Clients and Communities: The Political Economy of Party Network Organization and Development in India's Urban Slums

Appendices

Appendix A: Survey Methodology

Appendix A provides an outline of the survey methodology. I first describe the ethnographic fieldwork that preceded the survey and informed the design of the questionnaire and sampling procedure. Subsequently, I introduce the case cities of Jaipur and Bhopal and discuss the rationale for their selection. I then present the methodology used in sampling squatter settlements—the specific type of slums under examination in this study—and households within those settlements. I conclude with an assessment of the representativeness of the sample.

Ethnographic Foundations of the Survey

I conducted 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork in eight case study slums prior to the household survey, four in Jaipur and four in Bhopal. The fieldwork was conducted between September 2010 and December 2011. To control for exposure to elected representatives, levels of electoral competition, and local labor market conditions, case study slums were selected from single pre-2008 delimitation assembly constituencies.[1] The two constituencies, Hawa Mahal and Bhopal South, were chosen to be in close proximity to my place of residence to allow for daily access to the field sites. Slums were stratified in those constituencies by population and four were deliberately selected to hold constant a range of variables—settlement ages, land ownership categories, access to marketplaces, and absence of property rights. Case studies in each city, then, all "started" at the same time and under the same general conditions. The purposes of the case studies was to examine processes of organization and development, establish a deep understanding of context, and generate hypotheses that could be tested in the survey. In addition to daily ethnographic observation, I conducted interviews with settlement leaders, residents, politicians, and officials. A unique source of qualitative data was the archival documents I collected from the case study slums, including election materials, newspapers, correspondence between slum leaders and officials, and community meeting notes that span a fifty-year period.

The qualitative research shaped the design of the survey questionnaire and sampling procedure, thereby strengthening the validity of the measures and ensuring an accurate construction of the sampling frame—the population of squatter settlements in Jaipur and Bhopal. The questionnaire collected information on social identities, income, employment, education, property rights, social capital, strategies of collective action, community leadership, electoral behavior, and public service provision. The qualitative fieldwork also afforded a subtle understanding of the physical and historical characteristics that define squatter settlements and make these areas distinct from other urban poverty pockets.

Selection of Case Cities

Fieldwork for this project was conducted in the north Indian cities of Jaipur, Rajasthan and Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. These two locations were deliberately selected to control for several variables at the city level. Both Jaipur and Bhopal are classified as "tier two cities" by the Government of India—approximately three million and two million people, respectively—and are the administrative capitals of their respective states. Both cities were princely states before

[1]One case study slum in each city was divided from the other three after the 2008 state elections, placing them in a new constituency in 2009—a year prior to the start of my fieldwork. Case study slums shared the same representatives and levels of electoral competition for 28 years in Jaipur and 32 years in Bhopal.

independence in 1947—Jaipur a Hindu princely state and Bhopal a Muslim princely state—with historic, dilapidated, and densely populated "old cities" at their core and more recent urban sprawl in the peripheries. Jaipur and Bhopal are firmly situated in the "BIMARU"[2] region of India—a predominantly Hindi speaking area in northern India with low levels of economic growth and human development. In both Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, the two political parties in competition are the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Indian National Congress Party (INC), allowing me to hold constant party systems and party ideology. Both cities exhibit a similar ratio of municipal representatives to population, with 77 wards in Jaipur and 70 wards in Bhopal. Jaipur and Bhopal have been selected as JNNURM and *Rajiv Awas Yojana* (RAY) recipient cities by the Government of India,[3] two major urban development initiatives, and are undergoing considerable change in infrastructural development and poverty alleviation efforts.

The majority of slum dwellers in India do not live in the mega-cities of Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, and Kolkata, but rather in the constellation of medium-sized cities[4] and smaller towns that are spread throughout the country.[5] As Davis notes, "If megacities are the bright stars in the urban firmament, three quarters of the burden of future world population growth will be born by faintly visible second-tier cities and smaller urban areas" (Davis 2007: p. 7). Jaipur and Bhopal, as regional, medium-sized cities, represent these "faintly visible second-tier cities" that are coming to characterize urbanization in India and the developing world more broadly.

Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh were also attractive fieldwork sites for reasons of feasibility. I have extensively studied Hindi, and to a lesser extent Urdu, allowing for in-depth fieldwork in northern India. I had spent approximately a year in Jaipur prior to the fieldwork for language training and preliminary research. These previous experiences provided a network of academic and official contacts that helped introduce me to research assistants, obtain access to archives, and facilitate interviews with politicians and officials.

Tables A1 and *A2* situate the states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh and the cities of Jaipur and Bhopal among their counterparts in India with respect to slum populations. As the tables demonstrate, there is considerable variation in slum populations across states and cities. Maharashtra, at the top of the state list, has more than one quarter of its urban population residing in slums. On the lower side, Kerala has less than one percent of its urban population living in slums. The average percentage of residents living in slums at the state level is 11.69

[2] "BIMARU", similar to the Hindi word for "sick," is an acronym used for the relatively underdeveloped northern states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.

[3] For a list of all selected cities, as well as an overview of the stated mission and policies, see Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission Overview, Ministry of Urban Development.

[4] In addition to seven "mega-cities" (Delhi, Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata, and Hyderabad), 56 'mid-sized' cities are listed under the JNNURM program, half of which have populations that range between one million and three million people.

[5] A 2013 Census of India document notes that out of 4,041 Statutory Towns, 2,543 (63 percent) have slum settlements (Census of India Report 2013: slide 10). Remarkably, only 38 percent of India's slum households are in "million plus" cities (Census of India Report 2013: slide 14). The urban poor compose a larger percentage of the population of smaller cities and towns than in major metropolitan cities. As Kundu writes, "It would be wrong and dangerous to let the process of urbanization and migration be centered on a few megacities ignoring the smaller towns in the country. The latest data from the National Sample Survey suggest that poverty in large cities, particularly in metro cities, is rather low—at or below ten percent. Towns with less than 50,000 people, on the other hand, report much higher levels of poverty and greater deprivation and the quality of life is almost similar to that in rural areas" (GoI 2009: xxix).

percent. Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, then, lie close to the average, with the former having 9 percent of its urban population in slums and the latter 15 percent.

The presence and size of slum populations can be further disaggregated to the city level. *Table A2* lists the 2001 slum populations of the 35 million-plus cities in India. Jaipur and Bhopal are ranked, respectively, 11 and 14. The 2001 Census reports that approximately 16 percent of Jaipur's residents, or 350,275 people, reside in slums, while 9 percent of Bhopal's residents, or 126,346 people, reside in slums. These are underestimates. For Jaipur, a 2008 PDCOR survey estimated a total slum population of 906,282 individuals. My estimate, based on satellite images and estimates of population density (explained in *Appendix B*), puts the slum population of Jaipur at 866,094, or 30 percent of the city's total population. In Bhopal, a survey conducted in 2000 estimated the total slum population to be 468,606, or just under one third of the city's total population (Bhopal JNNURM: 76). Similarly, the total estimated slum population from the 2011/12 RAY data is 487,957, suggesting that 27 percent of people in Bhopal reside in slums.

Sampling Slum Settlements at the City Level

Lists of slums were first gathered in Bhopal and Jaipur. In Jaipur, lists were collected from the Jaipur Municipal Corporation, the Jaipur Development Authority, and the consulting firm PDCOR. The 2008 PDCOR database (273 listed slum settlements) is the most exhaustive and encompasses those slums listed in the government documents. In Bhopal, a list of settlements was gathered from the Urban Administration and Development Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh. This list was constructed in 2011/12 for RAY. The RAY list includes 375 settlements. A corresponding GIS map for Bhopal was not available at the time of my fieldwork. The only locational information available was the municipal ward in which the slum is located and a rough description of the area within that ward. The lists from Jaipur and Bhopal include settlements that are officially recognized by government authorities and those that are not officially recognized, allowing for the construction of a sample frame that does not suffer from the coverage bias that faces studies of only recognized settlements.

The definition of "slum" used by the Government of India is notoriously amorphous, including within it a diversity of housing conditions that are distinct from one another in their settlement origins, development, and degree of legality.[6] In reference to slums in Andhra Pradesh, but with broad relevance throughout India, Naidu notes that "students with a textbook notion of slums would be quite bewildered by the range of housing conditions which constitute a 'slum area' under the Andhra Pradesh Official Slum Act of 1956" (Naidu 2003: 205). Along similar lines, Roy writes, "the idea of a generic informal housing…fails to examine the varied conditions under which housing is acquired and negotiated. An obvious case is the difference between Calcutta's slums and squatter settlements, the former with regularized rights to land, and the latter with tenuous and revocable claims to residence. In both instances, rights and claims have to be negotiated and maintained, but the parameters within which such contestations take place are drastically different" (Roy 2008: 49).

This study focuses on a specific, pervasive, and vulnerable type of slum—squatter settlements. Squatter settlements are spontaneous, low-income areas that are constructed by residents in a highly decentralized, unplanned manner. Squatters establish these settlements on

[6] Slums are defined by the Census of India as "areas of at least 300 population or about 60-70 households of poorly built congested tenements, in unhygienic environment[s] usually with inadequate infrastructure and lacking in proper sanitary and drinking water facilities" (GOI 2011).

government lands or private plots under murky legal ownership. Squatter settlements are often located on environmentally sensitive lands such as riverbeds, mountainsides, factory grounds, and along highways and railway tracks. Squatter settlements are uniformly underdeveloped and lack formal property rights at the initial period of their establishment.[7] These settlements, moreover, are largely a post-independence phenomenon—the average settlement in my sample has existed for only 30 years. The shared origins of squatter settlements in conditions of illegality, informality, and underdevelopment, and recent nature of their emergence throughout urban India, afford unique analytical leverage over questions of organization and development.

Squatter settlements can be identified by their physical characteristics—unplanned, resident-built areas with labyrinthine networks of streets and alleyways.[8] Squatter settlements, moreover, often exhibit greater heterogeneity in the size and quality of houses than formal neighborhoods. These characteristics can be identified from satellite imagery and field visits.[9] *Figures A1* and *A2* show satellite images of squatter settlements. It should be noted that the quality of housing materials, income, and the provision of public services do not inform the identification of squatter settlements in this study. Of primary concern in the identification process is that the settlement originated through illegal squatting and maintains a distribution of housing and roads that exhibit a continued lack of centralized planning, thereby ensuring that the settlement has not been resettled by the state or evicted and later gentrified. Public services are the outcome variables under study and do not figure into the identification process.

Scholarship on India's slums makes important distinctions between squatter settlements and other types of urban poverty pockets such as dilapidated old-city neighborhoods, villages incorporated into municipalities, transient pavement dweller communities, post-eviction resettlement colonies, and factory housing.[10] As Krishna et al. (2013: 2) state, "little is gained (and much is lost) by considering slums as a homogenous category of settlements." Ali and Singh (1998: 18), for example, note that "out of Delhi's total population, about three [fourths] people live in sub-standard areas with a break-up of 1.2 million in regularized colonies, 0.5 million in unauthorized colonies, 1.3 million in *jhuggi* clusters [squatter settlements], 1.2 million in resettlement colonies, 0.5 million in urban villages, 0.5 million in rural areas, and 1.8 million in slum designated areas." Mathur (1987) and Bhatnagar (2010) differentiate old city slums in Jaipur—crumbling residential areas that have existed for centuries in the walled city—from their contemporary squatter settlement counterparts. Risbud (1988), Agnihotri (1994), and Lall et al. (2006) make a distinction between the old city slums in Bhopal and the hundreds of squatter

[7] See *Figures A5* and *A6* for photographs that depict the initial establishment of squatter settlements. The photographs illustrate the lack of infrastructure that defines the origins of squatter settlements.

[8] UNHABITAT defines squatter settlements as "mainly uncontrolled low-income residential areas with an ambiguous legal status regarding land occupation; they are to a large extent built by the inhabitants themselves using their own means and are usually poorly equipped with public utilities and community services…The land occupied by squatter settlements is often, but not always, further from the city center than is the case with slums…The land is often occupied illegally, while in many other cases the legality of occupation is complicated or unclear…They proliferated with the rapid growth of cities in the less developed countries after the Second World War" (UNHABITAT 1982).

[9] Joshi et al. 2002, Pfeffer et al. 2011, and Livengood and Kunte 2012 use satellite images to identify and map slums. Krishna et al. (2013) use satellite images to categorize types of slums in Bangalore.

[10] See Agnihotri 1994; Ali and Singh 1998; Bhatnagar 2010; Dupont and Ramanathan 2008; Hesselberg 2002; Mitra 2003; Lall et al. 2006; Roy 2008; Schenk 2001; Singh and de Souza 1980.

settlements that have sprung up outside of the old city, as well as further distinctions among squatter settlements and unauthorized colonies, resettlement areas, and factory housing.[11]

The official lists of slums in Jaipur and Bhopal do not make these important distinctions among various types of urban poverty pockets and therefore required truncation. Excluded from the sample frame were post-eviction resettlement colonies, rural villages located within municipal boundaries,[12] and dilapidated neighborhoods in the "old cities" of Jaipur and Bhopal. Dilapidated old city neighborhoods fit within the category of inner city slums, not squatter settlements.[13] Resettlement colonies are established by government agencies following the demolition of illegal settlements. The new settlements are typically arranged in coherent plots, with residents granted property rights and formal access to public services. Further, and consistent with India's Census, only slums with a population of over 300 people (60-70 households) were included in the sample frame. Housing clusters that stray below this number cease to be an area that would organize as a larger, complex community and be extended public services as a discrete area. Nineteen listed slums were also consolidated into larger contiguous units. For instance, *Durga Nagar* in Bhopal is one larger settlement but was arbitrarily divided into three sections by government enumerators. It was consolidated in the sample frame, as residents and local politicians do not acknowledge the divisions.

In Jaipur, there are listed slums that do not exhibit the characteristics of squatter settlements. These areas may have gone through a process of regularization and gentrification in the past, including the demolition of shanties, reorganization of roads, planned allocation of equally-sized plots, establishment of spaces for parks and markets, and high rates of population turnover. Others were never squatter settlements, but are either planned resettlement colonies, formal colonies that have become dilapidated over time, or middle-class housing cooperatives that are awaiting approval from the Jaipur Development Authority. They no longer—or never did—exhibit the unplanned features of squatter settlements.[14] As Bhatnagar explains, "that these [slums] are still being treated as slums by the government authorities is due to the vested political interests of politicians, of the slum dwellers themselves, and the ambiguous policy of the authorities" (Bhatnagar 2010: 103). Since the survey for this study is cross-sectional, and detailed longitudinal data on slums do not exist, it was critical to remove those areas that do not demonstrate the characteristics of squatter settlements.[15] An example of a listed non-squatter settlement is provided in *Figure A3*.

