

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

**DEMOCRATIC CONTRADICTIONS
IN EUROPEAN SETTLER COLONIES**

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A Supporting Information for Institutional Origins

A.1 Additional Data Information

Sample for Table 1. Owolabi’s (2015) dataset contains almost every colony under Western European rule in 1945 that now belongs to the United Nations (I added Bhutan, Eritrea, and Namibia), plus several present-day colonial dependencies. The sample for Table 1 contains all his units except seven present-day dependencies (all of which contain very small populations) that lack European population data in both Owolabi’s (2015) and Easterly and Levine’s (2016) datasets. The Table 1 sample also includes every former Western European colony that gained independence prior to 1945.

Overall, colonial political units—especially when measured within several decades of respective countries’ independence year—map closely to post-colonial political units,¹³² which justifies using Owolabi’s (2015) sample of (mainly) post-colonial units as the basis for the present sample. However, I use colonial-specific units for several cases in which colonial units differed from post-colonial units. The following post-colonial countries each merged together multiple territories that existed as distinct colonial units for lengthy time periods: United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, and St. Kitts and Nevis. It is particularly important to disaggregate these countries—each of which contains sizable British settler populations—because their constituent colonies varied in their first year of elected representation. Additionally, the sample contains four distinct mainland Spanish American colonies (New Granada, New Spain, Peru, Rio de la Plata) rather than the 16 modern-day countries. The resulting sample contains 144 colonies, including nine present-day dependencies.¹³³

European settlers. The main European settlers variable in Tables 1 and A.6 indicates whether a territory had a European population share of at least 5% at any point while under colonial occupation. The data draw primarily from Easterly and Levine’s (2016) dataset, who compiled information on colonial European populations from a variety of primary and secondary sources, and also from Owolabi (2015) for some forced settlement colonies for which Easterly and Levine are missing data. I added data points using additional secondary sources for many colonies, including the neo-Britains because Easterly and Levine (2016) code European population at the country level.

- For the United States, Carter (2006) provides pre- and post-independence decennial census data for each colony/state dating back to its colonial founding, disaggregated by race. Unfortunately, these estimates do not include the Native American population, and other sources consulted (Thornton, 1987) do not provide a basis for state-by-state estimates over time (for example, historians disagree whether in 1492 the total number of Native Americans in the present-day U.S. was closer to 1 million or 5 million). Therefore, the U.S. estimates somewhat overestimate white percentage of the population, but this percentage (at least in the southern states) is still lower than that in the other neo-British colonies. Furthermore, the data capture the most theoretically relevant non-white group—African Americans—for assessing the institutional evolution hypothesis because only this group posed a potential threat to white political dominance.

¹³² The overlap between colonial and post-colonial units is a surprising aspect of the post-colonial international system. Rulers of ex-colonies have largely accepted European-drawn boundaries despite often alleging their arbitrariness. Even leaders espousing pan-regional aims, such as pan-Africanism or Pan-Arabism, have largely accepted colonial-determined boundaries (Herbst, 2000). The failed United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria merged from 1958 to 1961) exemplifies the political difficulties of changing the colonial boundaries.

¹³³ Table 1 contains fewer colonies (141) because Egypt, Israel, Tonga had each established elected representation before colonial rule began, and the electoral representation onset variable is set to missing in all years after the first election year.

- Statistics Canada (2015) provides census information for Canada in 1871 that disaggregates by province and by First Nation population, and these European population share estimates are used for the entire period for the Canadian provinces.
- Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014) provides census data for Australia during the 19th century disaggregated by state and by country of origin—from which I calculated the white percentage of the non-aboriginal population—but the censuses did not count aboriginals. I incorporated Jones’s (1970) state-disaggregated estimates for aboriginal population in 1788 and 1901, assuming a linear time trend to generate annual aboriginal population estimates by state.
- Similar to the U.S., uncertain estimates of the African population in different parts of South Africa disabled computing a separate European population share variable for the four South African colonies (see McEvedy and Jones 1978), and therefore I use the same value for each. The resulting estimate is consistent with the scholarly consensus that although the European population in these colonies was large by African standards, Europeans were still a relatively small minority.
- Easterly and Levine’s (2016) source document enables computing separate estimates for the colony of St. Kitts and the colony of Nevis, and for the colony of Trinidad and the colony of Tobago.
- Data from New Zealand comes from the census (Stats NZ, N.d.).
- Libya data comes from its *Encyclopaedia Britannica* entry.
- Lawrence (2010) provides data for French colonies between 1946 and 1950.
- Rogoziński (2000, 78, 165, 212) provides colonial-era data for Martinique and Guadeloupe.
- Easterly and Levine (2016) do not have data on Portuguese islands Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe prior to the mid-20th century. Putterman and Weil’s (2010) descendency data shows that 41% of Cape Verde’s residents lived in Portugal in 1500. This high figure is the basis for coding Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe as settler colonies for Table 1 (Putterman and Weil 2010 do not have data for Sao Tome and Principe).

