

# When Is “Delivering the Goods” Not Good Enough? How Economic Disparities in Latin American Neighborhoods Shape Citizen Trust in Local Government

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## Supplemental Materials

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**Table A1. Descriptive Statistics at the Neighborhood Level**

|    | Neighborhood Size (Number of Inhabited Dwellings according to Census data gathered) | % households with <i>at least one</i> unsatisfied basic need (computed based on census data) | % households with Vehicle (computed based on data from public opinion survey) | % households with Computer (computed based on data from public opinion survey) | % households with Indoor plumbing (computed based on data from public opinion survey) | % households with Indoor bathroom (computed based on data from public opinion survey) |
|----|---|--|---|--|---|---|
| 1  | 48  | 100%   | 3.3%  | 0.0%   | 26.7%   | 0.0%  |
| 2  | 53  | 100%   | 16.1%   | 9.7%   | 87.1%   | 3.2%  |
| 3  | 54  | 98%  | 6.7%  | 6.7%   | 93.3%   | 73.3%   |
| 4  | 59  | 76%  | 0.0%  | 0.0%   | 80.0%   | 45.0%   |
| 5  | 68  | 82%  | 2.5%  | 0.0%   | 0.0%  | 2.5%  |
| 6  | 78  | 73%  | 13.3%   | 20.0%  | 56.7%   | 30.0%   |
| 7  | 79  | 55%  | 16.7%   | 3.3%   | 86.7%   | 46.7%   |
| 8  | 79  | 28%  | 31.0%   | 45.2%  | 92.9%   | 88.1%   |
| 9  | 82  | 82%  | 10.0%   | 0.0%   | 83.3%   | 50.0%   |
| 10 | 82  | 20%  | 24.5%   | 24.5%  | 98.0%   | 77.6%   |
| 11 | 85  | 62%  | 8.3%  | 5.6%   | 66.7%   | 33.3%   |
| 12 | 96  | 36%  | 11.1%   | 5.6%   | 80.6%   | 72.2%   |
| 13 | 98  | 83%  | 11.6%   | 2.3%   | 67.4%   | 30.2%   |
| 14 | 100   | 70%  | 16.7%   | 6.7%   | 73.3%   | 46.7%   |
| 15 | 100   | 100%   | 12.2%   | 0.0%   | 34.1%   | 4.9%  |
| 16 | 104   | 100%   | 2.5%  | 2.5%   | 77.5%   | 12.5%   |
| 17 | 106   | 33%  | 27.9%   | 34.9%  | 93.0%   | 72.1%   |
| 18 | 112   | 77%  | 12.5%   | 0.0%   | 10.0%   | 10.0%   |
| 19 | 114   | 79%  | 3.1%  | 3.1%   | 90.6%   | 43.8%   |
| 20 | 115   | 4%   | 52.4%   | 71.4%  | 100.0%  | 90.5%   |
| 21 | 119   | 100%   | 10.0%   | 2.0%   | 2.0%  | 10.0%   |
| 22 | 121   | 95%  | 2.4%  | 2.4%   | 70.7%   | 36.6%   |
| 23 | 122   | 78%  | 2.5%  | 0.0%   | 65.0%   | 40.0%   |
| 24 | 125   | 91%  | 6.0%  | 0.0%   | 22.0%   | 2.0%  |
| 25 | 130   | 100%   | 8.0%  | 6.0%   | 86.0%   | 8.0%  |
| 26 | 136   | 100%   | 8.3%  | 0.0%   | 1.7%  | 5.0%  |
| 27 | 137   | 98%  | 9.8%  | 0.0%   | 4.9%  | 2.4%  |
| 28 | 146   | 74%  | 16.7%   | 5.0%   | 61.7%   | 33.3%   |
| 29 | 156   | 21%  | 23.9%   | 35.8%  | 97.0%   | 82.1%   |
| 30 | 157   | 25%  | 35.0%   | 30.0%  | 86.7%   | 71.7%   |
| 31 | 159   | 26%  | 58.3%   | 56.3%  | 97.9%   | 89.6%   |
| 32 | 161   | 85%  | 11.7%   | 11.7%  | 78.3%   | 40.0%   |

**Table A1. Descriptive Statistics at the Neighborhood Level**

|    | Neighborhood<br>Size (Number of<br>Inhabited<br>Dwellings<br>according to<br>Census data<br>gathered) | % households<br>with <i>at least<br/>one</i><br>unsatisfied<br>basic need<br>(computed<br>based on<br>census data) | %<br>households<br>with<br>Vehicle<br>(computed<br>based on<br>data from<br>public<br>opinion<br>survey) | %<br>households<br>with<br>Computer<br>(computed<br>based on<br>data from<br>public<br>opinion<br>survey) | %<br>households<br>with<br>Indoor<br>plumbing<br>(computed<br>based on<br>data from<br>public<br>opinion<br>survey) | %<br>households<br>with<br>Indoor<br>bathroom<br>(computed<br>based on<br>data from<br>public<br>opinion<br>survey) |
|----|---|--|--|---|---|---|
| 33 | 167   | 27%  | 20.8%  | 12.5%   | 98.6%   | 73.6%   |
| 34 | 169   | 99%  | 22.0%  | 10.0%   | 0.0%  | 8.0%  |
| 35 | 172   | 100%   | 13.3%  | 1.7%  | 80.0%   | 15.0%   |
| 36 | 172   | 100%   | 8.2%   | 2.7%  | 2.7%  | 4.1%  |
| 37 | 172   | 45%  | 20.8%  | 22.9%   | 93.8%   | 81.3%   |
| 38 | 179   | 99%  | 12.8%  | 5.1%  | 78.2%   | 17.9%   |
| 39 | 180   | 43%  | 33.3%  | 28.3%   | 93.3%   | 81.7%   |
| 40 | 186   | 98%  | 16.7%  | 5.6%  | 38.9%   | 16.7%   |
| 41 | 192   | 100%   | 6.7%   | 0.0%  | 65.0%   | 0.0%  |
| 42 | 193   | 98%  | 6.8%   | 8.2%  | 84.9%   | 49.3%   |
| 43 | 195   | 99%  | 8.6%   | 4.3%  | 72.9%   | 48.6%   |
| 44 | 205   | 77%  | 14.1%  | 7.0%  | 52.1%   | 28.2%   |
| 45 | 209   | 99%  | 15.5%  | 5.6%  | 11.3%   | 8.5%  |
| 46 | 227   | 97%  | 3.7%   | 0.0%  | 0.0%  | 8.5%  |
| 47 | 237   | 57%  | 19.0%  | 22.4%   | 96.6%   | 81.0%   |
| 48 | 250   | 100%   | 16.7%  | 2.8%  | 58.3%   | 9.7%  |
| 49 | 258   | 98%  | 2.0%   | 1.0%  | 3.0%  | 1.0%  |
| 50 | 267   | 7%   | 52.8%  | 69.4%   | 100.0%  | 91.7%   |
| 51 | 292   | 80%  | 12.9%  | 13.9%   | 82.2%   | 38.6%   |
| 52 | 307   | 22%  | 18.8%  | 27.1%   | 97.9%   | 90.6%   |
| 53 | 313   | 2%   | 28.6%  | 45.2%   | 100.0%  | 95.2%   |
| 54 | 315   | 27%  | 39.1%  | 42.0%   | 91.3%   | 88.4%   |
| 55 | 321   | 32%  | 17.7%  | 18.8%   | 88.5%   | 81.3%   |
| 56 | 328   | 100%   | 11.0%  | 2.0%  | 84.0%   | 4.0%  |
| 57 | 332   | 98%  | 5.0%   | 2.0%  | 11.9%   | 11.9%   |
| 58 | 336   | 73%  | 11.0%  | 6.0%  | 75.0%   | 22.0%   |
| 59 | 360   | 98%  | 12.0%  | 0.0%  | 83.0%   | 10.0%   |
| 60 | 379   | 43%  | 8.3%   | 30.0%   | 90.0%   | 78.3%   |
| 61 | 407   | 51%  | 24.0%  | 29.2%   | 92.7%   | 80.2%   |
| 62 | 409   | 4%   | 51.9%  | 55.6%   | 100.0%  | 92.6%   |
| 63 | 414   | 9%   | 16.7%  | 18.5%   | 98.1%   | 90.7%   |
| 64 | 415   | 6%   | 45.2%  | 69.0%   | 100.0%  | 97.6%   |