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[11] Differentiation of dilapidated old city areas and squatter settlements is relevant for cities throughout India. As Singh and de Souza note, "in Delhi there are basically two types of slums: (i) the indigenous *katras* [old city slums], many of which date back to the time before the city became the British capital in 1911, and (ii) the more recent unauthorized housing areas, including squatter settlements [*jhuggi-jhompri* settlements] (Singh and de Souza 1980: 7); also see Dupont and Ramanathan 2008.

[12] See *Figure A4* for an example of a village in Bhopal that has been listed as a "slum."

[13] "Slums usually consist of run-down housing in older, established, legally built parts of the city proper. Slum buildings are mostly old and poorly maintained…in many cases, considerable areas of the old parts of cities in the Middle East and Asia are occupied by substandard housing…" (UNHABITAT 1982).

[14] After a mapping and enumeration exercise of slums in Jaipur, Singhi (1997: 6) found 101 "clusters of poor people" despite the official list of 172 slums at the time. Many of the settlements that remain on government lists of slums either no longer—or never did—exhibit the qualities of urban poverty pockets.

[15] In her study of squatters in Calcutta, Roy (2008: 238) removes from the sample frame established and planned areas officially classified as "slums" and instead focuses on squatter settlements. Risbud (1988) similarly isolates squatter settlements in Bhopal from the larger population of formally labeled "slums."

Squatter settlements were identified through a range of sources: satellite images, field visits, government documents, interviews with officials, and academic studies that provide accounts of slums in Jaipur and Bhopal. The number of rejected slums in each city, and the corresponding reasons for those rejections, are listed in *Table A3*. To avoid mistakenly removing a squatter settlement from the sample frame, any settlements that were ambiguous in character were left in the sample frame and required a field visit if randomly selected for the survey. Rejected settlements are nicely balanced across the population quintiles (see *Table A4*), removing concerns that the rejections somehow skewed the remaining distribution of settlements in terms of population and variables correlated with population.

The sample frames at the start of the survey were 162 settlements in Jaipur and 240 settlements in Bhopal. Settlements were stratified into population quintiles and cities were divided into three larger zones of roughly equal size to ensure a geographically diverse sample and to maximize variation in labor markets, land ownership categories, and electoral competition at the municipal and state levels. In Jaipur, 31 settlements were randomly sampled from the population quintiles (in addition to the four case study slums) and 41 slums were randomly sampled from the population quintiles in Bhopal (in addition to the four case study slums). The number of slums surveyed in each geographic zone approximately fit their proportion to the total number of slums in those areas, with a slight over-sample in those zones with the case studies. *Table A5* displays this information. The following section demonstrates that the sample is broadly representative of squatter settlements in Jaipur and Bhopal.

Some randomly selected slums had been evicted since their enumeration in the government list, while others were found to be non-squatter settlements upon field inspection. In two settlements in Bhopal and one settlement in Jaipur, it was determined during a pre-visit that the area was simply too dangerous for survey work. One settlement in Jaipur was located within a military compound and was removed from the sample frame because access would have been prohibited. It was discovered upon field inspection that three sampled settlements—two in Jaipur and one in Bhopal—had been either completely or almost entirely evicted since their last enumeration. In Bhopal, because a map of settlements was not available, several settlements could not be located. Mostly likely this was because the settlements had either been evicted or had become regularized to the point that they were unidentifiable as squatter settlements from the satellite images and field visits—and were no longer locally recognized by area residents as slums—making the introduction of any coverage bias minimal. Three or four settlements were sampled under uncertainty over their location and local name. For these reasons, selected slums were visited before sending in the survey teams to ensure they still exist and fit the category of squatter settlements. If the initially selected settlement was either evicted, could not be located, or fell outside the category of squatter settlements, a new settlement was randomly resampled. This close, context-driven involvement in the survey sampling process ensured that all sampled areas fell within the population of interest.

At the conclusion of the survey, after extensive field visits and further data collection allowed non-squatter settlements to be removed from the sample frame, the refined and final list of squatter settlements totaled 115 in Jaipur and 192 in Bhopal. These final lists represent the appropriate group of settlements from which to assess the representativeness of the sample.

Sampling Households within Slum Settlements

The next stage of sampling involved the selection of households within settlements. Slums are poorly documented spaces and accurate household rosters do not exist. Poor migrants often lack formal documentation and there can be high rates of population turnover, and so voter lists are inappropriate as sampling frames. Sampling every n^{th} household by linearly walking down a street is not feasible, as these areas do not have a coherent system of roads but rather a dizzying series of alleyways and streets. Enumerators would be faced with countless decisions on which alleyway to turn down, undermining an attempt to acquire a spatially distributed sample. Random walk techniques from selected landmarks would also be fraught with problems. Some areas are more difficult to access than others, biasing the sample toward households on major roads. Confusion would arise when enumerators were faced with multiple options of turns that often loop back to their original starting point. I therefore employed a spatial sampling technique with satellite images that ensured a representative selection of households, even geographic coverage, and minimized discretion on the part of survey enumerators while in the field.

Satellite images were created for all sampled slums, and each slum was divided into clusters of roughly 20 households. Ensuring a spatially representative sample of households was critical, as migrants form ethnic enclaves and development can be internally uneven. In each slum, a household was first arbitrarily selected in a starting cluster on the satellite image, and subsequent households in that settlement were then sampled across the remaining clusters to deliberately maintain approximate distances to ensure a spatially representative sample.[16] This is similar to a design in which every n^{th} household is sampled along a street, except the repeated sampling is across geographic clusters, not linearly along a series of streets. Each sampled household was marked on the satellite image and assigned to a survey enumerator. The sampling on the satellite images was all done prior to the survey work, affording a sample of households that approximates a random probability sample. Approximately one out of every 20 households in each slum was sampled, with very minor variation due to the number of survey enumerators that could be deployed to a settlement in a given day.

This sampling procedure yielded a total sample size of 1,925 households across the 80 slums. Because the number of households sampled in each settlement was proportional to size, the average number of sampled households per settlement is 24 with a one standard deviation of 30.[17] For the largest settlement with a population of 23,811, or 4,600 households, 228 households were sampled. The next largest settlement had 95 sampled households. In the two smallest slums (60 households each), 4 or 5 households were sampled. For a majority of settlements, between 10 and 35 households were sampled.[18] The sample size is consistent with other similar studies.[19]

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[16] Counting the exact number of households in a squatter settlement from satellite images, particularly in large settlements, is not possible. For this reason, the selection of households through the use of a defined sampling frame of households and random number generator was not feasible. Instead, the arbitrary selection of starting households on the satellite images was sufficient for the purposes of arriving at a spatially representative sample. Households were not observed in the field prior to their selection on the satellite images, nor were their demographic or attitudinal characteristics known, and so this segment of the sampling process did not likely introduce any meaningful bias.

[17] See *Figure A9* for a histogram of the number of households sampled across the 80 settlements.

[18] As observed in my ethnographic fieldwork, clusters of 20 households within slum settlements often lack significant variability in their developmental and demographic characteristics—incomes and employment, the quality of housing materials, larger social identities (religion and region of origin), and access to

Survey teams in Jaipur and Bhopal conducted the survey between March and July 2012. Enumerators were recruited from a local development institute in Jaipur and an NGO that works on urban development issues in Bhopal. Most of the enumerators had prior experience conducting surveys in either urban slums or rural villages. Teams were intensively trained for several days prior to the start of the survey to ensure that the questionnaire was understood and properly administered. All survey team members were trained in accordance with the University of Wisconsin-Madison's IRB guidelines. I accompanied the survey teams every day for the entire survey period to help navigate the satellite images and to ensure the integrity of the sampling procedure.[20] A research assistant served as co-supervisor. Enumerators were allowed to conduct a maximum of five interviews per day to minimize errors associated with fatigue.

Enumerators were asked to note if the initially selected household could not be surveyed. Based on these responses, the survey teams were able to successfully interview approximately 80 percent of the households initially selected through the sampling procedure. For those households that were locked, vacant, or unwilling to participate in the survey, survey enumerators were instructed to interview an adjacent household. Revisits to initially selected households were not possible due to resource constraints. Enumerators were further instructed, whenever possible, to alternate the sex of the respondent from interview to interview. All respondents were at least 18 years old. To ensure an occupationally diverse set of respondents, the survey teams conducted interviews between 3pm and 8pm. This period straddles two important blocks of time. Between 3pm and 5pm, slums are mostly populated with unemployed residents, stay-at-home adults, and residents working in cottage industries. After 5pm, laborers and those working outside of the settlement return home. Conducting the survey across these periods of time allowed for an occupationally diverse sample. Beyond considerations in balancing the sex of respondents, enumerators arbitrarily selected individuals within each household based on availability at the specific time of introduction. Data entry was conducted concurrently with the survey and was frequently checked to ensure accuracy.

The average respondent age was 38 years with a one standard deviation of 13 years. The majority of respondents (84 percent) were married. Just over half (53 percent) were male. The average level of education attained by respondents was 5 years of school with a one standard deviation of 5 years. 133 respondents had college and graduate degrees, while another 775 (40 percent) did not have any formal schooling. The average monthly household income was roughly Rs. 7,500 ($150) with a one standard deviation of Rs. 3,750 ($75). The average monthly household per capita income was Rs. 1,400 ($28) with a one standard deviation of Rs. 900

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public infrastructure and services. With regard to kinship ties, it was common for me to encounter groups of adjacent households all belonging to the same extended family—two or three generations of a family living as neighbors and sharing many of the same resources. Increasing the sample size within a small, contiguous cluster of households, therefore, quickly faces diminishing returns in capturing meaningful variation in development and socio-economic demographics, as well as experiences with collective action and conflict. For these reasons, the proportion of households sampled, in conjunction with the spatial sampling procedure, was adequate to obtain representative measures of the target variables.

[19] See, for examples, Bardhan 2000; Krishna 2002; Manion 2006; Kruks-Wisner 2013; Lyall et al. 2013.

[20] Beyond ensuring the integrity of the sampling procedure, my presence in the settlements was critical to clarifying the purpose of the survey to any inquiring participants, as well as being able to produce my research visa and supporting documents when needed. Enumerators were left to conduct interviews themselves, and I did not personally conduct any surveys. I do not believe my presence in the settlements influenced responses in any way. If anything, respondents would be *more* willing to share their opinions, as my presence demonstrated the survey was for academic purposes.

($18).[21] An alternative measure of material wellbeing draws on a series of questions that probed ownership of 11 assets.[22] The average household had 6 of these assets with a one standard deviation of 2 assets. In terms of housing, 31 percent of respondents lived in "*pacca*" housing—permanent walls typically made of brick with a cement roof. A majority of respondents (56 percent), however, lived in "semi-*pacca*" housing with permanent walls but makeshift roofs made of tarp, sticks, or sheets of corrugated steel weighed down by stones. The remaining respondents (13 percent) lived in temporary "*katcha*" housing, with both makeshift walls and roofs. 222 respondents claimed possession of formal land titles.

Assessing the Representativeness of the Sample

How well does the sample represent the population of squatter settlements in Jaipur and Bhopal? To assess the representativeness of the survey, I draw on available government data that provides slum-level development indicators. Comprehensive government data on slums is mostly limited to Bhopal, and so a majority of the following discussion focuses on the Bhopal sample. I conclude that the sample is broadly representative. I find some evidence of a minor over-representation of small, undeveloped slums in the Bhopal sample—the equivalent of 2 or 3 settlements out of 45—though this difference is not statistically significant.

Table A6 displays the population statistics for the three frames of interest: the full official list of slums in each city, the final reduced list of squatter settlements that serves as the sample frame, and the realized sample of squatter settlements. Comparisons among the lists, and most importantly, between the sample frame and realized sample, demonstrate that along the dimension of population, the sample is representative in both Jaipur and Bhopal.

For Bhopal, we can compare the sample with the sample frame with regard to two development outcomes—paved roads and household access to piped water. First, concerning paved roads, the average percentage of paved roads per settlement in the sample frame is 71.12 percent with a one standard deviation of 37.34 percent. For my sample of 45 settlements, the average percentage of paved roads per settlement is 66.41 percent using the government data (with a one standard deviation of 41.01 percent) and 73.04 percent using my measures based on satellite maps and traverse walks (with a one standard deviation of 34.95 percent). The average percentage of residents in each settlement reporting access to piped water in the full sample frame is 15.67 percent (with a one standard deviation of 28.56 percent), compared to 6.28 percent (with a one standard deviation of 12.49 percent) in my sample using the government data and 16.17 percent (with a one standard deviation of 25.89 percent) using my measures of piped water provision from the household survey. *Table A7* presents these descriptive statistics.

The correlation between population—the variable of stratification—and the two development indicators can additionally be assessed. I focus on the government measures of paved roads and household access to piped water for both the sample and sample frame because

[21] Reported incomes were placed in bins that initially increase every Rs. 1,000, from Rs. 1 until Rs. 10,000. Above Rs. 10,000, the bins gradually increase in the following manner: by Rs. 2,000 (from Rs. 10,000 to 12,000), by Rs. 3,000 (from Rs. 12,000 to Rs. 21,000), by Rs. 4,000 (from Rs. 21,000 to Rs. 25,000), and then by Rs. 5,000 (from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 55,000).

[22] Respondents were asked whether or not they own a television, motorcycle or scooter, mobile phone, air cooler, fan, refrigerator, bed, gas cooker, radio, car, and cabinet (*almari*).

they are directly comparable.[23] As displayed in *Table A7*, the correlation between population and the percentage of paved roads in the full sample frame is 0.18,[24] while in my sample it is 0.31. A test of the difference in these two correlations reveals that the null hypothesis—that the two correlations are from the same population—cannot be rejected with a *p* value (one-tailed) of 0.21. For piped water, the correlation between population and percentage of households with access to piped water is -0.06 in the full sample frame and 0.11 in my sample. The difference between these correlations is not statistically significant (one-tailed p-value of 0.16).

