SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

VOTE BROKERS, CLIENTELIST APPEALS, AND VOTER TURNOUT
Evidence from Russia and Venezuela

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Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela

Supplementary Appendix

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A1 Balance Checks

- Tables A1 and A2 show balance checks to assess assignment to treatment across the different groups in the Russia and Venezuela surveys. We use a simple vector of identical covariates in each exercise, and use the entire set of 12 treatments (4 broker x 3 inducement) as an outcome variable in a multinomial logistic regression. Both joint likelihood ratio tests indicate that treatment assignment is not correlated with these confounders.

TABLE A1: BALANCE TEST FOR RUSSIA SURVEY EXPERIMENT

	LR Chisq	Df	Pr(>Chisq)
City Size	8.12	11	0.7023
Household Economic Situation	12.46	11	0.3301
Male	6.68	11	0.8247
Age (log)	4.87	11	0.9371
Education	10.57	11	0.4797
Employed	7.26	11	0.7779
Joint Likelihood Ratio Test:	0.12		-0.0888

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table presents the likelihood-ratio tests for six demographic predictors from a multinomial logistic regression with the outcome variable being treatment status in the Russian survey experiment. Chi-squared values are given in the first column, degrees of freedom in the second, and finally p-values in the final column. Below these independent tests is the chi-square statistics from a joint likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all predictors are equal to zero.

TABLE A2: BALANCE TEST FOR VENEZUELA SURVEY EXPERIMENT

	LR Chisq	Df	Pr(>Chisq)
City Size	10.38	11	0.4965
Household Income	13.36	11	0.2705
Male	7.05	11	0.7948
Age (log)	9.42	11	0.5831
Education	4.15	11	0.9654
Employed	6.31	11	0.8521
Joint Likelihood Ratio Test:	-0.26		-0.0864

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table presents the likelihood-ratio tests for six demographic predictors from a multinomial logistic regression with the outcome variable being treatment status in the Venezuelan survey experiment. Chi-squared values are given in the first column, degrees of freedom in the second, and finally p-values in the final column. Below these independent tests is the chi-square statistics from a joint likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all predictors are equal to zero.

A2 Robustness Checks: Survey Experiment - Russia

- This set of tables and figures presents point estimates (and robustness checks) for the main findings from the Russia survey in the paper.
- Figure A1 shows the same plot comparing differences in voter turnout across brokers, but includes the full sample of respondents (rather than subsetting to only employed individuals, as in the main text). The plot shows the same patterns: employer-based mobilization is altogether more effective than mobilization by officials or parties, regardless of the strategies adopted.
- Table A3 uses different controls and sample specifications along the broker treatment dimension and collapses the inducement treatments (this approach is standard for analyzing factorial designs). We find strong evidence that no matter the sample used, employers have a much stronger mobilizing effect that party officials.
- Table A4 uses the same sample constraints to test the robustness of the different inducement treatment arms (collapsing by broker treatments). Here we see that in most models, Organizational Threat treatments strictly dominate both the other two treatments shown (Turnout-Buying and Individual Threats), as well as the Simple Ask (reference category). We also see no evidence that turnout-buying performs better than just asking respondents to vote.
- Tables A5 and A6 interact the broker and inducement treatments with measures of respondent education and income. We are interested in seeing whether poorer, less educated respondents are more affected by the material appeals made through turnout buying or from specific brokers. Although the point estimates are noisy, we see consistently negative signs, indicating that indeed offering gifts to the less well off can still be an effective vote mobilizing strategy.

FIGURE A1: CLIENTELISM EFFECTIVENESS ACROSS BROKERS - ALL RESPONDENTS



The figure displays the difference in the likelihood of voting among all respondents to the Russia survey experiment. Voting likelihood is measured on a five-point scale, with higher values indicating increased likelihood. Mean values for each treatment group are found above each bar and are organized according to which broker was responsible for voter mobilization. The sample includes *all* respondents.

TABLE A3: CLIENTELISM EFFECTIVENESS IN RUSSIA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, BETWEEN BROKER ANALYSIS

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote							
Sample:	All		Emp.	Gov	Private	Unemp.	Original	Oversample
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Employer Broker Treatment	0.236***	0.232***	0.222***	0.338***	0.180***		0.240***	0.223**
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.108)	(0.067)		(0.051)	(0.098)
Party Official Broker Treatment	0.058	0.055	0.028	0.071	0.020	0.103	0.035	0.131
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.109)	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.052)	(0.096)
Employed		0.146***						
		(0.039)						
Constant	2.562***	2.471***	2.629***	2.580***	2.643***	2.450***	2.540***	2.653***
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.079)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.069)
Observations	4,204	4,204	2,692	805	1,870	1,019	3,360	844

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the turnout propensity scale (five-point) from the survey experiment. The control (reference) group is the government official treatment. All inducement treatment arms are collapsed by broker. Model 2 adds a control for whether the respondent is employed. Model 3 subsets to only employed respondents, Model 4 subsets to those only employed in the government, Model 5 subsets to those only employed in the private sector, and Model 6 subsets to only unemployed respondents. Model 7 subsets to only the original sampling approach, while Model 8 looks only at the oversample of employed respondents. All models use OLS.

TABLE A4: CLIENTELISM EFFECTIVENESS IN RUSSIA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, BETWEEN STRATEGY ANALYSIS

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote						
Sample:	All	Emp.	Gov	Private	Unemp.	Original	Oversample
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Organizational Threat Treatment	0.178***	0.214***	0.134	0.243***	0.068	0.148**	0.285**
	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.127)	(0.078)	(0.107)	(0.060)	(0.112)
Turnout-Buying Treatment	−0.153***	−0.186***	−0.184	−0.199**	−0.140	−0.141**	−0.209*
	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.121)	(0.079)	(0.106)	(0.060)	(0.111)
Individual Threat Treatment	−0.063	−0.068	−0.043	−0.068	−0.134	−0.053	−0.106
	(0.054)	(0.067)	(0.125)	(0.080)	(0.106)	(0.061)	(0.114)
Constant	2.671***	2.725***	2.752***	2.712***	2.552***	2.646***	2.779***
	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.088)	(0.057)	(0.074)	(0.043)	(0.081)
Observations	4,204	2,692	805	1,870	1,019	3,360	844

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the turnout propensity scale (five-point) from the survey experiment. The control (reference) group is the simple ask treatment. All broker treatment arms are collapsed by inducement. Model 2 subsets to only employed respondents, Model 3 subsets to those only employed in the government, Model 4 subsets to those only employed in the private sector, and Model 5 subsets to only unemployed respondents. Model 6 subsets to only the original sampling approach, while Model looks only at the oversample of employed respondents. All models use OLS.

TABLE A5: CLIENTELISM EFFECTIVENESS IN RUSSIA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, BETWEEN BROKER ANALYSIS, HETEROGENEITY

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Employer Broker Treatment	0.236***	0.160	0.327**
	(0.046)	(0.133)	(0.130)
Party Official Broker Treatment	0.058	−0.133	0.088
	(0.046)	(0.137)	(0.132)
Education		−0.017	
		(0.016)	
Employer Broker Treatment * Education		0.014	
		(0.023)	
Party Official Broker Treatment * Education		0.034	
		(0.023)	
Income			0.014
			(0.014)
Employer Broker Treatment * Income			−0.016
			(0.020)
Party Official Broker Treatment * Income			−0.006
			(0.021)
Constant	2.562***	2.656***	2.497***
	(0.032)	(0.096)	(0.091)
Observations	4,204	4,204	3,321

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the turnout propensity scale (five-point) from the survey experiment. The control (reference) group is the government official treatment. All inducement treatment arms are collapsed by broker. Model 1 are the main results. The broker treatments are then interacted with predictors measuring respondent education (Model 2) and income (Model 3). All models use OLS.

