SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

ELECTORAL MANIPULATION AND REGIME SUPPORT
Survey Evidence from Russia

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Supplementary Material
Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support

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A 2016 Survey: Summary Statistics and Covariate Balance

- Table A1 presents the individual-level summary statistics for the September 2016 Russian Election Survey where the main survey experiment was fielded. Table A2 gives the question wordings used to create all of the variables used in the analysis.

- Table A3 shows balance checks to assess assignment to treatment across the different groups in the September 2016 survey. We use a simple vector of identical covariates in each exercise. In Columns 1-3, we use the entire set of 12 treatments (the factorial of the 3 candidate occupational backgrounds by the 4 types of electoral behavior) as an outcome variable in a multinomial logistic regression. In Columns 4-6, we collapse the candidate occupational backgrounds as well as the 'Fraud' treatment arms, as shown in the main analysis. There is only one treatment: whether a respondent was informed that a candidate had committed any of the three violations. In both tables, the joint likelihood ratio tests indicate that treatment assignment is not correlated with these confounders. We can be confident that the experiment was properly randomized and administered.

TABLE A1: 2016 EXPERIMENT: SUMMARY STATISTICS

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Male	2,010	0.336	0.472	0	0	1	1
Age (log)	2,010	3.795	0.439	2.890	3.466	4.111	7.559
Education	1,996	5.367	1.296	1.000	5.000	7.000	8.000
Town Size	2,010	2.893	1.632	1	1	4	6
Economic Situation	1,952	3.497	1.114	1.000	3.000	4.000	7.000
Employed	2,008	0.529	0.499	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
CPSU Member	2,010	0.093	0.290	0	0	0	1
Number of Civil Society Organizations	2,010	0.289	0.885	0	0	0	9
Follows Politics	2,008	2.781	1.037	1.000	2.000	4.000	4.000
Support for Putin	1,983	3.731	0.960	1.000	3.000	4.000	5.000
Support for United Russia	1,965	5.949	2.392	0.000	5.000	8.000	10.000
Is Putin Honest?	1,782	3.371	0.814	1.000	3.000	4.000	4.000
Is Putin Strong?	1,956	3.656	0.619	1.000	3.000	4.000	4.000
Electoral Integrity	1,757	3.340	1.305	1.000	2.000	4.000	5.000
Is Russia a Democracy?	1,596	0.628	0.484	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Electoral Impact	1,908	3.297	1.411	1.000	2.000	5.000	5.000
Acceptability of Blocking Opposition	1,806	1.295	0.606	1.000	1.000	1.000	4.000
Acceptability of Organizing Karusel Voting	1,882	1.395	0.780	1.000	1.000	1.000	4.000
Acceptability of Media Restributions	1,811	1.356	0.691	1.000	1.000	2.000	4.000
Voted in Duma Election	1,919	0.557	0.497	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Voted in Duma Election for United Russia	974	0.616	0.487	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000

TABLE A2: 2016 EXPERIMENT: QUESTION DESCRIPTIONS

Variable	Description
Male	Binary indicator for gender.
Age (log)	Years of age (logged).
Education	Eight-point scale increasing in the level of education acquired by the respondent.
Household Economic Situation	Seven-point scale increasing in self-reported ease of paying for household expenses.
Employed	Binary indicator for whether respondent was employed at time of survey.
CPSU Member	Binary indicator for whether respondent was a member of the Communist Party.
Number of Civil Society Organizations	Count of number of different non-government organizations that the respondent is a member of.
Follow Politics	Four-point scale of how closely respondent follows political events in Russia.
Support for Putin	Five-point scale of the degree to which the respondent approves of President Putin's performance in office from 2012-2016.
Support for United Russia	Ten-point scale of the degree to which the respondent supports the United Russia political party.
Is Putin Honest?	Four-point scale measuring the extent the respondent agrees that Putin is an honest person who deserves trust.
Is Putin Strong?	Four-point scale measuring the extent the respondent agrees that Putin is a strong leader.
Electoral Integrity	Five-point scale measuring the extent the respondent agrees that the most recent parliamentary elections in Russia (2016) were honest.
Is Russia a Democracy?	Binary indicator measuring if the respondent believes Russia is a democracy.
Electoral Impact	Five-point scale measuring the extent the respondent agrees that voting in elections can influence political events in the country.
Acceptability of Blocking Opposition	Four-point scale measuring the extent to which respondents believe blocking opposition candidates from registering is acceptable.
Acceptability of Organizing Karusels	Four-point scale measuring the extent to which respondents believe organizing 'karusels' to facilitate multiple voting is acceptable.
Acceptability of Restricting Access to Media	Four-point scale measuring the extent to which respondents believe placing restrictions on opposition candidates appearing on television is acceptable.
Voted in Election	Binary indicator measuring if the respondent voted in the 2016 parliamentary election.
Voted in Election for United Russia	Binary indicator measuring if the respondent voted for United Russia in the 2016 parliamentary election (only measure those who voted).

	All Treatment Arms			Any Fraud		
	LR Chisq	Df	Pr(>Chisq)	LR Chisq	Df	Pr(>Chisq)
Male	10.48	11.00	0.49	2.03	1.00	0.15
Age (log)	9.06	11.00	0.62	0.68	1.00	0.41
Education	14.17	11.00	0.22	2.49	1.00	0.11
Town Size	11.36	11.00	0.41	0.59	1.00	0.44
Economic Situation	10.58	11.00	0.48	2.56	1.00	0.11
Employed	7.40	11.00	0.77	0.42	1.00	0.52
CPSU Member	5.88	11.00	0.88	1.02	1.00	0.31
Voted	14.58	11.00	0.20	0.28	1.00	0.60
No. Civil Society Orgs	10.69	11.00	0.47	0.04	1.00	0.84
Interest in Politics	18.53	11.00	0.07	0.06	1.00	0.80
Putin Support	10.55	11.00	0.48	2.20	1.00	0.14
UR Support	18.36	11.00	0.07	1.33	1.00	0.25
Perception of Electoral Integrity	9.78	11.00	0.55	0.32	1.00	0.57
Is Russia a Democracy?	13.01	11.00	0.29	1.47	1.00	0.22

This table presents the likelihood-ratio tests for fourteen demographic predictors from a multinomial logistic regression with the outcome variable being the treatment status in two survey experiments In Columns 1-3, we conduct this test for all twelve possible treatments, while in Columns 4-6, we collapse the twelve treatment arms into a binary indicator for whether or not the respondent received the 'any fraud' treatment (the main predictor we use in the analysis in the main paper tables). Chi-squared values are given in the first column of each set, degrees of freedom in the second, and finally p-values in the final column. Below these independent tests is the chi-square statistic from a joint likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all predictors are equal to zero.

B   2016 Experiment: Unpacking and Updating Prior Knowledge about Violations

B.1   Knowledge of Electoral Violations by Regime Support

- The experimental set-up used in the main text simulates an instance where regime supporters find out about fraud. However, in the real world, these respondents might downplay the significance of electoral violations. Even though they might accept that fraud has occurred, they might ignore it and continue to see elections as ultimately free and fair.

