### Online Appendix

### Bothner F, Schrader SM, Bandau F and Holzhauser N Never let a serious crisis go to waste: the introduction of supplemental carbon taxes in Europe. *Journal of Public Policy*.

Tabele A1: Survey Data on ‘Environmental Protection’ as Main Political Issue

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **ESP- EURB** | **ESP-EES** | **ESP-CSES** | **FRA-EURB** | **FRA-EES** | **FRA-CSES** | **IRL-EURB** | **IRL-EES** | **IRL-CSES** | **ISL-EURB** | **ISL-EES** | **ISL-CSES** | **PRT-EURB** | **PRT-EES** | **PRT-CSES** | **UK-EURB** | **UK-EES** | **UK-CSES** |
| 2002 |   |   |   |   |   | 0.56 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | 0 |   |   |   |
| June | 2.17 |   |   | 7.69 |   |   | 5.22 |   |   |   |   |   | 2.49 |   |   | 3.63 |   |   |
| 2003 |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  | 1.24 |  |  | 5.13 |  |  |   |  |  |   |
| Apr. | 2.98 |  |   | 7.31 |  |   | 1.8 |  |   |  |  |   | 1.03 |  |   | 4.11 |  |   |
| Nov. | 1.29 |  |   | 3.53 |  |   | 2.16 |  |   |  |  |   | 0.84 |  |   | 2.46 |  |   |
| 2004 |   | 4.68 | 0 |   | 7.82 |   |   | 0 |   |   |   |   |   | 0 |   |   | 0 |   |
| Mar. | 1.19 |   |   | 5.28 |   |   | 3.92 |   |   |   |   |   | 1.02 |   |   | 2.57 |   |   |
| Nov. | 1.74 |   |   | 6.5 |   |   | 4.23 |   |   |   |   |   | 1.24 |   |   | 4.91 |   |   |
| 2005 |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  | 1.39 |  |  | 1.66 |
| May | 1.86 |  |   | 5.96 |  |   | 4.58 |  |   |  |  |   | 0.28 |  |   | 9.17 |  |   |
| Oct. | 3.24 |  |   | 6.76 |  |   | 4.31 |  |   |  |  |   | 0.75 |  |   | 7.1 |  |   |
| 2006 | 3.49 |   |   | 7.75 |   |   | 3.71 |   |   |   |   |   | 0.92 |   |   | 8.8 |   |   |
| 2007 |  |  |   |  |  | 6.18 |  |  | 2.93 |  |  | 9.72 |  |  |   |  |  |   |
| Apr. | 2.39 |  |   | 11.36 |  |   | 6 |  |   |  |  |   | 0.4 |  |   | 7.83 |  |   |
| Sept. | 3.23 |  |   | 12.62 |  |   | 4.02 |  |   |  |  |   | 1.85 |  |   | 6.62 |  |   |
| 2008 |   |   | 0.31 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Mar. | 1.36 |   |   | 7.81 |   |   | 4.19 |   |   |   |   |   | 1.25 |   |   | 6.43 |   |   |
| Oct. | 1.59 |   |   | 8.74 |   |   | 2.48 |   |   |   |   |   | 0.46 |   |   | 4.99 |   |   |
| 2009 |  | 0.4 |   |  | 6.5 |   |  | 0.3 |   |  |  | 0.58 |  | 0.1 | 0 |  | 1.8 |   |
| Oct. | 2.46 |  |   | 9.64 |  |   | 1.56 |  |   |  |  |   | 1.26 |  |   | 2.3 |  |   |
| 2010 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| May | 1.8 |   |   | 5.64 |   |   | 1.93 |   |   |   |   |   | 0.23 |   |   | 3.72 |   |   |
| 2011 |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |
| 2012 |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| May | 0.28 |   |   | 3.89 |   |   | 0.74 |   |   | 8.05 |   |   | 0.53 |   |   | 3.32 |   |   |
| Nov. | 0.4 |   |   | 2.96 |   |   | 1.41 |   |   | 5.67 |   |   | 0.08 |   |   | 3.69 |   |   |
| 2013 |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |
| May | 0.37 |  |   | 4.22 |  |   | 1.1 |  |   | 12.17 |  |   | 0 |  |   | 4.08 |  |   |
| Nov. | 0.74 |  |   | 4.75 |  |   | 0.68 |  |   | 7.02 |  |   | 0.19 |  |   | 5.77 |  |   |
| 2014 |   | 0 |   |   | 1.12 |   |   | 0.19 |   |   |   |   |   | 0 |   |   | 0.42 |   |
| Mar. | 1.16 |   |   | 7.4 |   |   | 1.55 |   |   |   |   |   | 0.11 |   |   | 5.08 |   |   |
| May | 0.55 |   |   | 6.74 |   |   | 1.83 |   |   | 11.75 |   |   | 0.18 |   |   |   |   |   |
| Nov. | 0.57 |   |   | 8.15 |   |   | 3.37 |   |   | 8.28 |   |   | 1.52 |   |   | 5.82 |   |   |
| 2015 |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |  |  |   |
| Feb.  | 0.45 |  |   | 8.06 |  |   | 3.44 |  |   |  |  |   | 0.2 |  |   | 5.51 |  |   |
| May | 0.64 |  |   | 6.52 |  |   | 2.84 |  |   |  |  |   | 0.85 |  |   | 5.08 |  |   |
| Nov. | 1.84 |  |   | 7.89 |  |   | 2.81 |  |   |  |  |   | 0.71 |  |   | 5.66 |  |   |

