SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

THE LOGIC OF ILLICIT FLOWS IN ARMED CONFLICT
Explaining Variation in Violent Nonstate Group Interactions in Colombia

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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL ON METHODOLOGY

DATA COLLECTION/INTERVIEWS

I conducted multisited, longitudinal ethnographic fieldwork comprising participant observation and 606 semi-structured anonymous interviews in and about four border zones of three countries affected by armed conflict and organized crime: Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.[1] The main data collection phase consisted of more than twelve months of fieldwork between 2011 and 2013, during which I carried out 433 interviews in the Colombian border departments of Nariño, Putumayo, Arauca, Cesar, Norte de Santander, and La Guajira; in the Ecuadorian provinces of Carchi, Esmeraldas, and Sucumbíos; in the Venezuelan border states of Apure, Táchira, and Zulia; and in the three capital cities Bogotá (Colombia), Caracas (Venezuela), and Quito (Ecuador). The remaining interviews took place in 2009, and between 2014 and 2018.

Source and data triangulation guided my data collection: I complemented my observations and interviews with various types of stakeholders by analyzing local media reports, policy documents such as risk reports published by the Ombudsman's Office, and relevant secondary literature on the region as well as on contemporary armed conflict and organized crime more broadly.

The interview questions evolved around the logics of illicit flows, the interactions of violent nonstate groups, and the everyday lives of the communities inhabiting these territories. Out of a long catalogue of questions, I selected the ones most suitable to the stakeholder group to which the interviewee belonged. I adjusted the questions when necessary: if I established close trust relationships with my interviewees, I asked them more direct questions, whereas other interviews focused more on contextual information. I obtained informed consent from all interviewees. The interviews generally ranged from thirty minutes to two hours. I conducted interviews in public spaces, offices, or sometimes in private locations, depending on which spaces minimized risks to the interviewees, myself, and any other person involved. In all cases, I only asked questions when interviewees felt comfortable about answering them and when I was confident that the interview would not cause any harm to anyone involved in or affected by the research process. Given the research's sensitive nature, all data were treated with absolute confidentiality.[2]

I used snowball sampling to select interviewees, aiming for a relatively balanced distribution of interviewees across ten different stakeholder groups to maximize possibilities for triangulation and thus minimize biases in the data I used. They comprised ex-combatants, police and military officers, civil society leaders, peasants, refugees, international organization staff, government officials, clerics, and others embedded in or with expert knowledge on violent nonstate groups. The 606 interviews included sixty-two in Nariño and ninety-two in Norte de Santander that served specifically to enhance understanding of the cases of Tumaco/Llorente and Catatumbo, respectively. Table 1 demonstrates the distribution of these local interviews across the ten stakeholder groups.

[1] On multisited fieldwork, see Marcus 1995, 105. For more details about the larger study for which I collected the data, see the appendix of Idler 2019, 337–49.

[2] Following the University of Oxford's strict ethical guidelines, as per its Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC), I ensured anonymity and safety protocols for everyone concerned.

Table 1: Distribution of interviews in Nariño and Norte de Santander across stakeholder groups.

	Nariño	**Norte de Santander**
(ex-)guerrillas, paramilitaries, militias	7	1
displaced persons/victims	1	8
community leaders/human rights defenders	7	7
residents, church members, ombudsman's office staff	12	26
nongovernmental organization staff	8	10
associations and private sector representatives	3	2
international agency staff	18	14
academics, journalists, think tanks' staff	1	4
state forces and intelligence officials	0	3
government officials	5	17
TOTAL	**62**	**92**

