

Supplementary Materials, Online Appendix:  
*Accountability and Corruption Displacement:  
Evidence from Italy*

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# 1 Institutions in Italy

## 1.1 The functioning of subnational government in Italy

Building on what is described in Section 2 of the main text, unless it is expressly stated that the State has a given competence, it is automatically the regions' responsibility. The Italian Constitution (Article 97) lays out the separation between the political and the administrative sides of government, whereby elected deputies give political direction to the bodies of the public administration which then realize - in their assigned areas of competence - the political directives set out by the government. In Italy, administrative competencies are assigned according to subject-matter and type of attribution, as stated in Article 117 of the Constitution.

In terms of the organisation of subnational government, at each of the levels a *presidente* ('president', regions and provinces) or a *sindaco* ('mayor', municipalities) is elected. This figure then heads a *consiglio* (legislative body) and a *giunta* (executive body). The former body is made up of elected councillors who manage the political and bureaucratic activities of the government in question. The latter body is composed of *assessori* ('councillors') chosen by the figurehead to take charge of a specific kind of activity.

In terms of the activities undertaken by the different administrative levels, the regions are responsible for the programming and organisation of health services, for providing educational facilities, and for infrastructure within their territories. These macro areas are then delegated further down the administrative structure with the provinces being responsible for urban development, public transport, and the management of school buildings in their jurisdictions. Municipalities, in turn, are responsible for an array of services including, for example, the registry of births and deaths and the provision of local public services such as water supply, waste management and municipal police.

Given that the focus in this paper is on local public administration in Italy, aggregated to the provincial level, I shall focus more closely on this administrative level. Examples of the competencies of the Italian provinces (at the time of the 'Clean Hands' investigations<sup>1</sup>)

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<sup>1</sup>Reforms have occurred since that have reduced the provinces' powers substantially.

are as follows: the definition and implementation of the provincial budget, civil protection (implementing regional plans, setting out provincial plans), schools and teaching (creating and shutting down schools, organizing school networks, building schools' infrastructure), energy saving and efficiency, transportation, driving schools (authorisations, vigilance, consortia, ensuring adequate teaching standards), regulating mechanic businesses, issuing licenses for lorry drivers, issuing industry permits, and managing job centres. I believe these examples suffice to demonstrate the significant powers conferred to the provincial public administration during this time period, as well as the ample room for the misuse of public goods and finance. In terms of administering electoral favours, then, it is easy to see why a national deputy would be interested in swaying the behaviour of the local public administration. Whilst regional public officials are the closest administrative level to national deputies, it was the provincial and municipal public officials at the time of the 'Clean Hands' investigations who were responsible for administering many of the services that citizens use directly and for which they may require favours. A full list of the Italian provinces and their corresponding electoral districts and macro regions is provided in Table A1.

The *Corruption Indictments* used in my analyses, described in Section 4.3 of the main text, are committed by a vast range of public officials ranging from street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980/2010), to third-party providers who furnish the state with services (Milward and Provan, 2000), to public managers (Rainey, 1982, 1983; Meier and O'Toole Jr, 2001; O'Toole Jr and Meier, 1999; O'Toole and Meier, 2000, 2003), to local politicians. The central government can intervene and take over functions of any of the sub-national administrative bodies<sup>2</sup> if any norms or legal treaties, for example, are not respected or if these bodies do not undertake their responsibilities in a timely fashion (Article 120). These "substitutive powers of the State" (*"poteri sostitutivi dello Stato"*) mean that sub-national administrative bodies are open to intervention from national ministries, which are, by their very nature, political entities and have a vested interest in

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<sup>2</sup>The relationship between the central government and the sub-national bodies are regulated by the principles of "loyal collaboration" (*"principio di leale collaborazione"*) and "subsidiarity" (*"principio di sussidiarietà"*).

maintaining voter support.

I would like to highlight that there were no major changes to hiring practices (more on this in Section 1.3) in the Italian public administration in the run-up to ‘Clean Hands’. The ex-Civil Service Minister, wrote that until 1993 “administrative reform was not on the political agenda” (Cassese, 1994, p.249).<sup>3</sup> He goes as far as to state that “[l]ike all things that are not seen as attention-worthy, the workings of the public administration were... just left to exist. The offices had archaic structures. The procedures were obsolete. The personnel [...] were frustrated by the other members of the personnel who had been hired for political, union-related or familial reasons” (Cassese, 1994, p.249).<sup>4</sup>

In terms of Italians’ exposure to local administration and their understanding of the functioning of government, I would argue that both are relatively high. Municipalities and provinces provide many of the services that Italians use on a daily basis - such as civil registration (residency rights, identification cards etc.), local public services (e.g. libraries, sports centres, roads etc.), local policing and local healthcare services - and, as such, citizens have a relatively clear idea of which bodies provide which services. The public administration in Italy is also digitalised in a very limited way - this was even more the case in the 1980s and 1990s - meaning that Italian citizens physically interact with different administrative bodies on a regular basis, further strengthening their knowledge of what public officials do. The role of the state in local administration in Italy is also clear. The Italian state is much more present in the lives of all citizens than is the case in, for example, countries like the USA with “liberal”-type (Esping-Andersen, 2013) welfare states that mostly cater to individuals with low socio-economic status due to the limited role for the state and the focus on the market. The “corporatist-statist”-type (Esping-Andersen, 2013) of welfare state that Italy has, on the other hand, is much more wide-reaching and extensive, meaning that exposure to the public administration is greater.

**Table A1. Italian provinces, electoral districts and macro regions**

	<b>Province</b>	<b>Electoral District</b>	<b>Macro Region</b>
1	CUNEO	ALESSANDRIA-ASTI-CUNEO	NORTH
2	ALESSANDRIA	ALESSANDRIA-ASTI-CUNEO	NORTH

<sup>3</sup>Translation by the author, original text in Section 6.

<sup>4</sup>As above.

