Supplementary Material (Not for Publication)

Good Riddance to Bad Government? Institutional Performance Voting in Swedish Municipalities

Contents

A The Swedish Municipal Audit Report database

The data for performance audit reports were collected in two steps:

First, in The Databank of Accountability (orig. *Ansvarsprövningsbanken*), the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (2017) compiles a record of formal audit critique from Swedish municipalities and regions between 2002 and 2017 (at the time of data collection information until 2015 was available). In 305 instances, a municipality was found to have received one or more points of formal critique.

Second, I found that the database contained a number of false negatives. As a result, I supplemented the SALAR database through an extensive search in the Swedish Media Archive (Retriever 2017) for additional instances of critique, complemented by confirmatory documentation gathered directly from the archives of the municipalities in question. This approach garnered an additional 69 instances of critique for the 2002-2015 period. This complementary work garnered a new dataset, the Swedish Municipal Audit Report database.

A.1 The structure of municipal audit committees in Sweden

Members of audit committees (henceforth "auditors") tend to have a political background, and are chosen by the municipal assembly for each four-year term period. Through a 2006 revision to the Swedish municipal code, which also eliminated auditors' possibility to serve in the municipal assembly and its sub-committees, the minimum number of members to serve in these committees was increased from three to five. The majority of municipalities appoint the legal minimum of five auditors, although the largest cities like Stockholm and Gothenburg tend to have considerably larger audit committees consisting of up to around twenty members (Swedish Association of Local

2

Authorities and Regions, 2016).

Although auditors are not to act in the interest of their respective parties, the system of politically appointed audit committees has been a consistent source of criticism by Swedish policy experts (e.g., Ahlénius 2013). As Lundin (2010, sec. 7) notes, although this debate is important to the credibility of the institution, there is little evidence of actual politicization of its outcomes. The data on audit critique does nothing to further the notion of politicization: In three-quarters of cases in the present sample, the audit committee chairperson is a representative of the political minority (data from Statistics Sweden, with adjustments for intra-period changes by the author). Between 2002 and 2015, audit committees led by a representative of a ruling coalition were significantly *more* prone to give out critique, with 12 % of years with audit critique, compared to 8 % for those helmed by the minority.

One potential explanation for the seeming absence of politicized audit critique is that any member of the audit board is free to launch formal critique as they please, even if the chair does not concur.[1] A second—and likely more potent—reason is the fact that the underlying basis of auditors' rulings are based on reports conducted by professional assistant experts. In almost all municipalities this task is outsourced to professional experts employed by consultancy firms, normally one of the "big four," Deloitte, EY, KPMG, or PwC. Since Swedish law (Svensk Författningssamling, 1991, ch. 9, §16) stipulates that the investigations written by the assistant experts be published alongside the municipal auditors' reports, it would therefore not be risk-free for an auditor or audit committee to draw a conclusion drastically different from the judgments of the external experts. Finally, a more speculative conclusion that can nevertheless reasonably be drawn from the fact that majority-chaired audit committees are not only *as* but *more* likely to launch critique could lie with an awareness among auditors of the aforementioned debate regarding politically appointed audit

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[1]Disagreement within audit committees is uncommon. Lundin (2010) cites this fact as evidence against politicized committees.

committees in itself. This awareness is singled out by Lundin (2010, 79); given this importance of appearances, such pressure may plausibly be more strongly felt by majority-nominated chairs, leading to a more critical outlook.

The lack of evident politicization attributed to the work of municipal audit committees nonwithstanding, its principal relevance for the study at hand is whether such factors may affect the link between critique and incumbents' electoral performance. This question is possible to approach empirically, by inserting majority/minority-chaired audit as a covariate and interaction term into the main analysis (table 1 in the article). Figure A1 displays marginal effects of critique on electoral performance of mayoral party, contingent on this variable, deriving from a model otherwise identical to column 2 in table 1. Indeed, variation in who nominates chairs does not affect the actual relationship between critique and vote loss. The interaction term is wholly insignificant (p=0.715), and the point estimate for minority-chaired audit (β-0.96) is accordingly indistinguishible from majority-chaired audits (β-0.61).[2]

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[2]The broader confidence intervals for majority chaired audit committees are a reasonable consequence of the smaller number of observations (N=214 vs. 696 for minority-chaired audit committees) in the sample.

Figure A1: Mayoral party's electoral performance, by Audit critique & who nominates audit chair
Note. Dependent variable: ΔMayoral party vote share. Model specifications identical to column 2 in table 1, with the addition of dummy variable *Audit Chair from Majority* as covariate and interaction term. Capped lines display confidence intervals (from standard errors clustered by municipality) at the 95 % level.

In sum, and further supported by the analysis in section A.2. below, the most likely account of how audit critique relates to incumbent vote loss is in that the presence of critique closely corresponds to actual poor institutional performance, thereby serving as a valid indicator of such a concept.

A.2 External validation of audit critique as an indicator of institutional performance

Although there are currently few available indicators of institutional quality in Swedish municipalities, I use three such measures to test the external validity of audit critique as an operationalization of the concept, correlating these indicators with an aggregate measure of total years in which audit critique has befallen a given municipality between 2002 and 2015: First, a question regarding the quality of the *Application of Laws and Rules*, derived from an annual survey of local businesspeople by Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (2017), aggregated for the years 2002-15 (data missing for 2014). Second, a composite *Quality of Qovernment (QoG)*-index derived from a battery of questions on the extent of impartiality, bribery, and meritocracy in the municipality (Dahlström and Sundell 2013), gathered from a survey of Swedish municipal politicians in 2012-13 (Karlsson and Gilljam, 2014). Third, a composite index of municipal politicians' and bureaucrats' perceptions of *Corruption* in seven administrative spheres, taken from a 2011 survey by the Swedish Agency for Public Management (Swedish Agency for Public Management 2012b; lower values indicate perceptions of more corruption). The correlations with audit critique are, as demonstrated in table A1, consistently and significantly in the expected directions.

Table A1: Audit critique & alternate indices of institutional quality in Swedish municipalities

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Application of Laws and Rules, 2002-15	-2.00***		
	(0.35)		
QoG Index		-1.06***	
		(0.27)	
Corruption Index			-0.78***
			(0.29)
Constant	1.09***	0.80***	0.69***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Observations	290	290	290

Note. Results from bivariate Poisson regressions. All independent variables set to range between 0 and 1. Dependent variable: Number of years with audit critique 2002-2015. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Next, using the sub-indicators underlying the Quality of Government index (see section F for a description of variables) we can further test the notion that audit critique actually captures a broader concept of institutional quality, and is not, for instance, merely a further proxy for corruption. The Quality of Government index consists of ten individual sub-indicators (*Politician Influencing Public Administration Report*, *Former Politician Hired*, *Not Hiring the Most Qualified Person*, *Gift/Service Offered During Procurement Process*, *Public Employee paid to Perform Duties*, and the *Level of impartiality* in five distinct areas: *Housing*, *Building Permits*, *Environmental Permits*, *Procurements*, and *Recruitment*). Provided that audit critique serves as an aggregate measure of institutional quality, it should follow that the composite measure correlates stronger to critique than its individual sub-indicators. Figure A1 displays the coefficient for each sub-indicator, as well as the composite measure, derived from separate Poisson regressions predicting the aggregated audit critique measure. Indeed, although the relationship is in the expected direction in every case, the relationship is stronger for the aggregated measure than any of its constituting parts. Thus, these results further bolster the view that the critique measure not only captures institutional dysfunction, but does so more cohesively than, for example, a conventional measure of corruption.