TABLE A6: CLIENTELISM EFFECTIVENESS IN RUSSIA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, BETWEEN STRATEGY ANALYSIS, HETEROGENEITY

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Organizational Threat Treatment	0.178***	0.307**	0.181
	(0.053)	(0.154)	(0.151)
Turnout-Buying Treatment	−0.153***	0.092	−0.052
	(0.053)	(0.154)	(0.151)
Individual Threat Treatment	−0.063	0.154	−0.036
	(0.054)	(0.156)	(0.156)
Education		0.024	
		(0.019)	
Organizational Threat Treatment * Education		−0.024	
		(0.026)	
Turnout-Buying Treatment * Education		−0.044*	
		(0.026)	
Individual Threat Treatment * Education		−0.039	
		(0.027)	
Income			0.017
			(0.017)
Organizational Threat Treatment * Income			−0.005
			(0.023)
Turnout-Buying Treatment * Income			−0.020
			(0.024)
Individual Threat Treatment * Income			−0.013
			(0.024)
Constant	2.671***	2.539***	2.612***
	(0.038)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Observations	4,204	4,204	3,321

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the turnout propensity scale (five-point) from the survey experiment. The control (reference) group is the simple ask treatment. All broker treatment arms are collapsed by inducement. Model 1 are the main results. The broker treatments are then interacted with predictors measuring respondent education (Model 2) and income (Model 3). All models use OLS.

A3 Robustness Checks: Survey Experiment - Venezuela

- This set of tables is nearly identical to those in the previous section but use the data from the Venezuela survey.
- Figure A2 shows pattern in voter turnout using the full sample of respondents (rather than subsetting to only employed individuals, as in the main text).
- Table A7 alternates between different ways of selecting the analysis sample, and analyzes the broker treatment arms by collapsing the inducement treatments. As was the case with the Russian data, employers are more effective than party officials at mobilizing the vote.
- Table A8 uses the same sample constraints to test the robustness of the different inducement treatment arms (collapsing by broker treatments). Here again, the Organizational Threat treatments almost always strictly dominate both the other two treatments shown (Turnout-Buying and Individual Threats), as well as the Simple Ask (reference category). We also see no evidence that turnout-buying performs better than just asking respondents to vote and that making individual threats may be an effective way to get out the vote in Venezuela.
- Tables A9 and A10 again interact the broker and inducement treatments with measures of respondent education and income. The point estimates are again negative but not statistical significant. This suggest turnout buying can still be used to mobilize votes from poorer respondents.

FIGURE A2: CLIENTELISM EFFECTIVENESS ACROSS BROKERS - ALL RESPONDENTS



The figure displays the difference in the likelihood of voting among all respondents to the Venezuela survey experiment. Voting likelihood is measured on a five-point scale, with higher values indicating increased likelihood. Mean values for each treatment group are found above each bar and are organized according to which broker was responsible for voter mobilization. The sample includes *all* respondents.

TABLE A7: CLIENTELISM EFFECTIVENESS IN VENEZUELA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, BETWEEN BROKER ANALYSIS

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote					
Sample:	All		Emp.	Gov	Private	Unemp.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Employer Broker Treatment	0.226**	0.226**	0.321**	0.388	0.292*	
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.136)	(0.237)	(0.167)	
Neighborhood Leader Broker Treatment	−0.054	−0.054	−0.132	0.016	−0.207	0.044
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.134)	(0.238)	(0.162)	(0.153)
Employed		−0.008				
		(0.083)				
Constant	3.178***	3.183***	3.171***	3.062***	3.225***	3.188***
	(0.072)	(0.085)	(0.096)	(0.173)	(0.116)	(0.109)
Observations	1,328	1,328	735	260	475	400

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the turnout propensity scale (five-point) from the survey experiment. The control (reference) group is the local leader treatment. All inducement treatment arms are collapsed by broker. Model 2 includes a control for whether the respondent is employed. Model 3 subsets to only employed respondents, Model 4 subsets to those only employed in the government, Model 5 subsets to those only employed in the private sector, and Model 6 subsets to only unemployed respondents. All models use OLS.

TABLE A8: CLIENTELISM EFFECTIVENESS IN VENEZUELA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, BETWEEN STRATEGY ANALYSIS

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote				
Sample:	All	Emp.	Gov	Private	Unemp.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Turnout-Buying Treatment	-0.429^{***}	-0.318	-0.771^{***}	-0.072	-0.335
	(0.147)	(0.205)	(0.271)	(0.200)	(0.218)
Individual Threat Treatment	0.236^{*}	0.263	0.163	0.333^{*}	0.432
	(0.130)	(0.180)	(0.296)	(0.176)	(0.272)
Organizational Threat Treatment	0.398^{**}	0.497^{***}	0.195	0.675^{***}	0.217
	(0.159)	(0.173)	(0.283)	(0.180)	(0.281)
Constant	3.175^{***}	3.106^{***}	3.271^{***}	3.000^{***}	3.144^{***}
	(0.120)	(0.127)	(0.143)	(0.137)	(0.208)
Observations	1,328	735	260	475	400

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the turnout propensity scale (five-point) from the survey experiment. The control (reference) group is the simple ask treatment. All broker treatment arms are collapsed by inducement. Model 2 subsets to only employed respondents, Model 3 subsets to those only employed in the government, Model 4 subsets to those only employed in the private sector, and Model 5 subsets to only unemployed respondents. All models use OLS.

TABLE A9: CLIENTELISM EFFECTIVENESS IN VENEZUELA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, BETWEEN BROKER ANALYSIS, HETEROGENEITY

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Employer Broker Treatment	0.226***	0.481*	0.038
	(0.080)	(0.270)	(0.195)
Neighborhood Leader Broker Treatment	−0.054	0.083	0.069
	(0.105)	(0.452)	(0.208)
Education		0.093	
		(0.089)	
Employer Broker Treatment * Education		−0.075	
		(0.075)	
Neighborhood Leader Broker Treatment * Education		−0.041	
		(0.122)	
Income			0.030*
			(0.018)
Employer Broker Treatment * Income			0.040
			(0.040)
Neighborhood Leader Broker Treatment * Income			−0.034
			(0.033)
Constant	3.178***	2.861***	3.059***
	(0.104)	(0.308)	(0.131)
Observations	1,328	1,328	1,226

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the turnout propensity scale (five-point) from the survey experiment. The control (reference) group is the local leader treatment. All inducement treatment arms are collapsed by broker. Model 1 are the main results. The broker treatments are then interacted with predictors measuring respondent education (Model 2) and income (Model 3). All models use OLS.

TABLE A10: CLIENTELISM EFFECTIVENESS IN VENEZUELA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, BETWEEN STRATEGY ANALYSIS, HETEROGENEITY

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Turnout-Buying Treatment	−0.429***	−0.207	−0.600
	(0.147)	(0.369)	(0.429)
Individual Threat Treatment	0.236*	0.764*	0.126
	(0.130)	(0.439)	(0.206)
Organizational Threat Treatment	0.398**	0.558	0.298
	(0.159)	(0.462)	(0.230)
Education		0.114*	
		(0.069)	
Turnout-Buying Treatment * Education		−0.062	
		(0.108)	
Individual Threat Treatment * Education		−0.151	
		(0.131)	
Organizational Threat Treatment * Education		−0.044	
		(0.121)	
Income			0.013
			(0.052)
Turnout-Buying Treatment * Income			0.044
			(0.083)
Individual Threat Treatment * Income			0.019
			(0.052)
Organizational Threat Treatment * Income			0.018
			(0.063)
Constant	3.175***	2.778***	3.132***
	(0.120)	(0.286)	(0.268)
Observations	1,328	1,328	1,226

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the turnout propensity scale (five-point) from the survey experiment. The control (reference) group is the simple ask treatment. All broker treatment arms are collapsed by inducement. Model 1 are the main results. The broker treatments are then interacted with predictors measuring respondent education (Model 2) and income (Model 3). All models use OLS.