I computed the continuous European population share variable in Tables 1 as follows. Easterly and Levine (2016) provide data points on European population share at various points in time in a colony’s history, as does the additional data described above. For every colony not included in Easterly and Levine’s dataset or that lacks a data point in the 20th century while still colonized, I added a data point from Owolabi (2015). These data points serve as the anchors for imputing a value for every other year. The interpolated points average between the last available data point and the next available data point, weighted by the temporal distance from each data point. For example, if a colony has data on European population share in 1850 and in 1860 but no years in between, then the imputed data point for 1857 equals 70% of the value for 1860 plus 30% of the value for 1850. In each colony’s first year of colonial rule, its European settler percentage is set to the year with the first data point.

The continuous European population share variable in Table A.6 differs because I analyze a concentrated time period and smaller territory sample. Unlike for Table 1, it is possible to use a small set of sources that cover every territory in the African decolonization sample. This measure is time-invariant and is based on one or multiple data points for each territory between 1945 and 1960, drawing from three sources that estimate Western European settlers as a percentage of the population. Lawrence (2010) provides a data point for each French colony between 1946 and 1950, Mosley (1983) for southern British colonies and several others in 1960, and United Nations (1965) for various colonies for up to three years ranging from 1946 to 1961. I found the latter two sources while using the replication data for Easterly and Levine (2016).

Colonizer identity and metropolitan constraints on the executive. For territories colonized by multiple European powers at different times, only the final colonizer is coded (the only partial exceptions are Somalia and Libya, which are coded as Italian colonies despite gaining independence as UN Mandates administered by Britain after Italy lost World War II). Consequently, the colonial onset year corresponds with colonization by the last-colonizing power, as opposed to the first year of colonization by any Western European power. For example, Tanzania is coded as colonized in 1919 by Britain, ignoring the earlier period of German colonization. Onset year is coded using Olsson (2009) and Encyclopaedia Britannica (which is also Olsson's 2009 source). For the few post-colonial countries that combine multiple colonies ruled by different European powers, I use the colonizer for the larger territory. For example, Somalia is coded as an Italian colony despite combining Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland.

Covariates. Many examine conditions that affected prospects for European settlement, or alternative colonial influences that affected democracy. The even-numbered specifications in Table 1 control for four factors. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) argue that Europeans faced difficulties settling en masse in territories with higher population density, and Hariri (2012, 2015) argues that territories with a longer history of statehood were better able to resist European encroachment. The regressions use their variables, logged population density in 1500 and state antiquity in 1500, respectively. I use the same data sources as the authors, although I modified the data for the more comprehensive sample in Table 1. Population density comes from McEvedy and Jones (1978), who provide population estimates and area in square kilometers that cover every territory in the present sample in 1500 except Maldives, which is computed by averaging Seychelles and Sri Lanka. I consulted Encyclopaedia Britannica (2017) for several territories with limited information in McEvedy and Jones (1978). The state antiquity index comes from the updated version of Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman's (2002) dataset, who code a territory's combined years with government above local level between 0 CE and 1500 (unit of analysis is modern countries). I coded this variable for numerous small islands and a handful of other territories missing data, using Bockstette et al.'s same data source (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017) and using their averaging procedure with a 5% discount factor for each 50-year interval.

Regarding alternative colonial explanations for democratization, Owolabi (2015) codes an indicator variable for colonies in which "descendants of non-indigenous African slaves and/or Asian indentured laborers make up at least 60 percent of the postcolonial population." This also relates to Engerman and Sokoloff's (2011) argument that land endowments favorable for plantation-type agriculture generated large slave populations and high inequality. I coded this variable for every pre-1945 independence country, which Owolabi (2015) does not include in his dataset. This additionally yielded Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Haiti as forced settlement colonies. Woodberry (2012) provides data on the number of Protestant missionaries per 10,000 people in each territory in 1923. Although this variable has broad coverage, it is missing for the neo-Britains and for the nine modern-day dependencies in the sample. Using Owolabi's (2015) source data on Protestant population share in 1900 (Barrett, 1982)—which covers every territory in the present sample—I imputed a value for Woodberry's (2012) measure for every territory with missing data using the following procedure: regressing Protestant missionaries in 1923 on Protestant population share in 1900, and recording the predicted value.

Given the aforementioned procedures for imputing data points, no covariate data are missing data for any territory. However, since every variable is measured at the national level, for subnational units such as U.S. states, I use the country value for each constituent unit.