3	ASTI	ALESSANDRIA-ASTI-CUNEO	NORTH
4	MACERATA	ANCONA-PESARO-MACERATA-ASCOLI PICENO	CENTRE
5	ANCONA	ANCONA-PESARO-MACERATA-ASCOLI PICENO	CENTRE
6	PESARO E URBINO	ANCONA-PESARO-MACERATA-ASCOLI PICENO	CENTRE
7	ASCOLI PICENO	ANCONA-PESARO-MACERATA-ASCOLI PICENO	CENTRE
8	AOSTA	AOSTA	NORTH
9	BARI	BARI-FOGGIA	SOUTH
10	FOGGIA	BARI-FOGGIA	SOUTH
11	BENEVENTO	BENEVENTO-AVELLINO-SALERNO	SOUTH
12	SALERNO	BENEVENTO-AVELLINO-SALERNO	SOUTH
13	AVELLINO	BENEVENTO-AVELLINO-SALERNO	SOUTH
14	FORLI	BOLOGNA-FERRARA-RAVENNA-FORLI	CENTRE
15	FERRARA	BOLOGNA-FERRARA-RAVENNA-FORLI	CENTRE
16	RAVENNA	BOLOGNA-FERRARA-RAVENNA-FORLI	CENTRE
17	RIMINI	BOLOGNA-FERRARA-RAVENNA-FORLI	CENTRE
18	BOLOGNA	BOLOGNA-FERRARA-RAVENNA-FORLI	CENTRE
19	BERGAMO	BRESCIA-BERGAMO	NORTH
20	BRESCIA	BRESCIA-BERGAMO	NORTH
21	ORISTANO	CAGLIARI-SASSARI-NUORO-ORISTANO	ISLANDS
22	NUORO	CAGLIARI-SASSARI-NUORO-ORISTANO	ISLANDS
23	CAGLIARI	CAGLIARI-SASSARI-NUORO-ORISTANO	ISLANDS
24	SASSARI	CAGLIARI-SASSARI-NUORO-ORISTANO	ISLANDS
25	ISERNIA	CAMPOBASSO-ISERNIA	CENTRE
26	CAMPOBASSO	CAMPOBASSO-ISERNIA	CENTRE
27	MESSINA	CATANIA-MESSINA-SIRACUSA-RAGUSA-ENNA	ISLANDS
28	SIRACUSA	CATANIA-MESSINA-SIRACUSA-RAGUSA-ENNA	ISLANDS
29	ENNA	CATANIA-MESSINA-SIRACUSA-RAGUSA-ENNA	ISLANDS
30	RAGUSA	CATANIA-MESSINA-SIRACUSA-RAGUSA-ENNA	ISLANDS
31	CATANIA	CATANIA-MESSINA-SIRACUSA-RAGUSA-ENNA	ISLANDS
32	REGGIO CALABRIA	CATANZARO-COSENZA-REGGIO CALABRIA	SOUTH
33	COSENZA	CATANZARO-COSENZA-REGGIO CALABRIA	SOUTH
34	CATANZARO	CATANZARO-COSENZA-REGGIO CALABRIA	SOUTH
35	CROTONE	CATANZARO-COSENZA-REGGIO CALABRIA	SOUTH
36	VIBO VALENTIA	CATANZARO-COSENZA-REGGIO CALABRIA	SOUTH
37	VARESE	COMO-SONDRIO-VARESE	NORTH
38	COMO	COMO-SONDRIO-VARESE	NORTH
39	LECCO	COMO-SONDRIO-VARESE	NORTH
40	SONDRIO	COMO-SONDRIO-VARESE	NORTH
41	PISTOIA	FIRENZE-PISTOIA	CENTRE
42	PRATO	FIRENZE-PISTOIA	CENTRE
43	FIRENZE	FIRENZE-PISTOIA	CENTRE
44	LA SPEZIA	GENOVA-IMPERIA-LA SPEZIA-SAVONA	NORTH
45	IMPERIA	GENOVA-IMPERIA-LA SPEZIA-SAVONA	NORTH
46	SAVONA	GENOVA-IMPERIA-LA SPEZIA-SAVONA	NORTH
47	GENOVA	GENOVA-IMPERIA-LA SPEZIA-SAVONA	NORTH
48	TERAMO	L'AQUILA-PESCARA-CHIETI-TERAMO	CENTRE
49	L'AQUILA	L'AQUILA-PESCARA-CHIETI-TERAMO	CENTRE
50	PESCARA	L'AQUILA-PESCARA-CHIETI-TERAMO	CENTRE
51	CHIETI	L'AQUILA-PESCARA-CHIETI-TERAMO	CENTRE
52	TARANTO	LECCE-BRINDISI-TARANTO	SOUTH
53	LECCE	LECCE-BRINDISI-TARANTO	SOUTH
54	BRINDISI	LECCE-BRINDISI-TARANTO	SOUTH
55	MANTOVA	MANTOVA-CREMONA	NORTH
56	CREMONA	MANTOVA-CREMONA	NORTH
57	MILANO	MILANO-PAVIA	NORTH
58	LODI	MILANO-PAVIA	NORTH
59	PAVIA	MILANO-PAVIA	NORTH
60	NAPOLI	NAPOLI-CASERTA	SOUTH
61	CASERTA	NAPOLI-CASERTA	SOUTH
62	PALERMO	PALERMO-TRAPANI-AGRIGENTO-CALTANISSETTA	ISLANDS