Figure A2: Audit critique & Government quality index, and its constituting parts
Note. Results from bivariate Poisson regressions. All independent variables set to range between 0 and 1. Dependent variable: Number of years with audit critique 2002-2015. Capped lines display confidence intervals at the 95 % level.

B Audit critique as signal or reflection of institutional dysfunction?

The key role of media for transmitting knowledge of dysfunction and wrongdoing to the electorate is among the clearest findings derived from the literature linking voting to corruption scandals. This makes intuitive sense; a transgression tends to become a scandal only once covered in the press. The literature tends to capture this dynamic in two different ways: One strand of studies derives the very data on scandals directly from media reports (e.g., Costas-Pérez et al. 2012; Fernández-Vázquez et al. 2016), thus turning media attention itself into treatment, and thereby capturing actual instances of wrongdoing only indirectly. Another strand complements "hard" data on corruption or malfeasance with data on media proliferation (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Chang et al., 2010), thereby treating media influence as a moderating variable. Bridging this division would allow for directly observing whether the observed link between audit critique and mayoral parties' vote loss can be attributed to negative attention stemming from the public's awareness of the report—a signal effect—or if the relationship is rather a reflection of voters' actual experiences with dysfunctional institutions they have encountered during the term.

The a priori most promising strategy to capture the signal effect of audit critique would be to compare instances of audit critique that are reported in media with those which are not. However, an extensive search using the Swedish Media Archive (Retriever, 2017) asserts that the vast majority of instances of audit critique are reported in the local press, television, or radio. For the two latter term periods in the sample, 2007-10 and 2011-14, the search only failed to find media reports for 18 instances, or 7.3 %, of audit critique, with a remaining possibility of false negatives, derived from idiosyncratic wording of the source material or certain media sources being missing from the Media Archive. The corresponding figure for the first term included in the analysis (2003-2006) garnered a considerably lower share of critique with media attention (40.5 %), although this is in all likelihood due to the fact that coverage for many local newspapers in the Swedish Media Archive

is spotty before the mid-00s.

Another approach to gauge the signal effect is to take advantage of the timing of the municipal audit reports. These reports, wherein the auditors present their recommendations of discharge, are released during the spring of the following year. Thus, audit critique during election years (the 4th year in a term-period) is not made public until spring/summer the year *after* the election was held. However, figure B1, which estimates the coefficient of Audit critique on ΔMayoral party vote share, by year in term period, shows no marked differences between critique in the 4th year and other years. In fact, the link to vote loss is relatively stronger for 4th -year critique. This finding provides grounds to rebuke the notion that audit critique *in itself* functions as a viable signal to voters, at least directly.


Figure B1: ΔMayoral party vote share & general audit critique, by year in term-period
Note. Estimates derived from column 2, table B1 (below), with the full set of controls included.
Capped lines display confidence intervals at the 95 % level

10

The relatively strong results deriving from critique in the final year point to audit critique reflecting real-world institutional dysfunction felt or observed directly by the members of the electorate, an experience that moreover occurs close to the election, a factor that Pereira and Waterbury (2019) find important for the electoral consequence of scandal. The results in figure B2, which replicates figure B1 but splitting the sample by median population size (15,473), supports this idea. The underlying logic here is that institutional issues are more readily observed in smaller municipalities, where the likelihood is higher that a voter belongs to the same social network as people who can informally disseminate such information prior to any formal audit report being distributed—such as municipal civil servants, politicians, or even auditors themselves—than in larger municipalities. Although the level of noise—which is already larger in figure B1 than in the main analysis—is compounded when the sample is split in two, the main pattern is as expected: While critique in large municipalities is most electorally damaging for incumbents when launched the year before elections—and thus publicly available by election day—in smaller municipalities election-year critique is most damning. This indicates that the presence of an actual report that can be reported in the media is more important in the larger group of municipalities than in the smaller one, where voters presumably are more likely to already know about the issues these reports flag.

Figure B2: ΔMayoral party vote share & general audit critique, by year in term-period, divided by small and large municipalities

Note. Estimates derived from column 3 and 4, table B1 (below), with the full set of controls included. Sample split along median population for the sample (15,473). Capped lines display confidence intervals at the 95 % level.

Notably, even before the final reports are released, it is impossible to strictly delineate between directly seen or felt institutional dysfunction information derived from audit signaling. An example of this latter dynamic is found in a survey carried out by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (2012), where auditors in most municipalities state that they continuously report the results of their findings during the year to the municipal assembly. Indeed, norms of best practice stipulates that auditors flag and explain the grounds for critique as soon as possible (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, 2014, 7.3.2). Thus, any audit critique signals are likely to be dispersed in a piecemeal fashion well before the official report is out, and since the ratio of assembly members to population is considerably higher in smaller than larger ones, these

signals are plausibly stronger in such settings.

Regardless of which specific signal is being picked up by the press, it is still likely to play a role in this story by means of transmitting information to voters, whether through covering the root causes of the problems that the audit reports only reflect at a later stage or through auditors' interim reports or similar actions. In order to further understand this dynamic, I explicitly investigate the influence of local media in two ways:

First, to investigate whether election-year critique is actually plausible to have reached voters prior to voting, I revisit election-year instances of critique (N=82) and search the Swedish Media archive for articles that relate to the issue that eventually becomes grounds for formal critique, between January 1st and the day before election day (mid-September) in 2006, 2010, and 2014. If the type of issues subsequently raised in the audit reports only become public upon their release a year later, there should be little trace of these issues in local media pre-election. If, on the other hand, the audit reports reflect issues already publicly known or if documents like preliminary interim reports or announcements that the audit committee will begin an investigation are released pre-election, we should be able to find mentions of them in local media. The results are highly supportive of the notion of pre-report dissemination: for nearly two thirds (66 %) of the issues that eventually result in election-year critique, a related pre-election article is found. Like critique in general, typical examples of pre-election attention concerns budget deficits for a committee first identified in the interim financial statements, minor scandals involving faulty procurement procedures, or specific large construction projects that are riddled with delays and/or budget overruns. The list also contains specific problems like fraud cases, mishandling of social work cases, and turbulent administration in a primary school.[3]

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[3]Note that this method of information finding is in itself subject to some measurement error: First, it can be difficult to discern whether the specific issue that subsequently warrants formal audit critique is exactly the same issue that is reported by a journalist as a story develops, often a year before the report is released. I have been liberal in defining a mention of a related problem as a hit, whether or not the same specific grounds for critique are subsequently mentioned

The second investigation into media influence is more indirect and carried out by interacting audit critique with a measure of local newspaper coverage in Swedish municipalities.[4] Estimating the marginal effect of audit critique contingent on the extent of local newspaper coverage in Swedish municipalities, there are some signs of a media factor, if only to a modest degree: Figure B3 shows that the negative coefficient for Audit critique is more pronounced where local press has higher circulation, although it should be emphasized that the interaction term itself is consistently insignificant (see table B2 below for full results).