- Although we believe experiments are still the best way to examine possible changes in voting behavior when new information is learned, this section shows two results about what happens in the 'real world.' Specifically, we examine two claims:

  1. Regime supporters are less likely to think violations occur in Russia;

  2. Those regime supporters that do know about violations react just as opposition supporters do: they give more negative evaluations of electoral integrity

- To evaluate these claims, we bring in a number of other representative surveys in addition to the 2016 Russian Election Survey where the main survey experiment was placed. First, we aim to show that regime supporters also have less information on electoral violations in other elections as well, even when information about violations is widespread in society. Second, the 2016 RES regrettably does not have all the questions we need to examine prior knowledge of fraud.

- To that end, we analyze the five surveys listed in Table B1. The surveys conducted during the 2011-2012 election cycle are particularly useful. Accusations of fraud in the 2011 State Duma elections spurred the the largest mass protests since the fall of the Soviet Union. Fraud allegations were widely disseminated on social media by opposition activists. For months, controversy swelled about the problems with the elections, even prompting the federal government to introduce webcams in polling stations. Given how much information about fraud was available during this period, we might expect regime supporters to be well-informed about electoral violations.

- First, we analyze one question placed on 2011 and 2016 Levada post-election Omnibus survey, which asked respondents if they believed there were electoral violations during those elections, and if so, were they significant. The responses for 2011 are shown in Table B2. Columns 1 and 2 describe All Respondents, while the columns to the right break down the distribution among Putin Supporters and Opposition Supporters. First, we see that 16% of all respondents did not think any violations during the elections. An additional 65% (totaling rows 2-3) though thought there were violations but did not think they changed the results. In fact, only 19% of respondents believed that the fraud changed the outcome. More importantly for this paper, only 9% of UR Supporters believed that significant, results-changing violations had been committed, versus 33% for the Opposition. Even at a time when information was more widely available, only a small percentage of regime supporters believed that there were major violations.

- The same is true for the identical question asked on the 2016 Omnibus, as shown in Table B3. Putin Supporters are much less likely than Opposition Supporters to believe there were significant violations committed.

- Finally, we also look at knowledge of those organizations that spread information on fraud. For this we use an online survey conducted in April 2012 that focused on Russians' awareness of electoral monitoring organizations (Robertson 2017). Respondents were asked if they had ever heard of Golos, the country's most prominent election monitoring organization. Golos performs a number of important functions before, during and after elections, including aggregating complaints about different forms of fraud, sending monitors to directly observe balloting, and preparing post-election reports. It is logical to think that respondents aware of Golos are more likely to be exposed to information about violations and have different appraisals of electoral integrity. Here we break down regime support according to whether the respondent voted for United Russia in the 2011 Parliamentary elections held three months before. We see in Table B4 that UR Voters are much less likely to have heard of Golos, and that in general, only a small percentage (20%) of the population is aware of its activities.

- These results provide evidence for our first point: that potentially because of their exposure to different forms of information, regime supporters are much less likely to believe violations are occurring in Russia.

TABLE B1: LIST OF REPRESENTATIVE SURVEYS

Name	Survey Firm	Date	Num. Respondents	Type	Election Described
Omnibus	Levada Center	12/2011	1,600	In-person	2011 Parliamentary
Election Monitors Survey	Synovate ComCon	4/2012	2,432	Internet	2012 Presidential
Russian Election Survey (RES)	Levada Center	3/2012	1,682	In-person	2012 Presidential
Russian Election Survey (RES)	Levada Center	9/2016	2,010	In-person	2016 Parliamentary
Omnibus	Levada Center	9/2016	1,602	In-person	2016 Parliamentary

TABLE B2: ELECTORAL VIOLATIONS BY PUTIN SUPPORT: LEVADA 2011

Question: Were there electoral violations during the 2011 parliamentary elections, and if yes, were they significant?

Response	All Resp.	(%)	Putin Supporters	(%)	Opposition Supporters	(%)
1. There weren't any violations.	197	0.16	164	0.22	33	0.07
2. There were insignificant violations.	477	0.39	358	0.49	123	0.25
3. There were quite significant violations, but they were unlikely to change the electoral results.	314	0.26	151	0.20	170	0.35
4. There were significant violations that changed the electoral results.	226	0.19	64	0.09	163	0.33

This table gives this distribution of responses from the December 2011 Levada survey for the above question for All Respondents, and then broken out by UR and Opposition Supporters. The percentage columns indicate the percentage of respondents out of the group indicated immediately in the column to the left. That is, 16% of All Respondents gave answer #1, while 34% of all UR Supporters did.

TABLE B3: ELECTORAL VIOLATIONS BY PUTIN SUPPORT: LEVADA 2016

Question: Were there electoral violations during the 2016 parliamentary elections, and if yes, were they significant?

Response	All Resp.	(%)	Putin Supporters	(%)	Opposition Supporters	(%)
1. There weren't any violations.	328	0.30	307	0.33	22	0.12
2. There were insignificant violations.	498	0.45	442	0.48	59	0.31
3. There were quite significant violations, but they were unlikely to change the electoral results.	193	0.17	127	0.14	69	0.37
4. There were significant violations that changed the electoral results.	91	0.08	53	0.06	38	0.20

This table gives this distribution of responses from the September 2016 Levada Omnibus survey for the above question for All Respondents, and then broken out by UR and Opposition Supporters. The percentage columns indicate the percentage of respondents out of the group indicated immediately in the column to the left. That is, 30% of All Respondents gave answer #1, while 33% of all UR Supporters did.

TABLE B4: KNOWLEDGE OF GOLOS BY UR SUPPORT: ELECTION MONITORS 2012

Question: Have you heard of the organization Golos?

Response	All Resp.	(%)	UR Voters	(%)	Opposition Voters	(%)	Non-Voters	(%)
0. No	1919	0.79	512	0.78	446	0.71	961	0.84
1. Yes	513	0.21	148	0.22	180	0.29	185	0.16

This table gives this distribution of responses from the 2012 Election Monitors Survey for the above question for All Respondents, and then broken out by UR, Opposition, and non-voters. The percentage columns indicate the percentage of respondents out of the group indicated immediately in the column to the left. That is, 21% of All Respondents had heard of Golos (answer #1), while 22% of all UR Voters had.

B.2   How Regime Supporters Digest Information about Violations

- The next task is to examine whether this differential knowledge about violations translates into different opinions about the quality of elections. We might be concerned that even though some UR Supporters may be aware that violations are occurring, they would discount them and still think that elections were free and fair. In Table 3 of the main text, we showed evidence that both Putin and United Russia support have higher opinions about the quality of elections in Russia. We expand that analysis to the 2011-2012 cycle in Table B5, using the same outcome question: a four-point scale measuring views of electoral integrity (higher values mean more positive views). The model specifications nearly identical to that used to study the 2016 survey (which is shown for comparison in Column 4). Note that different measures of regime support were used in the three surveys; we indicate when binary versus scale measures of regime support enter the models.

- The results indicate that core regime supporters evaluate elections much more positively, even when the probability of being exposed to information about fraud was much higher (as was the case in the winter of 2011). This suggests that these supporters are not fully aware of the many allegations circulating among independent media about problems with Russian elections. In Table B6, we show similar results using the 2016 RES. The outcome variables include a binary indicator for whether respondents believe Russia is a democracy, and 4-point scales (higher values signal greater agreement) for whether respondents agree that elections give votes choice, media are free to cover candidates, and opposition candidates are blocked. We see that Putin and UR supporters have much more positive assessments of both democracy over all and related procedures. We include these data with the caveat that some individuals may define democracy differently, associating it with both free elections, but also political stability, economic development, and liberalism.

