**APPENDIX I: Data**

**Table I.1 Data Sources and Summary Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Source | Mean (SD) | Min | Max | N= |
| Votes In Alignment[[1]](#footnote-1) | http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp Author’s calculations |  |  |  | 7405 |
| Votes Not In Alignment | http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp Author’s calculations |  |  |  | 10067 |
| Votes Into Alignment | http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp Author’s calculations |  |   |   | 474 |
| Votes From Alignment | http://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp Author’s calculations |  |  |  | 367 |
| *Imports* | <http://cow.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/Trade/Trade.html> (Billions of Current USD) | 3.66(18.59) | 0 | 363.99 | 16845 |
| *Exports* | <http://cow.la.psu.edu/COW2%20Data/Trade/Trade.html> (Billions of Current USD) | 2.76(12.17) | 0 | 229.36 | 16845 |
| *Ln(GDP)* | http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators | 23.37(2.43) | 16.40 | 30.29 | 16663 |
| *GDP pc* | <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> (Thousands of Current USD) | 9.19(16.71) | 0 | 186.24 | 17472 |
| *Democracy* | <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> | 3.31(6.45) | -10 | 10 | 14606 |
| *Democracy (FH)* | <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VOdQDXysWJo> | 3.36(1.97) | 1 | 7 | 17336 |
| *Diplomacy[[2]](#footnote-2)* | Bader (2015) | 0.17(0.42) | 0 | 2 | 15371 |
| *UN Diplomats* | Panke (2013) | 13.33(15.46) | 0 | 142 | 17472 |
| *Regime* | Geddes et al. (2014) | 0.018(0.133) | 0 | 1 | 17472 |

**Table I**.**2** Robustness Checks – Trade Shares and Struver (2014a) Table 2 replication.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | I Total Trade | II GDP | Struver (2014a: 14) Table 2 | III |
| Imports\_Non\_Alignment (Share) | -0.618(0.96) | -0.177(0.32) | Diplomatic Exchange | 0.098(0.62) |
| Exports\_Non\_Alignment (Share) | -0.211(0.20) | 0.971(0.41) | Partnership | 1.016†(1.85) |
| Diplomacy\_Non\_Alignment | 0.113(1.29) | 0.022(0.27) | Shared IGO Membership | 0.212(1.09) |
| Diplomats\_Non\_Alignment | 0.028\*(2.49) | 0.007(0.68) | Trade Dependence[[3]](#footnote-3) |  |
| ln(GDP)\_Non\_Alignment | -0.278\*\*(2.98) |  | Export Dependence | -0.010(0.49) |
| GDPpc\_Non\_Alignment | -0.083\*\*(2.69) | -0.122\*\*(3.65) | Import Dependence | 0.069(1.48) |
| Democracy\_Non\_Alignment | -0.095\*\*(6.21) | -0.102\*\*(6.53) | Aid Recipient | 0.120(0.61) |
| Imports\_Alignment (Share) | 0.823(0.70) | 0.131(0.04) | Arms Recipient | 0.002(0.63) |
| Exports\_Alignment (Share) | -1.184(1.28) | -3.649(1.56) | Regime Similarity | 0.404\*\*(4.22) |
| Diplomacy\_Alignment | 0.070(0.42) | 0.196(1.05) | Political Globalization | 0.090(1.12) |
| Diplomats\_Alignment | 0.005(0.86) | 0.038\*(2.11) | Social Globalization | 0.062(0.95) |
| ln(GDP)\_Alignment | 0.256\*\*(3.97) |  | Economic Globalization | -0.033(0.44) |
| GDPpc\_Alignment | 0.026(1.23) | 0.007\*(2.46) | Capabilities (Population) | 27.30\*(2.38) |
| Democracy\_Alignment | -0.008(0.39) | 0.000(0.01) | Capabilities (Resources) | -98.77\*(2.24) |
| Constant (Non-Alignment Dummy (t-1)) | 4.623\*(2.12) | -1.442\*\*(3.78) | Distance | -0.000\*\*(2.68) |
|  |  |  | Non-Alignment Movement | 0.722(1.40) |
|  |  |  | Years (p75) | -0.873\*\*(8.28) |
|  |  |  | Constant | -2.486\*\*(2.75) |
| N | 6,821 | 6,982 |  | 1,577 |
| Wald χ2 | 447.23 | 278.13 |  | 328.55 |
| P> χ2 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |  | 0.0000 |

Logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by country, UN resolution and time. Absolute *z* scores in parentheses. \*\* significant at 1% level, \* significant at 5% level, † significant at 10% level. ‡