Table A.1: Sample and Main Variables for Table 1

| Colony (Post-colonial country) | Final W.Eu. colonizer | >5% Eu. pop.? | Year colonized by final W.Eu. colonizer | First colonial year w/ elected rep.* | Year independent from W.Eu. |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|---|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Cape Verde | Portugal | YES | 1462 | 1973 | 1975 |
| Dominican Republic | Spain | YES | 1492 | - | 1821 |
| Mozambique | Portugal | NO | 1505 | 1956 | 1975 |
| Cuba | Spain | YES | 1511 | - | 1898 |
| New Spain (Mexico) | Spain | YES | 1521 | - | 1824 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | Portugal | YES | 1522 | 1973 | 1975 |
| New Granada (Colombia) | Spain | YES | 1525 | - | 1819 |
| Peru | Spain | YES | 1531 | - | 1821 |
| Brazil | Portugal | YES | 1533 | - | 1822 |
| Rio de la Plata (Argentina) | Spain | YES | 1536 | - | 1816 |
| Angola | Portugal | YES | 1576 | 1956 | 1975 |
| Virginia (United States) | Britain | YES | 1607 | 1619 | 1783 |
| Bermuda (Britain) | Britain | YES | 1612 | 1620 | - |
| Indonesia | Netherlands | NO | 1619 | 1917 | 1949 |
| Massachusetts (United States) | Britain | YES | 1620 | 1634 | 1783 |
| St. Kitts (St. Kitts and Nevis) | Britain | YES | 1624 | 1642 | 1983 |
| Barbados | Britain | YES | 1627 | 1639 | 1966 |
| Nevis (St. Kitts and Nevis) | Britain | YES | 1628 | 1658 | 1983 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | Britain | YES | 1632 | 1644 | 1981 |
| Maryland (United States) | Britain | YES | 1634 | 1638 | 1783 |
| Netherlands Antilles (Netherlands) | Netherlands | YES | 1634 | 1936 | - |
| Guadeloupe (France) | France | YES | 1635 | 1854 | - |
| Martinique (France) | France | YES | 1635 | 1854 | - |
| Connecticut (United States) | Britain | YES | 1636 | 1637 | 1783 |
| Rhode Island (United States) | Britain | YES | 1637 | 1647 | 1783 |
| Senegal | France | NO | 1638 | 1879 | 1960 |
| French Guiana (France) | France | YES | 1643 | 1878 | - |
| Bahamas | Britain | YES | 1648 | 1729 | 1973 |
| Reunion (France) | France | NO | 1650 | 1854 | - |
| Jamaica | Britain | YES | 1660 | 1664 | 1962 |
| North Carolina (United States) | Britain | YES | 1663 | 1665 | 1783 |
| New Hampshire (United States) | Britain | YES | 1663 | 1680 | 1783 |
| New Jersey (United States) | Britain | YES | 1664 | 1668 | 1783 |
| Delaware (United States) | Britain | YES | 1664 | 1704 | 1783 |
| New York (United States) | Britain | YES | 1664 | 1683 | 1783 |
| Haiti | France | YES | 1665 | - | 1804 |
| Suriname | Netherlands | NO | 1667 | 1866 | 1975 |
| South Carolina (United States) | Britain | YES | 1670 | 1671 | 1783 |
| Pennsylvania (United States) | Britain | YES | 1682 | 1682 | 1783 |
| Nova Scotia (Canada) | Britain | YES | 1713 | 1758 | 1867 |
| Georgia (United States) | Britain | YES | 1733 | 1751 | 1783 |
| India | Britain | NO | 1750 | 1910 | 1947 |
| Dominica | Britain | YES | 1759 | 1771 | 1978 |
| St. Vincent and the Grenadines | Britain | YES | 1762 | 1776 | 1979 |
| New Brunswick (Canada) | Britain | YES | 1762 | 1785 | 1867 |
| Tobago (Trinidad and Tobago) | Britain | YES | 1763 | 1763 | 1962 |
| Grenada | Britain | YES | 1763 | 1766 | 1974 |
| Equatorial Guinea | Spain | NO | 1778 | 1968 | 1968 |
| Ontario (Canada) | Britain | YES | 1784 | 1791 | 1867 |
| Quebec (Canada) | Britain | YES | 1784 | 1791 | 1867 |
| Malaysia | Britain | NO | 1786 | 1955 | 1957 |
| New South Wales (Australia) | Britain | YES | 1788 | 1842 | 1901 |
| Guyana | Britain | NO | 1796 | 1892 | 1966 |
| Belize | Britain | YES | 1798 | 1854 | 1981 |
| Sri Lanka | Britain | NO | 1802 | 1910 | 1948 |
| Trinidad (Trinidad and Tobago) | Britain | YES | 1802 | 1925 | 1962 |
| Tasmania (Australia) | Britain | YES | 1803 | 1850 | 1901 |
| Cape (South Africa) | Britain | YES | 1806 | 1853 | 1910 |
| Sierra Leone | Britain | NO | 1808 | 1924 | 1961 |
| Seychelles | Britain | YES | 1814 | 1948 | 1976 |
| St. Lucia | Britain | YES | 1814 | 1924 | 1979 |
| Mauritius | Britain | YES | 1814 | 1886 | 1968 |
| Gambia | Britain | NO | 1816 | 1947 | 1965 |
| Singapore | Britain | NO | 1819 | 1948 | 1963 |