**Table A1. Descriptive Statistics at the Neighborhood Level**

|    | Neighborhood<br>Size (Number of<br>Inhabited<br>Dwellings<br>according to<br>Census data<br>gathered) | % households<br>with <i>at least</i><br><i>one</i><br>unsatisfied<br>basic need<br>(computed<br>based on<br>census data) | %<br>households<br>with<br>Vehicle<br>(computed<br>based on<br>data from<br>public<br>opinion<br>survey) | %<br>households<br>with<br>Computer<br>(computed<br>based on<br>data from<br>public<br>opinion<br>survey) | %<br>households<br>with<br>Indoor<br>plumbing<br>(computed<br>based on<br>data from<br>public<br>opinion<br>survey) | %<br>households<br>with<br>Indoor<br>bathroom<br>(computed<br>based on<br>data from<br>public<br>opinion<br>survey) |
|----|---|--|--|---|---|---|
| 65 | 417   | 8%   | 33.3%  | 48.3%   | 100.0%  | 88.3%   |
| 66 | 441   | 5%   | 51.7%  | 61.7%   | 98.3%   | 96.7%   |
| 67 | 498   | 7%   | 47.9%  | 64.6%   | 97.9%   | 91.7%   |
| 68 | 498   | 15%  | 61.7%  | 68.3%   | 95.0%   | 86.7%   |
| 69 | 506   | 63%  | 15.8%  | 9.9%  | 78.2%   | 49.5%   |
| 70 | 540   | 4%   | 66.7%  | 66.7%   | 100.0%  | 91.7%   |
| 71 | 738   | 11%  | 30.0%  | 46.7%   | 95.0%   | 100.0%  |

**Table A2. Description of Individual Level Variables Included in the Analysis**

| <b>Individual-Level Variable</b>                          | <b>Description</b>   | <b>Instrument</b>     |
|---|--|-----------------------|
| Trust in local government (Dependent Variable)            | To what extent do you trust the municipal government?  | Public Opinion Survey |
| Terciles of Wealth  | Variable estimated based on Principal Component Analysis and 13 Household Assets   | Public Opinion Survey |
| Perception of government performance in service provision | Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? (5) Very good (4) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (2) Bad (1) Very bad  | Public Opinion Survey |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party                       | Which party did you vote for in the last municipal elections of 2009?<br>0= Did not vote<br>1= Voted for incumbent political party<br>2=Voted for opposition<br>3= Did not reveal who they voted for   | Public Opinion Survey |
| Asked for a bribe by a local government official          | Did you have any official dealings in the city hall where you lived in the last year?<br><br>If yes→ In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document (like a permit, for example), did you have to pay any money beyond that required by law?   | Public Opinion Survey |
| Attended Local Government Meeting                         | Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?<br><br>(1) Yes (0) No   | Public Opinion Survey |
| Attended Community Meetings                               | Have you participated in meetings of a committee for community improvement?<br><br>(1) Yes (0) No  | Public Opinion Survey |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood                           | Average based on responses indicating agreement with the following statements: “When there is a problem in the neighborhood, the neighbors usually organize themselves to try to fix it,” “This is a unified neighborhood,” “People around here are willing to help their neighbors,” “People in this neighborhood generally get along with each other,” “People in this neighborhood share the same values.”<br><br>Each on a Likert Scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Index ranges from 0 to 100.<br><br><b>Unidimensional index with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85</b> | Public Opinion Survey |

|   |   |                       |
|---|---|-----------------------|
| Victimized by crime in the neighborhood               | Crime victimization index based on 11 types of crime that occurred within the neighborhood.<br><br>(=1 if victimized; 0=No)   | Public Opinion Survey |
| Fear of being victimized by crime in the neighborhood | Index based on the following two items:<br>How worried are you that someone will stop you in the street, threaten you, hit you or hurt you in [NAME OF NEIGHBORHOOD]? Are you...?<br>How worried are you that someone from your family will be stopped in the street, threatened, hit or hurt in [NAME OF NEIGHBORHOOD]? Are you...?<br>(4) Very worried (3) Somewhat worried (2) Not very worried (1) Not worried<br><b>Unidimensional index with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.88</b> | Public Opinion Survey |
| Education Level                                       | Years of schooling (ranges from 0 to 18)  | Public Opinion Survey |
| Age   | How old are you? _____ years  | Public Opinion Survey |
| Sex   | Sex [note down; do not ask]<br><br>Female=1; Male=0   | Public Opinion Survey |

**Table A3. Description of Neighborhood Level Variables Included in the Analysis**

| <b>Neighborhood-Level Variable</b>                       | <b>Description</b>   | <b>Instrument</b>                |
|--|--|----------------------------------|
| Relative Living Conditions (Inequality)                  | Based on McKenzie's (2005) methodology   | Census carried out for the study |
| Absolute Living Conditions in the Neighborhood (Poverty) | Based on the Unsatisfied Basic Needs Methodology as described in Méndez and Trejos (2004)  | Census carried out for the study |
| Physical Disorder  | The physical disorder index consists of the sum of five items from the block observation: (1) garbage dumps or mounds of trash scattered outdoors throughout the area, (2) garbage or broken glass in the streets or on sidewalks, (3) empty lots with overgrown grass, (4) sewage or waste in the streets, and (5) lack of public electricity. The index was calculated at the neighborhood level by averaging the scores for blocks within each neighborhood.                                | Systematic Observation of Blocks |
| Neighborhood Crime                                       | Index based on responses to seven items in the opinion survey that asked respondents whether they had knowledge of the following seven acts occurring in the last twelve months in their neighborhood: robberies, damage to private property, sale of illegal drugs, extortions, sexual violence, kidnappings, and murders. The index measures the average number of crimes (from the list of seven possible crimes) that respondents reported in each neighborhood and varies between 0 and 7 | Public Opinion Survey            |
| Neighborhood Size  | Number of inhabited households in the neighborhood   | Census carried out for the study |
| Participation rate in meetings Local Government          | Percent of neighborhood residents who participated in a meeting convened by the local government in the past year  | Public Opinion Survey            |
| Participation rate Meetings Neighborhood Committees      | Percent of neighborhood residents who participated in meetings of a community improvement committee in the past year   | Public Opinion Survey            |
| Social Cohesion  | Average level of social cohesion   | Public Opinion Survey            |
| Percent who Voted for Incumbent Political Party          | Percent of respondents who voted for the winning party in the municipal election prior the study   | Public Opinion Survey            |

