Supplementary Material

THE CHOICE BETWEEN INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AND NONGOVERNMENTALISM: PROJECTING DOMESTIC PREFERENCES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

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APPENDIX

Part I: Descriptive statistics

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Models 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
New IGOs (Dependent variable)	142	11.423	14.378	0	55
Government activism of the most powerful state	139	0.136	0.139	0.007	0.526
Government activism of the two most powerful states	138	0.162	0.138	0.0156	0.39
Government activism of the three most powerful states	138	0.158	0.134	0.0189	0.401
Conflict for the most powerful state	142	2.719	2.064	0	8.4
Conflict for the two most powerful states	142	6.880	5.884	0	30
Conflict for the three most powerful states	142	9.447	6.714	0.867	30.4
Interactions of the most powerful state	138	0.054	0.109	0.0004	0.669
Interactions of the two most powerful states	138	0.103	0.214	0	1.215
Interactions of the three most powerful states	138	0.116	0.232	0.007	1.325
Power of the most powerful state	142	0.215	0.047	0.142	0.359
Power of the two most powerful states	141	0.369	0.0538	0.263	0.494
Power of the three most powerful states	141	0.486	0.062	0.339	0.601
New States	142	0.0103	0.032	-0.127	0.168
IGOs	141	301.326	442.026	1	1566
INGOs	141	2383.596	3410.141	31	12827

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Model 2.1

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ΔIGO membership	86	22.386	55.842	-80	366.667
Government Activism	78	0.161	0.181	0.006	0.856
Conflict	87	3.161	3.628	0	26
Interactions	74	0.066	0.165	0.00004	.891
Democracy	86	1.093	7.903	-9	10
IGOs	87	54.690	40.689	5	126

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics for Model 2.2

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ΔIGO membership	123	2.504	5.869	-13.043	50
Government activism	123	0.285	0.205	0.0459	1.737
Conflict	123	4.105	2.554	0	12
Interactions	102	0.184	0.209	0.001	0.891
Democracy	123	0.431	8.332	-9	10
IGOs	123	106.561	16.148	79	129

Part II: Additional models as robustness checks for Model 1

We developed the following tests to assess the robustness of our findings:

1) Model 1.4 controls for military expenditures of the most powerful states as we recognize that there are years when domestic spending increased due to perceived international security threats rather than to the "usual" domestic government activism that we are seeking to assess. Moreover, this measure offers another control (in addition to the conflict measure) for the security tensions between states. Unfortunately, the data for military expenditures are missing for a number of years, especially for the second and third most powerful countries. This led us only to test the model focusing on the single most powerful state. The positive effect of domestic government activism remains significant.

2) We develop several tests seeking to assess whether potential multicollinearity problems affect our results. We realize that we may be confronted with such problems because some of our control variables (such as interactions between states, the number of IGOs, and the number of INGOs) trend together. Indeed, these three variables exhibit strong levels of correlation.[1]

We sought multiple solutions to resolve this problem. First, as mentioned, whenever possible we combined highly correlated variables, such as trade and information flows,[2] into aggregate measures. Second, we tested several models where we only include one of the three aforementioned strongly correlated variables (number of IGOs, number of INGOs, and interactions between states), excluding the other two variables (Models 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7). The positive effect of domestic government activism remains significant in these models as well.

[1] The correlation was 0.8472 for measures of INGOs and Interactions; 0.9963 for measures of IGOs and INGOs; 0.8796 for measures of IGOs and Interactions.
[2] The correlation for these two measures is of 0.8717.

3) Model 1.8 controls for the level of democracy of the most powerful state to distinguish between the broader domestic "government activism" that is our main explanatory variable and the narrower "authoritarianism" (that refers solely to limiting actions of civil society, not necessarily the private sector). The variable is operationalized as the "polity" score from the Polity IV dataset.[3] The results show that, even when controlling for democracy, government activism (in the broader sense discussed in our study) remains a significant predictor of intergovernmentalism.

4) In Model 1.9 we include robustness checks using GDP as a proxy for power. The argument for replacing the broader measure of power with solely an economic one is that great powers are most likely to seek imposing intergovernmental cooperation through economic rather than military pressures.[4] The variable was developed based on data from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS). The results remain robust when replacing the CINC score with the GDP measure of power.

