

## **Appendix**

This appendix documents how the TAPEC members listed in Table 3 meet the membership criteria. The criterion on TAPEC's normative belief, that 'Stability is a good thing and that the US should keep its military in East Asia', is not included since engaging in TAPEC's policy enterprise presupposes an adherence to this belief. Several of the members move between professions and could thus fit into more than one category. Country or region does not signify a member's citizenship, but is instead my assessment of the primary location of his or her professional activities. The classification relies solely on publicly available sources. It is possible that individuals have made statements, which I am not aware of, that contradict the membership criteria. It is the social role of the members, not their self-identification, that is categorized. All translations are my own.

<i>Name / Country or region / Profession</i>	<i>Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia (causal belief)</i>	<i>Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia (policy enterprise)</i>
Thomas Berger / USA / University scholar	‘... [the end result of the US bearing the brunt of fighting and dying in an Asian conflict] could well be a disintegration of the alliance and multilateral structures upon which Asian-Pacific regional security depends.’ <sup>1</sup>	‘... it will be necessary to strengthen and reforge the bilateral security arrangements that the United States created in the region during the Cold War ...’ <sup>2</sup>
Thomas Christensen / USA / University scholar	‘... by maintaining a strong presence in the region, the United States has done more than provide collective goods in security and economic affairs; it may have provided a major catalyst for Beijing to help provide such collective goods as well. To the degree that Beijing’s new influence does not lead the United States to become fully extruded from the region, the end result of the competition for influence in the region may be a more stable and prosperous region in which actors in East Asia do not want to choose sides in a US-China conflict and Beijing and Washington lack any real pretense for starting one.’ <sup>3</sup>	‘The Obama administration should continue to strengthen US relationships in Asia. Such an agenda is a good idea under any circumstances.’ <sup>4</sup>
Aaron Friedberg / USA / University scholar	‘If they want to deter aggression, discourage coercion and preserve a plural, open order, Washington and its friends and allies are going to have to work harder, and to cooperate more closely, in order to maintain a favorable balance of regional power.’ <sup>5</sup>	‘Whoever is elected [US] president in November will have to take steps to dispel [doubts in East Asia about US resources and resolve]. Developing and funding a credible strategy for countering China’s buildup and adopting a tougher approach to economic engagement will both be important.’ <sup>6</sup>
John Ikenberry / USA / University scholar	‘In Europe, the major powers have fashioned a peaceful regional system around economic integration and an ambitious agenda for political union. By contrast, East Asia appears to be a decidedly more dangerous region governed by brute-power political realities. But over the last fifty years, the hub-and-spoke system of alliances has provided for remarkable region-wide stability despite the bloody wars inside Korea and Vietnam.’ <sup>7</sup>	‘The strategic understanding behind both NATO and Washington’s East Asian alliances is that the United States will work with its allies to provide security and bring them in on decisions over the use of force, and US allies, in return, will operate within the US-led Western order. ... the United States needs to reaffirm the political value of these alliances—recognizing that they are part of a wider Western institutional architecture that allows states to do business with one another.’ <sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Berger, ‘Set for stability? Prospects for conflict and cooperation in East Asia’, *Review of International Studies*, 26:3 (2000), p. 425.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 427.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Fostering stability or creating a monster? The rise of China and US policy toward East Asia’, *International Security*, 31:1 (2006), pp. 125–126.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The advantages of an assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s abrasive diplomacy’, *Foreign Affairs*, 90:2 (2011), available at {<http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/03/china-christensen>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>5</sup> Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Hegemony with Chinese characteristics’, *The National Interest*, 114: July/August, (2011), p. 27.

<sup>6</sup> Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Bucking Beijing: An alternative US China policy’, *Foreign Affairs*, 91:5 (2012), pp. 48–58.

<sup>7</sup> G. John Ikenberry, ‘American hegemony and East Asian order’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 58:3 (2004), p. 364.

<sup>8</sup> G. John Ikenberry, ‘The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal system survive?’, *Foreign Affairs*, 87:1 (2008), p. 34.

<i>Name / Country or region / Profession</i>	<i>Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia</i>	<i>Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia</i>
David Shambaugh / USA / University scholar	‘The US-led alliance system remains the predominant regional security architecture. ... It has been central to the maintenance of strategic stability and economic development throughout the East Asian region ...’ <sup>9</sup>	‘... maintaining strong US alliances and partnerships in Asia ... [is] prudent ...’ <sup>10</sup>
Michael Auslin / USA / Think tank scholar or analyst	‘As this Committee understand, strengthening [US alliances in the Asia-Pacific] is one of the surest ways to help maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific region, preserve US influence, and help promote a future of greater freedom and prosperity for half our world.’ <sup>11</sup>	‘As this Committee understand, strengthening [US alliances in the Asia-Pacific] is one of the surest ways to help maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific region, preserve US influence, and help promote a future of greater freedom and prosperity for half our world.’ <sup>12</sup>
Jeffrey Bader / USA / Think tank scholar or analyst	‘We believe that [the US] presence, our security presence, in the Asia-Pacific region is critical to peace and prosperity in the region. [It has] helped maintain that peace and prosperity for most of the last 60 years.’ <sup>13</sup>	‘Strengthening the [US] administration’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific region is a welcome and necessary development. Speeches and visits are important tools in imparting meaning to US policy. But we must ensure that they are backed by diligent, purposive actions across the full spectrum of US interests, without which our words and visits will ring hollow to the states whose behavior we seek to influence.’ <sup>14</sup>
Patrick Cronin / USA / think tank scholar or analyst	‘The South China Sea is where a militarily rising China is increasingly challenging American naval pre-eminence—a trend that, if left on its present trajectory, could upset the balance of power that has existed since the end of World War II and threaten these sea lines of communication.’ <sup>15</sup>	‘The United States should cooperate from a position of strength in order to preserve an open, rules-based regional order. A combination of strengthening the US naval presence, promoting nascent security ties among Asian countries outside of traditional US alliances, mobilizing multilateral cooperation on agreed-on rules of the road, building an open regional trading system and forging a realistic relationship with China can best preserve a favorable balance for cooperation.’ <sup>16</sup>
Michael Green / USA / think tank scholar or analyst	‘[T]he prevailing view is that a robust and credible US-Japan alliance is the answer to the real challenges to peace and stability [in the Asia-Pacific region].’ <sup>17</sup>	‘Barack Obama ... should remember ... that the future is shifting to Asia and we have the alliances, the partnerships, and the values to ensure that we benefit from this great tide of history in the years to come.’ <sup>18</sup>
Richard Haas / USA / think tank scholar or analyst	‘Most important, we should step up efforts to maintain stability in Asia and the Pacific Ocean, where this century’s great powers could easily collide and where American diplomatic, military and	‘Most important, we should step up efforts to maintain stability in Asia and the Pacific Ocean, where this century’s great powers could easily collide and where American diplomatic, military and

<sup>9</sup> David L. Shambaugh, ‘China engages Asia: Reshaping the regional order’, *International Security*, 29:3 (2004/05), pp. 95–96.