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in the audit report. The focus has been a negative mention. For example, the auditors do not criticize committees' budget deficits as such—a popular story in local media—but the lack of control and steering surrounding it. Further, individual scandals highlighted by the press can spur an audit investigation of systematic deficiencies to oversight, etc, even if the initial issue falls outside the scope of audit committees' purview. Second, as noted above, the Swedish media archive is not a complete record of all local press outlets, especially for the early 00s. Add to this the potential for missing hits due to idiosyncratic phrasing in the articles, and the risk of false negatives is readily apparent. A look at the rate of pre-election articles by individual election year supports this notion: For 2006 53 %, for 2010 62 %, for 2014 81 %, indicating that the true rate of pre-election coverage in local media surpasses the observed two-thirds.

[4]Data from T.S. Mediefakta (2017). Variable captures the circulation for local newspapers in each municipality, calculated as the percentage point share of total households. Mean value for respective term period. Since data for after 2010 is unavailable, the 2011-14 term period is excluded.

Figure B3: ΔMayoral party vote share & audit critique, conditional on local newspaper coverage
Note. Figure displays the average marginal effects of Audit critique after accounting for the complete battery of control variables (derived from column 2 in table B2).

Finally, if one prefers to only consider the reports that are formally made public in time for election season, purging the election-year critique from the audit critique measure altogether, a slightly weaker but still arguably noticeable pattern emerges (Tables B3 & B4 below). For the models predicting incumbent vote share, there is a mostly negligible decrease in strength of the Audit critique coefficient compared the main results. The most notable exception can be seen in column 5 and the FE-estimation of raw vote shares with controls, where the Audit critique coefficient diminishes from -1.38 to -0.88 and loses significance (p=0.11). Meanwhile, the models predicting incumbent reelection are less sensitive to the exclusion of election-year critique, with the sole substantive difference found in column 3, which includes the highly demanding covariate capturing incumbent vote share. Here, significance for Audit critique slips from the 95 % to the 90 % level.

15

Table B1: ΔMayoral party vote share & general audit critique, by year in term-period coverage

	Full sample		Small	Large
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Audit critique$_{1st\ year}$	-0.75	-0.75	-0.51	-0.84
	(0.77)	(0.73)	(1.19)	(0.88)
Audit critique$_{2nd\ year}$	-0.18	0.30	0.04	0.43
	(0.65)	(0.60)	(0.93)	(0.75)
Audit critique$_{3rd\ year}$	-0.52	-0.68	0.14	-1.35
	(0.92)	(0.83)	(1.35)	(0.95)
Audit critique$_{4th\ year}$	-0.90	-0.75	-1.35	-0.19
	(0.67)	(0.61)	(0.89)	(0.79)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.67***	1.58***	-0.05
		(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.25)
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.02***	-0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.01)
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.78	0.84	0.91
		(0.52)	(0.71)	(0.77)
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-0.13	-0.31	0.56
		(0.55)	(0.74)	(0.80)
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-1.26*	-1.73	-0.42
		(0.74)	(1.17)	(0.90)
Constant	-1.71***	-3.18*	-3.70	-3.77
	(0.20)	(1.88)	(2.51)	(2.90)
Observations	831	831	416	415
R^2	0.00	0.21	0.18	0.30
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Dependent variable: ΔMayoral party vote share. Sample reduction compared to main analysis is a result of mayoral parties entering or leaving office mid-term period, leading to missing data. Standard errors, clustered on municipality, in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table B2: ΔMayoral party vote share & general audit critique, conditional on local press coverage

	(1)	(2)
Audit Critique=1	-0.31	0.07
	(1.56)	(1.43)
Newspaper Coverage	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Audit Critique=1 × Newspaper Coverage	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.46**
		(0.19)
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.01**
		(0.01)
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.64
		(0.51)
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-0.11
		(0.56)
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-0.70
		(0.71)
Constant	-1.96*	-4.82***
	(1.07)	(1.82)
Observations	607	607
R^2	0.01	0.28
Term period FEs	No	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes

Note. Dependent variable: ΔMayoral party vote share. Standard errors, clustered at municipality-level, in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table B3: ΔMayoral party vote share & general audit critique, without election-year critique

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique, w/o election year	-1.12**	-0.83*	-0.39	-2.17***	-0.88	-0.90**
	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.38)	(0.77)	(0.55)	(0.45)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.55***	0.51***			
		(0.17)	(0.13)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.02***	-0.02***			
		(0.01)	(0.00)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.24	-0.05			
		(0.42)	(0.37)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-0.43	0.13			
		(0.45)	(0.35)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-1.17*	-1.89***			
		(0.70)	(0.55)			
Fiscal Result, final year					0.49***	0.10
					(0.18)	(0.17)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					-0.02***	-0.01
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					0.03	-0.02
					(0.04)	(0.04)
Unemployment, final year					-0.01	0.18
					(0.16)	(0.15)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-2.11**	0.11
					(1.03)	(0.77)
Constant	-1.62***	-1.51	-0.66	33.53***	55.15**	9.10
	(0.19)	(1.48)	(1.32)	(0.16)	(21.27)	(16.69)
Observations	909	909	897	909	909	897
R^2	0.01	0.20	0.11	0.01	0.55	0.36
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Dependent variable: ΔMayoral party vote share. Standard errors, clustered at municipality-level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B4: ΔMayoral party reelection & general audit critique, without election-year critique

	DV: Mayoral party reelected					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mayoral Party Reelected, t+1						
Audit Critique, w/o election year	0.64**	0.61***	0.67*	0.59**	0.50***	0.53**
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		1.22**	1.07			
		(0.11)	(0.12)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		1.00	1.00			
		(0.00)	(0.00)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		1.18	1.24			
		(0.20)	(0.26)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		1.42**	1.70**			
		(0.22)	(0.37)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		0.55**	0.86			
		(0.13)	(0.27)			
logscb_pop		0.86	1.17		5.05	0.25
		(0.09)	(0.15)		(20.98)	(1.40)
Mayoral Party Vote Share, t+1			1.29***			1.35***
			(0.03)			(0.05)
Fiscal Result, final year					1.14	1.08
					(0.12)	(0.15)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					0.99	0.99
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					1.07***	1.11***
					(0.02)	(0.04)
Unemployment, final year					0.98	0.99
					(0.07)	(0.09)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					0.78	1.73
					(0.38)	(1.09)
Constant		2.41***	6.91*	0.00***		
		(0.22)	(8.03)	(0.00)		
Observations	909	909	909	532	532	532
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Dependent variable: ΔMayoral party vote share. Standard errors, clustered at municipality-level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