These correlations are further examined in *Table A8* by comparing the average percentage of paved roads across the population quintiles. Looking across the row for the Bhopal sample frame, we see that the average percentage of paved roads steadily increases from 60.45 percent in the smallest quintile to 81.55 percent in the largest quintile. The standard deviations on those averages also tighten from 44.06 percent to 27.60 percent. The average percentage of paved roads, therefore, increases as we move up the population quintiles with decreasing variability. The realized sample of squatter settlements in Bhopal shows a similar trend. The only quintile that deviates from the sample frame is the first quintile—an average of 60.45 in the sample frame and 32.44 percent in the sample. The degree of variability is the greatest in the first quintile, explaining how a random sample within that quintile could produce the difference. The difference may have also emerged as a result of the few sampled settlements that were surveyed after ambiguity in their location, or a related degree of minor coverage bias introduced by those settlements that could not be located.

A possible, minor over-representation of small underdeveloped slums in Bhopal may bias the coefficient on population slightly upward. The main explanatory variable of interest, party network density, exhibits only a weak positive correlation with population in the Bhopal sample (0.26). There is significant variation in party network density, therefore, that is uncorrelated with population, allowing for a confident estimate of party network density's relationship with each of the development indicators while controlling for other factors, including population.

A final dimension I examine is official notification. Municipal and state governments can declare an area a slum. The importance of notification for development is variable across cities and states in India. Settlements without notification can be developed and settlements that are notified can be underdeveloped. In Bhopal, 57.22 percent of squatter settlements were officially notified at the time of the RAY survey. In my sample, 57.77 percent of squatter settlements are declared. We can also compare notification rates across population quintiles. As *Table A9* shows, the first three quintiles match those of the sample frame. The fourth quintile is shy of the sample frame parameter, while the fifth exceeds it. Given the small sample sizes in each quintile, these differences only reflect a difference of one or two settlements. The sample is otherwise representative of declared and non-declared slums in Bhopal.

[23] The correlations between my measures of percentage of paved roads and household access to piped water and those from the government data are 0.60 and 0.56, respectively.
[24] This correlation excludes a very significant outlier, Bheem Nagar. See *Figures A11*.

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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of India's Urban and Slum Populations Across States

State	Urban Population	% Urban Population	Slum Population	% Slum Pop. to Total Urban Pop.
Andhra Pradesh	20,503,597	27.08	5,149,272	25.11
Assam	3,389,413	12.72	84,644	2.50
Bihar	8,679,200	10.47	507,383	5.85
Chhattisgarh	4,175,329	20.08	788,127	18.88
Delhi	12,819,761	93.01	2,025,890	15.80
Gujarat	18,899,377	37.35	1,346,709	7.13
Haryana	6,114,139	29.00	1,421,839	23.25
Jammu & Kashmir	2,505,309	24.88	270,084	10.78
Jharkhand	5,986,697	22.25	309,557	5.17
Karnataka	17,919,858	33.98	1,267,759	7.07
Kerala	8,267,135	25.97	45,337	0.55
Madhya Pradesh	16,102,590	26.67	2,388,517	14.83
Maharashtra	41,019,734	42.40	10,644,605	25.95
Orissa	5,496,318	14.97	635,150	11.56
Punjab	8,245,566	33.95	1,151,864	13.97
Rajasthan	13,205,444	23.38	1,206,123	9.13
Tamil Nadu	27,241,553	43.86	2,530,289	9.29
Uttar Pradesh	34,512,629	20.78	4,156,020	12.04
Uttaranchal	2,170,245	25.59	195,604	9.01
West Bengal	22,486,481	28.03	3,822,309	17.00

Source: 2001 Census Data and Sivaramakrishnan et al. 2006 (pages 5-6; 108)

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Slum Populations in India's Million-Plus Cities

City	2001 Population	% City Population Residing in Slums
Greater Mumbai	11,914,398	48.88
Delhi	9,817,439	18.89
Kolkata	4,580,544	32.55
Bangalore	4,292,223	8.04
Chennai	4,216,268	25.60
Ahmedabad	3,515,361	12.15
Hyderabad	3,449,878	17.43
Pune	2,540,069	20.92
Kanpur	2,532,138	14.57
Surat	2,433,787	16.68
Jaipur	2,324,319	15.07
Nagpur	2,051,320	35.42
Indore	1,597,441	16.25
Bhopal	1,433,875	8.81
Ludhiana	1,395,053	22.56
Patna	1,376,950	0.25
Vadodara	1,306,035	8.21
Lucknow	2,207,340	N/A
Agra	1,259,979	9.67
Kochi	596,473	1.32
Varanasi	1,100,748	12.55
Nashik	1,076,967	13.21
Meerut	1,074,229	43.87
Faridabad	1,054,981	46.55
Coimbatore	923,085	6.49
Madurai	922,913	19.06
Vishakhapatnam	969,608	17.65
Jabalpur	951,469	28.95
Jamshedpur	570,349	N/A
Asansol	486,304	N/A
Dhanbad	198,963	N/A
Allahabad	990,298	N/A
Amritsar	975,695	N/A
Vijaywada	825,436	31.97
Rajkot	966,642	15.57

Source: 2001 Census Data and Sivaramakrishnan et al. 2006 (page 110)
Notes: N/A = data not available

Table A3: Settlements Rejected from Sample Frame

City	Old City Slum	Village	Below 300 Population	Non-Squatter Areas	Other
Jaipur	62	0	8	76	16
Bhopal	34	52	62	25	12

Note: The category "other" includes settlements that were evicted, located in a military area, or for two settlements, located along a railway line and only one house deep, preventing the measurement of internal levels of development.

Table A4: Settlements Rejected from Sample Frame by Reason and Population Quintile

	Rejected Slums	Population Quintile 1	Population Quintile 2	Population Quintile 3	Population Quintile 4	Population Quintile 5
Jaipur Old City Slums	62	15	14	15	7	11
Jaipur Non-Squatter Areas	76	13	18	14	15	16
Bhopal Old City Slums	34	9	4	8	5	8
Bhopal Non-Squatter Areas	25	5	3	5	7	5
Bhopal Villages	52	16	7	9	9	11

Table A5: Area-wise Samples from Jaipur and Bhopal

	North Area	East Area	Southwest Area
Jaipur Squatter Settlements	62	23	30
Jaipur Sampled Settlements	15	6 + *4 case study settlements*	10
Bhopal Squatter Settlements	54	68	70
Bhopal Sampled Settlements	12	15	14 + *4 case study settlements*

Figure A1: Example Squatter Settlement, Jaipur

Source: Image from Google Earth Pro, DigitalGlobe (2015)

Figure A2: Example Squatter Settlement, Bhopal

Source: Image from Google Earth Pro, DigitalGlobe (2015)

Figure A3: Example Non-Squatter Settlement, Jaipur

Source: Image from Google Earth Pro, DigitalGlobe (2015)

Figure A4: Example Village Listed as a "Slum," Bhopal

Source: Image from Google Earth Pro, DigitalGlobe (2015)

Figure A5: Emergence of a Squatter Settlement, Jaipur, early 1980s



Figure A6: Emergence of a Squatter Settlement, Bhopal, late 1970s



Figure A7: Number of Households Surveyed in Sampled Settlements



Note: 1 out of every 20 households was surveyed in each settlement. The largest settlement in the sample, with 228 sampled households, is left out of the figure for ease of presentation.

Figure A8: Estimated Number of Households in Sampled Settlements



Note: The largest settlement, with 4,600 households, is left out of the figure. Estimates based on an approximate average of 5 individuals per slum household (Chandramouli 2011).

Table A6: Population Statistics

	No. Slums	Av. Population	Stan. Dev.	Min	Max
Jaipur Full Slum List	277	3,256	4,126	94	38,099
Jaipur Squatter Settlement List	115	3,354	3,341	325	23,811
Jaipur Sample	35	3,525	4,331	467	23,811
Bhopal Full Slum List	375	1,301	1,566	23	15,604
Bhopal Squatter Settlement List	192	1,565	1,759	302	15,604
Bhopal Sample	45	1,669	1649	349	7,768

Figure A9: Scatterplot with Outlier Bheem Nagar



Table A7: Assessing the Representativeness of the Sample

	No. Slums	Av. % Paved Road	Stan. Dev. Paved Road	Corr. Pop: Paved Road	Av. % Piped Water	Stan. Dev. Piped Water	Corr. Pop: Piped Water
Jaipur Sample	35	60.92	42.19	0.35	55.29	34.40	0.12
Bhopal Full Slum List	375	71.60	37.74	0.11*	19.24	39.93	-0.006*
Bhopal Squatter List	192	71.12	37.34	0.18*	15.67	28.56	-0.06*
Bhopal Sample (gov.)	45	66.41	41.01	0.31	6.28	12.49	0.11
Bhopal Sample (mine)	45	73.04	34.95	0.37	16.17	25.89	0.04

*With Bheem Nagar, a significant outlier, removed (see *Figures A11*).

Table A8: Assessing the Representativeness of the Sample

	Pop. Quintile 1: Ave. Percentage of Paved Roads	Pop. Quintile 2: Ave. Percentage of Paved Roads	Pop. Quintile 3: Ave. Percentage of Paved Roads	Pop. Quintile 4: Ave. Percentage of Paved Roads	Pop. Quintile 5: Ave. Percentage of Paved Roads
Jaipur Sample	26.35 (45.23)	53.79 (48.63)	62.93 (36.64)	71.4 (39.01)	90.14 (15.11)
Bhopal Squatter List	60.45 (44.06)	68.44 (38.51)	70.97 (40.48)	74.57 (32.78)	81.55* (26.84)
Bhopal Sample (Gov.)	32.44 (44.64)	70.22 (41.61)	68.33 (42.38)	67.33 (37.89)	93.44 (13.20)
Bhopal Sample (mine)	42.12 (42.81)	70.71 (37.91)	68.36 (37.57)	93.58 (7.99)	90.43 (7.22)

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
*With Bheem Nagar, a significant outlier, removed (see *Figures A11*)

Table A9: Assessing the Representativeness of the Sample, Slum Notification

	Pop. Quintile 1: Notified/ Total	Pop. Quintile 2: Notified/ Total	Pop. Quintile 3: Notified/ Total	Pop. Quintile 4: Notified/ Total	Pop. Quintile 5: Notified/ Total	Total
Bhopal Squatter List	19/38 (50.00%)	26/43 (60.47%)	23/37 (62.16%)	20/35 (57.14%)	23/39 (58.97%)	111/192 (57.81%)
Bhopal Sample	4/9 (44.44%)	5/9 (55.56%)	6/9 (66.67%)	3/9 (33.33%)	8/9 (88.89%)	26/45 (57.77%)

Appendix B: Variables not Measured through the Survey

There are several variables used in the econometric analyses that were not measured through the household survey. I discuss the data and data gathering process for each of these variables below.

Six development indicators serve as the outcome variables in this study, two of which were measured separately from the survey. In each of the 80 sampled slums, community asset maps were created with satellite images and traverse walks. A small team of research assistants and myself visited all of the 80 sampled slums with satellite maps and marked the exact location of streetlights and paved roads.

Concerning the right-hand-side variables, I first discuss the measurement of settlement populations. I was able to gather accurate government population data on Bhopal's slums. This data was gathered by the government of Madhya Pradesh using GIS mapping and survey work. In Jaipur, available population data were very rough, rounded estimates. Most were derived from residents' guesses of their settlement's population. Estimates were highly variable across official sources and uneven in their coverage. I therefore calculated more accurate, comprehensive, and uniform population estimates for all slums in Jaipur using satellite imagery, geographic area calculations, and estimates of population densities. A smaller slum was first selected that had a verifiably accurate population estimate (*Katarpur* settlement in central Jaipur). An area and population density was calculated for that slum. I then calculated the area of all slums using Google Earth Pro, and was able to calculate approximate populations of all slums in relation to *Katarpur*'s population density (0.092 people per square meter). While the resulting calculations face some measurement error due to variability in actual population densities, the population estimates represent the most accurate data available on Jaipur's slum populations.

The age of settlements were measured through interviews with leaders and residents in each of the 80 sampled settlements. Official data on slums for Jaipur and Bhopal either do not mention the age of settlements or put them in very rough age bins (for instance, more or less than 10 years old). While past enumeration lists can provide a sense of whether or not certain settlements were in existence at that time, these lists are not exhaustive and, more critically, infrequency conducted. Residents and leaders, particularly those that have been living in their settlement for many years, are highly knowledgeable about the history and formation of their settlement. In addition to providing the year when the settlement was first settled, residents and leaders would often point to major historical events around which their settlement was established, such as the massive floods in Jaipur in the early 1980s or the gas tragedy in Bhopal.

Information on land categories was gathered through interviews and archival work. Residents—and leaders in particular—are deeply knowledgeable about land ownership. This is true for several reasons. First, agents of the concerned department—revenue, forest, railroad, municipality, electricity, industrial—will most likely have visited the settlement to either intimidate or warn squatters of their trespassing status. Second, slum leaders are intimately aware of land issues as a result of their struggles for property rights and services. Land categories figure prominently in discussions over development between officials and slum leaders.

Electoral data came from one of two sources depending on the level of the election. For state assembly constituencies, electoral returns are posted on the Election Commission of India's website for public consumption. Municipal electoral data before the mid 2000s, however, is neither digitized nor publically available, and therefore required substantial digging in government archives. Several weeks in Jaipur and Bhopal were allocated to searching through dusty boxes in the basements and storage rooms of municipal buildings to gather the election

data. I was able to either photograph or photocopy electoral data on Jaipur's municipal elections since the first post-decentralization elections were held in 1994. The same is true for Bhopal, except data on Bhopal's 1994 election could not be found, suggesting that unless another researcher had documented this information previously, this data might no longer be in existence. With the electoral data at the state and municipal levels, I calculated the vote margins between the winners and the runner-ups. Since the larger dataset is cross-sectional, I averaged the scores across elections. Sampled slums were then matched to the averaged competition scores for the constituencies in which they are located.

Appendix C: Measuring Party Networks

To my knowledge, this study is the first to enumerate political party networks across a large sample of urban communities in India. In total, I enumerated 513 party workers across the 80 sampled slums. This appendix describes the structures of political parties in Jaipur and Bhopal and then outlines the process used to enumerate party workers.

