# Supplementary Material to the paper entitled *Cobbler, stick to your last? Social democrats’ electoral returns from labour market policy*

Flavia Fossati and Philipp Trein, University of Lausanne

### Additional information on the short-time work (STW) in Germany

Employees have a claim to STW if there is a loss of earnings due to unforeseen circumstances such as economic crises or natural catastrophes and if the crisis affects at least one-third of the employees in a company.[[1]](#footnote-1) Legally, STW is a situation in which the employer carries the responsibility for halting production, and the work council must agree to introduce STW.[[2]](#footnote-2) In severe economic downturns, STW can be extended. During the 2007-2009 economic crisis, the German government included temporary agency workers in the STW scheme, increased the length of STW from 18 up to 24 months; the government loosened access rules for firms, halved social security contributions for firms or paid for them entirely and extended its scope to include specific groups of atypical workers (Sacchi et al., 2011, 27).

### Considerations about the operationalization of the dependent variables

We argue that it is legitimate to operationalise STW at the constituency level and link this to national level election as, although voters read national newspapers, we know that these papers also cover regional developments, and we assume that voters greatly care about those regional issues. In fact, several prominent media sources cover these interventions extensively (e.g. Spiegel Online, May 20, 2009, Die Zeit Online, June 16 2009, Spiegel Online, May 20, 2009:, Handelsblatt, January 7, 2009, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 15, 2009, IAB Report (see Literature list in the article). Finally, even tabloid newspapers such as Bild Zeitung discussed this issue on February 21, 2009, making aware the broad public about this issue.

Thus, we are convinced that estimating the effect of regional policy interventions on national elections is plausible because voters refer to their local economic situation when evaluating government performance and attempting to maximize their self-interest.

**Table S1**: Representativeness of pre-and post-election samples

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Second Vote**  (Percentage of votes) | **Results of vote 2009** | **Pre-election survey** | **Postelection survey** | **Mean pre- and post-election survey** |
| **CDU/CSU** | 33.8 | 33.61 | 36.22 | 34.94 |
| **SPD** | 23.0 | 25.98 | 23.04 | 24.48 |
| **Green Party** | 10.7 | 13.17 | 14.73 | 13.96 |
| **FDP** | 14.6 | 11.62 | 10.74 | 11.18 |
| ***die Linke*** | 11.9 | 15.63 | 15.27 | 15.44 |

### **Table S2:** Descriptive statistics at the macro level

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **MACRO LEVEL** | **N** | **Mean** | **St.dev.** | **Min** | **Max** |
| **Dependent variables** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Change electoral outcome SPD | 299 | -0.30 | 0.05 | -50.23 | -12.97 |
| Change electoral outcome CDU/CSU | 299 | -1.80 | 10.40 | -16.85 | 40.13 |
| Change electoral outcome Greens | 299 | 30.41 | 13.12 | -2.29 | 76.12 |
| Change electoral outcome FDP | 299 | 44.50 | 13.31 | -20.22 | 77.80 |
| Change electoral outcome *Linke* | 299 | 60.20 | 29.38 | 0.15 | 143.65 |
| **Independent variable** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Short-time work | 299 | 5.20 | 2.88 | 0.96 | 15.40 |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Change in unemployment | 299 | 0.59 | 0.67 | -1.77 | 3.00 |
| Absolute unemployment level | 299 | 8.05 | 3.12 | 2.93 | 15.21 |
| East Germany | 299 | 0.91 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| Participation | 299 | 0.71 | 0.04 | 0.58 | 0.80 |
| SPD vote 2005 | 299 | 0.34 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.55 |
| CDU vote 2005 | 299 | 0.35 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.60 |

