Supporting Information Document:

How Bureaucratic Leadership Shapes Policy Outcomes:
Partisan Politics and Affluent Citizens' Incomes in the American States[*]

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0. Listing of State-Year Observations Comprising High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity

One potential concern regarding our findings showing evidence of conditional state partisan differences in income among affluent citizens is that a small set of atypical states or years drive the results. We address this issue in two ways in the results reported in the manuscript. First, we employ two-way fixed effects for both cross-sectional and time units. Accounting for these time-invariant state features while controlling for secular time effects lends confidence to the model estimates not being dependent upon particular states nor timing across state panels. In addition, when estimating these conditional total long-run marginal effects we also employ the respective comparable quantiles of the Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity under unified Republican control and unified Democratic control of state political institutions' partisan regimes to account for any systematic differences in executive agency head compensation between these partisan regimes.

In addition, in the supplementary appendix **Table SI-0**, we list the state-year observations for high levels of bureaucratic leadership capacity (i.e., the upper quartile of sample observations where $\pi = 0.75$ and upper decile in **boldface type:** $\pi = 0.90$) where the evidence reveals significant partisan differences in affluent citizens' incomes in predictable ways. One notices that there is considerable heterogeneity in both the state and years for those bureaucratic leadership capacity values in the upper quartile for each of the three partisan

regimes. Fifty-four observations comprising 12 states are covered by unified Republican Control (10 states with at least three yearly observations in this group), while sixty-six observations accounting for 15 states are covered by unified Democratic control (9 states possess at least three yearly observations in this group). One-hundred and sixty-two observations accounting for 27 states experience higher levels of bureaucratic leadership capacity across their state executive agencies during times of divided partisan control (17 states have at least three yearly observations in this group). Moreover, when the analysis is restricted to the top decile (90th percentile and above and marked in **boldface type**) of bureaucratic leadership capacity observations, there remains a diversity of states and years. These patterns suggest that a few states and/or a handful of years in the sample do not drive the findings reported in the manuscript.

Moreover, the considerable overlap of states across two or three regimes in this table is especially striking. This issue is important since, if the statistical findings in the manuscript and Supporting Information document are potentially problematic, one would expect that (1) a small handful of states would drive the results, and (2) the states under the different regimes should be quite different. In fact, **Table SI-0** reveals considerable overlap among states across multiple partisan regimes for the upper quartile subset of observations. Arizona, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia (maroon typeface) have high bureaucratic leadership capacity both under unified Republican control and divided partisan control state governments. California, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington (blue typeface) have high bureaucratic leadership capacity both under unified Democratic control and divided partisan control state governments. Colorado, Georgia, New Jersey, and Texas have high bureaucratic leadership

capacity observations that appear in each of the three partisan regimes, plus Illinois contains

both unified Republican control and unified Democratic control observations (denoted by

purple typeface).

TABLE SI-0

Listing of State-Year Observations Comprising Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity
*(Upper Quartile of Sample Observations: Upper Decile denoted by **Boldface Type**)*

Unified Republican Control	Unified Democratic Control	Divided Partisan Control
Arizona (1994, 1996, 1998)	California (**1999-2003**)	Arizona (1998, 2002-2005, 2007-2008)
Colorado (2000, **2003-2004**)	Colorado (**2007**, 2008)	California (**1986-1998**, **2004-2008**)
Florida (**1999-2006**, 2007-2008)	Georgia (1986, 1989, **2002**)	Colorado (1996, 1998, 2001-2002, **2005-2006**)
Georgia (2003-2005, **2006-2007**)	Hawaii (1988, **1989-1992**, 1993-1995)	Connecticut (**2002-2003**, 2004, **2005-2008**)
Illinois (1996)	Illinois (**2003**, 2004-2008)	Florida (**1988**, 1989-1990, **1996**, 1997, **1998**)
Michigan (1999, **2000-2002**)	Kentucky (1986)	Georgia (2003-2004)
New Jersey (1994-1995, **1996-1998**, 1999-2001)	Louisiana (2007)	Illinois (1986, 1988, 1989, 1998, 2000-2001, **2002**)
Ohio (1996, 1998, 1999-2000)	Maryland (1988-1989, 1994, 1996-1997, 2002)	Iowa (2004)
Pennsylvania (**2000-2002**)	Massachusetts (1988-1989, 2007, **2008**)	Louisiana (2008)
South Carolina (2003-2004, 2007-2008)	New Jersey (**1990-1991**, **2004-2006**, 2007-2008)	Maryland (2003)
Texas (2002, **2004**, 2005-2007, **2008**)	North Carolina (1998-1999, 2002-2003)	Massachusetts (2002-2006)
Virginia (2000-2001)	Oregon (1989, 2008)	Michigan (1986, 1988-1990, 1994, 1998, 2003-2008)

	Texas (1986)	Minnesota (1986, 2002-2006)
	Virginia (1986-1987, **1988-1992**, 1993, 2008)	Missouri (1986)
	Washington (1986, **1988**, 1993-1994, 2001-2002, 2005, **2006-2008**)	New Jersey (**1986**, 1987, **1988-1989,1992**, 1993, 2003)
		New York (**1986-1995**, 1996-1999, **2000-2008**)
		North Carolina (1988-1990, 1998, 2003-2004)
		Ohio (2007)
		Oregon (2002-2004)
		Pennsylvania (2003-2005, **2006-2007**, 2008)
		South Carolina (1988, 1993, 2002)
		Tennessee (**2008**)
		Texas (1989-1990)
		Virginia (**1994**, 1995, **1996**, 1997-1999, **2003-2008**)
		Washington (**1989**, 1990-1992, 1995-2000, 2003-2004)
		Wisconsin (1998, 2005)

1. *Additional Evidence of Null Effects for Unified Partisan Control of State Government: Pseudo-Bivariate Relationships Between Each Covariate and the Dependent Variables*

We test for unconditional unified partisan regime effects for income in the American states among affluent citizens in the top 10% of the income distribution (see **Table 2**, **Pages 24-25** in the manuscript). These model specifications are identical to the econometric models reported in the manuscript (**Table 1**), except that interaction terms between *Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* and unified partisan control regimes are omitted from model specifications, including higher powers of this covariate that accounts for potential nonlinearities involving these conditional relationships.

Another way to analyze the baseline relationships is to provide separate sets of 'pseudo-bivariate' estimates of the individual key covariates at each income fractile, controlling only for both state and year fixed effects. These results appear in **Table SI−1**. Except in the case of bureaucratic leadership capacity's impact on income for those between the 90th and 95th percentile group (*Top 10% : Top 5%*), none of the other estimates fail to attain statistical significance. Therefore, the results from this pared down statistical analyses separating out these three distinct partisan regimes does not undermine the evidence presented here that case that unconditional partisan differences involving income for affluent citizens is not supported by the data.

Pseudo−Bivariate Relationships Between Key Covariates and *Affluent Citizens' Incomes*:
Explaining Average Real Adjusted Gross Income for Affluent Citizens in the American States by Income Fractile (1986−2008)
[ARDL(1,1) Dynamic Multiplicative Model Specification: OLS with Two−Way Fixed Effects]

	Top 0.01%	Top 0.1% : Top 0.01%	Top 0.5% : Top 0.1%	Top 1% : Top 0.5%	Top 5% : Top 1%	Top 10% : Top 5%
Bivariate Relationships: One Covariate Per Model Specification						
Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity	−8.02 [0.937]	−4.17 [0.580]	−2.01 [0.218]	−0.84 [0.223]	−0.41 [0.196]	−0.18** [0.050]
Unified Republican Partisan Control	165,667 [0.888]	−19,606 [0.844]	−11,570 [0.598]	−7,484 [0.443]	−3,420 [0.421]	−2,283 [0.247]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control	−567,616 [0.660]	−100,792 [0.386]	−18,588 [0.479]	−5,354 [0.632]	−1,356 [0.763]	359.25 [0.758]

Notes: Coefficient entries represent total long-run marginal effect differences in constant dollar terms: ***Unified Republican Partisan Control – Divided Partisan Control Baseline:*** $\beta_{URC} / (1 − \alpha_1)$; ***Unified Democratic Partisan Control – Divided Partisan Control Baseline:*** $\beta_{UDC} / (1 − \alpha_1)$; and ***Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control:*** $[\beta_{URC} / (1 − \alpha_1) − \beta_{UDC} / (1 − \alpha_1)]$, where α_1 equals the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (Average Real Adjusted Gross Income per fractile). Probability values are listed inside brackets. Models estimated by ordinary least squares with robust standard errors clustered by state appearing inside parentheses. All estimated regressions reported in this table drop all other key and control covariates from a given model specification, except for both state and year fixed effects. Nebraska is excluded from the sample because it is the only state that has a unicameral and non−partisan state legislature.