19

C   Summary statistics

Table C1: Summary statistics, mayoral party sample

	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Audit Critique	909	0.27	0.44	0	1
Critique for Executive Board	909	0.14	0.35	0	1
Critique for Committee	909	0.20	0.40	0	1
Remark	909	0.25	0.43	0	1
Dissuasion of Discharge	909	0.07	0.25	0	1
Δ Mayoral Party Vote Share	909	-1.86	6.12	-33	20
Mayoral Party Vote Share, t+1	909	33.08	11.16	1	67
Δ Differential, Mayoral Party Vote Share,municipal assembly-parliament	897	-0.35	4.98	-29	24
Differential, Mayoral Party Vote Share,municipal assembly-parliament, t+1	897	1.31	7.75	-27	49
Mayoral Party Reelected, t+1	909	0.69	0.46	0	1
Fiscal Result (sum, term)	909	0.88	1.44	-12	29
Fiscal Result, final year	909	1.20	2.04	-12	28
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)	909	2.83	0.57	0	6
Mean income, final year)	909	224.54	34.50	168	473
Δ Unemployment (annualized)	909	-0.06	0.58	-4	2
Unemployment, final year	909	13.53	3.44	4	29
Δ Municipal Tax Rate	909	0.15	0.31	-1	2
Municipal Tax Rate, final year	909	17.28	1.33	14	34
% Change, Mayoral Party Vote Share, t+1	909	-3.74	22.41	-76	177
% Change, Mayoral Party Vote Share, parliament, t+1	897	-2.77	22.14	-48	101
Mayoral party ID					
Social Democrats	909	0.18	0.38	0	1
Moderates	909	0.02	0.14	0	1
Centre Party	909	0.02	0.14	0	1
Christian Democrats	909	0.27	0.44	0	1
Liberals	909	0.00	0.03	0	1
Left Party	909	0.01	0.11	0	1
Green Party	909	0.49	0.50	0	1
Other	909	0.01	0.08	0	1
Alternate IQ-indicators					
Application of Laws and Regulations	909	0.49	0.15	-0	1
Δ Application of Laws and Regulations	908	0.08	0.14	-0	0
QoG Index	290	0.54	0.19	0	1
Corruption Index	290	0.56	0.18	0	1

Table C2: Summary statistics, full government sample

	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Audit Critique	970	0.26	0.44	0	1
Δ Government Vote Share	970	-3.92	5.76	-27	15
Government Vote Share, t+1	970	49.91	9.44	6	97
Δ Differential, Government Vote Share,municipal assembly-parliament	811	-0.27	5.24	-24	17
Differential, Government Vote Share,municipal assembly-parliament, t+1	811	0.37	6.67	-33	47
Fiscal Result (sum, term)	970	0.87	1.47	-12	29
Fiscal Result, final year	970	1.16	2.03	-12	28
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)	970	2.82	0.64	-1	6
Mean income, final year)	970	224.19	34.12	168	473
Δ Unemployment (annualized)	970	-0.08	0.71	-4	3
Unemployment, final year	970	13.48	3.41	4	29
Δ Municipal Tax Rate	970	0.14	0.30	-1	2
Municipal Tax Rate, final year	970	17.28	1.30	14	34

Table C3: Summary statistics, coalition sample

	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Audit Critique	847	0.27	0.44	0	1
Δ Supporting Parties' Vote Share	847	-2.22	4.26	-22	14
Supporting Parties' Vote Share, t+1	847	19.50	10.35	1	71
Δ Differential, Supporting Parties' Vote Share,municipal assembly-parliam	689	-1.82	6.57	-28	22
Differential, Supporting Parties' Vote Share,municipal assembly-parliament, t+1	689	30.83	12.41	-2	62
Fiscal Result (sum, term)	847	0.88	1.08	-6	13
Fiscal Result, final year	847	1.14	1.83	-5	28
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)	847	2.84	0.63	1	6
Mean income, final year)	847	225.14	34.86	168	473
Δ Unemployment (annualized)	847	-0.09	0.70	-4	3
Unemployment, final year	847	13.23	3.36	4	29
Δ Municipal Tax Rate	847	0.14	0.30	-1	2
Municipal Tax Rate, final year	847	17.28	1.37	14	34

D Robustness and extensions

D.1 Mediation analysis

Table D1: Mayoral party reelection, vote share, & audit critique: Mediation analysis

	Estimate	95% CI	Lower 95% CI	Upper p-value
ACME (control)	-0.0714	-0.1047	-0.04	<0.000 ***
ACME (treated)	-0.0766	-0.1124	-0.04	<0.000 ***
ADE (control)	-0.0592	-0.1232	-0.01	<0.000 ***
ADE (treated)	-0.0644	-0.1326	-0.01	<0.000 ***
Total Effect	-0.1358	-0.2085	-0.07	<0.000 ***
Prop. Mediated (control)	0.5293	0.3081	0.87	<0.000 ***
Prop. Mediated (treated)	0.5683	0.3436	0.88	<0.000 ***
ACME (average)	-0.0740	-0.1092	-0.04	<0.000 ***
ADE (average)	-0.0618	-0.1279	-0.01	<0.000 ***
Prop. Mediated (average)	0.5488	0.3275	0.88	<0.000 ***

Note. Analysis carried out using the medeff function from the mediation-package (v. 4.5) (Tingley et al., 2014) in r. Models employ robust standard errors, and the outcome model fitting probaility of mayoral party reelection employs the probit estimator to function properly when conducting the sensitivity analyses.

ACME$_0(\rho)$

Average Mediation Effect$_0$

Sensitivity Parameter: ρ

ACME$_1(\rho)$

Average Mediation Effect$_1$

Sensitivity Parameter: ρ

Figure D1: Δ ACME, defined as ρ

ρ at which ACME for Treatment & Control Group=0: 0.52

ACME$_0(\tilde{R}^2_M, \tilde{R}^2_Y)$, sgn$(\lambda_2\lambda_3) = 1$

$\tilde{R}^2_Y$

$\tilde{R}^2_M$

ACME$_1(\tilde{R}^2_M, \tilde{R}^2_Y)$, sgn$(\lambda_2\lambda_3) = 1$

$\tilde{R}^2_Y$

$\tilde{R}^2_M$

Figure D2: Δ ACME, defined as r^2

The thick line indicates the extent to which an unmeasured confounder needs to influence the mediator- and outcome models to yield an ACME=0

$ADE_0(\rho)$

$ADE_1(\rho)$

Figure D3: Δ ADE, defined as ρ

ρ at which ADE for Treatment & Control Group = 0: -0.66.

