

**War Outcomes and Leader Tenure**  
**Supplemental Appendix**  
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| **Note:** Dataset and do-files available at <https://users.polisci.wisc.edu/jweeks>.

## 1. Variable Definitions

### Growth

Numerous scholars have argued that one of the strongest predictors of survival in office is economic performance, with high growth resulting in rewards for good performance and low growth resulting in punishment. To measure economic growth, we use the Debs and Goemans (2010) dataset, which relies on Gleditsch (2002) for GDP data. Our measure reflects the percentage change in per capita GDP from the previous year.

### Founding Leader

We generate a dummy variable that marks whether a leader is the country's first leader after independence. These leaders often enjoy boosts to their tenure compared to other leaders, as reflected in our empirical analyses. They also appear more likely to engage in wars as many states in the modern age were forged as the result of conflict (for example, India under Nehru, Israel under Ben Gurion, etc).

### Civil War

Civil wars often result in loss of office. Civil war is also slightly correlated with participation in an interstate war. Failing to control for this variable could therefore lead to omitted variable bias. For data on civil wars, we rely on the PRIO dataset and count only civil conflicts that resulted in 1000 or more battle deaths. Where the PRIO data are missing, we rely on the COW civil war data (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). We lag this variable by one year to ensure that we only count civil wars ongoing *before* the leader was ousted.

### Age

We also control for the leader's age on entering office, as we expect leaders' chances of removal to increase as they grow older.

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## 2. Additional Specifications of Table 1

Table A1 – Replication with Interstate Wars Only

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Democracies	Non-Democracies	Low-Vulnerability Autocrats	High-Vulnerability Autocrats
Win Interstate War - Culpable	0.35** (0.16)	0.25** (0.15)	0.21 (0.25)	0.13*** (0.09)
Draw Interstate War - Culpable	0.96 (0.61)	1.22 (0.44)	0.50 (0.45)	1.11 (0.34)
Lose Interstate War - Culpable	3.27** (1.86)	2.05** (0.68)	2.03 (1.05)	3.72** (2.16)
Win Interstate War - Not Culpable	0.17*** (0.03)	2.27*** (0.42)	.	.
Draw Interstate War - Not Culpable	0.26 (0.35)	0.15** (0.14)	0.00 (0.00)	.
Lose Interstate War - Not Culpable	1.45 (0.56)	2.72 (2.41)	0.00 (0.00)	160.76*** (96.91)
Ongoing War - Culpable	334.59*** (179.44)	0.69 (0.25)	0.44** (0.18)	0.51 (0.26)
Ongoing War - Culpable x log(t)	0.42*** (0.04)			
Ongoing War - Not Culpable	2.27 (1.30)	1.56 (0.59)	7.45*** (1.59)	6.43*** (2.43)
Founding Leader	22.23 (78.82)	0.00* (0.01)	0.77 (0.23)	0.00 (0.00)
Founding Leader x log(t)	0.55 (0.26)	1.83* (0.63)		2.56 (1.72)
Civil War (lagged)	1.54* (0.36)	1.27 (0.19)	1.70** (0.38)	1.17 (0.34)
Percent Change in GDP (lagged)	0.98 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	0.99 (0.02)	1.01 (0.01)
Age of Leader at Entry	1.01 (0.00)	1.02*** (0.00)	1.05*** (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)
Observations	3,562	5,425	1,903	1,794

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table A2 – Replication with extra control variables (from Debs and Goemans 2010)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Democracies	Non-Democracies	Low-Vulnerability Autocrats	High-Vulnerability Autocrats
Wins War - Culpable	0.46** (0.15)	0.28** (0.17)	0.23 (0.23)	0.26* (0.19)
Draws War - Culpable	0.85 (0.36)	1.31 (0.44)	0.54 (0.50)	2.05 (0.93)
Loses War - Culpable	3.00*** (0.69)	1.92** (0.64)	2.35* (1.12)	3.49** (1.83)
Wins War - Not Culpable	0.07*** (0.05)	2.39*** (0.54)		
Draws War - Not Culpable	0.55 (0.44)	0.21** (0.14)	0.00 (0.00)	
Loses War - Not Culpable	1.22 (0.44)	1.03 (1.16)	0.50 (0.87)	
Ongoing War - Culpable	159.88*** (87.67)	0.75 (0.28)	0.48* (0.21)	0.66 (0.37)
Ongoing War - Culpable x log(t)	0.46*** (0.04)			
Ongoing War - Not Culpable	1.91 (1.05)	1.24 (0.52)	5.02*** (1.11)	
Founding Leader	29.64 (114.60)	0.00** (0.00)	0.82 (0.27)	0.00*** (0.00)
Founding Leader x log(t)	0.54 (0.27)	2.44** (0.95)		7.32*** (4.82)
Civil War (lagged)	0.93 (0.15)	1.31* (0.21)	1.73** (0.41)	1.18 (0.32)
Percent Change in GDP (lagged)	0.99 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)	0.99 (0.02)	1.01 (0.01)
Age of Leader at Entry	1.00 (0.01)	1.03*** (0.00)	1.05*** (0.01)	1.01* (0.01)
Type of Entry (DG)	3.56*** (0.65)	0.96 (0.11)	1.09 (0.20)	1.08 (0.21)
Times in Power (DG)	2.65*** (0.60)	1.82 (0.80)	0.04* (0.07)	0.71 (1.39)
Times in Power x log(t) (DG)	0.86*** (0.03)	0.91 (0.07)	1.51* (0.35)	1.10 (0.31)
Logged Population (DG)	1.07* (0.04)	0.90*** (0.04)	0.84*** (0.05)	0.85* (0.07)
Trade Openness (DG)	0.48***	0.21***	0.87	0.30**

	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.56)	(0.17)
Change in Trade Openness	0.73	0.89	1.04	0.93
(DG)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.08)
Logged GDP Per Capita (DG)	0.96	0.96	0.89	1.32*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.22)
Observations	3,476	5,168	1,864	1,707

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

### 3. Table of raw data

Below we show the proportion of leaders in each category that lost office by December 31st of the calendar year following the end of a war, for each combination of war outcome, vulnerability, and culpability. Occasionally, the same leader is observed more than once. We omit censored observations both from the proportions and the total number of observations in each cell (shown in italics below the proportions).

	Culpable			Not Culpable		
	Win	Draw	Lose	Win	Draw	Lose
Democracy	0.24 <i>46</i>	0.60 <i>10</i>	0.64 <i>11</i>	0.33 <i>6</i>	0.33 <i>3</i>	0.60 <i>5</i>
Low-Vulnerability Authoritarian	0.00 <i>8</i>	0.13 <i>8</i>	0.22 <i>18</i>	. <i>.</i>	0.00 <i>1</i>	0.50 <i>2</i>
High-Vulnerability Authoritarian	0.00 <i>16</i>	0.14 <i>7</i>	0.56 <i>9</i>	. <i>.</i>	. <i>.</i>	1.00 <i>1</i>