2. Robustness Checks: Comparison of Reported Model Results to Alternative Model Specifications and Functional Forms

A set of robustness checks are performed to assess the sensitivity of the reported results based on alternative model specification and functional form considerations. The results reported in the manuscript (graphically conveyed by **Figures 2-4**) are presented for each of the six income fractile groups in tabular form (see **Tables SI−2A – SI−2F**). The second column of each table reports the relevant set of estimates from a placebo-based reverse causality model specification that incorporates one-year 'leads' of the relevant political and agency capacity covariates (including interactions and higher powers) as potential confounders that may induce endogeneity bias (see **Page 17** in the manuscript). The third column of each table reports the parallel set of estimates that employ the ARDL(1,1)−GECM model specification that accounts for both first differences and lagged levels of the covariates represented in generalized error correction form (see **Page 14**, *Note 14* in the manuscript).[1] The fourth and fifth columns of these tables are estimates based on symmetric linear interaction effect and quadratic interaction effect functional forms for the conditional relationship between bureaucratic capacity on affluent citizens' market incomes under alternative unified partisan regimes in the American states (see **Page 16**, *Note 15* in manuscript). The model specifications reported in the manuscript were based on parsimony, equation balance (bureaucratic capacity measure was stationary based on heterogeneous panel

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[1] The estimates from the reported model are generally quite similar, but in certain instances reveal somewhat attenuated magnitude effects compared to those from the ARDL-(1,1)-GECM model. However, the substantive results and pattern remain consistent with respect to *H1*. The long-run multiplier from the ARDL(1,1)-GECM model is $-\alpha_1$, as opposed to $[1- \alpha_1]$ for the alternative dynamic model specifications analyzed here.

unit root test: Im-Pesaran-Shin test [with four lags] $W_{t\text{-bar}} = -1.958$, p = 0.025), and proper

modeling of potential nonlinearities in the conditional relationships.

The pattern of results with respect to **H1** (market incomes ***increasing*** in bureaucratic

leadership capacity under unified Republican partisan control of state governments; market

incomes ***decreasing*** in bureaucratic leadership capacity under unified Republican partisan

control of state governments) are generally consistent across model specifications. However,

some notable differences emerge regarding magnitude and precision of these estimates. First, the

reverse causality placebo-based model specifications for all but the highest income fractile (*Top*

0.01%) are generally similar in magnitude, precision, and more importantly, general observed

pattern in relation to **H1** to the estimates generated from the reported model results that do not

control for leads in the relevant political-bureaucratic covariates to account for potential

confounders. When tangible differences do emerge between these set of estimates (e.g., highest

income fractile: *Top 0.01%*), those generated from the reverse causality placebo-based model

specifications tend to be less conservative than those from the reported model that omit 'leads' of

the relevant covariates.

Second, the total long-run marginal effects estimated based on the generalized

ARDL(1,1)—ECM [error correction] model estimates based on asymmetric unified partisan

control conditional interaction effects tend to be somewhat more modest than those reported in

the manuscript (see ***Note 1*** above), while both the symmetric linear and quadratic conditional

interaction effects tend to be either similar or of a larger magnitude (i.e., less conservative

estimates) than those reported in the manuscript. In the former case, this is to be expected since

the generalized ARDL(1,1)−ECM model contains additional parameters for short-run differences

will induce both attenuated effects and the potential for greater variability in these statistical estimates due to model overfitting.

The estimates generated from the symmetric linear and quadratic conditional effect model specifications are generally of a larger magnitude than those reported in the manuscript based on the asymmetric linear-squared conditional interaction effects, especially at both lower and higher values of *Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (e.g., ***Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control; Unified Republican Partisan Control [Divided Partisan Control Baseline]:* Table SI−2A**). This is hardly surprising since these models account for different functional forms that make different behavioral assumptions regarding partisan difference effects on affluent citizens' income at both lower and higher levels of state executive agency head compensation (*Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity)* that may reflect under-fitting (symmetric linear conditional effects) and overfitting (quadratic conditional effects) these data, respectively.

Nonetheless, the income changes that results across the distribution of the *Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* measure across all three sets of analyses per unified partisan control regime are generally quite similar. More importantly, the observed patterns of these coefficients remain consistent with the sign direction and large effect swings consistent with the results reported in the manuscript testing **H1**. Specifically, the estimates of market incomes decreasing in *Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* under unified Democratic partisan control – but do so of a weaker magnitude and less precision as observed in results reported in the manuscript (see ***Figure 3***). In addition, the estimates of market incomes are generally more sensitive to changes in *Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* under unified Republican partisan control consistent with **H1**. Finally, the upward sloping pattern of differences between these unified partisan control

regimes reflected in **Figure 4** found in the manuscript are corroborated by these robustness checks, though these particular findings appear to be both larger in magnitude, and reveal statistically discernible income differences between unified Republican and unified Democratic state government regimes for those affluent citizens that fall below the top 0.1% income fractile (see **Tables SI-2C – SI-2F**). In essence, the ability of partisan governments in the American states to observed policy outcomes consistent with their policy preferences relies heavily on the caliber of executive agency leaders in state government that to carry out their policy objectives. However, the best that unified Democratic state governments appear to do is move policy outcomes closer to their preferred income for those affluent citizens that fall below to top 1% of the income distribution by diminishing the average income gap compared to unified Republican state governments.

TABLE SI-2A: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on ARDL(1,1) Model Specification with Asymmetric Functional Form for Unified Partisan Control Interaction Effects to Alternative Model Specifications and Functional Forms
(Top 0.01% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)-GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−19,573 [0.996]	1,063,245 [0.858]	1,703,005 [0.531]	−3,615,197* [0.099]	−36,837 [0.992]
10th Percentile Value	−1,221,731 [0.640]	−1,624,052 [0.726]	23,263 [0.994]	−2,887,630 [0.126]	−1,232,118 [0.631]
25th Percentile Value	−2,197,869 [0.162]	−4,007,510 [0.325]	−1,568,651 [0.436]	−1,861,181 [0.215]	−2,200,696 [0.160]
50th Percentile Value	−2,214,238* [0.055]	−4,650,198 [0.244]	−2,277,606 [0.135]	−540,166 [0.633]	−2,362,515* [0.052]
75th Percentile Value	607,217 [0.560]	-98,028 [0.970]	−321,751 [0.824]	1,548,432 [0.189]	611,512 [0.553]
90th Percentile Value	3,946,766** [0.027]	5,857,563* [0.096]	2,635,670* [0.097]	2,792,885* [0.073]	3,946,771** [0.027]
Maximum Value	12,100,000** [0.021]	20,800,000* [0.071]	10,400,000** [0.017]	4,831,130** [0.043]	12,100,000** [0.020]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)-GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	1,741,037 [0.424]	5,635,357 [0.370]	172,277 [0.941]	1,759,683 [0.415]	1,579,134 [0.641]
10th Percentile Value	947,340 [0.533]	3,036,791 [0.439]	−236,175 [0.877]	942,508 [0.535]	909,540 [0.565]
25th Percentile Value	508,632 [0.687]	1,600,462 [0.569]	-461,942 [0.700]	490,823 [0.696]	514,006 [0.687]
50th Percentile Value	−125,463 [0.914]	−475,566 [0.820]	−788,258 [0.466]	−162,029 [0.885]	−89,675 [0.949]
75th Percentile Value	−683,136 [0.682]	−2,301,389 [0.428]	−1,075,247 [0.437]	−736,198 [0.572]	−651,850 [0.675]

	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)-GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
90th Percentile Value	−1.297,060 [0.480]	−4,311,378 [0.343]	−1,391,184 [0.475]	−1,368,282 [0.426]	−1,304,552 [0.476]
Maximum Value	−2,489,174 [0.399]	−8,214,359 [0.318]	−2,004,667 [0.539]	−2,595,658 [0.349]	−2,673,201 [0.521]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)-GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	−1,760,610 [0.672]	−4,572,112 [0.589]	1,530,729 [0.763]	−5,374,879[*] [0.058]	−1,615,972 [0.759]
10th Percentile Value	−2,169,071 [0.429]	−4,660,844 [0.455]	259,437 [0.940]	−3,830,138[*] [0.083]	−2,141,658 [0.455]
25th Percentile Value	−2,706,501 [0.141]	−5,607,971 [0.301]	129,684 [0.916]	−2,352,004 [0.189]	−2,714,702 [0.139]
50th Percentile Value	−2,088,775 [0.231]	-4,174,632 [0.379]	-1,489,347 [0.456]	−378,137 [0.795]	−2,272,841 [0.216]
75th Percentile Value	1,290,353 [0.488]	2,203,360 [0.555]	753,496 [0.712]	2,284,630 [0.168]	1,263,362 [0.530]
90th Percentile Value	5,243,826[**] [0.022]	10,200,000[*] [0.072]	4,026,854[*] [0.052]	4,161,166[*] [0.053]	5,251,323[**] [0.021]
Maximum Value	14,600,000[***] [0.004]	29,100,000[*] [0.052]	12,400,00[***] [0.003]	7,426,789[**] [0.026]	14,700,000[**] [0.015]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