The INC and BJP are organized in Jaipur and Bhopal in a similar pyramidal fashion. At the most grassroots level is the booth, where each party has in place a president or representative and a small team of workers that can be drawn on to promote the party and build voter turnout. One level higher than the booth is the ward. At the time of the survey, there were 77 wards in Jaipur and 70 wards in Bhopal. In each ward a president and a committee of approximately 10-15 members are appointed and given the responsibility to oversee promotional and electoral activities. Above the ward, the two parties slightly diverge. The INC divides cities into blocks—two blocks for each state assembly constituency. Jaipur has 12 blocks and Bhopal has 10 blocks. Each block has a president and a committee of roughly 10-15 members. Instead of blocks, the BJP has *mandals*, which correspond to the same boundaries as state assembly constituencies. Above the block and *mandal* are the district and state. These committees are composed of regionally known party officers who have considerable sway in city politics.

Both parties have also created *prakoshts* and *morchas*, or cells and wings, to organize various interest groups. These include cells for slum dwellers, women, students, scheduled castes, Muslims and other "minorities," and even occupational wings for engineers, doctors, and lawyers. For both parties, the hierarchical structure of the cells follow that of the rest of the organizational structure of the party, with the exception that positions do not exist at the booth.

There were two inclusion criteria for this study in enumerating party workers. First, the individual needed to be a party member with an organizational position in either the main body or an organizational wing. Any level from the booth to the national level was acceptable. In the sampled settlements, membership most often ranged from the booth to the block level. Slum leaders that were party supporters, but not actual party organizational members with positions, were not included. Second, the individual needed to live within the sampled slum. Party workers that lived in nearby housing colonies but outside the slum under study were not included.

I identified party workers by drawing on three sources of information. First, I collected available party membership rosters from district and local party organizations. These lists were often aggregations of information provided by lower level committees, and were uneven in their quality, availability, and comprehensiveness across geographic areas within the case cities. When possible, I gathered rosters from lower levels of party organization and slum leaders themselves. These lower-level lists often came in the form of posters or listed entries on party letterhead stationary. Second, I asked survey respondents to identify leaders. These lists allowed me to better match names from rosters to specific slums. Most important, though, were the interviews I conducted in all of the 80 slums with local party workers to fill-out the lists and ensure their accuracy and completeness. If slums had party workers from both the INC and BJP, I interviewed party workers from both parties, as party workers have incentives to play down the membership size of rival networks. Interviewed workers were asked to confirm party workers already listed and add names of workers missed in the earlier steps. Together, these sources allowed me to create a comprehensive list of 513 party workers across the 80 slums.

Table C1 provides descriptive statistics of the primary right-hand-side variable of interest: party network density. Party network density is the number of party workers in each

settlement per 1,000 residents. 17 of the sampled settlements did not have any party workers. The average settlement had roughly 2 party workers per 1,000 people with a one standard deviation of 1.56 workers.[25] This is a significant density of party workers. In a small, tightly packed cluster of 200 shanties, the presence of two party workers means that there are two individuals—living down the street, if not next door—that residents can turn to for help in gaining access to the state. These party workers are neighbors, family members, or friends that residents see and interact with on a daily basis. In those settlements with the highest levels of party network density (approaching 6.5 party workers per 1,000 people), there are 4 additional party workers in that congested space providing these services—and competing with each another to build a large and loyal following. *Figure C1* displays a frequency histogram and kernel density plot of the party network density variable.

[25] Perhaps a more suggestive and equivalent way of conceptualizing party network density is the number of party workers per 200 households, as there are approximately five people per household. More than half of those 1,000 individuals in a settlement are children and the elderly—too young or too old to engage in leadership activities. Two party workers in a densely clustered group of 200 households, then, is a significant number of workers for residents living in that immediate area.

Table C1: Descriptive Statistics of Party Network Density

	Average	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Party Workers Per Settlement	6.41	17.00	0 (17)	147
Party Network Density	1.85	1.56	0 (17)	6.37

Note: Number of observations in parentheses

Figure C1: Distribution of Party Network Density Variable



Key: Frequency histogram (bars) and kernel density plot (solid line)

Appendix D: Measuring Social Capital

Table D1 lists the eight questions that were used to construct measures of community social capital. These questions are based on the World Bank's Social Capital Assessment Tool and those from Krishna 2002. Responses for each question were first averaged at the slum level. The averaged scores for each slum were then rescaled through subtracting the mean value and then dividing by the standard deviation. Weights were then calculated with principal component analysis, using the component with the highest eigenvalue. A social capital score was then constructed for each sampled slum by summing the rescaled indicators times their weights.

Table D1: Measuring Social Capital

Survey Question	Coding
If a family here is short of money, or has a member that is sick or dies, will people here in the slum help that family in need?	No = 0; Yes = 1
If you were short of money and needed Rs. 1,000, would your neighbors in the slum lend you the money?	No = 0; Maybe = 1; Yes = 2
In your opinion, would your neighbors in the slum give time or money to improve the development of the slum?	No = 0; Maybe = 1; Yes = 2
If there was a big problem in the slum, like no water or electricity for several days, would people in this slum unite to solve the problem?	No = 0; Yes = 1
When people here are free, do they mostly socialize and spend time with their own social group or do they mix with other social groups?	Mostly with own group = 0 Mix with other groups = 1
During your free time in the slum, how often do you meet with your neighbors to socialize?	Rarely = 0; Every few months = 0.25 About once a month = 0.5; About once a week = 0.75; Daily = 1
Is the following true or false: People in this slum only really care about their own household and don't care about the welfare of the community as a whole.	True = 0; False = 1
Generally speaking, how much do you trust people in this slum?	Don't Trust at all = 0; Trust a little = 1 Trust a lot = 2

Appendix E: Alternative Model Specifications and Robustness Checks

I present several alternative model specifications and post-estimation tests to demonstrate the robustness of the findings. I first consider the issue of multiple hypothesis testing. Following Anderson's benchmark 2008 article, I address multiple hypothesis testing in three ways. First, I combine the six development indicators into a summary index using principal component analysis, reducing the number of tests conducted and providing a more global assessment of party network density's relationship with community development. Two components exhibit eigenvalues above one and jointly explain 65 percent of the variation. I therefore regress both indices on the right-hand-side variables, using the weights derived from the two components. Party network density is positive and statistically significant in its association with both summary indices. See *Tables E1* and *E2* for results.[26]

Second, I calculate adjusted p-values that correct for the false discovery rate (FDR)—controlling for the expected proportion of false rejections across the six tests in the study. Party network density continues to exhibit statistical significance in relation to the same four development indicators—paved roads, streetlights, trash collection, and medical camps—at the 0.10 or 0.05 levels. I also calculate sharpened q-values based on the Benjamini et al. 2006 procedure. Conventional levels of statistical significance hold for the same four development indicators. FDR adjusted p-values and sharpened q-values are presented in *Table E3*.

Third, I calculate adjusted p-values that control for the familywise error rate (FWER). The Bonferroni procedure is generally considered too underpowered for FWER p-value adjustments, particularly when the outcomes under examination exhibit a moderate or high degree of dependence or inter-correlation, as they do in this study.[27] I instead use the Westfall and Young free step-down resampling method.[28] The adjusted p-values for party network density remain significant at the .05 level in relation to paved roads and streetlights. The associations between party network density and trash collection and medical camps slightly rise above conventional significance levels, from 0.044 and 0.05, respectively, to 0.168—adjusted p-values that cannot be dismissed, given the modest sample size of 80 settlements.[29]

The significance of party network density in relation to the summary indices and the robustness of the findings after controlling for the FDR reduce concerns about multiple hypothesis testing.[30] Even with Westfall and Young adjustments, party network density remains statistically significant in its association with paved roads and streetlights, and the p-values for trash collection and medical camps hover just slightly above conventional significance levels. With 80 observations, the greater power afforded by controlling for the FDR makes it a more appropriate adjustment strategy than controlling for the FWER.[31] As Benjamini et al. argue, "the

[26] Marginal effects plots for the interaction between party network density and representational balance are presented in *Figures E2.1* through *E3.2*. Marginal effects plots corresponding to those presented in the article—the effects of representational balance on the development indicators, conditional on party network density—are also presented in *Figures E4.1* through *E4.6* (Berry et al. 2012).

[27] See Benjamini and Hochberg 1995, Anderson 2008, and Gelman et al. 2012 on the shortcomings of the Bonferroni method.

[28] See Kling et al. 2007 for an application of the Westfall and Young free step-down resampling method.

[29] See *Table E3* for results.

[30] I thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the importance of multiple hypothesis testing.

[31] Anderson also notes that "FDR formalizes the trade-off between correct and false rejections and reduces the penalty to testing additional hypotheses" (2008: 1487).

restrictiveness of the FWER criterion leads to multiple testing procedures that are not powerful in the sense that the probability of rejecting null hypotheses that are false must also be small. At the other extreme lies the strategy of ignoring the multiplicity issue altogether and testing each hypothesis at level α…The false discovery rate (FDR) criterion…bridges these two extremes."[32]

Another robustness check uses logged values of party network density. Population enters into the right-hand-side of the equation twice, once in the log population variable and once as the denominator in the measure of party network density. To account for this, I take logged values of party network density.[33] Since 17 observations have values of 0 for party network density, I add one to every value before making the log transformation. Results are presented in *Table E4*. Results are robust to this specification.

Five of the development indicators are bound between 0 and 100, and there is clustering in some of the observations at both 0 and 100. This is also true for the measure of streetlights per 1,000 residents, though with only a lower bound of zero. Theoretically, there cannot be negative observations of the development indicators, nor can there be more than 100 percent access to the goods and services. For this reason, Tobit may be an inappropriate model specification on theoretical grounds.[34] To demonstrate the robustness of the findings, though, *Table E5* presents results from Tobit specifications. The results are consistent with those from the OLS models.

Another specification that can examine the bounded nature of the dependent variables is a fractional logit model. Other than streetlights per 1,000 residents, the development indicators in this study are percentages. Fractional logit models take into account the inherent boundedness of dependent variables that are proportions, employing a generalized linear model with a logit transformation of the dependent variable and a binomial distribution.[35] To fit this model, I transform the five development indicators into proportions. *Table E6.1* presents the results from the fractional logit models and *Table E6.2* presents the corresponding marginal effects. Again, the results are consistent with those from the OLS specification.

Seventeen of the 80 settlements do not have any party workers. To ensure that the relationships between party network density and the development indicators hold in the absence of these settlements, I run all of the main regressions without the 17 settlements that are absent of party workers. Results are presented in *Table E7*. Party network density is positive and statistically significant in relation to the same four development indicators. The size of the coefficient on party network density is slightly smaller in relation to the percentage of paved roads, but otherwise, the results are consistent with those from the full models.

A peculiar finding from the regression results is that neither household income nor educational levels are statistically significant in their association with the development indicators. I therefore consider alternative measures for household wealth—average household income (not per capita) and an asset index of eleven distinct items—as well as an alternative measure for education—the percentage of respondents in each sampled settlement that were literate.[36] The correlation between average per-capita household income and average measures of the asset index is a modest 0.39. In the average settlement, households, on average, had 5.73 of these items with a one standard deviation of 1.11 items. The asset index is statistically significant

[32] Benjamini et al. 2006: 492.
[33] See Brown et al. 2009 for a similar approach.
[34] See Sigelman and Zeng 1999 for a discussion on appropriate conditions for Tobit models.
[35] See Papke and Wooldridge 1996.
[36] See *Table E8*. Respondents were asked whether or not they own a television, motorcycle or scooter, mobile phone, air cooler, fan, refrigerator, bed, gas cooker, radio, car, and cabinet (*almari*).

in 2 of the 6 models (piped water and sewer connections), and nearly significant at the 0.10 level in one additional model (municipal trash collection). Party network density continues to be statistically significant at the same *p* values in all of the models except in relation to trash collection, which rises above 0.10 to 0.16. Average household income, without converting it to a per capita measure, continues to be non significant in all of the models. Party network density exhibits the same levels of statistical significance as in the main regressions. The asset index presents some evidence that household wealth is positively related to community development, though measures of household income are still the preferred measure for wealth.[37] The correlation between average education levels and average literacy levels is 0.86. In the average settlement, 57.23 percent of respondents were literate with a one standard deviation of 17.67 percent. Literacy is not significant in any of the regressions.

Ethnicity and other social identities might influence the provision of public services through their actual composition in settlements, rather than levels of fractionalization.[38] There are two larger social identity categories that may inform distributive politics across settlements—Muslims and Scheduled Castes (SC)/ Scheduled Tribes (ST). These groups have historically faced significant social and economic marginalization in post-Independence India. The average settlement was 21.40 percent Muslim, with a one standard deviation of 31.36 percent, and the average settlement was 43.05 percent SC/ST, with a one standard deviation of 28.71 percent. Results are presented in *Tables E11.1* and *E11.2*. The coefficient on percent SC/ST is clearly non-significant across all development indicators, providing evidence that the composition of these groups does not play a role in the development of settlements. The coefficient for percentage Muslim is significant in relation to streetlights, presenting only weak evidence of any association between religious composition and development.

To ensure that outliers are not driving any of the statistical results, I examine a robust regression model with Huber-weights. Results are consistent (see *Table E12*), with the exception of the association between party network density and trash removal, where the p-value slightly rises above 0.10. I also use MM regression. *Table E13* presents the results. The statistical findings are again consistent, though the p-value on party network density in the trash removal regression hovers above 0.10 at 0.13.

As *Table E14* demonstrates, there is evidence of heteroskedasticity in the residuals in four of the six regressions. The presence of heteroskedasticity does not bias the coefficients but may influence estimates of variance, and thus the standard errors. For this reason, I employ Huber-White standard errors in the main regressions of the study. Results from OLS models without robust standard errors are consistent with those with robust standard errors, with the same four development indicators being statistically significant at either the 0.10 or .05 levels. See *Table E9* for results from OLS models without robust standard errors. I additionally estimate bootstrapped standard errors (see *Table E10*), as asymptotic normality in robust standard errors cannot be assumed.[39] These regressions show consistent results.