Table A.1, continued

| Colony (Post-colonial country) | Final W.Eu. colonizer | >5% Eu. pop.? | Year colonized by final W.Eu. colonizer | First colonial year w/ elected rep.* | Year independent from W.Eu. |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|
| Queensland (Australia) | Britain | YES | 1823 | 1859 | 1901 |
| Natal (South Africa) | Britain | YES | 1824 | 1856 | 1910 |
| Western Australia (Australia) | Britain | YES | 1826 | 1867 | 1901 |
| Algeria | France | YES | 1830 | 1898 | 1962 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | France | NO | 1830 | 1925 | 1960 |
| Victoria (Australia) | Britain | YES | 1834 | 1850 | 1901 |
| South Australia (Australia) | Britain | YES | 1836 | 1850 | 1901 |
| New Zealand | Britain | YES | 1840 | 1854 | 1907 |
| Gabon | France | NO | 1841 | 1937 | 1960 |
| Hong Kong (China) | Britain | NO | 1842 | 1985 | 1997 |
| French Polynesia (France) | France | NO | 1842 | 1946 | - |
| Comoros | France | NO | 1843 | 1947 | 1975 |
| Nigeria | Britain | NO | 1851 | 1923 | 1960 |
| Vietnam | France | NO | 1859 | 1880 | 1945 |
| Bahrain | Britain | NO | 1861 | - | 1971 |
| Djibouti | France | NO | 1862 | 1946 | 1977 |
| Cambodia | France | NO | 1863 | 1947 | 1964 |
| Benin | France | NO | 1863 | 1925 | 1960 |
| Lesotho | Britain | NO | 1868 | 1960 | 1966 |
| Fiji | Britain | NO | 1874 | 1905 | 1970 |
| Ghana | Britain | NO | 1874 | 1925 | 1947 |
| Guinea-Bissau | Portugal | NO | 1879 | 1973 | 1974 |
| Congo | France | NO | 1880 | 1937 | 1960 |
| Tunisia | France | YES | 1881 | 1922 | 1956 |
| Guinea | France | NO | 1881 | 1925 | 1958 |
| Egypt | Britain | NO | 1882 | 1866 | 1922 |
| Solomon Islands | Britain | NO | 1885 | 1964 | 1978 |
| Congo, Democratic Republic | Belgium | NO | 1885 | 1960 | 1960 |
| Botswana | Britain | NO | 1885 | 1920 | 1966 |
| Myanmar | Britain | NO | 1886 | 1923 | 1948 |
| Maldives | Britain | NO | 1887 | 1954 | 1965 |
| Macao (China) | Portugal | NO | 1887 | 1973 | 1999 |
| Somalia | Italy | NO | 1888 | 1956 | 1960 |
| Brunei | Britain | NO | 1888 | 1965 | 1984 |
| Eritrea | Italy | NO | 1890 | 1952 | 1950 |
| Zambia | Britain | NO | 1890 | 1924 | 1964 |
| Uganda | Britain | NO | 1890 | 1958 | 1962 |
| Zimbabwe | Britain | YES | 1890 | 1899 | 1980 |
| Malawi | Britain | NO | 1891 | 1955 | 1964 |
| Kiribati | Britain | NO | 1892 | 1967 | 1979 |
| United Arab Emirates | Britain | NO | 1892 | - | 1971 |
| Tuvalu | Britain | NO | 1892 | 1967 | 1978 |
| Mali | France | NO | 1893 | 1925 | 1960 |
| Laos | France | NO | 1893 | 1947 | 1949 |
| Madagascar | France | NO | 1895 | 1946 | 1960 |
| Kenya | Britain | NO | 1895 | 1920 | 1963 |
| Burkina Faso | France | NO | 1895 | 1948 | 1960 |
| Guam (United States) | United States | NO | 1898 | 1968 | - |
| Philippines | United States | NO | 1898 | 1907 | 1946 |
| Chad | France | NO | 1898 | 1937 | 1960 |
| Sudan | Britain | NO | 1898 | 1948 | 1956 |
| Central African Republic | France | NO | 1899 | 1937 | 1960 |
| Orange (South Africa) | Britain | YES | 1900 | 1907 | 1910 |
| Tonga | Britain | NO | 1900 | 1875 | 1970 |
| Transvaal (South Africa) | Britain | YES | 1902 | 1906 | 1910 |
| Swaziland | Britain | NO | 1903 | 1921 | 1968 |
| Mauritania | France | NO | 1903 | 1946 | 1960 |
| Vanuatu | France | NO | 1906 | 1957 | 1980 |
| Papua New Guinea | Australia | NO | 1906 | 1951 | 1975 |
| Bhutan | Britain | NO | 1910 | - | 1947 |
| Morocco | France | NO | 1912 | - | 1956 |
| Libya | Italy | NO | 1912 | - | 1951 |
| Samoa | New Zealand | NO | 1914 | - | 1962 |
| East Timor | Portugal | NO | 1914 | 1973 | 1975 |