[*]significant at the 0.10 level   [**]significant at the 0.05 level   [***]significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

TABLE SI−2B: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on ARDL(1,1) Model Specification with Asymmetric Functional Form for Unified Partisan Control Interaction Effects to Alternative Model Specifications and Functional Forms
(Top 0.1% to Top 0.01% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)−GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−455,196** [0.015]	−515,937* [0.084]	−368,081** [0.027]	−458,979** [0.013]	−219,961 [0.373]
10th Percentile Value	−371,198** [0.022]	−419,502 [0.107]	−305,364** [0.033]	−374,296** [0.019]	−257,695 [0.156]
25th Percentile Value	−252,693** [0.046]	−282,366 [0.174]	−216,884* [0.056]	−10,487** [0.043]	−266,249** [0.032]
50th Percentile Value	−100,181 [0.271]	−106,455 [0.472]	−103,012 [0.213]	−101,071 [0.268]	−232,031*** [0.022]
75th Percentile Value	140,949 [0.104]	171,669 [0.113]	77,026 [0.330]	142,025* [0.098]	80,699 [0.293]
90th Percentile Value	284,622** [0.016]	337,384** [0.015]	184,299* [0.081]	286,868** [0.013]	351,063** [0.012]
Maximum Value	519,940*** [0.006]	608,804*** [0.009]	359,997** [0.030]	524,103*** [0.004]	959,932** [0.013]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)-GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	188,074 [0.386]	271,049 [0.549]	116,509 [0.619]	72,956 [0.627]	229,650 [0.286]
10th Percentile Value	46,257 [0.660]	124,814 [0.578]	−11,901 [0.897]	19,217 [0.854]	55,901 [0.597]
25th Percentile Value	−14,141 [0.877]	42,965 [0.781]	−64,089 [0.444]	−10,487 [0.907]	−14,973 [0.871]
50th Percentile Value	−78,801 [0.477]	−76,619 [0.558]	−115,879 [0.269]	−53,421 [0.560]	−85,753 [0.437]

	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)−GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
75th Percentile Value	−113,554 [0.388]	−183,043 [0.287]	−138,330 [0.232]	−91,180 [0.427]	−117,069 [0.373]
90th Percentile Value	−127,878 [0.409]	−301,558 [0.271]	−138,049 [0.346]	−132,747 [0.384]	−118,068 [0.450]
Maximum Value	−84,051 [0.755]	−535,747 [0.442]	−62,680 [0.875]	−213,463 [0.372]	-19,803 [0.942]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)−GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	−643,269** [0.039]	−786,985 [0.156]	−484,590* [0.096]	−531,935** [0.023]	−449,611 [0.193]
10th Percentile Value	−417,454** [0.030]	−543,865 [0.129]	−239,463* [0.090]	−393,513*** [0.031]	−313,596 [0.127]
25th Percentile Value	−238,552* [0.095]	−325,331 [0.229]	−152,795 [0.276]	−244,389* [0.092]	−251,275* [0.075]
50th Percentile Value	−21,380 [0.860]	−29,837 [0.881]	12,867 [0.918]	−47,650 [0.685]	−146,278 [0.280]
75th Percentile Value	254,503* [0.093]	354,712* [0.094]	215,356* [0.081]	233,204* [0.089]	197,768 [0.206]
90th Percentile Value	412,500** [0.037]	638,942** [0.047]	322,348** [0.005]	419,616** [0.024]	469,131** [0.019]
Maximum Value	603,991* [0.072]	1,144,550 [0.119]	422,677 [0.324]	737,566** [0.013]	979,735** [0.018]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level   **significant at the 0.05 level   ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

**TABLE SI−2C: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on ARDL(1,1) Model Specification
with Asymmetric Functional Form for Unified Partisan Control Interaction Effects
to Alternative Model Specifications and Functional Forms**
(Top 0.5% to Top 0.1% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)−GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−103,916*** [0.003]	−138,001** [0.023]	−76,106** [0.027]	−105,795*** [0.003]	−67,529 [0.127]
10th Percentile Value	−85,029*** [0.005]	−113,212** [0.029]	−63,025** [0.034]	−86,566** [0.004]	−67,502** [0.037]
25th Percentile Value	−58.383** [0.012]	−78,240** [0.050]	−44,570* [0.056]	−59,436** [0.011]	−60,536*** [0.009]
50th Percentile Value	−24,090 [0.136]	−33,232 [0.202]	−20,820 [0.204]	−24,521 [0.133]	−48,132** [0.017]
75th Percentile Value	30,129* [0.083]	37,928* [0.053]	16,731 [0.243]	30,681* [0.076]	20,809 [0.189]
90th Percentile Value	62,434** [0.011]	80,327*** [0.007]	39,105** [0.046]	63,573*** [0.009]	72,787** [0.015]
Maximum Value	115,346*** [0.003]	149,772*** [0.004]	75,750** [0.018]	117,444*** [0.003]	183,668** [0.027]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)−GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	75,955 [0.158]	111,570 [0.240]	58,105 [0.144]	16,462 [0.574]	82,403 [0.123]
10th Percentile Value	20,699 [0.350]	42,516 [0.349]	5,639 [0.754]	6,738 [0.729]	22,198 [0.320]
25th Percentile Value	−552 [0.975]	12,927 [0.661]	−13,481 [0.409]	1,362 [0.935]	−678 [0.969]
50th Percentile Value	−19,576 [0.386]	−19,045 [0.451]	−28,689 [0.142]	−6,407 [0.728]	−20,657 [0.359]
75th Percentile Value	−24,885 [0.359]	−36,617 [0.291]	−29,920 [0.169]	−13,240 [0.588]	−25,442 [0.348]

	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)–GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
90th Percentile Value	−18,369 [0.568]	−44,547 [0.403]	−18,133 [0.483]	−20,762 [0.531]	−16,874 [0.602]
Maximum Value	31,285 [0.631]	−25,780 [0.833]	44,092 [0.458]	−35,368 [0.499]	41,182 [0.528]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)– GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	−179,871** [0.013]	−249,570** [0.046]	−134,210** [0.016]	−122,258** [0.011]	−149,932** [0.049]
10th Percentile Value	−105,728*** [0.001]	−155,727** [0.045]	−66,664* [0.056]	−93,303*** [0.009]	−89,701** [0.028]
25th Percentile Value	−57,831** [0.031]	−91,167* [0.095]	−31,089 [0.266]	−60,799** [0.024]	−59,858** [0.026]
50th Percentile Value	−4,514 [0.840]	−14,187 [0.688]	7,869 [0.729]	−18,411 [0.400]	−27,475 [0.286]
75th Percentile Value	55,014* [0.080]	74,545* [0.073]	46,651** [0.037]	43,921 [0.130]	46,252 [0.152]
90th Percentile Value	80,803* [0.058]	124,875* [0.059]	57,238* [0.055]	84,344** [0.042]	89,661** [0.041]
Maximum Value	84,061 [0.291]	175,552 [0.216]	31,658 [0.642]	152,812** [0.023]	142,486 [0.135]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level   **significant at the 0.05 level   ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

TABLE SI−2D: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on ARDL(1,1) Model Specification with Asymmetric Functional Form for Unified Partisan Control Interaction Effects to Alternative Model Specifications and Functional Forms
(Top 1% to Top 0.5% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)− GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−37,529*** [0.002]	−49,554** [0.032]	−26,433** [0.012]	−38,301*** [0.003]	−29,425* [0.051]
10th Percentile Value	−30,813*** [0.003]	−40,827** [0.036]	−22,047** [0.014]	−31,445*** [0.004]	−26,912** [0.014]
25th Percentile Value	−21,337*** [0.007]	−28,515** [0.048]	−15,860** [0.022]	−21,773*** [0.007]	−21,823*** [0.005]
50th Percentile Value	−9,142* [0.091]	−12,670 [0.138]	−7,896 [0.103]	-9,324* [0.090]	−16,030** [0.020]
75th Percentile Value	10,139 [0.106]	12,382* [0.072]	4,694 [0.326]	10,356 [0.101]	8,063 [0.176]
90th Percentile Value	21,627** [0.017]	27,308** [0.022]	12,196* [0.069]	22,083** [0.016]	23,942** [0.024]
Maximum Value	40,443*** [0.005]	57,756** [0.018]	24,483** [0.024]	41,289*** [0.005]	55,691* [0.051]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)− GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
Minimum Value	28,622 [0.135]	41,605 [0.185]	25,467 [0.107]	6,577 [0.564]	30,062 [0.114]
10th Percentile Value	8,641 [0.272]	15,080 [0.318]	5,216 [0.450]	3,470 [0.618]	8,976 [0.254]
25th Percentile Value	1,040 [0.865]	4,553 [0.645]	−2,256 [0.689]	1,753 [0.756]	1,012 [0.869]
50th Percentile Value	−5,616 [0.470]	−5,459 [0.546]	−8,376 [0.201]	−730 [0.912]	−5,857 [0.450]

