**Online Appendix**

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**Table A1. Summary Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. |
| Lobbying preferences | 2.67 | 0.56 | 1 | 3 |
| Public Salience | 80.25 | 30.71 | 0 | 95 |
| National interests | .51 | .50 | 0 | 1 |
| European interests | .75 | .43 | 0 | 1 |
| Staff | 7.99 | 14.79 | 1 | 140 |
| Late compliers | 0.29 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 |
| Safe Harbour | 0.03 | 0.18 | 0 | 1 |
| Concentrated interest groups | 0.45 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Diffuse interest groups | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0 | 1 |
| Finance | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0 | 1 |
| Retail | 0.02 | 0.28 | 0 | 1 |
| Entertainment | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Technology | 0.13 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 |

**Table A2. Interest Groups Types**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Type | N | % |
| Individuals | 271 | 49.27 |
| Trade, business & professional associations | 160 | 29.09 |
| Companies & groups | 57 | 10.36 |
| NGOs | 35 | 6.36 |
| Trade unions | 12 | 1.09 |
| Law firms | 4 | 1.09 |
| Think tanks and research institutions | 4 | 0.73 |
| Professional consultancies | 3 | 0.73 |
| Public authorities | 2 | 0.55 |
| Other public or mixed entities, etc. | 2 | 0.36 |
| **Total** | **550** | **100** |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A3**. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Determinants of Interest Group Preferences | | |  |
|  | Logistic Regression | Multinomial Regression | |
|  | (1) | Status Quo  (2) | Less stringency  (3) |
| Late compliers | 4.052\* | 0.272\* | 6.43e-11 |
|  | (2.227) | (0.152) | (0.000) |
| Safe harbour | 0.905 | 1.075 | 6.39432e+09 |
|  | (0.745) | (0.891) | (9.57457e+13) |
| Concentrated interest | 0.272 | 7.494 | 0.000 |
|  | (0.224) | (8.142) | (0.000613) |
| Diffuse interests | 0.341 | 5.885 | 598.4 |
|  | (0.348) | (7.311) | (4711310.7) |
| Finance | 0.167\*\* | 5.922\*\* | 2.60273e+12 |
|  | (0.101) | (3.618) | (2.60330e+16) |
| Retail | 0.0890\* | 11.48\* | 14.90 |
|  | (0.0970) | (13.04) | (237858.6) |
| Technology | 0.947 | 1.046 | 18703853.6 |
|  | (0.483) | (0.537) | (3.37320e+11) |
| Entertainment | 1.522 | 0.684 | 2.44e-08 |
|  | (1.365) | (0.618) | (0.000) |
| Public salience | 0.995 | 1.003 | 0.959 |
|  | (0.00927) | (0.00971) | (115.9) |
| Staff | 1.070 | 0.935 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.0390) | (0.0341) | (0.863) |
| National-level interest | 0.915 | 0.955 | 2.16672e+09 |
|  | (0.382) | (0.408) | (7.68550e+12) |
| European-level interest | 0.167\*\* | 9.124\*\* | 1.28e-10 |
|  | (0.108) | (6.650) | (0.000) |
|  |  |  |  |
| N | 203 | 203 | 203 |

Model 1: Odds ration with Standard errors in parentheses;

Models 2 and 3: Relative risk ratios with Standard errors in parentheses; reference category is 3 (support for GDPR); category 1 (preferences for less stringency omitted)

\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Table A3 presents the results for two robustness tests. The first uses a re-coded version of our dependent variable, where 0 = preference for less stringent regulation *as well as* preference for retaining the status quo, and 1 = preference for the GDPR. As our dependent variable is, in this case, binary we use logistic regression analysis in Model 1. The second robustness test uses our original three categories for *Lobbying preferences* (1 = preference for less stringent regulation (N= 21), 2 = preference for retaining the status quo (N= 94), and 3 = preference for the GDPR (N= 309) but in the context of multinomial logistic regression. Doing so relaxes the ordinality assumption of the regression analyses presented in our main analysis.[[1]](#footnote-1) Models 2 and 3 present the results for the comparison categories ‘preference for less stringent regulation’ (model 2) and ‘preference for retaining the status quo’ (model 3), with the reference category being ‘preferences for the GDPR’. Some of the results in model 3 are exceedingly large and call into the question the validity of these findings. This might be the result of this particular category being too small for comparison with the reference category. Moreover, it is important to note that none of the results in Model 3 are statistically significant. We did attempt to re-run these models taking ‘preference for less stringent regulation’ as the reference category, but the regression estimations did not converge. Nevertheless, our main point of interest is the comparison made in Model 2, between preference for the status quo and preference for the GDPR. We will focus on this particular comparison.

Both robustness test give support to our central findings. Model 1, where the results are presented as odds ratios, clearly shows that *Finance* and *Retail* are less likely to support the GDPR and more likely to support either retaining the status quo or opting for even less stringent regulation. Results for *Late compliers* and *European-level interest* are also consistent with our main analysis.

Results in Models 2 are presented as relative risk ratios of the coefficients, indicating ‘how the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group compared to the risk of the outcome falling in the reference group changes with the each variable in question’.[[2]](#footnote-2) Relative risk ratios greater than 1 indicate an increase in the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group relative to the reference group, and ratios less than 1 the opposite. The most important findings presented in the table above relate to our main argument about industry-specific costs. Consistent with our main analysis, these results suggest that *Finance* and *Retail* are more likely to fall into the category ‘preference for the status quo’ compared to the reference category ‘preference for the GDPR’. Specially, when comparing organisations from the *Finance* to other industries, the relative risk of organisations supporting the status quo increases by a factor of about 6 compared to support the GDPR. For *Retail*, this increase is by a factor of 13. A with model 1, the results for *Late compliers* and *European-level interests* in model 2 are consistent with the results presented in our main analysis.

**Figure A1. Distribution of Interest Groups by Country**



**Table A3. Correlation Matrix**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Finance | Retail | Technology | Entertainment | Diffuse | Concentrated | Late compliers | Safe harbour | Public Salience | Staff | National interest | European interests |
| Finance | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Retail | -0.05 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Technology | -0.12 | -0.06 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Entertainment | -0.08 | -0.04 | -0.1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Diffuse | -0.06 | -0.05 | -0.11 | -0.08 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Concentrated | 0.2 | 0.11 | 0.28 | 0.08 | -0.22 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Late compliers | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0.02 | -0.06 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Safe habor | -0.03 | 0.12 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0 | 0.13 | -0.07 | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Public salience | 0.01 | -0.2 | 0.03 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.07 | 0.22 | -0.05 | 1 |  |  |  |
| Staff | 0.28 | -0.04 | -0.11 | -0.09 | 0.09 | -0.03 | -0.04 | 0.02 | -0.07 | 1 |  |  |
| National interests | 0.09 | -0.05 | -0.04 | 0 | 0.02 | -0.11 | 0.29 | -0.04 | 0.23 | 0.05 | 1 |  |
| European interests | 0.13 | -0.05 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.13 | -0.06 | 0.39 | 0.11 | 0.42 | 1 |

1. We would like to thank the Editor for this recommendation. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/output/multinomial-logistic-regression/ [↑](#footnote-ref-2)