Table A.1, continued

| Colony (Post-colonial country) | Final W.Eu. colonizer | >5% Eu. pop.? | Year colonized by final W.Eu. colonizer | First colonial year w/ elected rep.* | Year independent from W.Eu. |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|---|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Kuwait | Britain | NO | 1914 | - | 1961 |
| Qatar | Britain | NO | 1916 | - | 1971 |
| U.S. Virgin Islands (United States) | United States | YES | 1917 | 1936 | - |
| Lebanon | France | NO | 1918 | 1922 | 1946 |
| Togo | France | NO | 1919 | 1946 | 1960 |
| Burundi | Belgium | NO | 1919 | 1953 | 1962 |
| Cameroon | France | NO | 1919 | 1946 | 1960 |
| Tanzania | Britain | NO | 1919 | 1958 | 1960 |
| Rwanda | Belgium | NO | 1919 | 1953 | 1962 |
| Namibia | South Africa | YES | 1919 | 1926 | 1990 |
| Nauru | Australia | NO | 1920 | 1951 | 1968 |
| Jordan | Britain | NO | 1920 | 1929 | 1946 |
| Iraq | Britain | NO | 1920 | 1923 | 1932 |
| Niger | France | NO | 1922 | 1946 | 1960 |
| Syria | France | NO | 1922 | 1928 | 1946 |
| Israel | Britain | YES | 1923 | 1920 | 1948 |

* A separate coding appendix (available with the replication data) provides extensive details on the coding and sources for colonial elections.

A.2 Supporting Information and Robustness Checks for Table 1

Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Table 1

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Colony-years |
|---------------------------------|--------|-----------|--------------|
| Onset of elected representation | 0.008 | 0.087 | 10,538 |
| Settler colony (5% threshold) | 0.489 | 0.5 | 10,538 |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | -4.682 | 2.398 | 10,538 |
| British colony | 0.318 | 0.466 | 10,538 |
| Metro. exec. constraints | 0.579 | 0.494 | 10,538 |
| Pre-1850 colonization | 0.752 | 0.432 | 10,538 |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | 2.522 | 4.284 | 10,538 |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | 0.15 | 0.253 | 10,538 |
| Forced settlement colony | 0.334 | 0.472 | 10,538 |
| Protestant missionaries in 1923 | 1.081 | 1.669 | 10,538 |

Table A.3: Restricting Table 1 Sample to Pre-1919

| | DV: Onset of elected representation | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Settler colony (5% threshold) | -1.440** (0.713) | -0.968 (0.782) | -0.475 (1.138) | -0.246 (1.282) | | |
| British colony | 0.507 (0.973) | -0.0183 (0.933) | | | 6.232*** (1.360) | 6.975*** (1.328) |
| Settler*British colony | 4.903*** (0.940) | 5.268*** (1.006) | | | | |
| Metro. exec. constraints | | | 0.953 (1.026) | 0.888 (1.151) | | |
| Settler*Metro. exec. constraints | | | 2.619** (1.263) | 2.792** (1.385) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | | | -0.159 (0.151) | -0.131 (0.155) |
| ln(Eu. pop. %)*British colony | | | | | 0.862*** (0.198) | 1.088*** (0.222) |
| Pre-1850 colonization | -1.106*** (0.367) | -1.268*** (0.350) | 0.0941 (0.537) | -0.171 (0.499) | -1.164* (0.609) | -1.590** (0.661) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.0772** (0.0378) | | 0.0490* (0.0260) | | 0.0998*** (0.0387) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 0.256 (0.883) | | -0.439 (0.600) | | 0.676 (0.932) |
| Forced settlement colony | | -0.686* (0.354) | | -0.992** (0.389) | | 0.353 (0.312) |
| Protestant missionaries in 1923 | | 0.145 (0.0947) | | 0.196** (0.0824) | | -0.0917 (0.107) |
| Colony-years | 8,946 | 8,946 | 8,946 | 8,946 | 8,946 | 8,946 |
| Time controls? | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | Marginal effect estimates | | | | | |
| Settler colony British rule | 0.0632*** (0.0224) | 0.0698*** (0.0206) | | | | |
| Settler colony High metro. exec. const. | | | 0.0165*** (0.00540) | 0.0182*** (0.00569) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule | | | | | 0.00959** (0.00406) | 0.0119*** (0.00446) |
| Settler colony Non-British rule | -0.00100* (0.000591) | -0.000652 (0.000493) | | | | |
| Settler colony Low metro. exec. const. | | | -0.000327 (0.000853) | -0.000142 (0.000770) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule | | | | | -0.000102 (0.000115) | -8.25e-05 (9.80e-05) |