63	TRAPANI	PALERMO-TRAPANI-AGRIGENTO-CALTANISSETTA	ISLANDS
64	CALTANISSETTA	PALERMO-TRAPANI-AGRIGENTO-CALTANISSETTA	ISLANDS
65	AGRIGENTO	PALERMO-TRAPANI-AGRIGENTO-CALTANISSETTA	ISLANDS
66	MODENA	PARMA-MODENA-PIACENZA-REGGIO EMILIA	CENTRE
67	REGGIO EMILIA	PARMA-MODENA-PIACENZA-REGGIO EMILIA	CENTRE
68	PIACENZA	PARMA-MODENA-PIACENZA-REGGIO EMILIA	CENTRE
69	PARMA	PARMA-MODENA-PIACENZA-REGGIO EMILIA	CENTRE
70	TERNI	PERUGIA-TERNI-RIETI	CENTRE
71	PERUGIA	PERUGIA-TERNI-RIETI	CENTRE
72	RIETI	PERUGIA-TERNI-RIETI	CENTRE
73	LIVORNO	PISA-LIVORNO-LUCCA-MASSA CARRARA	CENTRE
74	MASSA-CARRARA	PISA-LIVORNO-LUCCA-MASSA CARRARA	CENTRE
75	PISA	PISA-LIVORNO-LUCCA-MASSA CARRARA	CENTRE
76	LUCCA	PISA-LIVORNO-LUCCA-MASSA CARRARA	CENTRE
77	POTENZA	POTENZA-MATERA	SOUTH
78	MATERA	POTENZA-MATERA	SOUTH
79	LATINA	ROMA-LATINA-VITERBO-FROSINONE	CENTRE
80	FROSINONE	ROMA-LATINA-VITERBO-FROSINONE	CENTRE
81	ROMA	ROMA-LATINA-VITERBO-FROSINONE	CENTRE
82	VITERBO	ROMA-LATINA-VITERBO-FROSINONE	CENTRE
83	SIENA	SIENA-AREZZO-GROSSETO	CENTRE
84	AREZZO	SIENA-AREZZO-GROSSETO	CENTRE
85	GROSSETO	SIENA-AREZZO-GROSSETO	CENTRE
86	BIELLA	TORINO-NOVARA-VERCELLI	NORTH
87	NOVARA	TORINO-NOVARA-VERCELLI	NORTH
88	VERBANO-CUSIO-OSSOLA	TORINO-NOVARA-VERCELLI	NORTH
89	TORINO	TORINO-NOVARA-VERCELLI	NORTH
90	VERCELLI	TORINO-NOVARA-VERCELLI	NORTH
91	TRENTO	TRENTO-BOLZANO	NORTH
92	BOLZANO	TRENTO-BOLZANO	NORTH
93	TRIESTE	TRIESTE	NORTH
94	BELLUNO	UDINE-BELLUNO-GORIZIA-PORDENONE	NORTH
95	GORIZIA	UDINE-BELLUNO-GORIZIA-PORDENONE	NORTH
96	PORDENONE	UDINE-BELLUNO-GORIZIA-PORDENONE	NORTH
97	UDINE	UDINE-BELLUNO-GORIZIA-PORDENONE	NORTH
98	TREVISO	VENEZIA-TREVISO	NORTH
99	VENEZIA	VENEZIA-TREVISO	NORTH
100	VERONA	VERONA-PADOVA-VICENZA-ROVIGO	NORTH
101	PADOVA	VERONA-PADOVA-VICENZA-ROVIGO	NORTH
102	ROVIGO	VERONA-PADOVA-VICENZA-ROVIGO	NORTH
103	VICENZA	VERONA-PADOVA-VICENZA-ROVIGO	NORTH

A brief note on how electoral rules at the subnational level in Italy were affected by the decentralising reforms that occurred following ‘Clean Hands’. The provincial and municipal elections were governed by Law 81/1993 which established that mayors were to be directly elected by their own constituents and (previously they had been appointed by municipal councillors<sup>5</sup>) instigated a majoritarian mechanism (assigning 60% of available

<sup>5</sup>Prior to 1993 municipal governments in Italy were ruled by a pure parliamentary system. The legislative body (i.e., the city council) was elected under proportional election rule with closed party lists; the council then appointed the mayor and the executive office (Bordignon et al., 2016).

seats to the winning coalition). The 1995 *Legge Tatarella* introduced a mixed electoral system to the regional levels of government, with 80% of the seats being assigned via an open list proportional rule and 20% via a majoritarian rule. The 1993 *Legge Mattarella* replaced the fully proportional system with a mixed (75% majoritarian) system.

## 1.2 The Italian judiciary

The Italian judiciary is composed of judges (*magistrati*) and public prosecutors (*pubblici ministeri*) who are public officials and who compete in a nationwide competition to be assigned to the different *procure* (judicial offices) around the country. The individuals who perform best in the competition have first choice of which *procura* to go to work at. Individuals will make this decision based upon, then, their ranking, their personal attributes (for example, their region of birth) and the type of work associated with each *procura* (some *procure* in the South, for example, are popular among judges who wish to work anti-organized crime cases). If one examines the *bollettini* (Il Ministero della Giustizia, 2018) that announce the results of the competition for *magistrati* it becomes clear that there is a strong correlation between individuals' place of birth and the *procura* they choose to work in. This is consistent with the fact that Italians have been found to have a strong preference for living and working near home.<sup>6</sup> All of this is to explain that judges and public prosecutors across Italy are all held to the same standard, are all trained in the same way and there are no local-level recruiting processes. Thus, one can reasonably expect all public prosecutors and judges to have the same level of expertise and to exert the same level of effort across the country.

In terms of how the judiciary processes the crimes I capture in my *Corruption Indictments* variable, given that I am dealing with crimes against the public administration (*delitti contro la pubblica amministrazione*), these are crimes that the Pubblico Ministero (PM) can investigate regardless of whether the consent of the offended individual has been given (*delitti perseguibili d'ufficio*). Thus, the PM is made aware or has reason to believe that a corrupt act has taken place. The PM includes the name of the allegedly

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<sup>6</sup>Even if this comes at the price of unemployment or a lack of career progression (Repubblica, 2017).

corrupt individual in the list of suspects (*registro degli indagati*) as soon as he or she becomes aware of the alleged crime. The PM then has to decide whether the alleged crime should be archived (*richiesta di archiviazione*), if the accusation seems to be unfounded, or whether it should be investigated (*formulazione di imputazione*). If the latter, the PM indicts the concerned individual (*richiesta di rinvio a giudizio*), thereby moving the investigation forward officially and requesting that the accused (*l'imputato*) face justice. This is what the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) considers to be the act of starting the penal process (*inizio dell'azione penale*) and is what defines the data I use, which refer precisely to such individuals (*delitti e persone per i quali l'Autorità giudiziaria ha iniziato l'azione penale*). The data that I use refer precisely to the indicted (*gli imputati*) and, therefore, individuals who have been called to face justice.

