**Appendix A – Additional country-level empirical evidence**

This Appendix includes four tables that refer to the domain-specific scales considered in the article: the two economy-related items *Authority over economic policy* and *Pooling of economic resources*, and the two immigration-related items *Authority over immigration policy* and *Costs of providing asylum*. In terms of the indicators of mass-elite congruence we display, the following tables are equivalent to Table 1, presented in the main body of the article and based on the scale gauging attitudes towards general European integration. In consulting Tables A1–A4, it should be noted that we have recoded the domain-specific scales in such a way that each one ranges from the pro-integration pole (point 0) to the pro-independence pole (point 10).

Table A1: Country-level measures of mass-elite congruence – Authority over economic policy

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | **Average** | **Average-based direction** |  |  | **Majority** | **Majority-based direction** | **Distribution** |
|  | **Mass mean** | **Elite mean** | **∆ in means** | **Aligned means?** | **Pro-EU mass %** | **Pro-EU elite %** | **∆ in %** | **Aligned majorities?** | **MTM** |
| Czechia | 7.38 | 6.77 | 0.61 | anti-EU alignment | 19.3% | 23.0% | -3.7 | anti-EU alignment | 81.24 |
| France | 5.81 | 3.69 | 2.12\*\*\* | pro-EU elite bias | 37.9% | 72.1% | -34.2 | pro-EU elite bias | 59.37 |
| Germany | 5.83 | 4.63 | 1.20\*\*\* | pro-EU elite bias | 38.9% | 55.4% | -16.5 | pro-EU elite bias | 74.46 |
| Greece | 6.52 | 5.38 | 1.14\*\* | anti-EU alignment | 30.7% | 46.7% | -16.0 | anti-EU alignment | 75.86 |
| Italy | 5.75 | 4.78 | 0.97\*\* | pro-EU elite bias | 38.8% | 53.8% | -15.0 | pro-EU elite bias | 81.25 |
| Netherlands | 6.25 | 6.70 | -0.45 | anti-EU alignment | 31.9% | 32.5% | -0.6 | anti-EU alignment | 77.11 |
| Poland | 6.36 | 6.19 | 0.17 | anti-EU alignment | 31.8% | 35.1% | -3.3 | anti-EU alignment | 86.61 |
| Portugal | 5.56 | 5.71 | -0.15 | anti-EU alignment | 40.3% | 38.5% | 1.8 | anti-EU alignment | 83.66 |
| Spain | 5.33 | 3.99 | 1.34\*\*\* | pro-EU elite bias | 43.5% | 68.6% | -25.1 | pro-EU elite bias | 71.29 |
| United Kingdom | 7.23 | 6.98 | 0.25 | anti-EU alignment | 19.0% | 27.6% | -8.6 | anti-EU alignment | 80.83 |

Three stars (\*\*\*), two stars (\*\*) and a single star (\*) respectively correspond to p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05.

Table A2: Country-level measures of mass-elite congruence – Pooling of economic resources

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | **Average** | **Average-based direction** |  |  | **Majority** | **Majority-based direction** | **Distribution** |
|  | **Mass mean** | **Elite mean** | **∆ in means** | **Aligned means?** | **Pro-EU mass %** | **Pro-EU elite %** | **∆ in %** | **Aligned majorities?** | **MTM** |
| Czechia | 5.31 | 4.70 | 0.61\* | pro-EU elite bias | 46.6% | 54.7% | -8.1 | pro-EU elite bias | 81.67 |
| France | 4.89 | 3.27 | 1.62\*\*\* | pro-EU alignment | 55.0% | 72.1% | -17.1 | pro-EU alignment | 74.11 |
| Germany | 4.63 | 3.78 | 0.85\*\* | pro-EU alignment | 58.3% | 68.6% | -10.3 | pro-EU alignment | 77.23 |
| Greece | 4.17 | 3.65 | 0.52 | pro-EU alignment | 62.6% | 72.5% | -9.9 | pro-EU alignment | 76.91 |
| Italy | 3.47 | 3.21 | 0.26 | pro-EU alignment | 73.8% | 75.6% | -1.8 | pro-EU alignment | 87.55 |
| Netherlands | 5.26 | 5.48 | -0.22 | anti-EU alignment | 50.1% | 47.6% | 2.5 | anti-EU elite bias | 79.50 |
| Poland | 4.41 | 4.04 | 0.37 | pro-EU alignment | 61.1% | 69.0% | -7.9 | pro-EU alignment | 85.49 |
| Portugal | 3.53 | 3.34 | 0.19 | pro-EU alignment | 71.9% | 70.3% | 1.6 | pro-EU alignment | 88.63 |
| Spain | 3.45 | 1.99 | 1.46\*\*\* | pro-EU alignment | 73.2% | 90.9% | -17.7 | pro-EU alignment | 66.16 |
| United Kingdom | 5.56 | 5.61 | -0.05 | anti-EU alignment | 45.8% | 48.3% | -2.5 | anti-EU alignment | 86.62 |

Three stars (\*\*\*), two stars (\*\*) and a single star (\*) respectively correspond to p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05.