- Next, in Table B7, we test whether Putin supporters internalized the information about violations differently. The table regresses a four-point scale of whether the 2011 elections were free and fair on the above measure about beliefs over electoral violations, including a battery of demographics. First, we see that those respondents who believed more serious violations had been committed were more likely to rate electoral integrity as lower. Column 1 shows this using the full four-point scale, while Column 3 collapses the violations measure into a binary indicator that takes a 1 if the respondent chose #4 (significant, result changing violations), and 0 otherwise.

- In Columns 2 and 4, we then interact that measure of violation exposure with a measure of support for Putin. If Putin supporters were discounting the violations, we should expect these point estimates to be positive: they should be less likely than opposition supporters to think elections were unfair, conditional on knowing about violations. However, for both models, the point estimates are negative and not statistically significant. In the 'real world', we don't see evidence that regime supporters are more likely to rate elections as free when they know about violations.

- These findings also hold in the 2016 election cycle. In Table B8, we run the same analyses using the 2016 RES and the same results: there is a strong correlation between knowledge of electoral violations and assessments of electoral integrity, and this holds true to the same degree for both Putin and Opposition supporters.

TABLE B5: REGIME SUPPORT AND OPINIONS ABOUT ELECTORAL INTEGRITY: MULTIPLE SURVEYS

	2011 Duma	2011 Duma	2012 Pres.	2016 Duma
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male	−0.019	−0.090	0.092	−0.064
	(0.038)	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.059)
Age (log)	0.131**	0.130	0.313***	−0.043
	(0.061)	(0.082)	(0.093)	(0.075)
Education	−0.0002	−0.041	−0.004	−0.029
	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Town Size	0.024	−0.155	0.007	−0.049
	(0.022)	(0.182)	(0.201)	(0.044)
Economic Situation	0.039	0.029	0.005	0.020
	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Employed	0.014	−0.013	−0.220***	−0.020
	(0.056)	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Putin Support (binary)	0.625***			
	(0.066)			
United Russia Support (binary)	0.552***			
	(0.053)			
Putin Support (5-point scale)		0.741***	0.852***	0.358***
		(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.042)
United Russia Support (5-point scale)		0.570***	0.673***	
		(0.101)	(0.126)	
United Russia Support (10-point scale)				0.110***
				(0.019)
Survey	Levada 2011	RES 2012	RES 2012	RES 2016
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,279	1,343	1,440	1,657
R^2	0.392	0.293	0.278	0.284

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ This table presents OLS models showing the types of respondents who believe elections are free and fair in Russia. In each column, the outcome variable is a five-point scale with higher values indicating that the election indicated in the column header was conducted honestly; the Survey Date row denotes when each survey was conducted. The data come from a 2011 Levada Omnibus Survey (column 1), the 2012 Russia Election Survey (columns 2-3), and the 2016 Russia Election Survey (column 4). The demographic measures are consistent across the four surveys, but not all used the same questions to measure support for Putin and United Russia. The covariate labels indicate which scale (binary, five-point, or ten-point) the question was asked, with higher levels indicating more support. Standard errors are clustered on region.

TABLE B6: REGIME SUPPORT AND VIEWS OF DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES: RES 2016

	Russia = Democracy	Elections Give Choice	Free Media Coverage	Opposition Blocked
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male	−0.030	0.002	−0.031	0.009
	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.041)
Age (log)	−0.093*	−0.011	−0.052	0.001
	(0.048)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.082)
Education	−0.008	−0.010	−0.025	0.013
	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Town Size	0.034***	−0.030	0.019	−0.009
	(0.011)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.031)
Economic Situation	0.042***	0.036	0.007	−0.013
	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Employed	0.014	−0.070	−0.052	−0.101
	(0.023)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.066)
CPSU Member	−0.077*	0.070	0.009	0.009
	(0.044)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.078)
Voted	0.014	0.041	0.051	−0.044
	(0.025)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.064)
No. Civil Society Orgs	−0.004	0.031	0.048**	0.027
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.033)
Interest in Politics	0.003	−0.035	0.001	0.020
	(0.018)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Putin Support	0.094***	0.093***	0.053	−0.072**
	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.044)	(0.031)
United Russia Support	0.041***	0.046***	0.045***	−0.019
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,456	1,538	1,465	1,296
R^2	0.261	0.174	0.155	0.131

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ This table examines the correlates of perceptions of democracy and related procedures using OLS models. The outcomes in the first two columns are measured on five-point scales (higher values indicate more positive perceptions). The outcomes in Columns 3-5 are all measured on four-point scales with higher values indicating greater acceptance of these activities. All models cluster standard errors at the region level.

	Dependent Variable: Elections are Free and Fair (4-point scale)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male	0.021	0.016	−0.022	−0.022
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Age (log)	0.121**	0.122**	0.149**	0.149**
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Education	0.002	0.001	0.005	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Town Size	0.027	0.026	0.029	0.029
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Economic Situation	0.034	0.033	0.047	0.046
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Employed	0.030	0.034	0.005	0.006
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Putin Support (binary)	0.371***	0.569***	0.496***	0.506***
	(0.058)	(0.196)	(0.055)	(0.061)
United Russia Support (binary)	0.295***	0.277***	0.482***	0.479***
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Electoral Violations (4-point)	−0.465***	−0.424***		
	(0.041)	(0.065)		
Electoral Violations * Putin Support		−0.074		
		(0.063)		
Serious Electoral Violations (binary)			−0.736***	−0.718***
			(0.078)	(0.095)
Serious Electoral Violations * Putin Support				−0.051
				(0.131)
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,103	1,103	1,103	1,103
R^2	0.603	0.604	0.510	0.510

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ The outcome variable s a four-point scale where respondents described how free and fair the 2011 elections were, with 1 indicating completely unfair and dishonest and 4 indicating completely fair and honest. The key predictor, Electoral Violations, takes the values described in Table B2. Columns 3 and 4 collapse into a binary measure if respondents answered #4. All models include region fixed effects and cluster errors on the region.

TABLE B8: LEARNING ABOUT VIOLATIONS DECREASES VIEWS OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY: RES 2016 SURVEY

	Dependent Variable: Elections are Free and Fair (4-point scale)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male	0.023	0.022	−0.038	−0.032
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Age (log)	0.046	0.050	0.091	0.094
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Education	−0.002	−0.002	−0.008	−0.007
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Town Size	0.025	0.024	0.010	0.010
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Economic Situation	0.073**	0.074*	0.105**	0.107**
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Employed	−0.078*	−0.079*	−0.053	−0.053
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Putin Support (binary)	0.445***	0.827***	0.745***	0.808***
	(0.074)	(0.262)	(0.077)	(0.086)
Electoral Violations (4-point)	−0.543***	−0.423***		
	(0.034)	(0.077)		
Electoral Violations * Putin Support		−0.152*		
		(0.086)		
Serious Electoral Violations (binary)			−1.073***	−0.816***
			(0.093)	(0.147)
Serious Electoral Violations * Putin Support				−0.420**
				(0.181)
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,008	1,008	1,008	1,008
R^2	0.581	0.584	0.469	0.473

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The outcome variable s a four-point scale where respondents described how free and fair the 2016 elections were, with 1 indicating completely unfair and dishonest and 4 indicating completely fair and honest. The key predictor, Electoral Violations, takes the values described in Table B2. Columns 3 and 4 collapse into a binary measure if respondents answered #4. All models include region fixed effects and cluster errors on the region.