**Table A4. Descriptive Statistics of All Variables**

|   | <b>Obs.</b> | <b>Mean</b> | <b>Std.<br/>Dev.</b> | <b>Min</b> | <b>Max</b> |
|---|-------------|-------------|----------------------|------------|------------|
| <b>Individual-Level Variables</b>                               |             |             |                      |            |            |
| Trust in Local Government                                       | 4060        | 4.53        | 1.59                 | 1.00       | 7.00       |
| Tercile of Wealth 1   | 4096        | 0.40        | 0.49                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Tercile of Wealth 2   | 4096        | 0.31        | 0.46                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Tercile of Wealth 3   | 4096        | 0.28        | 0.45                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Perception of government performance in service provision       | 4066        | 3.27        | 0.80                 | 1.00       | 5.00       |
| Did not vote in past Local Election                             | 4096        | 0.29        | 0.45                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Voted for Incumbent Party in Past Municipal Election            | 4096        | 0.24        | 0.43                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Voted for Opposition Political Party in Past Municipal Election | 4096        | 0.27        | 0.45                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Did not Reveal who She/He Voted for in Past Municipal Election  | 4096        | 0.20        | 0.40                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Asked for a bribe by a local government official                | 4092        | 0.03        | 0.16                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Not Asked for a bribe   | 4092        | 0.14        | 0.35                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| No contact with municipality (No Bribe)                         | 4092        | 0.83        | 0.37                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Attended a meeting convened by the local government             | 4074        | 0.04        | 0.20                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Participated in meetings of a community improvement committee   | 4056        | 0.11        | 0.31                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Social Cohesion   | 4084        | 59.47       | 17.94                | 0.00       | 100.00     |
| Fear of being victimized by crime in the neighborhood           | 4096        | 61.24       | 29.55                | 0.00       | 100.00     |
| Victimized by crime in the neighborhood                         | 4096        | 0.06        | 0.25                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Years of schooling  | 4089        | 7.94        | 4.80                 | 0.00       | 18.00      |
| Sex (Female=1)  | 4096        | 0.49        | 0.50                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Age cohort 1 (18-25)  | 4096        | 0.23        | 0.42                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Age cohort 2 (26-35)  | 4096        | 0.24        | 0.43                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Age cohort 3 (36-45)  | 4096        | 0.22        | 0.42                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Age cohort 3 (46 or more)                                       | 4096        | 0.14        | 0.34                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Municipality 1: San Juan Opico                                  | 4096        | 0.14        | 0.35                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Municipality 2: Santa Ana                                       | 4096        | 0.39        | 0.49                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Municipality 3: Zaragoza  | 4096        | 0.10        | 0.31                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Municipality 4: Santa Tecla                                     | 4096        | 0.12        | 0.33                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Municipality 5: San Salvador                                    | 4096        | 0.14        | 0.35                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| Municipality 6: Chalchuapa                                      | 4096        | 0.10        | 0.30                 | 0.00       | 1.00       |
| <b>Neighborhood-Level Variables</b>                             |             |             |                      |            |            |
| Relative living conditions in the neighborhood (Inequality)     | 4096        | 0.86        | 0.13                 | 0.61       | 1.38       |
| Absolute living conditions in the neighborhood (poverty rate)   | 4096        | 0.64        | 0.35                 | 0.02       | 1.00       |



**Table A4. Descriptive Statistics of All Variables**

|   | <b>Obs.</b> | <b>Mean</b> | <b>Std.<br/>Dev.</b> | <b>Min</b> | <b>Max</b> |
|---|-------------|-------------|----------------------|------------|------------|
| Neighborhood Crime                                  | 4096        | 2.60        | 1.76                 | 0.00       | 7.00       |
| Neighborhood Size                                   | 4096        | 245.58      | 138.04               | 48         | 738        |
| Physical Disorder                                   | 4096        | 1.37        | 0.82                 | 0.15       | 3.42       |
| Participation rate in meetings Local Government     | 4096        | 4.10        | 5.01                 | 0.00       | 29.27      |
| Participation rate Meetings Neighborhood Committees | 4096        | 10.76       | 11.36                | 0.00       | 49.38      |
| Average Social Cohesion                             | 4096        | 59.47       | 4.94                 | 46.62      | 71.65      |
| Percent who Voted for Incumbent Political Party     | 4096        | 29.14       | 11.77                | 0.00       | 58.33      |

**Table A5. Comparison of Neighborhood Sample with Nationally Representative Sample  
(Population 18 years old or older)**

|                        | <b>National Sample<br/>(2010 AmericasBarometer)</b> |                      |                                 |       | <b>Neighborhood Sample</b> |                      |                                 |       |
|------------------------|---|----------------------|---------------------------------|-------|----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|-------|
|                        | <b>Mean</b>   | <b>Std.<br/>Err.</b> | <b>[95% Conf.<br/>Interval]</b> |       | <b>Mean</b>                | <b>Std.<br/>Err.</b> | <b>[95% Conf.<br/>Interval]</b> |       |
| Women                  | 51.9%   | 1.3                  | 49.4%                           | 54.4% | 49.4%                      | 0.8                  | 47.8%                           | 50.9% |
| Age                    | 38.1  | 0.4                  | 37.4                            | 38.9  | 39.5                       | 0.3                  | 39.1                            | 40.0  |
| No formal<br>education | 8.2%  | 0.7                  | 6.8%                            | 9.6%  | 9.7%                       | 0.5                  | 8.8%                            | 10.6% |
| Primary<br>education   | 29.2%   | 1.2                  | 26.9%                           | 31.4% | 31.0%                      | 0.7                  | 29.5%                           | 32.4% |
| Secondary<br>education | 42.3%   | 1.3                  | 39.9%                           | 44.8% | 45.3%                      | 0.8                  | 43.8%                           | 46.9% |
| Higher<br>education    | 20.3%   | 1.0                  | 18.3%                           | 22.3% | 14.0%                      | 0.5                  | 12.9%                           | 15.1% |
| Sample Size            | 1,550   |                      |                                 |       | 4,096                      |                      |                                 |       |

**Table A6. Effect of Voting for Incumbent Party on Trust in Local Government**  
(Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|   | Coeff. (Std. Err)    | Coeff. (Std. Err)    |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>                              | -0.947**<br>(0.358)  | -0.777*<br>(0.368)   |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i> | -0.077<br>(0.208)    | 0.127<br>(0.215)     |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>   | -0.074**<br>(0.025)  | -0.066*<br>(0.026)   |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)                     | -0.164*<br>(0.073)   | -0.146*<br>(0.073)   |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)                     | -0.112<br>(0.074)    | -0.130+<br>(0.075)   |
| Perc. Gov. Performance in Service Provision                         |                      | 0.769***<br>(0.041)  |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)    | 0.188*<br>(0.081)    | 0.096<br>(0.082)     |
| Did not Vote (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                           | -0.050<br>(0.078)    | -0.072<br>(0.079)    |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)         | -0.124<br>(0.084)    | -0.151+<br>(0.085)   |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)                                  | -0.554**<br>(0.191)  | -0.447*<br>(0.194)   |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)                       | 0.034<br>(0.084)     | 0.005<br>(0.084)     |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)                        | 0.428**<br>(0.153)   | 0.224<br>(0.153)     |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)                              | -0.122<br>(0.100)    | -0.054<br>(0.101)    |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood                                     | 0.011***<br>(0.002)  | 0.006***<br>(0.002)  |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                  | -0.421***<br>(0.120) | -0.335**<br>(0.120)  |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood               | -0.002*<br>(0.001)   | -0.002+<br>(0.001)   |
| Years of Schooling  | -0.001<br>(0.008)    | -0.001<br>(0.008)    |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)  | 0.038<br>(0.057)     | 0.053<br>(0.058)     |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)                                | -0.308***<br>(0.084) | -0.346***<br>(0.085) |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)                                | -0.312***<br>(0.081) | -0.293***<br>(0.082) |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)                                | -0.207**<br>(0.079)  | -0.190*<br>(0.080)   |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)                                   | -0.010<br>(0.152)    | 0.009<br>(0.157)     |
| Santa Ana   | -0.219+<br>(0.152)   | -0.049<br>(0.157)    |

|  |                   |                   |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|
|  | (0.128)           | (0.132)           |
| Zaragoza                                     | -0.160            | -0.094            |
|  | (0.163)           | (0.168)           |
| Santa Tecla                                  | 0.071             | 0.110             |
|  | (0.192)           | (0.199)           |
| San Salvador                                 | 0.159             | 0.240             |
|  | (0.167)           | (0.173)           |
| <b>Num.Neighborhoods [Num. Observations]</b> | <b>71 [3,979]</b> | <b>71 [3,955]</b> |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Standard errors in parenthesis. Two-level ordered logistic multilevel model with random intercepts at the neighborhood level.