Notes: Table A.3 ends the Table 1 sample in 1918, but otherwise estimates identical models. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.4: Exclude Neo-British Colonies from Table 1

| | DV: Onset of elected representation | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Settler colony (5% threshold) | -0.559 (0.664) | -0.514 (0.683) | -0.226 (1.179) | -0.160 (1.212) | | |
| British colony | 0.228 (0.375) | 0.252 (0.384) | | | 3.618*** (0.786) | 3.440*** (0.907) |
| Settler*British colony | 3.228*** (0.722) | 3.160*** (0.720) | | | | |
| Metro. exec. constraints | | | 1.829* (0.948) | 1.853* (0.963) | | |
| Settler*Metro. exec. constraints | | | 1.814 (1.226) | 1.750 (1.243) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | | | -0.122 (0.112) | -0.137 (0.110) |
| ln(Eu. pop. %)*British colony | | | | | 0.548*** (0.163) | 0.502*** (0.184) |
| Pre-1850 colonization | -2.084*** (0.417) | -2.293*** (0.546) | -1.184*** (0.347) | -1.192*** (0.343) | -1.175*** (0.393) | -1.580*** (0.507) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.0142 (0.0258) | | -0.0107 (0.0240) | | 0.0160 (0.0279) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 0.705 (0.540) | | 0.274 (0.479) | | 0.706 (0.578) |
| Forced settlement colony | | 0.311 (0.499) | | -0.118 (0.437) | | 0.796 (0.507) |
| Protestant missionaries in 1923 | | 0.0720 (0.0634) | | 0.0745 (0.0547) | | 0.0241 (0.0791) |
| Colony-years | 10,068 | 10,068 | 10,068 | 10,068 | 10,068 | 10,068 |
| Time controls? | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | Marginal effect estimates | | | | | |
| Settler colony British rule | 0.0451*** (0.0149) | 0.0419*** (0.0139) | | | | |
| Settler colony High metro. exec. const. | | | 0.0164*** (0.00472) | 0.0160*** (0.00544) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule | | | | | 0.00469*** (0.00166) | 0.00375* (0.00220) |
| Settler colony Non-British rule | -0.00120 (0.00129) | -0.00104 (0.00126) | | | | |
| Settler colony Low metro. exec. const. | | | -0.000141 (0.000758) | -9.75e-05 (0.000757) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule | | | | | -0.000336 (0.000305) | -0.000349 (0.000278) |

Notes: Table A.4 excludes the 24 neo-British colonies (13 in United States, 4 in Canada, 6 in Australia, and New Zealand) from the sample for Table 1 but otherwise estimates identical models. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A.3 Disaggregating British Settler Colonies

An important historical distinction among British settler colonies is whether they were founded by British settlement or by conquest. “The settlers who established settled colonies took with them all the rights of British subjects, particularly the right to be granted representative government in the shape of a bicameral legislature with a nominated upper house and an elected lower house, on the model of the British Parliament. The inhabitants of ceded colonies had only such rights as the Crown chose to allow them” (Wight, 1952, 5). Empirically, with few exceptions (such as the Bahamas due to continual military pressure from pirates, or New South Wales in Australia because of its founding as a penal settlement), British settled colonies gained elected representation within one or two decades of colonization, as evidenced across British North America and the Caribbean in the 17th and 18th centuries, and Oceania in the 19th century.

By contrast, the conquered colonies exhibited higher variance. Some, like Jamaica, gained elected representation shortly after British conquest in the 17th century. However, in the 18th and 19th centuries, Britain became increasingly reluctant to grant elected representation to conquest colonies amid “the transformation

of the empire . . . from one peopled almost exclusively by the British race to one with considerable minorities of other European nationalities and an enormous dependent non-European population . . . The subjects in the new colonies were French, Dutch, Spanish or Asiatic, without claim to British institutions or understanding of them, and in some cases potentially hostile” (Wight, 1946, 47). Empirically, Britain approached non-British Europeans differently than British settlers. The Canada Constitutional Act of 1791 “was the extension for the first time of British constitutional rights to a non-British colonial population . . . In Grenada, in 1763, the old representative system had been granted to a colony of French population, but without the enfranchisement of Roman Catholics; in Quebec, in 1774, civil rights had been guaranteed to Roman Catholics, but without the grant of representative government” (Wight, 1946, 45). Colonies gained during the French revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars did not gain representative institutions for a century or more (Belize, Guyana, St. Lucia, Trinidad). For example, when debating whether to grant elected representation in Trinidad in the 1880s, colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain “argued that it was wrong to consider demands from the Crown Colonies for representative government as if they were advanced by ‘a wholly white and British population’; many of the Crown Colonies were largely composed of ‘native non-British races’. ‘In such cases it is really a misuse of terms to talk of Rep[resentative] government. There is no pretence of giving full representation of the alien or black population & the full concession of the demands of the Reformers would only result in transferring the responsibility of administration . . . to a small oligarchy of white settlers’” (Will, 1966, 714).

Although the main European settler variables analyzed here include *all* Europeans, assessing differences among British settler colonies enables assessing whether the relationship between British-ruled settler colonies and early representation is strongest when Britons—as opposed to other Europeans—founded the colony and composed its primary European inhabitants. Table A.5 evaluates this contention by including separate fixed effects for British settled colonies and for British conquest colonies that met the 5% European population threshold. The sample contains British colonies only, and therefore the excluded basis category is British non-settler colonies. The specifications resemble those in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, except there is no interaction term for British colonialism because the sample consists only of British colonies. Although the coefficient estimate for both types of British settler colonies indicates significantly earlier onset of elected representation than in British non-settler colonies, the estimated failure rate for British settled colonies is 2.9 times greater than that for British conquest colonies with sizable European settlement (however, these two categories exhibit overlapping 95% confidence intervals).