DEFINITION OF VIOLENT NONSTATE GROUPS

I define violent nonstate groups as a set of at least three individuals who are i) "willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their objectives"; ii) thereby directly or indirectly challenging the state's legitimate monopoly of violence by using or threatening to use violence illegally; and iii) "shaped through an organizational relationship or structure that exists over a specific period of time" and through which the individuals identify as members of this specific group.[3] They behave in an instrumentally rational way: their prior expectations, values, and norms influence their interests and cost-benefit analyses.[4] I refer to groups such as rebels, paramilitaries, or criminals whose raison d'être is ideological, profit-driven, or both. The difference between "state" and "nonstate" in these contexts is ambiguous. Corrupt state officials can be collaborators of criminals, and violent nonstate actors can penetrate or control state institutions.[5] I therefore use "nonstate" as an analytical category that refers to the *behavior* of actors rather than formal roles. Accordingly, a group of police officers operating a human trafficking ring would fall under "violent nonstate group," even though the police is a state actor.[6]

I delineated individual groups on the basis of the third point of the definition of violent nonstate groups ("shaped through an organizational relationship or structure that exists over a specific period of time" and through which the individuals identify as members of this specific group). To do so, I drew on data concerning the labels that the group members use to identify

[3] Schneckener 2006, 25; 2009, 8–9.
[4] Keohane 2005, 75.
[5] E.g., Hutchinson O'Malley 2007, 1098; Andreas 2004, 5.
[6] For a longer discussion of this definition, see Idler 2019, 33.

themselves (e.g., signatures in threat pamphlets, graffiti, bracelets, logos on uniforms, word of mouth) as well as data concerning how my interviewees, including local community members, refer to the groups. I triangulated the data sources to increase confidence about the information I obtained, and I only coded those interactions for which I was confident that they involved two distinct groups.

Analytically distinguishing where one group begins and another one ends can be difficult. For example, some interviewees stated that the Águilas Negras in Tumaco were one large group while others said it was an umbrella term for many smaller criminal groups. Observation 13 in Table 2, for instance, refers to a short-term arrangement between Águilas Negras and Rastrojos. The observation concerns two distinct groups, the Rastrojos and Águilas Negras, regardless of whether the latter is one of several criminal groups under the broader label of the Águilas Negras or a single group. I did not code interactions between two groups if both were labelled Águilas Negras. In other cases, as shown in Table 2, I refer to "Águilas Negras/Rastrojos" or "criminal groups" when there was no clear evidence about the group's label, but interviewees and other sources distinguished them as separate violent nonstate groups as per the definition I provide in this article.

Also, it is sometimes challenging to ascertain whether one single group controls a specific function of the supply chain, particularly if multiple groups are present or there is contestation between the groups. Guerrilla groups work together with specific financiers who buy the coca leaves or paste from the farmers. When the FARC demobilized, in regions like Putumayo that used to be FARC strongholds, new financiers appeared. According to local farmers, this meant that it was no longer clear who they were working with because several groups attempted to occupy the space left behind by the FARC and gain control over the product. This example suggests that the control of this function of the supply chain can be contested when the conflict status changes (e.g., during transitions triggered by the demobilization of one violent nonstate group).

For this study, I did not include such transition phases; I only coded interactions when the data allowed me to infer the existence of control by a single group. For example, I did not include in this analysis instances where other groups *attempted* to gain control or acted as informants for the Colombian state. The following extract of an interview I conducted in 2011 with a couple who were both former FARC guerrillas exemplifies this situation. In 2006, the male interviewee, a member of the FARC at the time, was the supervisor of a cocaine production site for the first processing stages, which locals call *cocinas* ("kitchens"). Located in Nariño, a border department in southern Colombia, the site was controlled by the FARC:

Author: *Who was in charge [of the kitchen]?*

Ex-guerrilla husband: The guerrillas, but inside there were civilian workers. I was with them for two years as a supervisor . . . .We were there to support them. Sometimes people came; therefore, we protected them with arms…The laboratories are practically [the FARC's], because they use them to finance themselves . . . .

Author: *What did they do with the cocaine afterwards?*

Ex-guerrilla wife: They pass it on to other countries. There are people in charge of this . . . . This was in 2006, our kid was two and a half years old.

Ex-guerrilla husband: We were working in a *cocina* . . . . There were infiltrators [among the civilians who worked in the *cocina*]. Infiltrators always tried to join. We noticed that there were two guys…

Ex-guerrilla wife: [interrupts] They had only spent two months there, no more!