Note: EURB = Eurobarometer, EES = European Election Studies, CSES = Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

Table A2: Availability of Policy Windows in Six Western European Countries, 2002-2015

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Political Window** | **Problem Window** | **Policy Window** | **Sources** |
| **France** 02-07 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2002 presidential election.  | NO: Country reports mention heat wave in 2003, but not framed as climate issue (Ysmal 2004: 1008). No “significant disaster” according to CRED.  | NO | EJPR Yearbook: Ysmal 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007Additional sources: Sénit 2012; Rocamora 2017 |
| **France**07-12 | **YES: Environmental policy is an important issue in the 2007 presidential election. Sarkozy signs “environmental pact” during the election campaign. The agreement includes the introduction of a carbon tax (Rocamora 2017: 21).** | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | **YES** | EJPR Yearbook: Ysmal 2008, 2009, Cautres 2010; Drake 2011, 2012Additional sources: Sénit 2012; Rocamora 2017 |
| **France**12-17 | **YES: Greens participate in government after 2012 elections. Socialist Party and Greens sign electoral agreement including a carbon tax (Rocamora 2017: 39).** | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | **YES** | EJPR Yearbook: Startin 2013, 2014Additional sources: Sénit 2012; Rocamora 2017 |
| **Iceland**03-06 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2003 election. | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | NO | EJPR Yearbook: Hardarson and Kristinsson 2004, 2005, 2006 |
| **Iceland**06-09 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2006 election. | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | NO | EJPR Yearbook: Hardarson and Kristinsson 2007, 2008, 2009 |
| **Iceland** 09-13 | **YES: Left-Greens enter government after 2009 election (Hardarson and Kristinsson 2010).** | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | **YES** | EJPR Yearbook: Hardarson and Kristinsson 2010, 2011 |
| **Ireland**02-07 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2002 election. | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | NO | EJPR Yearbook: O’Malley and Marsh 2003, 2004, 2005; O’Malley 2006, 2007 |
| **Ireland**07-11 | **YES: The Green Party became member of the coalition in 2007 and renegotiated the program of government in 2009.** | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | **YES** | EJPR Yearbook: O’Malley 2008, 2009, 2010  |
| **Portugal**05-09 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2003 election. | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | NO | EJPR Yearbook: Magone 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 |
| **Portugal**09-11 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2003 election. | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | NO | EJPR Yearbook: Magone 2010, 2011, 2012 |
| **Portugal**11-15 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2003 election. | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | NO | EJPR Yearbook: Magone 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016 |
| **Spain**04-08 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2004 election. | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | NO | EJPR Yearbook: Delgado and Lopez Nieto 2005, 2006, 2007 |
| **Spain**08-11 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2008 election. | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | NO | EJPR Yearbook: Delgado and Lopez Nieto 2009, 2010 |
| **Spain**11-15 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2011 election. | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | NO | EJPR Yearbook: Delgado and Lopez Nieto 2011, 2012, 2013; Delgado and López 2014, 2015, 2016 |
| **UK**5-10 | NO: No green party in government. Climate policy no issue in 2005 election. | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | NO | EJPR Yearbook: Fisher 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009;Whitaker 2010, 2011 |
| **UK**10-15 | **YES: Environmental protection and the green economy were highlighted by the Conservatives, who proposed a price floor for carbon and new green taxes, and the Liberal Party. Both parties formed a coalition government after the 2010 election (Quinn 2011: 404; Whitaker 2011: 1169).**  | NO: No focusing events mentioned in country reports. No “significant disaster” according to CRED. | **YES** | EJPR Yearbook: Whitaker 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016Additional source: Quinn 2011 |