Table A.5: Disaggregating British Settler Colonies

| | DV: Onset of elected representation | |
|---|-------------------------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| British settled colony | 3.773*** (0.574) | 3.952*** (0.747) |
| British conquered colony (5% threshold) | 2.649*** (0.489) | 3.250*** (0.505) |
| Pre-1850 colonization | -2.129*** (0.497) | -1.981*** (0.478) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | -0.00445 (0.0295) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 1.354* (0.787) |
| Forced settlement colony | | -0.714 (0.465) |
| Protestant missionaries in 1923 | | 0.0625 (0.105) |
| Colony-years | 3,356 | 3,356 |
| Time controls? | YES | YES |

Notes: Table A.5 differs from Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 by disaggregating British settler colonies into settled colonies and conquest colonies, and the sample contains only British colonies. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B Supporting Information for Institutional Evolution

B.1 Africa

Table A.6 statistically assesses differences in legalized enfranchisement between 1955 and 1970 using OLS models with year fixed effects and standard errors clustered by colony. It demonstrates support for Hypothesis 2 using the same sample of African countries as in Figure 4. As in Table 1, Column 1 of Table A.6 models the settler colony dummy, British colonialism, and their interaction. Column 2 adds covariates. Columns 3 and 4 run otherwise identical models that replace the settler colony dummy with logged European population share. Across the columns, the table shows that settlers are strongly negatively associated with franchise size among both British and non-British colonies.

Table A.6: Legalized Enfranchisement in Africa, 1955–1970

| | DV: Legally enfranchised pop % | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Settler colony | -37.51* | -34.14* | | |
| | (19.79) | (17.01) | | |
| British colony | -14.98** | -8.362 | -19.03 | -1.309 |
| | (7.162) | (7.646) | (22.74) | (20.23) |
| Settler*British colony | -12.60 | -1.640 | | |
| | (21.00) | (15.48) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | -7.552** | -6.474** |
| | | | (2.923) | (3.017) |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %)*British colony | | | -0.371 | 1.492 |
| | | | (3.294) | (2.922) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.422 | | 0.331 |
| | | (0.432) | | (0.396) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 22.35 | | 16.09 |
| | | (19.49) | | (17.53) |
| Protestant missionaries in 1923 | | -6.641* | | -6.156 |
| | | (3.917) | | (5.185) |
| Territory-years | 682 | 682 | 682 | 682 |
| R-squared | 0.404 | 0.449 | 0.416 | 0.441 |
| Year FE? | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| | Marginal effect estimates | | | |
| Settler colony British rule | -50.11*** | -36.45*** | | |
| | (7.204) | (8.460) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) British rule | | | -7.923*** | -4.982** |
| | | | (1.518) | (2.010) |
| Settler colony Non-British rule | -37.51* | -34.14* | | |
| | (19.79) | (17.01) | | |
| ln(Eu. pop. %) Non-British rule | | | -7.552** | -6.474** |
| | | | (2.923) | (3.017) |

Notes: Table A.6 summarizes a series of OLS regressions by presenting coefficient estimates, and country-clustered robust standard error estimates in parentheses using two-sided hypothesis tests. The sample contains a complete panel of 43 continental African countries (plus Madagascar) between 1955 and 1970 (including both colonized and post-independence years). The dependent variable is legally enfranchised population percent measured annually. The forced settlement covariate is not used because it equals 0 for every country in this sample. Every specification contains year fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Appendix Table A.7 shows that the results are similar when not controlling for British colonialism and its interaction, which produces settler effect estimates based on a larger number of units pooled across empires. Although the results in Columns 3 and 4 of Table A.6 show that the marginal effect findings are not predicated on using the 5% population threshold for settler colonies, analyzing results without the Britain interaction mitigates some small-sample issues that arise when using the binary settlers variable: the only

British settler territories (by the 5% threshold) in this sample are South Africa and Zimbabwe, and the non-British settler colonies are Algeria, Angola, Namibia, and Tunisia. In Column 1, the expected difference in percent enfranchised is 41%, with 72% legal enfranchisement in non-settler colonies versus 31% in settler colonies.

Paine (2018) provides additional tests that complement these findings. I demonstrate similar results when instrumenting for European settlement using land suitability for large-scale European agriculture, and also show that percentage of land alienated for Europeans negatively correlates with franchise size.