I consider the proximity of slums to centers of political power in the city. In urban India, centers of political power can be defined as the homes of politicians and officials or the public buildings in which they work. My ethnographic fieldwork showed that slum residents travel to both types of sites to make demands on the state. The homes of officials are spread throughout

[37] Assets, such as motorcycles, fans, and coolers, represent investments by households, investments that are partially determined by perceptions of security from eviction and crime.
[38] I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
[39] Angrist and Pischke 2009.

the city, and their specific locations are temporally in flux given India's anti-incumbency bias, electoral reservations, and political transfer of bureaucrats. Beyond major sites of public demand-making, there are also zonal offices, ward offices, and extension offices of departments, ensuring that settlements are within a reasonable distance of government offices. Moreover, in the case of acute problems, politicians visit slums themselves, and if residents are to participate in rallies or protests, busses are often provided for transportation. For these reasons, I do not believe that proximity to any single location will have an impact on the trajectory of organization or development in squatter settlements. In cities like Jaipur and Bhopal, distances to government buildings are never prohibitively costly, either in terms of time in transit or transportation fees.

To test this econometrically, I measured linear distances from sampled settlements to three prominent locations: the district collectorate, the *vidhan sabha*, and the old city. Distances lack in statistical significance across all of the development indicators, with the exception of streetlights, where the distance to the *vidhan sabha* exhibits a negative association and p-value of 0.09. See *Table E15* for results. A preponderance of evidence suggests that proximity to major sites of political interest do not influence the provision of infrastructure and services.

Table E16.1 presents results from probit regressions.[40] Party network density exhibits a positive and statistically significant association with three of the six development indicators—streetlights, doctor camps, and piped water. Party network density loses significance in its association with trash collection under the probit specification. This is because there are only 8 observations with zeros, providing insufficient variation for analysis. Party network density *gains* statistical significance in its association with piped water under the probit specification. Because the larger thrust of the econometric analyses in the study point against a significant association with piped water, though, I believe little weight should be attached to this finding.

I further inspect the dichotomous variable for paved road coverage. There are 14 settlements without any paved roads, and another four settlements with very negligible, near-zero percentages of paved roads—less than 15 percent, tantamount to one or a few paved footpaths. These 18 settlements are all clustered at the minimum extreme, with most of the remaining observations holding values above 70 percent. I therefore estimate a model that codes those four settlements as zeros. I also run two other alternative probit regressions: transforming the paved road variable into dichotomous variables for (1) whether or not settlements have 100 percent paved road coverage and (2) whether or not settlements have either zero or 100 percent paved road coverage, and removing those observations in between from the analysis.

Results are presented in *Table E16.2*. The three alternative coding schemes for paved roads all demonstrate statistical significance with party network density, with the first alternative model—including the four settlements with near-zero percentages with those slums that are absence of paved roads—being the preferred and most intuitive. The loss of statistical significance on party network density in *Table E16.1* is because those four observations are being artificially grouped with settlements that are clustered at the other extreme, losing a critical degree of variation in the process. The findings from the probit models are broadly consistent with those from the main regressions and related robustness checks.

[40] There are several right-hand-side variables that almost perfectly predict the dichotomous variable for doctor camps, and so the regression is over-determined and standard errors cannot be computed. I therefore reduce the set of right-hand-side variables for this regression so that results can be obtained. The right hand variables selected are the same as those in the reduced regressions presented in the manuscript.

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Table E1: Descriptive Statistics of Community Development Indices

	Average	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Eigenvalue
Development Index One (Component One)	4.61e-08	1.57	-2.44	4.40	2.47
Development Index Two (Component Two)	4.54e-08	1.20	-2.44	2.22	1.43

Figure E1: Plot of Eigenvalues after PCA for Community Development Indices



Table E2: Community Development Indices

	Development Index One			Development Index Two		
Party Network Density	0.207**	0.201**	0.365***	0.155**	0.148**	0.194**
	(0.0903)	(0.0878)	(0.101)	(0.0706)	(0.0693)	(0.0901)
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	-1.683***	-1.236***	-1.203***	1.664***	2.016***	2.625***
	(0.307)	(0.374)	(0.432)	(0.236)	(0.331)	(0.294)
Log Population	0.368**	0.439**	0.577***	0.401***	0.440***	0.425***
	(0.151)	(0.178)	(0.172)	(0.128)	(0.134)	(0.148)
Settlement Age	-0.00348	0.00230	0.00772	0.0148	0.0163	0.0193
	(0.0185)	(0.0204)	(0.0163)	(0.0115)	(0.0128)	(0.0123)
Average Education	0.458**	0.317	0.506*	0.0227	-0.220	-0.454*
	(0.192)	(0.206)	(0.288)	(0.212)	(0.295)	(0.259)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	0.483	0.302	1.000***	0.215	0.132	0.660**
	(0.384)	(0.418)	(0.360)	(0.422)	(0.423)	(0.294)
Caste Diversity	-1.099	-1.465	-3.615***	-1.037	-0.584	-0.758
	(1.398)	(1.389)	(0.886)	(0.668)	(0.778)	(1.111)
Religious Diversity	1.132	1.061	1.941**	0.621	0.458	0.323
	(0.866)	(0.809)	(0.823)	(0.650)	(0.657)	(0.785)
Regional Diversity	-0.491	-0.220	-0.495	0.169	-0.0769	-0.386
	(0.473)	(0.525)	(0.575)	(0.464)	(0.497)	(0.435)
Central Land		-0.493*	-0.366		0.196	0.465**
		(0.284)	(0.246)		(0.261)	(0.219)
Private Land		-0.266	-0.157		0.0972	-0.229
		(0.491)	(0.479)		(0.448)	(0.446)
State Electoral Competition		-0.0224	0.0000568		0.00161	0.000147
		(0.0293)	(0.0257)		(0.0254)	(0.0264)
Ward Electoral Competition		0.0250	0.0220		0.00141	0.00826
		(0.0189)	(0.0144)		(0.0151)	(0.0133)
Community Social Capital		0.0847	0.0922		0.130	0.262***
		(0.0889)	(0.0848)		(0.0849)	(0.0721)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.		0.00380	0.00534		-0.00237	-0.00683
		(0.00569)	(0.00428)		(0.00597)	(0.00588)
Land Titles		0.0137**	0.0113		0.00796*	0.0102***
		(0.0063)	(0.00784)		(0.0041)	(0.00374)
Party Representational Balance			-0.154			0.561
			(0.539)			(0.446)
PN Density * PR Balance			-0.278			-0.192
			(0.198)			(0.146)
Constant	-2.569*	-2.877*	-4.037***	-4.307***	-4.716***	-5.214***
	(1.461)	(1.677)	(1.308)	(0.994)	(1.184)	(1.295)
Observations	80	80	63	80	80	63
R^2	0.574	0.651	0.792	0.542	0.584	0.742

Note: Dependent variables are constructed from the 6 development indicators using principal component analysis. *Index 1* uses the first component (eigenvalue = 2.47) and *Index 2* uses the second component (eigenvalue = 1.43).
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Figure E2.1



Figure E2.2



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

Figure E3.2



Figure E4.1



Figure E4.2



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

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

Figure E4.5



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

Table E3: Adjusted P-Values to Account for Multiple Hypothesis Testing

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Collection	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Original P-Values	0.009	0.001	0.62	0.044	0.497	0.050
FWER Westfall and Young P-Values	0.05	0.006	0.736	0.168	0.736	0.168
FDR Q-Values	0.027	0.006	0.62	0.075	0.597	0.075
FDR Sharpened Q-Values	0.024	0.007	0.261	0.053	0.249	0.053

Note: Original P-Values from Full OLS Models with Robust Standard Errors

Table E4: Log Party Network Density

Variables	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Log Party Network Density	23.60***	2.988***	3.625	8.860**	-1.701	7.049*
	(7.869)	(1.014)	(9.449)	(4.163)	(7.033)	(3.898)
City (Jaipur = 0; Bhopal = 1)	24.46*	-5.764***	-28.96***	49.25***	-12.53	-7.322
	(12.63)	(1.351)	(9.488)	(7.678)	(8.254)	(5.504)
Log Population	15.28***	0.294	2.654	5.175	12.07**	2.824
	(5.530)	(0.805)	(5.571)	(3.265)	(4.689)	(2.868)
Settlement Age	0.214	0.00121	-0.0638	0.466*	0.558	-0.174
	(0.477)	(0.0514)	(0.473)	(0.272)	(0.517)	(0.249)
Average Education	1.079	0.277	5.611	-8.547	4.122	4.371
	(8.522)	(0.791)	(5.916)	(6.704)	(4.866)	(3.706)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-7.515	0.452	8.998	11.43	17.71	-1.388
	(16.29)	(1.725)	(11.55)	(8.901)	(12.27)	(6.558)
Caste Diversity	-14.55	0.0793	7.426	-10.14	-70.07**	-15.96
	(25.01)	(3.837)	(25.66)	(20.57)	(31.31)	(21.95)
Religious Diversity	3.303	4.412	-10.33	15.01	22.13	17.01
	(24.43)	(3.238)	(22.82)	(13.40)	(15.57)	(13.65)
Regional Diversity	-8.821	-1.999	-25.13	-6.520	4.159	6.335
	(19.73)	(2.559)	(20.02)	(10.41)	(14.73)	(8.512)
Central Land	1.781	1.228	-9.338	8.170	-26.63***	-1.459
	(9.890)	(1.465)	(9.991)	(5.016)	(6.848)	(4.737)
Private Land	-9.144	0.221	-6.749	8.268	-2.297	-3.709
	(17.63)	(1.327)	(11.62)	(7.030)	(14.61)	(5.510)
State Electoral Competition	-0.660	-0.0922	-0.133	0.104	0.532	-0.796*
	(0.923)	(0.116)	(0.973)	(0.570)	(0.798)	(0.451)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.758	0.115	-0.0529	0.580	0.634	0.450
	(0.540)	(0.0757)	(0.523)	(0.434)	(0.429)	(0.345)
Community Social Capital	1.129	0.668*	1.188	4.806**	0.776	0.105
	(2.606)	(0.338)	(2.165)	(2.100)	(2.045)	(1.672)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.180	-0.00382	-0.0169	0.0139	0.0408	0.178**
	(0.199)	(0.0215)	(0.180)	(0.117)	(0.143)	(0.0858)
Land Titles	0.202	0.0129	0.354**	0.154	0.282	0.0398
	(0.126)	(0.0200)	(0.138)	(0.0965)	(0.171)	(0.0811)
Constant	-42.43	1.989	14.34	-57.43*	-66.80*	16.18
	(50.61)	(4.887)	(49.29)	(29.00)	(36.45)	(25.68)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80
R^2	0.449	0.640	0.477	0.604	0.506	0.367

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E5: Tobit Models

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	10.52**	1.426***	2.771	3.193*	-1.811	2.818**
	(4.529)	(0.371)	(3.123)	(1.641)	(3.186)	(1.338)
City (Jaipur = 0; Bhopal =1)	35.62*	-6.816***	-37.56***	53.14***	-12.62	-7.609
	(19.89)	(1.587)	(13.83)	(6.923)	(13.62)	(5.696)
Log Population	23.90**	1.859*	11.82	5.870	29.96***	4.601
	(10.99)	(0.977)	(8.291)	(3.907)	(8.664)	(3.324)
Settlement Age	0.424	0.0340	0.0312	0.417	0.732	-0.194
	(0.817)	(0.0617)	(0.551)	(0.286)	(0.545)	(0.233)
Average Education	5.677	0.530	11.21	-9.293**	6.344	6.131
	(13.26)	(1.145)	(9.952)	(4.536)	(9.421)	(3.957)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-21.03	-0.182	7.676	13.44	23.43	-3.513
	(25.62)	(2.004)	(17.75)	(8.770)	(17.26)	(7.199)
Central Land	8.489	0.294	-20.28*	9.722*	-42.76***	-3.494
	(16.60)	(1.313)	(11.92)	(5.726)	(12.01)	(4.754)
Private Land	-6.001	0.254	-11.60	13.09*	-5.165	-4.149
	(22.84)	(1.666)	(15.58)	(7.763)	(14.73)	(6.225)
Caste Diversity	-35.40	-2.490	-2.053	-2.954	-110.2***	-17.94
	(50.48)	(3.888)	(34.91)	(17.49)	(34.98)	(14.43)
Religious Diversity	14.31	2.964	-19.61	16.03	34.01	17.40
	(41.28)	(3.478)	(30.10)	(14.73)	(29.95)	(12.25)
Regional Diversity	9.758	1.541	-33.46	-8.146	15.65	10.84
	(31.85)	(2.669)	(22.66)	(11.12)	(23.11)	(9.238)
State Electoral Competition	-0.966	-0.124	-1.037	0.345	0.589	-0.954*
	(1.730)	(0.149)	(1.274)	(0.626)	(1.298)	(0.524)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.989	0.250**	0.812	0.476	1.935**	0.602*
	(1.055)	(0.0959)	(0.786)	(0.379)	(0.841)	(0.315)
Community Social Capital	3.121	1.180***	1.771	4.896***	4.152	0.353
	(4.951)	(0.435)	(3.651)	(1.706)	(3.705)	(1.455)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.301	-0.0140	-0.0718	0.00866	-0.0599	0.193*
	(0.353)	(0.0268)	(0.247)	(0.123)	(0.245)	(0.0998)
Land Titles	0.460	0.00719	0.310	0.240*	0.242	0.0391
	(0.361)	(0.0252)	(0.222)	(0.122)	(0.216)	(0.0959)
Constant	-87.01	-10.47	-52.94	-72.76**	-212.6***	4.657
	(83.24)	(7.441)	(60.06)	(29.68)	(67.84)	(24.60)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80
Number of Censored Observations	38	24	28	9	36	8
Pseudo R^2	0.06	0.20	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.06

Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E6.1: Fractional Logit Models

