Supplementary Material

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COORDINATION
Tracing Border Effects

By DAVID B. CARTER and H. E. GOEMANS

September 19, 2017

Abstract

This supplemental appendix contains additional results that are not included in the main manuscript for reasons of space. Specifically, we include the following additional results:

1. we show how the recovering of trade following violent territorial transfers is conditional on the severity of the violence the produced the territorial redistribution;

2. we provide an alternative "break-point" for the long- versus short-term effects of border changes, showing that the basic patterns reported in the manuscript are robust to choosing year 10, 12, 18, or 20 instead of year 15;

3. we investigate the effects of the presence of market protecting institutions and their interaction with GATT/WTO membership;

4. we provide additional results that disaggregate pre-transfer periods by administrative transfer versus non-administrative transfer rather than violent versus peaceful transfer;

5. we also provide results that fully disaggregate pre-transfer periods into four categories, 1.) violent administrative, 2.) violent non-administrative, 3.) peaceful administrative, and 4.) peaceful non-administrative;

6. we disaggregate peaceful transfers according to whether they follow prior administrative lines or not within the set of 20th century secessions;

7. we employ an alternative measure of conflictual dyadic relations, focusing on the incidence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs);

8. we use an alternative measure of territorial conflict, reporting results using an indicator of territorial dispute developed by Huth and Allee (2002);

9. and, we provide a list of all peaceful and violent transfer cases along with their coding.

The numbers above correspond to the section heading numbers, to facilitate quickly finding each set of additional results.

1 Investigate Effects of Conflict Severity in Violent Transfers

Table 1 contains the results of two models that analyze how the severity of violent conflict that leads to territorial transfer influences its post-transfer effects on trade flows. It is intuitive that more severe conflicts would destroy trade relations to a greater degree, also setting the stage for more post-transfer recovery. Theoretically, trade recovery following violent transfer should be especially strong when the transferred unit breaks along prior administrative frontiers. The results in Table 1 show that this is indeed the case. Model I demonstrates that violent administrative transfers that follow militarized inter-state disputes (MIDs) result in greater subsequent increases in trade flows, while the same is not true following violent non-administrative transfers. The specification in Model I helps us distinguish between conflictual transfers that are MIDs versus those that involve two-sided violent conflict as coded by Tir et al. (1998), but at a level less severe than a MID.

Model II goes a step further by creating a conflict severity index that distinguishes between low level violence (0), a MID that falls short of interstate war (1), and interstate war (2) as coded by the Correlates of War. We again find support for the idea that conflicts of greater severity lead to greater subsequent increases in trade flows, especially following administrative transfers. The interaction between "Conflict Severity" and "Log Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer" is again positive, statistically significant at any conventional level and large. Interestingly, we find that the interaction between conflict severity and non-administrative transfers is also positive and significant at the 0.10 level in Model II. However, this effect is truly a post-severe conflict effect that is the result of disaggregating inter-state wars, as the effect of "Log Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer" remains negative and statistically insignificant.

2 Robustness Check: Changing the "Breakpoint" for Short- vs. Long-term Effects

Table 2 contains four alternative specifications of our short- versus long-term effects reported in Table 3 in the manuscript. While the main results in the manuscript use the 15 year mark after a transfer as the "breakpoint" to differentiate long- and short-term trade effects, we report results

using 10, 12, 18, and 20 year breakpoints in Table 2. The only differences in the findings in Table 2 are for the longer 18 and 20 breakpoints for the peaceful administrative transfer variables. While all other specifications (i.e., the 10, 12 and 15 year breakpoints) show positive and significant short-term effects for peaceful administrative transfers, the 18 and 20 year breakpoints result in positive but statistically insignificant short-term coefficients. Thus, the longer breakpoints are not as effective in estimating long- and short-term differences for peaceful transfers. All in all, these regressions show that the results reported in Table 3 of the main text are not that sensitive to reasonable changes in breakpoint year.

3   Robustness Check: Market Protecting Institutions

Table 3 contains results of an additional specification where we include a measure of whether both states in a dyad have market protecting institutions. We follow Souva, Smith and Rowan (2008) and Johnson, Souva and Smith (2013) in defining and measuring market protecting institutions as "domestic institutions that protect private property, establish banking and insurance laws, and create common standards of measurement (Souva, Smith and Rowan, 2008, 385)." We obtain our data from Johnson, Souva and Smith (2013), which covers the period of 1948–1999.

Model I in Table 3 adds the market protecting institutions variable to our main specification, also including an interaction between this variable and our measure of whether both states are GATT/WTO measures as in Johnson, Souva and Smith (2013). We find that market protecting institutions do promote trade, as reported by Souva, Smith and Rowan (2008) and Johnson, Souva and Smith (2013), but do not find significant results for the interaction with GATT/WTO membership as reported in Johnson, Souva and Smith (2013).[1] The other results are quite similar to those reported in Table 2 of the main text.

Importantly for our theory, the "Log Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer" variable remains positive and statistically significant. Thus, our most robust and consistent finding still holds when we include market protecting institutions in our specification. "Log Years Since Peace-

---

[1]Souva, Smith and Rowan (2008) also interact market protecting institutions with democracy, a strategy that leads to similar results to those in Table 3 in our specification.

ful Administrative Transfer" remains positive but falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance in Model I. However, we demonstrate that, similarly to our findings in Models V and VI in Table 2 of the main text where we include common currency, PTA, and GATT/WTO membership, the fall from statistical significance is a function of the changing sample rather than the inclusion of new variables. The sample size is cut by more than 50% from Model IV in Table 2 of the main text when we include the market protecting institutions measure. Model II in Table 3 below again excludes all of the additional variables that eliminate pre-1945 observations (including market protecting institutions) but drop all observations for which the market protecting institutions measure is missing. Note that "Log Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer" is again insignificant, which strongly suggests that the sample is the real issue with this variable rather than these additional measures washing its effect away. As in the specifications reported in the main text, inclusion of pre-World War II data is important for uncovering an effect for peaceful transfers.

Importantly for our theory, the "Log Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer" variable remains positive and statistically significant. Thus, our most robust and consistent finding still holds when we include market protecting institutions in our specification. "Log Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer" remains positive but falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance in Model I. However, we demonstrate that, similarly to our findings in Models V and VI in Table 2 of the main text where we include common currency, PTA, and GATT/WTO membership, the fall from statistical significance is a function of the changing sample rather than the inclusion of new variables. The sample size is cut by more than 50% from Model IV in Table 2 of the main text when we include the market protecting institutions measure. Model II in Table 3 below again excludes all of the additional variables that eliminate pre-1945 observations (including market protecting institutions) but drop all observations for which the market protecting institutions measure is missing. Note that "Log Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer" is again insignificant, which strongly suggests that the sample is the real issue with this variable rather than these additional measures washing its effect away. As in the specifications reported in the main text, inclusion of pre-World War II data is important for uncovering an effect for peaceful transfers.