Table A3: ‘Significant Disasters’ from 1990 to 2020

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Country**  | **Significant disaster according to CRED** |
| France  | 2010 (storm); 2021 (flood) |
| Iceland | No significant disaster |
| Ireland | No significant disaster |
| Portugal | 2003 (wildfire); 2017 (wildfire) |
| Spain | 1990 (drought); 2003 (wildfire); 2019 (storm) |
| UK | No significant disaster |

Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)

Table A4: Analysis of Necessary Conditions

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Conditions** | **Consistency** | **Coverage**  | **RoN-Value (Relevance of Necessity)** |
| **Problem Stream Budget**  | **0.81** | **0.52** | **0.59** |
| ~Problem Stream Climate + Policy Window | 0.92 | 0.59 | 0.63 |
| ~Political Stream + Policy Window | 0.92 | 0.50 | 0.49 |
| ~Problem Stream Climate + ~Political Stream + ~Policy Window | 0.81 | 0.33 | 0.10 |
| ~Problem Stream Climate + Political Stream + ~Policy Window | 0.86 | 0.34 | 0.08 |
| Problem Stream Climate + ~Political Stream + ~Policy Window | 0.81 | 0.34 | 0.15 |
| Problem Stream Climate + Political Stream + ~Policy Window | 0.86 | 0.35 | 0.12 |

Note: „~“ indicates the negation of a condition. „+“ stands for a logical “or“

Table A5: Truth Table

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Nr.** | **Problem Stream Climate** | **Problem Stream Budget** | **Political Stream** | **Policy Window** | **Consistency**  | **PRI-Value** | **Cases** | **Countries** |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | **Iceland\_09-13**; **Ireland\_07-11** |
| 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.68 | 0.68 | 3 | France\_07-12; **France\_12-17**; **UK\_10-15** |
| 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 3 | **Portugal\_11-15**; **Spain\_11-15;** UK\_05-10 |
| 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 1 | Portugal\_09-11 |
| 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 1 | France\_02-07 |
| 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 3 | Iceland\_06-09; Portugal\_05-09; Spain\_08-11 |
| 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | Iceland\_03-06; Spain\_04-08 |
| 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | Ireland\_02-07 |
| *9* | *0* | *0* | *0* | *1* | *-* | *-* | *0* | *-* |
| *10* | *0* | *0* | *1* | *0* | *-* | *-* | *0* | *­-* |
| *11* | *0* | *0* | *1* | *1* | *-* | *-* | *0* | *-* |
| *12* | *0* | *1* | *0* | *1* | *-* | *-* | *0* | *-* |
| *13* | *1* | *0* | *0* | *1* | *-* | *-* | *0* | *-* |
| *14* | *1* | *0* | *1* | *1* | *-* | *-* | *0* | *-* |
| *15* | *1* | *1* | *0* | *0* | *-* | *-* | *0* | *-* |
| *16* | *1* | *1* | *0* | *1* | *-* | *-* | *0* | *-* |

Note: Legislative periods in which the carbon tax was adopted are presented in bold characters. Logical remainders are presented in italic characters.

## **QCA – Intermediate and Most Parsimonious Solution**

Since QCA is a relatively new research approach, there are still disputes about the correct application of the method. One of the main debates within the QCA community concerns so-called logical remainders (theoretically possible but unobserved configurations), which can be used to reduce the complexity of the overall solution term (Schneider 2018; Thiem 2019; Thiem and Baumgartner 2016). In general, there are three alternatives. The complex solution (which we present in the main article) does not include logical remainders in the minimization process and therefore refers only to empirical data. The intermediate solution uses logical remainders based on theoretical consideration to minimize the complexity of the solution term and the most parsimonious solution includes all logical remainders that help to achieve the least complex solution term. While the debate about the “right” solution is ongoing, there is a general agreement to provide all three solutions (Schneider and Wagemann 2013). Hence, we present the intermediate and most parsimonious solution in Figure A6 and A7.