<sup>10</sup> David L. Shambaugh, ‘Coping with a conflicted China’, *The Washington Quarterly*, 34:1 (2011), p. 25.

<sup>11</sup> Michael R. Auslin, ‘Hearing on strengthening US alliances in Northeast Asia’, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs (4 March 2014).

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> PBS Newshour, ‘What does US military deployment mean for Asia-Pacific?’ (16 November 2011), available at: {[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military-july-dec11-australia2\\_11-16/](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military-july-dec11-australia2_11-16/)} accessed 31 May 2015.

<sup>14</sup> Jonathan D. Pollack and Jeffrey A. Bader, ‘Return to the Asia rebalance and the US-China relationship’, Brookings (23 January 2014), available at: {<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/asia-rebalance-us-china-relationship-pollack-bader>} accessed 31 May 2015.

<sup>15</sup> Patrick M. Cronin and Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Cooperation from strength: US strategy and the South China Sea’, in Patrick M. Cronin (ed.), *Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea* (Center for a new American Security, January 2012), p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>17</sup> Michael Green and Jeffrey W. Hornung, ‘Ten myths about Japan’s collective self-defence change’, *The Diplomat* (10 July 2014) available at: {<http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/ten-myths-about-japans-collective-self-defense-change/>} accessed 31 May 2015.

<sup>18</sup> Michael Green, ‘Get Asia right’, *Asia Policy*, 7:1 (2009), p. 5.

economic tools are well suited to ensure that they do not. Modest increases in America's Air Force and naval presence can reassure allies like Japan and South Korea while sending implicit warnings to China and North Korea ...<sup>19</sup>

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Name / Country or region / Profession	Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia	Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia
Randy Forbes/ USA / (Former) Politician or bureaucrat	'In a world where China has enough confidence to challenge the US and Japan in the skies of Asia; where North Korea has achieved, and Iran progresses towards, a nuclear weapons capability ... the current US policy is deeply irresponsible. A world without a strong America is not naturally inclined to peace. Rather, it is guaranteed to be far less stable.' <sup>21</sup>	'China has shown how a rising power expands the dimensions of its military capabilities into realms long under American control. While no one believes the Chinese air force is a match for American airpower today, a combination of lack of political will at home and a slow deterioration in our traditional advantages may lead to a dramatically different environment in just the next decade. Then, for the first time in over a half-century, American troops will look to the skies wondering if they are safe, as our ability to maintain global stability is increasingly tested.' <sup>22</sup>
Evan Medeiros / USA / (Former) Politician or Bureaucrat	'Since the Cold War, a US-centric system of bilateral alliances and partnerships, more commonly known as the hub-and-spokes system, has delivered stability and security to the region and facilitated Asia's impressive economic development.' <sup>23</sup>	'Washington should pursue a differentiated strategy with the following general characteristics: greater involvement in and contribution to regional economic and security institutions, both rhetorically and substantially; appreciation of each nation's economic and national-security priorities and capabilities and security cooperation that accords with these interests; sensitivity to local views of the United States and China, at both the popular and elite levels; efforts to broaden security cooperation to increase the quality of US defense assistance; and more burden sharing in defense and diplomatic cooperation.' <sup>24</sup>
Joseph Nye/ USA / (Former) Politician or bureaucrat	'[US withdrawal from its East Asian alliances] would let normal balance-of-power politics take the place of American leadership. The United States could try to play one state off against others. Some believe that this would be the lowest-cost option for the United States. In practice, however, such an approach would be both costly and destabilizing. ... East Asian reactions to the balance-of-power approach would likely lead to a regional arms race.' <sup>25</sup>	'... we must maintain a bipartisan consensus on our forward presence in East Asia. ... It is in America's interest to maintain the alliance structure with countries like Japan and South Korea because these relationships are the basis for regional security. ... For the security and prosperity of today to be maintained for the next 20 years, the United States must remain engaged in Asia ...' <sup>26</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Richard N. Haass, 'America can take a breather: And it should', *New York Times* (22 June 2013) available at: {<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/opinion/sunday/america-can-take-a-breather-and-it-should.html>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Randy Forbes J. and Michael Auslin, 'US power loses altitude in Asia', *Wall Street Journal* (11 December 2013), available at: {<http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303293604579251772697609630>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Evan S. Medeiros, 'Strategic hedging and the future of Asia-Pacific stability', *The Washington Quarterly*, 29:1 (2005), p. 146.

<sup>24</sup> Evan S. Medeiros et al., *Pacific Currents: The Responses of US Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China's Rise* (Rand Corporation, 2008), p. 29, available at: {[http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG736.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG736.pdf)} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>25</sup> Joseph S. Jr. Nye, 'The case for deep engagement', *Foreign Affairs*, 74:4 (1995), p. 93.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 101–102.