A4 Robustness Checks: Observational Data - Russia

- This section uses observational data from the same Russia 2014 post-election survey to examine if actual contact and mobilization by different brokers resulted in respondents being more likely to turnout to vote. This parallel data helps provide support for the experimental results.

- In Table A11, we include a series of predictors capturing whether different brokers mobilized respondents: mobilization in the workplace using a wide definition (Models 1-2), employers simply asking respondents to vote (Models 3-4), party activists simply asking respondents to vote (Models 5-6), and government officials simply asking respondents to vote (Models 3-4). Models 7 and 8 include all predictors. Overall, we see that workplace mobilization outperforms other mobilization by individual activists, even when all predictors and demographic characteristics are included. Model 9 includes an indicator for having been mobilized by any broker.

- Tables A12 and A13 probe deeper into the results on the various broker treatments, using additional characteristics of the workplace and alternate ways to measure respondent income. We find that the strength of the employer as broker treatment is robust to these different specifications, and that mobilization by parties and government officials generally produces smaller effects on actual voter turnout.

- Tables A14 puts the indicators capturing different types of mobilization (by employer, party activists, or government officials) on the left hand side in order to examine whether certain brokers can target different types of voters. The set of predictors is the same as used in Table A11, with the addition of an indicator for whether the respondent supported the United Russia ruling party by voting for it in the December 2011 parliamentary elections. The results do not suggest that either parties or employers are targeting specific categories of voting. Respondents who get asked to mobilize are not more likely to be interested in politics or members of parties. There is suggestive evidence though that both employers and party activists target UR supporters, although the effects are generally weak. Two other patterns stand out. Respondents working for the government are much more likely to be mobilized by their employer, while government officials tend to mobilize members of political parties less frequently.

TABLE A11: WORKPLACE MOBILIZATION AND REPORTED TURNOUT IN RUSSIA

	Outcome: Respondent Voted in Regional Elections in Russia								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Mobilized in Workplace	0.090**	0.095**							
	(0.041)	(0.047)							
Asked by Boss to Turn Out			0.130**	0.134**			0.119**	0.129**	
			(0.060)	(0.054)			(0.056)	(0.051)	
Asked by Party Activist to Turn Out					0.077*	0.052	0.060	0.033	
					(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.052)	
Asked by Government Official to Turn Out							0.072	0.013	
							(0.089)	(0.141)	
Any Individual Asked to Turnout									0.072
									(0.055)
City Size	−0.055***	−0.078***	−0.058***	−0.082***	−0.059***	−0.082***	−0.059***	−0.083***	−0.082***
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Male	−0.071***	−0.064**	−0.073***	−0.066**	−0.073***	−0.067**	−0.072***	−0.066**	−0.066**
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Age (log)	0.257***	0.198***	0.258***	0.201***	0.257***	0.203***	0.258***	0.201***	0.203***
	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Education	0.011	0.019*	0.012	0.019*	0.012	0.019*	0.012	0.019*	0.019*
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Household Economic Situation	0.017	−0.016	0.018	−0.015	0.019	−0.013	0.019	−0.014	−0.013
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Perceptions of Regional Economic Situation	0.055***	0.050**	0.057***	0.052**	0.056***	0.050**	0.056***	0.052**	0.050**
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Employed	−0.018		0.023		0.028		0.024		
	(0.028)		(0.022)		(0.022)		(0.022)		
Government Employee	0.118***	0.105***	0.123***	0.107***	0.125***	0.110***	0.122***	0.107***	0.108***
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Firm Owner		−0.252		−0.279		−0.269		−0.277	−0.270
		(0.233)		(0.225)		(0.221)		(0.225)	(0.223)
Manager		−0.049		−0.058		−0.056		−0.059	−0.057
		(0.044)		(0.044)		(0.045)		(0.043)	(0.044)
Importance of Computer Skills at Work		0.036**		0.039**		0.038**		0.039**	0.038**
		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Changed Work in Past 3 Years (0/1)		−0.087***		−0.084**		−0.085**		−0.084**	−0.084**
		(0.034)		(0.033)		(0.033)		(0.033)	(0.033)
Has Side Job		0.046		0.049		0.049		0.048	0.046
		(0.077)		(0.074)		(0.073)		(0.073)	(0.073)
Interest in Politics	0.074***	0.058***	0.075***	0.059***	0.075***	0.060***	0.075***	0.059***	0.059***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Member of Political Party	0.219**	0.169*	0.219**	0.172*	0.217**	0.173*	0.219***	0.172*	0.172*
	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.085)	(0.093)	(0.085)	(0.093)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.093)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,512	1,958	3,512	1,958	3,512	1,958	3,512	1,958	1,958

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a respondent voted in the 2014 regional elections in Russia. Logistic regression is used for all models; marginal effects are shown. The main predictors of interest are binary indicators capturing whether the respondent experienced any kind of mobilization in the workplace, were asked by their boss, party activist, or a government official to turn out. The odd-numbered columns show the results of models with basic demographic characteristics. The even-numbered columns restrict the sample to only employed individuals and add employment-specific characteristics. All models include region fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on the region level. The indicator Any Individual Asked to Turnout is a binary variable for whether a respondent was mobilized by an employer, party activist, or government official.

TABLE A12: WORKPLACE MOBILIZATION AND REPORTED TURNOUT IN RUSSIA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON EMPLOYERS AS BROKERS

	Outcome Variable: Respondent Voted in Regional Elections in Russia									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Mobilized in Workplace	0.103***	0.086**	0.111	0.090**	0.094**					
	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.071)	(0.039)	(0.043)					
Asked by Boss to Turn Out						0.171***	0.080	0.261***	0.101	0.130**
						(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.092)	(0.075)	(0.061)
City Size		−0.048***	−0.084**	−0.059***	−0.070***		−0.050***	−0.091**	−0.061***	−0.073***
		(0.012)	(0.037)	(0.015)	(0.021)		(0.011)	(0.036)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Male		−0.080***	−0.034	−0.061***	−0.080**		−0.081***	−0.040	−0.062***	−0.081***
		(0.029)	(0.060)	(0.023)	(0.031)		(0.029)	(0.054)	(0.023)	(0.032)
Age (log)		0.262***	0.274**	0.269***	0.205***		0.261***	0.284**	0.269***	0.208***
		(0.041)	(0.112)	(0.037)	(0.058)		(0.040)	(0.116)	(0.037)	(0.058)
Education		0.009	0.017	0.018**	0.018*		0.010	0.018	0.018**	0.018*
		(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.010)		(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Household Economic Situation		0.021**	0.00003		−0.005		0.021**	0.004		−0.004
		(0.009)	(0.043)		(0.018)		(0.009)	(0.040)		(0.017)
Perceptions of Regional Economic Situation		0.065***	0.020		0.041*		0.067***	0.018		0.043*
		(0.020)	(0.042)		(0.024)		(0.021)	(0.041)		(0.023)
Family Income				−0.003					−0.003	
				(0.007)					(0.007)	
Employed		0.005		−0.013			0.045**		0.030	
		(0.027)		(0.028)			(0.021)		(0.020)	
Government Employee		0.102***	0.160***	0.114***	0.078*		0.107***	0.160***	0.118***	0.080*
		(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.031)	(0.042)		(0.035)	(0.050)	(0.032)	(0.043)
Firm Owner					−0.392**					−0.400**
					(0.159)					(0.159)
Manager					−0.066					−0.071
					(0.045)					(0.044)
Importance of Computer Skills at Work					0.036*					0.039**
					(0.018)					(0.019)
Changed Work in Past 3 Years (0/1)					−0.072*					−0.069*
					(0.040)					(0.039)
Has Side Job					0.034					0.038
					(0.088)					(0.084)
Interest in Politics		0.079***	0.051	0.064***	0.060***		0.080***	0.054	0.065***	0.060***
		(0.013)	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.012)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Member of Political Party		0.171*	0.357	0.161*	0.148		0.178**	0.327	0.159*	0.151
		(0.088)	(0.220)	(0.097)	(0.107)		(0.083)	(0.203)	(0.088)	(0.102)
Sector FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,888	2,827	685	3,077	1,788	3,888	2,827	685	3,077	1,788