Table A3: Country-level measures of mass-elite congruence – Authority over immigration policy

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | **Average** | **Average-based direction** |  |  | **Majority** | **Majority-based direction** | **Distribution** |
|  | **Mass mean** | **Elite mean** | **∆ in means** | **Aligned means?** | **Pro-EU mass %** | **Pro-EU elite %** | **∆ in %** | **Aligned majorities?** | **MTM** |
| Czechia | 8.53 | 8.83 | -0.30 | anti-EU alignment | 10.7% | 6.1% | 4.6 | anti-EU alignment | 89.62 |
| France | 6.28 | 4.44 | 1.84\*\*\* | pro-EU elite bias | 37.7% | 62.0% | -24.3 | pro-EU elite bias | 70.92 |
| Germany | 5.34 | 3.51 | 1.83\*\*\* | pro-EU elite bias | 48.9% | 71.6% | -22.7 | pro-EU elite bias | 73.56 |
| Greece | 6.14 | 4.00 | 2.14\*\*\* | pro-EU elite bias | 37.7% | 73.2% | -35.5 | pro-EU elite bias | 61.31 |
| Italy | 4.81 | 3.41 | 1.40\*\*\* | pro-EU alignment | 55.4% | 72.4% | -17.0 | pro-EU alignment | 79.63 |
| Netherlands | 5.88 | 6.00 | -0.12 | anti-EU alignment | 42.6% | 37.5% | 5.1 | anti-EU alignment | 70.71 |
| Poland | 7.47 | 6.84 | 0.63 | anti-EU alignment | 23.4% | 33.1% | -9.7 | anti-EU alignment | 78.94 |
| Portugal | 5.87 | 4.73 | 1.14\*\*\* | pro-EU elite bias | 40.5% | 56.7% | -16.2 | pro-EU elite bias | 77.58 |
| Spain | 5.00 | 2.96 | 2.04\*\*\* | pro-EU alignment | 53.0% | 77.2% | -24.2 | pro-EU alignment | 70.39 |
| United Kingdom | 7.23 | 7.23 | 0.00 | anti-EU alignment | 25.8% | 25.0% | 0.8 | anti-EU alignment | 77.71 |

Three stars (\*\*\*), two stars (\*\*) and a single star (\*) respectively correspond to p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05.

Table A4: Country-level measures of mass-elite congruence – Costs of providing asylum

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  | **Average** | **Average-based direction** |  |  | **Majority** | **Majority-based direction** | **Distribution** |
|  | **Mass mean** | **Elite mean** | **∆ in means** | **Aligned means?** | **Pro-EU mass %** | **Pro-EU elite %** | **∆ in %** | **Aligned majorities?** | **MTM** |
| Czechia | 6.66 | 6.72 | -0.06 | anti-EU alignment | 29.6% | 26.9% | 2.7 | anti-EU alignment | 85.63 |
| France | 4.90 | 3.40 | 1.50\*\* | pro-EU alignment | 49.4% | 71.7% | -22.3 | pro-EU elite bias | 69.03 |
| Germany | 3.09 | 3.16 | -0.07 | pro-EU alignment | 72.3% | 76.5% | -4.2 | pro-EU alignment | 69.16 |
| Greece | 3.32 | 1.05 | 2.27\*\*\* | pro-EU alignment | 68.5% | 97.4% | -28.9 | pro-EU alignment | 64.41 |
| Italy | 2.96 | 1.73 | 1.23\*\*\* | pro-EU alignment | 70.7% | 85.7% | -15.0 | pro-EU alignment | 76.69 |
| Netherlands | 4.49 | 3.25 | 1.24 | pro-EU alignment | 55.5% | 68.8% | -13.3 | pro-EU alignment | 63.35 |
| Poland | 5.81 | 5.69 | 0.12 | anti-EU alignment | 39.6% | 44.4% | -4.8 | anti-EU alignment | 84.95 |
| Portugal | 4.05 | 2.70 | 1.35\*\*\* | pro-EU alignment | 60.9% | 82.1% | -21.2 | pro-EU alignment | 72.81 |
| Spain | 3.67 | 1.81 | 1.86\*\*\* | pro-EU alignment | 63.7% | 88.4% | -24.7 | pro-EU alignment | 69.88 |
| United Kingdom | 5.11 | 5.54 | -0.43 | anti-EU alignment | 48.5% | 51.0% | -2.5 | pro-EU elite bias | 65.03 |

Three stars (\*\*\*), two stars (\*\*) and a single star (\*) respectively correspond to p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p < 0.05.