B.3   Updating Priors

- Finally, Table B9 investigates whether regime supporters with potentially different information about electoral fraud update differently when presented with the experimental vignettes in the 2016 RES. We've made the case above that such supporters a) have a lower baseline probability of learning about fraud and b) do not ignore information about violations when it is presented to them in the real world. We now return to the survey experiment to exploit questions about media consumption in search of moderators of our main treatment effect. That is, we investigate whether regime supporters who are less exposed to information on fraud are more likely to update their preferences for the UR candidate when they learn about electoral fraud.

- Because the Russian government controls most broadcast (TV, radio, etc.) news coverage, respondents who use the internet to learn about political events will be more likely to have previous exposure to complaints about electoral violations. These respoondents should be less likely to update when learning that fraud occurred. By contrast, those who get most of their news from state television should have less prior information on fraud and they should update more when they find out that fraud has occurred. The first four columns use different questions from the RES to gauge each respondent's political news consumption online. Column 1 uses a binary measure for whether the respondent read internet news during the 2016 campaign, while Column 2 uses a measure for whether the respondent used the internet frequently in general. Columns 3 and 4 capture social media usage, which is where most information on fraud is spread. Column 5 focuses state media consumption. Column 6 examines how prior assessments of electoral integrity impact the treatment effect.

- For all the columns, we interact the media consumption measure (or the electoral integrity assessment in Column 6) with the 'Any Fraud' Treatment and restrict the analysis to only Strong UR Supporters. First, we find that internet usage (Columns 1-2) reduces the size of the treatment effect among UR supporters. The interaction effect is large and positive. Support for the UR candidate does not decrease at all among Strong UR Supporters who are exposed to political information on the internet. This effect is estimated much more precisely (and the effect is larger) in Column 1, which focuses specifically on political usage of the internet. This makes sense given that the measure in column 2 captures a much broader range of internet uses.

- There are similar findings for Facebook/Twitter usage, but the point estimate is noisy. This makes sense given that few UR supporters actually use these platforms. When we look at social media usage more broadly (column 5) we see that, among UR supporters, increased usage of social media decreased the size of the treatment effect considerably.

- Column 5 shows that, among UR supporters, those who frequently watch news on state television are more likely to say that they would punish UR candidates who commit fraud, but the interaction effect is not statistically significant.

- Column 6 examines respondent priors directly. We find that the treatment effect was much higher among UR supporters who believed that elections were free and fair. For respondents who already thought that elections were rigged, learning that the candidate committed fraud did little to change their assessment of the candidate.

- We conclude from this table that respondents' priors about fraud shape the way they react to the experimental treatment. Though our sample size is small and measures of media con-

sumption coarse, the results indicate that UR supporters who are shielded from information on fraud are more likely to react negatively when they find out that UR candidates committed fraud.

TABLE B9: HETEROGENOUS EFFECTS - INTERACTION TERMS: UPDATING PRIORS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Fraud Treatment	−0.897***	−0.883***	−0.788***	−0.970***	−0.659***	0.053
	(0.113)	(0.109)	(0.099)	(0.120)	(0.133)	(0.369)
Any Fraud Treatment * Read Political Information Online During 2016 Campaign	0.548**					
	(0.217)					
Any Fraud Treatment * Uses Internet Frequently		0.235				
		(0.178)				
Any Fraud Treatment * Facebook / Twitter User			0.217			
			(0.192)			
Any Fraud Treatment * Uses Internet to Access Social Media				0.394**		
				(0.149)		
Any Fraud Treatment * Watches State Television News Programs Frequently					−0.223	
					(0.136)	
Any Fraud Treatment * Electoral Integrity (4-point)						−0.224**
						(0.091)
Read Political Information Online During 2016 Campaign	−0.422**					
	(0.208)					
Uses Internet Frequently		−0.030				
		(0.172)				
Facebook / Twitter User			−0.008			
			(0.167)			
Uses Internet to Access Social Media				−0.356***		
				(0.117)		
Watches State Television News Programs Frequently					0.255*	
					(0.132)	
Electoral Integrity (4-point)						0.155*
						(0.077)
Region FE, Dem. Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	898	897	819	898	883	829
R^2	0.270	0.268	0.257	0.274	0.274	0.278

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ This table investigates whether people with less access to information about fraud update more strongly when presented with the experimental vignette (using interaction terms). The outcome is the five-point scale of support for the hypothetical candidate (treatment outcome). The models interact binary indicators for whether (1) whether the respondent read political news on the internet during the 2016 campaign, (2) used the internet frequently, (3) actively used Facebook or Twitter (4) used the internet to access social media, (5) the respondent frequently watched state-run news shows on television, and (6) believed that Russain elections were free and fair. All constituent terms are also included. The same set of demographic covariates used in the main paper tables are included in all models, with the addition of a measure of United Russia support. All models cluster standard errors at the individual level, on which the treatment was administered. Data comes from the 2016 Russia Election Survey.

C 2016 Experiment: Robustness and Extensions

C.1 Interaction Effects

- In the main text, we showed heterogeneity effects based on split samples. In Table C1, we interact each of the measures of support for the regime with the 'Any Fraud Treatment', while controlling for demographic covariates and region fixed effects. We find that our negative relationship still holds: stronger regime supporters are more likely to pull back their support for the candidate when they receive information that fraud has been committed.

TABLE C1: HETEROGENOUS EFFECTS - INTERACTION TERMS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Any Fraud Treatment	−0.634*** (0.060)	−0.631*** (0.060)	−0.423*** (0.134)	−0.640*** (0.063)	−0.636*** (0.061)	−0.650*** (0.064)	−0.722*** (0.068)
Any Fraud Treatment * Putin Support	−0.146** (0.063)						
Any Fraud Treatment * UR Support		−0.077*** (0.025)					
Any Fraud Treatment * Voted for United Russia			−0.429** (0.172)				
Any Fraud Treatment * Putin Is Honest				−0.219*** (0.080)			
Any Fraud Treatment * Putin is Strong					−0.206* (0.106)		
Any Fraud Treatment * Electoral Integrity						−0.135*** (0.049)	
Any Fraud Treatment * 2016 Political Internet							0.307** (0.151)
Putin Support	0.270*** (0.055)						
Voted for United Russia		0.141*** (0.021)					
UR Support			0.712*** (0.148)				
Putin Is Honest				0.409*** (0.070)			
Putin Is Strong					0.317*** (0.096)		
Electoral Integrity						0.181*** (0.042)	
2016 Political Internet							−0.281** (0.132)
Demographic Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,634	1,625	866	1,474	1,612	1,463	1,627
R^2	0.235	0.251	0.267	0.240	0.222	0.230	0.220

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ This table presents an alternate way of testing the relationship between regime support and the any fraud treatment using interaction terms. Each model in turn interacts demeaned measures of support for Putin and United Russia, voting behavior, and perceptions of democracy in Russia with the treatment variable; all constituent terms are also included. The same set of demographic covariates used in the main paper tables are included in all models. All models cluster standard errors at the individual level, on which the treatment was administered. Data comes from the 2016 Russia Election Survey.