	Paved Roads	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	0.452**	0.0934	0.139**	-0.139	0.132*
	(0.181)	(0.149)	(0.0667)	(0.127)	(0.0683)
City (Jaipur = 0; Bhopal = 1)	1.620**	-1.460***	2.319***	-0.580	-0.298
	(0.696)	(0.473)	(0.418)	(0.490)	(0.319)
Log Population	1.182***	0.224	0.276*	1.294***	0.212
	(0.316)	(0.304)	(0.145)	(0.287)	(0.156)
Settlement Age	0.0219	-0.00317	0.0222	0.0344	-0.0131
	(0.0288)	(0.0213)	(0.0151)	(0.0249)	(0.0145)
Average Education	-0.0210	0.323	-0.372	0.315	0.366
	(0.419)	(0.340)	(0.328)	(0.354)	(0.236)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-0.435	0.429	0.744	1.140*	-0.240
	(0.852)	(0.610)	(0.461)	(0.655)	(0.316)
Central Land	-0.0383	-0.779	0.408*	-2.523***	-0.0886
	(0.534)	(0.606)	(0.234)	(0.625)	(0.235)
Private Land	-0.757	-0.499	*Omitted*	-0.411	*Omitted*
	(0.825)	(0.557)		(0.687)	
Caste Diversity	-1.359	0.0825	-0.438	-5.731***	-1.048
	(1.360)	(1.183)	(1.109)	(1.687)	(1.007)
Religious Diversity	0.228	-0.897	0.964	1.780	1.166*
	(1.407)	(1.256)	(0.665)	(1.096)	(0.697)
Regional Diversity	-0.111	-1.497	-0.151	0.513	0.542
	(1.070)	(1.184)	(0.478)	(1.103)	(0.436)
State Electoral Competition	-0.0452	-0.0232	0.00988	0.0534	-0.0528**
	(0.0492)	(0.0527)	(0.0259)	(0.0518)	(0.0250)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.0325	0.00486	0.0219	0.101***	0.0329*
	(0.0271)	(0.0298)	(0.0182)	(0.0341)	(0.0178)
Community Social Capital	0.0854	0.0878	0.173*	0.226	0.0149
	(0.161)	(0.139)	(0.100)	(0.141)	(0.0867)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.00747	-0.000399	0.000167	0.00371	0.00892**
	(0.0108)	(0.00963)	(0.00576)	(0.00951)	(0.00455)
Land Titles	0.0122	0.0164**	0.00877	0.00811	0.00359
	(0.00941)	(0.00683)	(0.00548)	(0.00657)	(0.00435)
Constant	-7.145**	-1.986	-5.686***	-11.35***	-1.850
	(3.020)	(2.728)	(1.385)	(2.627)	(1.387)
Observations	80	80	72	80	72
R^2					

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E6.2: Marginal Effects of Fractional Logit Models

	Paved Roads	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	0.084**	0.019	0.032**	-0.017	0.025*
	(0.311)	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)
City (Jaipur = 0; Bhopal = 1)	0.311**	-0.300***	0.473***	-0.075	-0.058
	(0.136)	(0.095)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.062)
Log Population	0.221***	0.045	0.064*	0.162***	0.040
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.030)
Settlement Age	0.004	-0.001	0.005	0.004	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Average Education	-0.004	0.065	-0.086	0.040	0.070
	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-0.081	0.087	0.171	0.143*	-0.046
	(0.159)	(0.122)	(0.107)	(0.086)	(0.060)
Central Land	-0.007	-0.144	0.096*	-0.225***	-0.017
	(0.101)	(0.094)	(0.056)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Private Land	-0.161	-0.092	*Omitted*	-0.046	*Omitted*
	(0.194)	(0.092)		(0.066)	
Caste Diversity	-0.254	0.017	-0.101	-0.720***	-0.201
	(0.252)	(0.239)	(0.256)	(0.193)	(0.194)
Religious Diversity	0.043	-0.181	0.222	0.224*	0.224*
	(0.263)	(0.258)	(0.153)	(0.135)	(0.134)
Regional Diversity	-0.021	-0.303	-0.035	0.064	0.104
	(0.200)	(0.234)	(0.110)	(0.007)	(0.083)
State Electoral Competition	-0.008	-0.005	0.002	0.007	-0.010**
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.006	0.001	0.005	0.013***	0.006*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.03)	(0.003)
Community Social Capital	0.016	0.018	0.040*	0.028*	0.003
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.001	-0.00008	0.00004	0.0005	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Land Titles	0.002	0.003**	0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)
Observations	80	80	72	80	72

Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E7: Excluding the 17 Settlements without Party Workers

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	4.374*	1.125***	3.584	2.828*	-1.776	2.774*
	(2.348)	(0.381)	(2.898)	(1.447)	(1.871)	(1.505)
City (Jaipur = 0; Bhopal= 1)	46.22***	-5.925***	-18.80*	59.35***	-14.56	-11.23*
	(10.17)	(1.756)	(10.96)	(6.421)	(9.552)	(6.396)
Log Population	18.04***	0.145	1.524	5.850*	10.62**	2.309
	(4.407)	(0.812)	(6.008)	(3.206)	(4.813)	(3.396)
Settlement Age	-0.000419	-0.00203	0.261	0.631*	0.937*	-0.378
	(0.358)	(0.0625)	(0.487)	(0.329)	(0.476)	(0.335)
Average Education	-2.671	0.667	5.696	-14.08**	10.18	4.424
	(7.620)	(1.416)	(7.786)	(6.040)	(6.917)	(5.436)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	12.96	1.146	31.20***	16.10**	29.44**	1.371
	(11.00)	(1.995)	(8.901)	(7.107)	(12.88)	(6.529)
Central Land	13.89*	1.412	-9.331	8.175	-27.30***	0.869
	(7.763)	(1.552)	(9.155)	(5.281)	(6.685)	(4.905)
Private Land	-20.99	0.944	0.905	5.160	4.294	-1.243
	(16.53)	(1.534)	(11.36)	(6.796)	(16.26)	(6.720)
Caste Diversity	-30.03	-3.963	-31.31	-14.75	-105.9***	-24.08
	(20.24)	(3.478)	(23.58)	(30.04)	(23.57)	(28.15)
Religious Diversity	4.045	4.194	1.643	15.07	20.48	15.01
	(21.41)	(3.911)	(21.99)	(14.95)	(16.26)	(15.27)
Regional Diversity	-21.76	-2.334	-50.43**	-10.32	-2.830	10.81
	(14.33)	(3.211)	(19.43)	(9.418)	(14.54)	(10.07)
State Electoral Competition	-0.372	-0.0629	0.510	0.286	0.568	-0.380
	(0.922)	(0.131)	(1.047)	(0.556)	(0.702)	(0.505)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.416	0.0998	-0.0440	0.664**	0.522	0.122
	(0.520)	(0.0884)	(0.565)	(0.266)	(0.513)	(0.313)
Community Social Capital	5.500***	0.708*	-0.226	7.107***	-1.154	-1.274
	(1.865)	(0.403)	(2.386)	(1.998)	(2.187)	(1.933)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.351*	0.00430	0.0716	-0.0215	0.0220	0.194*
	(0.181)	(0.0212)	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.139)	(0.0996)
Land Titles	0.302***	0.0124	0.416**	0.235**	0.229	0.0554
	(0.106)	(0.0246)	(0.172)	(0.0946)	(0.185)	(0.0810)
Constant	-63.64*	5.361	-4.355	-66.40*	-56.87	28.53
	(33.77)	(5.722)	(58.50)	(34.40)	(37.15)	(34.94)
Observations	63	63	63	63	63	63
R^2	0.612	0.671	0.650	0.724	0.662	0.355

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E8: OLS Models with Asset Index and Literacy Rates

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	6.111***	1.084***	0.132	1.967	-3.197	2.507*
	(2.294)	(0.318)	(3.041)	(1.381)	(2.033)	(1.278)
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	21.97*	-5.799***	-32.10***	42.73***	-16.37**	-5.900
	(11.02)	(1.262)	(9.130)	(7.128)	(7.365)	(5.649)
Log Population	13.24**	0.211	0.0966	4.528	11.11**	2.602
	(6.148)	(0.759)	(5.791)	(3.386)	(4.492)	(2.664)
Settlement Age	0.0256	-0.0161	-0.240	0.291	0.407	-0.193
	(0.498)	(0.0474)	(0.422)	(0.294)	(0.451)	(0.254)
Literacy	0.0617	-0.00007	0.0332	-0.185	-0.0621	0.0897
	(0.295)	(0.0305)	(0.190)	(0.175)	(0.149)	(0.129)
Asset Index	6.927	0.602	10.84***	4.889	11.91***	1.355
	(4.850)	(0.515)	(3.917)	(3.005)	(3.159)	(2.517)
Central Land	3.327	1.345	-6.692	7.484	-24.49***	-0.660
	(9.941)	(1.466)	(9.643)	(5.393)	(6.827)	(4.455)
Private Land	-4.004	0.647	-0.983	11.24	3.617	-2.892
	(16.85)	(1.372)	(11.05)	(7.374)	(13.19)	(5.435)
Caste Diversity	-26.47	-0.527	0.509	-16.99	-74.56***	-16.44
	(23.79)	(3.579)	(22.96)	(19.48)	(26.22)	(21.32)
Religious Diversity	16.90	4.667	-7.754	19.91	23.92	17.35
	(24.12)	(3.169)	(22.27)	(13.96)	(15.24)	(13.27)
Regional Diversity	0.725	-1.291	-21.23	2.785	10.01	6.058
	(19.53)	(2.539)	(18.86)	(12.02)	(14.61)	(8.869)
State Electoral Competition	-0.288	-0.0690	0.159	0.394	0.903	-0.754
	(0.928)	(0.111)	(0.960)	(0.613)	(0.662)	(0.460)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.843	0.113	-0.156	0.673	0.614	0.395
	(0.598)	(0.0708)	(0.529)	(0.474)	(0.455)	(0.339)
Community Social Capital	-0.552	0.611*	0.276	3.320	0.129	0.271
	(2.675)	(0.325)	(1.891)	(2.218)	(1.666)	(1.660)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.129	-0.00084	-0.0223	0.0491	0.00632	0.177**
	(0.204)	(0.0210)	(0.160)	(0.115)	(0.126)	(0.0809)
Land Titles	0.205	0.0155	0.304**	0.125	0.216	0.0550
	(0.135)	(0.0201)	(0.135)	(0.104)	(0.171)	(0.0876)
Constant	-63.73	1.173	0.560	-59.71**	-86.81**	11.66
	(50.67)	(4.725)	(49.95)	(27.90)	(34.68)	(25.47)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80
R^2	0.443	0.661	0.535	0.599	0.580	0.367

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E9: OLS Models (Non-Robust Standard Errors)

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	6.664**	1.159***	1.520	2.895*	-1.504	2.577*
	(2.849)	(0.316)	(2.499)	(1.652)	(2.186)	(1.385)
City (Jaipur = 0; Bhopal = 1)	25.18**	-5.651***	-28.81***	49.55***	-12.65	-7.065
	(11.87)	(1.315)	(10.41)	(6.885)	(9.107)	(5.770)
Log Population	17.51**	0.347	2.635	5.727	12.65**	3.064
	(6.838)	(0.758)	(5.996)	(3.965)	(5.245)	(3.323)
Settlement Age	0.172	-0.00779	-0.0761	0.446	0.573	-0.194
	(0.499)	(0.0553)	(0.438)	(0.289)	(0.383)	(0.242)
Average Education	1.929	0.307	5.619	-8.324*	4.313	4.480
	(7.899)	(0.875)	(6.927)	(4.581)	(6.059)	(3.839)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-9.592	0.436	9.069	10.96	17.06	-1.549
	(15.10)	(1.673)	(13.24)	(8.756)	(11.58)	(7.338)
Central Land	0.924	1.193	-9.355	7.940	-26.80***	-1.579
	(9.980)	(1.106)	(8.752)	(5.788)	(7.656)	(4.850)
Private Land	-8.577	0.321	-6.618	8.516	-2.429	-3.487
	(13.29)	(1.473)	(11.66)	(7.709)	(10.20)	(6.461)
Caste Diversity	-15.45	-0.162	7.086	-10.64	-69.58***	-16.47
	(29.83)	(3.305)	(26.16)	(17.30)	(22.88)	(14.50)
Religious Diversity	8.402	4.523	-10.39	16.26	23.50	17.54
	(25.89)	(2.868)	(22.70)	(15.01)	(19.86)	(12.58)
Regional Diversity	-1.942	-1.497	-24.66	-4.399	4.864	7.702
	(19.35)	(2.144)	(16.97)	(11.22)	(14.85)	(9.405)
State Electoral Competition	-0.434	-0.0832	-0.130	0.164	0.579	-0.765
	(1.097)	(0.122)	(0.962)	(0.636)	(0.842)	(0.533)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.687	0.118	-0.0520	0.599	0.649	0.460
	(0.659)	(0.0730)	(0.578)	(0.382)	(0.506)	(0.320)
Community Social Capital	1.121	0.657*	1.170	4.790***	0.810	0.0837
	(2.987)	(0.331)	(2.620)	(1.732)	(2.291)	(1.452)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.166	-0.00006	-0.0117	0.0218	0.0335	0.186*
	(0.212)	(0.0235)	(0.186)	(0.123)	(0.163)	(0.103)
Land Titles	0.252	0.0188	0.360**	0.172	0.280*	0.0539
	(0.204)	(0.0226)	(0.179)	(0.119)	(0.157)	(0.0993)
Constant	-55.06	2.033	14.99	-60.12**	-71.23*	15.47
	(51.40)	(5.694)	(45.07)	(29.81)	(39.43)	(24.98)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80
R^2	0.422	0.654	0.478	0.601	0.510	0.370

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E10: OLS Models with Bootstrapped Standard Errors