4 Disaggregate Pre-Transfers by Administrative vs. Non-administrative

Table 4 contains the estimates from two specifications where we alter how we deal with the pre-transfer period. Recall that in the main text we control for the pre-transfer period and condition out whether the transfer is violent or peaceful. We did this for several reasons outlined in the manuscript on pages x–xx. One concern was that we do not want our estimated coefficients for the time since transfer variables to possibly just reflect the fact that dyads which experience different kinds of transfers generally have a different quality of relations. We thought that violent versus peaceful transfers represented an especially worrisome possibility, as states that violently transfer territory are known to have different relations than those that peacefully transfer territory (see Gibler and Tir (2010)). However, it is also possible that our findings could be affected by general differences (not directly related to the border change itself) across dyads that transfer along administrative frontiers versus neighbors that do not transfer along administrative precedent. Table 4 contains replications of Models IV and V from Table 2 in the main text that demonstrate this concern is not warranted. In short, the results are unaffected by distinguishing between administrative and non-administrative pre-transfer periods rather than violent and peaceful.

5 Disaggregate all Pre-Transfer Categories

Table 5 further addresses with the concern that how we deal with the pre-transfer periods might affect our key results. Specifically, we go beyond what is reported in the main manuscript in Table 2 and build on the robustness test in Table 4 of the prior section by disaggregating all four possible pre-transfer categories, i.e., all four combinations of peaceful/violent and administrative/non-administrative. Again, our findings are unaffected.

6 Disaggregating Peaceful Transfers: A Look at Secessions

One possible objection to the results presented above is that we discard cases of secession. Recall that the secession cases are dropped from the analysis reported above, as we wanted to focus on cases in which the two states in question traded before and after a territorial transfer. In cases of

secession, the seceding unit does not exist as an independent state prior to the transfer, so this is not possible. To demonstrate that secessions seem to result in similar patterns relative to inter-state violent transfers, we present results that focus on secessions here.

Table 6 shows the distribution of the 53 secession cases according to whether they are peaceful or violent and whether they follow prior administrative frontiers or not. The table suggests that these two variables are independent of each other in the case of secessions, as the Chi-square test of independence fails to reject the null that new boundaries that follow administrative lines are independent of whether a secession is the result of violence.

Table 7 contains the results of gravity models that estimate the effects of secessions. Including secessions allows us to explore the distinction between administrative and non-administrative borders across violent and peaceful territorial transfers. The key limitation to analysis of secession cases is that there are precious few cases when we disaggregate down to the level reported in table 6. We help address this concern by reporting results that only disaggregate by whether a new border follows administrative lines or not in addition to results that fully disaggregate as shown in table 6.

Table 7 reports the results of two models. Both models include all of the same variables from model IV in table 2 in the main text in addition to the secession variables. Model I disaggregates all 53 secessions according to whether they followed prior administrative frontiers or not. Since 35 cases (66%) are peaceful secessions, this model provides us with a good deal of evidence about the effects of how borders are drawn affects trade flows when a territorial transfer is peaceful. The results of model I demonstrate that the distinction between new borders that follow prior administrative frontiers and those that do not follow precedent matters regardless of whether transfers are peaceful or violent in secession cases as well. As we would expect, any transfer along administrative lines leads to increases in cross-border trade flows across time. Strikingly, secessions that do not break along administrative frontiers lead to depressed trade flows as the new boundary becomes older. Both results are significant at the 0.10 level, with standard errors clustered by directed dyad.

Model II further disaggregates new boundaries that result from secessions, distinguishing between peaceful and violent transfers in addition to whether the new boundary follows prior adminis-

trative frontiers. As noted above, the results in model II should be interpreted cautiously, especially in the disaggregated non-administrative category, as there are only 5 violent non-administrative secessions. The results are largely consistent with expectations in terms of direction, although none of the four coefficients are statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance is likely due to the smaller number of cases in each of the four categories when we fully disaggregate.[2] We still find a positive coefficient for years since a secession that breaks along administrative frontiers, regardless of whether the secession is violent or peaceful. The years since a peaceful non-administrative secession is again negative, although statistically insignificant. The one anomaly is that the years since a violent non-administrative secession is positive, although the standard error is well over three times as large as the coefficient. Given that there are only 5 cases in this category, we do not make much of this estimate.

7   Alternative Measure of Territorial Dispute

Table 8 contain results that use the Huth and Allee (2002) measure of territorial disputes rather than the ICOW measure of territorial claims used in the main text. The coefficient is similarly negative, but fails to reach statistical significance. Interestingly, the this measure of territorial dispute achieves statistical significance in all models if our measure of strategic rivalry is excluded, which is not true of the ICOW measure. Given that we want to measure the varying character of bilateral relations as completely as possible, we use the ICOW variable in the main text, which performs better.

8   Alternative Measure of Dyadic Relations - MIDs

Table 9 contains the results of models that replace the strategic rivalry measure with a more restrictive measure of poor bilateral relations – whether the two states engaged in a militarized interstate dispute (MID) in the prior year (Maoz, 2005). While the coefficient is always in the expected negative direction, the MID measure never achieves statistical significance. In short, we

---

[2]The years since peaceful administrative secession and years since violent administrative secession are statistically significant in models where standard errors are not clustered by directed dyad.

prefer the strategic rivalry measure as it captures more variation and performs better in all models.

9 Table with Transfer Cases and Codings

Tables 10 and 11 respectively list all the peaceful and violent territorial transfer cases in the data. Note that Table 10 is based on the data developed and used in Carter and Goemans (2011) and is thus also reported there. Table 10 shows all of the newly coded peaceful transfer cases that we have used in our analysis, how they are coded, in addition to a list of sources used to code each case. Note that some of the "No" cases do not have sources. Following Carter and Goemans (2011) we coded a case as not following a prior administrative frontier if we were unable to find any confirming or disconfirming evidence. We adopt this coding rule to (1.) make the peaceful transfer data consistent with the violent transfer data, and (2.) because it seems that if no evidence can be located that discusses an administrative precedent for the new border it is unlikely to be a case that followed administrative precedent as this is usually clearly noted in either treaty or in secondary sources covering the transfer. However, we have tried recoding all of these cases as "Yes" cases or treating them as missing data, and the results are similar to what is reported in the main text.

