Supplementary Material for "Preventing Civil War: How the potential for international intervention can deter conflict onset." *World Politics*, vol. 68, no. 2, April 2016.*

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*Replication materials and code available at http://www.davidcunninghampolisci.com

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Appendix A: Measures of hierarchy included independently

In Table 2 in "Preventing Civil War," I include both measures of hierarchy together in one model. Doing so allows me to, for example, examine the effect of the degree to which a country is in a hierarchical relationship with the United States, while controlling for whether or not the country is in the Warsaw Pact. Here, I re-run the analyses in Table 2 including each measure of hierarchy independently, not controlling for the other measure. The results are presented in two tables (A1 and A2) below.

The results in Tables A1 and A2 are extremely similar to those reported in Table 2. The *U.S. security hierarchy* and *Warsaw Pact* variables retain the same signs in all cases when they are included separately as in Table 2. The only change in significance for one of the measures of hierarchy is for the effect of being a member of the Warsaw Pact on *nonviolent campaigns*, which was significant (at the 0.1 level) in Table 2, but is not in Table A2 ($p=0.12$). The close similarity between Table 2 and Tables A1 and A2 show that the results presented in the article are not driven by including both variables together in the model. The control variables also show identical patterns across Tables 2, A1 and A2.

Table A1: US security hierarchy

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-0.891*	-1.157*	-0.725*	0.567**	0.226	0.818**	2.597**
	(0.353)	(0.562)	(0.324)	(0.188)	(0.149)	(0.262)	(0.586)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.151+	-0.274**	0.411**	-0.188**	-0.165**	0.231*	0.621**
	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.116)	(0.109)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.315**	0.370**	-0.422**	0.132**	0.161**	0.389**	0.518**
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.053)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.066)	(0.085)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.573*	-0.545*	1.544**	-0.686**	-0.825**	-2.272**	-0.204
	(0.239)	(0.265)	(0.186)	(0.092)	(0.079)	(0.590)	(0.273)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.617**	-0.618*				0.083	
	(0.190)	(0.251)				(0.301)	
Peace years	-0.069	-0.086					
	(0.048)	(0.062)					
Peace years^2	0.003	0.005					
	(0.003)	(0.004)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	-0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$			-2.294**	1.076**	1.184**	-0.068	2.081**
			(0.231)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.338)	(0.179)
Constant	-4.388**	-4.948**	5.336**	2.928**	2.278**	-9.887**	-8.880**
	(0.903)	(0.836)	(0.827)	(0.380)	(0.350)	(1.101)	(1.200)
Observations	6,377	6,377	2,830	3,007	3,497	6,375	4,514
Alpha							4.281
Alpha SE							0.377
R-squared			0.494	0.408	0.483		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Table A2: Warsaw Pact

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
Warsaw Pact	-1.887*	0.310	-0.018	0.050	0.505	-2.589**
	(0.884)	(0.483)	(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.328)	(0.513)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.167*	0.396**	-0.179**	-0.158**	0.204+	0.709**
	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.114)	(0.155)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.312**	-0.417**	0.129**	0.165**	0.380**	0.577**
	(0.072)	(0.056)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.067)	(0.093)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.711**	1.420**	-0.579**	-0.779**	-2.187**	0.083
	(0.262)	(0.207)	(0.103)	(0.089)	(0.578)	(0.312)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.472*				-0.098	
	(0.186)				(0.299)	
Peace years	-0.069					
	(0.049)					
Peace years^2	0.003					
	(0.003)					
Peace years^3	-0.000					
	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$		-2.318**	1.093**	1.184**	-0.100	2.098**
		(0.237)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.343)	(0.251)
Constant	-4.370**	5.348**	2.921**	2.200**	-9.407**	-9.571**
	(0.895)	(0.865)	(0.412)	(0.356)	(1.047)	(1.329)
Observations	6,428	2,851	3,033	3,497	6,426	4,546
Alpha						4.632
Alpha SE						0.414
R-squared		0.490	0.399	0.481		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Appendix B: Models with different measures of terrorism

The final model in Table 2 of "Preventing Civil War" examines whether the degree of hierarchy between a state and the United States and membership in the Warsaw Pact influence the number of terrorist attacks a country experiences in a given year. In that analysis, I include all terrorist attacks that take place on the state's territory in the year, based on the Global Terrorism Database as presented in Enders, Sandler and Gaivulloev (2011). Within the literature on terrorism, however, there is often a distinction made between domestic and transnational terrorism. Enders, Sandler and Gaivulloev (2011) indicate whether a terrorist attack is domestic, transnational, or unknown.

They define domestic terrorism as terrorism "in which the venue, target, and perpetrators are all from the same country" (321). Transnational terrorism, by contrast, involves more than the single country "through its victims, targets, supporters, or perpetrators" (321). If they could not identify whether or not an attack was domestic or transnational, it is coded as unknown.

In Table B, I re-run the negative binomial regression from Table 2 with four measures of terrorism. The first is a replication of the analysis in Table 2 and includes the total count of terrorist attacks (of all three types) in the country-year. In the next three columns I include only those terrorist attacks identified as domestic, transnational, and unknown, respectively.

In comparing across the columns of Table B, the results are very robust to the measurement of terrorism. *U.S. security hierarchy* is always positive and significant, and the *Warsaw Pact* variable is negative and significant for each of the types except transnational attacks. Even in that case, the variable is negative, but the standard error is too large for it to reach statistical significance. The control variables are all consistent with Table 2 with the exception of *democracy*, which is negative and significant (at the 0.1 level) for domestic terrorism.