### **Table S3:** Descriptive statistics at the micro level

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **MICRO LEVEL** | **N** | **Mean** | **St.dev.** | **Min** | **Max** |
| **Main variables** |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Macro level** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Short-time | 3437 | 5.11 | 2.80 | 0.96 | 15.40 |
| **Micro level** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ego-tropic | 3251 | 1.94 | 0.59 | 0 | 4 |
| Government performance | 3396 | 5.62 | 2.44 | 1 | 11 |
| **Party votes** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vote coalition | 2908 | 0.59 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Vote SPD | 2908 | 0.24 | 0.43 | 0 | 1 |
| Vote CSUCDU | 2908 | 0.35 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |
| Vote *Linke* | 2908 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 |
| Vote FDP | 2908 | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |
| Vote Greens | 2908 | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Macro level** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Change in unemployment | 3437 | 0.512 | 0.73 | -1.77 | 2.98 |
| Absolute unemployment level | 3437 | 8.78 | 3.11 | 2.93 | 15.21 |
| **Individual level** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Gender | 3437 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 3383 | 2.99 | 1.11 | 1 | 5 |
| Age | 3437 | 51.63 | 17.95 | 16 | 94 |
| Age#2 | 3437 | 2987.48 | 1850.59 | 256 | 8836 |
| Unemployed | 3437 | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Union member | 3437 | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 |
| High party identification | 3437 | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Pol. interest | 3427 | 2.97 | 0.95 | 1 | 5 |
| Left-right position | 3113 | 5.38 | 1.91 | 1 | 11 |
| Left-right position^2 | 3113 | 32.61 | 21.29 | 1 | 121 |
| Socio-tropic | 3270 | 1.50 | 0.60 | 0 | 3.33 |
| Survey wave | 3437 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| East Germany | 3437 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 |

### **Figure S1**: Electoral gains and losses per party/block in 2009 as compared to the 2005 German federal elections

****

# Macro-level analysis

**Table S4: Macro-level evidence:** The effect of short-time work on the electoral outcome (Link 1), government versus opposition

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) |  | (2) |  | (3) |  |
| DV: electoral outcome government vs. opposition | Reward |  | Reward and controls |  | Reward, punishment and controls |  |
| Government (SPD and CDU/CSU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **STW** | **-0.814\*\*\*** | **(0.200)** | -0.291 | (0.181) | **0.499\*\*** | **(0.188)** |
| Unemployment change |  |  |  |  | -3.152\*\*\* | (0.826) |
| Absolute unemployment |  |  |  |  | 1.841\*\*\* | (0.206) |
| East Germany |  |  | 11.483\*\*\* | (2.549) | 5.084\* | (2.287) |
| Participation |  |  | -42.343\*\* | (15.020) | -2.113 | (13.568) |
| Government outcome 2005 |  |  | 7.185 | (10.842) | 14.962 | (9.454) |
| Constant | -28.055\*\*\* | (1.190) | -8.139 | (14.564) | -57.645\*\*\* | (13.630) |
| R2 | 0.052 |  | 0.325 |  | 0.498 |  |
| Opposition (FDP, Greens, *die Linke*) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **STW** | **4.644\*\*\*** | **(0.895)** | 0.136 | (0.550) | **-1.352\*** | **(0.631)** |
| **Unemployment change** |  |  |  |  | **6.965\*** | **(2.775)** |
| **Absolute unemployment** |  |  |  |  | **-3.015\*\*\*** | **(0.699)** |
| East Germany |  |  | -16.641\* | (7.223) | -4.940 | (7.160) |
| Participation |  |  | 77.679° | (46.132) | 8.618 | (46.554) |
| Opposition outcome 2005 |  |  | -432.473\*\*\* | (33.493) | -422.162\*\*\* | (32.732) |
| Constant | 110.961\*\*\* | (5.321) | 196.160\*\*\* | (33.043) | 267.759\*\*\* | (34.910) |
| R2 | 0.083 |  | 0.700 |  | 0.726 |  |
| N | 299 |  | 299 |  | 299 |  |
| ll | -2577.932 |  | -2365.939 |  | -2320.132 |  |

Standard errors in parentheses, seemingly unrelated regressions, macro level.