	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)−GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
75th Percentile Value	−7,237 [0.457]	−9,182 [0.469]	−9,183 [0.225]	−2,913 [0.758]	−7,361 [0.449]
90th Percentile Value	−4,442 [0.727]	−7,779 [0.681]	−5,122 [0.594]	−5,316 [0.690]	−4,108 [0.749]
Maximum Value	14,693 [0.602]	11,442 [0.776]	17,582 [0.445]	−9,982 [0.643]	16,904 [0.554]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)−GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	−66,151*** [0.010]	−91,159** [0.041]	−51,901*** [0.009]	−44,878** [0.011]	−59,487** [0.025]
10th Percentile Value	−39,454*** [0.005]	−55,907** [0.048]	−27,264** [0.023]	−34,915*** [0.006]	−35,889** [0.013]
25th Percentile Value	−22,377** [0.019]	−33,068* [0.090]	−13,603 [0.129]	−23,525** [0.013]	−22,835** [0.016]
50th Percentile Value	−3,526 [0.663]	−7,211 [0.558]	479 [0.949]	−8,595 [0.276]	−10,173 [0.266]
75th Percentile Value	17,376 [0.133]	21,563 [0.155]	13,887* [0.067]	13,269 [0.237]	15,425 [0.196]
90th Percentile Value	26,070 [0.109]	35,087 [0.144]	17,318* [0.093]	27,399* [0.093]	28,050* [0.088]
Maximum Value	25,750 [0.424]	40,344 [0.397]	6,901 [0.781]	51,272* [0.054]	38,787 [0.266]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times \mathsf{L}BC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level **significant at the 0.05 level ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

TABLE SI−2E: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on ARDL(1,1) Model Specification with Asymmetric Functional Form for Unified Partisan Control Interaction Effects to Alternative Model Specifications and Functional Forms
(Top 5% to Top 1% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)−GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−15,958*** [0.006]	−21,777 [0.115]	−10,965*** [0.004]	−16,333*** [0.007]	−13,320** [0.027]
10th Percentile Value	−13,255*** [0.007]	−17,743 [0.124]	−9,316*** [0.004]	−13,562*** [0.008]	−11,997*** [0.007]
25th Percentile Value	−9,441** [0.013]	−12,053 [0.153]	−6,990*** [0.005]	−9,654** [0.014]	−9,622** [0.014]
50th Percentile Value	−4,532* [0.082]	−4,728 [0.329]	−3.996** [0.018]	−4,623* [0.083]	−7,114* [0.075]
75th Percentile Value	3,228 [0.215]	6,851 [0.147]	737 [0.648]	3,331 [0.202]	2,551 [0.366]
90th Percentile Value	6,581 [0.147]	13,751* [0.088]	3,557 [0.130]	8,070** [0.032]	8,663* [0.054]
Maximum Value	15,425** [0.011]	25,051* [0.079]	8,175** [0.036]	15,832** [0.011]	20,490 [0.135]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)−GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	20,195** [0.021]	36,598* [0.079]	15,242** [0.012]	9,346 [0.110]	20,719** [0.019]
10th Percentile Value	8,117** [0.031]	14,226 [0.124]	5,937** [0.024]	5,595 [0.109]	8,248** [0.031]
25th Percentile Value	3,115 [0.240]	5,102 [0.358]	2,046 [0.380]	3,522 [0.176]	3,144 [0.243]
50th Percentile Value	−1,898 [0.551]	−4,006 [0.445]	−2,002 [0.482]	526 [0.848]	−1,82 [0.532]

	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)– GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
75th Percentile Value	−4,238 [0.311]	−8,030 [0.286]	−4,023 [0.211]	−2,109 [0.604]	−4,290 [0.305]
90th Percentile Value	−4,547 [0.424]	−8,147 [0.456]	−4,582 [0.234]	−5,010 [0.401]	−4,449 [0.440]
Maximum Value	1,637 [0.893]	4,537 [0.848]	-682 [0.939]	−10,643 [0.286]	2,367 [0.850]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)– GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	−36,153*** [0.004]	−58,376* [0.065]	−26,207*** [0.000]	−25,679*** [0.006]	−34,039*** [0.005]
10th Percentile Value	−21,371*** [0.004]	−31,969* [0.087]	−15,253*** [0.001]	−19,158*** [0.006]	−20,245*** [0.004]
25th Percentile Value	−12,585** [0.015]	−17,154 [0.149]	−9,036** [0.019]	−13,176** [0.012]	−12,766** [0.016]
50th Percentile Value	-2,635 [0.505]	−723 [0.915]	−1,994 [0.559]	−5,149 [0.184]	−5,133 [0.309]
75th Percentile Value	7,466 [0.122]	14,882 [0.132]	4,760 [0.120]	5,440 [0.231]	6,840 [0.187]
90th Percentile Value	12,399* [0.065]	21,898 [0.142]	8,139** [0.025]	13,080* [0.055]	13,082* [0.056]
Maximum Value	13,787 [0.288]	20,514 [0.439]	8,857 [0.324]	26,475** [0.024]	18,123 [0.231]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t−1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t−1}] / [1 − \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t−1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t−1}] / [1 − \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t−1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t−1}] / [1 − \alpha_1]\} − \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t−1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t−1}] / [1 − \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level   **significant at the 0.05 level   ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

TABLE SI−2F: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on ARDL(1,1) Model Specification with Asymmetric Functional Form for Unified Partisan Control Interaction Effects to Alternative Model Specifications and Functional Forms
(Top 10% to Top 5% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results	Reverse Causality Placebo	ARDL(1,1)−GECM	Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects	Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−6,707*** [0.003]	−4,769** [0.028]	−6,499*** [0.008]	−7,020*** [0.002]	−6,402*** [0.004]
10th Percentile Value	−5,737*** [0.005]	−4,084** [0.033]	−5,616** [0.012]	−5,998*** [0.003]	−5,590*** [0.002]
25th Percentile Value	−4,369*** [0.005]	−3,119** [0.049]	−4,370** [0.024]	−4,556*** [0.008]	−4,387** [0.016]
50th Percentile Value	−2,608* [0.077]	−1,876 [0.131]	−2,767* [0.089]	−2,700* [0.062]	−3,303* [0.098]
75th Percentile Value	175 [0.895]	89 [0.935]	−231 [0.869]	234 [0.863]	97 [0.950]
90th Percentile Value	1,834 [0.209]	1,259 [0.328]	1,279 [0.384]	1,982 [0.197]	1,920 [0.204]
Maximum Value	4,550** [0.018]	3,177* [0.091]	3,753** [0.04]	4,847** [0.019]	4,847 [0.258]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)−GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	6,268** [0.027]	7,458*** [0.002]	4,429 [0.212]	1,973 [0.221]	6,323** [0.026]
10th Percentile Value	2,406** [0.014]	2,724*** [0.006]	1,502 [0.244]	1,409 [0.164]	2,419** [0.015]
25th Percentile Value	951 [0.280]	979 [0.279]	407 [0.637]	1,097 [0.178]	950 [0.280]
50th Percentile Value	−298 [0.806]	−446 [0.704]	−519 [0.627]	647 [0.463]	−306 [0.800]

75th Percentile Value	−560 [0.674]	−628 [0.634]	−692 [0.574]	250 [0.838]	−565 [0.671]
90th Percentile Value	54 [0.972]	330 [0.826]	−187 [0.907]	−186 [0.914]	67 [0.966]
Maximum Value	3,953 [0.361]	5,663* [0.099]	2,872 [0.548]	−1,033 [0.712]	4,036 [0.348]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Reverse Causality Placebo**	**ARDL(1,1)− GECM**	**Symmetric Linear Interaction Effects**	**Symmetric Quadratic Interaction Effects**
Minimum Value	−12,975*** [0.000]	−12,227*** [0.000]	−10,928** [0.014]	−8,993*** [0.002]	−12,724*** [0.000]
10th Percentile Value	−8,143*** [0.001]	−6,809*** [0.003]	−7,118*** [0.009]	−7,407*** [0.002]	−8,009*** [0.000]
25th Percentile Value	−5,320** [0.011]	−4,098** [0.039]	−4,777** [0.034]	−5,653*** [0.005]	−5,337** [0.013]
50th Percentile Value	−2,311 [0.256]	−1,493 [0.451]	−2,247 [0.259]	−3,347* [0.059]	−2,997 [0.217]
75th Percentile Value	735 [0.718]	717 [0.705]	460 [0.803]	−16 [0.993]	662 [0.764]
90th Percentile Value	1,779 [0.433]	929 [0.647]	1,466 [0.499]	2,167 [0.359]	1,853 [0.420]
Maximum Value	597 [0.899]	−2,486 [0.484]	811 [0.866]	5,879* [0.098]	1,086 [0.858]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p{}_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p{}_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p{}_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p{}_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level   **significant at the 0.05 level   ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

3. Robustness Checks:

Abbreviated List of State Agencies for Measuring Executive Agency Head Compensation
&
Comparison of Reported Model Results using Grand Median (π = 0.50) Values of Executive
Agency Head Salary Compensation with Estimates from Low Bureaucratic Leadership
Capacity (Lower Quartile Median: π = 0.125) and
High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity (Upper Quartile Median: π = 0.875)

As noted in both the manuscript and *Note 10* in the revised manuscript, the statistical

analyses performed in this study is based on a measure of bureaucratic leadership capacity that is

measured as the grand median *(π = 0.50)* of executive agency head salary compensation across

35 relevant state government agencies. This is a sensible summary statistic measure in a given

state-year since it utilizes the full, unrestricted density of this distribution. Yet, it remains that

some subset of agencies within each state executive branch may disproportionately affect

incomes of the most affluent. Moreover, given the highly aggregate nature of our bureaucratic

leadership capacity measure resting on thirty-five state executive agencies, considerable

variability exists within these measure based on the constant-dollar compensation salary for the

grand median state executive agency head for each state-year.