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	6.664**	1.159***	1.520	2.895*	-1.504	2.577*
	(2.811)	(0.357)	(3.263)	(1.613)	(2.316)	(1.440)
City (Jaipur = 0; Bhopal = 1)	25.18*	-5.651***	-28.81**	49.55***	-12.65	-7.065
	(14.38)	(1.523)	(11.38)	(8.961)	(9.837)	(6.421)
Log Population	17.51***	0.347	2.635	5.727	12.65**	3.064
	(6.536)	(0.878)	(6.228)	(3.645)	(5.103)	(3.367)
Settlement Age	0.172	-0.00779	-0.0761	0.446	0.573	-0.194
	(0.568)	(0.0580)	(0.546)	(0.316)	(0.553)	(0.283)
Average Education	1.929	0.307	5.619	-8.324	4.313	4.480
	(9.857)	(0.938)	(7.424)	(7.596)	(6.502)	(4.270)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-9.592	0.436	9.069	10.96	17.06	-1.549
	(17.64)	(1.874)	(13.21)	(10.53)	(14.09)	(7.290)
Central Land	0.924	1.193	-9.355	7.940	-26.80***	-1.579
	(11.40)	(1.491)	(10.50)	(5.761)	(7.845)	(4.970)
Private Land	-8.577	0.321	-6.618	8.516	-2.429	-3.487
	(19.29)	(1.528)	(12.96)	(7.953)	(15.77)	(6.571)
Caste Diversity	-15.45	-0.162	7.086	-10.64	-69.58**	-16.47
	(30.25)	(4.246)	(28.76)	(23.17)	(33.70)	(23.66)
Religious Diversity	8.402	4.523	-10.39	16.26	23.50	17.54
	(27.40)	(3.455)	(24.76)	(15.32)	(18.28)	(14.40)
Regional Diversity	-1.942	-1.497	-24.66	-4.399	4.864	7.702
	(21.67)	(2.533)	(20.10)	(12.02)	(16.38)	(9.399)
State Electoral Competition	-0.434	-0.0832	-0.130	0.164	0.579	-0.765
	(1.073)	(0.123)	(1.044)	(0.655)	(0.824)	(0.520)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.687	0.118	-0.0520	0.599	0.649	0.460
	(0.662)	(0.0822)	(0.558)	(0.452)	(0.500)	(0.368)
Community Social Capital	1.121	0.657*	1.170	4.790**	0.810	0.0837
	(3.065)	(0.368)	(2.691)	(2.275)	(2.455)	(1.882)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.166	-0.00006	-0.0117	0.0218	0.0335	0.186*
	(0.233)	(0.0240)	(0.212)	(0.133)	(0.177)	(0.102)
Land Titles	0.252	0.0188	0.360*	0.172	0.280	0.0539
	(0.179)	(0.0256)	(0.196)	(0.129)	(0.214)	(0.117)
Constant	-55.06	2.033	14.99	-60.12*	-71.23*	15.47
	(56.04)	(5.571)	(55.43)	(32.35)	(42.21)	(27.97)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80
R^2	0.422	0.654	0.478	0.601	0.510	0.370

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E11.1: OLS Models (with Percent Muslim and Percent SC/ST)

	Paved Roads		Street Lights		Piped Water	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Party Network Density	6.223**	6.153**	1.165***	1.125***	0.214	0.270
	(2.404)	(2.410)	(0.306)	(0.309)	(2.860)	(2.915)
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	19.89**	21.43*	-7.953***	-6.410***	-35.82***	-33.77***
	(9.337)	(11.61)	(1.166)	(1.313)	(7.513)	(9.064)
Log Population	16.30***	14.91***	-0.209	0.286	2.513	1.351
	(4.018)	(5.494)	(0.573)	(0.646)	(4.361)	(5.830)
Settlement Age	0.0332	0.0145	-0.0335	-0.0117	-0.298	-0.287
	(0.443)	(0.447)	(0.0430)	(0.0523)	(0.434)	(0.458)
Average Education	7.575	4.917	1.598**	0.799	11.20**	10.69*
	(7.426)	(8.660)	(0.774)	(0.817)	(5.504)	(5.953)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-7.829	-7.721	0.759	0.279	17.43	13.53
	(15.15)	(14.81)	(1.290)	(1.493)	(11.29)	(10.67)
Percent Muslim	0.192	0.209	0.0503***	0.0444**	0.127	0.125
	(0.147)	(0.155)	(0.0178)	(0.0182)	(0.140)	(0.149)
Percent SC/ST	-0.0475	0.0105	0.0299*	0.0294	-0.189	-0.119
	(0.152)	(0.169)	(0.0177)	(0.0206)	(0.144)	(0.149)
Central Land		2.560		0.681		-9.610
		(10.24)		(1.289)		(9.554)
Private Land		-11.84		-0.455		-10.46
		(16.07)		(1.505)		(11.07)
State Electoral Competition		-0.154		-0.0349		-0.0806
		(0.984)		(0.102)		(0.990)
Ward Electoral Competition		-0.817		0.101		-0.0154
		(0.576)		(0.0703)		(0.512)
Community Social Capital		0.300		0.632**		-0.593
		(2.607)		(0.307)		(2.101)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.		-0.122		-0.00069		0.0572
		(0.199)		(0.0200)		(0.165)
Land Titles		0.226		0.0131		0.306**
		(0.141)		(0.0205)		(0.150)
Constant	-79.95**	-54.56	4.356	0.225	8.783	19.66
	(39.08)	(50.01)	(3.944)	(4.671)	(34.70)	(53.13)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80
R^2	0.390	0.438	0.635	0.668	0.436	0.483

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E11.2: OLS Models (with Percent Muslim and Percent SC/ST)

	Trash Removal		Sewer Connections		Doctor Camps	
	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
Party Network Density	2.892*	2.687*	-1.516	-2.138	2.468*	2.912**
	(1.690)	(1.583)	(2.572)	(2.573)	(1.257)	(1.410)
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	38.88***	48.51***	-19.73**	-20.43*	-12.38***	-7.270
	(5.042)	(6.506)	(8.376)	(11.02)	(3.781)	(4.520)
Log Population	2.338	4.596	5.646	6.275	3.243	2.329
	(2.767)	(2.991)	(4.948)	(4.909)	(1.952)	(2.696)
Settlement Age	0.381*	0.325	0.348	0.401	-0.159	-0.166
	(0.223)	(0.231)	(0.414)	(0.537)	(0.176)	(0.249)
Average Education	-1.239	-6.251	5.426	4.510	3.935	3.432
	(4.829)	(6.322)	(4.932)	(5.024)	(3.334)	(3.095)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	14.93*	13.35	22.78*	13.24	-3.344	-3.601
	(8.447)	(8.295)	(12.54)	(13.39)	(5.386)	(5.885)
Percent Muslim	0.161*	0.122	0.241	0.248	0.0898	0.0623
	(0.0919)	(0.0960)	(0.152)	(0.162)	(0.104)	(0.114)
Percent SC/ST	-0.111	-0.127	-0.0217	0.136	0.0938	0.0659
	(0.0911)	(0.1000)	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.109)	(0.110)
Central Land		10.33**		-21.82***		-0.679
		(4.283)		(6.172)		(4.303)
Private Land		5.089		-2.800		-3.672
		(5.741)		(15.97)		(5.666)
State Electoral Competition		0.202		1.167		-0.643
		(0.530)		(0.992)		(0.495)
Ward Electoral Competition		0.525		0.226		0.343
		(0.444)		(0.406)		(0.362)
Community Social Capital		3.998**		0.107		0.474
		(1.925)		(1.949)		(1.609)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.		0.0610		0.0339		0.166*
		(0.103)		(0.134)		(0.0834)
Land Titles		0.117		0.372*		0.0703
		(0.0957)		(0.211)		(0.119)
Constant	-34.01	-57.69**	-57.92*	-74.71*	3.561	11.57
	(20.42)	(28.69)	(32.16)	(38.61)	(17.65)	(27.62)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80
R^2	0.548	0.636	0.328	0.459	0.265	0.344

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E12: Robust Regression Models with Huber-Weights

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	7.073**	1.024***	-1.340	1.858	-2.020	2.485*
	(3.013)	(0.298)	(2.314)	(1.427)	(2.132)	(1.386)
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	30.65**	-5.153***	-38.18***	62.59***	-16.13*	-6.119
	(12.55)	(1.242)	(9.642)	(5.945)	(8.884)	(5.775)
Log Population	20.02***	0.924	6.481	4.899	14.45***	3.397
	(7.230)	(0.716)	(5.553)	(3.424)	(5.117)	(3.326)
Settlement Age	-0.178	-0.0220	0.756*	0.730***	1.108***	-0.149
	(0.528)	(0.0522)	(0.405)	(0.250)	(0.373)	(0.243)
Average Education	3.374	-0.148	2.072	-15.84***	4.025	2.254
	(8.352)	(0.827)	(6.415)	(3.955)	(5.911)	(3.842)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-5.146	0.592	22.95*	14.25*	21.58*	-2.610
	(15.97)	(1.580)	(12.26)	(7.561)	(11.30)	(7.345)
Central Land	7.138	0.596	-17.61**	7.935	-27.83***	0.603
	(10.55)	(1.044)	(8.105)	(4.997)	(7.468)	(4.854)
Private Land	-15.94	0.298	8.355	6.854	15.70	-1.571
	(14.06)	(1.391)	(10.80)	(6.657)	(9.948)	(6.466)
Caste Diversity	-5.411	-3.181	-7.322	19.56	-69.46***	3.218
	(31.54)	(3.122)	(24.23)	(14.94)	(22.32)	(14.51)
Religious Diversity	10.13	-0.583	12.23	-2.252	16.18	9.422
	(27.37)	(2.709)	(21.03)	(12.96)	(19.37)	(12.59)
Regional Diversity	6.405	-0.349	-18.73	-19.97**	2.776	5.821
	(20.46)	(2.025)	(15.72)	(9.691)	(14.48)	(9.413)
State Electoral Competition	-0.230	-0.0402	0.630	0.490	0.654	-0.538
	(1.160)	(0.115)	(0.891)	(0.550)	(0.821)	(0.534)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.760	0.0232	0.532	0.787**	0.587	0.439
	(0.697)	(0.0690)	(0.535)	(0.330)	(0.493)	(0.321)
Community Social Capital	1.311	0.326	0.164	8.828***	-0.0620	0.650
	(3.159)	(0.313)	(2.426)	(1.496)	(2.235)	(1.453)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.306	0.00991	-0.0728	-0.00911	-0.0568	0.169
	(0.225)	(0.0222)	(0.173)	(0.106)	(0.159)	(0.103)
Land Titles	0.365*	0.0200	0.301*	0.152	0.227	0.00897
	(0.216)	(0.0214)	(0.166)	(0.102)	(0.153)	(0.0994)
Constant	-87.97	1.682	-56.21	-83.56***	-101.9**	-1.579
	(54.35)	(5.379)	(41.74)	(25.74)	(38.46)	(25.00)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80
R^2	0.489	0.632	0.612	0.744	0.586	0.347

Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E13: MM Regression Models

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	7.124**	1.008***	-0.996	1.779	-1.725	2.501*
	(2.880)	(0.305)	(2.265)	(1.375)	(2.103)	(1.346)
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	30.065**	-5.187***	-36.90***	62.051***	-15.731*	-6.190
	(11.999)	(1.270)	(9.439)	(5.731)	(8.760)	(5.610)
Log Population	19.746***	0.848	6.486	4.972	14.355***	3.403
	(6.911)	(0.731)	(5.436)	(3.301)	(5.045)	(3.231)
Settlement Age	-0.161	-0.010	0.671*	0.681***	1.091***	-0.152
	(0.504)	(0.053)	(0.397)	(0.241)	(0.368)	0.236
Average Education	3.227	-0.097	2.862	-16.077***	3.603	2.217
	(7.983)	(0.845)	(6.280)	(3.813)	(5.829)	(3.733)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-5.210	0.523	20.790*	15.462**	22.079*	-2.606
	(15.260)	(1.615)	(12.005)	(7.289)	(11.142)	(7.135)
Central Land	6.379	0.345	-18.186**	8.893*	-27.15***	0.641
	(10.087)	(1.068)	(7.935)	(4.817)	(7.364)	(4.716)
Private Land	-16.531	0.204	6.997	7.121	19.209*	-1.483
	(13.436)	(1.422)	(10.569)	(6.417)	(9.809)	(6.282)
Caste Diversity	-5.648	-2.408	-1.440	19.716	-69.80***	3.603
	(30.150)	(3.191)	(23.717)	(14.400)	(22.012)	(14.097)
Religious Diversity	8.719	0.880	6.828	-1.417	15.813	9.316
	(26.164)	(2.770)	(20.582)	(12.496)	(19.102)	(12.233)
Regional Diversity	5.931	0.113	-22.978	-19.121**	1.487	5.898
	(19.559)	(2.070)	(15.386)	(9.342)	(14.280)	(9.145)
State Electoral Competition	-0.268	-0.061	0.800	0.492	0.669	-0.526
	(1.109)	(0.117)	(0.873)	(0.530)	(0.810)	(0.519)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.761	0.056	0.501	0.780**	0.563	0.435
	(0.666)	(0.071)	(0.524)	(0.318)	(0.487)	(0.312)
Community Social Capital	1.089	0.444	0.410	8.648***	-0.160	0.633
	(3.019)	(0.320)	(2.375)	(1.442)	(2.204)	(1.412)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.297	0.007	-0.065	-0.017	-0.048	0.169*
	(0.215)	(0.023)	(0.169)	(0.103)	(0.157)	(0.100)
Land Titles	0.360*	0.021	0.295*	0.150	0.250	0.008
	(0.207)	(0.022)	(0.163)	(0.099)	(0.151)	(0.097)
Constant	-84.579	1.198	-57.106	-83.47***	-101.5***	-1.958
	(51.944)	(5.498)	(40.862)	(24.809)	(37.925)	(24.287)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80

Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E14: Post-Estimation Tests for Heteroskedasticity

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg Test	20.44 (0.000)	7.92 (0.005)	0.69 (0.406)	0.06 (0.799)	5.74 (0.017)	4.89 (0.0270)

Note: Chi^2 Tests, H_0 Constant Variance (Prob. > Chi^2 in Parentheses)

Table E15: Examining the Influence of Distance to Major Political Centers (OLS Models)