Table B

VARIABLES	*Terrorist Attacks*	*Domestic Terrorist Attacks*	*Transnational Terrorist Attacks*	*Unknown Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	2.519**	2.976**	1.567*	2.152**
	(0.581)	(0.587)	(0.614)	(0.779)
Warsaw Pact	-2.032**	-2.979**	-1.026	-3.350**
	(0.479)	(0.472)	(0.666)	(0.616)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	0.644**	0.683**	0.512**	0.544**
	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.113)	(0.169)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.531**	0.576**	0.399**	0.571**
	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.114)	(0.121)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.255	-0.489+	0.237	-0.019
	(0.273)	(0.286)	(0.283)	(0.369)
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$	2.044**	2.216**	1.499**	2.157**
	(0.180)	(0.195)	(0.165)	(0.225)
Constant	-9.123**	1.711**	-8.077**	2.186**
	(1.174)	(0.082)	(1.545)	(1.889)
Observations	4,514	4,514	4,514	4,514
Alpha	4.199	5.532	3.834	8.896
Alpha SE	0.365	0.453	0.627	1.144

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Appendix C: Substantive effects

To analyze substantive effects, I use Fred Boehmke's "Plotfds" program, which is a front end for the CLARIFY software developed by Tomz, Wittenberg and King (2003). CLARIFY uses simulation to estimate the substantive effect of varying a variable between certain values, while holding other variables constant at some value. Plotfds allows for showing the substantive effects of all of the variables on the same graph. I produce five graphs below, showing the substantive effect of the variables in Table 2 on *internal armed conflicts*, *one-thousand-battle-death civil wars*, state repression (as measured by the *Physical Integrity Rights Index*), *nonviolent campaigns* and *terrorist attacks*. I only use the *Physical Integrity Rights Index* to measure repression because the other measures show very similar substantive effects. In the models of *internal armed conflict* and *one-thousand-battle-death civil wars*, I include *peace years* but not its square and cubed term because I cannot vary them together in the first difference plots. In all of the models, I vary continuous variables from their 10^{th} to 90^{th} percentiles and dichotomous variables from 0 to 1, holding the other variables constant at their mean (continuous variables) or mode (dichotomous variables).

For *internal armed conflict*, the biggest substantive effect is that of *log population*, with the likelihood that a country at the 90^{th} percentile of *log population* will experience a civil war onset being 5% greater than the likelihood that a country at the 10^{th} percentile of *log population* will. That large effect is consistent with much of the literature on civil war. Being a member of the Warsaw Pact has the next largest effect, with *U.S. security hierarchy*, *log GDP per capita*, *democracy*, *autocracy*, and *peace years* having a similar size of effect. The results for *one-thousand-battle-death civil wars* are similar, although the first differences for each of the variables are smaller, a result of the smaller number of onsets of civil wars of that scale.

For state repression, *internal armed conflict incidence* has the largest effect, indicating that states are much more repressive when they are in civil war. *Democracy*, *log GDP per capita*, and *log population* have similar substantive effects. The average effect of the *Warsaw Pact* variable is larger than that of *U.S. security hierarchy*, but *U.S. security hierarchy* is the only one that is significant. The results show that the average repression score for countries at the 90^{th} percentile in the U.S. hierarchy is 0.35 lower than those at the 10^{th} percentile (on a scale ranging from 0 to 8) with lower values meaning a higher level of repression.

For *nonviolent campaigns*, *log population* and *democracy* have the largest effect, and the only other variable that is statistically significant is *U.S. security hierarchy*, which has a relatively small substantive effect. For *terrorist attacks*, *log population* and *log GDP per capita* have the largest effect, with *U.S. security hierarchy* being next. The analysis here shows that, on average, countries at the 90^{th} percentile on the hierarchy index experience almost an additional 8 terrorist attacks a year than those at the 10^{th} percentile, a very large difference.


First Differences for Internal Armed Conflicts
Security Hierarchy
Warsaw Pact*
Log GDP per capita
Log Population
Democracy*
Autocracy*
Peace Years
-0.02 [-0.03, -0.01
-0.03 [-0.05, -0.01
-0.02 [-0.04, 0.00]
0.05 [0.03, 0.07]
-0.02 [-0.03, -0.00
-0.02 [-0.03, -0.01
-0.02 [-0.04, -0.00
-.05
0
.05
.1
Continuous variables vary from 10th to 90th percentile.
*Dichotomous variables vary from 0 to 1.
95% Confidence Intervals reported.


First Differences for Nonviolent Campaigns
Security Hierarchy
Warsaw Pact*
Log GDP per capita
Log population
Democracy*
Autocracy*
0.00 [0.00, 0.01]
0.01 [-0.00, 0.02]
0.01 [-0.00, 0.02]
0.02 [0.01, 0.03]
-0.01 [-0.02, -0.00]
0.00 [-0.01, 0.01]
-.02
-.01
0
.01
.02
.03
Continuous variables vary from 10th to 90th percentile.
*Dichotomous variables vary from 0 to 1.
95% Confidence Intervals reported.


First Differences for 1,000 Battledeath Civil Wars
Security Hierarchy
Log GDP per capita
Log Population
Peace Years
Democracy*
Autocracy*
-0.01 [-0.02, -0.00]
-0.01 [-0.02, -0.01]
0.02 [0.01, 0.03]
-0.01 [-0.02, 0.00]
-0.01 [-0.01, -0.00]
-0.01 [-0.01, -0.00]
-.02
0
.02
.04
Continuous variables vary from 10th to 90th percentile.
*Dichotomous variables vary from 0 to 1.
95% Confidence Intervals reported.