To evaluate the consequences of this considerable heterogeneity on the pattern of the

reported estimates consistent with **H1**, we take a more granular approach by exploiting variations

in our bureaucratic leadership capacity. First, we pare down the set of state executive agencies

used to construct our bureaucratic leadership capacity measure from the full set of 35 agencies

denoted in *Note 10* in the manuscript down to 18 state executive agencies of primary importance

to economic development, as well as the subset of eight (8) traditional economic development

related agencies, that we deemed as being most critical to affecting income for affluent citizens

in a given state. The pared down lists of 18 and eight state executive agencies whose head's

compensation are employed in the calculation of our bureaucratic leadership capacity measure

are as follows: *Agriculture, Banking, Budget, Commerce, Comptroller, Consumer Affairs,*

Economic Development, Energy, Environmental Protection, Finance, Health, Highways,

Insurance, Labor, Licensing, Natural Resources, Revenue, and Transportation (the smaller

*subset of eight (8) traditional economic development related agencies are as follows: **Banking,***

***Budget**, **Commerce**, **Comptroller**, **Economic Development**, **Finance**, **Natural Resources**,*

***Revenue**)*. This analysis is performed as a means to evaluate the sensitivity of the estimates

reported in the manuscript by incorporating a more comprehensive set of agencies to reflect the

breadth of bureaucratic leadership capacity.

Although there is some variation in certain instances between the comparable estimates

from these models and the ones reported in the manuscript, these respective patterns are

remarkably consistent and only reveal minor substantive differences in a couple of instances.

Specifically, the substantive coefficient impacts for the fewest agencies (8), as well as at the

latter's upper values, are noticeably more modest compared to both the full (35) and restricted

(18) set of agencies when comparing average income differences between the *Unified*

Republican Partisan Control and *Divided Partisan Control* baseline for the highest income

fractile group (*Top 0.01%*, **Table SI-3A**). Moreover, this particular analysis reveals less precise

estimates of *Unified Republican Control – Unified Democratic Control* conditional partisan

income differences for the smallest subset of agencies generally for the two highest income

fractiles appearing in **Table SI-3A** (*Top 0.01%*) and **Table SI-3B** (*Top 0.1% : 0.01%*) compared

to those based on the full 35 and restricted 18 state agencies. Therefore, the larger set of state

executive agencies do little to alter the main conclusions drawn from the analysis contained in

the manuscript regarding the asymmetric partisan conditional effect of bureaucratic leadership capacity on affluent citizens' incomes.

In addition, we restrict the density to the lower quartile median, $\pi = 0.125$ (*Low Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity Subset*), as well as to the upper quartile median, $\pi = 0.825$ (*High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity Subset*). This additional granular analysis of these data are undertaken since state executive agencies that are typically at the respective bottom and top rungs in terms of salary compensation might be attributable to the nature of an agency's policy mission and the requirements of attracting qualified individuals to fill these critical positions. For instance, state executive agencies managing solid waste ($61,068), public welfare ($61,488), purchasing ($62,504), and computer services ($57,916) are, on average, compensated much less than those agencies charged with administering transportation services ($86,700), public health ($94,120), and higher education ($105,000). Put simply, a considerable degree of heterogeneity exists within our measure of bureaucratic leadership capacity based on the grand median of executive agency head salary compensation across 35 common state agencies.

Specifically, the aim is to show that incomes for affluent citizens are *increasing* (*decreasing*) in bureaucratic leadership capacity under unified Republican (Democratic) control of state political institutions consistent with **H1**. The reported manuscript results employing the grand median *($\pi = 0.50$)* values of this measure show clear support for these theoretical hypotheses. It should be noted that magnitude of bureaucratic leadership capacity effects on income will be attenuated for the *Low* and *High* bureaucratic leadership capacity subset covariates since they are based on a restricted density by construction. As a result, direct comparison of each respective percentile value of the various bureaucratic leadership capacity

measures' total long-run marginal impact on incomes of affluent citizens are not directly comparable.[2]

The results reported in the manuscript (graphically conveyed by **Figures 2-4**) based on the grand median ($\pi = 0.50$) of the bureaucratic leadership capacity measure for all 35 state executive agencies duly noted in the manuscript are presented for each of the six income fractile groups in tabular form (see **Tables SI−3A − SI−3F**). The second and third columns of each table lists the comparable estimates using only 18 and eight state executive agencies respectively to measure salary compensation. The fourth column of each table reports the relevant set of estimates from using bureaucratic leadership capacity measure that is based on the lower quartile median, $\pi = 0.125$ (***Low Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity Subset***), while the fifth column of estimates are based the upper quartile median, $\pi = 0.875$ (***High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity Subset***).[3] A 'Left-Right' horizontal inspection of the tabular estimates across models reveal that they often diverge from one another at a given *relative* level of bureaucratic leadership capacity as one would expect since they are constructed from starkly different quantiles of the salary compensation distribution for state executive agency heads. For reasons noted above, this is to be expected since, for instance, the 25th percentile value from these

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[2] The correlation coefficient between the grand mean measure (***bureaucratic leadership capacity: reported measure***) and the high (***High bureaucratic leadership capacity***) and low (***Low bureaucratic leadership capacity***) capacity measures are 0.78 and 0.82, respectively. The correlation coefficient between the latter two restricted density measures is 0.60.

[3] For comparability purposes, all other aspects regarding model specification and functional form are identical across all three sets of regression models for each of the six income fractiles.

respective measures are far from being roughly equivalent *(Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity*: $74,295; Low Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity: $56,082; and ***High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity***: $87,314).

However, inspection of these tables from a "Top-Down" vertical direction reveals consistent evidence of the asymmetric conditional partisan income differences reported in the manuscript using the median state executive agency head salary for each-state year ($\pi = 0.50$). Some differences remain, however, when using these alternative measures. These are listed below:

- The low bureaucratic leadership capacity measure (**Low BL Capacity Subset**: $\pi = 0.125$) generally reveals both weaker and less precise estimates of the conditional partisan income differential between *Unified Republican Partisan Control* and *Divided Partisan Control* across the range of this covariate's values compared to either the median ($\pi = 0.50$ employed in the manuscript) or high (**High BL Capacity Subset:** $\pi = 0.875$) bureaucratic leadership capacity measures.

- For affluent citizens below the top 1% of the income distribution (**Table SI-3E**: *Top 5% : Top 1%*, **Table SI-3F**: *Top 10% : Top 5%),* the high bureaucratic leadership capacity measure (**High BL Capacity Subset**: $\pi = 0.875$) generally offers less precise estimates of the conditional partisan income differential between *Unified Republican Partisan Control* and *Divided Partisan Control* at *Control* at the top quartile (i.e., 75th percentile and above) of this covariate's

values compared to either the median ($\pi = 0.50$ employed in the manuscript) bureaucratic leadership capacity measure.

and

- For affluent citizens below the above the top 0.5% of the income distribution (**Table SI-3A**: *Top 0.01%*, **Table SI-3B**: *Top 0.1% : Top 0.01%*, **Table SI-3C**: *Top 0.5% : Top 0.1%*), the high bureaucratic leadership capacity measure (**High BL Capacity Subset**: $\pi = 0.875$) generally offers less precise estimates of the conditional partisan income differential between *Unified Republican Partisan Control* and *Unified Democratic Partisan Control* at the top quartile (i.e., 75th percentile and above) of this covariate's values compared to either the median ($\pi = 0.50$ employed in the manuscript) bureaucratic leadership capacity measure.

