

# Online supplementary material for "Realists and Idealists in QCA", Political Analysis, forthcoming

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In order for a minimally necessary disjunction of minimally sufficient conjuncts to be causally interpretable, at least three criteria must be fulfilled: (a) the disjunction must pass the necessity consistency threshold; (b) each conjunction must pass the sufficiency consistency threshold; (c) there cannot be model ambiguity.

Column 'Causally interpretable' summarizes if all three conditions are met. Column 'Cons. Nec.' reports the consistency value of the most parsimonious solution formula interpreted as a necessary condition. Column 'Model ambiguity' indicates if there is model ambiguity and column 'Number models' reports how many models there are. In case of model ambiguity, no consistency value is reported. Column 'Notes' provides further information on peculiarities of some of the results for specific studies. This includes situation in which either no or all truth table rows pass the consistency threshold and when the prime implicant chart is too large to calculate all solution models. In none of these scenarios can a causally interpretable model obtained and the study in question coded accordingly in column 'Causally interpretable'.

**Outcome Y, threshold 0.9**

Study	Causally intepretable	Cons. Nec.	Model ambiguity	Number models	Notes
AVD	0	0.769	0		
BAN	0	0.809	0		
BAS	0		1	2	
CEB	0		1	2	
DAR	0		1	13	
DAV	0	0.478	0		no disjunction
EMM	0		1	2	
EPP	0		1	9	
FIS	0	0.885	0		
HAM	0	0.730	0		
ISH	0		1	9	
KAR	0		1	33	
LIL	0		1		PI chart too large
MEL	0	0.668	0		
MET	1	1	0		atomic condition solution
PAH	0		1		PI chart too large
PAL	0		1	10	
PAR	0		1	4	
SCH	0	0.192	0		no disjunction
THO	0		1	9	
VER	0	0.884	0		
<b>sum</b>	<b>1</b>				

**Outcome Y, threshold 0.75**

Study	Causally intepretable	Cons. Nec.	Model ambiguity	Number models	Notes
AVD	1	0.769	0		
BAN	0		1	2	
BAS	0		1	2	
CEB	1	0.815	0		
DAR	0		1	13	
DAV	0		1	2	
EMM	0		1	6	
EPP	1	0.917	0		atomic condition solution
FIS	1	0.885	0		
HAM	0	0.874	0		one conjunct cons<.75
ISH	0		1	3	
KAR	0		1	52	
LIL	0		1		PI chart too large
MEL	0		1	2	
MET	1	1	0		atomic condition solution
PAH	0		1	15	
PAL	0		1	10	
PAR	0		1	4	
SCH	1	0.861	0		no conjunctions
THO	0		1	4	
VER	0		na		all rows above threshold
<b>sum</b>	<b>6</b>				

**Outcome  $\neg Y$ , threshold 0.9**

Study	Causally intepretable	Cons. Nec.	Model ambiguity	Number models	Notes
AVD	0	0.585	0		
BAN	0		1	3	
BAS	1	1	0		
CEB	0		1	3	
DAR	0		1	11	
DAV	0	0.688	0		atomic condition solution
EMM	0		1	112	
EPP	0		1	2	
FIS	0		na		no row above threshold
HAM	0		na		no row above threshold
ISH	0		1	3	
KAR	0		1	134	
LIL	0		1		PI chart too large
MEL	0		1	2	
MET	1	1	0		atomic condition solution
PAH	0		1	3	
PAL	0		1	6	
PAR	0		1	4	
SCH	0		na		no row above threshold
THO	0		na		no row above threshold
VER	0	0.375	0		no disjunction
<b>sum</b>	<b>2</b>				

**Outcome  $\neg Y$ , threshold 0.75**

Study	Causally intepretable	Cons. Nec.	Model ambiguity	Number models	Notes
AVD	1	0.864	0		
BAN	0		1	12	
BAS	0		1	2	
CEB	1	.906	0		
DAR	0		1	11	
DAV	1	0.758	0		
EMM	0		1	112	
EPP	1	0.922	0		
FIS	1	0.891	0		no disjunction
HAM	1	0.75	0		atomic condition solution
ISH	0		1	3	
KAR	0		1	252	
LIL	0		1		PI chart too large
MEL	1	0.767	0		
MET	1	1	0		atomic condition solution
PAH	0	0.978	0		one conjunction cons<.75
PAL	0		1	3	
PAR	0		1	4	
SCH	0		na		no row above threshold
THO	0		1	12	
VER	0	1	0		conjunction cons <.75
<b>sum</b>	<b>8</b>				

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