Ex-guerrilla husband: . . . . they belonged to the paramilitaries and later [the FARC] realized it and they killed them.

Author: *So they were…*

Ex-guerrilla husband: Civilian workers! Around one month later, they burnt the laboratories, they burnt everything.

Author: *The paramilitaries?*

Ex-guerrilla wife: The army.

Ex-guerrilla husband: Through [the paramilitaries]. They arrived straight away. It was a hidden place that no-one could find, but they came straight there. After that I decided to leave. Through my brother, because the truth is . . . . if you kill someone, they kill you. . . . Therefore, we left. In the *cocina* there were also civilians. There were around six civilians at the entrance and six from the organization and three with radios inside . . . .

Observations of Violent Nonstate Group Interactions

I drew on a dataset of 101 observations of violent nonstate group interactions that I recorded across Colombia's borderlands for a larger study roughly over the past two decades (2000-2018), with the main research period being from 2008 to 2018, as noted above.[7] This sufficiently large sample allows me to make claims about the interactions' interrelations with illicit flows. I identified these observations on the basis of interviews, risk reports of the Ombudsman's Office, and other policy documents. They comprise interactions including various forms of competition and cooperation among violent nonstate groups. Since the aim of this study is to demonstrate how a locality's function in the illicit supply chain influences the types of cooperative arrangements (unstable, short-term arrangements and stable, long-term arrangements) among violent nonstate groups, I excluded all observations of interactions without an arrangement: twenty-two observations of combat and armed disputes.[8]

Scope conditions

As outlined in the article, I specify my theory by positing that, first, the violent nonstate groups involved derive or plan to derive a significant portion of their income from the illicit economy; second, mutual sympathies arising from personal bonds do not supersede interests; and third, there are no significant power asymmetries.

First, if violent nonstate groups do not draw on the illicit economy as an income source, the distrust-reducing mechanism of interest convergence that facilitates economically driven cooperation between untrustworthy armed actors is absent. This helps to explain why there were not as many cooperative arrangements between ideologically opposed groups in Colombia in previous decades compared with the timeframe in this study. The FARC were less dependent on the drug trade as an income source in the 1980s. They did not have the motive of economic interest to cooperate.

Second, in situations where mutual sympathies supersede interests, violent nonstate groups may decide *not* to engage in a short-term arrangement with another group even if their economic interests converge. This may be the case when Group A and B have converging interests, yet, for example, Group A's leader betrayed Group B's leader with his girlfriend and hence Group B allies with Group C whose leader was also humiliated by Group A in order to

[7] See Idler 2019, 351–56. The larger study included one hundred observations; I added one observation for this study: the armed disputes between EPL, ELN, FARC, and paramilitary successor groups in the Catatumbo region in Norte de Santander (COL), 2015/2016.

[8] Note that I explain why certain localities are conducive to short-term or long-term arrangements; I do not argue that in these locations armed clashes cannot occur.

jointly take revenge on Group A. I found evidence of such scenarios in the Colombian towns of Tumaco and Maicao. Both are strategic trafficking nodes. *Machismo,* conducive to such behavior, characterized everyday lives in these places.

Third, power asymmetries between violent nonstate groups makes distrust-reducing mechanisms irrelevant. In a situation of power asymmetry in which one violent nonstate group exerts territorial control, stable, long-term arrangements can also exist at trafficking nodes. In this case, the more powerful group subordinates the others, leading to a relatively stable situation in which one single group is preponderant. This was (and still is at the time of writing) the case of the Rastrojos in Puerto Santander, a major trafficking node at the Colombia-Venezuela border. Such arrangements also exist at the US-Mexican border.[9] Likewise, at production sites, one powerful group may control the territory, which is conducive to stable, long-term arrangements with subordinated groups. In this sense, arguments emphasizing the control of territory and routes are important, but only if one group is significantly more powerful than others. The more puzzling phenomena, however, are stable, long-term arrangements at production sites even if there is *no* power asymmetry and even if the groups do *not* share values. As I demonstrate in the article, in Norte de Santander power is *not* concentrated in one single group, and yet there is no direct competition between ideologically opposed groups. The logic of illicit flows affects how actors behave, and this, rather than power or territorial control, explains the variation.