---

[3]NYT = New York Times; EB = Encyclopedia Britannica; U.S. IBS = U.S. International Boundary Study; Treaty = Text of border agreement, arbitral award, or text of later treaty referencing border agreement; ICJ = Ruling by International Court of Justice; LT = London Times; BBC = British Broadcasting Corporation; NDPB = Department of Publicity and Broadcasting Ministry of National Guidance; FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Service; ISS = Institute for Security Studies; MS = Milwaukee Sentinel. GJ=Geographic Journal

[4]UA refers to University of Alabama 2006. EIB refers to Biger 1995. IBS refers to U.S. Department of State 2004. KM refers to Kliot and Mansfield 1997. The Taiwan source is Copper 1996. Magosci refers to Magocsi 1993. Magocsi2 refers to Magocsi 1985. Pluvier refers to Pluvier 1995. Kedansha refers to *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan* 2006. Huth refers to Huth 1996. Anderson refers to Anderson 2003. Cribb refers to Cribb 2000. IML refers to Survey of Israel 1970. Hertslet refers to Hertslet 1909. LeFeber refers to LaFeber 1997. U.S. Army refers to Headquarters 1964. U.S. State Dept. refers to U.S. Department of State 1947. Chew refers to Chew 1970. Hewsen refers to Hewsen 2001. Pitcher refers to Pitcher 1972. Rhode and Wagner refers to Rhode and Wagner 1959. BPH refers to Barnes, Parekh and Hudson 1998. Calvert refers to Calvert 2004. Troeller refers to Troeller 1976. Kelly refers to Kelly 1964. Thomas refers to Thomas 1951. Gerteiny refers to Gerteiny 1967. Taylor refers to Taylor 1961. Vassiliev refers to Vassiliev 1997. CSM refers to one of the following articles in the Christian Science Monitor: *France Hails Ending of Morocco Question* 1912, *Peace Treaty as Seen by Former Serbian Minister* 1919, or *Conquest of Jehol Gives Japan Key to Northern China* 1933. NYT refers to one of the following articles in the New York Times: *France Controls Morocco* 1912, *Germany and China* 1905, *French in Africa* 1909, *Treaty With Italy Signed* 1912, *How Turkey's Face Is Saved* 1912, *Italy Today Joins Nations At Peace; Treaty in Effect* 1947, *Texts of First Five Peace Treaties of World War II* 1947, or *3 Enclaves Fall* 1961. WP refers to the following article in The Washington Post: *Official Summary of Treaty Handed to Austrian Delegates* 1919. AC refers to one of the following articles in the Atlanta Constitution: *Turco-Italian Treaty Signed* 1912 or *Italy Resolved To Hold Fiume* 1919. CT refers to one of the following articles in the Chicago Tribune: *Raisuli Joins Mulai Hafid* 1908, *Tsing-Tau Forts Fall: Germans Out of East* 1914, *4 Former Axis Satellites Find Treaties Tough* 1947, *Greece Gets 14 Isles and a Big Burden* 1947, or *Treaty Gains and Losses* 1947.

References

3 Enclaves Fall. 1961. *The New York Times* p. 1. December 19.

4 Former Axis Satellites Find Treaties Tough. 1947. *Chicago Tribune* p. 6. June 5.

Anderson, Evan W. 2003. *International Boundaries: A Geopolitical Atlas.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Barnes, Ian, Bhikhu Parekh and Robert Hudson. 1998. *The History Atlas of Asia.* New York, NY: MacMillan.

Biger, Gideon, ed. 1995. *The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries.* University of Durham International Boundaries Research Unit. New York: Facts on File.

Calvert, Peter, ed. 2004. *Border and Territorial Disputes of the World.* London, UK: John Harper.

Carter, David B. and H.E. Goemans. 2011. "The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the Emergence of Interstate Conflict." *International Organization* 65(2):275–310.

Chew, Allen F. 1970. *An Atlas of Russian History; Eleven Centuries of Changing Borders.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Conquest of Jehol Gives Japan Key to Northern China. 1933. *Christian Science Monitor* p. 1. March 4.

Copper, John F. 1996. *Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?* 2 ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Cribb, R.B. 2000. *Historical Atlas of Indonesia.* Honolulu, HA: University of Hawaii Press.

France Controls Morocco. 1912. *The New York Times* p. 1. March 31.

France Hails Ending of Morocco Question. 1912. *Christian Science Monitor* p. 20. April 17.

French in Africa. 1909. *The New York Times* p. C4. August 15.

Germany and China. 1905. *The New York Times* p. 8. November 14.

Gerteiny, Alfred G. 1967. *Mauritania*. New York, NY: Praeger.

Gibler, Douglas M. and Jaroslav Tir. 2010. "Settled Borders and Regime Type: Democratic Transitions as Consequences of Peaceful Territorial Transfers." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(4):951–968.

Greece Gets 14 Isles and a Big Burden. 1947. *Chicago Tribune* p. 8. December 5.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. 1964. *U.S. Army Handbook for the United Arab Republic (Egypt)*. Washington, D.C.: Harrison and Sons.

Hertslet, E. 1909. *Map of Africa By Treaty*. London, UK: Harrison and Sons.

Hewsen, Robert H. 2001. *Armenia: A Historical Atlas*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

How Turkey's Face Is Saved. 1912. *The New York Times* p. 9. October 17.

Huth, Paul K. 1996. *Standing your ground: territorial disputes and international conflict*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Huth, Paul K. and Todd L. Allee. 2002. *The democratic peace and territorial conflict in the twentieth century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Italy Resolved To Hold Fiume. 1919. *Atlanta Constitution* p. 15. December 31.

Italy Today Joins Nations At Peace; Treaty in Effect. 1947. *The New York Times* p. 1. September 15.

Johnson, Jesse C, Mark Souva and Dale L Smith. 2013. "Market-Protecting Institutions and the World Trade Organization's Ability to Promote Trade." *International Studies Quarterly* 57(2):410–417.

Kelly, J.B. 1964. *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*. London: Faber and Faber.

Kliot, N. and Y. Mansfield. 1997. "The Political Landscape of Partition: The Case of Cyprus." *Political Geography* 16(6):495–521.

Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan. 2006. `http://www.ency-japan.com`.

LaFeber, Walter. 1997. *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History.* New York, NY: Norton.

Magocsi, Paul Robert. 1985. *Ukraine: A Historical Atlas.* Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press.

Magocsi, Paul Robert. 1993. *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe.* Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Maoz, Zeev. 2005. Dyadic MID Dataset. Technical Report Version 2 University of California, Davis.

Official Summary of Treaty Handed to Austrian Delegates. 1919. *The Washington Post* p. 1. June 3.

Peace Treaty as Seen by Former Serbian Minister. 1919. *Christian Science Monitor* p. 1. November 7.

Pitcher, Donald Edgar. 1972. *An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire From Earliest Times to the End of the Sixteenth Century.* Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.

Pluvier, Jan. 1995. *Historical Atlas of South-East Asia.* Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.

Raisuli Joins Mulai Hafid. 1908. *Chicago Tribune* p. 5. January 14.

Rhode, Gotthold and Wolfgang Wagner, eds. 1959. *The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line: Sources and Documents.* Stuttgart, Germany: Brentano-Verlag.

Souva, Mark, Dale L Smith and Shawn Rowan. 2008. "Promoting trade: The importance of market protecting institutions." *The Journal of Politics* 70(2):383–392.

Survey of Israel, Ministry of Labor. 1970. *Atlas of Israel.* Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier.

Taylor, A.J.P. 1961. *The Origins of the Second World War.* Greenwich, CT: Fawcett.

Texts of First Five Peace Treaties of World War II. 1947. *The New York Times* p. C25. January 18.

Thomas, H.B. 1951. "The Kionga Triangle." *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 31:47–51.

Tir, Jaroslav, Philip Shafer, Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz. 1998. "Territorial Changes, 1816–1996." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 16:89–97.