$ADE_0(\tilde{R}_M^2, \tilde{R}_Y^2), \text{sgn}(\lambda_2\lambda_3) = -1$

$ADE_1(\tilde{R}_M^2, \tilde{R}_Y^2), \text{sgn}(\lambda_2\lambda_3) = -1$

Figure D4: Δ ADE, defined as r^2

The thick line indicates the extent to which an unmeasured confounder needs to influence the mediator- and outcome models to yield an ADE=0

Table D2: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, with lagged vote share

|	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique	-1.40***	-1.26***	-0.65*	-2.16***	-1.53***	-0.95**
	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.50)	(0.45)	(0.42)
Mayoral Party Vote Share	-0.16***	-0.24***	-0.15***	0.62***	0.38***	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.53***	0.50***			
		(0.17)	(0.12)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.01***	-0.02***			
		(0.01)	(0.00)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.15	-0.11			
		(0.39)	(0.35)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-0.40	0.15			
		(0.39)	(0.32)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-1.58**	-2.12***			
		(0.69)	(0.55)			
Fiscal Result, final year					0.47***	0.09
					(0.18)	(0.17)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					-0.02***	-0.01
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					-0.05	-0.03
					(0.04)	(0.04)
Unemployment, final year					0.01	0.18
					(0.15)	(0.15)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-1.02	0.19
					(1.01)	(0.82)
Constant	3.99***	4.88***	3.25**	11.92***	42.41**	8.00
	(0.64)	(1.44)	(1.30)	(1.26)	(20.71)	(17.08)
Observations	909	909	897	909	909	897
R^2	0.09	0.29	0.16	0.43	0.62	0.36
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of mayoral party's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Standard errors, clustered on municipality (in parentheses). *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

27

Table D3: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, excluding influential cases

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique	-1.39***	-1.08***	-0.71**	-2.10***	-1.00***	-0.75**
	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.32)	(0.66)	(0.34)	(0.37)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.45**	0.43**			
		(0.20)	(0.17)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.01*	-0.02***			
		(0.01)	(0.01)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.27	-0.18			
		(0.37)	(0.33)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-0.34	0.14			
		(0.35)	(0.31)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-1.11*	-1.41***			
		(0.62)	(0.50)			
Fiscal Result, final year					0.43***	0.18
					(0.13)	(0.18)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					-0.03***	-0.01
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					-0.02	-0.00
					(0.03)	(0.03)
Unemployment, final year					-0.14	0.16
					(0.11)	(0.13)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-2.43***	-0.37
					(0.72)	(0.68)
Constant	-1.44***	-1.34	-0.20	33.90***	71.64***	12.35
	(0.18)	(1.27)	(1.14)	(0.18)	(15.40)	(15.09)
Observations	869	869	861	815	815	807
R^2	0.01	0.21	0.10	0.02	0.71	0.35
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Cases with a Cook's Distance-score exceeding 4/n in model presented in columns 2 (difference)/ columns 5 (FE) in table 1 excluded from regression. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of mayoral party's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Standard errors, clustered on municipality (in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D4: Mayoral party vote share, proportional to vote share$_t$ & audit critique

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique	-4.88***	-3.49**	-0.73	-8.21***	-7.19***	-4.06**
	(1.62)	(1.58)	(1.25)	(2.36)	(2.22)	(1.70)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		2.11***	2.11***			
		(0.66)	(0.50)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.08***	-0.09***			
		(0.02)	(0.02)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		-0.05	-0.33			
		(1.60)	(1.39)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-2.55	-1.06			
		(2.18)	(1.52)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-5.59**	-8.15***			
		(2.36)	(1.97)			
Fiscal Result, final year					1.61	1.73**
					(0.99)	(0.70)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					-0.08**	-0.09**
					(0.04)	(0.04)
Mean income, final year)					-0.53***	0.57***
					(0.20)	(0.18)
Unemployment, final year					-0.80	0.24
					(0.74)	(0.59)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					2.85	-3.49
					(4.24)	(3.75)
Constant	-2.43***	-0.43	-0.58	-1.54**	65.92	-61.97
	(0.77)	(5.49)	(4.77)	(0.63)	(96.25)	(84.94)
Observations	909	909	897	909	909	897
R^2	0.01	0.19	0.15	0.02	0.23	0.12
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Dependent variable: Mayoral party vote share, proportional to vote share$_t$. Standard errors clustered on municipality (in parentheses).*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D5: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, one observation per term

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique	-1.04**	-0.84**	-0.38	-2.73***	-1.40***	-0.90**
	(0.44)	(0.41)	(0.36)	(0.70)	(0.47)	(0.43)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.56***	0.52***			
		(0.17)	(0.14)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) $\times$ Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.02***	-0.02***			
		(0.01)	(0.00)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.50	0.30			
		(0.47)	(0.42)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-0.17	0.62			
		(0.48)	(0.45)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-1.21*	-1.96***			
		(0.72)	(0.56)			
Fiscal Result, final year					0.46**	0.11
					(0.18)	(0.16)
Fiscal Result, final year $\times$ Fiscal Result, final year					-0.02***	-0.00
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					-0.03	-0.06
					(0.06)	(0.05)
Unemployment, final year					-0.03	0.15
					(0.17)	(0.16)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-2.35**	0.43
					(0.98)	(0.77)
Constant	-1.57***	-2.08	-1.65	34.30***	71.86***	12.39
	(0.21)	(1.67)	(1.48)	(0.19)	(22.54)	(18.62)
Observations	869	869	859	869	869	859
R^2	0.01	0.21	0.11	0.03	0.54	0.36
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. In case of multiple incumbents during a single term, the incumbent at the time of election $_{t+1}$ is included. In one instance (Orust 2014), mayor had defected from his party while remaining in office, which garners a missing observation for that election. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of mayoral party's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Standard errors, clustered on municipality (in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D6: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, controlled for Mayoral party national vote share, parliamentary election

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique	-0.93**	-0.98**	-0.62*	-1.63***	-1.27***	-1.05***
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.53)	(0.48)	(0.39)
Δ Mayoral Party Vote Share, national parliamentary results	0.53***	0.56***	-0.46***			
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.44***	0.46***			
		(0.15)	(0.13)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.01***	-0.02***			
		(0.00)	(0.00)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.70*	0.08			
		(0.38)	(0.31)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		0.66	0.37			
		(0.42)	(0.32)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-1.18*	-1.51***			
		(0.65)	(0.47)			
Mayoral Party Vote Share, national parliamentary results				0.63***	0.39***	-0.63***
				(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Fiscal Result, final year					0.59***	0.14
					(0.18)	(0.17)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					-0.03***	-0.01
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					-0.03**	-0.04***
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Unemployment, final year					0.04	0.17
					(0.16)	(0.14)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-2.64***	-0.25
					(0.94)	(0.73)
Constant	-0.84***	-4.35***	-1.14	17.85***	72.03***	25.03**
	(0.20)	(1.19)	(1.00)	(0.91)	(15.02)	(12.44)
Observations	897	897	897	897	897	897
R^2	0.16	0.23	0.24	0.47	0.55	0.40
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of mayoral party's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Standard errors, clustered on municipality (in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D7: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, election-year covariates