C.2 Turnout by Regime Support

- Table C2 shows that both regime and core supporters are more likely to vote when elections are more free and fair, with little difference in turnout propensity between the two groups. The outcome variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent voted, with subsets based on high versus low levels of support for United Russia. Three different measures of electoral integrity are used as proxies for perceptions of the fairness of the elections in Russia. This finding suggests that electoral fraud does not have differential effects on abstention.

TABLE C2: PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY AND TURNOUT PROPENSITY

	UR Approval		UR Approval		UR Approval	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Male	−0.134*	−0.062**	−0.122*	−0.060**	−0.111	−0.052*
	(0.067)	(0.028)	(0.069)	(0.025)	(0.081)	(0.029)
Age (log)	0.141	0.209***	0.086	0.172***	0.041	0.234***
	(0.090)	(0.049)	(0.086)	(0.055)	(0.079)	(0.055)
Education	−0.009	0.015	0.007	0.012	0.006	0.009
	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.009)
Town Size	−0.092***	−0.053***	−0.075***	−0.056***	−0.061*	−0.049***
	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.015)
Economic Situation	0.054*	0.015	0.048	0.003	0.039	0.008
	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.014)
Employed	0.051	0.027	0.057	0.047	−0.002	0.073**
	(0.067)	(0.031)	(0.068)	(0.030)	(0.071)	(0.030)
CPSU Member	0.114	0.104**	0.099	0.148***	0.045	0.136***
	(0.069)	(0.047)	(0.074)	(0.047)	(0.084)	(0.046)
No. Civil Society Orgs	0.039*	0.027*	0.009	0.020	0.034	0.031*
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.016)
Interest in Politics	0.032	0.127***	0.046**	0.125***	0.056**	0.128***
	(0.025)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.014)
Electoral Integrity	0.006	0.036***				
	(0.026)	(0.010)				
Electoral Impact			0.054**	0.072***		
			(0.022)	(0.011)		
Russia = Democracy					−0.142	0.107***
					(0.104)	(0.029)
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	260	1,339	269	1,472	237	1,230
R^2	0.359	0.238	0.332	0.263	0.357	0.241

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ The outcome examined in this table is a binary indicator for whether the respondent voted in the 2016 election. Each set of High/Low columns uses a ten-point scale to subset the sample into respondents with high levels of approval of United Russia (values higher than 7) and low levels (values between 4 and 7). All models cluster standard errors at the individual level, on which the treatment was administered. Data comes from the 2016 Russia Election Survey.

C.3 Analyzing Non-Response

- As the main text highlights, respondents were given a choice of answering 'Hard to Answer', instead of picking a value on the five-point scale of support for the UR candidate. We found that Strong UR Supporters were slightly more likely to pick this choice after being treated with any of the fraud treatments. This section digs further into this result by analyzing a binary indicator for whether a respondent answered 'Hard to Answer' (response 9), and 0 otherwise. Figure C1 shows the raw percentages broken down by treatment group. Those in the Control had a 9% chance of having difficulty, while those receiving information that the candidate engaged in vote-buying were 14% likely to do so. This difference between Control and Bought Votes is statistically significant, while those differences with the other two treatment groups are not. It does appear that respondents struggle more often to express a concrete vote preference under conditions of vote-buying, perhaps because as Row 4, Table 1 in the main text suggests, there is much less consensus among the Russian electorate about the acceptability of this manipulation. Strong UR Supporters appear most vexed by this new information.

- However, the regressions in Table C3, we do not see a 'treatment effect' on the 'Hard to Answer' outcome when the three treatments are collapsed. Moreover when we include demographics, we do not see statistically significant differences based on UR or regime support. These results suggest that although some UR supporters hesitated to make final judgments about our hypothetical candidates, these effects were outweighed by the number who removed their support from the candidate after learning about fraud.

FIGURE C1: DON'T KNOWS BY TREATMENT STATUS

TABLE C3: DON'T KNOWS: HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF LEARNING ABOUT ELECTORAL FRAUD

	Control	Full Sample	Putin Approval High	Putin Approval Low	UR Approval High	UR Approval Low	Voted for UR High	Voted for UR Low
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Any Fraud Treatment		0.012	0.042	0.021	0.025	0.006	0.024	0.005
		(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.034)
Male	0.017	0.018	0.008	0.009	0.031	0.020	−0.033	−0.024
	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.041)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.032)
Age (log)	−0.050	−0.017	−0.047	0.005	−0.008	−0.014	−0.025	0.114**
	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.054)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.055)
Education	−0.010	−0.003	0.005	−0.005	−0.004	−0.006	−0.015	0.010
	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Town Size	0.022*	0.014**	0.002	0.021***	−0.014	0.018**	−0.005	0.020
	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Economic Situation	0.00005	−0.010	0.009	−0.022**	0.001	−0.012	0.003	−0.021
	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Employed	0.004	−0.014	−0.069**	−0.007	−0.049	−0.033*	−0.042	0.017
	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.035)
CPSU Member	−0.039	−0.017	0.021	−0.057*	0.026	−0.027	0.017	−0.048
	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Voted	−0.006	−0.009	−0.044	0.004	−0.036	−0.011		
	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.043)	(0.020)		
No. Civil Society Orgs	0.007	−0.011	−0.010	−0.007	−0.008	−0.012	−0.014	0.009
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Interest in Politics	−0.005	−0.006	−0.001	−0.003	−0.019	−0.005	−0.032**	0.011
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Putin Support	−0.021	0.007			0.036	−0.006	0.002	−0.030*
	(0.018)	(0.009)			(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)
United Russia Support	0.003	−0.004	0.002	−0.007*				
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)				
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	476	1,778	441	1,211	278	1,200	580	358
R^2	0.183	0.066	0.150	0.087	0.165	0.104	0.175	0.183

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ This table uses OLS models to examine the 'Don't Know' outcome from the framing experiment. Column 1 restricts the analysis to only the 'control group' (which received no information about the candidate engaged in electoral fraud). Column 2 estimates the same treatment effect graphically depicted in Figure 1, while including covariates. Columns 3 and 4 use a five-point scale to subset to respondents with high levels of approval of Putin's performance in office (a value of 5) and low levels (values of 3 and 4). Columns 5 and 6 use a ten-point scale to subset the sample to respondents with high levels of approval of United Russia (values higher than 7) and low levels (values between 4 and 7). Columns 7 and 8 subset the sample by whether the respondent voted for United Russia in the 2016 Duma Election.

C.4 Breaking Down Fraud

- The 2016 survey experiment used a factorial design, randomly assigning respondents to receive one of three 'fraud' treatments or the control group. In the main analysis, we collapsed these three treatment groups into an 'Any Fraud' group since we were most interested in the aggregate effect of learning about fraud for regime versus opposition supporters. Our theoretical framework specifically shows on how individuals who support the regime have different perceptions of electoral integrity, and thus are differentially affected when information about fraud is introduced. Because of that focus, we spend little time in the main text discussing variation within the treatments or along other demographic dimensions.