In summary, the "Top-Down" vertical empirical pattern observed in all three models using different stratum of state executive agencies, by either administrative function or state executive agency head compensation, are largely consistent with one another insofar that they demonstrate that increases in both *absolute* and *relative* salary compensation for state executive agency heads results in terms of improving policy outcomes with respect to each political party's preferred outcomes. This evidence is compelling given that these three variants of bureaucratic leadership capacity covariate used in our statistical analyses are quite distinct from one another.

TABLE SI-3A: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on *Median Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (50th Percentile Rank Value: Grand Median) to Same Measure Based on Alternative Subsets of State Executive Agencies and Within State-Year *Low Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (12.5 Percentile Rank Value: Lower Quartile Median) and *High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (87.5 Percentile Rank Value: Upper Quartile Median) (Top 0.01% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results (35 agencies)	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity (18 Agencies)	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity (8 Agencies)	LOW BL Capacity Subset (35 agencies)	HIGH BL Capacity Subset (35 agencies)
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−19,573 [0.996]	−3,294,125 [0.278]	−3,406,837 [0.327]	2,769,579 [0.467]	−3,469,097* [0.075]
10th Percentile Value	−1,221,731 [0.640]	−2,890,433 [0.124]	−2,259,306 [0.170]	1,031,052 [0.642]	−2,238,129** [0.027]
25th Percentile Value	−2,197,869 [0.162]	−2,279,370 [0.105]	−1,578,986 [0.240]	230,198 [0.888]	−1,869,545 [0.183]
50th Percentile Value	−2,214,238* [0.055]	−1,418,709 [0.268]	−417,114 [0.738]	−583,087 [0.688]	−238,334 [0.868]
75th Percentile Value	607,217 [0.560]	1,606,445 [0.154]	1,114,422 [0.321]	−128,313 [0.923]	1,953,048 [0.120]
90th Percentile Value	3,946,766** [0.027]	3,817,385** [0.020]	2,364,027 [0.136]	1,301,061 [0.260]	3,025,394 [0.124]
Maximum Value	12,100,000** [0.021]	6,668,711** [0.040]	4,549,665 [0.252]	4,975,029 [0.129]	4,365,095 [0.567]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	Reported Results	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity	LOW BL Capacity Subset	HIGH BL Capacity Subset
Minimum Value	1,741,0377 [0.424]	2,083,442 [0.345]	1,333,603 [0.565]	3,040,796 [0.285]	−35,947 [0.990]
10th Percentile Value	947,340 [0.533]	1,104,503 [0.447]	522,360 [0.684]	1,118,033 [0.462]	−78,345 [0.964]
25th Percentile Value	508,632 [0.687]	604,993 [0.620]	192,080 [0.857]	410,718 [0.727]	−104,746 [0.935]
50th Percentile Value	−125,463 [0.914]	5,749 [0.996]	−246,062 [0.831]	−295,886 [0.778]	−137,166 [0.902]

	Reported Results	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity	LOW BL Capacity Subset	HIGH BL Capacity Subset
75th Percentile Value	−683,136 [0.682]	−718,366 [0.643]	−717,155 [0.661]	−1,273,601 [0.339]	−165,697 [0.911]
90th Percentile Value	−1.297,060 [0.480]	−1,330,970 [0.510]	−1,196234 [0.601]	−1,972,384 [0.256]	−188,174 [0.923]
Maximum Value	−2,489,174 [0.399]	−2,590,052 [0.413]	−1,982,720 [0.568]	−4,051,797 [0.435]	−341,438 [0.953]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Fewer Agencies BL Capacity**	**Fewest Agencies BL Capacity**	**LOW BL Capacity Subset**	**HIGH BL Capacity Subset**
Minimum Value	−1,760,610 [0.672]	−5,377,568 [0.153]	−4,740,440 [0.268]	−271,217 [0.954]	−8,001,922 [0.168]
10th Percentile Value	−2,169,071 [0.429]	−2,292,790* [0.078]	−2,881,666 [0.172]	−86,981 [0.973]	−3,390,753 [0.190]
25th Percentile Value	−2,706,501 [0.141]	−2,884,363 [0.112]	−1,771,066 [0.291]	−180,520 [0.923]	−1,764,799 [0.369]
50th Percentile Value	−2,088,775 [0.231]	−1,424,458 [0.432]	−171,052 [0.919]	−287,201 [0.865]	−101,169 [0.954]
75th Percentile Value	1,290,353 [0.488]	2,324,811 [0.224]	1,831,577 [0.333]	1,144,719 [0.515]	2,119,105 [0.237]
90th Percentile Value	5,243,826** [0.022]	5,148,355** [0.021]	3,560,262 [0.160]	3,273,445* [0.068]	3,213,568 [0.200]
Maximum Value	14,600,000*** [0.004]	9,258,763** [0.012]	6,532,385 [0.172]	9,026,826* [0.024]	4,706,533 [0.595]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level   **significant at the 0.05 level   ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

TABLE SI-3B: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on *Median Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (50th Percentile Rank Value: Grand Median) to Same Measure Based on Alternative Subsets of State Executive Agencies and Within State-Year *Low Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (12.5 Percentile Rank Value: Lower Quartile Median) and *High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (87.5 Percentile Rank Value: Upper Quartile Median) (Top 0.1% to Top 0.01% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results (35 Agencies)	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity (18 Agencies)	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity (8 Agencies)	LOW BL Capacity Subset (35 Agencies)	HIGH BL Capacity Subset (35 Agencies)
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−455,196** [0.015]	−516,856*** [0.005]	−508,154** [0.013]	−179,682 [0.325]	−621,135*** [0.010]
10th Percentile Value	−371,198** [0.022]	−377,469** [0.011]	−333,875** [0.024]	−131,745 [0.361]	−349,192** [0.017]
25th Percentile Value	−252,693** [0.046]	−255,861** [0.034]	−221,143* [0.053]	−100,332 [0.406]	−235,765** [0.035]
50th Percentile Value	−100,181 [0.271]	−133,209 [0.166]	−73,936 [0.378]	−33,225 [0.688]	−104,063 [0.220]
75th Percentile Value	140,949 [0.104]	157,901* [0.051]	96,113 [0.265]	36,787 [0.654]	116,977 [0.238]
90th Percentile Value	284,622** [0.016]	315,268*** [0.002]	220,573* [0.051]	96,185 [0.399]	262,904* [0.060]
Maximum Value	519,940*** [0.006]	485,765*** [0.001]	416,344** [0.016]	180,500 [0.313]	602,225** [0.019]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	**Reported Results**	**Fewer Agencies BL Capacity**	**Fewest Agencies BL Capacity**	**LOW BL Capacity Subset**	**HIGH BL Capacity Subset**
Minimum Value	188,074 [0.386]	175,176 [0.422]	320,490 [0.369]	723,269** [0.032]	445,030 [0.151]
10th Percentile Value	46,257 [0.660]	50,271 [0.580]	27,229 [0.771]	108,082 [0.349]	46,689 [0.748]
25th Percentile Value	−14,141 [0.877]	−2,460 [0.978]	−49,084 [0.531]	−33,394 [0.711]	−97,827 [0.313]
50th Percentile Value	−78,801 [0.477]	−55,911 [0.629]	−111,847 [0.234]	−129,170 [0.167]	−166,599** [0.042]

	Reported Results	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity	LOW BL Capacity Subset	HIGH BL Capacity Subset
75th Percentile Value	−113,554 [0.388]	−106,223 [0.462]	−130,385 [0.271]	−185,592 [0.124]	−128,005 [0.210]
90th Percentile Value	−127,878 [0.409]	−136,587 [0.418]	−97,922 [0.644]	−174,225 [0.261]	−32,250 [0.829]
Maximum Value	−84,051 [0.755]	−163,885 [0.568]	70,959 [0.899]	126,032 [0.737]	2,155,843* [0.088]
Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Fewer Agencies BL Capacity**	**Fewest Agencies BL Capacity**	**LOW BL Capacity Subset**	**HIGH BL Capacity Subset**
Minimum Value	−643,269** [0.039]	−710,173** [0.027]	−828,644** [0.023]	−902,951** [0.015]	−1,066,165*** [0.005]
10th Percentile Value	−417,454** [0.030]	−427,740** [0.017]	−360,105** [0.026]	−239,827 [0.180]	−395,881* [0.060]
25th Percentile Value	−238,552* [0.095]	−253,401* [0.078]	−172,059 [0.204]	−66,938 [0.642]	−137,938 [0.365]
50th Percentile Value	−21,380 [0.860]	−77,298 [0.570]	37,911 [0.753]	95,945 [0.387]	62,536 [0.567]
75th Percentile Value	254,503* [0.093]	264,124 [0.104]	226,498 [0.103]	223,278* [0.070]	244,982* [0.073]
90th Percentile Value	412,500** [0.037]	451,855** [0.026]	317,795 [0.190]	270,410 [0.115]	299,154 [0.168]
Maximum Value	603,991* [0.072]	649,649** [0.047]	345,385 [0.572]	54,468 [0.896]	−1,555,618 [0.250]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level   **significant at the 0.05 level   ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