Treaty Gains and Losses. 1947. *Chicago Tribune* p. 3. February 11.

Treaty With Italy Signed. 1912. *The New York Times* p. 1. October 19.

Troeller, Gary. 1976. *The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'ud*. Oxford, UK: Routledge.

Tsing-Tau Forts Fall: Germans Out of East. 1914. *Chicago Tribune* p. 1. November 7.

Turco-Italian Treaty Signed. 1912. *Atlanta Constitution* p. 1. October 19.

University of Alabama. 2006. "Historical Map Archive.". `http://alabamamaps.ua.edu/historicalmaps/africa/subsaharan.html`.

U.S. Department of State. 1947. *The Treaty of Versailles and After: Annotations of the Text of the Treaty*. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. 2004. "International Boundary Study." `http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/numericalibs.php`.

Vassiliev, Alexei. 1997. *The History of Saudi Arabia*. London, UK: Saqi Books.

Table 1: Dyadic Trade Flows: Multilateral Resistance Gravity Models with Conflict Severity

	Model I	Model II
Democratic Dyad	0.628**	0.634**
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Alliance	0.282**	0.282**
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Strategic Rivalry	-0.331**	-0.334**
	(0.12)	(0.12)
Territorial Claim (ICOW)	-0.199**	-0.200**
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Pre-Peaceful Transfer	-0.217	-0.217
	(0.20)	(0.20)
Pre-Violent Transfer	0.193	0.437
	(0.54)	(0.42)
Log Violent Non-Admin x Conflict MID	0.162	
	(0.14)	
Log Violent Admin x Conflict MID	0.425**	
	(0.15)	
Conflict MID	-0.502	
	(0.40)	
Log Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer	0.288**	0.259**
	(0.10)	(0.10)
Log Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer	-0.007	-0.029
	(0.12)	(0.11)
Log Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer	0.406**	0.423**
	(0.19)	(0.19)
Log Years Since Peaceful Non-Administrative Transfer	-0.200	-0.173
	(0.22)	(0.21)
Log Violent Non-Admin x Conflict Severity		0.250*
		(0.15)
Log Violent Admin x Conflict Severity		0.321**
		(0.12)
Conflict Severity		-0.088
		(0.36)
Country-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
N	44845	44845

Standard errors clustered
by directed dyad in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 2: Dyadic Trade Flows: Alternative Short- vs. Long-term Effects

	10 Year	12 Year	18 Year	20 Year
Democratic Dyad	0.647**	0.648**	0.651**	0.651**
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Allies	0.255**	0.261**	0.278**	0.284**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Strategic Rivalry	-0.335**	-0.336**	-0.336**	-0.336**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Territorial Claim (ICOW)	-0.178*	-0.179**	-0.180**	-0.180**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Pre-Peaceful Transfer	-0.255	-0.264	-0.278	-0.283
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Pre-Violent Transfer	0.347	0.330	0.283	0.269
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.45)
First 10 Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer	0.090**			
	(0.03)			
Post-10 Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer	0.002			
	(0.01)			
First 10 Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer	-0.096**			
	(0.04)			
Post-10 Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer	0.012**			
	(0.01)			
First 10 Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer	0.132*			
	(0.07)			
Post-10 Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer	0.002			
	(0.02)			
First 10 Years Since Peaceful Non-Administrative Transfer	-0.054			
	(0.06)			
Post-10 Years Since Peaceful Non-Administrative Transfer	0.013			
	(0.01)			
First 12 Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer		0.076**		
		(0.03)		
Post-12 Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer		0.001		
		(0.01)		
First 12 Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer		-0.081**		
		(0.03)		
Post-12 Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer		0.013**		
		(0.01)		
First 12 Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer		0.108*		
		(0.06)		
Post-12 Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer		0.002		
		(0.02)		
First 12 Years Since Peaceful Non-Administrative Transfer		-0.045		
		(0.05)		
Post-12 Years Since Peaceful Non-Administrative Transfer		0.015		
		(0.01)		

	10 Year	12 Year	18 Year	20 Year
First 18 Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer			0.051** (0.02)	
Post-18 Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer			-0.001 (0.01)	
First 18 Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer			-0.056** (0.02)	
Post-18 Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer			0.017** (0.01)	
First 18 Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer			0.064 (0.04)	
Post-18 Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer			0.007 (0.02)	
First 18 Years Since Peaceful Non-Administrative Transfer			-0.019 (0.04)	
Post-18 Years Since Peaceful Non-Administrative Transfer			0.016 (0.01)	
First 20 Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer				0.046** (0.02)
Post-20 Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer				-0.001 (0.01)
First 20 Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer				-0.052** (0.02)
Post-20 Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer				0.019** (0.01)
First 20 Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer				0.055 (0.04)
Post-20 Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer				0.009 (0.03)
First 20 Years Since Peaceful Non-Administrative Transfer				-0.014 (0.04)
Post-20 Years Since Peaceful Non-Administrative Transfer				0.015 (0.01)
Country-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	44845	44845	44845	44845

Standard errors clustered
by directed dyad in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 3: Dyadic Trade Flows: Multilateral Resistance Gravity Models with Market Protecting Institutions

	Model I	Model II
Democratic Dyad	0.447**	0.605**
	(0.14)	(0.15)
Alliance	0.471**	0.584**
	(0.15)	(0.16)
Strategic Rivals	-0.381**	-0.349**
	(0.12)	(0.11)
Territorial Claim (ICOW)	-0.216**	-0.276**
	(0.10)	(0.11)
Both GATT/WTO	0.399**	
	(0.16)	
GATT/WTO	0.518	
x Market Protecting Institutions	(0.93)	
Market Protecting Institutions	1.892**	
	(0.71)	
Preferential Trade Agreement	0.383**	
	(0.08)	
Common Currency	0.229	
	(0.22)	
Pre-Peaceful Transfer	0.275	0.051
	(0.25)	(0.25)
Pre-Violent Transfer	1.695**	1.650**
	(0.53)	(0.56)
Log Years Since Violent Administrative Transfer	0.512**	0.516**
	(0.15)	(0.16)
Log Years Since Violent Non-Administrative Transfer	0.044	0.008
	(0.18)	(0.18)
Log Years Since Peaceful Non-Administrative Transfer	-0.158	-0.217
	(0.22)	(0.25)
Log Years Since Peaceful Administrative Transfer	0.017	-0.083
	(0.23)	(0.25)
Country-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
N	19798	21039

Standard errors clustered
by directed dyad in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 4: Dyadic Trade Flows: Multilateral Resistance Gravity Models with Alternative Pre-Transfer Variables