Ely Ratner / USA / (Former) Politician or bureaucrat	‘... China is now calling into question its commitment to preserving the very system that facilitated its rise. ... it is imperative that China’s destabilizing actions stop. This will require the United States to take steps that more regularly and visibly enforce the rules-based international order in Asia. ... While bolstering its alliances and partnerships, the United States should also help countries develop the defensive capacity to stand their ground in the face of China’s rapidly emerging force-projection capabilities.’ <sup>27</sup>	‘The US shift toward Asia should and will continue ...’ <sup>28</sup>
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<i>Name / Country or region / Profession</i>	<i>Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia</i>	<i>Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia</i>
James Steinberg / USA / (Former) Politician or bureaucrat	‘... military cooperation between the United States and Japan remains critical to sustaining a peaceful, stable environment and our military presence remains essential to the dual mission of helping to preserve Japan’s security while providing stability throughout the region.’ <sup>29</sup>	‘We appreciate the importance of the new Japanese government assuring itself that the proposed realignment serves these twin goals of continuity and change and look forward to being able to move forward in a timely way with crucial adjustments to anchor our presence in the Asia-Pacific region.’ <sup>30</sup>
Peter Ennis / USA / Journalist, Pundit or publicist	‘The committee in previous hearings has done a great job of highlighting for the Congress and the American people the importance of a strong American military, economic, and political presence in East Asia. Our presence in the region brings stability, enabling economic growth and increasing prosperity for both the region and the United States.’ <sup>31</sup>	‘My concern today is to try to highlight for the Committee some important trends in the region that might be off the radar screen and to perhaps suggest some steps the House might take to help truly solidify our position in East Asia for years to come. ... the [South Korean-US] Combined Forces Command is very important ... That is a valuable institutional arrangement that we should be working to expand, not cut out. ... The two key aspects of our position in Japan are the Yokosuka naval base ... That is absolutely crucial. We have to maintain that. Secondly is the Kadena air base on Okinawa ... We absolutely have to maintain that.’ <sup>32</sup>
Sakata Yasuyo / Japan / University scholar	‘The Japan-US alliance continues to serve Japanese security interests regarding the Korean Peninsula: maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, deterring and defending against the North Korean threat, and maintaining a favorable strategic balance in Northeast Asia.’ <sup>33</sup>	‘Japan-US defense cooperation is the core function of the alliance to deter and defend against the North Korean threat. ... If the alliance is to be more effective, however, Japan must overhaul its security policy addressing the legal issues that constrain Japan from effectively cooperating with allies and partners for the defense of Japan and international security

<sup>27</sup> Michèle Flournoy and Ely Ratner, ‘China’s territorial advances must be kept in check by the United States’, *Washington Post* (4 July 2014), available at: {[http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-territorial-advances-must-be-kept-in-check-by-the-united-states/2014/07/04/768294dc-0230-11e4-b8ff-89afd3fad6bd\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-territorial-advances-must-be-kept-in-check-by-the-united-states/2014/07/04/768294dc-0230-11e4-b8ff-89afd3fad6bd_story.html)} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>28</sup> Ely Ratner, ‘Rebalancing to Asia with an insecure China’, *The Washington Quarterly*, 36:2 (2013), p. 22.

<sup>29</sup> James B. Steinberg, ‘The future of the US-Japan alliance: Remarks. US Department of State’ (15 January 2010), p. 19, available at: {<http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/steinberg/remarks/2010/169326.htm>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>31</sup> Peter Ennis, ‘The United States and Asia: Continuity, instability and transition. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives’ (17 March 2004), available at: {[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa92611.000/hfa92611\\_of.htm](http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa92611.000/hfa92611_of.htm)} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Yasuyo Sakata, ‘Korea and the Japan-US alliance: A Japanese perspective’, in Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry, and Yoichiro Sato (eds), *The US-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 108.

Kamiya Mataka / Japan / University scholar	'Following the Senkaku incident, East Asian countries 'rediscovered' the role that the US strategic presence in the region fulfils for underwriting peace and stability there.' <sup>35</sup>	operations... rebuilding trilateral security cooperation with South Korea is another task the Japan-US alliance must engage in.' <sup>34</sup>
Sahashi Ryo / Japan / University scholar	'Both the United States and Japan have long seen the US-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of the regional order in Asia-Pacific. Now, as the regional security architecture evolves in this era of power shifts and globalization, they need to adapt and make sure that the US-Japan alliance remains as vital and useful as it has been in the past.' <sup>37</sup>	'... Japan should work closely with the United States on efforts to promote alliance networking and functionalist cooperation in order to sustain the US commitment to Asia Pacific.' <sup>38</sup>
<i>Name / Country or region / Profession</i>	<i>Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia</i>	<i>Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia</i>
Akutsu Hiroyasu / think tank scholar or analyst	'Japan and South Korea should work jointly to enhance the US extended deterrent to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia...' <sup>39</sup>	'Japan and South Korea should continue to cooperate to maintain and strengthen the US presence in Northeast Asia and beyond...' <sup>40</sup>
Michishita Narushige/ Japan/ think tank scholar or analyst	'In order to maintain regional stability, it is indispensable [ <i>fukaketsu</i> ] that Australia, the South East Asian countries and India strengthen security cooperation under Japanese-US leadership.' <sup>41</sup>	'In order to maintain regional stability, it is indispensable [ <i>fukaketsu</i> ] that Australia, the South East Asian countries and India strengthen security cooperation under Japanese-US leadership.' <sup>42</sup>
Okamoto Yukio / think tank scholar or analyst	'The Japan-US alliance is dedicated to preserving the status quo in the Far East, that is, deterring the use of force as a means of altering political borders. ... The US-Japan alliance has roles to play that are vital to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. ... [Alternatives to the US-Japan alliance] seem certain to increase the likelihood of war in the region ...' <sup>43</sup>	'Given the magnitude of the danger that an end of the alliance would pose to both Japan and the United States, both sides will likely want to maintain their security relationship for many years to come. A completely new world would have to emerge for Japan and the United States to no longer need each other. Despite frictions over trade, supposed Japanese passivity, purported US arrogance, and the myriad

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 108-109.

<sup>35</sup> Mataka Kamiya, 'China, North Korea, nationalism and regional order', in William Tow and Tomonori Yoshizaki (eds), *Beyond the Hub and Spokes: Australia-Japan Security Cooperation* (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014), p. 32.

<sup>36</sup> Mataka Kamiya, 'Future visions of the alliance', in Brad Glosserman (ed.), *Celebrate or Separate? The Japan-US Security Treaty at 50: A Conference Report*, Pacific Forum CSIS: Issues and Insights, 10:15 (2010), p. 44.