Table A.7: Table A.6 without British Colonial Control

| | DV: Legally enfranchised pop % | | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Settler colony | -41.38*** (14.48) | -32.48** (12.37) | | |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | | | -7.631*** (1.943) | -5.209** (2.311) |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | | 0.482 (0.407) | | 0.396 (0.367) |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | | 23.75 (18.67) | | 17.10 (16.32) |
| Protestant missionaries in 1923 | | -8.361* (4.239) | | -8.183 (5.539) |
| Territory-years | 682 | 682 | 682 | 682 |
| R-squared | 0.366 | 0.441 | 0.379 | 0.429 |
| Year FE? | YES | YES | YES | YES |

Notes: Table A.7 is identical to Table A.6 except it does not control for British colonialism nor the interaction term.
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Summary Statistics for Table A.6

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Territory-years |
|---------------------------------|--------|-----------|-----------------|
| Legally enfranchised pop. % | 66.645 | 42.416 | 682 |
| Settler colony | 0.141 | 0.348 | 682 |
| ln(Colonial European pop. %) | -5.752 | 1.997 | 682 |
| British colony | 0.352 | 0.478 | 682 |
| ln(Pop. density in 1500) | 3.251 | 5.125 | 682 |
| State antiquity index in 1500 | 0.182 | 0.259 | 682 |
| Protestant missionaries in 1923 | 0.637 | 0.950 | 682 |

B.2 British Caribbean After World War I

After World War I, British Caribbean colonies experienced peaceful transitions to renewed electoral representation, universal suffrage, and independence. The important difference from contemporaneous African settler colonies, or from the British Caribbean in the 19th century, is that European settlers' political and economic clout had weakened considerably by the interwar period. Therefore, these colonies and time period provides informative null cases for assessing Hypothesis 2.

B.2.1 Main Pattern: Early and Peaceful Transitions to Universal Suffrage


Excepting Jamaica's early return to elected representation in 1884, British Caribbean colonies that changed their institutions in the 19th century lacked elected representatives through World War I. However, the self-government movement became vocal and prominent in the 1920s, led by non-white professionals, World War I soldiers, and trade union leaders. "All demanded the election of at least some members of the colonial

legislative councils and a role in local government for the elected members” (Rogoziński, 2000, 311-2). These demands, complemented by sporadic violence such as fires in Grenada and strikes in Trinidad and Tobago, preceded reforms in 1924 to grant legislative representation to most of the islands. In the two exceptions—Antigua and Barbuda, and St. Kitts and Nevis—“the strong opposition of the large plantation owners and the prominent merchants to the introduction of the elective principle delayed the advent of a minority of elected members to these Councils until 1936” (Forbes, 1970, 60).

Following these initial reforms, only a minority of members on the legislative councils were elected, and the franchise remained small. Coupled with the Great Depression in the 1930s, “[d]emonstrations, strikes, and riots were frequent throughout the British Caribbean between 1935 and 1938” (Rogoziński, 2000, 313). These actions precipitated several influential commission reports. “The Moyne Report placed much of the blame for the disturbances on the Crown colony form of government. It called for stronger labor unions, more elected members to the Legislative Councils, and the eventual extension of the vote to all islanders” (Rogoziński, 2000, 314). The two largest islands, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, gained universal suffrage in the 1940s, followed by the smaller islands in the 1950s.

Figure A.1 compares franchise expansion in 20th century British Caribbean to patterns from Africa, using the same V-Dem legalized enfranchisement variable as in Figure 4. The black line presents average population percentage with legalized suffrage for the only three British Caribbean settler colonies with V-Dem data, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, and therefore the black line is slightly biased upward prior to 1951 relative to the true British Caribbean average. The gray lines pool the African countries from Figure 4 into settler (solid gray) and non-settler (dashed gray).

Figure A.1: Comparing Suffrage in British Caribbean and Africa



The main takeaway from Figure A.1 is that the British Caribbean colonies moved earlier to widespread suffrage not only before *settler* colonies in Africa, but also before non-settler colonies in Africa. Therefore, despite the institutional changes in the 19th century British Caribbean in which European settlers sought to prevent mass enfranchisement, a similar trend did not occur in this region following World War I.

B.2.2 Evidence of Weakened European Planter Class

The crucial difference between the 20th century British Caribbean relative to the 19th century or to contemporaneous African settler colonies was that the British metropole rather than European settlers had the power to decide how to respond to demands by non-whites. Britain reacted to the disturbances in the 1930s

with concessions in the 1940s that went “much further than the local upper classes would have dreamed of” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 240), and the movement to universal suffrage further “restricted the political power of the white planter oligarchy” (Hillebrands and Trefs, 2005, 595). Since the change in political institutions in the 19th century, economic changes weakened the white plantocracy by increasing foreign land ownership (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 238-239). Additionally, after ending slavery, Britain granted metropolitan legal rights to freed slaves in the Caribbean, and corresponding educational gains during the Crown rule period helped to facilitate societal organization (Owolabi, 2015), such as labor unions. This not only enhanced workers’ bargaining power, but trade union leaders also established labor parties across the region that advocated for political representation and participated in the first elections under universal suffrage in the 1940s (Rogoziński 2000, 315-319; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992, 236-238). Overall, the re-establishment of elected representation and the rise of mass franchise expansion in the British Caribbean in the 20th century tended to occur in spite of rather than because of European settlers, and “the driving force behind democratization and decolonization was an alliance of the [non-white] working-class and the middle classes” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, 244).

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