	Model I	Model II
Democratic Dyad	0.643**	0.525**
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Alliance	0.290**	0.121
	(0.09)	(0.11)
Strategic Rivalry	-0.362**	-0.353**
	(0.12)	(0.11)
Territorial Claim (ICOW)	-0.181**	-0.194**
	(0.09)	(0.10)
Pre-Administrative Transfer	0.156	0.136
	(0.26)	(0.26)
Pre-Non Administrative Transfer	0.039	0.109
	(0.30)	(0.30)
Log Years Since Violent	0.297**	0.386**
Administrative Transfer	(0.10)	(0.11)
Log Years Since Violent	-0.060	-0.060
Non-Administrative Transfer	(0.12)	(0.15)
Log Years Since Peaceful	-0.143	-0.170
Non-Administrative Transfer	(0.20)	(0.19)
Log Years Since Peaceful	0.433**	0.284
Administrative Transfer	(0.19)	(0.19)
Log Years Since Full	0.066	0.052
Border Settlement	(0.05)	(0.05)
Preferential Trade Agreement		0.292**
		(0.07)
Common Currency		0.267*
		(0.16)
One in GATT/WTO		0.730**
		(0.08)
Both in GATT/WTO		1.120**
		(0.13)
Country-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
N	44845	34564

Standard errors clustered
by directed dyad in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 5: Dyadic Trade Flows: Multilateral Resistance Gravity Models with Alternative Pre-Transfer Variables

	Model I	Model II
Democratic Dyad	0.636**	0.519**
	(0.11)	(0.11)
Alliance	0.281**	0.110
	(0.09)	(0.11)
Strategic Rivalry	-0.349**	-0.336**
	(0.12)	(0.11)
Territorial Claim (ICOW)	-0.181*	-0.190*
	(0.09)	(0.10)
Pre-Peaceful	0.141	0.366
Administrative Transfer	(0.35)	(0.44)
Pre-Peaceful	0.610*	0.431
Non-Administrative Transfer	(0.37)	(0.45)
Pre-Violent	0.655	0.788
Administrative Transfer	(0.49)	(0.61)
Pre-Violent	0.592	1.114
Non-Administrative Transfer	(0.58)	(0.92)
Log Years Since Violent	0.262**	0.335**
Administrative Transfer	(0.08)	(0.10)
Log Years Since Violent	-0.057	-0.066
Non-Administrative Transfer	(0.12)	(0.15)
Log Years Since Peaceful	-0.161	-0.178
Non-Administrative Transfer	(0.20)	(0.19)
Log Years Since Peaceful	0.454**	0.317
Administrative Transfer	(0.19)	(0.20)
Log Years Since Full	0.065	0.046
Border Settlement	(0.05)	(0.05)
Preferential Trade Agreement		0.289**
		(0.07)
Common Currency		0.260
		(0.16)
One in GATT/WTO		0.729**
		(0.08)
Both in GATT/WTO		1.115**
		(0.13)
Country-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
N	44845	34564

Standard errors clustered
by directed dyad in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 6: Independence of Administrative Frontiers and Violent Transfers

	Violent	Peaceful	Row Sum
Administrative	**13** (13.6)	**27** (26.4)	**40**
¬ Administrative	**5** (4.4)	**8** (8.6)	**13**
Column Sum	**18**	**35**	**53**

(Observed values in bold, expected values in parentheses.)

Table 7: Dyadic Trade Flows: Including Secession Cases

	Model I	Model II
Democratic Dyad	0.77**	0.77**
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Alliance	0.45**	0.45**
	(0.12)	(0.12)
Militarized Dispute$_{t-1}$	-0.11	-0.11
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Territorial Dispute	-0.32**	-0.32**
	(0.14)	(0.14)
Log Years Since Peaceful Transfer	-0.05	
	(0.08)	
Log Years Since Violent Admin Transfer	0.39**	0.39**
	(0.15)	(0.15)
Log Years Since Violent Non-Admin Transfer	-0.10	-0.10
	(0.14)	(0.14)
Pre-Peaceful Transfer	-0.63**	
	(0.31)	
Pre-Violent Transfer	0.89	
	(0.60)	
Log Years Since Admin Secession	3.34*	
	(1.87)	
Log Years Since Non-Admin Secession	-3.47*	
	(1.90)	
Log Years Since Peaceful Admin Secession		1.42
		(3.85)
Log Years Since Violent Admin Secession		0.73
		(5.63)
Log Years Since Peaceful Non-Admin Secession		-5.91
		(3.81)
Log Years Since Violent Non-Admin Secession		3.62
		(11.39)
Country-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
N =	36863	36863

Standard errors clustered
by directed dyad in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 8: Dyadic Trade Flows: Multilateral Resistance Gravity Models with Huth Dispute Variable

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI	Model VII
Democratic Dyad	0.788**	0.808**	0.781**	0.790**	0.837**	0.780**	0.829**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Alliance	0.463**	0.433**	0.456**	0.456**	0.398**	0.447**	0.391**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Strategic Rivalry	-0.588**	-0.580**	-0.572**	-0.625**	-0.634**	-0.611**	-0.630**
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Territorial Dispute (Huth)	-0.174	-0.110	-0.178	-0.161	-0.211*	-0.121	-0.176
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Violent Transfer	-0.451						
	(0.76)						
Peaceful Transfer	0.458**	0.476**					
	(0.22)	(0.21)					
Violent Admin Transfer		1.183**					
		(0.42)					
Violent Non-Admin Transfer		-3.062**					
		(0.68)					
Pre-Violent Transfer			0.754	0.938	0.920	0.973	0.939
			(0.80)	(0.62)	(0.72)	(0.63)	(0.73)
Pre-Peaceful Transfer			-0.567**	-0.450*	-0.208	-0.451*	-0.210
			(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.29)
Log Years Since Any Violent Transfer			0.115				
			(0.12)				
Log Years Since Peaceful Transfer			-0.053	-0.047	0.056	-0.073	0.034
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Log Years Since Violent Admin Transfer				0.366**	0.414**	0.385**	0.425**
				(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Log Years Since Violent Non-Admin Transfer				-0.139	-0.190	-0.142	-0.186
				(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.16)
Preferential Trade Agreement					0.392**		0.388**
					(0.08)		(0.08)
Log Years Since Full Border Settlement						0.088*	0.070
						(0.05)	(0.05)
Country-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	38881	38881	38881	38881	30904	38881	30904

Standard errors clustered
by directed dyad in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 9: Dyadic Trade Flows: Multilateral Resistance Gravity Models with MIDs

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI	Model VII
Democratic Dyad	0.752**	0.770**	0.736**	0.758**	0.822**	0.732**	0.803**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Alliance	0.523**	0.482**	0.516**	0.505**	0.384**	0.492**	0.373**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Militarized Dispute$_{t-1}$	-0.116	-0.117	-0.105	-0.107	-0.106	-0.116	-0.114
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Territorial Claim (ICOW)	-0.287**	-0.252**	-0.292**	-0.289**	-0.244**	-0.245**	-0.206*
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Violent Transfer	0.073						
	(0.62)						
Peaceful Transfer	0.573**	0.598**					
	(0.22)	(0.22)					
Violent Admin Transfer		1.408**					
		(0.33)					
Violent Non-Admin Transfer		-2.577**					
		(0.66)					
Pre-Violent Transfer			0.413	0.596	0.727	0.636	0.757
			(0.68)	(0.55)	(0.73)	(0.57)	(0.74)
Pre-Peaceful Transfer			-0.684**	-0.561**	-0.316	-0.539*	-0.302
			(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.31)
Log Years Since Any Violent Transfer			0.195				
			(0.14)				
Log Years Since Peaceful Transfer			-0.062	-0.041	0.058	-0.076	0.024
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Log Years Since Violent Admin Transfer				0.413**	0.453**	0.442**	0.472**
				(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Log Years Since Violent Non-Admin Transfer				-0.084	-0.131	-0.089	-0.125
				(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Preferential Trade Agreement					0.430**		0.428**
					(0.09)		(0.09)
Log Years Since Full Border Settlement						0.117*	0.102
						(0.07)	(0.07)
Country-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Directed Dyad Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N =	37888	37888	37888	37888	29231	37888	29231