° p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Dependent absolute change in electoral support for the government vs. opposition, i.e., difference of the sum of the vote share of the government parties (SPD, CDU/CSU) and opposition parties (*die Linke*, Greens and FDP).

### **Table S5:** **Macro-level evidence:** The effect of short-time work on the electoral outcome (Link 1), separate parties

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1** |  |
| CDU/CSU |  |  |
| **STW** | **0.219°** | **(0.124)** |
| Unemployment change | -1.322\* | (0.547) |
| Absolute unemployment | -0.496\* | (0.194) |
| East Germany | 16.877\*\*\* | (1.618) |
| Participation | -39.013\*\*\* | (9.155) |
| CDU outcome 2005 | -34.971\*\*\* | (6.779) |
| SPD CDU outcome 2005 | 27.033\*\*\* | (7.253) |
| Constant | 28.862\*\* | (9.267) |
| R2 | 0.789 |  |
| SPD |  |  |
| **STW** | **0.403\*\*\*** | **(0.106)** |
| Unemployment change | -0.966\* | (0.467) |
| Absolute unemployment | 0.530\*\* | (0.165) |
| East Germany | -5.296\*\*\* | (1.382) |
| Participation | 9.540 | (7.818) |
| CDU outcome 2005 | 29.407\*\*\* | (6.194) |
| SPD CDU outcome 2005 | 15.964\*\* | (5.789) |
| Constant | -57.370\*\*\* | (7.913) |
| R2 | 0.413 |  |
| FDP |  |  |
| **STW** | -0.344 | (0.242) |
| Unemployment change | 2.554\* | (1.069) |
| Absolute unemployment | -0.094 | (0.378) |
| East Germany | -10.638\*\* | (3.301) |
| Participation | 23.066 | (18.701) |
| FDP outcome 2005 | -273.375\*\*\* | (28.362) |
| CDU outcome 2005 | 13.097 | (15.733) |
| SPD CDU outcome 2005 | 65.590\*\*\* | (13.697) |
| Constant | 30.651° | (18.267) |
| R2 | 0.510 |  |
| Greens |  |  |
| **STW** | **-0.552\*** | **(0.256)** |
| Unemployment change | 2.344\* | (1.116) |
| Absolute unemployment | 0.117 | (0.395) |
| East Germany | 11.698\*\* | (3.652) |
| Participation | 51.200\* | (20.176) |
| Greens outcome 2005 | -136.888\*\*\* | (20.809) |
| CDU outcome 2005 | 100.146\*\*\* | (16.938) |
| SPD CDU outcome 2005 | 128.637\*\*\* | (15.873) |
| Constant | -75.167\*\*\* | (18.610) |
| R2 | 0.457 |  |
| *Die Linke* |  |  |
| **STW** | 0.129 | (0.362) |
| Unemployment change | 1.306 | (1.622) |
| Absolute unemployment | -2.968\*\*\* | (0.572) |
| East Germany | 1.790 | (5.499) |
| Participation | -94.520\*\* | (29.749) |
| *Linke* outcome 2005 | -202.538\*\*\* | (27.740) |
| CDU outcome 2005 | 107.345\*\*\* | (22.071) |
| SPD CDU outcome 2005 | 57.481\* | (23.091) |
| Constant | 110.400\*\*\* | (32.648) |
| R2 | 0.774 |  |
| N | 299 |  |
| ll | -4982.568 |  |