TABLE SI-3C: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on *Median Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (50th Percentile Rank Value: Grand Median) to Same Measure Based on Alternative Subsets of State Executive Agencies and Within State-Year *Low Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (12.5 Percentile Rank Value: Lower Quartile Median) and *High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (87.5 Percentile Rank Value: Upper Quartile Median) (Top 0.5% to Top 0.1% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results (35 Agencies)	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity (18 Agencies)	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity (8 Agencies)	LOW BL Capacity Subset (35 Agencies)	HIGH BL Capacity Subset (18 Agencies)
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−103,916*** [0.003]	−118,754*** [0.001]	−124,518*** [0.002]	−44,532 [0.180]	−129,569*** [0.008]
10th Percentile Value	−85,029*** [0.005]	−87,110*** [0.002]	−82,857*** [0.004]	−33,442 [0.130]	−74,477*** [0.009]
25th Percentile Value	−58.383** [0.012]	−59.502*** [0.007]	−55,858*** [0.009]	−26,175 [0.220]	−51,498** [0.014]
50th Percentile Value	−24,090 [0.136]	−31,657* [0.066]	−20,643 [0.168]	−10,650 [0.463]	−24,817* [0.100]
75th Percentile Value	30,129* [0.083]	34,432** [0.031]	20,037 [0.237]	5,547 [0.726]	19,963 [0.323]
90th Percentile Value	62,434** [0.011]	70,158*** [0.001]	49,811** [0.035]	19,288 [0.397]	49,526* [0.097]
Maximum Value	115,346*** [0.003]	108,865*** [0.000]	96,644*** [0.009]	38,794 [0.277]	118,268** [0.035]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	Reported Results	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity	LOW BL Capacity Subset	HIGH BL Capacity Subset
Minimum Value	75,955 [0.158]	70,311 [0.141]	118,838 [0.114]	215,231*** [0.007]	103,066 [0.106]
10th Percentile Value	20,699 [0.350]	19,873 [0.283]	17,301 [0.408]	38,509 [0.106]	18,432 [0.532]
25th Percentile Value	−552 [0.975]	1,631 [0.923]	−7,815 [0.624]	−1,215 [0.942]	−13,248 [0.496]
50th Percentile Value	−19,576 [0.386]	−13,572 [0.547]	−26,647 [0.163]	−27,318 [0.136]	−30,081* [0.090]

75th Percentile Value	−24,885 [0.359]	−22,218 [0.455]	−28,465 [0.259]	−41,052 [0.121]	−24,769 [0.262]
90th Percentile Value	−18,369 [0.568]	−21,223 [0.533]	−10,728 [0.800]	−34,945 [0.313]	−7,315 [0.807]
Maximum Value	31,285 [0.631]	4,737 [0.932]	61,219 [0.566]	61,754 [0.452]	423,409* [0.067]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Fewer Agencies BL Capacity**	**Fewest Agencies BL Capacity**	**LOW BL Capacity Subset**	**HIGH BL Capacity Subset**
Minimum Value	−179,871** [0.013]	−189,065*** [0.007]	−243,355*** [0.004]	−259,763*** [0.001]	−232,635*** [0.005]
10th Percentile Value	−105,728*** [0.001]	−106,983*** [0.004]	−99,888*** [0.005]	−71,951** [0.039]	−92,909** [0.033]
25th Percentile Value	−57,831** [0.031]	−61,133** [0.023]	−48,043* [0.061]	−24,960 [0.326]	−38,250 [0.190]
50th Percentile Value	−4,514 [0.840]	−18,085 [0.457]	6,005 [0.776]	16,668 [0.398]	5,264 [0.797]
75th Percentile Value	55,014* [0.080]	56,650* [0.087]	48,502* [0.094]	46,599* [0.084]	44,732 [0.130]
90th Percentile Value	80,803* [0.058]	91,381** [0.034]	60,538 [0.227]	54,234 [0.160]	56,841 [0.209]
Maximum Value	84,061 [0.291]	104,128 [0.118]	35,424 [0.765]	−22,959 [0.799]	−305,140 [0.219]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level   **significant at the 0.05 level   ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

TABLE SI-3D: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on *Median Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (50th Percentile Rank Value: Grand Median) to Same Measure Based on Alternative Subsets of State Executive Agencies and Within State-Year *Low Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (12.5 Percentile Rank Value: Lower Quartile Median) and *High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (87.5 Percentile Rank Value: Upper Quartile Median) (Top 1% to Top 0.5% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results (35 Agencies)	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity (18 Agencies)	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity (8 Agencies)	LOW BL Capacity Subset (35 Agencies)	HIGH BL Capacity Subset (35 Agencies)
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−37,529*** [0.002]	−42,358*** [0.001]	−46,020*** [0.001]	−13,725 [0.226]	−43,921** [0.012]
10th Percentile Value	−30,813*** [0.003]	−31,223*** [0.002]	−30,743*** [0.002]	−10,599 [0.237]	−13,650*** [0.010]
25th Percentile Value	−21,337*** [0.007]	−21,507*** [0.005]	−21,005** [0.004]	−8,485 [0.258]	−17,938** [0.013]
50th Percentile Value	−9,142* [0.091]	−11,708*** [0.040]	−8,175 [0.104]	−4,054 [0.443]	-9,058* [0.077]
75th Percentile Value	10,139 [0.106]	11,549* [0.053]	6,646 [0.266]	570 [0.918]	5,846 [0.414]
90th Percentile Value	21,627** [0.017]	24,121*** [0.005]	17,493** [0.040]	4,492 [0.556]	15,685 [0.143]
Maximum Value	40,443*** [0.005]	37,743*** [0.002]	34,556*** [0.010]	10,060 [0.392]	38,564* [0.056]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	**Reported Results**	**Fewer Agencies BL Capacity**	**Fewest Agencies BL Capacity**	**LOW BL Capacity Subset**	**HIGH BL Capacity Subset**
Minimum Value	28,622 [0.135]	27,341* [0.100]	40,345 [0.113]	88,788*** [0.003]	31,621 [0.186]
10th Percentile Value	8,641 [0.272]	8,403 [0.210]	6,985 [0.349]	16,771* [0.058]	7,456 [0.492]
25th Percentile Value	1,040 [0.865]	1,680 [0.773]	−1,231 [0.826]	789 [0.893]	−1,875 [0.789]
50th Percentile Value	−5,616 [0.470]	−3,765 [0.617]	−7,336 [0.266]	−9,533 [0.145]	−7,331 [0.283]

	Reported Results	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity	LOW BL Capacity Subset	HIGH BL Capacity Subset
75th Percentile Value	−7,237 [0.457]	−6,528 [0.522]	−7,799 [0.397]	−14,511 [0.155]	−6,658 [0.448]
90th Percentile Value	−4,442 [0.727]	−5,606 [0.660]	−1,786 [0.909]	−11,405 [0.408]	−2,520 [0.837]
Maximum Value	14,693 [0.602]	5,671 [0.803]	22,259 [0.556]	30,296 [0.360]	110,475 [0.169]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Fewer Agencies BL Capacity**	**Fewest Agencies BL Capacity**	**LOW BL Capacity Subset**	**HIGH BL Capacity Subset**
Minimum Value	−66,151*** [0.010]	−69,696*** [0.004]	−86,374*** [0.004]	−102,513*** [0.002]	−75,542*** [0.018]
10th Percentile Value	−39,454*** [0.005]	−39,625*** [0.003]	−37,728*** [0.003]	−27,330** [0.032]	−33,041** [0.039]
25th Percentile Value	−22,377** [0.019]	−23,187** [0.014]	−19,774** [0.028]	−9,274 [0.313]	−16,063 [0.125]
50th Percentile Value	−3,526 [0.663]	−7,944 [0.340]	−840 [0.910]	5,480 [0.472]	−1,727 [0.828]
75th Percentile Value	17,376 [0.133]	18,077 [0.129]	14,444 [0.179]	15,081 [0.165]	12,504 [0.277]
90th Percentile Value	26,070 [0.109]	29,728* [0.068]	19,280 [0.293]	15,942 [0.293]	18,205 [0.273]
Maximum Value	25,750 [0.424]	32,071 [0.232]	12,296 [0.766]	−20,236 [0.558]	−71,911 [0.391]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times \mathsf{L}BC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level   **significant at the 0.05 level   ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