Standard errors clustered
by directed dyad in parentheses
** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Table 10: Peaceful Territorial Change Codings

Gaining Country	Losing Country	Date	Match	Source[3]
U.K.	Tonga	1900	Yes	EB "Tonga"
Russia	China	1900	No	N/A
Chile	Argentina	1902	No	Biger 1995
Argentina	Chile	1902	No	Biger 1995
U.K.	Ethiopia	1902	No	Biger 1995; Treaty 1902
U.S.	U.K.	1903	No	Biger 1995; Ward, et al. 1907
U.S.	Panama	1903	No	EB "Panama Canal Zone"
Brazil	Bolivia	1903	Yes	EB "Acre"; Hecht 2013
Bolivia	Brazil	1903	No	EB "Acre"; Hecht 2013
Brazil	Ecuador	1904	No	Treaty 1904
France	U.K.	1904	No	Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 1981; EB "Los Islands"
France	U.K.	1904	No	Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 1981; EB "Los Islands"
France	Thailand	1904	No	St John and Schofield 1998; Oishi 2015
France	U.K.	1904	No	Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 1981; EB "Los Islands"
Thailand	France	1904	Yes	St John and Schofield 1998; Oishi 2015
Japan	Russia	1905	Yes	Vinokurov 2007
Japan	Korea	1905	Yes	Ishikida 2005
U.K.	Turkey	1906	No	Treaty 1988; Calvert 2004
Belgium	U.K.	1906	Yes	U.S. IBS 1970
Brazil	Colombia	1907	No	Biger 1995
Brazil	Bolivia	1907	No	N/A
France	Morocco	1907	No	Maghraoui 2013
France	Thailand	1907	Yes	St John and Schofield 1998; Oishi 2015
Thailand	France	1907	Yes	St John and Schofield 1998; Oishi 2015
Peru	Bolivia	1909	No	Biger 1995; Treaty 1909
U.K.	Thailand	1909	Yes	Ooi 2004; Ludher 2015; Richmond 2010; Falarti 2013
U.K.	Belgium	1910	Yes	U.S. IBS 1970
U.K.	Bhutan	1910	Yes	Shelley 2013
Belgium	U.K.	1910	No	U.S. IBS 1970
Morocco	France	1910	Yes	Gershovich 2000
Sierra Leone	Liberia	1911	No	Ellis 1911; North, et al. 1912; Treaty 1911; GJ 1911; Brawley 2005
Germany	France	1911	No	Delancey, et al. 2010; Treaty 1912
Liberia	Sierra Leone	1911	No	Ellis 1911; North, et al. 1912; Treaty 1911; G J 1911; Brawley 2005
France	Morocco	1912	Yes	Ikeda 2016
Spain	Morocco	1912	Yes	Ikeda 2016; Rzette 1975
Greece	Turkey	1913	No	N/A
Greece	U.K.	1913	Yes	EB "Crete"
Saudi Arabia	Turkey	1913	Yes	Niblock 2004
U.K.	Malaysia	1914	Yes	Ooi 2004
Italy	Albania	1914	No	Elsie 2010
Albania	Greece	1914	No	Pearson 2004
U.K.	South Yemen	1915	No	EB "Kamaran"
U.S.	Nicaragua	1916	No	EB "Bryan-Chamorro Treaty"; Morgan 1996
U.K.	Qatar	1916	Yes	EB "Qatar"; Biger 1995
Spain	France	1916	No	N/A
U.S.	Denmark	1917	Yes	Department of State
Luxembourg	Germany	1919	No	N/A
Italy	France	1919	No	Hurewitz 1979; ICJ 1991

Gaining Country	Losing Country	Date	Match	Source
Poland	Czechoslovakia	1920	No	Magocsi 1993
Austria	Yugoslavia	1920	Yes	Marxer 2012
Poland	Czechoslovakia	1920	No	Magocsi 1993
Yugoslavia	Italy	1920	No	N/A
Italy	Yugoslavia	1920	Mixed	Magocsi 1993
Denmark	Germany	1920	No	Hare 2015
Costa Rica	Panama	1921	No	Leonard 2014; Treaty 1914
Hungary	Austria	1921	No	Magocsi 1993
Russia	Turkey	1921	Yes	Biger 1995
Finland	Sweden	1921	Yes	EB "Aland Islands"
U.S.	N/A	1922	No	EB "Kingman Reef"
Colombia	Venezuela	1922	No	Biger 1995; Scott 1922; Calvert 2004
Poland	Germany	1922	No	Magocsi 1993
Germany	Poland	1922	No	Magocsi 1993
China	Japan	1922	Yes	Gerwarth and Manela 2014
Lithuania	Germany	1923	No	Magocsi 1993
Yugoslavia	Italy	1924	No	Sarti 2009; Magocsi 1993
Italy	U.K.	1924	Mixed	LT 1923
Italy	Yugoslavia	1924	Yes	Sarti 2009; Magocsi 1993
International	France	1924	No	Stahn 2008
Italy	Egypt	1925	No	U.S. IBS 1966
Egypt	Italy	1925	No	U.S. IBS 1966
Iraq	Turkey	1926	No	U.S. IBS 1964
New Zealand	U.K.	1926	Yes	Europa Publications 2004
Belgium	Portugal	1927	No	Hodder-Williams, et al. 1998; Lemarchand 1964
Portugal	Belgium	1927	No	Hodder-Williams, et al. 1998; Lemarchand 1964
Netherlands	U.S.	1928	No	Treaty 1928
Norway	U.K.	1928	No	EB "Bouvet Island"
Peru	Chile	1929	Yes	Biger 1995
China	U.K.	1930	Yes	EB "Weihai"
France	Mexico	1932	No	Parry, Grant, and Barker 2009
U.K.	Newfoundland	1933	Yes	EB "Newfoundland and Labrador"
Colombia	Peru	1934	Yes	Wright 2015
Italy	France	1934	No	Biger 1995; Millard and Collins 2008
Paraguay	Bolivia	1935	No	EB "Chaco War"; EB "Chaco Boreal"
Italy	France	1935	No	ISS 2008
Germany	Austria	1938	Yes	EB "Anschluss"
Germany	Czechoslovakia	1938	No	Magocsi 1993
Poland	Czechoslovakia	1938	No	Magocsi 1993
Hungary	Czechoslovakia	1938	No	Magocsi 1993
Germany	Czechoslovakia	1939	Yes	Magocsi 1993
Germany	Lithuania	1939	Yes	Magocsi 1993
Hungary	Czechoslovakia	1939	Yes	Magocsi 1993
Lithuania	Russia	1939	No	Van Voren 2011
Turkey	Syria	1939	Yes	U.S. IBS 1978; Biger 1995
Bulgaria	Romania	1940	Yes	EB "Dobruja"
Russia	Estonia	1940	Yes	EB "Baltic States"
Russia	Latvia	1940	Yes	EB "Baltic States"
Russia	Lithuania	1940	Yes	EB "Baltic States"
Czech Republic	Slovakia	1945	Yes	Rudolph 2015
Russia	Poland	1945	No	N/A
Russia	Czechoslovakia	1945	Yes	Calvert 2004
Allies	Germany	1945	No	N/A
France	Germany	1947	Yes	EB "Saarland"