- This section investigates whether there is additional heterogeneity among Russians in how they respond to the three distinct treatment arms: Bought Votes, Organized Karusels, and Threatened Colleagues. But before doing that experimental analysis, we begin by looking at the observational data about which types of voters find different types of electoral fraud more or less acceptable. The reasoning is that we may find that certain groups see fewer problems in certain manipulations, and therefore would not be as affected by the revelation that a hypothetical candidate committed that manipulation. For example, older voters might be accepting of certain types of vote-buying if they directly benefit. Or employed individuals may react more negatively to the notion of mobilization in the workplace, since it places undue pressure on them in a non-political setting.

- Table C4 show simple OLS models where the outcome variables are (in order) the measures reported in Table 1 of the main text, i.e. respondents views over how "acceptable' the following actions are for attracting votes: attending opening ceremonies, limiting opposition candidates from appearing on television, etc. We include the same battery of demographics predictors as the rest of the paper and are looking for other possible dimensions that could explain variation in our survey experiment.

- The results, though interesting, do not reveal any clear trends. For example, we find surprisingly that older people are *less* likely to say distributing food to pensioners and recruiting people with alcohol or food to attend rallies are acceptable during campaigns; that contrasts with our expectations. Across the models, older individuals appear less approving of all types of pre-electoral interventions.

- Beyond age, we find more mixed patterns. More educated individuals seem to condemn various restrictions placed on the opposition as well as vote-buying. But economic situation and employment status are more weakly related with the outcomes. Finally, we see that political views (such as support for Putin or UR) are not consistently related with more lenience with regards to electoral manipulations. As we discussed in Columns 4-6, Table 3, in the main paper, regime and opposition supporters have very similar definitions about what is right and wrong during elections.

- In Table C5, we run the same analysis as in the main text and interact three other demographic characteristics with the treatment conditions. For each characteristic (age: Columns 1-2, education: Columns 3-4, and employment status: Columns 5-6), we indicate the respondent's value with first the collapsed 'Any Fraud' Treatment and then the three treatment arms broken out: Bought Votes, Organized Karusels, and Threatened Colleagues. We also include the UR Support measure (Columns 7-8) as a way to illustrate what our paper's main findings look in this set-up.

- The results do not reveal the other demographic characteristics (besides regime support) moderate the effect of treatment. In both the collapsed and the broken out models, the interactions are not statistically significant and often go in contradictory directions. For example, Column 1 suggests elderly people may be more sensitive to the Treatment, though the point estimate is not statistically significant. When the treatment arms are broken out in Column 2, we see potential evidence that older respondents are less moved by the Bought Votes Treatment, but the standard errors for all three interactions are large and far from statistically significant.

- Our takeaway from this exercise is that there is still significant unexplained variation in how Russian voters respond to different types of electoral fraud. Although the experiment uncovers significant differences between the three types of fraud included, we do not find evidence that basic demographic characteristics are correlated with these differences. In fact, only regime support emerges as a clear moderator in explaining differential reactions. More research is needed to unpack why certain voters might approve of specific manipulations, while others do not.

TABLE C4: FRAUD ACCEPTABILITY

	Acceptability of Fraud						
	Opening Ceremonies	Media Restrictions	Opp. Blocked	Food for Pensioners	Rally Freebies	Workplace Pressure	Karusel Voting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	−0.033	0.014	0.019	−0.066	0.108***	0.038	−0.022
	(0.055)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.066)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.039)
Age (log)	−0.107	−0.025	0.016	−0.280***	−0.196***	−0.012	−0.097
	(0.079)	(0.050)	(0.037)	(0.104)	(0.064)	(0.037)	(0.067)
Education	0.018	−0.027*	−0.015	−0.036**	−0.009	−0.011	0.0004
	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Town Size	0.035	0.011	−0.002	0.033	−0.002	−0.006	0.007
	(0.055)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Economic Situation	−0.019	0.010	0.002	−0.003	−0.028	0.012	−0.017
	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.019)
Employed	−0.127**	0.031	−0.004	−0.160**	0.010	0.031	0.0005
	(0.061)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.060)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.034)
CPSU Member	0.077	0.025	−0.027	0.111	0.052	−0.018	−0.038
	(0.095)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.087)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.073)
Voted	0.023	0.036	0.023	−0.040	−0.071	0.048	0.062*
	(0.071)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.059)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.034)
No. Civil Society Orgs	0.049	0.032	0.009	0.057**	0.032	0.0002	0.042*
	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Interest in Politics	0.022	−0.012	−0.002	−0.031	−0.032	−0.011	−0.016
	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Putin Support	0.112***	−0.043**	−0.029	0.058	0.009	−0.032	−0.003
	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.027)
United Russia Support	−0.023	0.012	0.013*	−0.005	−0.018	−0.008	0.003
	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,701	1,647	1,641	1,704	1,720	1,729	1,704
R^2	0.120	0.105	0.122	0.191	0.189	0.127	0.159

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ This table examines the the acceptability of different types of electoral fraud using OLS models. The outcomes are all measured on four-point scales with higher values indicating greater acceptance of these activities. See Table 1 in the main text for the full read-out of the question. All models cluster standard errors at the region level.

TABLE C5: OTHER HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Any Fraud Treatment	−0.216 (0.601)		−1.070*** (0.259)		−0.690*** (0.086)		−0.171 (0.164)	
Any Fraud Treatment * Age (log)	−0.112 (0.156)							
Any Fraud Treatment * Education			0.081* (0.047)					
Any Fraud Treatment * Employed					0.092 (0.120)			
Any Fraud Treatment * UR Support							−0.077*** (0.025)	
Bought Votes Treatment		−0.594 (0.747)		−0.748** (0.325)		−0.486*** (0.108)		−0.204 (0.197)
Organized Karusel Treatment		0.292 (0.733)		−0.751** (0.322)		−0.828*** (0.108)		−0.275 (0.196)
Threatened Colleagues Treatment		−0.435 (0.705)		−1.586*** (0.311)		−0.756*** (0.107)		−0.057 (0.201)
Bought Votes Treatment * Age (log)		0.040 (0.195)						
Organized Karusel Treatment * Age (log)		−0.282 (0.191)						
Threatened Colleagues Treatment * Age (log)		−0.065 (0.184)						
Bought Votes Treatment * Education				0.057 (0.059)				
Organized Karusel Treatment * Education				−0.003 (0.058)				
Threatened Colleagues Treatment * Education				0.170*** (0.057)				
Bought Votes Treatment * Employed						0.075 (0.150)		
Organized Karusel Treatment * Employed						0.094 (0.148)		
Threatened Colleagues Treatment * Employed						0.133 (0.147)		
Bought Votes Treatment * UR Support								−0.038 (0.030)
Organized Karusel Treatment * UR Support								−0.082*** (0.030)
Threatened Colleagues Treatment * UR Support								−0.103*** (0.031)
Age (log)	0.105 (0.144)	0.104 (0.143)	0.014 (0.079)	0.029 (0.078)	0.017 (0.079)	0.025 (0.079)	0.020 (0.079)	0.033 (0.078)
Education	0.017 (0.023)	0.013 (0.023)	−0.044 (0.042)	−0.045 (0.042)	0.016 (0.023)	0.011 (0.023)	0.018 (0.023)	0.013 (0.023)
Employed	−0.029 (0.060)	−0.019 (0.060)	−0.033 (0.060)	−0.025 (0.059)	−0.097 (0.105)	−0.094 (0.105)	−0.035 (0.060)	−0.028 (0.059)
United Russia Support	0.070*** (0.014)	0.072*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.014)	0.071*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.014)	0.072*** (0.013)	0.128*** (0.023)	0.127*** (0.023)
Demographic Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,610	1,610	1,610	1,610	1,610	1,610	1,610	1,610
R^2	0.245	0.256	0.246	0.260	0.245	0.255	0.250	0.261

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ This table uses OLS models to examine the framing experiment. Each pair of columns includes interactions with a different demographic characteristic. The first column in each pair interacts the demographic measure with the collapsed 'Any Fraud' treatment, while the second interacts it with the three individual treatment arms. All demographic covariates and constituent terms are included.