Indictment (*richiesta di rinvio a giudizio*) happens in a relatively quick time frame, on the whole. The PM is obliged to include the name of the accused in the list of suspects immediately upon becoming aware of the alleged crime and the decision to indict comes shortly afterwards. Indeed, statistics about these time frames are available publicly, although sadly not for the time period that I study in this paper. If I consult the available data (2011-2017), however, we see that 33% of individuals are indicted within 3 months of being accused, a further 8% within 3-6 months, and a further 15% within 6-12 months. This means that 56% of individuals are indicted within one year. A further 21% of individuals are indicted within 2 years. In short, the majority (77%) of accused individuals are indicted within 2 years in the 2011-2017 data.

There is reason to believe that such figures would have been even higher in the 1980s and 1990s, namely that an even larger share of accused individuals would be indicted in under a year. The Italian justice system has infamously been becoming increasingly overwhelmed as time has passed, with severe backlogs in judicial proceedings (e.g., *Il Sole 24 Ore* (2009)), especially trials (e.g., *Agenzia Giornalistica Italia* (2019)), and difficulties in the management of the influx of offences (e.g., *Questione Giustizia* (2015)). One may well imagine that particularly during the 'Clean Hands' investigations when media scrutiny of the justice system was high that PMs would attempt to dispatch their indictments in a



timely fashion.

### 1.3 Politics and the appointment of high-level bureaucrats

In the Italian public administration, the role of *dirigente* (the most senior level of civil servant) was introduced in 1972 by Presidential Decree n. 748, which created a new managerial career and separated it from the directive one (which was regulated by the 1957 Presidential Decree n. 3). The new leadership was divided into three qualifications in ascending order: *primo dirigente* (first managers/directors), *dirigente superiore* (senior managers/directors) and *dirigente generale* (general managers/directors). As described by Cassese (1981), a future *dirigente generale* would enter the career track after graduating (at around 25 years of age), in the same Ministry where she would then become director. To access the Ministry, she would have to pass a *concorso pubblico* (public exam), after which a selection is made by a commission from the Public Administration School. Starting as *consigliere*, she would then become *direttore di sezione*, and then select into a role as *direttore di divisione aggiunto*. After another exam, she would become *primo dirigente* (at around 40-50 years of age), entrusted with heading a division. Through seniority or an internal exam, she would then become *direttore superiore*. Finally, the Council of Ministers would nominate her *direttore generale*. These appointments do not occur routinely, rather only become available when a spot opens up.

The aforementioned reform also introduced new responsibilities, only for executives, which clearly differentiated them from the rest of the civil service. However, the changes in the functions attributed to high-level bureaucrats were limited by the funds associated with their projects. These were normally in the range of 60-300 million lire ( $\approx 40,000-150,000$  in EUR), a sum that was comparatively low, suggesting that high-level bureaucrats did not have significant power. Importantly, the decree also enabled the government to discharge directors. Therefore, while they would still hold tenure, their assignment to certain roles could be removed at the Ministry's discretion. Moreover, Ministers would also entrust *dirigenti generali* with the direction of public bodies to extend their control over both aspects of law execution.

A further reduction of directors' power came with the institution of the regions and the passage of functions to these territories. This first occurred through Presidential Decree n. 9 (15 January 1972), but the functions to be passed onto regional administrations were only formalised some years later with Presidential Decree n. 616 (24 July 1977). This led to the elimination of 15 *direzioni generali*, and the Ministries most affected by it were those of Public Works, Home Affairs, Tourism, Labour, Health and Education. The design and execution of programmes then came to depend on *assessori regionali* (regional councillors), formally elected by the public (but pre-selected by party officials), who in turn selected the President (until these began to be directly elected by the public in the 1990s).

The managerial career thus develops within a single Ministry, the one to which the director had originally applied, and each assignment and selection of personnel depends on other bureaucrats, usually with minimal interference from Ministers. Ministers make sure their programmes are executed through their own cabinets and public sector bodies, leaving to the bureaucracy the power to manage their own career tracks. The aim of the reforms mentioned above - separating the political aspect of the administration, entrusted to the governing bodies, from the technical-managerial one, entrusted to the managers - was therefore not achieved both because political bodies continued to maintain important powers of interference on the work of the managers (e.g., being able to remove them from certain positions), and because the latter showed themselves rather reluctant to exercise their new powers and assume the subsequent responsibilities. Not only were these powers limited and circumscribed by paltry spending caps, but the new-found responsibilities were also not accompanied by a system to measure their results (Battini and Gasparrini, 2020). This resulted in a tacit agreement between high-level bureaucrats and the political class, whereby the bureaucrats would leave the actual execution of programmes to other government-controlled bodies, while they would maintain control over personnel and career tracks.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>The appointment of high-level bureaucrats became further politicised with the public administration privatisation reforms of the 1990s. In fact, while privatisation initially concerned civil servants below the managerial level, in 1998, their roles, too, became privatised through time-limited contracts and, thus, began to depend on renewal at each change of Ministers. This implied an increased politicisation of

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these high-level bureaucrats, who would favour a specific Minister in order to ensure the renewal of their contracts (Cassese, 1998; Cassese and Mari, 2001).

## 2 Corruption in the Italian public administration before the ‘Clean Hands’ investigations

An effective way to understand how corruption in the public administration functioned before the ‘Clean Hands’ investigations is to examine the formal organisation of the dominant party of the time, Democrazia Cristiana (DC), which had a multilevel hierarchy. At the top were the so-called *capi-corrente* (‘faction leaders’), that is, the directors of the various political strands of the party, who were usually the principal national leaders (such as Antonio Gava in Naples) or members of the national direction of the party, Ministers, or State Secretaries. Below them were the main *luogotenenti* (‘lieutenants’), usually parliamentarians, under-secretaries or directors of the main public agencies, sometimes even the secretaries of provincial federations or those of main cities. Underneath these were *grandi elettori* (‘grand electors’), important figures who acted in the party’s favour by controlling the local clientelist networks, such as mayors and municipal councillors, secretaries of local party branches, but also members of liberal professions (e.g. doctors, lawyers). Similar to these were the *capi elettori* (‘head electors’), who also controlled important social networks, often through familial, territorial, or professional bases (e.g. construction and commerce). At the lowest level were the *galoppini* (‘common electors’), who became clients of a political figure after receiving material help or merely its promise (Allum, 1997). Control of the electors was thus exercised through a political system that was a closed circle. The constant hegemony of the DC in government between 1945 and 1992 meant that local leaders could in turn control State power in their territory. That is the case, for instance, of the Gava family in Naples since the 1950s: their power in Naples consolidated their power in Rome, and their power in Rome cemented and increased their power in Naples (Allum, 1973, 1997; Caprara, 1975).