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share				DV: Mayoral party vote share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique	-1.13***	-0.58	-0.96**	-0.58	-1.34***	-0.91**
	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.36)	(0.50)	(0.41)
Fiscal Result, final year	0.45***	0.32***				
	(0.16)	(0.12)				
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year	-0.02***	-0.02**				
	(0.01)	(0.01)				
Mean income, final year)	-0.01	-0.01*				
	(0.01)	(0.01)				
Unemployment, final year	0.06	-0.08				
	(0.07)	(0.06)				
Municipal Tax Rate, final year	0.11	-0.00				
	(0.14)	(0.07)				
(annual) Δ Fiscal Result, final year			0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(annual) Δ Fiscal Result, final year × (annual) Δ Fiscal Result, final year			-0.00	-0.00	-0.00**	-0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
(annual) Δ Mean income, final year			0.09	0.00	0.19	0.16
			(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.11)
(annual) Δ Unemployment, final year			0.10	0.03	0.28	0.05
			(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.32)	(0.22)
(annual) Δ Municipal Tax Rate, final year			-1.09	1.60	-5.26***	-3.37**
			(1.28)	(1.40)	(1.79)	(1.36)
Constant	-2.06	1.78	-1.19*	-1.01	24.24***	8.32***
	(3.46)	(2.43)	(0.72)	(0.65)	(1.17)	(0.94)
Observations	909	897	909	897	909	897
R^2	0.19	0.09	0.18	0.08	0.55	0.37
Term period FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note. In columns 1,3 & 5, vote share is calculated in terms of mayoral party's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 2, 4 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Standard errors, clustered on municipality (in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

(a) Difference-estimator   (b) FE-estimator

Figure D5: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, by term period

Note. Figures denote point estimates for Audit critique. Model specifications based on the models in column 2 and 5 in table 1, with the addition of *term period* as interaction term. Capped lines display confidence intervals (from standard errors clustered on municipality) at the 95 % level.

Table D8: Mayoral party vote share & Application of Laws & Regulations

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Application of Laws and Regulations	14.83***	13.25***	8.06***			
	(1.46)	(1.97)	(1.54)			
Application of Laws and Regulations				-4.81**	18.13***	15.94***
				(2.30)	(3.13)	(2.78)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.54***	0.49***			
		(0.19)	(0.14)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.02**	-0.02***			
		(0.01)	(0.01)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.11	-0.14			
		(0.42)	(0.36)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-0.34	0.16			
		(0.47)	(0.35)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-0.61	-1.49***			
		(0.68)	(0.55)			
Fiscal Result, final year					0.30*	-0.09
					(0.18)	(0.15)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					-0.01*	0.00
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					-0.01	-0.06
					(0.04)	(0.04)
Unemployment, final year					-0.08	0.11
					(0.15)	(0.14)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-1.32	0.85
					(1.00)	(0.76)
Constant	-2.98***	-2.29	-1.09	35.46***	43.64**	-0.92
	(0.19)	(1.50)	(1.30)	(1.13)	(20.43)	(15.98)
Observations	908	908	896	909	909	897
R^2	0.12	0.24	0.13	0.01	0.58	0.40
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of mayoral party's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Standard errors, clustered on municipality, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D9: Mayoral party vote share & Quality of Government Index

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
QoG Index	3.95**	5.33***	3.45**	7.77**	7.69***	6.22***
	(1.68)	(1.60)	(1.36)	(3.33)	(2.21)	(1.78)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		1.06*	0.93**			
		(0.56)	(0.43)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.16*	-0.12*			
		(0.08)	(0.07)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		-0.79	-0.49			
		(0.91)	(0.76)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-0.85	-0.80			
		(1.17)	(0.98)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-2.66*	-2.50**			
		(1.37)	(1.09)			
Fiscal Result, final year					0.21	1.62***
					(0.46)	(0.46)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					-0.04	-0.27*
					(0.18)	(0.15)
Mean income, final year)					0.09***	-0.06***
					(0.02)	(0.01)
Unemployment, final year					0.50**	-0.31**
					(0.19)	(0.15)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-0.68**	-0.32
					(0.31)	(0.28)
Constant	-6.34***	-2.94	-1.71	27.12***	2.40	27.76***
	(1.00)	(3.14)	(2.65)	(1.92)	(9.25)	(7.71)
Observations	290	290	289	290	289	289
R^2	0.02	0.19	0.31	0.02	0.58	0.49
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Note. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of mayoral party's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table D10: Mayoral party vote share & Corruption Index

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption Index	0.78	0.30	-0.23	1.04	1.49	-2.19
	(1.83)	(1.59)	(1.32)	(3.69)	(2.59)	(1.86)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		1.06**	0.91**			
		(0.53)	(0.41)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.20**	-0.14**			
		(0.08)	(0.06)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		-0.71	-0.48			
		(0.75)	(0.60)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-1.09	-1.00			
		(0.89)	(0.73)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-2.38*	-2.28**			
		(1.43)	(1.12)			
Fiscal Result, final year					-0.29	0.68
					(0.50)	(0.48)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					0.06	-0.04
					(0.07)	(0.08)
Mean income, final year)					0.09***	-0.06***
					(0.02)	(0.01)
Unemployment, final year					0.45**	-0.49***
					(0.21)	(0.15)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-0.78**	-0.39
					(0.31)	(0.26)
Constant	-4.65***	-0.54	0.21	30.68***	9.20	37.08***
	(1.09)	(2.46)	(2.05)	(2.14)	(9.03)	(7.15)
Observations	290	290	289	290	290	289
R^2	0.00	0.17	0.29	0.00	0.56	0.47
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Note. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of mayoral party's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

E   Extensions

Table E1: Government vote share & audit critique

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique	-0.79*	-0.59	-0.57	-0.89	-0.40	-0.82*
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.75)	(0.71)	(0.47)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.51***	0.45***			
		(0.18)	(0.15)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.01*	-0.02***			
		(0.01)	(0.01)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.95***	-0.00			
		(0.34)	(0.35)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		0.42	0.40			
		(0.26)	(0.30)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-1.50**	-1.00			
		(0.66)	(0.65)			
Fiscal Result, final year					0.52	0.23
					(0.41)	(0.15)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					-0.04*	-0.01
					(0.02)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					-0.04	-0.05
					(0.05)	(0.03)
Unemployment, final year					-0.33	0.06
					(0.22)	(0.15)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-2.37	0.04
					(1.70)	(0.85)
Constant	-3.72***	-6.17***	-1.18	50.14***	103.78***	10.67
	(0.20)	(1.26)	(1.24)	(0.19)	(31.72)	(16.33)
Observations	970	969	811	970	969	811
R^2	0.00	0.15	0.08	0.00	0.13	0.17
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Dependent variable: ΔGovernment vote share. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of government's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Standard errors, clustered at municipality-level, in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table E2: Supporting parties vote share & audit critique

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique	0.17	0.12	0.46	0.38	0.14	0.54
	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.83)	(0.66)	(0.73)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.06	0.01			
		(0.20)	(0.13)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) $\times$ Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.02	-0.02			
		(0.02)	(0.01)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.83***	0.68**			
		(0.31)	(0.29)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		0.48*	0.24			
		(0.29)	(0.28)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-0.67	-1.63***			
		(0.51)	(0.51)			
Fiscal Result, final year					-0.52**	-0.84***
					(0.24)	(0.26)
Fiscal Result, final year $\times$ Fiscal Result, final year					0.01	0.02*
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					-0.06	-0.02
					(0.04)	(0.06)
Unemployment, final year					-0.35	0.04
					(0.22)	(0.25)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-1.14	-1.34
					(1.58)	(1.96)
Constant	-2.26***	-4.83***	-4.01***	19.40***	63.61**	60.64*
	(0.17)	(1.12)	(1.04)	(0.22)	(28.95)	(36.67)
Observations	847	847	689	847	847	689
R^2	0.00	0.09	0.26	0.00	0.33	0.46
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of supporting parties' share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Dependent variable: ΔGovernment vote share. Standard errors, clustered at municipality-level, in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table E3: Government vote share & audit critique, contingent on clarity of responsibility