D 2016 Experiment: Question Wordings

D.1 Russian

Представьте себе, что во время следующих выборов в государственную думу по вашему избирательному округу выдвинут [предприниматель/главный врач больницы/рабочий промышленного предприятия] от Единой Россий. Ему 50 лет и его предвыборная кампания сосредоточена на оказании помощи местным школам и строительства новых дорог в округе. В ходе избирательной кампаний появляется некоторая интересная информация об этом кандидате. Вам становится известно, что он усыновил двух детей-инвалидов из детских домов. [/ С другой - что он угрожал некоторым из своих работников, которые сказали, что не пойдут на выборы / С другой - что этот кандидат раздавал подарки избирателям перед выборами. / С другой - что этот кандидат на предыдущих выборах развозил людей автобусами по избирательным участкам, чтобы они могли проголосовать на нескольких участках.] Насколько вероятно, что вы проголосуете за этого кандидата?

01. Определенно, проголосую

02. Скорее, проголосую

03. Может быть, проголосую, а может быть и нет

04. Скорее, не стану голосовать

05. Определенно, не стану голосовать[1]

09. Затрудняюсь ответить

D.2 English

Imagine that in your electoral district during the next elections to the State Duma, a [businessman/hospital director/factory worker] is nominated to run by United Russia. He is 50 years old and his pre-election campaign is focused on providing assistance to local schools and building new roads in your district. During the campaign, some good and and not so good news stories emerge about the candidate. On the one hand, it becomes known that he adopted two disabled children from orphanages. On the other hand, it also emerged that [/ he threatened some of his employees/coworkers that said they were not going to turn out in the election / this candidate had handed out goodies to voters prior to the elections / this candidate had organized a karusel in a past election so that people could vote multiple times in the election]. How likely is it that you would vote for this candidate?

01. I would definitely vote for him

02. I would likely vote for him

03. Maybe I would vote for him, maybe not

04. I probably would not vote for him

05. I definitely would not vote for him

09. Difficult to answer

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[1]The propensity scale in the Russia experiment used "I will absolutely not vote" as the top value on the five-point scale. For ease of interpretation, we reversed the scale in analyses.

E   2018 Survey: Summary Statistics, Covariate Balance, and Robustness

- Table E1 presents the individual-level summary statistics for the May 2018 Levada Monthly Omnibus where the two additional survey experiment (with turnout and vote choice alternately as outcomes) were fielded. This face-to-face survey included interviews with 1,602 Russian adults between May 9-15, 2018. Table D2 gives the question wordings used to create all of the variables used in the analysis.

- Table E3 shows that the experiments were each properly randomized and administered. We use a simple vector of identical covariates in each exercise. The joint likelihood ratio tests indicate that treatment assignments are not correlated with these confounders.

- Figure D2 shows the interaction effect between the treatment and a 10-point scale of support for United Russia for each of the two 2018 experiments: Turnout (Panel A) and Vote Choice (Panel B). This figure approximates Figure 5 in the main text, except that a UR approval rating is used instead of one for President Putin. The results in Panel A indicate again that learning about electoral fraud committed by UR candidates does not have differential effects on turnout among opposition versus regime supporters; the line is essentially flat. Panel B replicates Figure 3, showing that support for the UR candidate fall faster for regime supporters when information on fraud is revealed.

### TABLE E1: 2018 EXPERIMENTS: SUMMARY STATISTICS

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Male	1,602	0.449	0.498	0	0	1	1
Age (log)	1,602	3.768	0.388	2.890	3.497	4.094	4.500
Education	1,602	5.614	1.943	1	4	8	9
Town Size	1,602	2.686	1.312	1	1	4	5
Economic Situation	1,596	3.032	0.858	1.000	3.000	3.000	6.000
Employed	1,602	0.567	0.496	0	0	1	1
Follows Politics	1,587	2.551	1.094	1.000	2.000	3.000	5.000
Support for Putin	1,560	3.040	0.843	1.000	3.000	4.000	4.000
Support for United Russia	1,596	5.243	2.633	0.000	5.000	7.000	10.000
Voted in 2018 Presidential Election	1,576	0.721	0.448	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000

TABLE E2: 2018 EXPERIMENT: QUESTION DESCRIPTIONS

Variable	Description
Male	Binary indicator for gender.
Age (log)	Years of age (logged).
Education	Eight-point scale increasing in the level of education acquired by the respondent.
Household Economic Situation	Seven-point scale increasing in self-reported ease of paying for household expenses.
Employed	Binary indicator for whether respondent was employed at time of survey.
Follow Politics	Four-point scale of how closely respondent follows political events in Russia.
Support for Putin	Four-point scale of the degree to which the respondent approves of President Putin's performance in office from 2012-2016.
Support for United Russia	Ten-point scale of the degree to which the respondent supports the United Russia political party.
Voted in Election	Binary indicator measuring if the respondent voted in the 2018 presidential election.

FIGURE E2: HETEROGENOUS EFFECTS OF FRAUD ON TURNOUT AND VOTE CHOICE: UR SUPPORT

CI(Max − Min): [−0.567, 0.736]   CI(Max − Min): [−1.081, 0.228]

TABLE E3: 2018 EXPERIMENTS: COVARIATE BALANCE

	Turnout Exp.			Vote Choice Exp.		
	LR Chisq	Df	Pr(>Chisq)	LR Chisq	Df	Pr(>Chisq)
Male	0.27	1.00	0.60	0.59	1.00	0.44
Age (log)	0.07	1.00	0.80	0.21	1.00	0.65
Education	1.69	1.00	0.19	1.50	1.00	0.22
Town Size	1.62	1.00	0.20	2.50	1.00	0.11
Economic Situation	2.13	1.00	0.14	0.04	1.00	0.84
Employed	2.19	1.00	0.14	0.33	1.00	0.57
Voted	1.35	1.00	0.24	1.36	1.00	0.24
Joint Likelihood Ratio Test:	-0.25		0.5332	-0.34		0.4962

This table presents the likelihood-ratio tests for fourteen demographic predictors from a multinomial logistic regression with the outcome variables being the treatment status in the 2018 Turnout Experiment (Columns 1-3) and the treatment status in the 2018 Vote Choice Experiment (Columns 4-6. Chi-squared values are given in the first column of each set, degrees of freedom in the second, and finally p-values in the final column. Below these independent tests is the chi-square statistic from a joint likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all predictors are equal to zero.