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a respondent voted in the 2014 regional elections in Russia. Logistic regression is used for all models; marginal effects are shown. The main predictors of interest are binary indicators capturing whether the respondent experienced any kind of mobilization in the workplace ('Mobilized in Workplace' - Columns 1-5) or were asked by their boss to turn out ('Asked by Boss to Turn Out' - Columns 6-10). Columns 1 and 6 are reduced form models. Columns 2 and 7 restrict the sample to only the main sample in the survey, excluding the oversample of employed people. Columns 3 and 8 restrict the sample to only the oversample of employed people; the coefficient on 'Employed' is missing because this entire sample is employed. Columns 4 and 9 use an alternate measure of household wealth: a categorical measure of household income ('Household Income'). Columns 5 and 10 add characteristics on the size of the workplace, whether the respondent worked for the government, and sector fixed effects indicating which area the employee's organization operated in (both public and private sector). All models include region fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on the region level.

TABLE A13: WORKPLACE MOBILIZATION AND REPORTED TURNOUT IN RUSSIA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON PARTY ACTIVISTS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AS BROKERS

	Outcome Variable: Respondent Voted in Regional Elections in Russia									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Asked by Party Activist to Turn Out	0.116***	0.061*	0.178**	0.070	0.052					
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.088)	(0.044)	(0.060)					
Asked by Government Official to Turn Out						0.085	0.088	0.080	0.146	0.016
						(0.090)	(0.078)	(0.195)	(0.093)	(0.148)
City Size		−0.051***	−0.092**	−0.061***	−0.074***		−0.050***	−0.091**	−0.061***	−0.073***
		(0.011)	(0.037)	(0.015)	(0.021)		(0.011)	(0.036)	(0.015)	(0.021)
Male		−0.081***	−0.035	−0.062***	−0.082***		−0.081***	−0.037	−0.061***	−0.083***
		(0.029)	(0.056)	(0.023)	(0.031)		(0.029)	(0.057)	(0.023)	(0.031)
Age (log)		0.261***	0.279**	0.269***	0.210***		0.262***	0.283**	0.270***	0.209***
		(0.041)	(0.118)	(0.038)	(0.059)		(0.040)	(0.117)	(0.037)	(0.059)
Education		0.009	0.017	0.018**	0.018		0.009	0.018	0.018**	0.018
		(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.011)		(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Household Economic Situation		0.022**	0.004		−0.002		0.022**	0.004		−0.003
		(0.009)	(0.042)		(0.017)		(0.009)	(0.042)		(0.017)
Perceptions of Regional Economic Situation		0.066***	0.019		0.041*		0.065***	0.024		0.042*
		(0.020)	(0.040)		(0.023)		(0.020)	(0.041)		(0.023)
Family Income				−0.003					−0.003	
				(0.007)					(0.007)	
Employed		0.048**		0.034*			0.049**		0.035*	
		(0.021)		(0.020)			(0.021)		(0.020)	
Government Employee		0.108***	0.171***	0.120***	0.081*		0.110***	0.168***	0.121***	0.081*
		(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.043)		(0.033)	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.043)
Firm Owner					−0.393**					−0.394**
					(0.163)					(0.163)
Manager					−0.071					−0.070
					(0.044)					(0.044)
Importance of Computer Skills at Work					0.038**					0.038**
					(0.019)					(0.019)
Changed Work in Past 3 Years (0/1)					−0.069*					−0.070*
					(0.040)					(0.039)
Has Side Job					0.039					0.039
					(0.084)					(0.083)
Interest in Politics		0.080***	0.052	0.065***	0.061***		0.081***	0.052	0.065***	0.061***
		(0.012)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.012)	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Member of Political Party		0.176**	0.336*	0.158*	0.151		0.179**	0.338*	0.161*	0.151
		(0.083)	(0.203)	(0.088)	(0.102)		(0.083)	(0.205)	(0.087)	(0.102)
Sector FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,888	2,827	685	3,077	1,788	3,888	2,827	685	3,077	1,788

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a respondent voted in the 2014 regional elections in Russia. Logistic regression is used for all models; marginal effects are shown. The main predictors of interest are binary indicators capturing whether the respondent were asked by a party activist to turn out ('Asked by Party Activist to Turn Out' - Columns 1-5) or were asked by their boss to turn out ('Asked by Government Official to Turn Out' - Columns 6-10). Columns 1and 6 are reduced form models. Columns 2 and 7 restrict the sample to only the main sample in the survey, excluding the oversample of employed people. Columns 3 and 8 restrict the sample to only the oversample of employed people; the coefficient on 'Employed' is missing because this entire sample is employed. Columns 4 and 9 use an alternate measure of household wealth: a categorical measure of household income ('Household Income'). Columns 5 and 10 add characteristics on the size of the workplace, whether the respondent worked for the government, and sector fixed effects indicating which area the employee's organization operated in (both public and private sector). All models include region fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on the region level.

TABLE A14: DETERMINANTS OF VOTER TARGETING IN RUSSIA

	Employer Asked to Turn Out			Activist Asked to Turn Out			Official Asked to Turn Out		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
City Size	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.010**	0.010*	0.010**	0.003	0.001	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Male	−0.002	−0.008	0.001	−0.011**	−0.016*	−0.008	−0.010***	−0.011**	−0.011***
	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Age (log)	0.004	0.015	0.0001	0.005	0.0004	0.002	−0.010	−0.004	−0.009
	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Education	0.0002	−0.0004	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.001	−0.0001	0.0004
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Household Economic Situation	0.003	0.005	0.002	−0.003	−0.006	−0.002	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Perceptions of Regional Economic Situation	−0.005	−0.007	−0.004	0.006	0.017*	0.006	0.004	0.001	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Employed	0.035***		0.035***	−0.001		0.003	−0.011*		−0.010
	(0.008)		(0.009)	(0.012)		(0.014)	(0.006)		(0.007)
Government Employee	0.039***	0.031***	0.038***	0.021	0.013	0.026	0.001	0.002	0.003
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Firm Owner		0.030			−0.086***			−0.023***	
		(0.086)			(0.033)			(0.008)	
Manager		0.018			0.015			0.022	
		(0.026)			(0.024)			(0.015)	
Importance of Computer Skills at Work		−0.003			−0.002			−0.002	
		(0.006)			(0.004)			(0.003)	
Changed Work in Past 3 Years (0/1)		−0.024*			−0.012			−0.002	
		(0.012)			(0.012)			(0.007)	
Has Side Job		0.012			0.022			0.048***	
		(0.020)			(0.018)			(0.018)	
Interest in Politics	0.005	0.010	0.003	0.005	0.006	0.005	−0.00002	0.004	−0.001
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Member of Political Party	−0.003	0.0002	−0.004	0.008	0.015	0.008	−0.016***	−0.021***	−0.017***
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Voted for United Russia in 2011			0.015*			0.012			−0.005
			(0.009)			(0.009)			(0.005)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,778	2,114	3,175	3,778	2,114	3,175	3,778	2,114	3,175
R^2	0.047	0.038	0.047	0.093	0.112	0.102	0.029	0.033	0.037

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcomes analyzed are a binary indicator for whether a respondent was mobilized by their employer (Columns 1-3), a party activity (Columns 4-6), or a government official (Columns 7-9). Columns 1 and 6 are reduced form models. Columns 2 and 7 restrict the sample to only the main sample in the survey, excluding the oversample of employed people. Columns 1, 4 and 7 show the results of models with basic demographic characteristics. Columns 2, 5 and 8 restrict the sample to only employed individuals and add employment-specific characteristics. Columns 3, 6 and 9 include the full sample but add an indicator for whether the respondent voted in the 2011 Duma elections for United Russia (conditional on them voting). All models use linear probability specifications, include region fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on the region level.

