Online Appendix to 'Electoral Clientelism as Status Affirmation in Africa: Evidence from Ghana'

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I. Sampling procedures and characteristics of the sample

The survey was administered in ten settlements in the Nabdam and Chiana/Paga parliamentary constituencies in Ghana's Upper East region. The head settlement was included in both (Nangodi in Nabdam and Chiana in Chiana/Paga) and the other 9 were selected using a random numbers generator out of the 20+ settlements in each district. Twenty individuals were selected using a random walk method, and interviewed in each settlement. Care was taken that no two individuals from the same household were selected and interviewers alternated between speaking to men and women between households. Interviewers spoke to respondents in private (out of earshot but not necessarily out of sight of family members) in the local languages. Interviews lasted between 30-40 minutes and were carried out early in the morning or late in the evening when most residents were likely to be home. The survey questions were pre-tested and finalized during two focus group discussions with voters in order to improve clarity (on 11 Jan. 2014 in Nangodi and on 21 Jan. 2014 in Paga).

	Nabd	am				China/	Paga	
Settlement	Male	Female	Total	Settlement	'otal	Male	Female	Т
Nangodi	13	11	24	Kakunju	24	11	9	
Sakoti	14	3	17	Kajelu	17	10	10	
Pelungu	12	8	20	Banyono	20	10	9	
Kongo	11	9	20	Navio	20	10	10	
Damolgo	12	8	20	Sakaa	20	8	9	
Yakoti	11	9	20	Boania	20	9	10	
Dasalugo	10	10	20	Nania	20	9	8	
Zua	10	10	20	Chania	20	9	10	
Zanlerigu	9	11	20	Gwaru	20	12	10	
Tindongo	13	6	19	Nakolo	19	10	10	
Total	115	85	200	Total	200	98	95	

Table A1. Respondents by settlement and gender in Nabdam and Paga.

Table A2. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Ν	Mean	Std.	Min	Max
			Dev.		
Age	379	38.10	14.50	16	97
Female	393	0.46	0.50	0	1
Education	367	2.57	1.51	1	5
Swing voter	367	0.51	0.50	0	1
Farmer	393	0.35	0.48	0	1
Teacher	393	0.11	0.32	0	1
Party member	393	0.11	0.31	0	1

	Nabdar	n			Paga		
Ethnic group	Freq.	Percent	Cum.	Ethnic group	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Nabit	191	95.5	95.5	Kassena	141	73.06	73.06
Other	7	3.5	99	Nankana	37	19.17	92.23
N/A	2	1	100	Other	9	4.66	96.89
Total	200	100		N/A	6	3.11	100
				Total	193	100	

Table A3. Respondents' ethnic group by constituency

Table A4. Respondents' highest completed level of formal education

Education	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
None	143	38.96	38.96
Primary	45	12.26	51.23
Junior highschool	61	16.62	67.85
Senior highschool	63	17.17	85.01
Tertiary/graduate	55	14.99	100
Total	367	100	

Table A5.	Types of	gifts received	by constituency	(self-reported)
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		Type of gift					
Parliamentary		Food/drink/party		Larger			
constituency	None	t-shirt	Cash	gifts	Total		
Nabdam	86	81	31	2	200		
Percent	43	40.5	15.5	1	100		
Paga	136	29	26	2	193		
Percent	70.47	15.03	13.47	1.04	100		
Total	222	110	57	4	393		
	56.49	27.99	14.5	1.02	100		

II. Additional figures and tables

Why others support other party's			
MP	Nabdam	Paga	Total
Party loyalty	29	9	38
	14.5	4.66	9.67
Policies	28	6	34
	14	3.11	8.65
Tribe/clan/family connections	26	0	26
	13	0	6.62
Gifts/favoritism	9	6	15
	4.5	3.11	3.82
Performance expectations	3	7	10
	1.5	3.63	2.54
Other	8	10	18
	4	5.18	4.58
Don't know	88	80	168
	44	41.45	42.75
No answer	9	75	84
	4.5	38.86	21.37
Total	200	193	393
	100	100	100

