there an advance agreement with the implementation group that all results can be published?

No

Other publication agreement information

No response

JEL classification(s)

F22, F52, F59, N34, N44, P23, P26

Keywords and Data

Keywords for Methodology

Mixed Method

Keywords for Policy

Development

Certification

Agree

Confirmation

Agree

Additional