This was coupled with the party’s ubiquitous control of economic resources, the labour market, and the public administration. There was no postman or bank employee that had not been hired through DC deputies and party officials. In fact, during the ‘Clean Hands’ investigations Alfredo Vito (a DC deputy from Naples and close collaborator of

Antonio Gavi and *pentito* ('repented') witness during the investigations) described to magistrates how throughout his political career – he was municipal councillor between 1975 and 1980, regional councillor between 1980 and 1987, and national deputy between 1987 and 1992 – there was a constant influx of individuals contacting him for personal favours. Not just the unemployed hoping for a post, but also professionals requesting institutional and administrative functions, promotions, transfers. This system became all the more popular over the years and was helped by the fact that control was exercised pyramidally, in the sense that national politicians would rely on regional, provincial, and municipal levels. It is at these levels that there is concrete rapport with electors and it is at these levels that such requests were made and executed. Vito further noted that job assignment would mostly occur by directly contacting the relevant agencies and firms, who would then work around the legislation present at the time. If direct hirings were not possible, they would create “under-agencies” such as cooperatives that need not abide by the same legislation, or rig the relevant public exams (Musella, 1999).

A closer look at the legal proceedings of the ‘Clean Hands’ investigations further elucidates this. The magistrates’ interviews with the former ministers and deputies involved in the *Tangentopoli* scandal revealed an intricate network of clientelistic, corrupt relations at all levels of government and administration, which further involved entrepreneurs and criminal organisations. For instance, as noted by the public prosecutor of Salerno, the Affairs Committee of Nocera Inferiore, a town of 50,000 inhabitants south of Naples, would meet in the office of the local *Camorra* boss to discuss issues such as the public exam for the local council, a tender, or the council’s composition. Before there was even a municipal meeting, there would be a pre-meeting across parties with the local boss’ participation (Allum, 1997). In fact, according to Alfredo Vito, local party sections had a very strong influence over the selection of mayors because they controlled local councillors who in turn selected the mayor. What would happen is that elections would not be held, rather the heads of the different groups on the council would agree upon certain individuals based on the projected electoral power these people would have had if elections had been held (Musella, 1999).

An example of the connection between deputies, local administrators, and entrepreneurs is provided by the testimony of a constructor over the tender for the 1990 football World Cup. He noted how he met with two deputies in Rome, Vincenzo Scotti and Ugo Grippo, both members of the DC, who asked if he was interested in the tender, and then directed him to *segretario comunale* Vincenzo Diretto (also of the DC), to representatives of the PSI, to representatives of the Liberals (who also controlled a town secretary, Giovanni Marone), then to a further representative of the Republicans and one of the Social Democrats. All of these representatives asked for large sums of money in exchange for the speedy approval of the contracts (Allum, 1997). For this system to work, it was necessary for those elected at sub-national levels, who in turn elected mayors and regional presidents, to be subordinated to political leaders. Their docility was ensured by the control that the latter had on the municipal sections of the DC. Indeed, DC deputy Alfredo Vito told judges in his testimony that the composition of electoral lists was predetermined in most municipalities, as was access to municipal councils (Allum, 1997).

A way to maintain this power structure was the ability to reinvest resources at the local level. This is exemplified by the behaviour of Cirino Pomicino and Vito Alfredo of the DC, by Di Donato of the PSI, and by De Lorenzo of the PLI, who all rose to Ministerial positions. Judges described how they all had relations at different levels with businesses and criminal groups. The behaviour of De Lorenzo was especially striking. His party's headquarters in Naples also housed the regional, provincial, and municipal secretaries, as well as the leader's office. Here, individuals in need of help would come and the relevant files and permits would be managed by a handful of functionaries. This was enabled by contact with hospital directors, university professors, and health functionaries. As De Lorenzo became Health Minister, he used these networks to reinforce his relations with pharmaceutical industries, and appointed individuals from these same networks to his Ministry (Musella, 2000). His corrupt activities were mostly concentrated in the public administration, such as in the case of procedures for the approval and pricing of pharmaceuticals, which would never occur without the payment of heavy bribes. Another exemplary case is that of Antonio Gava (DC), who used his support base within the

party to ensure the election of Ciriaco De Mita as national party leader and in return was awarded the role of Minister for Post and Telecommunications after the 1983 election – a position that enabled him to widen his clientelistic network, as he nominated 3,808 people of Neapolitan origin under his Ministry. This, of course, then had knock-on effects, for example with his personal secretary then managed to hire 40 *falsi invalidi* (individuals pretending to have disabilities to fill posts reserved for this category) from his town of origin to the same Ministry (Allum, 1997).

It was specifically by controlling local authorities such as municipal and regional councils that deputies and ministers would achieve the realisation of “delicate” policy decisions. This in turn depended on the respective roles they held. Vito, for instance, as deputy would mostly control the local levels, while Pomicino and De Lorenzo, as both deputies and ministers, would control both the local and national levels (Müller, 2000).

## 3 Final dataset, details

### 3.1 Treated and control districts

As mentioned in the main body of the paper, the treatment variable is a dummy variable that indicates those districts that were ‘treated’ with an increase in the indictment rate of national deputies following the investigations (1) and those that are ‘control’ districts in that they saw no (or small) increase(s) in the indictment rate (0).

