SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

VOTING FOR VICTORS
Why Violent Actors Win Postwar Elections

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Supplementary Material

The supplementary material contains the following additional results, summary statistics, and qualitative materials for "Voting for Victors: Why Violent Actors Win Postwar Elections":

- S1 presents the list of sources for the election data.

- Table A.1 provides summary statistics for the cross-national variables.

- Table A.2 shows the military strength and vote share results when boycotted elections are excluded.

- Table A.3 uses the alternative government and opposition electoral coercion variables instead of the free and fair election measure.

- Table A.4 disaggregates the findings by ethnic and non-ethnic wars.

- Table A.5 provides alternative operationalizations of belligerents' wartime atrocities.

- Table A.6 tests the robustness of the results to a wild bootstrap to estimate clustered standard errors.

- Figure A.1 shows the relationship between military strength and vote share by belligerent.

- Figure A.2 uses the Post-Civil War Order Data measures of military strength.

- Figure A.3 illustrates the relationship between ARENA atrocities and vote share in El Salvador.

- Figure A.4 shows how FMLN atrocities correlate with the FMLN vote share in El Salvador.

- Figure A.5 presents the FMLN share of atrocities and vote share in El Salvador.

- Figure A.6 illustrates coerced voting in El Salvador using blank votes.

- Figure A.7 shows coerced voting in El Salvador using null and blank votes.

- Figure A.8 evaluates non-linearity in the relationship between electoral coercion and military strength.

- Figure A.9 shows the relationship between military and election outcomes in less clean and cleaner elections.

- Figure A.10 depicts an ARENA campagin ad spinning FMLN's violent past.

- Figure A.11 shows an ARENA campagin ad blaming wartime violence on the FMLN.

- Figure A.12 provides an ARENA campaign ad claiming credit for peace.

- Figure A.13 presents an ARENA ad undermining FMLN's ownership of the security issue.

- Figure A.14 shows a FMLN campaign ad spinning FMLN in a positive light.

S1. List of Election Sources

Information about electoral vote shares was collected from various print and electronic sources including Birch 2003, Grotz, Hartmann, and Nohlen 2001, Nohlen 2005a, b, Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut 1999, Nohlen and Stöver 2010, Political Handbook of the World 1999, African Elections Database, Political Database of the Americas, and Parties and Elections in Europe. I also consulted Keesing's Record of World Events; Lexis-Nexis Academic; Pro-Quest Historical Newspaper Databases; CIA World Factbook; US State Department Reports; Library of Congress Country Reports; BBC Country Profiles, Latin American Election Statistics; and Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profiles.

Table A.1. Summary Statistics, Civil War Successor Party Dataset

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Vote Share	25.76	25.77	0	88.14	127
Military strength	2.86	1.54	0	6	129
Belligerent's atrocities	0.58	0.49	0	1	130
Adversary's atrocities	0.60	0.49	0	1	130
Relative atrocities	2.57	0.91	1	4	130
Free and fair elections	0.41	0.22	0.07	0.92	130
UN	0.52	0.50	0	1	130
Power-sharing	0.18	0.39	0	1	130
Number of vetoes	2.28	0.61	2	4	129
Incompatibility	1.72	0.45	1	2	130
War duration	7.36	10.76	0	50	129
Incumbent electoral coercion (V-Dem)	-0.45	1.04	-2.57	1.91	130
Incumbent electoral coercion (Nelda)	0.22	0.41	0	1	110
Opposition electoral coercion (V-Dem)	-0.86	1.17	-3.16	1.69	130
Opposition electoral coercion (Nelda)	0.50	0.50	0	1	108
Rebel governance	0.46	0.50	0	1	69
Rebel cohesion	1.17	0.63	0	2	65
Rebel finances	0.70	0.46	0	1	70
Popular support	0.94	0.71	0	2	124

Table A.2 tests whether military strength is robustly predictive of vote share when excluding cases in which belligerent successor parties boycotted the elections. As model 1 shows, relative military strength remains a robust predictor even after the exclusion of these cases.

Table A.2. Robustness Check, Boycotted Elections Excluded

| | (1) |
	Vote share
Military strength	9.87***
	(1.08)
Belligerent's atrocities	-1.06
	(4.57)
Free and fair elections	-12.22
	(7.89)
UN	-2.93
	(4.13)
Power-sharing	-0.68
	(5.08)
Number of vetoes	0.42
	(2.05)
Incompatibility	7.67*
	(3.29)
War duration	-0.11
	(0.19)
Constant	-7.85
	(10.99)
Observations	118

Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors account for country clustering.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.3 looks separately at whether government electoral coercion can account for incumbent successor-party performance and rebel electoral coercion can explain rebel party vote share, using variables from the V-Dem and NELDA projects (Hyde and Marinov 2012, Lindberg et al. 2014). Note that the V-Dem measures – *v2elintim* and *v2elpeace* – are decreasing in electoral intimidation and violence whereas the NELDA ones – nelda15 and nelda33 – are increasing in electoral intimidation and violence. While the signs on the coefficients are consistent with the expectations, models 1-4 confirm the null results for electoral coercion found in Tables 2-4.