A5 Robustness Checks: Observational Data - Venezuela

- We perform the same exercise on the observational data from the Venezuela survey to examine whether the experimental findings match with what we actually see in the real world.

- In Table A15, we include a series of predictors capturing whether different brokers mobilized respondents: mobilization in the workplace using a wide definition (Models 1-2), employers simply asking respondents to vote (Models 3-4), party activists simply asking respondents to vote (Models 5-6), and neighborhood activists simply asking respondents to vote (Models 7-8). Again, in most models the coefficients on different measures of workplace mobilization are largest. We should note that the wording on the different questions is not identical: we asked respondents if their employer 'encouraged' them to vote, or if a party activist 'requested' them to vote. This may explain the results in Model 10 where parties seem to be slightly more effective. Model 11 includes an indicator for whether a respondent was mobilized by any type of brokers.

- Table A16 includes as covariates additional characteristics of the workplace and alternate ways to measure respondent income. We find that the strength of the employer as broker treatment is robust to these different specifications, and that mobilization by parties and local leaders generally produces smaller effects on actual voter turnout.

- Table A17 again puts the indicators capturing different types of mobilization (by employer, party activists, or neighborhood leaders) on the left hand side in order to examine whether certain brokers can target different types of voters, this time in Venezuela. Once more, the results do not suggest that either parties or employers have any special advantages in targeting certain categories of voters, nor do they place priorities. Being interested in politics, a member of a political party, or a supporter of the ruling coalition does not make a respondent more likely to be mobilized by any of the three actors. Similar to the Russian results, respondents working for the government are much more likely to be mobilized by their employer, and also by a party activist.

TABLE A15: WORKPLACE MOBILIZATION AND REPORTED TURNOUT IN VENEZUELA

	Outcome Variable: Respondent Voted in National Parliamentary Elections in Venezuela										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Mobilized in Workplace	0.081**	0.051*									
	(0.034)	(0.028)									
Encouraged by Boss to Turn Out			0.079**	0.057**					0.075**	0.048*	
			(0.031)	(0.028)					(0.031)	(0.025)	
Requested by Party Activist to Turn Out					0.044	0.063***			0.054**	0.078***	
					(0.032)	(0.023)			(0.025)	(0.022)	
Requested by Neighborhood Leader to Turn Out							−0.021	−0.018	−0.052*	−0.067**	
							(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.029)	
Any Individual Asked to Turnout											0.022
											(0.038)
City Size	−0.003	−0.006	−0.002	−0.004	−0.001	−0.003	−0.002	−0.004	−0.001	−0.003	−0.002
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Household Income	0.010	0.014	0.009	0.013	0.008	0.014	0.009	0.014	0.008	0.014	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Male	−0.020	−0.035	−0.019	−0.033	−0.017	−0.034	−0.015	−0.032	−0.017	−0.034	−0.015
	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.036)
Age (log)	0.125***	0.124**	0.128**	0.131**	0.122**	0.124**	0.117**	0.123**	0.123**	0.125**	0.121**
	(0.048)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.052)
Education	0.036**	0.038*	0.034**	0.037*	0.036**	0.037*	0.035**	0.040*	0.034**	0.035**	0.036**
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Employed	−0.035		−0.025		0.0003		0.002		−0.025		−0.005
	(0.047)		(0.044)		(0.039)		(0.040)		(0.044)		(0.045)
Government Employee	−0.0001	−0.006	−0.006	−0.013	0.009	−0.010	0.014	0.001	−0.012	−0.020	0.013
	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Firm Size		−0.007		−0.007		−0.006		−0.007		−0.008	
		(0.014)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.016)	
Firm Owner		−0.049		−0.047		−0.071		−0.057		−0.069	
		(0.110)		(0.109)		(0.117)		(0.115)		(0.115)	
Manager		−0.058*		−0.062**		−0.063*		−0.067**		−0.070**	
		(0.031)		(0.031)		(0.034)		(0.033)		(0.031)	
Importance of Computer Skills at Work		−0.011		−0.011		−0.011		−0.010		−0.010	
		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.013)	
Member of Political Party		0.086***		0.088***		0.089***		0.092***		0.081***	
		(0.031)		(0.029)		(0.029)		(0.028)		(0.031)	
Receives State Benefits		0.032		0.022		0.027		0.030		0.015	
		(0.030)		(0.036)		(0.037)		(0.038)		(0.038)	
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,211	668	1,220	676	1,222	681	1,224	681	1,213	676	1,221

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a respondent voted in the 2015 national parliamentary elections in Venezuela. Logistic regression is used for all models; marginal effects are shown. The main predictors of interest are binary indicators capturing whether the respondent mobilized in the workplace or was asked by their employer or a party activist to turn out. The odd-numbered columns show the results of models with basic demographic characteristics. The even-numbered columns restrict the sample to only employed individuals and add employment-specific characteristics. All models include region fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on the region level. The indicator Any Individual Asked to Turnout is a binary variable for whether a respondent was mobilized by an employer, party activist, or neighbhorhood leader.

TABLE A16: WORKPLACE MOBILIZATION AND REPORTED TURNOUT IN VENEZUELA: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

	Outcome Variable: Respondent Voted in National Parliamentary Elections in Venezuela									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Encouraged by Boss to Turn Out	0.074***	0.021**					0.070***	0.075**	0.048*	0.018**
	(0.014)	(0.008)					(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.007)
Requested by Party Activist to Turn Out			0.036	0.020***			0.043	0.054**	0.078***	0.025***
			(0.032)	(0.007)			(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.007)
Requested by Neighborhood Leader to Turn Out					−0.029	−0.007	−0.054*	−0.052*	−0.067**	−0.024**
					(0.034)	(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.010)
City Size		−0.001		−0.001		−0.001		−0.001	−0.003	−0.001
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.004)
Household Income		0.004		0.004		0.004		0.008	0.014	0.004
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.003)
Male		−0.015		−0.013		−0.013		−0.017	−0.034	−0.014
		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.011)		(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.010)
Age (log)		0.039*		0.038*		0.037*		0.123**	0.125**	0.037*
		(0.021)		(0.020)		(0.021)		(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.020)
Education		0.009		0.009		0.010		0.034**	0.035**	0.009
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.006)
Employed								−0.025		
								(0.044)		
Government Employee		−0.004		−0.003		0.0002		−0.012	−0.020	−0.006
		(0.007)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.008)
Firm Size		−0.003		−0.003		−0.003			−0.008	−0.004
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)			(0.016)	(0.004)
Firm Owner		−0.019		−0.027		−0.024			−0.069	−0.026
		(0.040)		(0.044)		(0.042)			(0.115)	(0.043)
Manager		−0.022		−0.024		−0.023			−0.070**	−0.027
		(0.017)		(0.019)		(0.019)			(0.031)	(0.018)
Importance of Computer Skills at Work		−0.004		−0.004		−0.003			−0.010	−0.003
		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)			(0.013)	(0.005)
Member of Political Party		0.029***		0.028***		0.030***			0.081***	0.026***
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)			(0.031)	(0.008)
Receives State Benefits		0.006		0.008		0.009			0.015	0.003
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.014)			(0.038)	(0.014)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,326	675	1,329	680	1,331	680	1,319	1,213	676	675

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether a respondent voted in the 2015 national parliamentary elections in Venezuela. Logistic regression is used for all models; marginal effects are shown. The main predictors of interest are binary indicators capturing whether the respondent were asked by their employer, a party activist, or a neighborhood leader to turn out. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 are reduced form models. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 10 add characteristics on the size of the workplace, whether the respondent worked for the government, and sector fixed effects indicating which area the employee's organization operated in (both public and private sector). Column 8 includes basic demographic characteristics, while Column 9 restricts the sample to only employed individuals and add an indicator for whether or not the respondent is a government employee. Column 10 adds sector fixed effects. All models include region fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on the region level.