E1 Question Wordings

Представьте себе, что во время следующих выборов в государственную думу по вашему избирательному округу выдвинут предприниматель от Единой Россий. Ему 50 лет и его предвыборная кампания сосредоточена на оказании помощи местным школам и строительстве новых дорог в округе. В ходе избирательной кампаний появляется некоторая интересная информация об этом кандидате. Вам становится известно, что он усыновил двух детей инвалидов из детских домов. [/ С другой - что этот кандидат на предыдущих выборах развозил людей автобусами по избирательным участкам, чтобы они могли проголосовать на нескольких участках.]

Turnout Experiment Outcome: Насколько вероятно, что Вы примите участие в этих выборах?

01. Определенно приму участие

02. Скорее приму участие

03. может быть да, а может быть и нет

04. Скорее, не стану принимать участие

05. Определенно, не стану принимать участие

09. Затрудняюсь ответить

Vote Choice Experiment Outcome: Насколько вероятно, что вы проголосуете за этого кандидата?

01. Определенно, проголосую

02. Скорее, проголосую

03. Может быть, проголосую, а может быть и нет

04. Скорее, не стану голосовать

05. Определенно, не стану голосовать

09. Затрудняюсь ответить

E2 English

Imagine that in your electoral district during the next elections to the State Duma, a businessman] is nominated to run by United Russia. He is 50 years old and his pre-election campaign is focused on providing assistance to local schools and building new roads in your district. During the campaign, some good and and not so good news stories emerge about the candidate. On the one hand, it becomes known that he adopted two disabled children from orphanages. On the other hand, it also emerged that [/ this candidate had organized a karusel in a past election so that people could vote multiple times in the election].[2]

Turnout Experiment Outcome: How likely is it that you would vote in this election?

01. I would definitely vote

02. I would likely vote

03. Maybe I would vote, maybe not

04. I probably would not vote

05. I definitely would not vote

09. Difficult to answer

Vote Choice Experiment Outcome: How likely is it that you would vote for this candidate?

01. I would definitely vote for him

02. I would likely vote for him

03. Maybe I would vote for him, maybe not

04. I probably would not vote for him

05. I definitely would not vote for him

09. Difficult to answer

How likely would it be that you would vote for this candidate?

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[2]For ease of interpretation, we reversed both scales in analyses.

F Cross-National Evidence

- To show the relationship between regime support and perceptions of democracy worldwide, we use data from the 2010-2014 waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) for ten electoral autocracies governed by a ruling party: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Singapore, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. These parties command a plurality, if not a majority, of popular support, as measured by questions in the WVS.

- In Table F1, we show descriptive statistics about popular perceptions of democratic institutions for the ten electoral autocracies, as well as two other nondemocracies in the Middle East (Egypt and Jordan). For sake of comparison, we include statistics for the same questions for five democracies also surveyed during the same period. The questions (in order of the columns) involve ranking the level of democracy in one's country on a 10-point scale (with 10 being the highest), and then answering questions on a four-point scale about specific electoral practices, with higher values indicating more agreement. We transformed these latter questions into binary indicators with values of 1 or 2 equalling 0, and 3 or 4 indicating 1. This table demonstrates that large parts of the population in electoral autocracies rate the quality of democracy in their country relatively high. Some of scores in these nondemocratic countries rival those found in countries with much more developed democratic institutions, at least scored by the academic community.

TABLE F1: PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY - EVIDENCE FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

Country	Level of Democracy in Country (1-10)	How Often: (%)					
		Votes Counted Unfairly	Restrictions Placed on Opposition	Voters Bribed	Biased Media Coverage	Voters Threatened With Violence	Genuine Choice Not Available
Algeria (2013)	5.80	52	39	63	48	29	41
Azerbaijan (2011)	5.90	46	28	14	43	7	35
Egypt (2013)	4.70	48	40	50	47	34	48
Jordan (2014)	6.70	44	42	80	40	30	35
Kazakhstan (2011)	6.80	38	31	29	41	10	37
Malaysia (2012)	7.20	20	24	36	36	17	31
Nigeria (2011)	5.70	47	54	71	38	67	46
Rwanda (2012)	7.20	23	19	10	51	13	46
Singapore (2012)	6.90	8	32	15	33	11	24
Ukraine (2011)	4.50	62	59	72	43	19	52
Yemen (2014)	5.10	52	27	67	61	31	36
Zimbabwe (2012)	5.40	53	40	50	54	55	46
Argentina (2013)	6.50	24	42	70	27	37	25
Germany (2013)	7.20	4	19	12	15	7	10
Netherlands (2012)	7.30	4	10	6	23	2	25
Poland (2012)	5.90	15	15	25	33	3	35
Taiwan (2012)	6.90	8	57	77	43	32	12

This table provides summary statistics from the 2010-2014 wave of the World Values Survey about respondents' impressions of their country's level of democracy. The top block of countries are generally considered electoral autocracies, whereas the bottom block are either established or developing democracies. The first column presents the mean on a ten-point scale for how respondents rated their own country's 'democraticness'. The remaining columns to the right present the percentage of respondents who answered that the listed activities occurred 'fairly often' or 'very often' (the top two values of a four-point scale) during elections.

- Finally, in Table F2, we find strong correlations between being a support of the ruling party (regime) and believing that democracy is stronger in one's country. Using the same set of questions (including the continuous four-point scales), we regress the measures of democracy on a battery of covariates, country fixed effects, and most importantly an indicator for whether the respondent is a self-described supporter of their country's ruling party. Regime supporters believe their country to be significantly more democratic, with much fewer instances of electoral malpractice. Connecting this cross-national evidence with our results from Russia indicates that core supporters hold fundamentally different beliefs about the nature of political institutions in their countries.

TABLE F2: REGIME SUPPORTERS AND PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY: CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE

	Level of Democracy in Country	Votes Counted Unfairly	Restrictions Placed on Opposition	Voters Bribed	Biased Media Coverage	Voters Threatened With Violence	Genuine Choice Not Available
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	−0.194*	0.039	−0.003	0.067***	0.055	0.041	0.067
	(0.095)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.038)
Age (log)	−0.281**	0.020	−0.054	−0.073***	0.015	−0.061*	−0.020
	(0.103)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.024)
Education	−0.021	0.024**	−0.022*	0.017*	−0.003	−0.004	0.001
	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Town Size	−0.024	0.019*	0.012*	0.012	0.018***	0.009	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Economic Class	0.168***	−0.017	0.018	−0.035*	−0.015	0.034*	−0.034
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Employed	0.006	−0.089**	−0.028	−0.032	−0.030	−0.091**	0.012
	(0.059)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.051)
Votes in National Elections	0.105	−0.101**	0.004	−0.017	−0.088**	−0.047	−0.104***
	(0.070)	(0.037)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Ruling Party Supporter	0.796***	−0.460**	−0.375***	−0.363**	−0.279**	−0.349**	−0.326**
	(0.164)	(0.170)	(0.080)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.114)	(0.141)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,881	9,507	8,577	8,693	8,949	8,418	8,864
R^2	0.149	0.107	0.116	0.282	0.050	0.281	0.039

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$ This table looks at the factors affecting perceptions of democracy and electoral integrity cross-nationally. The countries that enter the sample are all considered electoral autocracies and include: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Singapore, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. The outcome in Column 1 is a ten-point scale, with greater values indicating stronger beliefs that each respondent's country is democratic. The outcomes in Columns 2-7 are all four-point scales, with greater values indicating that the respondent believes each of the electoral violations happens more often in their country. All models use OLS and cluster errors at the country level.