**Table A7. Model Testing Hypothesis 1 with Terciles 2 and 3 as a Reference Category**  
(Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)


|   | Coeff. (Std. Err)    |
|---|----------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>                              | -0.351<br>(0.406)    |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; Terciles of Wealth 2 and 3=0)              | 1.006*<br>(0.506)    |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                | -1.220*<br>(0.575)   |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i> | 0.083<br>(0.211)     |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>   | -0.062*<br>(0.026)   |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision           | 0.772***<br>(0.041)  |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)    | 0.089<br>(0.083)     |
| Did not Vote (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                           | -0.084<br>(0.079)    |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)         | -0.160+<br>(0.085)   |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; 0=No Bribe)                                  | -0.432*<br>(0.195)   |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)                       | 0.013<br>(0.085)     |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)                        | 0.236<br>(0.154)     |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)                              | -0.059<br>(0.101)    |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood                                     | 0.006***<br>(0.002)  |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                  | -0.357**<br>(0.120)  |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood               | -0.002*<br>(0.001)   |
| Years of Schooling  | -0.000<br>(0.008)    |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)  | 0.055<br>(0.058)     |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)                                | -0.351***<br>(0.085) |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)                                | -0.291***<br>(0.082) |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)                                | -0.197*<br>(0.080)   |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)                                   | 0.041<br>(0.155)     |
| Santa Ana   | -0.033<br>(0.129)    |
| Zaragoza  | -0.073<br>(0.165)    |

|  |                  |
|--|------------------|
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.093<br>(0.194) |
| San Salvador                           | 0.283<br>(0.172) |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 3,955            |

---

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Standard errors in parenthesis. Two-level ordered logistic multilevel model. Model allows intercepts and slope of tercile of wealth 1 to vary randomly.

**Figure A1. Testing Hypothesis 1: Statistical Significance of Differences in Mean Predicted Probabilities**



Statistical significance of differences in mean predicted probabilities determined based on the Delta Method in Stata 13.1. Results from the Two-Way Interaction Model in Table 1 in the paper.

**Table A8. Model Testing Hypothesis 1: Split Sample by Tercile of Wealth** (Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|   | Tercile 1            | Tercile 2            | Tercile 3            |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|   | Coeff.<br>(Std. Err) | Coeff.<br>(Std. Err) | Coeff.<br>(Std. Err) |
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>                              | -1.712**<br>(0.603)  | -0.356<br>(0.535)    | -0.398<br>(0.580)    |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i> | 0.303<br>(0.346)     | -0.008<br>(0.311)    | -0.141<br>(0.329)    |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>   | -0.110**<br>(0.041)  | -0.063<br>(0.040)    | -0.013<br>(0.038)    |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision           | 0.722***<br>(0.067)  | 0.801***<br>(0.071)  | 0.792***<br>(0.076)  |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)    | -0.049<br>(0.136)    | 0.014<br>(0.152)     | 0.287*<br>(0.144)    |
| Did not Vote (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                           | -0.091<br>(0.126)    | -0.040<br>(0.140)    | -0.105<br>(0.155)    |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)         | -0.296*<br>(0.139)   | 0.017<br>(0.149)     | -0.137<br>(0.158)    |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)                                  | -0.755*<br>(0.311)   | 0.018<br>(0.370)     | -0.426<br>(0.337)    |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)                       | 0.034<br>(0.146)     | -0.018<br>(0.145)    | -0.034<br>(0.151)    |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)                        | 0.223<br>(0.258)     | 0.480+<br>(0.272)    | -0.010<br>(0.272)    |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)                              | -0.096<br>(0.166)    | 0.232<br>(0.174)     | -0.391*<br>(0.190)   |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood                                     | 0.008**<br>(0.003)   | -0.001<br>(0.003)    | 0.010**<br>(0.003)   |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                  | -0.388*<br>(0.196)   | -0.316<br>(0.199)    | -0.415+<br>(0.240)   |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood               | -0.001<br>(0.002)    | -0.002<br>(0.002)    | -0.003<br>(0.002)    |



|  |                      |                   |                    |
|--|----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Years of Schooling                     | 0.016<br>(0.013)     | -0.015<br>(0.014) | -0.008<br>(0.014)  |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)                 | -0.001<br>(0.092)    | 0.057<br>(0.103)  | 0.126<br>(0.111)   |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.590***<br>(0.141) | -0.110<br>(0.149) | -0.320*<br>(0.157) |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.449***<br>(0.128) | -0.180<br>(0.145) | -0.233<br>(0.160)  |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.357**<br>(0.125)  | -0.045<br>(0.145) | -0.144<br>(0.153)  |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | -0.070<br>(0.246)    | -0.057<br>(0.224) | 0.333<br>(0.249)   |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.061<br>(0.206)    | 0.052<br>(0.188)  | -0.112<br>(0.206)  |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.100<br>(0.263)    | -0.077<br>(0.248) | -0.040<br>(0.266)  |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.189<br>(0.318)     | 0.048<br>(0.283)  | 0.053<br>(0.299)   |
| San Salvador                           | -0.051<br>(0.271)    | 0.406<br>(0.253)  | 0.476+<br>(0.259)  |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [1,582]           | 71[1,245]         | 71[1,128]          |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Standard errors in parenthesis. Two-level ordered logistic multilevel model.


**Table A9. Model Testing Hypothesis 2: Tercile of Wealth 3 as Reference Category**  
(Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|   | Coeff. (Std. Err)   |
|---|---------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>  | 0.687<br>(2.273)    |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)                                 | -3.660<br>(2.324)   |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)                                 | 0.136<br>(2.392)    |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                            | 4.624+<br>(2.677)   |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                            | -0.155<br>(2.763)   |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision                       | 1.080+<br>(0.598)   |
| Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                       | -0.297<br>(0.681)   |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance                                  | 1.454*<br>(0.689)   |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 x Percep. Gov. Performance                                  | -0.025<br>(0.713)   |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i> | -1.842*<br>(0.793)  |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 x Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i> | -0.018<br>(0.823)   |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i>             | 0.021<br>(0.219)    |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>   | -0.053*<br>(0.026)  |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                | 0.082<br>(0.083)    |
| Did not Vote (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                                       | -0.082<br>(0.080)   |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                     | -0.155+<br>(0.085)  |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; 0=No Bribe)  | -0.406*<br>(0.197)  |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; 0=No Bribe)                                   | 0.023<br>(0.085)    |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)                                    | 0.184<br>(0.156)    |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)  | -0.043<br>(0.102)   |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood   | 0.006***<br>(0.002) |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                              | -0.323**<br>(0.121) |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood                           | -0.002+<br>(0.001)  |
| Years of Schooling  | -0.003<br>(0.008)   |

|  |                      |
|--|----------------------|
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)                 | 0.057<br>(0.058)     |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.350***<br>(0.086) |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.286***<br>(0.083) |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.201*<br>(0.081)   |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | 0.044<br>(0.155)     |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.022<br>(0.130)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.049<br>(0.166)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.140<br>(0.198)     |
| San Salvador                           | 0.305+<br>(0.173)    |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955]           |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Two-level ordered logistic multilevel model with random intercepts at the neighborhood level. The slope associated with the variables on the first tercile of wealth and perceptions of government performance in the provision of services are allowed to vary across neighborhoods.

**Figure A2. Testing Hypothesis 2: Statistical Significance of Differences in Mean Predicted Probabilities**



Statistical significance of differences in mean predicted probabilities determined based on the Delta Method in Stata 13.1. Results from the Three-Way Interaction Model in Table 2 in the paper.