The indictment rate is defined as the number of national deputies accused of corruption per year in a given district. I take the log of this number and calculate the difference in the number of indictments before and after the ‘Clean Hands’ investigations to calculate my  $\delta$ .<sup>8</sup> The reported regressions define as treated those districts that fell into the fortieth percentile of the distribution of  $\delta$ . This threshold provides the most reasonable balance between treated (59%) and control (61%) districts, without sacrificing the meaningfulness of the treatment itself. As illustrated in the map presented in Figure 3 of the main text, this threshold produces a reasonable number of control districts and avoids a situation whereby changes in very few districts could be driving the results.<sup>9</sup>

### 3.2 Data set-up

To illustrate how the final dataset is set up, I will continue with the example of *Milano-Pavia* used in the main text. The electoral district is classified as treated as it has a  $\delta$  of 0.138, which falls in the fortieth percentile of  $\delta$ . *Milano-Pavia* has a pre-period average of 63 public officials with *Corruption Indictments* at the local level and a post-period average of 339 public officials with *Corruption Indictments* at the local level. *Milano-Pavia* is classified as being in the Northern region of the *Macro Regions of Italy*. The average value for the *Length of Judicial Proceedings* for *Milano-Pavia* is 126.10, as compared to the sample average of 152.66. The *Corruption Indictments* score is adjusted down by 4, as 4 national deputies are indicted for crimes that are included in the local level data.

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<sup>8</sup>In order to adjust for skewness in the number of individuals prosecuted.

<sup>9</sup>I show in Table A3 that my results are robust to modifying the threshold used to define treatment status.



### 3.3 Treatment map

With respect to the map presented in Figure 3 in the main text, it was created using R software and data from ISTAT. The plurinominal electoral district shape files were extracted from ISTAT (2018) and the provincial district shape files from ISTAT (2019). The only geodata available from ISTAT for plurinominal districts is from 2017. The electoral districts changed very little over the years so this does not pose a problem in terms of illustrating how my data are set up. I remind the reader that the correct district alignments for the years under analysis are used for all the analyses in the text, these geodata refer only to this illustrative map.

The darker grey districts are treated and the lighter grey ones are control. The circles represent the intensity of treatment, namely the magnitude of  $\delta$  described in Section 3.1 of the Appendix.

## 4 Discussion of assumptions required for inference from DiD model

In order to justify inference from the DiD model, the following assumptions are required (Lechner et al., 2011): the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), the exogeneity assumption (EXOG), the assumption that in the pre-treatment period the treatment had no effect on the pre-treatment population (NEPT), the common trend assumption (CT), and the common support assumption (COSU). SUTVA requires that the treated units are completely represented and that there are no relevant interactions between the treatment and control groups. EXOG requires that individuals in the pre-treatment period do not anticipate the treatment and change their behaviour accordingly. NEPT is very similar to EXOG, but relates to pre-treatment *outcomes* rather than covariates, that is to say that any pre-treatment changes in behaviour that anticipate the treatment should not translate into actions that affect the outcome variable. CT, instead, stipulates that if the treatment group were not subjected to the treatment, it would experience the same time trends as the control group. COSU requires that units with the same characteristics are in both the treatment and the control groups. Of these assumptions, only COSU and CT are statistically testable.


I shall address each assumption in the order presented above. Regarding SUTVA, treated districts are completely represented in my case and, in terms of relevant interactions between the treatment and control groups, I argue that given that indictments - and the whole judicial process - occurs at the level of the *procure* (so at the provincial or even municipal level) there is little reason to expect spillovers between treated and control districts as they are all grouped into the same electoral district (which is either treated or a control). With respect to the, similar, EXOG and NEPT assumptions, in my setting, a violation of these assumptions would translate into local public officials anticipating that the indictment rate of their national representatives would increase in 1992 and changing their behaviour (EXOG) such that their own corrupt practices (NEPT) changed ahead of the ‘Clean Hands’ investigations. I argue that this is highly unlikely due to the very nature

of the treatment I analyse. Prosecutors uncovering a previously hidden network of corrupt politicians have many incentives to keep their groundwork invisible, until the moment of arrest, so as to successfully apprehend the individuals in question before they change their strategy or hide their tracks. This is reflected in the manner in which Mario Chiesa (see Section 1 of the main text) was arrested in 1992, taken entirely by surprise and eliciting a defensive response from his party, the PSI.<sup>10</sup> It is highly unlikely, therefore, that ahead of the breaking of the scandal in early 1992 that national politicians themselves, let alone local level public officials, would anticipate such an event or change their behaviour. With respect to the CT or ‘parallel trends assumption, the most critical of the DiD assumptions in terms of internal validity, in this case the assumption means that the districts with no increase in the indictment rate of national deputies (control) and those with an increased indictment rate of national deputies (treated) were moving in parallel to one another in terms of local public administration corruption ahead of the 1992 scandal. I show that this assumption holds in both Figures 2 and 4 of the main text.


Regarding COSU, in the case in question, this assumption requires that districts with the same characteristics are in both the treated and control groups. Given that this assumption is formulated in terms of observable quantities (Lechner et al., 2011) it is testable, as I demonstrate in Figures A1 and A2. These figures show the kernel distributions for three provincial level variables *Population*, *Length of Judicial Proceedings* and *Indictments for Violence* against the public administration, which are unrelated to my main dependent variable. One can see that, indeed, there is a great deal of common support between the treated and control groups in each case.

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
<sup>10</sup>Bettino Craxi famously referred to Chiesa as a “mariuolo isolato” (lone wolf) (Il Corriere della Sera, 2012), in an attempt to deflect the idea that there was a wide-reaching network of corruption in which his party was involved.



**Figure A1. Common support for *Length of Judicial Proceedings***



**Figure A2. Common support for *Indictments for Violence***



**Figure A3. Common support for *Population***

## 5 Additional analyses

With reference to the robustness tests presented in Table 3 of the main text, *Omissione di atti d'ufficio* (omission of official acts) is a charge that can be part of corruption investigations as it pertains to the omission, refusal or delay of official acts which may be undertaken due to a public official wishing to obscure or obstruct access to certain information due to a corrupt exchange. Unfortunately, parallel trends do not hold well for this variable and, as such, the results presented in Column 4 should be taken with a pinch of salt, but it is reassuring to see that the effect goes in the same direction and is of a similar magnitude to my main models. Parallel trends hold well, instead, for *Violenza o minaccia a un pubblico ufficiale*, so this result is more persuasive.