In line with the scope conditions of my theory, I also exclude from this study all interactions with power asymmetries that are recorded in the dataset: twenty-three observations of interactions when one group subordinates the others, and six of subcontractual relationships.

Coding and Definitional Criteria of Violent Nonstate Group Arrangements

I coded the remaining fifty observations according to the definitions used in this study: I coded interactions as unstable, short-term arrangements when they constitute one of three types of interactions (spot sales, barter agreements, or tactical alliances). "Unstable" means that they often end in switching of business partners or violent breakdowns. "Short-term" does not refer to a fixed duration. It can mean days, weeks, or, in the case of tactical alliances, months. Spot sales and barter agreements arise from the convergence of interests in one-time financial or material transactions involving commodities such as weapons or illegally used drugs. Violent nonstate groups sell these goods "on the spot" or as a barter agreement, including across supply chains. These arrangements are hardly regulated. The groups involved are only minimally interdependent. They may strike a deal one day and fight each other the next day when they no longer rely on each other for this deal to be successful. At the time of the transaction, however, they must share some common understanding of the deal or else it will fall through. The groups can augment this restraint through enforcement methods such as so-called hostage-taking whereby shared information on illegal business deals between the groups involved renders them hostages of each other.[10] In settings with only two actors, iterated deals stabilize cooperation,[11] distrust is reduced more effectively, and the business partner's credibility increases. Where multiple groups compete to maximize profit, general mistrust persists. In such cases, interest convergence reduces distrust for one deal. However, in subsequent deals if the interests of Group A no longer converge with those of Group B, but of Group C, this can lead to clashes between Groups A and B.

[9] The author thanks one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out.
[10] Campana and Varese 2013, 281; Williamson 1983; Cook 2005, 37.
[11] Axelrod 1984.

Tactical alliances among violent nonstate groups exist when the groups' converging interests reflect immediate and temporary benefits, such as shared intelligence on state operations, or the joint use of infrastructure to transport or store illegal goods. Even though there is no long-term commitment,[12] tactical alliances are minimally institutionalized.[13] Since the convergence originates from a specific business opportunity rather than more generally, tactical alliances are fragile: the groups are interdependent to some extent, but they can easily abandon the arrangement. In contexts where many violent nonstate groups are present, as is the case in multiparty conflicts, strategies of issue linkages that would stabilize alliances in other contexts are difficult because alliances frequently shift due to a constant flow of newly emerging actors.[14] Two groups allying to increase profits and to fight state forces might be considered issue linkage (if one group breaks the alliance, the other one stops collaborating against the state forces). However, as this would constitute a negative payoff for both, such issue linkage does not deter defection. Certainly, tactical alliances are generally useful when two groups have a shared interest in balancing the power of a third one.[15] Still, in conflict-affected territories that feature nodes of illicit supply chain networks, tactical alliances are particularly likely *and* often contradict the broader conflict cleavages because even those conflict actors who are ideologically opposed to each other forge them.

I coded interactions as stable, long-term arrangements when the groups involved engaged in institutionalized transactional relationships, with the transactions concerning activities required to process the raw material coca into cocaine. "Stable" means that the arrangements are relatively free from intergroup violence. "Long-term" does not refer to a fixed duration; the arrangement must be long enough for cocaine to be produced successfully. In the Catatumbo region, the average number of coca harvests per year is 4.4 and in Nariño it is 3.8.[16] I consider an arrangement to be long-term if it at least bridges the period between two harvests, on average around three months.