# Testing Hypotheses 1 Controlling for Additional Neighborhood-Level Variables: Robustness Tests

**Table A10. Model Testing Hypothesis 1: Controlling for Average Physical Disorder**  
(Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|   | Coeff. (Std. Err)   | Coeff. (Std. Err)         |
|---|---------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>                              | -0.774*<br>(0.368)  | -0.240<br>(0.525)         |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)                     | -0.146*<br>(0.073)  | 1.023+<br>(0.585)         |
| Tercile of Wealth 2   | -0.131+<br>(0.075)  | 0.068<br>(0.532)          |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b>         |                     | <b>-1.318*</b><br>(0.663) |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                |                     | -0.220<br>(0.601)         |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i> | 0.256<br>(0.280)    | 0.236<br>(0.272)          |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>   | -0.065*<br>(0.026)  | -0.060*<br>(0.026)        |
| <i>Physical Disorder</i>  | -0.062<br>(0.086)   | -0.078<br>(0.084)         |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision           | 0.769***<br>(0.041) | 0.773***<br>(0.041)       |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)    | 0.095<br>(0.082)    | 0.087<br>(0.082)          |
| Did not Vote (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                           | -0.072<br>(0.079)   | -0.079<br>(0.080)         |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)          | -0.151+<br>(0.084)  | -0.154+<br>(0.085)        |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)                                  | -0.445*<br>(0.194)  | -0.435*<br>(0.195)        |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)                       | 0.008<br>(0.084)    | 0.017<br>(0.085)          |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)                        | 0.221<br>(0.153)    | 0.229<br>(0.154)          |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)                              | -0.056<br>(0.101)   | -0.059<br>(0.101)         |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood                                     | 0.006***<br>(0.002) | 0.006***<br>(0.002)       |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                  | -0.334**<br>(0.120) | -0.349**<br>(0.120)       |

|   |                                |                                |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood | -0.002 <sup>+</sup><br>(0.001) | -0.002 <sup>+</sup><br>(0.001) |
| Years of Schooling                                    | -0.001<br>(0.008)              | -0.002<br>(0.008)              |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)                                | 0.053<br>(0.058)               | 0.057<br>(0.058)               |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)                  | -0.347***<br>(0.085)           | -0.351***<br>(0.085)           |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)                  | -0.292***<br>(0.082)           | -0.290***<br>(0.082)           |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)                  | -0.189*<br>(0.080)             | -0.199*<br>(0.080)             |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)                     | -0.008<br>(0.159)              | 0.020<br>(0.156)               |
| Santa Ana   | -0.055<br>(0.132)              | -0.043<br>(0.129)              |
| Zaragoza  | -0.111<br>(0.169)              | -0.093<br>(0.166)              |
| Santa Tecla   | 0.119<br>(0.199)               | 0.108<br>(0.193)               |
| San Salvador  | 0.228<br>(0.174)               | 0.270<br>(0.172)               |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations]                | 71 [3,955]                     | 71[3,955]                      |

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Standard errors in parenthesis. Two-level ordered logistic multilevel models. The two-way interaction model allows intercepts and slope of tercile of wealth 1 to vary randomly.

**Table A11. Model Testing Hypothesis 1: Controlling for Neighborhood Size**  
(Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|   | Coeff. (Std. Err)   | Coeff. (Std. Err)                |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>                              | -0.774*<br>(0.366)  | -0.213<br>(0.527)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)                     | -0.146*<br>(0.073)  | 1.053+<br>(0.584)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 2   | -0.129+<br>(0.075)  | 0.087<br>(0.532)                 |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b>         |                     | <b>-1.351*</b><br><b>(0.662)</b> |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                |                     | -0.238<br>(0.600)                |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i> | 0.117<br>(0.214)    | 0.074<br>(0.210)                 |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>   | -0.065*<br>(0.026)  | -0.062*<br>(0.026)               |
| <i>Neighborhood Size (Number of Inhabited Dwellings)</i>            | -0.000<br>(0.000)   | -0.000<br>(0.000)                |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision           | 0.769***<br>(0.041) | 0.773***<br>(0.041)              |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)    | 0.097<br>(0.082)    | 0.088<br>(0.082)                 |
| Did not Vote (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                           | -0.071<br>(0.079)   | -0.079<br>(0.080)                |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)          | -0.149+<br>(0.085)  | -0.152+<br>(0.085)               |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)                                  | -0.448*<br>(0.194)  | -0.439*<br>(0.195)               |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)                       | 0.006<br>(0.084)    | 0.013<br>(0.085)                 |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)                        | 0.228<br>(0.153)    | 0.237<br>(0.154)                 |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)                              | -0.055<br>(0.101)   | -0.058<br>(0.101)                |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood                                     | 0.006**<br>(0.002)  | 0.006**<br>(0.002)               |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                  | -0.336**<br>(0.120) | -0.352**<br>(0.120)              |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood               | -0.002+<br>(0.001)  | -0.002+<br>(0.001)               |
| Years of Schooling  | -0.000<br>(0.008)   | -0.002<br>(0.008)                |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)  | 0.054<br>(0.058)    | 0.057<br>(0.058)                 |

|  |                      |                      |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.347***<br>(0.085) | -0.350***<br>(0.085) |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.293***<br>(0.082) | -0.290***<br>(0.082) |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.190*<br>(0.080)   | -0.198*<br>(0.080)   |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | 0.006<br>(0.156)     | 0.033<br>(0.154)     |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.062<br>(0.132)    | -0.046<br>(0.130)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.124<br>(0.171)    | -0.098<br>(0.170)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.155<br>(0.206)     | 0.133<br>(0.203)     |
| San Salvador                           | 0.234<br>(0.172)     | 0.272<br>(0.172)     |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955]           | 71[3,955]            |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Standard errors in parenthesis. Two-level ordered logistic multilevel models. The two-way interaction model allows intercepts and slope of tercile of wealth 1 to vary randomly.



**Table A12. Model Testing Hypothesis 1: Controlling for % Participates in Local Gov. Meetings**  
(Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|   | Coeff. (Std. Err)   | Coeff. (Std. Err)                |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>                              | -0.753*<br>(0.380)  | -0.190<br>(0.531)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)                     | -0.147*<br>(0.073)  | 1.039+<br>(0.584)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 2   | -0.130+<br>(0.075)  | 0.082<br>(0.532)                 |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b>         |                     | <b>-1.337*</b><br><b>(0.662)</b> |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                |                     | -0.235<br>(0.601)                |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i> | 0.115<br>(0.219)    | 0.059<br>(0.216)                 |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>   | -0.065*<br>(0.027)  | -0.059*<br>(0.027)               |
| <i>% Participates in Local Gov. Meetings</i>                        | 0.002<br>(0.009)    | 0.004<br>(0.009)                 |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision           | 0.769***<br>(0.041) | 0.773***<br>(0.041)              |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)    | 0.095<br>(0.082)    | 0.087<br>(0.083)                 |
| Did not Vote (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                           | -0.072<br>(0.079)   | -0.079<br>(0.080)                |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)          | -0.151+<br>(0.085)  | -0.154+<br>(0.085)               |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)                                  | -0.447*<br>(0.194)  | -0.437*<br>(0.195)               |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)                       | 0.006<br>(0.084)    | 0.014<br>(0.085)                 |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)                        | 0.218<br>(0.155)    | 0.224<br>(0.156)                 |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)                              | -0.057<br>(0.102)   | -0.062<br>(0.102)                |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood                                     | 0.006***<br>(0.002) | 0.006***<br>(0.002)              |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                  | -0.335**<br>(0.120) | -0.351**<br>(0.120)              |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood               | -0.002+<br>(0.001)  | -0.002+<br>(0.001)               |
| Years of Schooling  | -0.001<br>(0.008)   | -0.002<br>(0.008)                |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)  | 0.053               | 0.057                            |

|  |            |            |
|--|------------|------------|
|  | (0.058)    | (0.058)    |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.346***  | -0.350***  |
|  | (0.085)    | (0.085)    |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.293***  | -0.291***  |
|  | (0.082)    | (0.082)    |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.190*    | -0.198*    |
|  | (0.080)    | (0.080)    |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | 0.011      | 0.043      |
|  | (0.157)    | (0.155)    |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.046     | -0.031     |
|  | (0.132)    | (0.129)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.099     | -0.080     |
|  | (0.169)    | (0.165)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.110      | 0.098      |
|  | (0.199)    | (0.193)    |
| San Salvador                           | 0.241      | 0.285+     |
|  | (0.173)    | (0.172)    |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955] | 71 [3,955] |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Standard errors in parenthesis. Two-level ordered logistic multilevel models. The two-way interaction model allows intercepts and slope of tercile of wealth 1 to vary randomly.