In Table A2, I present a series of sensitivity tests. In Column 1, I recalculate the  $\delta$  that I use to define treatment status, reassigning those deputies who were elected in more than one district to the district where they were elected but did *not* accept the seat. This falsification test is intended to probe whether my research design is valid in that the district in which deputies are elected is that in which they are likely to have most influence in terms of patronage hiring. Encouragingly, this test yields a non-statistically significant result providing further evidence that the corruption displacement effect I find runs through the deputies who are indicted and their effective districts of election. This analysis and that presented in Column 2 are simpler versions of the main analysis employing a non-adjusted count of *Corruption Indictments* at the local level and are equivalent to Column 1 in Table 2 of the main text (with district/province fixed effects, but no controls).<sup>11</sup>

In Column 2, I use national deputies' province of birth as a proxy for where they have influence in terms of electoral clout and patronage networks such that I can replicate my main analyses, but at the provincial (rather than electoral district level). If a deputy born in province X is indicted during 'Clean Hands' I treat that province as if it were the electoral district in which the deputy was elected. In fact, there is a strong overlap between where the deputies in my sample were born and where they were elected: 80%

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<sup>11</sup>This is due to a complete rehauling of the structure of the data to be able to undertake these analyses.

of deputies were elected in the same region in which they were born. This is typical in Italy, where most politicians have the strongest voter base in the area they were born or grew up - this is true of the labour market more broadly, with most people living and working in the area in which they were born. Reassuringly, this analysis yields a positive and statistically significant result, in line with my main results.

In Column 3, I subset my data to exclude those electoral districts where there has been historical organised crime presence. Very simplistically, I select the regions of Sicily, Calabria and Campania<sup>12</sup> due to the presence of *Cosa Nostra*, *'Ndrangeta* and *Camorra*, respectively. I would like to underline that there is a very rich literature documenting the spread of these organisations across Italy and Europe over time. I select only these regions for conceptual clarity, but absolutely do not adhere to the notion that organised crime affects only these territories. The magnitude of the effect we see here decreases slightly as compared to my main analyses (Table 2 in the main text). This indicates that some of the effect is driven by electoral districts with a historical presence of organised crime, but not in a significant way (an average difference in treatment effect of  $(44-41)= 3$  local *Corruption Indictments*.)

In Table A3, I demonstrate that my results are robust to changing how treated and control districts are defined. Table A3 presents results replicating my main model (Column 4 of Table 2 in the main text) at varying thresholds of indictment rate.<sup>13</sup> As can be seen, the interaction term remains positive and statistically significant even in rather extreme cases (e.g., Columns 1 and 2), where there are very few control districts (12% and 21%, respectively).

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<sup>12</sup>These regions cover the following electoral districts: *Napoli-Caserta*, *Benevento-Avellino-Salerno*, *Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria*, *Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna* and *Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta*.

<sup>13</sup>The thresholds used are the tenth, twentieth, thirtieth, fortieth and fiftieth percentiles of indictment rate).

**Table A2. Sensitivity tests (falsification, province of birth, and organised crime)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Falsif. Test (1)	Prov. Birth (2)	Org. Crime (3)
Treated	-165.644*** (20.208)	130.526*** (10.952)	-177.369*** (17.835)
Post	42.116*** (7.505)	8.141*** (2.415)	33.708*** (10.253)
Treated*Post	14.324 (9.786)	14.192*** (3.112)	41.259*** (9.181)
Constant	154.337*** (14.347)	-2.674 (7.757)	2,243.126 (1,778.641)
Full controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	612	1,854	522
District FE	YES	YES	YES
R <sup>2</sup>	0.514	0.495	0.553
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.486	0.465	0.526
Residual Std. Error	59.202 (df = 578)	32.594 (df = 1749)	52.082 (df = 491)
F Statistic	18.506*** (df = 33; 578)	16.472*** (df = 104; 1749)	20.247*** (df = 30; 491)

*Note:* For Columns 1 and 2, equivalent of Column 1 from Table 2 in the main text. Column 3, equivalent of Column 4 of Table 2 in the main text. Analyses described above. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



**Table A3. Changing the thresholds used to define treatment status**

	<i>Dependent variable: Corruption Indictments</i>				
	Treated 10	Treated20	Treated30	Treated40	Treated50
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treated10*Post	30.966** (14.960)				
Treated20*Post		38.761*** (11.845)			
Treated30*Post			35.589*** (10.226)		
Treated40*Post				44.401*** (9.646)	
Treated50*Post					27.398*** (9.625)
Constant	2,455.570 (1,870.698)	2,492.837 (1,860.378)	2,631.669 (1,858.155)	2,625.892 (1,843.985)	2,741.812 (1,864.887)
Full controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	612	612	612	612	612
District FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R <sup>2</sup>	0.515	0.520	0.522	0.529	0.518
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.486	0.491	0.493	0.500	0.489
Residual Std. Error (df = 576)	59.201	58.876	58.805	58.357	59.007

*Note:* Equivalent of Column 4 from Table 2 in the main text, changing how treatment status is defined. Analyses described above. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 5.1 Deputies returning to office, following ‘Clean Hands’

Politicians involved in major corruption scandals typically experience a loss in their vote share (Peters and Welch, 1980; Welch and Hibbing, 1997), if not a more damaging outcome such as an outright seat loss or an estrangement from the party leadership (Asquer et al., 2018). Given this, the sheer scale of the 1992 scandal, and the public outrage it caused, one may well ask what incentives these politicians would have to collude with public officials to administer electoral favours after their involvement in the scandal. To explore this line of reasoning, I analyse how many of the individuals involved in the scandal return to politics afterwards (which would give them an incentive to administer favours to voters in their district in the manner evoked in the “*public officials as surrogates*” hypothesis). To do so, I conduct a merge of the data on accused politicians (Golden, 2014) with my larger dataset of the universe of Italian politicians from 1987-2013 (see Section 4.1 in the main text) to see how many accused politicians re-enter the world of politics after their involvement in the scandal. This provides an indication of whether politicians would be interested in maintaining their local voter base after involvement in a major scandal, as re-election hopes would certainly motivate a politician to keep her voter base loyal and content. I present descriptive evidence that the majority of deputies implicated in ‘Clean Hands’ returned to public office, as presented in Table A4.<sup>14</sup>

This result is supported by other analyses which document that a significant share of the politicians investigated during ‘Clean Hands’ survived and maintained institutional positions (Busso and Scaglione, 2017) or were able to navigate across levels or between politics and the public administration (Vidotto, 2015). For example, Busso et al. (2018) found that in 2015, 62% of politicians implicated in corruption cases who still hold political positions started their careers *before* 1994. This tenacity does not appear to be explained by First Republic deputies’ exiting and re-entering the political scene, but rather by their ability to remain in office throughout the judiciary proceedings, often by moving across different governmental levels. Local administrations provide an especially fertile ground in

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<sup>14</sup>The number of politicians who attempted to return to politics may be much higher, but I only observe *elected* politicians, rather than candidates, so cannot measure how many attempt to make a come-back and fail.