First Differences for Count of Terrorist Attacks
Security Hierarchy
Warsaw Pact*
Log GDP per capita
Log population
Democracy*
Autocracy*
7.80 [3.00, 15.00]
-3.40 [-6.21, -0.89]
10.83 [4.78, 21.60]
11.55 [6.38, 19.81]
-2.36 [-5.48, -0.15]
-3.61 [-6.40, -1.63]
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Continuous variables vary from 10th to 90th percentile.
*Dichotomous variables vary from 0 to 1.
95% Confidence Intervals reported.


First Differences for State Repression
Security Hierarchy
Warsaw Pact*
Log GDP per capita
Log population
Democracy*
Minor Armed Conflict*
-0.35 [-0.72, -0.04]
0.26 [-0.67, 1.20]
1.20 [0.69, 1.73]
-1.53 [-1.92, -1.18]
1.56 [1.18, 1.92]
-2.28 [-2.76, -1.83]
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Continuous variables vary from 10th to 90th percentile
*Dichotomous variables vary from 0 to 1.
95% Confidence Intervals reported.

Appendix D: Analyses using the economic hierarchy index

In Table 2 in "Preventing Civil War," the main measure of the theoretical concept—the probability of intervention on behalf of the government leading to extreme asymmetry—is *U.S. security hierarchy* from Lake (2009). Lake provides two indices of hierarchy—the security hierarchy index and the economic hierarchy index. As I describe in the text, the security hierarchy index is a more appropriate measurement of the concept developed in the article, and that is why I use it as the primary measure. Here, I also examine the economic hierarchy index to see if it has a similar effect.

The economic hierarchy index, like the security hierarchy index, is made up of two component indicators. The first is a measurement of how closely the country's exchange rate is tied to the dollar. It is a four-point scale—a floating exchange rate, a crawling peg, relative to the dollar, a fixed exchange rate, relative to the dollar, and then some merged currency, which can include dollarization. See Lake (2009, p. 73) for more discussion of how economic hierarchy is measured. The second is a measure of the country's relative trade dependence with the United States. Table D reports a replication of Table 2 in the article, with *U.S. economic hierarchy* replacing *U.S. security hierarchy*.

In Table D, the sign on the coefficient for *U.S. economic hierarchy* is the same as for *U.S. security hierarchy* in Table 2 for every model. However, the only effects of *U.S. economic hierarchy* that are statistically significant are for two measures of repression—the *Physical Integrity Rights Index* and *PTS Amnesty International*. Some of the loss of significance may be due to a significant reduction in the sample size (in the analysis of *internal armed conflicts*, for example, the number of observations declines from 6375 to 4918), but this table suggests that *U.S. economic hierarchy* does not perform as strongly as *U.S. security hierarchy* as a predictor of civil war, *nonviolent campaigns*, and *terrorist attacks*.

There are a handful of changes in significance for the other variables in Table 2. *Log GDP per capita* loses significance for *nonviolent campaigns* in Table D. *Autocracy* becomes insignificant in both civil war models and *democracy* loses significance for *one-thousand battle-death civil wars*. Some of the peace years variables become significant in Table D.

Table D

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US economic hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-0.416	-0.020	-0.674*	0.315*	0.106	0.523	0.244
	(0.308)	(0.494)	(0.336)	(0.159)	(0.134)	(0.468)	(0.414)
Warsaw Pact	-0.992+		0.800	-0.214	-0.283	0.709*	-3.180**
	(0.589)		(0.596)	(0.245)	(0.186)	(0.290)	(0.486)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.239*	-0.352**	0.354**	-0.160**	-0.153**	0.141	0.681**
	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.095)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.149)	(0.184)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.417**	0.436**	-0.412**	0.158**	0.171**	0.425**	0.568**
	(0.077)	(0.102)	(0.063)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.095)	(0.103)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.530*	-0.457	1.401**	-0.531**	-0.727**	-2.180**	-0.053
	(0.240)	(0.309)	(0.211)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.662)	(0.323)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.224	-0.481				0.103	
	(0.219)	(0.307)				(0.331)	
Peace years	-0.106+	-0.113					
	(0.057)	(0.074)					
Peace years^2	0.006+	0.008					
	(0.003)	(0.005)					
Peace years^3	-0.000*	-0.000+					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$			-2.533**	1.181**	1.218**	-0.195	2.149**
			(0.244)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.421)	(0.274)
Constant	-4.935**	-5.353**	5.712**	2.464**	2.084**	-9.523**	-9.133**
	(1.177)	(1.259)	(0.955)	(0.451)	(0.419)	(1.333)	(1.682)
Observations	4,918	4,843	2,343	2,426	2,823	4,917	3,520
Alpha							4.539
Alpha SE							0.411
R-squared			0.505	0.411	0.478		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Appendix E: Analyses using component measures of hierarchy

U.S. security hierarchy is comprised of two component measures—a measure of the similarity in alliance portfolio between the state and the United States and the number of U.S. military personnel per capita on the country's soil. Here, I include each component measure separately into a replication of Table 2 in place of *U.S. security hierarchy*. Tables E1 and E2 show that the *alliance similarity* variable has the same sign in all seven regressions, and is statistically significant in all seven (including the model where, in Table 2, *U.S. security hierarchy* was insignificant). *U.S. military personnel per capita*, meanwhile, has the same sign for the two measures of civil war, *nonviolent campaigns* and *terrorist attacks*, but is statistically insignificant for all, and has a sign shift (but is insignificant) for the tests of state repression. The other variables, meanwhile, generally perform identically with the exception of a few small differences. The *Warsaw Pact* variable loses significance in the model of *nonviolent campaigns* when *U.S. security hierarchy* is replaced with *U.S. military personnel per capita*. *Log GDP per capita* becomes insignificant for *nonviolent campaigns* in Table E1.