I only coded those interactions when I was reasonably confident that they included at least two distinct groups as defined above. For example, if the FARC controlled both the coca cultivation and the first phase of processing coca leaves into coca paste, I did not code such instances as an observation of an arrangement, even though they constitute transactions along the supply chain.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

My empirical strategy consisted of four steps.[17] First, I mapped illicit supply chain networks, including the various steps of the cocaine supply chain and the intersections with other illicit supply chains across Colombia's borderlands, to identify locations of production sites and trafficking nodes, the two independent variables. I concentrated on the cocaine supply chain as the major illicit flow. The cocaine business is estimated to be the world's most profitable type of organized crime,[18] and Colombia is the world's principal cocaine producer, which demonstrates the significance of violent nonstate groups' involvement in this type of illicit business. I based my analysis on interviews as well as drawings of illicit flows on maps that some of my interviewees produced. I triangulated these data with data from police and

[12] Williams 2002, 75.
[13] Ávila and Núñez 2008.
[14] For strategies of issue linkages, see Oye 1986; Axelrod and Keohane 1985.
[15] See, e.g., Waltz 2010.
[16] The average in all Colombian territory is 4.3 per year (UNODC 2018, 89).
[17] I engaged in the first two steps concurrently.
[18] UNODC 2017.

military sources on trafficking routes, and formal and informal border crossings, and from policy documents by organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). I used satellite images to trace geographical features such as rivers and roads to identify transport routes. Drawing on Esri's ArgGIS 10.2 mapping and spatial analysis software, based on triangulation of data collected via interviews and other sources, I created maps to visualize these flows (see figures 2 and 3).

Second, across the border areas, I identified and mapped the fifty observations that fit the definitional criteria of unstable, short-term arrangements and stable, long-term arrangements between at least two violent nonstate groups. I then overlaid the spatial distribution of the illicit supply chains with the one of violent nonstate group arrangements. This overlay demonstrates that territories with coca cultivation and physical infrastructure to process coca leaves into cocaine typically feature long-term arrangements. I also identified how strategic transit points and logistical hubs at border crossings, towns, roads, and rivers where trafficking routes converge and networks intersect, coincide with clusters of short-term arrangements. This includes the starting points of international trafficking routes at maritime borders. As discussed in the article, the illicit flows are interconnected, and thus illicit supply chains are of a networked character. Therefore, even though the focus of this study is on the cocaine supply chain, I also consider observations of violent nonstate group interactions in related types of business (e.g., gasoline-for-arms barter agreements). A bias toward matching the flows can be ruled out, given the nonchronological nature of these steps: I identified the cases independently and as part of the larger study mentioned above that aimed to understand the repercussions of violent nonstate group interactions on the security of civilians, regardless of potential causal links with illicit flows.[19]

Third, adopting an ethnographic approach to my analysis of the fifty observations, I traced the processes from the illicit flows to the motives for cooperation and the effect on group arrangements (dependent variable), and from the group arrangements to the motives and their linkages with illicit flows. Accounting for causal complexity, I found that in sixteen cases, cooperation was unrelated to illicit supply chain networks. The spatial overlap was a coincidence. These include:

- nine observations of interactions when directly shared values between two guerrillas gave rise to stable, long-term arrangements (e.g., shared ideology facilitated a relatively stable and enduring alliance between the left-wing guerrillas FARC and ELN);[20]
- two observations of interactions when marriage across groups constituted a shared value and gave rise to stable, long-term arrangements;
- five observations of interactions when mutual sympathies between group leaders gave rise to unstable, short-term arrangements (e.g., in the Colombian towns of Maicao and Tumaco, two gangs engaged in tactical alliances to take revenge on a third group).[21]

In the remaining thirty-four observations (see Table 2 below), I detected and traced processes whereby distinct functions that specific localities have in illicit supply chain networks influence the distrust-reducing mechanisms of interest convergence and shared values that enable short-term and long-term arrangements, respectively.[22] This means that, by ignoring the logic of illicit flows in armed conflict, we fail to account for the causal mechanisms

[19] See Idler 2019.
[20] In these cases, the guerrillas explicitly justified their arrangements on the basis of commonalities in their ideology (considered here as "shared values"), which highlights that the role of ideology for conflict dynamics more broadly is still important.
[21] For a discussion of these additional causal processes, see Idler 2019.
[22] For process tracing, see George and Bennett 2005, 75.

that explain the emergence of more than one third of all violent nonstate group interactions and their variations (based on the sample of 101 observations).