**Table A4. Statistics describing how many indicted politicians re-entered politics following involvement in ‘Clean Hands’**

<b>Re-enter: Yes</b>	<b>Re-enter: No</b>	<b>Total</b>
Municipal	N/A	83 (35%)
Provincial	N/A	5 (2%)
Regional	N/A	4 (2%)
National	N/A	143 (61%)
<b>235 (75%)</b>	<b>78 (25%)</b>	<b>313 (100%)</b>


this respect, possibly due to the different electoral mechanisms and reduced media scrutiny. As referenced in the main text, Section 5.1, Busso et al. (2018) also observe that 42.2% of the resources obtained from corrupt exchanges were used for party financing *prior* to ‘Clean Hands’, whereas only 6.6% of resources for used for party financing afterwards. The use of resources for personal enrichment increased from 35% to 60.5% in the same pre- and post-‘Clean Hands’ periods.

Additionally, I calculate the number of years a deputy waits before returning to politics after the scandal. I then correlate this amount of time with the number of serious charges<sup>15</sup> that each politician has accumulated and show that the relationship between the two variables is close to zero (Figure A4). This supports the notion that accountability mechanisms were not working as intended in Italy in this time period, with voters in Italy in the time period not electorally punishing deputies for particularistic practices. Had this been the case, we would expect to see a positive correlation between the gravity of the politician’s involvement in the scandal and the amount of time required to pass before she re-enters politics.

The hypothesised ‘surrogacy behaviours’ channel, in particular, links to the literature on brokers or mediators in clientelistic relationships between politicians and voters.

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<sup>15</sup>Here, I follow Chang et al. (2010) in categorising charges into two major groups, serious and non-serious. Non-serious charges are “all charges involving opinion crimes because these are especially likely to arise during the process of political campaigning. This category includes libel, slander, defamation, and other, similar items, including anything related to fascist activities” (Chang et al., 2010, p.182). Serious charges cover all the remaining charges, which involve “a variety of allegations running from the mundane to the genuinely severe, extending even to murder. A great many involve explicit allegations of political corruption, involvement in illegal party financing, or abuse of office” (Chang et al., 2010, p.182).



**Figure A4. Correlation between count of serious charges and length of time before returning to office**

Public officials, here, are hypothesised to act as agents of the politician, collecting and responding to the requests of voters. Recent literature has enriched our understanding of clientelistic exchanges (Gingerich and Medina, 2013; Stokes et al., 2013; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Rodrigo Zarazaga, 2014) by focusing on political brokers or “ground-level intermediaries between parties and voters [...] who can identify the needs of clients, distribute goods, and monitor behavior” (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015, p.1187). Such figures are hypothesised to become especially important in times of scandals:

“...scandals rip the tissue of trusting relationships uniting political actors and economic subjects in corruption. In this ‘vacuum’, mediators can become central figures, precisely by virtue of their capacity to cushion the uncertainties associated with the illegal nature of the exchanges” (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2016, p.171).

Although only correlational evidence, this finding stands in contrast to existing understandings of the intertemporal dynamics of electoral accountability according to

which politicians' reputations are "a rapidly depreciating asset that increasingly loses value the longer a politician takes a hiatus from elective office" (Krause and Melusky, 2014, p.1114). This applies to both poor- and well-performing politicians in that a 'good' politician should try to return immediately to offer to cash in on her reputation, whereas as a 'bad' politician should wait to try to return to office such that her reputation effect will have diminished. In the context under study, it seems that such a logic does not apply, as 'bad' politicians do not wait to return to office.

## 6 Original Italian Texts

Main text:

- From Section 2.1 of the main text: *Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale* Institute for Industrial Reconstruction, *Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi* National Hydrocarbons Authority, *Ente Partecipazioni e Finanziamento Industrie Manifatturiere* Body for the Holdings and Financing of the Manufacturing Industries.
- From Section 4.1 of the main text: *violazione norme finanziamento pubblico dei partiti* violation of the regulations on public financing of political parties, *abuso di ufficio* abuse of office, and *corruzione per un atto contrario ai doveri di ufficio* corruption for an act contrary to official duties.
- From Section 4.1 of the main text: “Agli effetti della legge penale, sono pubblici ufficiali (1) coloro i quali esercitano una pubblica funzione legislativa, giudiziaria o amministrativa”.
- From Section 4.1 of the main text: “Esempi di pubblici ufficiali sono l’ufficiale giudiziario, il consulente tecnico, il testimone, l’assistente universitario, l’ispettore sanitario di un ospedale, i membri della commissione edilizia comunale, il portalettere, i carabinieri ed gli agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza, il geometra tecnico dell’ufficio comunale”.
- From Section 4.3 of the main text: “È stato creato un sistema giuridico e processuale per garantire l’impunità a politici e ‘colletti bianchi’ che si fanno corrompere. Il 98% delle condanne – ha detto Davigo – riguardano pene inferiori ai due anni, che non comportano il carcere. Per quelle fino ai tre anni si è provveduto allo stesso risultato con l’indulto. In Italia ci sono meno condannati per corruzione che in Finlandia; e in provincia di Reggio Calabria, che “non è certo una isola felice”, in 20 anni si hanno avute solo due condanne per corruzione.”

Appendix:

- From Section 1.1: “la riforma amministrativa non era nell’ ‘agenda politica””.
- From Section 1.1: “Come tutto ciò che non interessa, il funzionamento dell’amministrazione... era lasciata esistere. Gli uffici avevano strutture arcaiche. Le procedure erano obsolete. Il personale [...] era frustrato da altro personale, scelto per meriti politici o sindacali o familiari...”.

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