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique=1	-0.71*	-0.43	-0.65	-1.40**	-0.69	-0.83*
	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.64)	(0.57)	(0.47)
CoR index	1.07	0.56	-2.73**	-25.73***	-29.78***	-1.42
	(0.94)	(1.01)	(1.14)	(2.51)	(2.28)	(1.64)
Audit Critique=1 × CoR index	1.20	3.03	2.60	-1.94	-0.08	4.51
	(2.53)	(2.44)	(2.77)	(3.80)	(3.26)	(3.14)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.46***	0.43***			
		(0.16)	(0.16)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.01**	-0.01**			
		(0.01)	(0.01)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.96***	-0.09			
		(0.35)	(0.35)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		0.38	0.32			
		(0.27)	(0.30)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-1.69**	-1.10*			
		(0.66)	(0.65)			
Fiscal Result, final year					0.42	0.23
					(0.26)	(0.15)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					-0.03***	-0.01
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					-0.01	-0.04
					(0.04)	(0.03)
Unemployment, final year					-0.21	0.04
					(0.18)	(0.15)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-4.12***	-0.12
					(1.45)	(0.88)
Constant	-3.65***	-5.96***	-1.09	50.13***	123.11***	13.49
	(0.20)	(1.26)	(1.24)	(0.16)	(27.32)	(16.54)
Observations	954	954	811	954	954	811
R^2	0.01	0.15	0.09	0.23	0.40	0.18
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. CoR Index is centered around its mean. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of government's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Standard errors, clustered at municipality-level (in parentheses). *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table E4: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, contingent on clarity of responsibility

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique=1	-1.27***	-0.95**	-0.52	-2.12***	-1.20**	-0.87**
	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.68)	(0.48)	(0.42)
CoR index	-6.28***	-6.48***	-3.83***	14.51***	5.51***	-1.22
	(1.07)	(1.13)	(1.04)	(2.52)	(1.76)	(1.55)
Audit Critique=1 × CoR index	2.20	4.56*	1.43	4.49	4.77*	2.63
	(2.60)	(2.50)	(1.97)	(4.04)	(2.79)	(2.21)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.42**	0.47***			
		(0.17)	(0.14)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.01*	-0.02***			
		(0.01)	(0.01)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.07	-0.17			
		(0.41)	(0.36)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		-0.50	0.10			
		(0.43)	(0.35)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-1.43**	-1.98***			
		(0.70)	(0.56)			
Fiscal Result, final year					0.52***	0.08
					(0.19)	(0.17)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					-0.03***	-0.00
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					0.04	-0.02
					(0.04)	(0.04)
Unemployment, final year					0.01	0.17
					(0.16)	(0.15)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-2.05**	0.05
					(1.00)	(0.79)
Constant	-1.43***	-1.50	-0.69	33.83***	52.50**	10.13
	(0.20)	(1.45)	(1.28)	(0.18)	(21.21)	(16.82)
Observations	897	897	897	897	897	897
R^2	0.05	0.22	0.12	0.11	0.57	0.36
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. CoR Index is centered around its mean. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of mayoral party's share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Standard errors, clustered at municipality-level (in parentheses). *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table E5: Supporting parties vote share & audit critique, contingent on clarity of responsibility

	DV: Δ Mayoral party vote share			DV: Mayoral party vote share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Audit Critique=1	0.03	-0.15	0.06	0.63	0.59	0.61
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.61)	(0.58)	(0.59)
CoR index	14.84***	16.55***	6.13***	-61.39***	-51.38***	-53.87***
	(1.92)	(2.10)	(1.78)	(4.95)	(4.69)	(7.36)
Audit Critique=1 × CoR index	-1.47	-3.86	-7.45**	-2.72	-1.90	-6.91
	(3.50)	(3.18)	(3.42)	(6.87)	(5.56)	(6.55)
Fiscal Result (sum, term)		-0.11	0.03			
		(0.19)	(0.13)			
Fiscal Result (sum, term) × Fiscal Result (sum, term)		0.02	-0.02*			
		(0.02)	(0.01)			
Growth Mean income (%, annualized)		0.95***	0.79***			
		(0.29)	(0.29)			
Δ Unemployment (annualized)		0.37	0.35			
		(0.26)	(0.27)			
Δ Municipal Tax Rate		-0.32	-1.46***			
		(0.48)	(0.51)			
Fiscal Result, final year					-0.25	-0.66***
					(0.19)	(0.21)
Fiscal Result, final year × Fiscal Result, final year					0.00	0.01
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Mean income, final year)					-0.06*	-0.05
					(0.03)	(0.04)
Unemployment, final year					-0.26	-0.01
					(0.17)	(0.21)
Municipal Tax Rate, final year					-3.82***	-4.00**
					(1.35)	(1.66)
Constant	-1.23***	-3.06***	-3.80***	14.74***	103.09***	107.43***
	(0.14)	(0.96)	(0.99)	(0.39)	(26.03)	(31.40)
Observations	832	832	689	832	832	689
R^2	0.13	0.20	0.28	0.47	0.60	0.67
Term period FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Municipal FEs	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. CoR Index is centered around its mean. In columns 1,2 & 4,5, vote share is calculated in terms of supporting parties' share of valid votes in the election for municipal assembly. In columns 3 & 6, vote share is calculated in terms of percentage-point difference between elections in municipal assembly and parliament for a given municipality. Standard errors, clustered at municipality-level, in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

(a) Dissuasion of discharge   (b) Remark

Figure E1: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, by severity

Note. Figures denote point estimates for Audit critique. Model specifications identical to those employed in the main analysis (table 1). Capped lines display confidence intervals (from standard errors clustered on municipality) at the 95 % level.


(a) Critique for executive board   (b) Critique for committee

Figure E2: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, by target

Note. Figures denote point estimates for Audit critique. Model specifications identical to those employed in the main analysis (table 1). Capped lines display confidence intervals (from standard errors clustered on municipality) at the 95 % level.

(a) inadequate goal achievement, failure to observe the objectives and guidelines set by the assembly or in regulation

(b) deficient management, follow-up and control

(c) deficient accounting

(d) financial injury

(e) damage to the public trust or other intangible injury

(f) unauthorized decision making

(g) operations not conforming to law, criminal conduct

(h) insufficient preparation of decisions

Figure E3: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, by grounds for critique

Note. Figures denote point estimates for Audit critique. Model specifications identical to those employed in the main analysis (table 1). Capped lines display confidence intervals (from standard errors clustered on municipality) at the 95 % level.