Table E1: Alliance similarity

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
Alliance similarity $_{t-1}$	-0.471*	-0.646*	-0.476*	0.382**	0.183*	0.772**	1.416**
	(0.201)	(0.317)	(0.189)	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.256)	(0.276)
Warsaw Pact	-1.992*		0.244	0.043	0.095	0.693*	-2.009**
	(0.889)		(0.478)	(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.336)	(0.476)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.140+	-0.260**	0.405**	-0.188**	-0.168**	0.197	0.652**
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.092)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.125)	(0.105)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.316**	0.370**	-0.420**	0.129**	0.157**	0.382**	0.521**
	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.066)	(0.083)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.599*	-0.561*	1.603**	-0.717**	-0.845**	-2.315**	-0.282
	(0.247)	(0.271)	(0.190)	(0.095)	(0.079)	(0.603)	(0.266)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.544**	-0.542*				0.059	
	(0.186)	(0.247)				(0.315)	
Peace years	-0.069	-0.084					
	(0.048)	(0.062)					
Peace years^2	0.003	0.005					
	(0.003)	(0.004)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	-0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$			-2.280**	1.073**	1.185**	-0.005	2.031**
			(0.229)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.340)	(0.174)
Constant	-4.499**	-5.060**	5.364**	2.941**	2.325**	-9.711**	-9.110**
	(0.895)	(0.831)	(0.834)	(0.386)	(0.354)	(1.089)	(1.169)
Observations	6,377	6,145	2,830	3,007	3,497	6,375	4,514
Alpha							4.123
Alpha SE							0.363
R-squared			0.496	0.414	0.484		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Table E2: U.S. military personnel per capita

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
U.S. military personnel per capita $_{t-1}$	-1.330	-1.357	0.047	-0.200	-0.173	0.210	0.041
	(1.127)	(0.919)	(0.547)	(0.211)	(0.242)	(0.149)	(0.296)
Warsaw Pact	-1.930*		0.344	-0.048	0.042	0.509	-2.602**
	(0.884)		(0.483)	(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.329)	(0.518)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.165*	-0.299**	0.380**	-0.164**	-0.155**	0.210+	0.721**
	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.114)	(0.158)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.317**	0.374**	-0.438**	0.144**	0.166**	0.387**	0.584**
	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.054)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.068)	(0.097)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.646**	-0.618*	1.412**	-0.567**	-0.779**	-2.121**	0.075
	(0.250)	(0.283)	(0.206)	(0.103)	(0.089)	(0.564)	(0.310)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.500**	-0.484*				-0.090	
	(0.188)	(0.242)				(0.300)	
Peace years	-0.073	-0.093					
	(0.049)	(0.061)					
Peace years^2	0.004	0.006					
	(0.003)	(0.004)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	-0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$			-2.291**	1.072**	1.181**	-0.100	2.094**
			(0.235)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.342)	(0.252)
Constant	-4.401**	-4.920**	5.654**	2.692**	2.174**	-9.541**	-9.723**
	(0.921)	(0.872)	(0.860)	(0.394)	(0.357)	(1.064)	(1.359)
Observations	6,377	6,145	2,830	3,007	3,497	6,375	4,514
Alpha							4.696
Alpha SE							0.417
R-squared			0.490	0.397	0.481		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Appendix F: Instrumental variable regressions

The analyses in Table F are two-stage least squares regressions using the distance between the country's capital and Washington, DC (log-transformed) as an instrument for *U.S. security hierarchy*. Table F1 shows the results of the first-stage regression, indicating that *log capital distance* is a negative and highly significant predictor of U.S. security hierarchy. It also shows that levels of hierarchy are higher in democracies and lower in autocracies, higher in more populous states, and higher in states with a longer history of peace.

Table F2 shows the effect of hierarchy when *log capital distance* is used as instrument. The results there suggest strongly that the effect of *U.S. security hierarchy* is not driven by endogeneity. In the two-stage models, *U.S. security hierarchy* is statistically significant in every case except for *nonviolent campaigns*. There, the sign is in the same direction as in Table 2, but the standard error is roughly the same size as the coefficient.

One difference between the analyses in Table F2 and those in Table 2 is that, because the models here are two-stage regressions, the analyses of civil war and *nonviolent campaigns* here are linear probability models, rather than logistic regressions (and the model of *terrorist attacks* is also a linear model rather than a count model). To see if this change in the modeling approach made any difference, I conducted IV probit models of *internal armed conflicts*, *one-thousand-battle-death civil wars*, and *nonviolent campaigns*. Those models revealed results nearly identical to those in Table F2—in both civil war models *U.S. security hierarchy* was negative and significant (at the 0.1 level in the *one-thousand-battle-death civil war* model), and it was positive and insignificant in the *nonviolent campaigns* model.

There are some small changes in the control variables in these two-stage least squares models. *Log GDP per capita* is no longer significant for *internal armed conflicts* and *terrorist attacks*, and *democracy* is now insignificant for civil war by both measures.