Standard errors in parentheses

° p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

# Micro-level analysis

### **Table S6: Micro-level evidence**: the determinants of ego-tropic and government performance evaluation (Links 2 and 3)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1 (Link 2)** |  | **Model 2 (Link 3)** |  |
| DV | Ego-tropic evaluation |  | Government performance |  |
| *Main independent variable* |  |  |  |  |
| **STW %** | **0.013\*** | **(0.006)** |  |  |
| **Ego-tropic evaluation** |  |  | **0.573\*\*\*** | **(0.088)** |
| *Macro controls* |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment change | -0.082\*\* | (0.026) | -0.538\*\*\* | (0.138) |
| STW % |  |  | 0.052 | (0.033) |
| Absolute unemployment | 0.002 | (0.007) | -0.048 | (0.035) |  |
| *Micro controls* |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.012\*\*\* | (0.003) | -0.047\*\* | (0.014) |
| Age^2 | 0.000\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Gender | 0.023 | (0.019) | 0.214\*\* | (0.081) |
| Education | 0.075\*\*\* | (0.009) | 0.065 | (0.043) |
| Personal unemployment | -0.408\*\*\* | (0.042) | 0.361° | (0.187) |
| Union membership | -0.013 | (0.028) | -0.102 | (0.122) |
| Strong party identification | 0.104\*\*\* | (0.021) | 0.217\* | (0.093) |
| High interest | 0.015 | (0.011) | 0.007 | (0.051) |
| Left-right | 0.115\*\*\* | (0.021) | 0.687\*\*\* | (0.095) |
| Left-right^2 | -0.008\*\*\* | (0.002) | -0.032\*\*\* | (0.008) |
| Socio-tropic | 0.407\*\*\* | (0.017) | 0.942\*\*\* | (0.085) |
| Pre-election | -0.053\*\* | (0.018) | -0.488\*\*\* | (0.079) |
| East Germany | -0.049 | (0.044) | 0.286 | (0.232) |
| Constant | 0.952\*\*\* | (0.129) | 1.414\* | (0.608) |
| N | 2545 |  | 2545 |  |
| AIC | 3217.026 |  | 10789.890 |  |
| BIC | 3328.022 |  | 10906.727 |  |
| ll | -1589.513 |  | -5374.945 |  |

Standard errors in parentheses, logit models, micro level.

° p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001.

### **Table S7:** **Micro-level evidence**: the determinants of the electoral outcome (Link 4)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Link 4** | |
| DV: Vote for SPD vs. CDU/CSU vs. Opposition |  | |
| CDU/CSU |  |  |
| *Main independent variable* | |  |
| **Government evaluation** | **0.318\*\*\*** | **(0.039)** |
| *Macro controls* | | |
| STW% | 0.014 | (0.031) |
| Unemployment change | 0.148 | (0.151) |
| Absolute unemployment | 0.068\* | (0.033) |
| *Micro controls* |  |  |
| Age | 0.034 | (0.021) |
| Age^2 | -0.000 | (0.000) |
| Gender | 0.239 | (0.125) |
| Education | -0.190\*\* | (0.065) |
| Personal unemployment | -0.144 | (0.268) |
| Union membership | 0.026 | (0.179) |
| Strong party identification | 0.145 | (0.147) |
| High interest | -0.140 | (0.077) |
| Left-right | 1.383\*\*\* | (0.387) |
| Left-right^2 | -0.066\* | (0.029) |
| Socio-tropic | 0.169 | (0.120) |
| Ego-tropic | 0.197 | (0.149) |
| Pre-election | 0.156 | (0.153) |
| East Germany | 0.728\*\* | (0.232) |
| Constant | -9.976\*\*\* | (1.459) |
| SPD |  |  |
| *Independent variabl*e |  |  |
| **Government evaluation** | **0.165\*\*\*** | **(0.032)** |
| *Macro controls* |  |  |
| STW% | 0.037 | (0.039) |
| Unemployment change | -0.351\* | (0.171) |
| Absolute unemployment | 0.123\*\*\* | (0.033) |
| *Micro controls* |  |  |
| Age | -0.002 | (0.017) |
| Age^2 | 0.000 | (0.000) |
| Gender | 0.083 | (0.138) |
| Education | -0.364\*\*\* | (0.070) |
| Personal unemployment | -0.548 | (0.315) |
| Union membership | 0.199 | (0.189) |
| Strong party identification | 0.176 | (0.141) |
| High interest | -0.113 | (0.081) |
| Left-right | 1.676\*\*\* | (0.239) |
| Left-right^2 | -0.177\*\*\* | (0.025) |
| Socio-tropic | -0.079 | (0.114) |
| Ego-tropic | -0.105 | (0.137) |
| Pre-election | 0.253\* | (0.126) |
| East Germany | -1.076\*\*\* | (0.232) |
| Constant | -4.505\*\*\* | (0.883) |
| Base outcome: *Opposition* |  |  |
| N | 2545 |  |
| AIC | 4265.275 |  |
| BIC | 4487.267 |  |
| ll | -2094.638 |  |