5) Model 1.10 controls for the "Security" variable in Model 1.1. The test is intended to control for issue-areas where governments are less likely to allow nongovernmental actors to become involved in global governance due to high "sovereignty costs." Building on arguments from Tallberg et al. 2013, we consider that the security realm is the prime example of an issue-area with such high costs. Our measure represents the number of security agreements with stand-alone permanent bureaucracies to emerge in a given year. It is based on the *ORGAN1* variable in the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Dataset.[5] The tests for this model show that even when controlling for this critical difference across issue-areas, domestic government activism continues to be a strong predictor of intergovernmentalism.

[3] Marshall and Jaggers 2002.
[4] We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this additional test.
[5] Leeds et al. 2002.

6) Model 1.11 examines INGO (rather than IGO) emergence. It is intended to assess whether government preferences also affect the nongovernmental nature of global governance. Although, as mentioned, the degree of nongovernmentalism is reflected in many other trends besides INGO emergence, we use this measure because INGOs are the most common types of nongovernmental actors and because existing datasets have kept track of their numbers for the broad period under investigation in this study. The variable for the INGO emergence is derived from the Yearbook of International Organizations. The model shows that domestic government activism of the most powerful state has a statistically significant negative effect on INGO emergence. The results support our argument that governments' "hands-off" approaches to domestic governance indeed lead to a more nongovernmental approach to global governance, that is, to more nongovernmental actors emerging to address global issues.

7) Model 1.12 uses the total number of states in the system (instead of the ratio between new states established in a given year and the existing number of states that we use in the main models).

8) In our models, we use Prais-Winsten regression to deal with the problems of autocorrelation that are inherent in time series analyses. We use five-year lags for independent variables (based on weighted moving averages) to incorporate feedback over time, and to identify the time delay between the IGO emergence and its relevant indicators. To further assess the robustness of our findings, we introduced a control variable for "year" in order to ensure that the dynamics we observe are not due to time trends. Model 1.13 shows that our estimation is robust to the inclusion of time trends.[6]

9) Models 1.14 and 1.15 control for the power of the single most powerful state (the hegemon) instead of the aggregate proportion of global power of the two and three most powerful

[6] We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this additional robustness test.

states in models 1.2 and 1.3

The results of these additional tests are included in Table A4.

Table A4: Additional models as robustness checks

	Model 1.4 IGO emergence	**Model 1.5** IGO emergence	**Model 1.6** IGO emergence	**Model 1.7** IGO emergence	**Model 1.8** IGO emergence	**Model 1.9** IGO emergence	**Model 1.10** IGO emergence	**Model 1.11** INGO emergence
Government activism of the most powerful state	8.337*** (2.492)	8.497*** (2.082)	6.379** (2.309)	6.636** (2.115)	8.781*** (2.108)	7.436*** (1.577)	9.101*** (2.388)	-5.631* (2.509)
Conflict	0.331 (0.474)	0.391 (0.7)	0.307 (0.617)	0.321 (0.6)	-0.272 (0.556)	0.376 (0.4)	0.628 (0.51)	0.233 (0.734)
Interactions	-6.133* (2.961)	2.172 (2.167)	-	-	-5.72* (2.289)	-5.622** (2.092)	-6.352* (2.797)	-23.48*** (5.163)
Power	-3.066* (1.473)	-3.461* (1.516)	-1.454 (1.350)	-1.518 (1.253)	-1.997 (1.172)	-	-2.912* (1.439)	0.343 (2.858)
New states	-0.253 (10.51)	-0.450* (10.81)	-0.524 (10.09)	-0.353 (10.06)	-1.375 (10.68)	-1.995 (11.18)	-0.044 (11.50)	-
Military expenditure	1.899* (0.954)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IGOs	-0.117* (0.052)	-	0.014* (0.006)	-	-0.057 (0.057)	-0.104** (0.0327)	-0.157** (0.0517)	-0.292 (0.234)
INGOs	0.0182** (0.007)	-	-	0.002* (0.001)	0.0115 (0.007)	0.0163*** (0.004)	0.0232*** (0.007)	0.0531 (0.03)
Democracy	-	-	-	-	0.810* (0.355)	-	-	-
GDP	-	-	-	-	-	0.001* (0.000)	-	-
Security	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.093 (0.76)	-
Constant	2.104 (3.048)	10.07 (2.444)	6.043 (2.358)	5.897** (2.252)	-2.698 (3.229)	0.391 (2.005)	1.659 (2.992)	2.805 (12.73)
Observations	133	138	138	138	138	138	138	130
R-squared	0.672	0.317	0.445	0.470	0.722	0.756	0.572	0.246