Figure E4: Mayoral party vote share & audit critique, by number of critiques

Note. Figures denote point estimates for number of unique audit critiques launched in a given term. Model specifications identical to those employed in the main analysis (table 1). Capped lines display confidence intervals (from standard errors clustered on municipality) at the 95 % level.

F   Description of Data Sources

Table F1: Description of Data Sources

Variable	Source	Comment
Audit Critique Remark Dissuasion of Discharge Critique for Committee Critique for Executive Board	Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions 2017; Author	See Appendix A for description of the Swedish Municipal Audit Report Dataset.
ΔMayoral Party Vote Share Mayoral Party Vote Share$_t$ Mayoral Party Vote Share$_{t+1}$ % Change, Mayoral Party Vote Share % Change, Mayoral Party Vote Share, parliament ΔGovernment Vote Share Coalition CoR-index ΔSupporting parties' Vote Share	Statistics Sweden (internal variable reference code ME0104B2)	Share of valid ballots. Disaggregated vote shares for local parties included in governments derived from the Swedish Election Authority (URL: http://www.val.se) for respective municipal term-period. To correspond with actual ruling conditions, results from the March 2003 re-election in Orsa municipality. For the May 2011 re-election in Örebro municipality, variables will use original 2010 results for calculating 2006-2010 differences but 2011 results for 2010-2014 differences. Since only the 2010-2014 variation in election results are of interest for the 2014 election, Båstad municipality's results for the 2014 election were chosen, rather than those of the May 2015 re-election.
Mayoral Party ID Mayoral Party Reelected Mayoral Party-Adjusted Term-Period Coalition-Adjusted Term Period	SALAR (personal communication, May 13, 2016); Dr. David Karlsson (personal communication, April 29, 2016); author's own coding, and the Swedish Official Yearbook.	Author's coding is based on a survey of local media reports of intra-term period power shifts and coalition breakdowns using the *Mediearkivet* database (Retriever n.d.), complementary searches on google.com, municipalities' web pages, and media sources listed in Wikipedia articles on municipal rule for 2003-06 term (`https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lista_%C3%B6ver_kommun-_och_landstingsstyren_i_Sverige_2002%E2%80%932006`), 2007-10 term (`https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lista_%C3%B6ver_kommun-_och_landstingsstyren_i_Sverige_2006%E2%80%932010`), 2011-14 term (`https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lista_%C3%B6ver_kommun-_och_landstingsstyren_i_Sverige_2010%E2%80%932014`), and 2015-18 term (`https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lista_%C3%B6ver_kommun-_och_landstingsstyren_i_Sverige_2014%E2%80%932018`). One idiosyncratic adjustment was made for the specific set of analyses herein: Audit critique was directed at a government that assumed power after July 1st, 2012 in Åre municipality. To avoid erroneously attributing critique to the outgoing and incoming governments, the criticized party was allotted these years. For incumbents that assume or leave power mid-term period, I use the mean difference between the year immediately preceding and the final year of their incumbency.

Variable	Source	Comment

ΔMunicipal Tax Rate
Municipal Tax Rate
	Statistics Sweden (internal variable reference code OE0101D2)	Adjusted for transfer of taxes between municipality- and county-level (sources: all counties 2002-2012 [Swedish Agency for Public Management 2012a; Statistics Sweden 2012], Jönköping county 2013/14 [`https://www.varnamo.se/download/18.`
		`1c6cca85154ef7d33698f2a/1466021593280/C4%20L%C3%A4nets%`
		`20skattesatser%2095-17%20160413.pdf`]; Blekinge county 2013 [`https://www.scb.se/Statistik/OE/OE0101/2013A02/OE0101_`
		`2013A02_SM_OE18SM1301.pdf`]; Dalarna county 2013 [`http://www.regiondalarna.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/`
		`Slutrapport-Ekonomi.pdf`]; Gävleborg county 2013 [`http://www.nordanstig.se/download/18.`
		`464bc9f3135cfbf2b459fc/1348011783039/Kommunstyrelsens%`
		`20arbetsutskott%20120322%20%C2%A7%C2%A7%2034-49.pdf`]; Västerbotten county 2013 [`https://regionvasterbotten.se/halsa/`
		`fortsatt-tryggt-nar-kommunerna-tar-over/`]; Norrbotten county 2013 [`http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=98&`
		`artikel=5132891`]; Östergötland county 2014 [`https://wssext.regionostergotland.se/Politiska%20dokument/`
		`Regionstyrelsen/2013%20Landstingsstyrelsen/2013-01-30/`
		`2013-0129%20Protokollsutdrag%20HSN%20och%20TN/HSN%`
		`20130129Protokollsutdrag%20%C2%A7%207.pdf`]; Västernorrland county 2014 [`http://kfvn.se/Filer/Socialtjanst/`
		`Avtalhemsjukvardversion-1.0.pdf`]). Note: Data for municipal tax rate before the first term (i.e. 2002) in Knivsta municipality (founded in 2003 by breaking off from Uppsala municipality) derived from the 2002 value for Uppsala municipality.

Fiscal result	Statistics Sweden through KO-LADA (KPI: N03007)	Year-end result.
Unemployment, Final Year ΔUnemployment (annualized)	Statistics Sweden	Share of 20-64 year-old population openly unemployed, percentage point. Data from December. Data from STATIV-survey (`https://www.scb.se/contentassets/` `659b9a5233dc4dd49b22630b2745ca57/scdok-stativ-2014.pdf`)

47

Variable	Source	Comment
Mean Income, Final Year (Logged) Mean Income, Annual Growth (%)	Statistics Sweden (internal variable reference code HE0110K1)	Total earned income for full-year residents in Sweden, aged 16 years and over.
Population	Statistics Sweden (URL: `http://www.scb.se/be0101`)	
Quality of Government Index	Dahlström and Sundell 2013; Karlsson and Gilljam 2014	Additive index using questions 52a-52e & 53a-53e in the 2012 KOLFU Survey. Alpha=0.77. Data available for 2012.
Application of Laws and Rules	Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 2017 (URL: `http://www.foretagsklimat.se/enkatsvar`)	Survey item, respondents local businesses. Available as excel document, by visiting sourced web page, choosing kommunens myndighetsutövning, followed by tillämpning av lagar och regler in the drop-down menu (checked Dec. 27, 2017). Data missing for 2014.
Newspaper Coverage	T.S. Mediefakta 2017	Data available for 2003-2010.
Vote share, parliamentary election, National	Statistics Sweden (internal variable reference code ME0104B7)	Share of valid ballots. Also used to calculate vote shares proportional to past vote shares.
Vote Share, parliamentary Election, by municipality	Statistics Sweden (internal variable reference code ME0104B6)	

Note. Unless otherwise stated, all data available for the full (2003-2014) sample period. Data derived from Statistics Sweden are publicly available from `www.scb.se`. Data derived from KOLADA are publicly available from `www.kolada.se`. Data from CHES are publicly available from `https://www.chesdata.eu/our-surveys`. Data from TS Mediefakta are proprietary (contact `https://ts.se`). Data from the KOLFU Survey are available, subject to review by the principal investigators (see `https://spa.gu.se/forskning/publicerat/kolfu`).

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