Table F1: First stage regression

VARIABLES	*U.S. security hierarchy*
Log capital distance	-0.233**
	(0.050)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	0.006
	(0.010)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.024+
	(0.013)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	0.071+
	(0.042)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.089**
	(0.027)
Peace years	0.008*
	(0.003)
Peace years^2	-0.000*
	(0.000)
Peace years^3	0.000+
	(0.000)
Constant	2.000**
	(0.533)
Observations	6,375
R-squared	0.280

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed;
robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Table F2: Instrumental variable regressions

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death-Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy	-0.061*	-0.035**	-1.981*	1.095*	0.899*	0.007	39.005+
	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.932)	(0.451)	(0.395)	(0.007)	(22.769)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.005	-0.004**	0.454**	-0.206**	-0.188**	0.002+	1.821
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.093)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.001)	(1.205)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.012**	0.006**	-0.399**	0.123**	0.145**	0.003**	2.634*
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.058)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.001)	(1.319)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.013	-0.002	1.800**	-0.797**	-0.953**	-0.014**	7.529
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.274)	(0.131)	(0.110)	(0.003)	(6.320)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.024**	-0.010*				0.000	
	(0.007)	(0.005)				(0.003)	
Peace years	-0.002	-0.001					
	(0.002)	(0.001)					
Peace years^2	0.000	0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	-0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$			-2.284**	1.075**	1.186**	-0.002	38.810**
			(0.229)	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.003)	(8.655)
Constant	0.000	0.003	4.890**	3.105**	2.538**	-0.032**	-40.871**
	(0.033)	(0.014)	(0.902)	(0.434)	(0.395)	(0.009)	(14.848)
Observations	6,375	6,375	2,830	3,007	3,497	6,373	4,512
R-squared	0.016	0.010	0.481	0.397	0.465	0.006	0.165

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Appendix G: Tests of the effect of the level of hierarchy

The analyses in Table 2 indicate that countries with higher scores on the hierarchy index are more likely to experience civil war, more repressive, less prone to nonviolent campaigns, and experience more terrorist attacks. However, there are a large number of zeros on the *U.S. security hierarchy* variable, and so these models could, to some degree, be picking up differences between countries that are and are not in the U.S. hierarchy, but not the effect of higher levels of hierarchy. To determine if that is true, Table G reports replications of Table 2 adding a dichotomous measure of whether or not the country is in the U.S. hierarchy. The results on *U.S. security hierarchy* are virtually identical to Table 2. The sign and significance are the same in all seven models. This indicates that the effect of *U.S. security hierarchy* identified in Table 2 is not just picking up a difference between states with a "0" and a positive score on the hierarchy measure.

U.S. security hierarchy dummy is insignificant in all of the models except for *nonviolent campaigns* and *terrorist attacks*, and it is significant and positive in both of those models. These analyses suggest that countries that are completely out of the U.S. hierarchy are particularly less likely to experience nonviolent campaigns and see sharply fewer terror attacks, but that, within the countries that have a positive score on the hierarchy index, the more hierarchical the relationship, the greater the number of terrorist attacks and the more likely nonviolent campaigns are.

The only change in the control variables in Table G, as compared to Table 2, is that *Log GDP per capita* is no longer statistically significant for *nonviolent campaigns*, although the sign is in the same direction.

Table G

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy dummy $_{t-1}$	0.137	0.179	-0.002	0.083	-0.006	0.648+	1.122**
	(0.244)	(0.311)	(0.265)	(0.094)	(0.097)	(0.373)	(0.296)
US security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-1.003**	-1.297*	-0.713*	0.540**	0.234	0.718**	2.111**
	(0.378)	(0.584)	(0.333)	(0.192)	(0.154)	(0.266)	(0.604)
Warsaw Pact	-2.024*		0.254	0.022	0.085	0.556+	-1.857**
	(0.885)		(0.474)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.286)	(0.685)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.146+	-0.269**	0.407**	-0.194**	-0.166**	0.185	0.547**
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.095)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.125)	(0.107)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.308**	0.360**	-0.424**	0.125**	0.160**	0.361**	0.469**
	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.062)	(0.085)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.590*	-0.558*	1.554**	-0.682**	-0.821**	-2.238**	-0.240
	(0.240)	(0.265)	(0.191)	(0.095)	(0.080)	(0.586)	(0.261)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.541**	-0.531*				0.058	
	(0.190)	(0.245)				(0.310)	
Peace years	-0.066	-0.079					
	(0.047)	(0.062)					
Peace years^2	0.003	0.005					
	(0.003)	(0.004)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	-0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$			-2.288**	1.081**	1.186**	-0.016	2.116**
			(0.233)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.341)	(0.172)
Constant	-4.470**	-5.037**	5.379**	2.977**	2.293**	-9.851**	-8.695**
	(0.908)	(0.815)	(0.853)	(0.401)	(0.370)	(1.136)	(1.151)
Observations	6,377	6,145	2,830	3,007	3,497	6,375	4,514
Alpha							4.033
Alpha SE							0.316
R-squared			0.495	0.409	0.483		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Appendix H: Additional control variables

In the models in Table 2, I include control variables that should theoretically be associated with both international hierarchy and the various outcomes measured there. Here, I include several additional controls to examine the robustness of those findings. First, to test how ethnicity affects these relationships, I include a variable (*largest excluded group)* from the Ethnic Power Relations project measuring the demographic size (as a percentage of total state population) of the largest ethnic group in the country which is politically excluded (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). Second, I examine the effect of terrain by including a variable (*log mountainous terrain)* measuring the natural log of the percentage of the country's terrain that is mountainous (from Fearon and Laitin 2003). Third, because hierarchy is quite geographically clustered, I examine whether the effects of U.S. security hierarchy in Table 2 are driven by some aspect of geography. To examine geography I include two variables—a dichotomous measure (*Middle East/North Africa)* indicating whether the country is in the Middle East or North Africa and a dichotomous measure (*NATO member)* indicating whether the state is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Middle East is one of the regions that has had the highest level of U.S. hierarchy and it has generally been less prone to civil war, particularly through 2005 when the data for this article ends. NATO, meanwhile, has been a long-running collective security organization, and so the hierarchical relationship between the U.S. and its subordinate states may be different among states that are members of NATO and those that are not. Table G reports the results of replications of the analyses in Table 2 adding these four variables.