Standard errors in parentheses, multinomial logit models, micro level.

° p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001.

**Table S8: Micro-level evidence:** the effect of short-time work on the ego-tropic evaluation, alternative specification (Link 2)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **LINK 2** | **Model 1** |  | **Model 2** |  | **Model 3** |  | **Model 4** |  |
| DV: Ego-tropic evaluation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Independent variable* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| STW % | **0.002** | **(0.005)** |  |  |  |  | **0.013\*** | **(0.006)** |
| *Macro controls* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment change |  |  | -0.053\* | (0.022) |  |  | -0.081\*\* | (0.026) |
| Absolute unemployment |  |  |  |  | 0.005 | (0.006) | 0.002 | (0.007) |
| *Micro controls* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.013\*\*\* | (0.003) | -0.012\*\*\* | (0.003) | -0.012\*\*\* | (0.003) | -0.012\*\*\* | (0.003) |
| Age^2 | 0.000\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.000\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.000\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.000\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Gender | 0.025 | (0.019) | 0.023 | (0.019) | 0.024 | (0.019) | 0.023 | (0.019) |
| Education | 0.076\*\*\* | (0.010) | 0.075\*\*\* | (0.009) | 0.076\*\*\* | (0.009) | 0.075\*\*\* | (0.009) |
| Personal unemployment | -0.405\*\*\* | (0.042) | -0.408\*\*\* | (0.042) | -0.406\*\*\* | (0.042) | -0.408\*\*\* | (0.042) |
| Union membership | -0.016 | (0.028) | -0.015 | (0.028) | -0.016 | (0.028) | -0.013 | (0.028) |
| Strong party identification | 0.100\*\*\* | (0.021) | 0.101\*\*\* | (0.021) | 0.100\*\*\* | (0.021) | 0.104\*\*\* | (0.021) |
| High interest | 0.015 | (0.011) | 0.014 | (0.011) | 0.015 | (0.011) | 0.015 | (0.011) |
| Left-right | 0.112\*\*\* | (0.021) | 0.114\*\*\* | (0.021) | 0.112\*\*\* | (0.021) | 0.115\*\*\* | (0.021) |
| Left-right^2 | -0.008\*\*\* | (0.002) | -0.008\*\*\* | (0.002) | -0.008\*\*\* | (0.002) | -0.008\*\*\* | (0.002) |
| Socio-tropic | 0.407\*\*\* | (0.017) | 0.407\*\*\* | (0.017) | 0.408\*\*\* | (0.017) | 0.407\*\*\* | (0.017) |
| Pre-election | -0.051\*\* | (0.018) | -0.052\*\* | (0.018) | -0.052\*\* | (0.018) | -0.053\*\* | (0.018) |
| East Germany | -0.007 | (0.034) | -0.048 | (0.035) | -0.033 | (0.045) | -0.049 | (0.044) |
| Constant | 0.986\*\*\* | (0.114) | 1.029\*\*\* | (0.110) | 0.958\*\*\* | (0.121) | 0.952\*\*\* | (0.129) |
| N | 2545.000 |  | 2545.000 |  |  |  | 2545.000 |  |
| AIC | 3222.872 |  | 3217.218 |  | 3222.464 |  | 3217.026 |  |
| BIC | 3322.184 |  | 3316.530 |  | 3321.776 |  | 3328.022 |  |
| ll | -1594.436 |  | -1591.609 |  | -1594.232 |  | -1589.513 |  |

Standard errors in parentheses, linear multilevel regression, micro level.