TABLE SI-3E: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on *Median Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (50th Percentile Rank Value: Grand Median) to Same Measure Based on Alternative Subsets of State Executive Agencies and Within State-Year *Low Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (12.5 Percentile Rank Value: Lower Quartile Median) and *High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (87.5 Percentile Rank Value: Upper Quartile Median) (Top 5% to Top 1% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results (35 Agencies)	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity (18 Agencies)	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity (8 Agencies)	LOW BL Capacity Subset (35 Agencies)	HIGH BL Capacity Subset (35 Agencies)
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−15,958*** [0.006]	−17,388*** [0.001]	−18,856*** [0.004]	−6,194 [0.224]	−18,065** [0.013]
10th Percentile Value	−13,255*** [0.007]	−13,041*** [0.002]	−12,879*** [0.005]	−4,941 [0.242]	−10,826** [0.012]
25th Percentile Value	−9,441** [0.013]	−9,248*** [0.006]	−9,066*** [0.008]	−4,120 [0.248]	−7,086** [0.018]
50th Percentile Value	−4,532* [0.082]	−5,422** [0.037]	−4,044* [0.090]	−2,366 [0.342]	−4,301* [0.084]
75th Percentile Value	3,228 [0.215]	3,658 [0.170]	1,758 [0.485]	−537 [0.825]	1,583 [0.603]
90th Percentile Value	6,581 [0.147]	8,566** [0.021]	6,005* [0.084]	1,015 [0.759]	5,468 [0.208]
Maximum Value	15,425** [0.011]	13,884*** [0.006]	12,685** [0.021]	3,218 [0.529]	14,500* [0.070]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	**Reported Results**	**Fewer Agencies BL Capacity**	**Fewest Agencies BL Capacity**	**LOW BL Capacity Subset**	**HIGH BL Capacity Subset**
Minimum Value	20,195** [0.021]	23,978*** [0.009]	29,708*** [0.003]	34,064** [0.011]	23,569** [0.025]
10th Percentile Value	8,117** [0.031]	8,494** [0.016]	8,077** [0.022]	9,068** [0.026]	7,780* [0.085]
25th Percentile Value	3,115 [0.240]	2,825 [0.254]	2,111 [0.405]	2,801 [0.267]	1,262 [0.644]
50th Percentile Value	−1,898 [0.551]	−1,985 [0.509]	−3,087 [0.246]	−1,887 [0.481]	−3,263 [0.258]

	Reported Results	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity	LOW BL Capacity Subset	HIGH BL Capacity Subset
75th Percentile Value	−4,238 [0.311]	−4,902 [0.250]	−5,338 [0.191]	−5,780 [0.201]	−4,073 [0.301]
90th Percentile Value	−4,547 [0.424]	−4,896 [0.385]	−4,078 [0.568]	−6,721 [0.290]	−2,619 [0.612]
Maximum Value	1,637 [0.893]	2,240 [0.844]	5,747 [0.722]	−425 [0.978]	56,436 [0.101]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Fewer Agencies BL Capacity**	**Fewest Agencies BL Capacity**	**LOW BL Capacity Subset**	**HIGH BL Capacity Subset**
Minimum Value	−36,153*** [0.004]	−41,367*** [0.002]	−48,567*** [0.000]	−40,258*** [0.008]	−41,634*** [0.004]
10th Percentile Value	−21,371*** [0.004]	−21,535*** [0.002]	−20,886*** [0.000]	−14,010** [0.028]	−18,606*** [0.009]
25th Percentile Value	−12,585** [0.015]	−12,073*** [0.009]	−11,177** [0.022]	−6,922 [0.138]	−9,068* [0.052]
50th Percentile Value	−2,635 [0.505]	−3,437 [0.354]	−956 [0.790]	−480 [0.890]	−1,038 [0.776]
75th Percentile Value	7,466 [0.122]	8,561* [0.092]	7,096 [0.119]	5,243 [0.254]	5,656 [0.244]
90th Percentile Value	12,399* [0.065]	13,462** [0.050]	10,083 [0.196]	7,737 [0.238]	8,086 [0.232]
Maximum Value	13,787 [0.288]	11,645 [0.323]	6,937 [0.686]	3,644 [0.817]	−41,936 [0.229]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level   **significant at the 0.05 level   ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).

TABLE SI-3F: Comparing Manuscript Reported Results Based on *Median Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (50th Percentile Rank Value: Grand Median) to Same Measure Based on Alternative Subsets of State Executive Agencies and Within State-Year *Low Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (12.5 Percentile Rank Value: Lower Quartile Median) and *High Bureaucratic Leadership Capacity* (87.5 Percentile Rank Value: Upper Quartile Median) *(Top 10% to Top 5% Income Fractile in Each State Per Year)*

Hypothesis Test	Reported Results (35 Agencies)	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity (18 Agencies)	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity (8 Agencies)	LOW BL Capacity Subset (35 Agencies)	HIGH BL Capacity Subset (35 Agencies)
Unified Republican Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*					
Minimum Value	−6,707*** [0.003]	−6,796*** [0.001]	−8,339*** [0.001]	−5,125* [0.051]	−8,166*** [0.006]
10th Percentile Value	−5,737*** [0.005]	−5,360*** [0.002]	−5,925*** [0.003]	−4,224* [0.053]	−5,318** [0.011]
25th Percentile Value	−4,369*** [0.005]	-4,109*** [0.008]	−4,451*** [0.008]	−3,633* [0.059]	−4,129** [0.020]
50th Percentile Value	−2,608* [0.077]	−2,845** [0.042]	−2,508* [0.075]	−2,371 [0.119]	−2,750* [0.063]
75th Percentile Value	175 [0.895]	152 [0.915]	−263 [0.848]	−1,055 [0.469]	−434 [0.743]
90th Percentile Value	1,834 [0.209]	1,772 [0.279]	1,379 [0.376]	62 [0.971]	1,095 [0.467]
Maximum Value	4,550** [0.018]	3,528* [0.075]	3,963* [0.056]	1,648 [0.492]	4,649* [0.055]
Unified Democratic Partisan Control *(Divided Partisan Control Baseline)*	Reported Results	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity	LOW BL Capacity Subset	HIGH BL Capacity Subset
Minimum Value	6,268** [0.027]	5,751** [0.042]	9,336*** [0.001]	12,763*** [0.005]	6,060** [0.012]
10th Percentile Value	2,406** [0.014]	2,109** [0.014]	2,040*** [0.025]	3,748*** [0.004]	2,090* [0.051]
25th Percentile Value	951 [0.280]	872 [0.294]	325 [0.670]	1,497 [0.129]	536 [0.516]
50th Percentile Value	−298 [0.806]	−56 [0.961]	−827 [0.385]	−181 [0.859]	−409 [0.679]

	Reported Results	Fewer Agencies BL Capacity	Fewest Agencies BL Capacity	LOW BL Capacity Subset	HIGH BL Capacity Subset
75th Percentile Value	−560 [0.674]	−371 [0.789]	-638 [0.615]	−1,559 [0.248]	−362 [0.767]
90th Percentile Value	54 [0.972]	52 [0.975]	1,071 [0.556]	−1,874 [0.322]	256 [0.861]
Maximum Value	3,953 [0.361]	2,906 [0.445]	7,193* [0.053]	495 [0.942]	18,078** [0.033]
Unified Republican Partisan Control – Unified Democratic Partisan Control	**Reported Results**	**Fewer Agencies BL Capacity**	**Fewest Agencies BL Capacity**	**LOW BL Capacity Subset**	**HIGH BL Capacity Subset**
Minimum Value	−12,975*** [0.000]	−12,547*** [0.000]	−17,575*** [0.000]	−17,888*** [0.001]	−14,226*** [0.000]
10th Percentile Value	−8,143*** [0.001]	−7,470*** [0.000]	−7,965*** [0.001]	−7,972*** [0.003]	−7,407*** [0.002]
25th Percentile Value	−5,320** [0.011]	−4,981*** [0.008]	−4,776** [0.014]	−5,130** [0.027]	−4,665** [0.024]
50th Percentile Value	−2,311 [0.256]	−2,789 [0.144]	−1,681 [0.347]	−2,191 [0.259]	−2,341 [0.224]
75th Percentile Value	735 [0.718]	523 [0.798]	375 [0.850]	504 [0.803]	−73 [0.971]
90th Percentile Value	1,779 [0.433]	1,721 [0.460]	309 [0.900]	1,936 [0.452]	839 [0.708]
Maximum Value	597 [0.899]	622 [0.882]	−3,229 [0.440]	1,153 [0.853]	−13,429 [0.108]

Note: Total long-run marginal effect point estimates appear as cell entries and two-tailed probability values appear inside square brackets. The general form for these estimates are as follows:

Unified Republican Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1];$$

Unified Democratic Partisan Control (Divided Partisan Control Baseline):

$$[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]; \text{ and}$$

Unified Republican Partisan Control − Unified Democratic Partisan Control:

$$\{[\beta_1 + \beta_5 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\} - \{[\beta_2 + \beta_7 \times BLC_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \times BLC^p_{i,t-1}] / [1 - \alpha_1]\}.$$

*significant at the 0.10 level   **significant at the 0.05 level   ***significant at the 0.01 level (2−tailed tests).