**Table I.3**: Robustness Checks (No Controls, Oil, OECD, Taiwan)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | I | II | III | IV | V | VI |
| Imports\_Non\_Alignment  | -0.806\*\*(2.68) | -0.243\*\*(3.42) | -0.287\*\*(3.20) | -0.244\*\*(3.41) |  | -0.222\*\*(2.73) |
| Exports\_Non\_Alignment  | 0.163\*\*(3.31) | 0.096\*\*(6.07) | 0.119\*\*(4.31) | 0.096\*\*(5.88) |  | 0.091\*\*(27.05) |
| Resource\_Imports\_Non\_Alignment  |  |  |  |  | -2.154\*(2.24) | -1.241(0.93) |
| Resources\_Exports\_Non\_Alignment  |  |  |  |  | 0.099\*(2.45) | 0.078(1.28) |
| Diplomacy\_Non\_Alignment | 0.206†(1.95) | 0.126\*\*(11.22) | 0.123†(1.75) | 0.122†(1.83) | 0.159\*\*(5.88) | 0.129\*(2.02) |
| Diplomats\_Non\_Alignment | 0.023\*(2.14) | 0.031\*(2.52) | 0.032\*(2.48) | 0.031\*(2.48) | 0.030\*\*(2.61) | 0.031\*(2.56) |
| ln(GDP)\_Non\_Alignment |  | -0.221\*\*(2.88) | -0.243\*\*(3.18) | -0.221\*\*(2.89) | -0.245\*\*(3.22) | -0.225\*\*(2.95) |
| GDPpc\_Non\_Alignment |  | -0.030(1.39) | -0.056\*(2.23) | -0.030(1.40) | -0.038(1.58) | -0.033(1.54) |
| Democracy\_Non\_Alignment |  | -0.084\*\*(6.07) | -0.090\*\*(6.41) | -0.083\*\*(6.19) | -0.082\*\*(6.05) | -0.081\*\*(5.86) |
| Regime\_Non\_Alignment |  | 0.717\*(2.26) | 0.715\*(2.35) | 0.715\*(2.29) | 0.648\*(2.17) | 0.707\*(2.23) |
| OECD\_Non\_Alignment |  | -1.660\*(2.31) |  | -1.665\*(2.32) | -1.964\*(2.36) | -1.645\*(2.27) |
| Taiwan\_Non\_Alignment |  |  | 0.021(0.09) | -0.039(0.18) | -0.016(0.07) | -0.021(0.10) |
| Imports\_Alignment  | 0.123(1.07) | -0.000(0.05) | -0.002(0.29) | 0.000(0.08) |  | -0.015(0.21) |
| Exports\_Alignment  | 0.000(0.03) | 0.013(0.22) | 0.002(0.37) | 0.010(0.17) |  | 0.000(0.04) |
| Resource\_Imports\_Alignment  |  |  |  |  | 0.049(0.54) | 0.663(0.83) |
| Resource\_Exports\_Alignment  |  |  |  |  | 0.070(0.53) | 0.089(0.72) |
| Diplomacy\_Alignment | 0.249\*(2.14) | 0.056(0.33) | 0.015(0.07) | 0.010(0.04) | -0.019(0.09) | 0.002(0.01) |
| Diplomats\_Alignment | 0.041\*(2.05) | 0.004(0.50) | 0.006(0.61) | 0.006(0.59) | 0.010(1.16) | 0.005(0.49) |
| ln(GDP)\_Alignment |  | 0.271\*\*(3.45) | 0.260\*\*(3.75) | 0.265\*\*(3.65) | 0.243\*\*(3.48) | 0.258\*\*(3.52) |
| GDPpc\_Alignment |  | 0.023(1.07) | 0.024(1.14) | 0.023(1.09) | 0.024(1.11) | 0.022(1.07) |
| Democracy\_Alignment |  | -0.009(0.41) | -0.004(0.19) | -0.006(0.25) | -0.007(0.29) | -0.004(0.18) |
| Regime\_Alignment |  | 0.683(1.19) | 0.671(1.15) | 0.671(1.15) | 0.671(1.14) | 0.671(1.16) |
| OECD\_Alignment |  | -0.579(0.82) |  | -0.609(0.84) | -0.594(0.85) | -0.566(0.76) |
| Taiwan\_Non\_Alignment |  |  | -0.475(0.82) | -0.484(0.83) | -0.487(0.85) | -0.486(0.84) |
| Alignment\_Dummy (t-1) | 1.698\*\*(5.81) | -3.937\*(2.35) | -3.661\*(2.47) | -3.769\*(2.47) | -3.320\*(2.36) | -3.617\*(2.37) |
| Constant (Non-Alignment Dummy (t-1)) | -2.134\*\*(7.51) | 3.156†(1.95) | 3.644\*(2.28) | 3.168\*(1.98) | 3.693\*(2.32) | 3.242\*(2.05) |
| Fixed Effects | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| N | 8,464 | 6,982 | 6,982 | 6,982 | 7,126 | 6,982 |
| Wald χ2 | 1266.75 | 1324.45 | 782.52 | 1593.35 | 693.50 | 598.24 |
| P> χ2 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |

Logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by country, UN resolution and time (except model I where robust standard errors are clustered by time and country). Absolute *z* scores in parentheses. \*\* significant at 1% level, \* significant at 5% level, † significant at 10% level. ‡ N is larger in Model II than Model I as some countries had observations for trade in 1999 but not 2000.

1. As suggested in Brazys and Panke (2015) UNGA voting absences can be strategic and, as China was absent for none of the votes in our study, we consider absenteeism by a country to be a state of non-alignment with China. Additionally, we only consider cases where China itself had a stable preference, i.e. where China’s vote in *t* on resolution *r* was the same as in *t-1*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. High-level visits coded from data supplements to the *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. We omit Trade Dependence as it is a linear combination of Export Dependence and Import Dependence. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)