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	7.144***	1.231***	1.089	2.938**	-2.024	2.752**
	(2.513)	(0.335)	(2.896)	(1.461)	(2.234)	(1.337)
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	20.54	-6.279***	-24.72**	48.50***	-14.43	-9.560
	(12.64)	(1.443)	(11.10)	(8.074)	(8.663)	(5.819)
Log Population	14.58**	0.137	2.178	4.738	13.51***	3.552
	(5.841)	(0.786)	(5.503)	(3.390)	(4.484)	(2.940)
Settlement Age	-0.127	-0.0316	-0.0868	0.349	0.643	-0.168
	(0.506)	(0.0512)	(0.478)	(0.288)	(0.523)	(0.271)
Average Education	3.928	0.354	7.234	-7.351	4.620	3.481
	(8.818)	(0.773)	(5.621)	(6.763)	(4.858)	(3.733)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-5.986	0.966	5.410	11.60	17.43	0.552
	(17.43)	(1.624)	(11.48)	(9.376)	(12.32)	(6.295)
Central Land	9.156	2.182	-13.62	9.562	-31.71***	0.0521
	(10.98)	(1.468)	(10.29)	(6.531)	(8.054)	(5.977)
Private Land	-13.30	0.0791	-8.719	6.644	-1.604	-1.955
	(19.02)	(1.329)	(12.56)	(7.016)	(14.86)	(4.805)
Caste Diversity	-9.529	1.035	-2.777	-10.87	-76.01**	-11.60
	(24.25)	(3.662)	(28.71)	(22.07)	(29.76)	(21.16)
Religious Diversity	4.840	4.459	-13.66	14.53	23.69	19.64
	(25.50)	(3.174)	(23.67)	(14.24)	(16.41)	(13.52)
Regional Diversity	0.902	-2.201	-11.45	-0.859	8.956	0.219
	(21.41)	(2.493)	(18.66)	(13.26)	(15.92)	(10.34)
State Electoral Competition	0.781	0.0331	-0.422	0.528	0.601	-0.633
	(1.081)	(0.116)	(1.125)	(0.704)	(0.945)	(0.507)
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.801	0.128	-0.336	0.520	0.727	0.644*
	(0.611)	(0.0856)	(0.552)	(0.409)	(0.479)	(0.356)
Community Social Capital	-0.00333	0.534	1.708	4.473*	0.509	-0.234
	(2.805)	(0.339)	(2.457)	(2.283)	(2.100)	(1.705)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.153	-0.00572	0.0842	0.0445	0.0585	0.132
	(0.224)	(0.0237)	(0.197)	(0.122)	(0.140)	(0.0879)
Land Titles	0.221	0.0172	0.343**	0.161	0.303	0.0683
	(0.143)	(0.0190)	(0.153)	(0.102)	(0.186)	(0.0849)
Distance to Vidhan Sabha (km)	-2.990	-0.493*	3.686	-0.340	0.604	-2.017
	(2.907)	(0.286)	(2.394)	(1.614)	(1.999)	(1.285)
Distance to Collectorate (km)	-2.809	-0.149	-1.455	-0.962	2.530	1.290
	(2.690)	(0.320)	(2.398)	(1.692)	(1.979)	(1.463)
Distance to Old City (km)	-0.703	0.0133	-0.637	-0.601	-2.823	0.0516
	(2.769)	(0.334)	(2.496)	(1.379)	(1.949)	(1.315)
Constant	-21.09	4.073	25.70	-47.44	-77.59**	7.026
	(53.09)	(5.024)	(49.95)	(30.36)	(35.62)	(26.25)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80
R^2	0.472	0.672	0.506	0.615	0.526	0.410

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E16.1: Probit Models

	Paved Roads	Street Lights	Piped Water	Trash Removal	Sewer Lines	Doctor Camps
Party Network Density	0.0329	0.457***	0.340*	0.0528	0.0318	0.528**
	(0.229)	(0.173)	(0.181)	(0.182)	(0.123)	(0.263)
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	2.186**	-1.617**	-0.979*	2.686***	0.624	-1.345
	(0.943)	(0.702)	(0.545)	(1.013)	(0.490)	(0.962)
Log Population	2.278***	2.140***	0.952**	0.913*	1.178***	1.230*
	(0.636)	(0.625)	(0.397)	(0.515)	(0.311)	(0.632)
Settlement Age	0.0352	0.112***	0.0135	0.0289	0.0145	-0.0652*
	(0.0304)	(0.0411)	(0.0263)	(0.0349)	(0.0246)	(0.0368)
Average Education	0.0613	-0.397	0.0323	-1.722***	-0.176	1.123**
	(0.344)	(0.505)	(0.340)	(0.643)	(0.326)	(0.440)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-3.096***	0.511	0.355	2.388**	0.579	0.224
	(1.000)	(0.858)	(0.719)	(1.005)	(0.603)	(0.820)
Central Land	0.349	-1.107*	-0.635	2.113**	-0.569	
	(0.638)	(0.618)	(0.596)	(1.025)	(0.435)	
Private Land	-1.779**	0.365	-1.030*	*Omitted*	-0.187	
	(0.793)	(0.646)	(0.537)		(0.658)	
Caste Diversity	0.511	-1.406	-0.0174	9.046***	-0.892	1.469
	(2.091)	(1.863)	(1.407)	(2.769)	(1.321)	(1.742)
Religious Diversity	0.233	-3.429**	0.187	-7.495***	0.739	-0.623
	(1.960)	(1.694)	(1.335)	(2.734)	(1.175)	(1.478)
Regional Diversity	-0.632	2.624**	-0.959	2.131	-0.222	
	(1.026)	(1.202)	(0.991)	(1.467)	(0.805)	
State Electoral Competition	0.0305	-0.158***	-0.108**	0.293**	-0.0193	
	(0.0599)	(0.0599)	(0.0508)	(0.115)	(0.0441)	
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.0317	0.0905**	0.0739**	-0.116***	0.0513**	
	(0.0363)	(0.0417)	(0.0349)	(0.0436)	(0.0260)	
Community Social Capital	0.0167	0.425*	0.0332	0.102	0.187	
	(0.188)	(0.235)	(0.159)	(0.213)	(0.130)	
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.0136	-0.0326**	-0.0105	-0.0403**	-0.00471	
	(0.0124)	(0.0138)	(0.0107)	(0.0168)	(0.0093)	
Land Titles	0.0193	-0.00513	0.0117	0.0966**	0.0195*	
	(0.0137)	(0.0153)	(0.0111)	(0.0433)	(0.0117)	
Constant	-12.99***	-14.88***	-5.840**	-16.21***	-9.337***	-6.986*
	(4.295)	(4.303)	(2.726)	(5.268)	(2.217)	(4.046)
Observations	80	80	80	72	80	80
Pseudo R^2	0.5440	0.6116	0.4899	0.3382	0.5910	0.6171

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: *Paved Roads* and *Streetlights* have 4 and 5 successful observations completely determined, respectively. For *Trash Removal*, private land is automatically dropped from the regression along with 8 observations; 18 successful observations are then completely determined. The full *Doctor Camp* regression exhibits considerable over-determination, preventing the calculation of standard errors. I therefore reduce the set of right-hand-side variables to match the minimum model specifications from the main article so that standard errors can be obtained. Further, one diversity variable was dropped, as having all three generates a non-concave function that prevents convergence. Any combination of two diversity measures produces the same significance level for party network density. Eight successful observations are completely determined in the *Doctor Camps* regression.

Table E16.2: Probit Models (Three Alternative Specifications of Paved Roads)

	Paved Roads	Paved Roads	Paved Roads
Party Network Density	0.595**	0.251**	0.445*
	(0.263)	(0.114)	(0.262)
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	1.030	0.293	1.151*
	(0.721)	(0.527)	(0.686)
Log Population	1.170***	-0.156	1.060**
	(0.426)	(0.262)	(0.426)
Settlement Age	0.00774	0.0290	0.0056
	(0.0307)	(0.0192)	(0.0238)
Average Education	-0.0358	-0.0522	0.3793
	(0.372)	(0.337)	(0.3977)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-0.867	0.306	-0.8114
	(0.779)	(0.622)	(0.7792)
Central Land	0.146	0.470	
	(0.514)	(0.422)	
Private Land	-0.916	0.516	
	(0.719)	(0.480)	
Caste Diversity	0.340	-1.663	-1.989
	(1.447)	(1.133)	(1.560)
Religious Diversity	-0.530	-0.299	0.1793
	(1.480)	(1.044)	(2.1194)
Regional Diversity	-1.129	0.620	-0.1522
	(0.964)	(0.842)	(1.2424)
State Electoral Competition	-0.0214	-0.0797*	
	(0.0576)	(0.0479)	
Ward Electoral Competition	-0.0535*	-0.0176	
	(0.0305)	(0.0259)	
Community Social Capital	-0.186	0.190	
	(0.178)	(0.136)	
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.00582	-0.000807	
	(0.0113)	(0.00844)	
Land Titles	0.0123	0.00314	
	(0.0111)	(0.00816)	
Constant	-6.385**	-14.88***	-6.4009**
	(3.172)	(4.303)	(2.8824)
Observations	80	80	32
Pseudo R^2	0.4896	0.1767	0.413

Notes: *Model One* codes those four settlements with near-zero percentages of paved roads as unsuccessful cases ("0"). *Model Two* codes settlements with 100% paved roads as "1" and anything less "0." *Model Three* removes those observations between 0 and 100, only considering settlements with all or no paved roads.

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E17: Correlates of Party Network Density and Party Representational Balance

	OLS	OLS	Tobit	Tobit	OLS	Tobit
	Network Density	Network Density	Network Density	Network Density	Rep. Balance	Rep. Balance
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	-0.0716	-0.0300	-0.231	-0.301	-0.0434	-0.225
	(0.483)	(0.521)	(0.567)	(0.596)	(0.164)	(0.264)
Log Population	0.728***	0.759**	0.979***	1.004***	0.296***	0.575***
	(0.272)	(0.286)	(0.308)	(0.312)	(0.0761)	(0.132)
Settlement Age	0.0120	0.0172	0.00878	0.0130	0.00194	0.00313
	(0.0218)	(0.0224)	(0.0259)	(0.0256)	(0.00705)	(0.0110)
Average Education	0.246	0.263	0.433	0.436	0.0675	0.0203
	(0.277)	(0.280)	(0.364)	(0.365)	(0.135)	(0.236)
Av. HH Monthly Income per Capita	-0.784	-0.840	-1.126	-1.112	-0.180	-0.322
	(0.594)	(0.646)	(0.693)	(0.740)	(0.192)	(0.351)
Central Land	-0.232	-0.596	-0.259	-0.663	-0.0194	-0.109
	(0.459)	(0.508)	(0.477)	(0.538)	(0.142)	(0.223)
Private Land	-0.0891	-0.0450	-0.0866	-0.0432	-0.0946	-0.132
	(0.517)	(0.516)	(0.605)	(0.579)	(0.0904)	(0.163)
Caste Diversity	0.408	-0.128	0.831	0.417	-0.422	-0.474
	(1.194)	(1.153)	(1.473)	(1.409)	(0.349)	(0.504)
Religious Diversity	1.699	1.619	2.334*	2.228*	1.058***	1.967***
	(1.163)	(1.160)	(1.219)	(1.212)	(0.307)	(0.565)
Regional Diversity	1.174	1.532**	2.032**	2.403**	-0.107	-0.232
	(0.792)	(0.746)	(0.956)	(0.908)	(0.253)	(0.356)
State Electoral Competition	0.0622	0.0445	0.0872*	0.0801	0.00986	0.0385*
	(0.0442)	(0.0510)	(0.0508)	(0.0592)	(0.0126)	(0.0213)
Ward Electoral Competition	0.0199	0.0184	0.0234	0.0238	0.0115	0.0234
	(0.0300)	(0.0339)	(0.0370)	(0.0423)	(0.00845)	(0.0178)
Community Social Capital	0.0326	0.0383	0.0197	0.0133	0.0835*	0.141**
	(0.104)	(0.110)	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.0427)	(0.0671)
Slum Pop. : Ward Slum Pop.	-0.00608	-0.00311	-0.00470	-0.00196	-0.000435	-0.00245
	(0.0089)	(0.0081)	(0.0089)	(0.0084)	(0.00242)	(0.00430)
Land Titles	0.00163	0.00252	0.00461	0.00593	-0.00167	-0.00280
	(0.0091)	(0.0089)	(0.0099)	(0.0089)	(0.0018)	(0.0034)
Distance to Vidhan Sabha (km)		0.122		0.0894	-0.0349	-0.0904**
		(0.126)		(0.134)	(0.0254)	(0.0394)
Distance to Collectorate (km)		0.111		0.164	-0.0130	0.0162
		(0.106)		(0.127)	(0.0397)	(0.0693)
Distance to Old City (km)		-0.131		-0.194	0.0488	0.0537
		(0.103)		(0.125)	(0.0385)	(0.0656)
Constant	-5.221**	-5.430**	-8.172***	-8.391***	-1.834**	-4.366***
	(2.187)	(2.307)	(2.828)	(2.953)	(0.763)	(1.418)
Observations	80	80	80	80	63	63
R^2	0.309	0.334	0.130	0.140	0.551	0.394

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E18: Descriptive Statistics of Settlements with and without Party Networks

	Settlements without Party Networks (n = 17)				Settlements with Party Networks (n = 63)			
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Min	Max
City (Jaipur = 0, Bhopal = 1)	0.53	0.51	0	1	0.57	0.50	0	1
Population	814.18	577.40	349	2348	2930.48	3500.62	350	23811
Population w/o Observation 7	814.18	577.40	349	2348	2593.69	2278.69	350	11182
Settlement Age	31.24	12.88	10	62	33.22	8.44	19	52
Average Education	1.37	0.91	0	3.25	1.68	0.58	0.3	3.13
Av. HH Monthly Income per Cap.	1.28	0.27	0.91	1.81	1.32	0.31	0.67	1.93
Central Land	0.24	0.44	0	1	0.27	0.45	0	1
Private Land	0.12	0.33	0	1	0.10	0.30	0	1
Caste Diversity	0.68	0.22	0	0.86	0.82	0.14	0.24	0.97
Religious Diversity	0.05	0.10	0	0.30	0.19	0.17	0	0.5
Regional Diversity	0.16	0.21	0	0.69	0.34	0.21	0	0.78
State Electoral Competition	14.36	4.41	9.80	22.66	15.47	4.16	9.8	25.16
Ward Electoral Competition	16.02	7.36	6.73	37.91	12.53	6.33	3.28	32.37
Community Social Capital	-0.19	2.07	-4.60	3.01	0.05	1.68	-3.97	4.02
Land Titles	3.68	8.57	0	25.00	11.02	23.49	0	88.89
Distance to *Vidhan Sabha* (km)	4.97	1.34	2.7	7.71	4.49	2.01	0.44	8.78
Distance to Collectorate (km)	5.14	3.46	0.26	10.06	5.41	2.53	0.61	11.25
Distance to Old City (km)	5.20	2.96	1.43	9.34	5.18	2.34	1.34	10.1

Notes: The following variables exhibit significant difference of means tests (two-tailed, Welch) between the two categories: population, caste diversity, religious diversity, regional diversity, ward competition, and land titles.