**Table A13. Model Testing Hypothesis I: Controlling for % Participates in Neighborhood Association Meetings** (Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|   | Coeff. (Std. Err)   | Coeff. (Std. Err)                |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>                              | -0.809*<br>(0.369)  | -0.244<br>(0.526)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)                     | -0.146*<br>(0.073)  | 1.042+<br>(0.583)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 2   | -0.129+<br>(0.075)  | 0.097<br>(0.532)                 |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b>         |                     | <b>-1.339*</b><br><b>(0.661)</b> |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                |                     | -0.250<br>(0.600)                |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i> | 0.172<br>(0.222)    | 0.115<br>(0.218)                 |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>   | -0.068**<br>(0.026) | -0.064*<br>(0.026)               |
| <i>% Participates in Neigh. Association Meetings</i>                | -0.003<br>(0.004)   | -0.003<br>(0.004)                |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision           | 0.770***<br>(0.041) | 0.774***<br>(0.041)              |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)    | 0.099<br>(0.082)    | 0.091<br>(0.083)                 |
| Did not Vote (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                           | -0.071<br>(0.079)   | -0.078<br>(0.080)                |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)          | -0.149+<br>(0.085)  | -0.152+<br>(0.085)               |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)                                  | -0.452*<br>(0.194)  | -0.442*<br>(0.195)               |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)                       | 0.002<br>(0.084)    | 0.010<br>(0.085)                 |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)                        | 0.232<br>(0.154)    | 0.240<br>(0.154)                 |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)                              | -0.034<br>(0.104)   | -0.041<br>(0.104)                |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood                                     | 0.006***<br>(0.002) | 0.006**<br>(0.002)               |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                  | -0.335**<br>(0.120) | -0.351**<br>(0.120)              |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood               | -0.002+<br>(0.001)  | -0.002*<br>(0.001)               |
| Years of Schooling  | -0.001<br>(0.008)   | -0.002<br>(0.008)                |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)  | 0.054<br>(0.058)    | 0.058<br>(0.058)                 |

|  |                      |                      |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.344***<br>(0.085) | -0.348***<br>(0.085) |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.291***<br>(0.082) | -0.289***<br>(0.082) |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.191*<br>(0.080)   | -0.199*<br>(0.080)   |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | 0.006<br>(0.156)     | 0.034<br>(0.155)     |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.038<br>(0.132)    | -0.027<br>(0.129)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.052<br>(0.175)    | -0.042<br>(0.172)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.131<br>(0.200)     | 0.116<br>(0.195)     |
| San Salvador                           | 0.249<br>(0.173)     | 0.287+<br>(0.172)    |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955]           | 71 [3,955]           |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Standard errors in parenthesis. Two-level ordered logistic multilevel models. The two-way interaction model allows intercepts and slope of tercile of wealth 1 to vary randomly.

**Table A14. Model Testing Hypothesis 1: Controlling for % Residents who Voted for Incumbent Party in Last Municipal Election** (Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|   | Coeff. (Std. Err)   | Coeff. (Std. Err)                |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>                              | -0.765*<br>(0.367)  | -0.198<br>(0.526)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)                     | -0.146*<br>(0.073)  | 1.056+<br>(0.584)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 2   | -0.129+<br>(0.075)  | 0.104<br>(0.532)                 |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b>         |                     | <b>-1.354*</b><br><b>(0.662)</b> |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                |                     | -0.258<br>(0.601)                |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i> | 0.130<br>(0.214)    | 0.082<br>(0.210)                 |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>   | -0.066*<br>(0.026)  | -0.062*<br>(0.026)               |
| <i>% Residents Voted for Incumbent Party</i>                        | -0.282<br>(0.465)   | -0.276<br>(0.455)                |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision           | 0.769***<br>(0.041) | 0.773***<br>(0.041)              |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)    | 0.102<br>(0.083)    | 0.094<br>(0.083)                 |
| Did not Vote (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                           | -0.072<br>(0.079)   | -0.079<br>(0.080)                |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)          | -0.150+<br>(0.085)  | -0.152+<br>(0.085)               |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)                                  | -0.455*<br>(0.194)  | -0.446*<br>(0.195)               |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)                       | 0.002<br>(0.085)    | 0.010<br>(0.085)                 |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)                        | 0.229<br>(0.153)    | 0.239<br>(0.154)                 |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)                              | -0.049<br>(0.101)   | -0.052<br>(0.102)                |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood                                     | 0.006***<br>(0.002) | 0.006**<br>(0.002)               |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                  | -0.335**<br>(0.120) | -0.350**<br>(0.120)              |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood               | -0.002+<br>(0.001)  | -0.002+<br>(0.001)               |
| Years of Schooling  | -0.001<br>(0.008)   | -0.002<br>(0.008)                |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)  | 0.054<br>(0.058)    | 0.058<br>(0.058)                 |

|  |                      |                      |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.345***<br>(0.085) | -0.348***<br>(0.085) |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.292***<br>(0.082) | -0.290***<br>(0.082) |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.189*<br>(0.080)   | -0.198*<br>(0.080)   |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | -0.008<br>(0.159)    | 0.021<br>(0.157)     |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.049<br>(0.131)    | -0.035<br>(0.128)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.168<br>(0.207)    | -0.146<br>(0.203)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.113<br>(0.198)     | 0.102<br>(0.193)     |
| San Salvador                           | 0.199<br>(0.185)     | 0.242<br>(0.184)     |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955]           | 71 [3,955]           |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Standard errors in parenthesis. Two-level ordered logistic multilevel models. The two-way interaction model allows intercepts and slope of tercile of wealth 1 to vary randomly.

**Table A15. Model Testing Hypothesis 1: Controlling for Average Social Cohesion in Neighborhood** (Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|   | Coeff. (Std. Err)   | Coeff. (Std. Err)                |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>                              | -0.763*<br>(0.364)  | -0.216<br>(0.524)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)                     | -0.148*<br>(0.073)  | 1.042+<br>(0.583)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 2   | -0.132+<br>(0.075)  | 0.062<br>(0.532)                 |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x Neighborhood Inequality</b>                |                     | <b>-1.354*</b><br><b>(0.662)</b> |
| Tercile of Wealth 2 x Neighborhood Inequality                       |                     | -0.258<br>(0.601)                |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i> | 0.064<br>(0.219)    | 0.020<br>(0.214)                 |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>   | -0.051+<br>(0.029)  | -0.049+<br>(0.028)               |
| <i>Average Social Cohesion</i>                                      | 0.011<br>(0.010)    | 0.011<br>(0.009)                 |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision           | 0.767***<br>(0.041) | 0.771***<br>(0.041)              |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)    | 0.096<br>(0.082)    | 0.088<br>(0.082)                 |
| Did not Vote (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                           | -0.072<br>(0.079)   | -0.080<br>(0.080)                |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)          | -0.149+<br>(0.085)  | -0.152+<br>(0.085)               |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)                                  | -0.448*<br>(0.194)  | -0.439*<br>(0.195)               |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)                       | 0.003<br>(0.084)    | 0.011<br>(0.085)                 |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)                        | 0.222<br>(0.153)    | 0.231<br>(0.154)                 |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)                              | -0.055<br>(0.101)   | -0.059<br>(0.101)                |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood                                     | 0.005**<br>(0.002)  | 0.005**<br>(0.002)               |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                  | -0.336**<br>(0.120) | -0.352**<br>(0.120)              |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood               | -0.002+<br>(0.001)  | -0.002+<br>(0.001)               |
| Years of Schooling  | -0.001<br>(0.008)   | -0.002<br>(0.008)                |