Table A.3. Government and Opposition Electoral Coercion and Vote Shares

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Incumbent Vote share	Incumbent Vote share	Rebel Vote share	Rebel Vote share
Incumbent Electoral Coercion (V-Dem)	-5.05 (3.21)			
Incumbent Electoral Coercion (NELDA)		9.68 (12.88)		
Opposition Electoral Coercion (V-Dem)			-0.76 (2.21)	
Opposition Electoral Coercion (NELDA)				8.04 (5.82)
UN	-10.70 (8.42)	-12.79 (9.19)	-2.61 (6.35)	-2.26 (7.17)
Power-sharing	3.99 (12.08)	9.37 (15.48)	5.01 (8.23)	-1.60 (7.29)
Number of vetoes	4.66 (6.47)	0.51 (6.15)	-8.72* (4.46)	-5.34 (3.48)
Incompatibility	1.94 (6.17)	7.71 (7.09)	12.45** (5.51)	18.26** (5.38)
War duration	-0.03 (0.23)	-0.15 (0.24)	-0.45* (0.25)	-0.43 (0.29)
Constant	23.73 (17.90)	25.07 (16.78)	18.99 (12.92)	-3.28** (10.18)
Observations	56	47	70	58

Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors account for country clustering.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.4 tests whether the relationship between military outcomes and electoral performance holds across ethnic and nonethnic wars, as anticipated by the theory. I follow Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010 and classify conflicts based on the aims of the armed organizations, their recruitment and their alliance structures. I define ethnic wars as those seeking ethnic aims, which predominantly recruit fighters among their leaders' own ethnic group and which forge alliances on the basis of ethnic affiliation.

The results in models 1 and 2 suggest that military outcomes drive voting patterns across ethnic and non-ethnic wars. The findings also casts doubt on the prediction that citizens vote for co-ethnics irrespective of their atrocities, but that in non-ethnically divided societies, victims punish perpetrators as anticipated by the vengeful voting thesis. The results indicate that the lack of a relationship between atrocities and ballots is not being driven by identity conflicts.

Table A.4. Correlates of Successor Party Success in Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Wars

	(1)	(2)
	Vote share (Non-Ethnic Wars)	Vote share (Ethnic Wars)
Military strength	6.88***	10.88***
	(1.65)	(1.25)
Belligerent's atrocities	-5.85	-0.17
	(13.94)	(4.13)
Free and fair elections	11.80	-13.14
	(10.82)	(8.39)
UN	4.92	-10.12
	(9.72)	(5.60)
Power-sharing	-14.46	6.85
	(13.20)	(6.13)
Number of vetoes	1.51	-5.06
	(3.19)	(2.90)
Incompatibility	20.29	9.15*
	(7.76)	(4.31)
War duration	-0.11	-0.28
	(1.02)	(0.16)
Constant	-40.66	3.22
	(14.57)	(11.52)
Observations	29	97

Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors account for country clustering.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.5 shows that the results presented in Table 2, model 6 are robust to alternative measures of atrocities – adversary's atrocities and relative atrocities. In Table A.5, models 1 and 2, atrocities remain an insignificant predictor of successor party vote share.

A.5. Alternative Operationalizations of Atrocities (Adversary's Atrocities & Relative Atrocities)

	(1) Vote share	(2) Vote share
Military strength	9.86***	9.89***
	(1.02)	(1.03)
Adversary's atrocities	4.97	
	(4.53)	
Relative atrocities		-2.05
		(2.20)
Free and fair elections	-6.52	-9.17
	(8.32)	(7.60)
UN	-4.82	-5.12
	(4.36)	(4.18)
Power-sharing	0.80	2.29
	(4.71)	(5.16)
Number of vetoes	-1.57	-1.61
	(2.53)	(2.26)
Incompatibility	9.41*	8.36*
	(3.75)	(3.66)
War duration	-0.23	-0.17
	(0.15)	(0.15)
Constant	-11.94	-1.37
	(10.62)	(12.55)
Observations	126	126

Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors account for country clustering.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In Table A.6, I replicate the results in Table 2. There are more than 50 clusters in the data. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, I follow Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008's recommendations and use a wild bootstrap to estimate clustered standard errors. I implement the method based on Roodman et al. 2018. The results, as shown in Table A.6, models 1-6, do not change.