TABLE A17: DETERMINANTS OF VOTER TARGETING IN VENEZUELA

	Employer Asked to Turn Out			Activist Asked to Turn Out			Leader Asked to Turn Out		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
City Size	−0.007*	−0.011	−0.008	−0.010	−0.011	−0.010	−0.008	−0.012	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Household Income	0.003	0.007	0.004	0.008	−0.0003	0.007	0.001	0.004	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Male	0.012	0.019	0.014	0.035*	0.050*	0.050***	−0.008	0.027	0.019
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Age (log)	−0.090*	−0.100*	−0.105**	−0.025	−0.129	−0.059	−0.060	−0.146***	−0.097
	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.087)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.063)
Education	0.001	0.017	0.003	−0.010	0.021	−0.025	−0.021	0.025	−0.041
	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.045)
Employed	0.310***		0.330***	0.030		0.070***	0.025		0.028
	(0.085)		(0.092)	(0.021)		(0.026)	(0.029)		(0.023)
Government Employee	0.239***	0.233***	0.278***	0.093**	0.087*	0.112**	−0.012	0.038	0.029
	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.051)
Firm Size		0.004			0.011			−0.030	
		(0.013)			(0.017)			(0.022)	
Firm Owner		−0.109			0.079			−0.035	
		(0.090)			(0.152)			(0.074)	
Manager		−0.016			0.005			−0.046	
		(0.025)			(0.037)			(0.056)	
Importance of Computer Skills at Work		−0.008			0.015			0.018	
		(0.030)			(0.020)			(0.020)	
Member of Political Party		0.111			0.118			−0.037	
		(0.090)			(0.091)			(0.055)	
Receives State Benefits		0.102			0.026			−0.064	
		(0.066)			(0.076)			(0.044)	
Voted for Government			−0.007			−0.029			−0.051
			(0.026)			(0.081)			(0.047)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	1,281	715	1,036	1,283	721	1,039	1,285	721	1,042
R^2	0.372	0.281	0.407	0.047	0.070	0.061	0.059	0.086	0.067

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcomes analyzed are a binary indicator for whether a respondent was mobilized by their employer (Columns 1-3), a party activity (Columns 4-6), or a neighborhood leader (Columns 7-9). Columns 1 and 6 are reduced form models. Columns 2 and 7 restrict the sample to only the main sample in the survey, excluding the oversample of employed people. Columns 1, 4 and 7 show the results of models with basic demographic characteristics. Columns 2, 5 and 8 restrict the sample to only employed individuals and add employment-specific characteristics. Columns 3, 6 and 9 include the full sample but add an indicator for whether the respondent voted for the ruling party in the last parliamentary election (conditional on them voting). All models use linear probability specifications, include region fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered on the region level.

A6 Robustness Checks: Mechanisms

- In the main text, we tested mechanisms by comparing the employer as broker treatment to the party as broker treatment (excluding the government official treatment). In Table A18, we bring the government official back into the reference group. Thus, we compare employer effectiveness to a reference category of both party activists and government officials. As is standard for factorial designs, we collapse the inducement arms to just compare brokers.

- The results suggest again that different characteristics of the workplace drive the relative effectiveness of employers. We see that respondents that are worried about losing their job and finding a new one, as well as dependent on benefits are more likely to say they would turn out based on an appeal from their employer. This is evidence of the leverage mechanism. We also find that the length of time spent at a firm as well as the frequency of socializing with coworkers also predicts the effectiveness of employer brokers. We interpret these findings as confirmatory evidence that both leverage and monitoring matter for how well brokers can get out the vote.

- In Table A19, we show robustness checks for the results shown in Table 3 that use ordered logit specifications rather than OLS. In the main paper, we opted to show linear probability results to ease interpretation as well as to create the simple predicted probability plots in Figure 3. But the outcome is an ordinal categorical variable, and a logistic modelling approach might be appropriate. Table A19 shows that our results are robust to using ordinal logit. We include information on demographics and cluster standard errors on region in all models, showing only the interaction terms just as in the main paper.

- Finally in Table A20, we perform the same interaction exercise to investigate mechanisms in Venezuela. Unfortunately, our data on workplace characteristics is much sparser. First, we interact the employer treatment with a binary measure for whether a respondent received any public assistance from the government. This wording is different from the Russian survey, where we asked about employer-provided benefits which are very common legacy from the Soviet period. In case of the Venezuela, the majority of respondents instead receive such in-kind benefits from the state. The point estimate on the interaction is positive and substantively large, but not statistically significant, which we attribute to the small sample size. A similar pattern is evident through the interaction with the employer treatment and an indicator for whether a respondent worked for the government. The effect is positive and large,

but again noisily estimated. We leave a further investigation of workplace characteristics to future surveys.

TABLE A18: SUBGROUP ANALYSIS FOR EMPLOYER VERSUS BOTH TREATMENTS
RUSSIA SURVEY EXPERIMENT

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote						
	Leverage				Monitoring		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Employer Treatment * Chance of Job Loss	0.266						
	(0.191)						
Employer Treatment * Hard to Find a New Job		0.098***					
		(0.023)					
Employer Treatment * Receives Benefits			0.046				
			(0.032)				
Employer Treatment * Employed in Government				0.140*			
				(0.078)			
Employer Treatment * Knows Supervisor Well					0.033		
					(0.058)		
Employer Treatment * Number of Years Employed						0.010**	
						(0.004)	
Employer Treatment * Socializes with Coworkers							0.130*
							(0.073)
Constituent Terms	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,788	2,273	2,557	2,675	2,320	2,675	2,025

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A19: EXAMINING MECHANISMS: RUSSIA SURVEY EXPERIMENT, ORDINAL LOGIT

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote						
	Leverage				Monitoring		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Employer Treatment * Chance of Job Loss	0.586**						
	(0.240)						
Employer Treatment * Hard to Find a New Job		0.263***					
		(0.057)					
Employer Treatment * Receives Benefits			0.108**				
			(0.052)				
Employer Treatment * Employed in Government				0.266**			
				(0.105)			
Employer Treatment * Knows Supervisor Well					0.166*		
					(0.090)		
Employer Treatment * Number of Years Employed						0.018**	
						(0.009)	
Employer Treatment * Socializes with Coworkers							0.094
							(0.114)
Constituent Terms	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,209	1,532	1,724	1,806	1,567	1,806	1,392

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the willingness to turnout outcome (five-point scale) from the survey experiment. The same includes only respondents who received the Employer or Political Party broker treatment. The Employer Treatment collapses the data along the inducement treatment arm of the factorial design used in the experiment. The sample is limited to only those who are employed. Chance of Job Loss measures the probability a respondent believes they will lose their job in the next 12 months. Hard to Find a New Job uses a five-point scale to capture the likelihood that if they were to lose their job, a respondent could find a similar one; higher values indicate more difficulty. Receives Benefits captures the number of in-kind benefits (health care, education, transportation subsidies, etc.) respondents received from their employer. Higher values on the three-point scale used in Knows Your Supervisor Well indicate better familiarity withe one's boss. Number of Years Employed measures the length of time at one's work. Socializes with Coworkers captures whether respondents spend time with colleagues outside of work. All models include the constituent terms and basic demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, size of settlement, and an indicator for government employment). Models are estimated via ordered logit.