|  |                      |                      |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)                 | 0.053<br>(0.058)     | 0.057<br>(0.058)     |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.346***<br>(0.085) | -0.350***<br>(0.085) |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.293***<br>(0.082) | -0.291***<br>(0.082) |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.190*<br>(0.080)   | -0.199*<br>(0.080)   |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | 0.009<br>(0.154)     | 0.037<br>(0.152)     |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.023<br>(0.132)    | -0.011<br>(0.129)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.048<br>(0.170)    | -0.031<br>(0.167)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.054<br>(0.202)     | 0.047<br>(0.196)     |
| San Salvador                           | 0.275<br>(0.173)     | 0.312+<br>(0.171)    |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955]           | 71 [3,955]           |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Standard errors in parenthesis. Two-level ordered logistic multilevel models. The two-way interaction model allows intercepts and slope of tercile of wealth 1 to vary randomly.



# Testing Hypotheses 2 Controlling for Additional Neighborhood-Level Variables: Robustness Tests

**Table A16. Model Testing Hypothesis 2: Controlling for Average Physical Disorder**  
(Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|  | Coeff. (Std. Err)                 |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>   | 1.004<br>(1.358)                  |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; Tercile of Wealth 3=0)  | -3.539*<br>(1.761)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                                   | 4.448*<br>(2.058)                 |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision                              | 1.164***<br>(0.347)               |
| Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                              | -0.428<br>(0.401)                 |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance   | 1.375**<br>(0.530)                |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b> | <b>-1.722**</b><br><b>(0.619)</b> |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i>                    | 0.224<br>(0.281)                  |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>  | -0.065*<br>(0.026)                |
| <i>Physical Disorder in Neighborhood</i>   | -0.046<br>(0.086)                 |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                       | 0.085<br>(0.082)                  |
| Did not Vote(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)   | -0.087<br>(0.079)                 |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                             | -0.168*<br>(0.085)                |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)   | -0.420*<br>(0.194)                |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)  | 0.007<br>(0.084)                  |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)   | 0.186<br>(0.154)                  |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)   | -0.055<br>(0.101)                 |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood  | 0.006***<br>(0.002)               |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                                     | -0.002+<br>(0.001)                |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood                                  | -0.356**<br>(0.120)               |
| Years of Schooling   | 0.001                             |

|  |            |
|--|------------|
|  | (0.008)    |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)                 | 0.053      |
|  | (0.058)    |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.363***  |
|  | (0.085)    |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.293***  |
|  | (0.082)    |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.195*    |
|  | (0.080)    |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | -0.006     |
|  | (0.159)    |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.042     |
|  | (0.133)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.096     |
|  | (0.170)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.140      |
|  | (0.200)    |
| San Salvador                           | 0.238      |
|  | (0.174)    |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955] |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Two-level ordered logistic multilevel model with random intercepts at the neighborhood level.

**Table A17. Model Testing Hypothesis 2: Controlling for Neighborhood Size** (Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|  | Coeff. (Std. Err)                 |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>   | 0.614<br>(1.613)                  |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; tercile of wealth 3=0)  | -3.684*<br>(1.851)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                                   | 4.657*<br>(2.158)                 |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision                              | 1.066*<br>(0.429)                 |
| Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                              | -0.307<br>(0.492)                 |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance   | 1.458**<br>(0.550)                |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b> | <b>-1.824**</b><br><b>(0.641)</b> |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i>                    | 0.026<br>(0.220)                  |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>  | -0.053*<br>(0.026)                |
| <i>Neighborhood Size</i>   | -0.000<br>(0.000)                 |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                       | 0.084<br>(0.083)                  |
| Did not Vote   | -0.087<br>(0.080)                 |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior   | -0.160+<br>(0.085)                |
| Asked for a Bribe (yes=1; 0=no)  | -0.401*<br>(0.197)                |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; no bribe=0)  | 0.022<br>(0.085)                  |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; no=0)   | 0.190<br>(0.156)                  |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; no=0)   | -0.047<br>(0.102)                 |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood  | 0.006***<br>(0.002)               |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; no=0)                                     | -0.002+<br>(0.001)                |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood                                  | -0.331**<br>(0.121)               |
| Years of Schooling   | -0.000<br>(0.008)                 |
| Sex (female=1; male=0)   | 0.055<br>(0.058)                  |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.352***                         |

|  |            |
|--|------------|
|  | (0.086)    |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.286***  |
|  | (0.083)    |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.200*    |
|  | (0.081)    |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | 0.039      |
|  | (0.156)    |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.032     |
|  | (0.132)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.072     |
|  | (0.172)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.166      |
|  | (0.208)    |
| San Salvador                           | 0.296+     |
|  | (0.174)    |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955] |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Two-level ordered logistic multilevel model with random intercepts at the neighborhood level. The slopes associated with the variables on the first tercile of wealth and perceptions of government performance in the provision of services are allowed to vary across neighborhoods.

**Table A18. Model Testing Hypothesis 2: Controlling for % Participates in Local Gov. Meetings**  
(Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|  | Coeff. (Std. Err)          |
|--|----------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>   | 0.607<br>(1.613)           |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; tercile of wealth 3=0)  | -3.723*<br>(1.848)         |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                                   | 4.701*<br>(2.156)          |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision                              | 1.067*<br>(0.428)          |
| Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                              | -0.307<br>(0.491)          |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance   | 1.466**<br>(0.550)         |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b> | <b>-1.833**</b><br>(0.640) |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i>                    | 0.028<br>(0.224)           |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>  | -0.053+<br>(0.027)         |
| <i>% Participates Local Gov. Meetings</i>  | 0.000<br>(0.009)           |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                       | 0.084<br>(0.083)           |
| Did not Vote   | -0.087<br>(0.080)          |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior   | -0.162+<br>(0.085)         |
| Asked for a Bribe (yes=1; 0=no)  | -0.400*<br>(0.197)         |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; no bribe=0)  | 0.023<br>(0.085)           |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; no=0)   | 0.186<br>(0.157)           |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; no=0)   | -0.047<br>(0.103)          |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood  | 0.006***<br>(0.002)        |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; no=0)                                     | -0.002+<br>(0.001)         |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood                                  | -0.330**<br>(0.121)        |
| Years of Schooling   | -0.001<br>(0.008)          |
| Sex (female=1; male=0)   | 0.054<br>(0.058)           |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.352***                  |

|  |                       |
|--|-----------------------|
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | (0.086)<br>-0.287***  |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | (0.083)<br>-0.200*    |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | (0.081)<br>0.045      |
| Santa Ana                              | (0.156)<br>-0.020     |
| Zaragoza                               | (0.131)<br>-0.050     |
| Santa Tecla                            | (0.167)<br>0.135      |
| San Salvador                           | (0.199)<br>0.307+     |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | (0.174)<br>71 [3,955] |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Two-level ordered logistic multilevel model with random intercepts at the neighborhood level. The slopes associated with the variables on the first tercile of wealth and perceptions of government performance in the provision of services are allowed to vary across neighborhoods.