The results of these regressions adding additional controls are strikingly similar to those in Table 2. *U.S. security hierarchy* has the same sign and significance in every model that it was significant in Table 2, and actually becomes significant for *PTS State Department*. The effect of the *Warsaw Pact* variable is the same across all seven models.

The new control variables show some interesting patterns. *Largest excluded group* is positive for both measures of civil war, but not quite statistically significant. Ethnic exclusion is associated with greater repression, which is not surprising given that exclusion could essentially be thought of as a form of repression. There is no statistical relationship between *largest excluded group* and *nonviolent campaigns* or *terrorist attacks*. Consistent with Fearon and Laitin (2003), countries with more mountainous terrain are more prone to civil wars (the effect is only significant for *one-thousand-battle-death civil wars*). Table H also shows that they experience more *terrorist attacks*. At the same time, I find that those states are more repressive, and there is no significant effect on *nonviolent campaigns*.

Table H shows that states in the Middle East/North Africa are more repressive (which is significant for all measures except *PTS State Department*), while those in NATO are significantly less repressive. States in NATO are less likely to experience internal armed conflict, and the sign is negative for *one-thousand-battle-death civil wars*, but not significant. Neither the *Middle East/North Africa* nor *NATO member* variable is significantly associated with *terrorist attacks* or *nonviolent campaigns*.

The control variables generally perform the same in Table H as in Table 2. The exceptions are that in Table H *democracy* is no longer significant for either measure of civil war and that the cubed term for peace years becomes significant for *one-thousand-battle-death civil wars* when the additional controls are included.

Table H: Additional control variables

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-0.847*	-1.361*	-1.291**	0.802**	0.437**	0.804**	1.964**
	(0.384)	(0.634)	(0.314)	(0.189)	(0.155)	(0.281)	(0.595)
Warsaw Pact	-1.768*		0.017	0.129	0.085	0.617*	-2.459**
	(0.843)		(0.417)	(0.104)	(0.116)	(0.274)	(0.270)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.142+	-0.241**	0.381**	-0.203**	-0.130**	0.263+	0.690**
	(0.073)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.143)	(0.113)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.337**	0.361**	-0.445**	0.151**	0.179**	0.364**	0.503**
	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.059)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.078)	(0.086)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.312	-0.326	1.182**	-0.464**	-0.651**	-2.286**	-0.221
	(0.227)	(0.282)	(0.190)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.733)	(0.268)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.528**	-0.572*				0.190	
	(0.190)	(0.248)				(0.317)	
Largest excluded group $_{t-1}$	0.347	0.566	-1.046*	0.434*	0.538*	-0.143	0.420
	(0.363)	(0.487)	(0.484)	(0.178)	(0.219)	(0.607)	(0.456)
Log mountainous terrain	0.108	0.177*	-0.155**	0.092**	0.067*	-0.004	0.304**
	(0.067)	(0.083)	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.085)	(0.088)
Middle East/North Africa	0.303	0.321	-0.677*	0.450**	0.171	-0.792	0.187
	(0.226)	(0.292)	(0.328)	(0.113)	(0.131)	(0.484)	(0.393)
NATO member	-0.854*	-0.551	1.523**	-0.753**	-0.739**	0.102	0.067
	(0.388)	(0.435)	(0.298)	(0.203)	(0.153)	(0.589)	(0.395)
Peace years	-0.058	-0.067					
	(0.049)	(0.063)					
Peace years^2	0.003	0.006					
	(0.003)	(0.005)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	-0.000+					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$			-2.026**	0.936**	1.084**	0.067	1.950**
			(0.193)	(0.091)	(0.103)	(0.359)	(0.198)
Constant	-5.107**	-5.690**	6.377**	2.524**	1.583**	-9.867**	-9.902**
	(1.028)	(1.003)	(0.968)	(0.440)	(0.404)	(1.309)	(1.176)
Observations	5,673	5,476	2,587	2,750	3,124	5,671	3,976
Alpha							3.785
Alpha SE							0.287
R-squared			0.550	0.480	0.527		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Appendix I: Effect of hierarchy in different contexts

The analyses in Table 2 focus on the effect of hierarchy across all country-years. However, it is possible that it has different effects in different contexts. In particular, I focus on three. The first set of analyses split the sample into democracies (countries with a Polity score greater than 6) and non-democracies (all other countries). The second set of analyses divides the sample temporally, analyzing the Cold War period and the post Cold-War period (with the Cold War being coded as ending in 1991). The third set of analyses divides the sample between NATO and non-NATO members, since the effect of U.S. hierarchy may be different within NATO states. In all three contexts, I only examine the effect of *U.S. security hierarchy*. I leave out the *Warsaw Pact* variable because it does not vary across the contexts (there are no Warsaw Pact countries after the Cold War or in NATO, and none of the Warsaw Pact countries are democracies).