Prais-Winsten regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

	Model 1.12 IGO emergence	**Model 1.13** IGO emergence	**Model 1.14** IGO emergence	**Model 1.15** IGO emergence
Government activism of the most powerful state	6.492*	9.233***	-	-
	(2.600)	(2.693)		
Government activism of the two most powerful states	-	-	4.204** (1.330)	-
Government activism of the three most powerful states	-	-	-	4.801*** (1.345)
Conflict	0.139	0.666	-0.295*	-0.244*
	(0.566)	(0.573)	(0.128)	(0.102)
Interactions	-5.038	-6.443*	-12.92***	-11.53***
	(2.968)	(2.915)	(2.962)	(2.915)
Power	-2.408	-2.891*	-	-
	(1.336)	(1.418)		
New states	-	-0.202	1.328	4.781
		(10.88)	(10.11)	(10.14)
IGOs	-0.154**	-0.159**	-0.0471	-0.0318
	(0.0508)	(0.0588)	(0.0339)	(0.0307)
NGOs	0.0203**	0.0235**	0.0126**	0.0100*
	(0.00672)	(0.00791)	(0.00466)	(0.00430)
Hegemony	-	-	-0.343	-0.427
			(1.129)	(0.960)
Total number of states	0.185*	-		
	(0.0883)		-	-
Year		-0.0101		
	-	(0.0554)	-	-
Constant	-7.302	20.88	-2.397	-0.741
	(4.631)	(104.7)	(2.389)	(2.569)
Observations	138	138	138	138
R-squared	0.603	0.576	0.682	0.721

Prais-Winsten regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Part III: Robustness checks for the method of estimation

We include robustness checks that estimate negative binomial models. The observed variance of our data is larger than the mean, and the likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the over-dispersion parameter, α, is not equal to zero. These tests suggest that the data is over-dispersed. Given that the observations of the dependent variable are count data and are over-dispersed, using negative binomial regression is appropriate. The results of the tests for the models with negative binomial regression are presented in Table A5.[7]

The results are robust to the method of estimation. However, we prefer using Prais-Winsten regression in the main models, since it controls for the autocorrelation (Durbin—Watson statistic of 0.84, 1.02, and 1.08 for the Models 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, respectively), and fits better with the data (with R-squared values of 0.57, 0.63 and 0.66 for Models 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, respectively).

[7] We also ran our models with zero-inflated negative binomial regression, as we are using count data that exhibit over-dispersion and excess zeros (49 zeros over 142 observations). However, Vuong tests, which compare the zero-inflated negative binomial model to a standard negative binomial model, show that the zero-inflated negative binomial is not a better fit than the standard negative binomial (p values of 0.0788, 0.0840 and 0.0650, respectively, for the most powerful state, the second, and third most powerful states).

Table A5: Robustness checks for Models 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 using negative binomial regression models

	Model 1.16 IGO emergence	**Model 1.17** IGO emergence	**Model 1.18** IGO emergence
Government activism of the most powerful state	0.966***		
	(0.0922)		
Government activism of the two most powerful states		1.085***	
		(0.115)	
Government activism of the three most powerful states			1.029***
			(0.109)
Conflict	0.241***	-0.00450	-0.0185
	(0.0254)	(0.0132)	(0.0125)
Interactions	-0.628***	-0.965***	-0.792***
	(0.118)	(0.138)	(0.144)
Power	0.356***	0.286	0.639***
	(0.100)	(0.165)	(0.144)
New states	5.144	3.188	3.739
	(3.327)	(2.491)	(2.488)
IGOs	-0.00946***	-0.00278	0.00255*
	(0.00283)	(0.00185)	(0.00130)
INGOs	0.00163***	0.000949***	0.000302
	(0.000365)	(0.000192)	(0.000164)
Constant	-0.484*	-0.290	-0.190
	(0.197)	(0.239)	(0.267)
Observations			
	138	138	138

Negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05