Fourth, to explain variation in the dependent variable (unstable, short-term or stable, long-term arrangements), I combined within-case analysis (analyzing processes that contribute to the emergence of short-term and long-term arrangements, respectively) with cross-case analysis (comparing short-term and long-term arrangements).

CASE SELECTION[23]

Out of the thirty-four observations, I selected two cases on the independent variable to demonstrate the causal mechanisms at work.[24] For trafficking nodes, I selected Tumaco where I observed unstable, short-term arrangements (see observations 13 and 14).[25] For production sites, I selected pre-2015 Catatumbo where I observed a stable, long-term arrangement (see Observation 33). They are most likely cases that are "useful for the heuristic purpose of identifying the outsized causal mechanisms related to the extreme variable."[26] I also selected these cases because I had extensive within-case evidence available that allowed for maximum triangulation, including through my own in situ observations and semi-structured interviews. Both cases are representative of their types. Most of the other cases resembled these examples in the types of groups involved, the types of activities that these groups carried out, and the stability and duration of the arrangements.

For each of the two independent variables, I selected a second case in order to engage in a "secondary comparison" to productively "build contrasts into the research design,"[27] and to achieve "a more robust understanding and interpretation of the primary case."[28] For trafficking nodes, to substantiate my causal claim, I selected Llorente, where I observed short-term arrangements (see observations 8 and 9). Considering the "larger sample of cases lying in the background of the analysis," Llorente helps "maximize variance on the dimension of interest," that is, violent nonstate group arrangements. Contrary to the Tumaco case, an urban area where one may intuitively expect dense interaction between groups, Llorente is a rural area where such cooperative interactions are particularly puzzling, and yet overlooked by alternative explanations.[29] For production sites, I selected post-2015 Catatumbo as a second case. It is a "non-case": despite the locality's function as a production site, I did not observe any stable, long-term arrangements as would be expected from my theory, according to which production sites are conducive to long-term arrangements. Instead, post-2015 Catatumbo lacked any substantial cooperative arrangement and featured armed clashes between violent nonstate groups. This case provides useful "contrast space" to refine the theory.[30] It demonstrates the relevance of a trustworthy broker in order for production sites to be an operative part of illicit supply chain networks: production itself relies on a labor force that needs a powerful broker who is perceived to share their values and to provide certain guarantees

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[23] I follow George 1979 and consider a case to be "an instance of a class of events of interest to the investigator," quoted in Bennett 2004, 20–21.
[24] This selection is guided by the twin objectives of "(1) a representative sample and (2) useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest" (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296).
[25] Bennett and Checkel 2015, 8.
[26] George and Bennett 2005, 123.
[27] Collier and Mahoney 1996, 74.
[28] Mukhija 2010, 423.
[29] Seawright and Gerring 2008, 301–2.
[30] For a discussion of "contrast space," see Collier and Mahoney 1996, 88.

of protection. The absence of such a broker helps to explain the absence of a stable, long-term arrangement.

Table 2. Selected observations of unstable, short-term arrangements and stable, long-term arrangements among violent nonstate groups across the Colombia-Ecuador and Colombia-Venezuela border (2000-2018)[31]