The six regression tables presented below generally show similar results for the effect of *U.S. security hierarchy* across these six contexts. There are a few interesting exceptions, however. Table I2 shows that, when the sample is restricted to democracies, the patterns are the same (the coefficient on *U.S. security hierarchy* has the same sign in all seven regressions), but many of these effects are no longer significant. This loss of significance is likely due to two simultaneous effects—hierarchy may have a smaller effect in democracies (the coefficients on *U.S. security hierarchy* are somewhat smaller), however, the sample of country-years that are democracies is substantially smaller (meaning that the standard errors are much larger). A similar loss of significance emerges in the Post Cold-War sample (Table I4), but there the effect is almost entirely driven by the increased standard errors due to decreased sample size, because the coefficients in Table I4 are very similar to those in Table 2.

The most interesting differences across context come in the comparison of NATO and non-NATO countries. The effects of *U.S. security hierarchy* among non-NATO members (Table I6) are very similar to those in Table 2. Within NATO, however, there are sign shifts. A higher score on *U.S. security hierarchy* is associated with less repression and less dissent of all types—as *U.S. security hierarchy* increases among NATO members, civil wars and nonviolent campaigns are both less likely, states are less repressive, and they experience a lower number of terrorist attacks. These effects are statistically significant for *one-thousand-battle-death civil wars* and *PTS Amnesty International*, and the coefficients are quite large for the others (but the sample size is quite small).

The control variables generally show very consistent effects as well. There are some differences in model specification due to the specific nature of these contexts. For example, there are not enough internal armed conflicts within NATO states during the period for which data is available to include *internal armed conflict incidence* as a predictor of repression or terrorism. There is only one case in which a variable is statistically significant in the opposite direction in the tables below and in Table 2, the effect of *log GDP per capita* on *terrorist attacks* in NATO member states. Table 2 showed that richer countries experience a greater number of terrorist attacks, Table I5 shows that, within NATO, states with lower average per capita incomes experience more attacks.

Table I1: Non-democracies

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-0.597	-0.733	-1.109*	0.917**	0.283	0.934**	3.003**
	(0.365)	(0.580)	(0.449)	(0.223)	(0.177)	(0.299)	(0.840)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.035	-0.133	0.146	-0.079+	-0.063	0.377**	0.813**
	(0.086)	(0.098)	(0.112)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.107)	(0.153)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.223**	0.295**	-0.465**	0.133**	0.171**	0.398**	0.414**
	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.056)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.066)	(0.120)
Peace years	-0.054	-0.075					
	(0.048)	(0.067)					
Peace years^2	0.001	0.003					
	(0.003)	(0.005)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	-0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$			-2.156**	1.047**	1.177**	-0.362	2.047**
			(0.205)	(0.088)	(0.101)	(0.385)	(0.205)
Constant	-4.658**	-5.455**	7.744**	2.085**	1.417**	-11.026**	-9.434**
	(0.870)	(0.904)	(0.910)	(0.385)	(0.385)	(1.097)	(1.325)
Observations	4,441	4,441	1,775	2,115	2,272	4,439	3,084
Alpha							5.313
Alpha SE							0.566
R-squared			0.358	0.339	0.358		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Table I2: Democracies

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-0.565	-0.968	-0.479	0.252	0.210	0.600	1.182+
	(0.730)	(0.979)	(0.380)	(0.234)	(0.216)	(2.196)	(0.657)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.253	-0.550+	0.909**	-0.483**	-0.395**	-0.614	0.118
	(0.218)	(0.317)	(0.138)	(0.084)	(0.070)	(0.383)	(0.190)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.460**	0.511**	-0.390**	0.152*	0.177**	0.125	0.734**
	(0.102)	(0.119)	(0.084)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.189)	(0.157)
Peace years	-0.164	-0.189					
	(0.103)	(0.135)					
Peace years^2	0.010+	0.016+					
	(0.006)	(0.009)					
Peace years^3	-0.000+	-0.000+					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$			-2.525**	1.050**	1.103**	1.255	2.174**
			(0.606)	(0.341)	(0.334)	(1.194)	(0.305)
Constant	-5.560*	-5.191*	2.088	4.750**	3.350**	-2.815	-6.379**
	(2.318)	(2.234)	(1.385)	(0.796)	(0.706)	(2.775)	(1.803)
Observations	1,936	1,936	1,055	885	1,220	1,936	1,426
Alpha							2.789
Alpha SE							0.275
R-squared			0.528	0.442	0.439		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Table I3: During the Cold War

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-0.728+	-1.106+	-1.072**	0.808**	0.349*	0.802**	2.797**
	(0.374)	(0.617)	(0.380)	(0.222)	(0.152)	(0.275)	(0.750)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.163	-0.283*	0.334**	-0.127**	-0.106*	0.315**	0.985**
	(0.112)	(0.133)	(0.116)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.118)	(0.154)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.297**	0.382**	-0.343**	0.104**	0.118**	0.391**	0.423**
	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.060)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.065)	(0.105)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.680*	-0.480	2.000**	-0.914**	-1.040**	-1.879**	-0.235
	(0.269)	(0.350)	(0.257)	(0.134)	(0.099)	(0.579)	(0.346)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.646**	-0.587+				0.250	
	(0.187)	(0.319)				(0.340)	
Peace years	-0.019	-0.016					
	(0.060)	(0.077)					
Peace years^2	0.000	0.001					
	(0.004)	(0.006)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	-0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence $_{t-1}$			-2.395**	0.958**	1.118**	0.039	2.228**
			(0.312)	(0.127)	(0.131)	(0.382)	(0.208)
Constant	-4.330**	-5.221**	5.398**	2.701**	2.056**	-10.522**	-10.875**
	(1.039)	(1.157)	(1.036)	(0.425)	(0.389)	(1.123)	(1.344)
Observations	4,845	4,845	1,388	1,690	1,988	4,843	2,982
Alpha							4.753
Alpha SE							0.576
R-squared			0.482	0.364	0.489		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Table I4: Post Cold War