TABLE A20: SUBGROUP ANALYSIS FOR EMPLOYER VERSUS PARTY TREATMENTS
VENEZUELA SURVEY EXPERIMENT

	Outcome: Respondent Would Vote	
	(1)	(2)
Employer Treatment * Receives State Benefits	0.212	
	(0.295)	
Employer Treatment * Employed in Government		0.120
		(0.156)
Constituent Terms	Yes	Yes
Demographics	Yes	Yes
Observations	440	480

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable is the willingness to turnout outcome (five-point scale) from the survey experiment. The same includes only respondents who received the Employer or Political Party broker treatment. The Employer Treatment collapses the data along the inducement treatment arm of the factorial design used in the experiment. The sample is limited to only those who are employed. Receives State Benefits is a binary indicator for whether a respondent receives any government assistance through an official state program. All models include the constituent terms and basic demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, size of settlement, and an indicator for government employment). Models are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered on region.

A7 Survey Design

Russia Survey

- The survey we conducted in Russia consisted of 4200 face-to-face interviews. It was carried out by the Levada Market Research in October 2014 in 20 regions, three weeks after regional elections had been held on September 14, 2014. Fifteen regions had held gubernatorial elections: Astrakhan, Bashkortorstan, Chelyabinsk, Ivanov, Kirov, Krasnoyarsk, Kursk, Nizhegorod, Novosibirsk, Orenburg, Samara, Tyumen, Udmurtia Republic, Vologod, and Voronezh. Four regions had held legislative elections: Moscow, Tatarstan, Tula, and Volgograd. One region, Altai Krai, had held both simultaneously. We selected these regions out of the 42 that had held regional elections using a scale that would achieve representativeness on several indicators: expected level of political competition, experience with clientelist behavior in the past (based on media and crowd-sourced reports), and the percentage of the population living in monogorods (a primary objective of study for our project). We constructed a base sample of 3,360 respondents that first included a representative sample of 500 respondents from four regions. Representativeness in the four regions (Chelyabinsk, Nizhegorod, Samara, and Volgograd) was achieved using quotas based on census data. For the remaining 16 regions, we randomly selected 85 respondents.

- The motivation for the survey primarily stemmed from a parallel project on why some employers engage in workplace mobilization and others do not. In order to increase statistical power for those regressions, we opted to add an oversample of employed respondents and a second oversample of those employed in certain economic sectors (heavy industry, oil/gas extraction, and mining) where our qualitative fieldwork and previous surveys had suggested that workplace mobilization was most common. To do so we surveyed an additional 50 qualifying employed respondents in the four regions where we drew a representative sample and an additional 40 qualifying employed respondents from each region where we randomly selected 85 individuals. The total oversample was 840 employed respondents, of which no fewer than 240 individuals were required to work in the selected sectors.

Venezuela Survey

- The survey we conducted in Venezuela was carried out by Consultores 21 in January 2016 following the national parliamentary elections held in December 2015. The survey included responses from 1000 face-to-face interviews in nine regions of

the country (Capital, Central, Llanera, Center Western, Zuliana, Andean, Northeastern I, Northeastern II, and Guayana). We first used a stratified sampling procedure based on geography and habitation to divided the country into 36 strata. Within each stratum, population centers (metropolitan areas, major cities or villages/hamlets) were randomly selected proportional to the weight of each population center. Then 173 sample points were then randomly selected from a list of sampling points within these areas. Respondents were chosen using the random route system through appropriate values of sex and age quotas. In addition, we oversampled 400 employed respondents distributed proportionally from the sample points. Thus, our sample included 1400 respondents in all.

- The wordings on the two surveys are very similar, except that in the Venezuela survey respondents were not given the initial primer: "Imagine that during the next election campaign" due to a translation error. This difference, though unfortunate, should only differentially affect cross-survey comparisons of average turnout propensity, and not of individual treatment effects within the surveys.

Randomization Checks

- For each survey, we conducted the randomization for the survey experiments using the randbetween command through MicrosoftExcel, then creating inserts with the experiments through a mail merge function. Both the Russian and Venezuelan survey firms recorded the number of the insert, the treatment indicator, and the outcomes in the prepared data. We able to validate that the insert numbers recorded by the firms matched up to the master Excel spreadsheet we created for the randomization.

- In the case of the Venezuelan survey, there is slight differences in the number of individuals assigned to different treatment groups. This was not intentional and solely the result of the randomization procedure. To double-check, we show several tests. First, in Appendix Table A2 (above), we show that the assignment to treatment is not correlated with any of the individual-level predictors recorded in the survey. Next, we confirm that the proportions of individuals assigned to each group are identical to the master Excel sheet. Finally, in Appendix Table A21, we show three different Bartels Rank Tests for treatment indicators for both surveys: whether the vector is nonrandom, displays trend patterns, or is prone to systematic oscillation. The null hypothesis for all three tests is randomness, and we see by the p-values that in no case can we reject this null hypothesis. These three pieces of evidence help confirm to us that the randomization was conducted properly.

TABLE A21: BARTELS RANK TESTS OF RANDOMIZATION

	Bartels Rank Test	p-value
Russia Survey		
	Nonrandomness	0.96
	Trend	0.48
	Systematic oscillation	0.52
Venezuela Survey		
	Nonrandomness	0.43
	Trend	0.21
	Systematic oscillation	0.99

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 This table presents the p-values of three randomization tests from Bartels Rank Tests on the treatment indicator for the Russian and Venezuela surveys. The rows indicate whether the null hypothesis of randomness is tested against a hypothesis of Nonrandomness, Trend, or Systematic Oscillation.

A8 Framing Experiment Original Wordings

A8.1 Russian Survey

Представьте, что во время какои-то из предстоящих избирательных кампании в вашем регионе к вам обратится (ваш работодатель / активист / агитатор политической партии или конкретного кандидата / государственный служащий, не являющийся вашим работодателем) и (попросит вас проголосовать / предложит вам подарок, деньги или вознаграждение, если вы поидете на выборы / намекнет, что если вы не пойдете голосовать, то это будет иметь негативные последствия для вас лично / скажет, что ваше предприятие или организация пострадает, если явка сотрудников будет низкой). Насколько вероятно, что вы после этого проголосуете на выборах? (отметьте один ответ)

01. Определенно, проголосую

02. Скорее, проголосую

03. Может быть, проголосую, а может быть и нет

04. Скорее, не стану голосовать

05. Определенно, не стану голосовать[1]

09. Затрудняюсь ответить

[1]The turnout propensity scale in the Russia experiment used "I will absolutely not vote" as the top value on the five-point scale. For ease of interpretation, we reversed the scale in analyses.

A8.2 Venezuelan Survey

(Si su jefe / Si un activista político / Si una persona de su urbanización/barrio que tenga mucha influencia) (le pide que vaya a votar. / le ofrece un regalo, dinero o un premio si usted va a votar. / le dice que habrá consecuencias negativas para usted si no vota. / sugiere que el sitio donde usted trabaja puede sufrir consecuencias negativas si los empleados no van a votar.)