° p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001.

### **Table S9:** Micro-level evidence: the effect of ego-tropic evaluation on government performance, alternative specification (Link 3)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **LINK 3** | **Model 1** |  | **Model 2** |  | **Model 3** |  | **Model 4** |  |
| DV: Government performance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Independent variable* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Ego-tropic evaluation** | **0.588\*\*\*** | **(0.088)** | **0.577\*\*\*** | **(0.088)** | **0.588\*\*\*** | **(0.088)** | **0.573\*\*\*** | **(0.079)** |
| *Macro controls* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| STW % | -0.009 | (0.029) |  |  |  |  | 0.052 | (0.033) |
| Unemployment change |  |  | -0.372\*\* | (0.114) |  |  | -0.538\*\*\* | (0.138) |
| Absolute unemployment |  |  |  |  | -0.023 | (0.034) | -0.048 | (0.035) |
| *Micro controls* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.047\*\* | (0.014) | -0.046\*\* | (0.014) | -0.047\*\*\* | (0.014) | -0.047\*\* | (0.014) |
| Age^2 | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) | 0.001\*\*\* | (0.000) |
| Gender | 0.217\*\* | (0.081) | 0.213\*\* | (0.081) | 0.218\*\* | (0.081) | 0.214\*\* | (0.081) |
| Education | 0.070 | (0.043) | 0.064 | (0.043) | 0.071° | (0.043) | 0.065 | (0.043) |
| Personal unemployment | 0.376\* | (0.187) | 0.360Â° | (0.187) | 0.379\* | (0.187) | 0.361° | (0.187) |
| Union membership | -0.114 | (0.122) | -0.105 | (0.122) | -0.115 | (0.122) | -0.102 | (0.122) |
| Strong party identification | 0.209\* | (0.093) | 0.217\* | (0.093) | 0.206\* | (0.093) | 0.217\* | (0.093) |
| High interest | 0.006 | (0.051) | 0.006 | (0.051) | 0.006 | (0.051) | 0.007 | (0.051) |
| Left-right | 0.675\*\*\* | (0.096) | 0.684\*\*\* | (0.095) | 0.675\*\*\* | (0.096) | 0.687\*\*\* | (0.095) |
| Left-right^2 | -0.031\*\*\* | (0.008) | -0.031\*\*\* | (0.008) | -0.031\*\*\* | (0.008) | -0.032\*\*\* | (0.008) |
| Socio-tropic | 0.946\*\*\* | (0.085) | 0.949\*\*\* | (0.085) | 0.943\*\*\* | (0.085) | 0.942\*\*\* | (0.085) |
| Pre-election | -0.488\*\*\* | (0.080) | -0.492\*\*\* | (0.079) | -0.486\*\*\* | (0.080) | -0.488\*\*\* | (0.079) |
| East Germany | 0.294 | (0.182) | 0.289 | (0.233) | 0.422° | (0.238) | 0.286 | (0.232) |
| Constant | 0.996° | (0.521) | 1.703\*\* | (0.580) | 1.122\* | (0.561) | 1.414\* | (0.608) |
| N | 2545 |  | 2545 |  | 2545 |  | 2545 |  |
| AIC | 10801.211 |  | 10790.299 |  | 10800.868 |  | 10789.890 |  |
| BIC | 10906.365 |  | 10901.295 |  | 10906.022 |  | 10906.727 |  |
| ll | -5382.605 |  | -5376.150 |  | -5382.434 |  | -5374.945 |  |

Standard errors in parentheses, linear multilevel regression, macro level.