<sup>37</sup> Ryo Sahashi, 'The rise of China and the changing regional security architecture', *Japan Center for International Exchange: US-Japan papers*, December (2011), pp. 1-2.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>39</sup> Hiroyasu Akutsu, 'Japan's North Korea strategy: Dealing with new challenges', in Michael J. Green and Zack Cooper (eds), *Strategic Japan: New Approaches to Foreign Policy and the US-Japan Alliance* (Lanham: Rowman Littlefield, 2014), p. 75.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>41</sup> Narushige Michishita, 'Chikara no baransu iji ni kōken [Contribution to the maintenance of the balance of power]', *Kumamoto Nichinichi Shimbun* (4 July 2014).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Yukio Okamoto, 'Japan and the United States: The essential alliance', *The Washington Quarterly*, 25:2 (2002), pp. 60, 68, 72.

overwrought “threats to the alliance”, the truth is that this military alliance between two democratic states is well-nigh unbreakable—because there are no acceptable alternatives.’<sup>44</sup>

<p>Kitaoka Shinichi / Japan/ (Former) Politician or bureaucrat</p>	<p>‘Since it would be impossible to achieve regional stability without the cooperation of the United States, it is important to establish organic coordination between the framework for regional security cooperation and the ‘close and equal Japan-US relationship’ espoused by the DPJ in its election manifesto, and this will necessitate the simultaneous deepening of regional and Japan-US cooperation.’<sup>45</sup></p>	<p>‘Since it would be impossible to achieve regional stability without the cooperation of the United States, it is important to establish organic coordination between the framework for regional security cooperation and the ‘close and equal Japan-US relationship’ espoused by the DPJ in its election manifesto, and this will necessitate the simultaneous deepening of regional and Japan-US cooperation.’<sup>46</sup></p>
<p>Nogami Yoshiji / Japan / (Former) Politician or bureaucrat</p>	<p>‘Japan and the United States, both have responsibility and vital interests in preserving open and rule-based security and the political architecture, which has served the region well. It is therefore extremely important for us to take a close look at the security landscape of the region today and developed shared understanding of the challenges we face today.’<sup>47</sup></p>	<p>‘Japan and the United States, both have responsibility and vital interests in preserving open and rule-based security and the political architecture, which has served the region well. It is therefore extremely important for us to take a close look at the security landscape of the region today and developed shared understanding of the challenges we face today.’<sup>48</sup></p>

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<p>Tanaka Hitoshi / Japan / (Former) Politician or Bureaucrat</p>	<p>‘... the benefits of the [Japanese-US] alliance extend beyond just the United States and Japan; it has played a major role in maintaining stability throughout Asia Pacific.’<sup>49</sup></p>	<p>‘The US-Japan alliance needs to be reaffirmed in light of the new international system, particularly given the major changes occurring within East Asia.’<sup>50</sup></p>
<p>Funabashi Yoichi / Japan / Journalist, Pundit or publicist</p>	<p>‘... the US-Japan alliance will continue to be central to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific.’<sup>51</sup></p>	<p>‘... perhaps we should really take into account of the regional aspect, regional elements into strengthening the US-Japan alliance. Certainly, we have seen that Hatoyama government in the past 10 months or so stumbling over that Futenma relocation issue, which has caused the deterioration of the US-Japan alliance to such a degree. And several Asian countries, the heads of state, have expressed their serious concerns about this plight of the US-Japan alliance. This revealed how much that alliance has been appreciated for a stabilizing factor throughout East Asia. And so this stabilizing factor should be recognized and appreciated throughout Asia, but not least by the Japanese themselves. .... I think that it’s time for</p>

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>45</sup> Tokyo Foundation, ‘Japan’s Security: 10 proposals for the Hatoyama Administration’ (October 2009) available at: {[http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/additional\\_info/2009-08E-1.pdf](http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/additional_info/2009-08E-1.pdf)} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> American Enterprise Institute, ‘The US-Japan alliance in action: Threats to thwart, opportunities to seize’ (2013), available at: {[http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/-usjapan-transcript\\_171606587972.pdf](http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/-usjapan-transcript_171606587972.pdf)} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Hitoshi Tanaka, ‘US-Japan relations: Past, present, and future. New Shimoda Conference: Revitalizing Japan-US strategic partnership for a changing world, conference report’, Japan Center for International Exchange (22 February 2011), p. 52, available at: {<http://www.jcie.or.jp/books/abstracts/S/newshimoda.html>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>51</sup> Yoichi Funabashi, ‘Japan locks into China’, *East Asia Forum* (19 July 2011) available at: {<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/19/tokyo-has-no-option-but-to-cleave-to-china/>} accessed 23 June 2015.

Japan and the United States to consult with like-minded Asian countries to discuss about how to strengthen the effect of that stabilizing effect of the US-Japan alliance regionally.<sup>52</sup>

John Blaxland / Australia / University scholar	‘Tearing up the agreement on Pine Gap and on the Marines in Darwin would send a strong and negative signal to the region that even the United States’ closest and longest ally is walking away. The knock-on consequences on regional security and stability would be incalculable.’ <sup>53</sup>	‘Tearing up the agreement on Pine Gap and on the Marines in Darwin would send a strong and negative signal to the region that even the United States’ closest and longest ally is walking away. The knock-on consequences on regional security and stability would be incalculable.’ <sup>54</sup>
Paul Dibb / Australia / University scholar	‘... China will need to readjust to the fact that the US is refocusing on our region after been absent in the Middle East for the past decade. Beijing will no longer have the luxury of free kicks to unilaterally assert its power in the region. The likely evolution is not some formal Concert of Asia but a mixture of good old-fashioned power balancing and prudent hedging on both sides.’ <sup>55</sup>	‘The picture presented in this analysis of how the new Defence White Paper treats Australia’s critical alliance with the United States is a mixed bag. As with all its predecessors, it clearly recognizes the central importance of the alliance to Australia’s defence posture and planning. But it is less fulsome than previous White Papers with the words it uses to describe just how important the alliance is to us.’ <sup>56</sup>

<i>Name / Country or region / Profession</i>	<i>Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia</i>	<i>Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia</i>
David Envall / Australia / University scholar	‘Recent tensions in Northeast Asia highlight the need for a stable regional security architecture—a role long played by the US-Japan alliance. In fact, the alliance has long been a core part of regional security politics. The United States’ ‘San Francisco,’ or ‘hub-and-spokes,’ system of alliances has contributed much to Asia’s security and economic development ...’ <sup>57</sup>	‘New approaches will necessitate that the US and its regional partners creatively revise and credibly operationalize their security collaboration. Old defense burden-sharing debates, for example, will assume new forms that emphasize niche areas of collaboration and demand higher levels of allied commitment to US strategic postures. ... The broadening of ‘intra-spoke’ alliance relations will also proceed and intensify. This may well be in the form of the US working with its allies in a plurilateral or minilateral context. The challenge the US confronts for implementing convergent security in this manner is to find and pursue ways for bilateral and multilateral strategies to do more than just coexist. Complementary strategies must be identified and pursued, so that current arrangements can be superseded by policies more coherent, overarching, and enduring.’ <sup>58</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Yoichi Funabashi, ‘The United States and Japan at 50: Remarks by Yoichi Funabashi’ (8 October 2010) available at: {<http://www.cfr.org/japan/united-states-japan-50-remarks-yoichi-funabashi/p23148>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>53</sup> John Blaxland, ‘The United States: Dangerous, indispensable or convenient Ally?’, *The Age*, available at: {<http://www.theage.com.au/it-pro/the-united-states-dangerous-indispensable-or-convenient-ally-20140508-zr4qk.html>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Paul Dibb, ‘Why I disagree with Hugh White on China’s rise’, *The Australian* (13 August 2012), available at: {<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/why-i-disagree-with-hugh-white-on-chinas-rise/story-e6frg6zo-1226448713852>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>56</sup> Paul Dibb, ‘Is the US alliance of declining importance to Australia?’, *Security Challenges*, 5:2 (2009), p. 37.