Eso haría que usted (LEA LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA):

01. Seguramente no vote
02. A lo mejor no vote
03. Quizá vote o quizá no vote
04. A lo mejor vote
05. Seguramente vote
99. Ns-nc

A9 Summary Statistics and Variable Descriptions

TABLE A22: RUSSIA SURVEY

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Mobilized in Workplace	4,204	0.34	0.47	0	0	1	1
Mobilized in Workplace (Only Employed)	2,692	0.52	0.50	0	0	1	1
Asked by Boss to Turn Out	4,204	0.03	0.17	0	0	0	1
Asked by Boss to Turn Out (Only Employed)	2,692	0.05	0.21	0	0	0	1
Asked by Party Official to Turn Out	4,204	0.05	0.21	0	0	0	1
Asked by Party Official to Turn Out (Only Employed)	2,692	0.05	0.22	0	0	0	1
Asked by Gov. Official to Turn Out	4,204	0.02	0.13	0	0	0	1
Asked by Gov. Official to Turn Out (Only Employed)	2,692	0.02	0.13	0	0	0	1
Asked by Boss to Turn Out	4,204	0.03	0.17	0	0	0	1
Asked by Party Official to Turn Out	4,204	0.05	0.21	0	0	0	1
Asked by Gov. Official to Turn Out	4,204	0.02	0.13	0	0	0	1
City Size	4,204	2.76	1.24	1	2	4	5
Household Economic Situation	3,921	3.03	0.72	1.00	3.00	3.00	5.00
Change in Household Economic Situation	4,058	2.96	0.74	1.00	3.00	3.00	5.00
Household Income	3,321	5.93	2.54	1.00	4.00	8.00	14.00
Male	4,204	0.45	0.50	0	0	1	1
Age (log)	4,204	3.71	0.39	2.89	3.40	4.03	4.50
Education	4,204	5.55	2.02	1	4	8	8
Employed	4,204	0.64	0.48	0	0	1	1
Government Employee	2,675	0.30	0.46	0	0	1.00	1.00
Organization Size	2,556	2.73	1.33	1.00	2.00	4.00	5.00
Firm Owner	2,537	0.05	0.21	0	0	0	1.00
Manager	2,537	0.08	0.27	0	0	0	1.00
Importance of Computer Skills at Work	2,386	2.34	1.25	1.00	1.00	4.00	4.00
Changed Work in Past 3 Years (0/1)	2,406	0.20	0.40	0	0	0	1.00
Has Side Job	2,692	0.07	0.25	0	0	0	1.00
Interest in Politics	4,192	2.75	0.97	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00
Member of Political Party	4,204	1.03	0.20	1	1	1	3
Chance of Job Loss	1,799	0.24	0.28	0	0	0.50	1.00
Hard to Find a New Job	2,289	2.83	1.15	1.00	2.00	4.00	5.00
Receives Benefits	2,570	0.97	1.30	0	0	2.00	6.00
Knows Supervisor Well	2,333	1.66	0.84	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00
Number of Years Employed	2,692	8.07	8.01	0.50	2.00	10	50
Socializes with Coworkers	2,038	0.68	0.73	0	0	1.00	2.00

TABLE A23: VENEZUELA SURVEY

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Encouraged by Boss to Turn Out	1,390	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Requested by Party Activist to Turn Out	1,393	0.26	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Requested by Neighborhood Leader to Turn Out	1,395	0.30	0.46	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
City Size	1,400	4.53	2.34	1	2	7	7
Household Income	1,290	3.98	1.89	1.00	3.00	5.00	9.00
Male	1,400	0.51	0.50	0	0	1	1
Age (log)	1,400	3.57	0.32	2.89	3.33	3.81	4.42
Education	1,400	3.42	0.89	1	3	4	5
Employed	1,400	0.55	0.50	0	0	1	1
Government Employee	1,400	0.19	0.40	0	0	0	1
Organization Size	763	2.14	1.15	1.00	1.00	3.00	5.00
Respondent is Firm Owner	767	0.03	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Respondent is Firm Manager	767	0.26	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.00
Importance of Computer Skills at Work	764	1.86	1.12	1.00	1.00	3.00	4.00
Member of Political Party	1,400	0.16	0.37	0	0	0	1
Receives State Benefits	1,398	0.18	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00

TABLE A24: RUSSIA SURVEY - DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Variable	Description
Mobilized in Workplace	Binary indicator for whether respondent experienced any of the following activities at their workplace prior to elections: campaign posters, management discussing elections with employees, the distribution of agitation materials, management providing transportation to the polls, management asking employees to agitate, or management publicly endorsing a candidate.
Asked by Boss to Turn Out	Binary indicator for whether respondent was asked by their employer to vote in upcoming election.
Asked by Party Official to Turn Out	Binary indicator for whether respondent was asked by a party official to vote in upcoming election.
Asked by Government Official to Turn Out	Binary indicator for whether respondent was asked by a government official to vote in upcoming election.
City Size	Five-point scale increasing in the size of the settlement where the respondent lives.
Household Economic Situation	Five-point scale increasing in self-reported ease of paying for household expenses.
Change in Household Economic Situation	Five-point scale marking self-reported recent change over time in the ease of paying for household expenses.
Household Income	Ten-point scale at 10,000 ruble intervals denoting total household income.
Male	Binary indicator for gender.
Age (log)	Years of age (logged).
Education	Eight-point scale increasing in the level of education acquired by the respondent.
Employed	Binary indicator for whether respondent was employed at time of survey.
Government Employee	Binary indicator for whether respondent worked for the government.
Organization Size	Five-point scale increasing in the number of employees working at the organization where the employer was employed.
Firm Owner	Binary indicator for whether respondent was the owner of the establishment where they worked.
Manager	Binary indicator for whether respondent was engaged in the management of the establishment where they worked.
Importance of Computer Skills at Work	Four-point scale increasing in the importance of computers in the respondent's work.
Changed Work in Past 3 Years	Binary indicator for whether respondent had changed jobs in the previous three years.
Has Side Job	Binary indicator for whether respondent held a second job in addition to their primary employment.
Interest in Politics	Four-point scale increasing in the level of interest reporting in following news about politics in the country.
Member of Political Party	Binary indicator for whether respondent is a member of any political party.

TABLE A24: RUSSIA SURVEY - DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Variable	Description
Chance of Job Loss	Scale from 0.0 to 1.0 measuring the probability that a respondent will lose their job in the next 12 months.
Hard to Find a New Job	Five-point scale measuring the difficulty of finding a new job given a sudden firing.
Receives Benefits	The number of benefits a respondent receives from their employer: medical insurance, children's education, vacation packages, pensions, transportation, etc.
Knows Supervisor Well	Three-point scale measuring how well a respondent knows his or her subordinate.
Number of Years Employed	Number of years a respondent has been employed in their current job.
Socializes with Coworkers	Three-point scale indicating whether respondent spends time with coworkers outside of work more than once a week, less than once a week, or never.

TABLE A25: VENEZUELA SURVEY - DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Variable	Description
Encouraged by Boss to Turn Out	Binary indicator for whether respondent was encouraged by their employer to vote in upcoming election.
Requested by Party Official to Turn Out	Binary indicator for whether respondent was requested by a party official to vote in upcoming election.
Requested by Neighborhood Leader to Turn Out	Binary indicator for whether respondent was asked by a neighborhood leader to vote in upcoming election.
City Size	Seven-point scale increasing in the size of the settlement where the respondent lives.
Household Income	Nine-point scale at 5,000 bolivar intervals denoting total household income.
Male	Binary indicator for gender.
Age (log)	Years of age (logged).
Education	Five-point scale increasing in the level of education acquired by the respondent.
Employed	Binary indicator for whether respondent was employed at time of survey.
Government Employee	Binary indicator for whether respondent worked for the government.
Organization Size	Five-point scale increasing in the number of employees working at the organization where the employer was employed.
Firm Owner	Binary indicator for whether respondent was the owner of the establishment where they worked.
Manager	Binary indicator for whether respondent was engaged in the management of the establishment where they worked.
Importance of Computer Skills at Work	Four-point scale increasing in the importance of computers in the respondent's work.
Member of Political Party	Binary indicator for whether respondent is a member of any political party.
Receives State Benefits	Binary indicator for whether respondent received any public assistance from the government.

FIGURE A3: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO FRAMING EXPERIMENT



This picture is a histogram of the number of respondents who answered each of the options on the 1-5 scale for the main framing experiment on each survey.