° p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001.

### **Table S10: Micro-level evidence:** the effect of government evaluation on vote choice (Link 4), alternative specification

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **LINK 4** | **Model 1** |  | **Model 2** |  | **Model 3** |  | **Model 4** |  |
| DV: Vote for government (vs. opposition) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Independent variable* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Government performance** | **0.229\*\*\*** | **(0.024)** | **0.227\*\*\*** | **(0.024)** | **0.230\*\*\*** | **(0.024)** | **0.230\*\*\*** | **(0.024)** |
| *Macro controls* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| STW % | -0.007 | (0.024) |  |  |  |  | 0.022 | (0.029) |
| Unemployment change |  |  | -0.084 | (0.099) |  |  | -0.021 | (0.119) |
| Absolute unemployment |  |  |  |  | 0.108\*\*\* | (0.028) | 0.113\*\*\* | (0.030) |
| *Micro controls* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.014 | (0.018) | 0.014 | (0.018) | 0.017 | (0.018) | 0.017 | (0.018) |
| Age^2 | 0.000 | (0.000) | 0.000 | (0.000) | 0.000 | (0.000) | 0.000 | (0.000) |
| Gender | 0.077 | (0.099) | 0.075 | (0.099) | 0.082 | (0.099) | 0.083 | (0.099) |
| Education | -0.211\*\*\* | (0.050) | -0.213\*\*\* | (0.050) | -0.216\*\*\* | (0.050) | -0.215\*\*\* | (0.050) |
| Personal unemployment | -0.232 | (0.222) | -0.238 | (0.222) | -0.259 | (0.222) | -0.260 | (0.223) |
| Union membership | 0.140 | (0.146) | 0.143 | (0.146) | 0.160 | (0.145) | 0.164 | (0.145) |
| Strong party identification | 0.261\* | (0.110) | 0.264\* | (0.110) | 0.284\*\* | (0.110) | 0.287\*\* | (0.110) |
| High interest | -0.218\*\*\* | (0.061) | -0.218\*\*\* | (0.061) | -0.216\*\*\* | (0.061) | -0.215\*\*\* | (0.061) |
| Left-right | 0.934\*\*\* | (0.122) | 0.940\*\*\* | (0.122) | 0.935\*\*\* | (0.121) | 0.935\*\*\* | (0.122) |
| Left-right^2 | -0.057\*\*\* | (0.011) | -0.057\*\*\* | (0.011) | -0.057\*\*\* | (0.011) | -0.057\*\*\* | (0.011) |
| Socio-tropic | 0.086 | (0.103) | 0.088 | (0.103) | 0.106 | (0.103) | 0.106 | (0.103) |
| Ego-tropic | 0.056 | (0.106) | 0.051 | (0.106) | 0.050 | (0.105) | 0.048 | (0.106) |
| Pre-election | 0.187° | (0.097) | 0.185° | (0.097) | 0.170° | (0.097) | 0.169° | (0.097) |
| East Germany | 0.279° | (0.155) | 0.236 | (0.161) | -0.221 | (0.193) | -0.212 | (0.195) |
| Constant | -4.084\*\*\* | (0.619) | -4.064\*\*\* | (0.607) | -5.030\*\*\* | (0.650) | -5.182\*\*\* | (0.685) |
| N | 2545 |  | 2545 |  | 2545 |  | 2545 |  |
| AIC | 2877.439 |  | 2876.827 |  | 2863.267 |  | 2866.640 |  |
| BIC | 2982.593 |  | 2981.981 |  | 2968.421 |  | 2983.477 |  |
| ll | -1420.720 |  | -1420.414 |  | -1413.634 |  | -1413.320 |  |

Standard errors in parentheses, logistic multilevel regression, micro level.

° p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001.

1. Code of Social Law III (Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB) Drittes Buch (III)), articles 95-96. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), article 615. Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), article 87. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)