Table A.6. Correlates of Civil War Successor Party Success, Wild Bootstrap

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Vote share	Vote share	Vote share	Vote share	Vote share	Vote share
Military strength	9.88***					9.90***
	(1.06)					(1.09)
Belligerent's atrocities		-0.46				-1.06
		(5.59)				(4.65)
Adversary's atrocities			6.00			
			(5.42)			
Relative atrocities				-2.04		
				(3.32)		
Free and fair elections					-7.31	-8.84
					(8.31)	(7.94)
UN	-4.23	-7.61	-7.71	-7.81	-8.13	-4.92
	(4.39)	(4.70)	(5.23)	(5.09)	(5.19)	(4.68)
Power-sharing	1.17	4.76	4.05	5.60	4.74	1.60
	(5.56)	(6.18)	(5.60)	(5.93)	(5.74)	(6.17)
Number of vetoes	-1.51	-3.74	-3.76	-3.79	-3.77	-1.56
	(3.44)	(3.52)	(4.60)	(3.50)	(3.71)	(3.45)
Incompatibility	10.21*	9.40*	9.93*	9.28*	8.08*	8.49*
	(4.23)	(4.11)	(4.14)	(4.16)	(3.55)	(4.02)
War duration	-0.21	-0.04	-0.09	-0.02	-0.03	-0.19
	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.20)
Constant	-13.75	21.31*	17.07*	26.37*	26.62**	-6.35
	(8.95)	(8.13)	(8.27)	(11.26)	(9.78)	(11.10)
Observations	126	126	126	126	126	126

Standard errors in parentheses
Robust clustered bootstrap standard errors account for country clustering.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure A.1 shows the symmetry between the correlates of incumbent successor-party vote share and those of rebel successor-party vote share.


Figure A.1. Relative Military Strength and Successor Party Vote Share, by Belligerent

Figure A.2 shows the relationship between military strength and electoral success using an alternative measure of relative military strength at war's end derived from the Gromes and Ranft 2016 Dataset on Post-Civil War Power and Compromise variables *victory* and *rebfight*. Unfortunately, these data are available only for eighty-one cases in my Civil War Successor Party (CWSP) data set.

Figure A.2. Post-Civil War Power and Compromise Data

Figures A.3-A.5 evaluate whether victimized regions voted against the perpetrators, while nonvictimized regions accounted for the puzzling vote share for the civil war belligerents in El Salvador. I find that a higher number of incumbent atrocities – disappearances, homicides, kidnappings, torture, and rapes – was associated with dampened ballots for the ARENA party (Figure A.3). However, the substantive effect of additional atrocities is small. Meanwhile, surprisingly, greater levels of FMLN victimization, on average, was associated with higher vote shares for the guerrilla successor party (Figure A.4). As in Figure 9, which shows that ARENA's vote share remained constant whether the government was responsible for 0 percent of the atrocities in the municipality or 100 percent, in Figure A.5, there is no relationship between the rebels' share of atrocities and the FMLN's vote share. This is consistent with my analyses of subnational violence and voting in twenty founding elections in seventeen countries. I find that belligerents' share of violence at the municipal or provincial levels proves unrelated to successor parties' disaggregated vote shares in these elections.


Figure A.3. ARENA Atrocities and Vote Share

Figure A.4. FMLN Atrocities and Vote Share

Figure A.5. FMLN Share of Atrocities and Vote Share

To test for the fear of reprisals explanation subnationally, Figures A.6 and A.7 supplement the focus on valid vote shares with an analysis of nonvalid votes in El Salvador. The figures illustrate no relationship between blank and null votes and ARENA's electoral success.


Figure A.6. Coerced Voting in El Salvador (Blank Votes)

Figure A.7. Coerced Voting in El Salvador (Null and Blank Votes)

In Figure A.8, I test whether electoral coercion does not correlate with the relative balance of power because the relationship is non-linear, with strong government victory and strong rebel victory predicting coercion, but not negotiated settlements. I do not find evidence that this is the case.


Figure A.8. Electoral Coercion and Military Strength

Figure A.9 illustrates that the relationship between military and election outcomes holds in both cleaner (above 0.5 on the free and fair election index) and less clean elections (below 0.5 on the index).


Figure A.9. Military Strength and Vote Share in Less Clean and Cleaner Elections

Figures A.10-A.13 exhibit examples of ARENA advertisements in which ARENA aims to spin the violent past, place blame on the FMLN, own the security valence issue, and deny the FLMN this issue ownership. Figure A.14 shows an example of a FMLN advertisement seeking to spin the rebel successor party in a positive light.

Figure A.10. Placing Blame on the FMLN

Figure A.11. ARENA Blaming the FMLN[1]

[1] *El Diario de Hoy*, March 9, 1994, p. 49.

Figure A.12. Owning the Security Issue[2]

Figure A.13. Denying FMLN the Security Issue

[2] *El Diario de Hoy*, March 9, 1994, p. 39.

Figure A.14. FMLN Spinning Itself in a Positive light[3]

[3] Archives of Sebastian Alejos, campaign manager for the FMLN, 1994 election.

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