<sup>57</sup> H.D.P. Envall and Kerri Ng, ‘Okinawa, the US-Japan alliance, and Asia-Pacific security’, MacArthur Asia Security Initiative: Policy Background Paper, 11 (24 May 2013), p. 1, available at: {[http://asi.anu.edu.au/papers/Okinawa\\_US\\_Japan\\_Asia-Pacific.php](http://asi.anu.edu.au/papers/Okinawa_US_Japan_Asia-Pacific.php)} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>58</sup> William T. Tow and H.D.P. Envall, ‘The United States, Asia, and “convergent security”’, MacArthur Asia Security Initiative Partnership, Australia National University, 7 (13 December 2011), available at: {[http://asi.anu.edu.au/papers/US\\_and\\_Asia.php](http://asi.anu.edu.au/papers/US_and_Asia.php)} accessed 23 June 2015.



Andrew Davies / Australia / think tank scholar or analyst	'... the core values of [The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty] members are strongly aligned, and successive Australian governments and American presidential administrations have seen great value in working with like-minded partners to ensure Asia-Pacific security.' <sup>59</sup>	'In a more contested and challenging region, the ability of the military forces of the US and its allies to work together will only increase in importance. The US's and Australia's respective interests, responsibilities and expectations will call for enhanced levels of interoperability, not just on a bilateral basis, but for more complex and broader coalition operations.' <sup>60</sup>
Rory Medcalf / Australia / think tank scholar or analyst	'Through military and diplomatic moves in 2010—from pointed political statements to combined exercises with allies and the conspicuous surfacing of three of its most potent submarines—the United States underscored a determination to retain its mantle as guarantor of regional security in East Asia. ... This broad role includes alliance and extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea as well as support for a peaceful status quo across the Taiwan Strait and the provision of modern defensive arms to Taiwan.' <sup>61</sup>	'... it should not be that hard to countenance the possibility that a lot of Asians want a multipolar order, not one dominated by any country, be it China or the USA. If you accept that possibility, it is necessary also to contemplate that Australia has an important role to play in advancing many Asian countries' security preferences by supporting and encouraging the US rebalance to Asia—because that gives them their best chance to ensure that a rising China respects their interests.' <sup>62</sup>

<i>Name / Country or region / Profession</i>	<i>Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia</i>	<i>Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia</i>
Andrew Shearer / Australia / think tank scholar or analyst	'... Australia should continue working with what is still the world's superpower to keep peace in the region. The US never really left Asia, but Mr Obama's current Asia tour is part of a wider effort by Washington to reassure its friends and allies that despite its economic travails and looming defense cuts, America will not abandon them to face an increasingly assertive China on their own. ... The future of this key relationship depends on whether America's 'pivot' to Asia proves to be a lasting trend or a passing media sound bite. US friends and allies in the region, and its rising competitor, will be watching closely to see that US defense cuts do not undermine security in Asia.' <sup>63</sup>	'A greater US presence will provide Australia with welcome strategic reassurance in a more uncertain regional security environment, helping to deter any potential aggressor.' <sup>64</sup>
Michael Danby / Australia / (Former)	'China is not an expansionist power in the traditional sense but it is a totalitarian power that seeks to extend hegemony over its neighbourhood as a means of	'China is not an expansionist power in the traditional sense but it is a totalitarian power that seeks to extend hegemony over its neighbourhood as a means of

<sup>59</sup> Andrew Davies and Peter Jennings, 'Introduction,' in *Expanding Alliance: ANZUS Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Security* (The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2014), p. 5, available at: {[https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/expanding-alliance-anzus-cooperation-and-asiapacific-security/Strategy\\_ANZUS\\_cooperation.pdf](https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/expanding-alliance-anzus-cooperation-and-asiapacific-security/Strategy_ANZUS_cooperation.pdf)} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>60</sup> Andrew Davies, 'Alliance burden-sharing and force interoperability', in *Expanding Alliance: ANZUS Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Security* (The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2014), p. 23, available at: {[https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/expanding-alliance-anzus-cooperation-and-asiapacific-security/Strategy\\_ANZUS\\_cooperation.pdf](https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/expanding-alliance-anzus-cooperation-and-asiapacific-security/Strategy_ANZUS_cooperation.pdf)} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>61</sup> Rory Medcalf, Justin Jones, and Raoul Heinrichs, 'Crisis and confidence: Major powers and maritime security in Indo-Pacific Asia' (Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2011), p. 19, available at: {[http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Medcalf\\_and\\_Heinrichs%2C\\_Crisis\\_and\\_confidence-revised.pdf](http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Medcalf_and_Heinrichs%2C_Crisis_and_confidence-revised.pdf)} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>62</sup> Rory Medcalf, 'Malcolm Fraser's Asia delusion', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 69:1 (2015), p. 7.