To calculate the intermediate solution we draw on our theoretical considerations and our knowledge of the significance of financial pressure. According to the MSF, the introduction of a carbon tax is more likely if all four conditions are met. Furthermore, our descriptive results show there is no country that introduces a carbon tax without having financial pressure. Hence, we assume that financial pressure is a necessary condition. As result, we get the intermediate solution present in figure A6, which does not differ from the complex solution.

Table A6: Intermediate Solution

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Solution Paths** | **Consistency** | **PRI-Value** | **Coverage** | **Cases** |
| **Outcome: Carbon Tax** |  |  |  |  |
| Problem-Stream Climate \* Problem Stream Budget \* Political Stream \* Policy Window | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.18 | *Iceland\_09-13; Ireland-07-11* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Consistency*: 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall PRI-Value:* 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Coverage:* 0.18 |  |  |  |  |

Table A7: Most Parsimonious Solution

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Solution Paths** | **Consistency** | **PRI-Value** | **Coverage** | **Cases** |
| **Outcome: Carbon Tax** |  |  |  |  |
| Problem-Stream Climate \* Policy Window | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | *Iceland\_09-13; Ireland-07-11* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Consistency*: 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall PRI-Value:* 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Coverage:* 0.33 |  |  |  |  |

Table A8: Robustness Check: Problem Stream - Climate ± 20%

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Solution Paths** | **Consistency** | **PRI-Value** | **Coverage** | **Cases** |
| **Outcome: Carbon Tax** |  |  |  |  |
| Problem-Stream Climate \* Problem Stream Budget \* Political Stream \* Policy Window | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.18 | *Iceland\_09-13; Ireland-07-11* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Consistency*: 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall PRI-Value:* 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Coverage:* 0.18 |  |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Solution Paths** | **Consistency** | **PRI-Value** | **Coverage** | **Cases** |
| **Outcome: Carbon Tax** |  |  |  |  |
| Problem-Stream Climate \* Problem Stream Budget \* Political Stream \* Policy Window | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.18 | *Iceland\_09-13; Ireland-07-11* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Consistency*: 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall PRI-Value:* 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Coverage:* 0.18 |  |  |  |  |

Table A9: Robustness Check: Problem Stream - Budget ± 20%

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Solution Paths** | **Consistency** | **PRI-Value** | **Coverage** | **Cases** |
| **Outcome: Carbon Tax** |  |  |  |  |
| Problem-Stream Climate \* Political Stream \* Policy Window | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.19 | *Iceland\_09-13; Ireland-07-11* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Consistency*: 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall PRI-Value:* 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Coverage:* 0.19 |  |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Solution Paths** | **Consistency** | **PRI-Value** | **Coverage** | **Cases** |
| **Outcome: Carbon Tax** |  |  |  |  |
| Problem-Stream Climate \* Problem Stream Budget \* Political Stream \* Policy Window | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.19 | *Iceland\_09-13; Ireland-07-11* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Consistency*: 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall PRI-Value:* 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Coverage:* 0.19 |  |  |  |  |

Table A10: Robustness Check: Political Stream ± 20%

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Solution Paths** | **Consistency** | **PRI-Value** | **Coverage** | **Cases** |
| **Outcome: Carbon Tax** |  |  |  |  |
| Problem-Stream Climate \* Problem Stream Budget \* Political Stream \* Policy Window | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.17 | *Iceland\_09-13; Ireland-07-11* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Consistency*: 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall PRI-Value:* 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Coverage:* 0.17 |  |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Solution Paths** | **Consistency** | **PRI-Value** | **Coverage** | **Cases** |
| **Outcome: Carbon Tax** |  |  |  |  |
| Problem-Stream Climate \* Problem Stream Budget \* Political Stream \* Policy Window | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.19 | *Iceland\_09-13; Ireland-07-11* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Consistency*: 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall PRI-Value:* 1.00 |  |  |  |  |
| *Overall Coverage:* 0.19 |  |  |  |  |

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