Gaining Country	Losing Country	Date	Match	Source
South Africa	N/A	1947	No	EB "Prince Edward Islands"
Australia	U.K.	1947	No	EB "Heard and McDonald Islands"
Netherlands	Germany	1949	No	Bernhardt 2014
Belgium	Germany	1949	No	Bernhardt 2014
Luxembourg	Germany	1949	No	Bernhardt 2014
France	Germany	1949	No	Bernhardt 2014
Bhutan	India	1949	Yes	Kramer 1989
India	France	1950	No	Gupta 2006
India	Sikkim	1950	Yes	Bareh 2001
Russia	Poland	1951	No	Treaty 1951
Poland	Russia	1951	No	Treaty 1951
Japan	U.S.	1953	Yes	Eldridge 2003
Italy	Trieste	1954	Yes	Hametz 2005
Yugoslavia	Trieste	1954	Yes	Hametz 2005
France	Portugal	1954	Yes	Nolan 2002
France	Libya	1955	Yes	Blake and Schofield 1987; Biger 1995; Calvert 2004
West Germany	N/A	1955	Yes	Cook 2001
Austria	N/A	1955	Yes	Treaty 1955
Australia	U.K.	1955	No	EB "Cocos Islands"
Germany	Belgium	1956	No	Bernhardt 2014; U.S. IBS 1961
Morocco	Spain	1956	Yes	Tusell 2011
Morocco	International	1956	Yes	Treaty 1956
Egypt	U.K.	1956	Yes	Economist 2006
Japan	Russia	1956	Yes	BBC 2013
Germany	France	1957	Yes	Biger 1995; Huth 1996
Morocco	Spain	1958	Yes	Stapleton 2013
India	Pakistan	1958	No	Treaty 1958
Pakistan	India	1958	No	Treaty 1958
Pakistan	Oman	1958	No	Syed, Akhtar, and Usmani 2011; Olesen 2013
Australia	U.K.	1958	No	EB "Christmas Island"
Honduras	Nicaragua	1960	No	Treaty 1960
Benin	Portugal	1961	No	EB "Sao Joao Baptista de Ajuda"
China	Myanmar	1961	No	U.S. IBS 1964b; Biger 1995
Nepal	China	1961	No	U.S. IBS 1965; Biger 1995; NDPB 1963; Shrestha 2013
Mexico	U.S.	1963	No	NPS
Germany	Netherlands	1963	No	U.S. IBS 1964c
Pakistan	China	1963	No	Cukwurah 1967
Jordan	Saudi Arabia	1965	No	U.S. IBS 1965b
Saudi Arabia	Jordan	1965	No	U.S. IBS 1965b
Oman	U.K.	1967	Yes	EB "Khuriya Muriya Islands"
Japan	U.S.	1968	Yes	Treaty 1968
India	Pakistan	1968	No	Treaty 1968b; U.S. IBS 1968
Pakistan	India	1968	No	Treaty 1968b; U.S. IBS 1968
Morocco	Spain	1969	Yes	Stapleton 2013
Saudi Arabia	Kuwait	1969	No	Calvert 2004; NYT 2012
Kuwait	Saudi Arabia	1969	No	NYT 2012
Nicaragua	U.S.	1971	Yes	EB "Bryan-Chamorro Treaty"
Iran	U.K.	1971	Yes	Mojtahed-Zadeh 2007
Pakistan	India	1971	No	N/A

Gaining Country	Losing Country	Date	Match	Source
Honduras	U.S.	1972	Yes	EB "Swan Islands"
North Yemen	South Yemen	1972	No	Gause 1990; Bercovitch and Fretter 2004
Japan	U.S.	1972	Yes	EB "Ryukyu Islands"
India	Pakistan	1972	Yes	Rizvi 1993
Pakistan	India	1972	Yes	Rizvi 1993
Libya	Chad	1973	No	Calvert 2004; Biger 1995; Joffe 1987
Egypt	Israel	1974	No	Kumaraswamy 2009
Sri Lanka	India	1974	No	Raghavan 2012
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	1975	No	U.S. IBS 1971; Calvert 2004
Egypt	Israel	1975	No	Treaty 1975
Saudi Arabia	Iraq	1975	No	U.S. IBS 1971; Calvert 2004
France	Comoros	1976	Yes	Law 1999
Mauritania	Spain	1976	No	Biger 1995
Seychelles	U.K.	1976	Yes	Cawley 2015
Morocco	Spain	1976	No	Biger 1995
Syria	Israel	1976	Yes	Biger 1995; MS 1974
Indonesia	East Timor	1976	Yes	Martin 2001
Panama	U.S.	1978	No	EB "Panama Canal Zone"
Egypt	Israel	1979	Yes	Calvert 2004
Morocco	Mauritania	1980	Yes	BBC 2016
Colombia	U.S.	1981	No	Austin and Clubb 1986; Treaty 1972
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	1981	No	U.S. IBS 1971; Calvert 2004
Saudi Arabia	Iraq	1981	No	U.S. IBS 1971; Calvert 2004
Chile	Argentina	1984	No	N/A
Argentina	Chile	1984	No	N/A
Egypt	Israel	1989	Yes	NYT 1989
El Salvador	Honduras	1992	No	World Court Digest 1992; NYT 1992
Honduras	El Salvador	1992	No	World Court Digest 1992; NYT 1992
Yemen	Oman	1992	No	Treaty 1992
Oman	Yemen	1992	No	Treaty 1992
Bangladesh	India	1992	No	Iftekharuzzaman 1992
Kuwait	Iraq	1993	No	Calvert 2004; Schofield 1993
Namibia	South Africa	1994	Yes	Treaty 1994; FBIS 1982
Jordan	Israel	1995	Yes	Biger 1995
China	Russia	1996	Yes	Calvert 2004
Czech Republic	Slovakia	1997	No	Votruba 1994; Nabelkova 2016
Slovakia	Czech Republic	1997	No	Votruba 1994; Nabelkova 2016
China	U.K.	1997	Yes	EB "Hong Kong"
China	Kazakhstan	1998	No	Rumer 2015
Ukraine	Moldova	1998	No	Calvert 2004
Moldova	Ukraine	1998	No	Calvert 2004
Russia	Estonia	1999	No	Postimees 2013
Estonia	Russia	1999	No	Postimees 2013
China	Portugal	1999	Yes	EB "Macau"
Botswana	Namibia	1991	No	Alexander 1999
Sudan	Egypt	2000	Yes	Guo 2006
Nigeria	Cameroon	2003	Yes	Akinsanya and Ayoade 2013; ICJ Ruling 2002
Cameroon	Nigeria	2003	Yes	Akinsanya and Ayoade 2013; ICJ Ruling 2002
China	Russia	2008	No	Economist 2008; Brunet-Jailly 2015
China	Tajikistan	2011	No	BBC 2011; Biger 1995