<sup>63</sup> Andrew Shearer, 'Renewing an alliance', *Wall Street Journal* (17 November 2011) available at: {<http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203699404577041633002544456>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

Politician or bureaucrat	protecting itself. ... The principal counterweight to Chinese hegemony in our region is the US and its system of alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia. It is in Australia's most vital strategic interest that the US presence in our region is not weakened or undermined. <sup>65</sup>	protecting itself. ... The principal counterweight to Chinese hegemony in our region is the US and its system of alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia. It is in Australia's most vital strategic interest that the US presence in our region is not weakened or undermined. <sup>66</sup>
Josh Frydenberg / Australia / (Former) Politician or bureaucrat	'... America's primacy in the region plays an important stabilising role. It sends a clear message to China, we recognise your interests but you must play by the rules. ... Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula and the vexed issue of reunification with Taiwan, are all potential flash points. In each case American leadership is required to constructively engage with China. This can only be done from a position of strength. A US that is politically and militarily anchored in the region is best able to influence outcomes that are consistent with the region's long-term stability. This is exactly what many of our Asian partners need and want.' <sup>67</sup>	'China and the US are not destined for conflict. It would be wrong for Australia to act as if they are. Australia's national interest is best served by continuing to engage and encourage our long-standing ally, the US, to retain its primacy in the region. In so doing, an awakening China, with the opportunities it presents, will be consistent with our fundamental political, economic and strategic interests.' <sup>68</sup>

<i>Name / Country or region / Profession</i>	<i>Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia</i>	<i>Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia</i>
Kevin Rudd / Australia / (Former) Politician or bureaucrat	'The US alliance is the cornerstone of Australia's security and the continued presence of the US is the key to the stability of Asia. ... I think it's very important for those who discuss these questions to understand that so much of the economic growth that we have seen in East Asia and the Pacific in the last 30 years has come off the back of the strategic stability afforded to the region by the US's presence. ... The fact that economic growth can occur, and at such rapid levels and rates that we have seen in these recent decades, is because the problems of peace and security have not had to confront us on a grand scale. And that has been guaranteed so much by the presence of the US.' <sup>69</sup>	'... the position of the Australian government is that the strategic stability of East Asia and the Pacific remains anchored in the strategic presence of the United States of America. And furthermore, that is articulated, in part, through American alliance arrangements with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and other security arrangements with other countries in the region.' <sup>70</sup>
Paul Kelly / Australia / Journalist, Pundit or publicist	'For Australia's current leaders the dominant factor is the need for a firm, ongoing US commitment to Asia, given the region's rapid accumulation of economic and military power and its lack of institutions to ameliorate national rivalries.' <sup>71</sup>	'Meanwhile, domestic critics remain unpersuasive in their prescription that Australia should put more distance between itself and the United States in order to accommodate China. That advice is hardly a recipe for national success. It would be seen by China for what it is: weakness masquerading as cleverness. Withal, the United States needs to be aware of the intensifying strategic dilemma that Australia faces, and of the new debate it has spawned. But it should

<sup>65</sup> Michael Danby, Carl Ungerer, and Peter Khalil, 'No winners by appeasing China', *The Australian* (September 16 2010, available at: {<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/no-winners-by-appeasing-china/story-e6frg6zo-1225924276179>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Josh Frydenberg, 'Washington is integral to our region', *The Australian* (21 September 2010) available at: {<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/washington-is-integral-to-our-region/story-e6frg6ux-1225926937881?nk=987ea29957d621bd16b7078abd4f74dd>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Greg Sheridan, 'US involvement remains central to Asia-Pacific', *cogitASIA* (24 September 2010), available at: {<http://cogitasia.com/us-involvement-remains-central-to-asia-pacific/>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Paul Kelly, 'Australia's wandering eye', *The American Interest*, 8:5 (2013), available at: {<http://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/04/12/australias-wandering-eye/>} accessed 23 June 2015.

not be pessimistic. The task facing the current Australian political generation is unprecedented, yet history demonstrates that Australian leaders have a remarkable capacity to integrate their US alliance and their Asian engagements.<sup>72</sup>

Renato Cruz de Castro / Other East Asian countries / University scholar

‘In November 2011, the Obama administration announced a strategic pivot to Asia. ... Clearly, the United States is poised to ensure stability in Asia, protect its allies, and strategically balance, if not confront head-on, an assertive China.’<sup>73</sup>

‘China’s emergence and design to control the South China Sea present the Philippines and the United States a persistent, complex, and enigmatic security challenge. Simply reviving, strengthening, or transforming the Philippine-US security alliance may not be sufficient in the long run. This long-standing alliance needs to be linked with other US bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific/East Asia (US-Japan, US-ROK, and US-Australia). A coordinated four-way partnership will result in the convergence of views and well-thought-out alliance policies. These policies can redound to fostering a loose association of US allies in the Asia-Pacific that can pursue shared interests and values with other East Asian states. ... [a loose association of US allies] can goad the allies to participate actively and increase their responsibility in managing the regional security. More significantly, it can ensure that the United States remains Asia-Pacific’s guarantor of security, balancer of regional power, and champion of democratic principles in the 21st century.’<sup>74</sup>

Name / Country or region / Profession	Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia	Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia
Park Jae Jeok / Other East Asian countries / University scholar	‘... the hub-and-spoke alliance system serves as a hedge in the event that evolving multilateral gatherings (which the United States or/and its regional allies initiate) were to become disadvantageous to the current US-led order or should they ultimately fail. ... In many ways, multilateralism has not—and will not in the foreseeable future—substituted for existing US bilateral alliances in dealing with regional security problems.’ <sup>75</sup>	‘If the US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific provide both the United States and its regional allies with tangible order insurance benefits that cannot be obtained through other security arrangements, they may be well advised to uphold the continuation of the alliances unless and until a more viable security arrangement becomes available in the region.’ <sup>76</sup>
Yoon Young-kwan /Other East Asian countries / University scholar	‘Striking a grand compromise between the United States, the established power, and China, the rising power, would be an ideal solution. It might not be easy to strike a grand bargain between the two, but it would be the required starting-point to stabilize international relations in the region. ... It would be prudent for Chinese decision-makers to address the fact that the United States still maintains substantial military advantage over China. Considering the huge domestic challenges that the Chinese leaders are	‘Striking a grand compromise between the United States, the established power, and China, the rising power, would be an ideal solution. It might not be easy to strike a grand bargain between the two, but it would be the required starting-point to stabilize international relations in the region. ... It would be prudent for Chinese decision-makers to address the fact that the United States still maintains substantial military advantage over China. Considering the huge domestic challenges that the Chinese leaders are

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Renato Cruz de Castro, ‘The 21st century Philippine-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA): The Philippines’ policy in facilitating the Obama administration’s strategic pivot to Asia’, *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 26:4 (2014), p. 427.

<sup>74</sup> Renato Cruz de Castro, ‘Linking spokes together: The Philippines’ gambit of harnessing the United States’ alliances in its external balancing policy against an emergent China’, *Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies*, 29:1 (2014), pp. 162–163.

<sup>75</sup> Jae Jeok Park, ‘The US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Hedge against potential threats or an undesirable multilateral security order?’, *The Pacific Review*, 24:2 (2011), p. 148.