**Table A19. Model Testing Hypothesis 2: Controlling for % Participates in Neighborhood Association Meetings** (Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|  | Coeff. (Std. Err)                 |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>   | 0.556<br>(1.613)                  |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; tercile of wealth 3=0)  | -3.750*<br>(1.848)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                                   | 4.734*<br>(2.155)                 |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision                              | 1.061*<br>(0.428)                 |
| Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                              | -0.300<br>(0.491)                 |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance   | 1.473**<br>(0.550)                |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b> | <b>-1.841**</b><br><b>(0.640)</b> |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i>                    | 0.064<br>(0.228)                  |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>  | -0.055*<br>(0.026)                |
| <i>% Participates Neighborhood Association Meetings</i>                                | -0.002<br>(0.004)                 |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                       | 0.086<br>(0.083)                  |
| Did not Vote(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)   | -0.087<br>(0.080)                 |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                             | -0.160+<br>(0.085)                |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)   | -0.403*<br>(0.197)                |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)  | 0.020<br>(0.085)                  |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)   | 0.192<br>(0.156)                  |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)   | -0.031<br>(0.105)                 |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood  | 0.006***<br>(0.002)               |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                                     | -0.002+<br>(0.001)                |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood                                  | -0.330**<br>(0.121)               |
| Years of Schooling   | -0.001<br>(0.008)                 |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)   | 0.055<br>(0.058)                  |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.349***                         |

|  |            |
|--|------------|
|  | (0.086)    |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.286***  |
|  | (0.083)    |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.200*    |
|  | (0.081)    |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | 0.041      |
|  | (0.156)    |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.014     |
|  | (0.131)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.021     |
|  | (0.173)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.151      |
|  | (0.201)    |
| San Salvador                           | 0.310+     |
|  | (0.173)    |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955] |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Two-level ordered logistic multilevel model with random intercepts at the neighborhood level. The slopes associated with the variables on the first tercile of wealth and perceptions of government performance in the provision of services are allowed to vary across neighborhoods.



**Table A20. Model Testing Hypothesis 2: Controlling for Average Social Cohesion in Neighborhood**

(Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)

|  | Coeff. (Std. Err)          |
|--|----------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>   | 0.635<br>(1.612)           |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; tercile of wealth 3=0)  | -3.670*<br>(1.850)         |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                                   | 4.636*<br>(2.157)          |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision                              | 1.068*<br>(0.428)          |
| Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                              | -0.310<br>(0.491)          |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance   | 1.454**<br>(0.550)         |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b> | <b>-1.818**</b><br>(0.641) |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i>                    | -0.010<br>(0.224)          |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>  | -0.043<br>(0.029)          |
| <i>Average Social Cohesion</i>   | 0.008<br>(0.010)           |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                       | 0.084<br>(0.083)           |
| Did not Vote(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)   | -0.088<br>(0.080)          |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                             | -0.161+<br>(0.085)         |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)   | -0.401*<br>(0.197)         |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)  | 0.020<br>(0.085)           |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)   | 0.187<br>(0.156)           |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)   | -0.048<br>(0.102)          |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood  | 0.006***<br>(0.002)        |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                                     | -0.002+<br>(0.001)         |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood                                  | -0.332**<br>(0.121)        |
| Years of Schooling   | -0.001<br>(0.008)          |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)   | 0.055<br>(0.058)           |

|  |                      |
|--|----------------------|
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.352***<br>(0.086) |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.287***<br>(0.083) |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.201*<br>(0.081)   |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | 0.042<br>(0.154)     |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.003<br>(0.131)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.018<br>(0.169)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.097<br>(0.202)     |
| San Salvador                           | 0.327+<br>(0.173)    |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955]           |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Two-level ordered logistic multilevel model with random intercepts at the neighborhood level. The slopes associated with the variables on the first tercile of wealth and perceptions of government performance in the provision of services are allowed to vary across neighborhoods.

**Table A21. Model Testing Hypothesis 2: Controlling for % Residents who Voted for Incumbent Party in Last Municipal Election** (Neighborhood Level Variables in *Italics*)



|  | Coeff. (Std. Err)                 |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| <i>Inequality Within Neighborhoods</i>   | 0.596<br>(1.610)                  |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 (=1; tercile of wealth 3=0)  | -3.725*<br>(1.848)                |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                                   | 4.705*<br>(2.155)                 |
| Perception of Government Performance in Service Provision                              | 1.061*<br>(0.428)                 |
| Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i>                              | -0.301<br>(0.491)                 |
| Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance   | 1.469**<br>(0.550)                |
| <b>Tercile of Wealth 1 x Percep. Gov. Performance x <i>Neighborhood Inequality</i></b> | <b>-1.836**</b><br><b>(0.640)</b> |
| <i>Absolute Living Conditions in Neighborhood (Overall Poverty)</i>                    | 0.033<br>(0.219)                  |
| <i>Neighborhood Crime</i>  | -0.053*<br>(0.026)                |
| <i>% Voted for Incumbent Party</i>   | -0.313<br>(0.456)                 |
| Voted for Incumbent Political Party (=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                       | 0.090<br>(0.084)                  |
| Did not Vote(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)   | -0.088<br>(0.080)                 |
| Did Not Reveal Voting Behavior(=1; Voted for Opposition=0)                             | -0.160+<br>(0.085)                |
| Asked for a Bribe (=1; No Bribe=0)   | -0.410*<br>(0.197)                |
| No Contact with Municipality (=1; No Bribe=0)  | 0.019<br>(0.085)                  |
| Attended Local Government Meeting (=1; No=0)   | 0.192<br>(0.156)                  |
| Attended Community Meetings (=1; No=0)   | -0.040<br>(0.102)                 |
| Social Cohesion in Neighborhood  | 0.006***<br>(0.002)               |
| Victimized by Crime in the Neighborhood (=1; No=0)                                     | -0.002+<br>(0.001)                |
| Fear of being Victimized by Crime in the neighborhood                                  | -0.330**<br>(0.121)               |
| Years of Schooling   | -0.001<br>(0.008)                 |
| Sex (Female=1; Male=0)   | 0.055<br>(0.058)                  |
| Age Cohort 1 (1=18-25; 0=46 or more)   | -0.349***                         |

|  |            |
|--|------------|
|  | (0.086)    |
| Age Cohort 2 (1=26-35; 0=46 or more)   | -0.286***  |
|  | (0.083)    |
| Age Cohort 3 (1=36-45; 0=46 or more)   | -0.199*    |
|  | (0.081)    |
| San Juan Opico (=1; Chalchuapa=0)      | 0.026      |
|  | (0.158)    |
| Santa Ana                              | -0.020     |
|  | (0.129)    |
| Zaragoza                               | -0.131     |
|  | (0.204)    |
| Santa Tecla                            | 0.141      |
|  | (0.198)    |
| San Salvador                           | 0.260      |
|  | (0.185)    |
| Num. Neighborhoods [Num. Observations] | 71 [3,955] |

+  $p < 0.1$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  Two-level ordered logistic multilevel model with random intercepts at the neighborhood level. The slopes associated with the variables on the first tercile of wealth and perceptions of government performance in the provision of services are allowed to vary across neighborhoods.

Testing Hypothesis 1 at Different Levels of Trust in Local Government<sup>3</sup>



Figure A3



<sup>3</sup> Results in Figures A3 and A4 are based on the two-way interaction model (Model 2) in Table 1 in the manuscript.



# Testing Hypothesis 1 at Different Levels of Trust in Local Government

## Figure A4



Testing Hypothesis 2 at Different Levels of Trust in Local Government<sup>4</sup>

Figure A5



<sup>4</sup> Results in Figures A5 and A6 are based on the three-way interaction model (Model 3) in Table 2 in the manuscript.

## Testing Hypothesis 2 at Different Levels of Trust in Local Government

Figure A6