Table A6. Why people support the other party's MP

*Note: Question wording: 'Who supports the other party's MP candidate? Why?' Column percentages in italics. Categories created from qualitative responses. Likelihood-ratio chi2(7) = 124.539, Pr = 0.000





Figure A2. Probability of receiving campaign gifts by settlement



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Took gifts	-0.112	0.067	-0.236	-0.137
	(0.185)	(0.578)	(0.584)	(0.640)
Paga	-0.272	-0.217	-0.349	-0.271
	(0.182)	(0.239)	(0.266)	(0.289)
Age			-0.011	-0.01
			(0.009)	(0.010)
Gender			-0.138	-0.149
			(0.244)	(0.243)
No education			(Base)	(Base)
			(.)	(.)
Primary			-0.481	-0.556*
			(0.253)	(0.237)
Junior highschool			-0.078	-0.135
			(0.283)	(0.282)
Senior highschool			0.012	-0.034
			(0.258)	(0.273)
Tertiary			0.349	0.279
			(0.290)	(0.304)
Farmer				-0.105
				(0.345)
Partisan				-0.421
				(0.326)
Constant	0.251	0.217	0.836	0.880*
	(0.145)	(0.167)	(0.462)	(0.447)
Ν	366	366	334	334
Settlement clusters	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wald chi2	2.38	2.43	17.92	19.2
P > chi2	0.3047	0.4873	0.0362	0.0576

Table A7. Effect of campaign gifts on probability of changing one's vote

*Logit coefficients reported.



Figure A3. Probability of changing one's vote by type of gift



	(1)	(2)
Negative evaluations of		
incumbent	0.469*	0.461*
	(0.191)	(0.200)
Took gifts	-0.13	-0.124
	(0.178)	(0.189)
Age		-0.004
		(0.010)
Gender		-0.098
		(0.233)
Education		0.013
		(0.075)
Farmer		-0.074
		(0.335)
Partisans		-0.342
		(0.328)
Nabit		Base
		(.)
Kassena		-0.646
		(1.346)
Nankana		-0.963
		(1.302)
Other		1.235
		(0.908)
Constant	0.108	0.318
	(0.163)	(0.483)
Ν	366	331

Settlement clusters	Yes	Yes
Constituency fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Wald chi2	7.68	65.1
P > chi2	0.0871	0.0276
*Logit coefficients reported		

*Logit coefficients reported.

III. Propensity Score Matching

In order to address the possibility for non-random exposure to handouts and vote-buying, I estimate the effect of receiving an electoral gift on changing one's vote and on incumbents' performance evaluation using matching. Matching techniques can improve on regression approaches in the estimation of the average treatment effect among the treated (ATT) and have been recommended for the study of vote-buying in particular.¹ I estimate the effect of receiving electoral handouts (the treatment) on (1) changing one's vote, and (2) evaluating incumbents' performance negatively and match on age, gender, occupation (teacher or farmer), ethnicity, and constituency.





As Figure A4 shows, the standardized percent bias improves when implementing matching, particularly on the age, ethnicity, and constituency covariates.

The Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT) for changing one's vote after receiving electoral handouts is -0.026 (s.e. 0.079) using next neighbor matching with boot-strapped standard errors, -0.053 (s.e. 0.062) using kernel matching and boot-strapped standard errors. None of the treatment effects reach conventional levels of statistical significance, suggesting there is no effect of receiving an electoral

¹ Jenny Guardado and Leonard Wantchékon, "Do Electoral Handouts Affect Voting Behavior?," 2014, http://q-aps.princeton.edu/q-aps/files/VoteBuying_Rev030314.pdf.

handout on changing one's vote. When matching at the community (township) level, which is the lowest settlement level in the two districts, the ATT is -0.03 (s.e. 0.08).

The ATT of receiving campaign gifts for evaluating incumbents negatively is 0.063 (s.e. 0.07) using next neighbor matching with boot-strapped standard errors, suggesting that there is no effect of receiving a gift on incumbents' performance evaluation either.