<sup>76</sup> Jae Jeok Park, ‘The persistence of the US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific: an order insurance explanation’, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 13:3 (2013), p. 364.

	facing, it is against China's own national interest to challenge the military status quo prematurely. This is why China had better respect the status quo in the security field, especially in terms of the East and South China Seas. <sup>77</sup>	facing, it is against China's own national interest to challenge the military status quo prematurely. This is why China had better respect the status quo in the security field, especially in terms of the East and South China Seas. <sup>78</sup>
Kim Changsu / Other East Asian countries / think tank scholar or analyst	'Over the past six decades, the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States has become one of the most successful military alliances in history, and has played a pivotal role in ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.' <sup>79</sup>	'It is true that there will be much uncertainty about the future of Northeast Asian regional order. If South Korea achieves reunification, the uncertainty will become much more serious. In this process, the ROK-US alliance will definitely serve as the guarantor of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian region, and as the most reliable partner in promoting the ROK's national interests during and after reunification, and ultimately world peace.' <sup>80</sup>
Simon Tay / Other East Asian countries / think tank scholar or analyst	'For older Asians, the role that the United States has played in Asia is apparent—whether it was the battles in the Korean and Vietnam wars or the wave of investment and consumer demand that has helped fuel Asia's economic growth or the guarantees of stability that have been a bedrock for peace in the region.' <sup>81</sup>	'The US presence has benefited Asia on balance and—so long as they do not seek to contain China or Asian regionalism, nor to dominate and exploit the region—Americans will be the essential partners in Asia's rise. ... The United States does need to engage Asia. The United States must have presence in the region and be present in regional processes and with key countries and on key issues.' <sup>82</sup>
Woo Jung-yeop / Other East Asian countries / think tank scholar or analyst	'South Korea has made clear that its proposal to promote institutionalized regional cooperation will be pursued as a complement to the U.S.-ROK alliance, thereby recognizing the essential contributions of the U.S.-led alliances in promoting regional stability.' <sup>83</sup>	'Given their overlapping goals of promoting cooperation and strengthening respect for international norms in Asia, Washington should support the Seoul Process under NAPCI and Seoul should support the U.S. rebalance.' <sup>84</sup>
Kim Sung-Han / Other East Asian countries / (Former) Politician or Bureaucrat	'In order to maintain great-power stability [in Northeast Asia], there needs to be a "balancer"—a role that the United States is likely to play because of its geopolitical power and geographical distance from Northeast Asia. The existence of a credible balancer provides a foundation for the emergence and endurance of regional organizations. This means that the ROK should consider the 'US factor' when searching for a Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism.' <sup>85</sup>	'US attention toward Asia should be "restored", either by expanding the security role of [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] or by participating in the [East Asia Summit]. During the Bush administration, the United States was preoccupied by the Middle East, but Asia-Pacific regionalism would not be possible without active US commitment. Of twenty-seven EU member states, twenty-one are NATO members, which means the United States can actively pursue Asia-Pacific regionalism while going beyond its traditional hub-and-spoke approach to expand its alliance network in Asia.' <sup>86</sup>
Park Jae-Kyung / Other East	'Most countries in the region want peace, stability and economic prosperity, and most understand that these goals are better guaranteed with an active US regional presence.' <sup>87</sup>	'The point is that Asian allies and partners of the United States should remain cognizant of the many positive US contributions to Asia that have provided for

<sup>77</sup> Yoon Young-kwan, 'Will Europe's Past be East Asia's Future?', *Politique Étrangère*, 1 (2014), pp. 8–9.

<sup>78</sup> Yoon, 'Wille Europe's Past', pp. 8–9.

<sup>79</sup> In Hyo Seol and Changsu Kim, 'The future of the ROK-US alliance: Suggestions based on considerations of the reunification and post-reunification', *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 25:4 (2013), p. 531.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 545.

<sup>81</sup> Simon S. C. Tay, *Asia Alone: The Dangerous Post-crisis Divide from America* (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), p. 179.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 171–173.

<sup>83</sup> Scott Snyder and Woo Jung-yeop, 'The U.S. Rebalance and the Seoul Process: How to Align U.S. and ROK Visions for Cooperation in East Asia', Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper (January 2015), p. 5.

<sup>84</sup> Snyder and Woo, 'The U.S. Rebalance', p. 1.

<sup>85</sup> Sung-han Kim, 'Northeast Asian regionalism in Korea', Council on Foreign Relations, (December, 2009), p. 1.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>87</sup> Jae-Kyung Park, 'The US pivot to Asia and Asia's pivot to the US', *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, 173 (19 July 2012), available at: {<http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb173.pdf>} accessed 23 June 2015.

Asian countries  
/ (Former)  
Politician or  
bureaucrat

regional peace and prosperity. In turn, as a Pacific power, the United States relies upon reciprocity for its own interests from its many regional friends, partners, and allies throughout the region.<sup>88</sup>

Hong Seok-hyun /  
Rest of the world/  
Journalist,  
pundit or  
publicist

‘Overall, the actions of America, as the dominant outside force in East Asia over the past century, have contributed to peace, stability and prosperity in the region ... The precedents for a positive role for the United States hint at the potential for a new order that fully integrates China ... I am skeptical that the countries in East Asia can create a new geopolitical order all on their own. ... the U.S. presence in East Asia over the last century is a geopolitical constant in East Asia and venturing an East Asian order without such an honest broker as a stakeholder runs the risk of returning to the old patterns of rivalry and conflict.’<sup>89</sup>

‘The U.S. has responded to China’s rise with a policy of “Asian rebalancing,” or what is known as the “pivot to Asia.” I believe this policy is an important one and that the new economic importance of East Asia in the world demands that Washington focus its resources more on responding to the emergence of East Asia. ... The U.S. must play a leadership role in encouraging a common agenda for collaboration in East Asia and checking narrow-minded nationalism and chauvinism. ... Also the United States should continue to play a leading role in addressing in a multilateral format potential trouble spots such as North Korea’s nuclear program. ... I hope that China will welcome America’s role in East Asia...’<sup>90</sup>