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-2.231**	-2.630	-0.674+	0.312	0.506**	-2.389	1.581**
	(0.851)	(2.078)	(0.383)	(0.212)	(0.192)	(2.424)	(0.418)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.392*	-0.349	0.555**	-0.295**	-0.363**	0.063	0.163
	(0.190)	(0.311)	(0.105)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.345)	(0.117)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.361**	0.327*	-0.488**	0.169**	0.201**	0.412**	0.620**
	(0.100)	(0.146)	(0.063)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.146)	(0.079)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	0.133	-0.424	1.271**	-0.436**	-0.642**		0.059
	(0.445)	(0.590)	(0.201)	(0.108)	(0.095)		(0.232)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.385	-0.967					
	(0.534)	(0.906)					
Peace years	-0.142+	-0.286+					
	(0.076)	(0.166)					
Peace years^2	0.005	0.016					
	(0.004)	(0.011)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	-0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence$_{t-1}$			-2.207**	1.211**	1.219**	-0.101	1.781**
			(0.244)	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.948)	(0.230)
Constant	-2.747	-3.501	4.609**	3.449**	3.675**	-9.484**	-6.082**
	(1.824)	(2.625)	(1.003)	(0.522)	(0.508)	(3.394)	(1.169)
Observations	1,532	1,532	1,442	1,317	1,509	1,674	1,532
Alpha							3.133
Alpha SE							0.230
R-squared			0.538	0.488	0.573		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Table I5: NATO members

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-0.861	-9.745*	1.517	-0.580+	-0.519	-6.928	-1.051
	(1.128)	(3.790)	(0.913)	(0.331)	(0.582)	(4.684)	(1.005)
Log GDP per capita$_{t-1}$	0.324	-5.711+	1.678*	-0.766**	-0.352	-0.237	-0.484*
	(0.482)	(3.174)	(0.725)	(0.256)	(0.234)	(0.678)	(0.227)
Log population $_{t-1}$	1.507*	21.415**	-0.522*	0.286+	0.212+	-0.556	1.294**
	(0.723)	(6.752)	(0.181)	(0.152)	(0.121)	(0.498)	(0.311)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-1.064	-2.096	-0.796	-0.367	-0.620+	-1.810	1.433**
	(0.879)	(4.259)	(1.393)	(0.404)	(0.301)	(1.884)	(0.537)
Peace years	-0.000	0.304					
	(0.226)	(0.520)					
Peace years^2	-0.000	-0.001					
	(0.012)	(0.035)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Constant	-21.267**	-191.015**	-3.796	6.673*	3.368+	5.810	-6.620
	(6.524)	(50.932)	(5.302)	(2.473)	(1.621)	(7.829)	(4.398)
Observations	634	634	280	233	338	634	412
Alpha							2.183
Alpha SE							0.460
R-squared			0.408	0.376	0.210		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses

Table I6: Non-NATO members

VARIABLES	*Internal Armed Conflicts*	*One-Thousand-Battle-death Civil Wars*	*Physical Integrity Rights Index*	*PTS Amnesty International*	*PTS State Department*	*Nonviolent Campaigns*	*Terrorist Attacks*
US security hierarchy $_{t-1}$	-0.699*	-0.925+	-1.435**	0.859**	0.519**	0.896**	3.037**
	(0.335)	(0.553)	(0.342)	(0.188)	(0.157)	(0.263)	(0.607)
Log GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.152+	-0.253**	0.291**	-0.147**	-0.123**	0.251*	0.657**
	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.092)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.116)	(0.111)
Log population $_{t-1}$	0.312**	0.362**	-0.474**	0.147**	0.183**	0.396**	0.473**
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.066)	(0.086)
Democracy $_{t-1}$	-0.465+	-0.446+	1.419**	-0.605**	-0.733**	-1.992**	-0.295
	(0.240)	(0.263)	(0.180)	(0.094)	(0.082)	(0.634)	(0.265)
Autocracy $_{t-1}$	-0.612**	-0.571*				0.098	
	(0.193)	(0.251)				(0.309)	
Peace years	-0.065	-0.084					
	(0.049)	(0.064)					
Peace years^2	0.003	0.005					
	(0.003)	(0.005)					
Peace years^3	-0.000	-0.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)					
Internal armed conflict incidence$_{t-1}$			-2.308**	1.098**	1.197**	-0.030	2.142**
			(0.195)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.338)	(0.179)
Constant	-4.384**	-5.025**	6.785**	2.452**	1.740**	-10.151**	-8.816**
	(0.933)	(0.837)	(0.909)	(0.410)	(0.375)	(1.121)	(1.239)
Observations	5,743	5,743	2,550	2,774	3,159	5,741	4,102
Alpha							4.442
Alpha SE							0.420
R-squared			0.486	0.407	0.467		

+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed; robust standard errors, clustered on country, in parentheses