Table 11: Violent Territorial Change Codings

Gaining Country	Losing Country	Date	Match	Source[4]
United Kingdom	Transvaal	1902	Yes	UA
United Kingdom	Orange Free State	1902	Yes	UA
Panama*	Columbia	1903	Yes	EIB
France	Morocco	1912	Yes	CSM, NYT
Japan	Russia	1905	No	LaFeber
China	Germany	1905	Yes	NYT
Netherlands	Indonesia	1907	Yes	CT, Cribb
France	African Nations	1909	No	Gerteiny
France	African Nations	1911	No	NYT
Italy	Turkey–Libya	1912	Yes	NYT, AC
Italy	Turkey–Dodecanese	1912	Yes	Magocsi
Serbia	Turkey	1913	No	UT, Pitcher
Montenegro	Turkey	1913	No	Pitcher
Greece	Turkey	1913	No	Pitcher, Magocsi
Bulgaria	Turkey	1913	No	Magocsi
Serbia	Bulgaria	1913	No	EIB, Magocsi
Greece	Bulgaria	1913	No	EIB, Magocsi
Romania	Bulgaria	1913	Yes	EIB
Najd	Turkey	1914	Yes	Kelly, Troeller
Japan	Germany	1914	Yes	LaFeber, CT
Poland	Russia	1918	No	Magocsi
Czechoslovakia*	Austria	1918	Yes	WP
Georgia*	Russia	1918	Mixed	Hewsen
Azerbaijan*	Russia	1918	Yes	Hewsen
Estonia*	Russia	1918	No	EIB
Latvia*	Russia	1918	No	EIB
Ukraine*	Russia	1918	Yes	Magocsi2
Armenia*	Russia	1918	Yes	Hewsen
Belgium	Germany	1919	Yes	EIB, U.S. State Dept.
Poland	Austria	1919	Yes	Magocsi
Yugoslavia*	Austria	1919	Yes	CSM
Italy	Austria	1919	Yes	EIB, Calvert
Hungary*	Austria	1919	Yes	EIB
France	Germany	1919	Yes	EIB
Poland	Germany	1919	Mixed	EIB, U.S. State Dept.
Italy	Austria	1919	No	AC
France	Germany	1919	Yes	U.S. State Dept.
Yugoslavia*	Bulgaria	1919	No	EIB, Magocsi
Greece	Bulgaria	1919	Yes	EIB, UT, Magocsi
Portugal	Germany	1919	Yes	Thomas
Russia	Ukraine	1920	Yes	Magocsi2
Russia	Armenia	1920	Yes	Hewsen
Russia	Georgia	1920	Yes	Hewsen
Russia	Azerbaijan	1920	Yes	Hewsen
Romania	Russia	1920	Yes	EIB, IBS
Czechoslovakia*	Hungary	1920	Yes	EIB, IBS
Hijaz	Turkey	1920	Yes	Vassiliev
Yugoslavia*	Hungary	1920	No	EIB, Magocsi
Romania	Hungary	1920	Mixed	EIB, Magocsi, Calvert
Poland	Lithuania	1920	No	EIB
Poland	Russia	1921	No	BFO
Mongolia*	China	1921	Yes	EIB
Ireland*	United Kingdom	1922	Yes	EIB
Japan	China	1932	Yes	BPH
Japan	China	1933	Yes	CSM, BPH
Saudi Arabia	Yemen Arab Republic	1934	Yes	EIB
Italy	Ethiopia	1936	Yes	Taylor

Gaining Country	Losing Country	Date	Match	Source
Japan	China	1937	No	Pluvier
Italy	Albania	1939	Yes	EIB
Ethiopia	Italy	1941	Yes	
Peru	Ecuador	1942	No	IBS
China	Japan	1945	No	
Poland	Germany	1945	No	EIB, Rhode and Wagner
U.S.S.R.	Germany	1945	No	EIB
Albania	Italy	1945	Yes	Anderson
China	Japan	1945	Yes	Copper
Russia	Japan	1945	Yes	Kodansha
United States	Japan	1945	Yes	LaFeber
Czechoslovakia	Germany	1945	Yes	EIB
Czechoslovakia	Hungary	1945	Yes	EIB
Syria*	France	1946	Yes	EIB
Czechoslovakia	Hungary	1947	No	IBS
France	Italy	1947	No	EIB, IBS
Yugoslavia	Italy	1947	Yes	Day
Russia	Romania	1947	Yes	CT, Chew
Greece	Italy	1947	Yes	CT, NYT, Magocsi
Russia	Finland	1947	Yes	EIB
Albania	Italy	1947	No	NYT
Israel*	United Kingdom	1948	Mixed	IML
Indonesia*	Netherlands	1949	Yes	Pluvier
Egypt	Israel	1949	Mixed	EIB, IML
Jordan	Israel	1949	Mixed	EIB, IML
India	Pakistan	1949	No	Calvert
Pakistan	India	1949	No	Calvert
Vietnam*	France	1954	No	IBS
Republic of Vietnam*	France	1954	No	IBS
India	Portugal	1961	Yes	NYT
Algeria*	France	1962	Yes	Keesings
Indonesia	Netherlands	1963	Yes	Keesings
Israel	Jordan	1967	Yes	EIB
Israel	Egypt	1967	Yes	EIB, Hertslet, U.S. Army
Israel	Syria	1967	No	EIB, Calvert
Bangladesh*	Pakistan	1971	Yes	EIB
India	Pakistan	1971	No	EIB, Calvert
Iran	United Arab Emirates	1971	No	Huth
Israel	Syria	1973	No	EIB, Calvert
Turkey	Cyprus	1974	No	KM
Angola*	Portugal	1975	Yes	Anderson
Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	1975	Yes	Anderson
Mali	Burkina Faso	1986	Yes	Day, Keesings
Namibia*	South Africa	1990	Yes	EIB
Croatia*	Yugoslavia	1991	Yes	EIB
Slovenia*	Yugoslavia	1991	Yes	EIB
Bosnia & Herzogovina*	Yugoslavia	1992	Yes	EIB
Eritrea*	Ethiopia	1993	Yes	EIB
East Timor	Indonesia	1999	Yes	Pluvier