Unstable, Short-term Arrangements at Strategic Trafficking Nodes
1. FARC Front 48 and Ecuadorian criminal groups (spot sales/barter agreements), near San Miguel between Sucumbíos (ECU) and Putumayo (COL), 2000s 2. Rastrojos and other paramilitary successor groups (spot sales/barter agreements), urban areas along a major road in Putumayo (COL), after 2006 3. FARC Front 48 and Ecuadorian criminal groups (spot sales/barter agreements), near San Miguel between Sucumbíos (ECU) and Putumayo (COL), 2012 4. criminal groups (spot sales/barter agreements), Pasto, Nariño (COL), 2011/2012 5. Ecuadorian criminal groups and FARC, including Front 29 (spot sales/barter agreements), in rural Carchi and Tulcán, Carchi (ECU) and Ipiales, Nariño (COL), 2011/2012 6. Águilas Negras/Rastrojos and guerrilla militias (spot sales/barter agreements), at the formal border crossing between Ipiales, Nariño (COL), and Tulcán, Carchi (ECU), 2011/2012 7. FARC and criminal groups (spot sales/barter agreements), in Maldonado, Chical, and Tufiño in Carchi (ECU), around 2011/2012 8. **Águilas Negras, Mano Negra, Nueva Generación, Rastrojos, and FARC (spot sales/barter agreements), in Llorente, Nariño (COL), around 2007** 9. **Rastrojos and FARC militias (spot sales/barter agreements), in Llorente, Nariño (COL), 2011** 10. paramilitaries and criminal groups (spot sales/barter agreements), in Nariño (COL) and Carchi (ECU), 2000s 11. Águilas Negras/Rastrojos, Mexican Sinaloa/Zeta cartel (spot sales/barter agreements), around Tumaco municipality, Nariño (COL), 2010s 12. FARC militias, Rastrojos, Águilas Negras, and other violent nonstate groups (tactical alliances) in Tumaco, Nariño (COL), 2000s 13. **Águilas Negras and Rastrojos (tactical alliances), in Tumaco, Nariño (COL), 2010/2011** 14. **Rastrojos, FARC militias of mobile column Daniel Aldana, Mexican Sinaloa cartel, and other criminal groups (tactical alliances), in Tumaco, Nariño (COL), 2011/2012** 15. Colombian criminal groups (tactical alliances), in Esmeraldas (ECU), around 2012 16. Colombian criminal groups and Zeta/Sinaloa cartel (spot sales/barter agreements), in Esmeraldas (ECU), around 2012 17. Águilas Negras and criminal groups (spot sales/barter agreements), at border crossings in Arauca including Puerto Lleras and La Playa (COL), around 2011 18. Rastrojos, Urabeños, and Venezuelan criminal groups (spot sales/barter agreements), San Cristóbal (VEN), 2011/2012 19. Rastrojos and Urabeños (spot sales/barter agreements), in Alejandría, Cúcuta, Norte de Santander (COL), 2011 20. Rastrojos and Urabeños (spot sales/barter agreements), near Cúcuta, Norte de Santander (COL), 2011/2012

[31] Observations in bold are discussed in the article. Observations of arrangements that occurred from 2011 to 2013 are shown on figures 4 and 5.

21. Rastrojos and criminal groups (spot sales/barter agreements), Puerto Santander (COL) and Boca del Grita (VEN), around 2011/2012
22. Rastrojos and Urabeños (spot sales/barter agreements), La Paz, Cesar (COL), 2011
23. guerrillas and criminal groups (spot sales/barter agreements), near Machiques (VEN), 2011/ 2012
24. FARC and criminal groups (tactical alliances), La Guajira (COL) and Zulia (VEN), around 2011/2012
25. criminal groups and Águilas Negras (tactical alliances), in Maracaibo (VEN), 2012
26. Mexican Sinaloa/Zeta cartel and Rastrojos (tactical alliances), in Zulia (VEN), 2011
27. Counterinsurgent Front Wayúu (Alta Guajira) and Paisas (tactical alliances) in La Guajira (COL), 2009
28. Paisas and Rastrojos (tactical alliances) in Cesar and La Guajira (COL), 2010

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29. guerrillas and other violent nonstate groups in Bajo Putumayo (COL) and Sucumbíos (ECU), 2010s
30. ELN's Front Héroes de Sindagua and other violent nonstate groups in Pizarro, Nariño (COL), around 2011/2012
31. FARC, including mobile column Daniel Aldana in Bajo Mira, Rastrojos in Alto Mira and Frontera, and other violent nonstate groups along River Mira in Nariño (COL) and Esmeraldas and Carchi (ECU), 2011/2012
32. Guerrillas and other violent nonstate groups in Arauca (COL) and Apure (VEN), 2012
33. **FARC, ELN, EPL, and Rastrojos in the Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander (COL), 2010s**
34. Guerrillas and other groups, Machiques, Zulia (VEN), 2012

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