<i>Name / Country or region / Profession</i>	<i>Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia</i>	<i>Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia</i>
James Manicom / Rest of the world / University scholar	‘The possession and exercise of American seapower is integral to American hegemony in East Asia. American regional hegemony has kept East Asia stable despite concerns of growing instability caused by rising military spending, growing energy needs, disputed territories and unresolved historical legacies. The possession of seapower is embodied by the presence of the United States military in region, particularly at sea.’ <sup>91</sup>	‘The article argued that it is possible for China and the United States to sidestep disputes on navigational questions despite the zero-sum nature of their legal interpretations. The two could develop an ‘agree-to-disagree’ formula on military operations in the EEZ. The proposals outlined herein reflect a middle ground between those that advocate for US retrenchment from East Asia and those that advocate for a stronger US regional presence constrained by budget cuts. Arriving at an agree-to-disagree formula reduces the risk profile confronting American ships and personnel, thereby undercutting part of the case for retrenchment. Although China will have to accept the possession of American seapower, if China’s emergence is welcomed—rather than resisted by the United States—it may be possible for the two powers to share the burden of policing East Asia’s maritime commons along with partnered regional states in due course.’ <sup>92</sup>
Xenia Dormandy / Rest of the world / think tank Scholar or analyst	‘Attempts by the United States to rationalize its troop presence in allied countries, particularly by reducing the presence of personnel in Japan and South Korea, could be perceived by allies as a weakening of American resolve and commitment to their security and to regional stability. Fearing a diluted American security commitment, allies could be driven to increase their own military expenditure and capabilities, prompting a regional arms race or causing them to reach out to other strong players such	‘As America debates its “Pacific Century” and Europeans fret that they are forgotten or overlooked, it is worth examining opportunities for new areas of cooperation that build on the US pivot. Such a realignment need not be solely about Europe and Asia as competing poles of American attention, but also about how America can work with its traditional NATO allies in Asia. ... There are also opportunities for the United States and its Atlantic allies to build common strategies to further integrate China into a

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Hong Seok-hyun, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of the American Role in Asia’, *Korea Joongang Daily* (29 February 2016), available at: { <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3015579> } accessed 22 May 2016.

<sup>90</sup> Hong, ‘The Rise of China’.

<sup>91</sup> James Manicom, ‘China and American seapower in East Asia: Is accommodation possible?’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 37:3 (2014), p. 351.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., pp. 366–367.

Karl-Heinz Kamp / Rest of the world / (former) politician or bureaucrat	<p>as China. It could also strengthen the case of commentators who argue that US power is in decline. Moreover China could interpret these moves as a sign of American weakness, thereby reducing the effect of American deterrence policies. Therefore, a rebalancing of assets would have to be combined with a sophisticated communications strategy that emphasizes ongoing American commitment, highlights US capabilities (rather than troop numbers) in the region, and is matched by new and expanded security cooperation, potentially around non-traditional security threats. US engagement in other areas also sends a strong message that America will continue to play an important regional role.<sup>93</sup></p> <p>‘... NATO has to consider new ways of transatlantic burden-sharing. If Washington focuses more on Asia, and if Europe benefits from America’s stabilizing presence in Asia, then Europeans should take on a greater role in other regions on Europe’s borders.’<sup>95</sup></p>	<p>liberal, rules-based international order. Despite their differing interests and perspectives there is room for discussion about how they can cooperate with China on addressing issues of global concern. The United States also sees a potentially strong role for NATO in peace-building and stability operations. NATO and EU members have much expertise in such areas as security-sector reform that could provide considerable benefits to the region and provide valuable areas of collaboration and cooperation with Asian states.<sup>94</sup></p> <p>‘The relevance of the Asia-Pacific and the implicit challenges to the Euro-Atlantic community make it plain that NATO’s European members must do more than passively take note of the U.S. reorientation, and should therefore actively support it.’<sup>96</sup></p>
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Name / Country or region / Profession	Criterion: Believes that the US military guarantees stability in East Asia	Criterion: Works actively to influence policy to strengthen the US military presence in East Asia
Mike Winnerstig / Rest of the world/ Think tank scholar or analyst	<p>‘Should the USA leave Europe there will be problems because there is a suspicion of both Germany and Russia in other countries. The American presence functions as reinsurance [<i>återförsäkring</i>]. Should they leave Asia it would be even worse. In that case, countries like Japan, South Korea and Australia—countries that today are living under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella—would be forced to rearm and maybe get their own nuclear weapons. [A number of Swedish opposition parties’ demand that the US should withdraw its military from overseas bases] would not lead to peace and stability, rather the opposite.’<sup>97</sup></p>	<p>‘Should the USA leave Europe there will be problems because there is a suspicion of both Germany and Russia in other countries. The American presence functions as reinsurance [<i>återförsäkring</i>]. Should they leave Asia it would be even worse. In that case, countries like Japan, South Korea and Australia—countries that today are living under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella—would be forced to rearm and maybe get their own nuclear weapons. [A number of Swedish opposition parties’ demand that the US should withdraw its military from overseas bases] would not lead to peace and stability, rather the opposite.’<sup>98</sup></p>
Geoff Dyer / Rest of the world/ Journalist, Pundit or publicist	<p>‘If China and its neighbors all believe that the US has a credible plan for a conflict, this both acts as deterrence against any eventual Chinese adventurism and reduces the risk that anxious Asians will start their own arms races with Beijing. ... If constructed in the right way, Washington’s web of friends and allies in the region could provide a parallel layer of deterrence against a Chinese push to dominate the region.’<sup>99</sup></p>	<p>‘A large number of the tensions with China in recent years are rooted in the Chinese perception that the US is in decline—a view that was almost uniform in 2008 and which is still strong today. The best way to sway Chinese behavior and to deter adventurism is to demonstrate that the US is not going anywhere. That means maintaining a robust military presence in the</p>

<sup>93</sup> Xenia Dormandy, ‘Prepared for future threats? US defence partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region’, Chatham House (June 2012), p. 33, available at: {<http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/pr0612dormandy.pdf>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>95</sup> Karl-Heinz Kamp, ‘NATO Needs to Follow the U.S. Pivot to Asia’, Carnegie Europe (March 27, 2013), available at: {<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=51314>}, accessed 22 May 2016.

<sup>96</sup> Karl-Heinz Kamp, ‘NATO’s European members, too, should pivot to Asia’, Europe’s World (Spring 2014), available at: { <http://europesworld.org/2014/02/24/natos-european-members-too-should-pivot-to-asia/#.V0H6wvkrLrc> }, accessed 22 May 2016.

<sup>97</sup> Fredrik Westerlund, ‘Världen håller andan [The world is holding its breath]’, *Neo*, 4 (2010), available at: {<http://magasinetneo.se/artiklar/varlden-haller-andan/>} accessed 23 June 2015.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Geoff A. Dyer, *The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China: and How America Can Win* (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), pp. 116, 123.

region, although without the sort of rapid buildup that would provoke China.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 279.